I suspect that few today even know who Mark Fidel Kools is — which is, perhaps, perfectly understandable. Mr. Kools is the illegitimate son of John Kools. John was a gangster who operated in the Watts section of Los Angeles, California, and, as a consequence of his domestic terrorism as a gangster, was sent to prison. The State of California released John from prison in 1974 — but not before falling in with another gang, which we today call the Moslem Brotherhood — an organization funded by the Saudi Kingdom as part of their Wahhabist invasion of western civilization. John Kools, having converted to Islam (at the taxpayer’s expense), changed his name to Akbar.
At the time of John’s release from prison, Mark was three years old. By then, his mother had also converted to Islam and married William Bilal, also a convert to Islam. Mrs. Bilal is known today as Quran Bilal. With apparent pride in her former lover’s accomplishments, Mrs. Bilal changed Mark’s name to Hasan Karim Akbar.
In 1988, Hasan began attending the University of California (Davis); he graduated nine years later with bachelor’s degrees in Aeronautical and Mechanical Engineering. During his somewhat elongated college experience, Hasan participated in the Army Reserve Officer’ Training Corps (ROTC), but he was not offered a commission upon his graduation in 1997. Deeply in debt, Hasan subsequently enlisted in the US Army.
A few years later, Hasan served as a sergeant with the 326th Engineer Battalion, 101st Airborne. In 2003, the Army staged elements of the division at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait. In the early morning hours of 23 March 2003, Akbar cut off the generator that powered the lights inside the encampment. He then tossed four fragmentation grenades into three tents where other soldiers were sleeping, causing numerous injuries. In the resulting chaos, Akbar used his service rifle to kill Army Captain Christopher S. Seifert, an intelligence officer whom Akbar shot in the back. Air Force Major Gregory L. Stone was killed from one of the four hand grenades.
An Army court-martial convicted Akbar of murder and sentenced him to death. Having exhausted all of his appeals, he remains on death row at the disciplinary barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. All that remains, in this case, is presidential authority to carry out the execution.
Also awaiting execution at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is former Army major Nidal Hasan. We all know what he did at Fort Hood, Texas. While awaiting his execution, Hassan petitioned the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant for citizenship. Whether he remains in close contact with former sergeant Akbar is unknown, but it is plausible that they offer one another comfort and encouragement since they are both confined on death row.
Carrying forward in my snake hunt, I similarly expect that few people today know who Ali Abdul Saoud Mohamed is. Mr. Mohamed has a long and interesting history working against the interests of the United States of America and its people. He was born in Egypt in 1952. For some period of time until 1984, Ali Mohamed served in the Egyptian army as an intelligence officer, reaching the rank of colonel. From around 1979 through 1984, he was instrumental in training anti-Soviet fighters en route to Afghanistan.
Afterward, back in Egypt, Mr. Mohamed went to the US Embassy in Cairo, asked to speak to the CIA Station Chief. During this meeting, Mohamed volunteered his services as an informant against the emerging Al-Qaeda organization. Apparently, the CIA was unaware of Mohamed’s former association with the Egyptian Army or his involvement with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Despite the CIA’s suspicions that he might be an Islamist agent, they appointed him as a junior CIA intelligence officer and tasked him with collecting information about the Islamist movements. One of his first tasks was to infiltrate a mosque with known ties to Hezbollah. Mohamed affiliated with the mosque but soon informed the Imam that he was working for the United States as a spy. He may have suggested that this situation would be an excellent opportunity to feed the Americans misinformation about Islamist movements.
As it turned out, Mohamed was not the only informant in that particular mosque. There was another who informed the CIA that Mohamed was a double agent. The CIA subsequently dismissed Mohamed and took measures to bar him from entering the United States. However, Mohamed somehow evaded the ban and once more went to the United States. He married an American woman, became a US citizen, and joined the U. S. Army.
After Mohamed’s initial training, he found his way into the US Special Forces. In that organization, his leaders encouraged him to pursue advanced degrees in Islamic Studies. They wanted Mohamed to become an instructor so that he could teach courses involving the Middle East. They thought he was a pretty sharp tack, not knowing he was a former Egyptian army colonel. Mohamed was a “self-starter,” they said.
Throughout his service in the US Army, Mohamed collected information from the Army. He made copies of technical manuals, doctrinal publications, and training manuals to inform Al-Qaeda better how to defeat the American armed forces. He provided information about weapons, tactical formations, and Special Forces operations.
In 1988, Mohamed took a 30-day leave from the Army and returned to the middle east. He informed his superiors that he wanted to fight in Afghanistan. When he returned, he bragged about killing Soviets, and to back up his claim, he showed people his “war relics.” Alarm bells sounded in the head of his immediate commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Anderson, who initiated action to have Mohamed investigated by Army Intelligence. Anderson’s reports went unanswered; no investigation was ever conducted (that we know about) — which led Anderson to wonder if Mohamed was part of the US clandestine services.
Mohamed left the US Army in 1989, finding work with a defense contractor providing security at a factory that produced Trident Missile systems. When he wasn’t doing that, he began training Middle Eastern refugees and American-born Islamists in such areas as demolitions, including those who were later associated with the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, Mahmud Abouhalima and Ramzi Yousef.
In the early 1990s, Mohamed returned to Afghanistan. He trained Al-Qaeda volunteers in unconventional warfare techniques, including kidnapping, assassination, and aircraft hijacking, which he had learned during Special Forces training. According to some, Mohamed even trained a wealthy Saudi fighter named Osama bin-Laden and later helped bin-Laden plan the US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Mohamed became the “go-to” guy when bin-Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri needed to know or understand something about the US Army. In 1993, Mohamed toured California with Zawahiri, who posed as a Kuwait Red Crescent Society representative. Together, the two men hoped to raise money from Islamic-American charities to fund Jihadi movements (otherwise known as global terrorism).
In May 1993, Mohamed became an FBI informant in San Jose, California. In exchange for worthless information, Mohamed provided Al-Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad with valuable American intelligence. It was also in 1993 that Mohamed was nearly arrested in Canada while meeting with a representative of Osama bin-Laden. He escaped arrest by telling Canadian authorities that he was an FBI informant, and they promptly released him.
After the 1998 bombings, FBI agents searched Mohamed’s apartment and discovered his complicity in terrorist activities. Such evidence included plans and scripts of Al-Qaeda training, plans to meet with Osama bin-Laden, and so forth. On the day Mohamed was scheduled to give testimony in another case, FBI agents arrested him.
Federal authorities charged Mohamed with several offenses, including five counts of conspiracy to kill US nationals, conspiracy to kidnap, murder, and maim others outside of the United States, conspiracy to kill government employees, conspiracy to destroy US buildings and property, and conspiracy to destroy or disrupt utilities vital to the security of the United States. Mohamed faced the death penalty, but he made a deal with the federal prosecutor. He would plead guilty in exchange for life in prison. To date, Ali Mohamed has not appeared in court. He remains in federal custody at an undisclosed location.
These are the snakes among us. How many of these snakes exist is — unknown. What the US government is doing about the snakes inside America is equally obscure. It would be comforting to have some indication that the United States is on top of the problem rather than unwittingly playing a role in global terrorism. Still, I cannot comment about that possibility, either. However, here’s what we know: all three men are US citizens, all three are Moslems, all three murdered American citizens, and all three remain alive at the taxpayer’s expense. Pest control specialists say that if you see one cockroach, there are 50 more that you don’t see. I wonder if the same ratio applies to venomous snakes.
In a televised interview, Ali Mohamed explained his rationale for becoming a terrorist: “Islam without political dominance cannot survive.” If this isn’t good advice, then I’ve never heard it.
Atwan, A. B. The Secret History of Al-Qaeda. UC Berkley, 2006.
Bergen, P. Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden. Free Press, 2001.
Esposito, J. L. Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. Oxford University, 2002.
Mura, A. The Symbolic Scenarios of Islamism: A study in Islamic political thought. Routledge Publishing, 2015.
In the eighty or so years following independence from Spain, Panama was a province of Gran Colombia, a free association begun in 1821. From that point onward, the people living in Panama made several dozen attempts to withdraw from their Colombian alliance, including the so-called Thousand Days War (1899-1902). For the Panamanians, it was a struggle for land rights more than an issue of sovereignty. Observing these machinations and with a growing interest in constructing a canal across the Isthmus, the United States under President Theodore Roosevelt began to engineer the separation of Panama from Colombia.
In November 1903, Panama declared its independence from Colombia. To constrain Colombia from sending naval and ground forces to Panama, the United States re-introduced a Marine Corps presence in Panama under future commandant, Major John A. Lejeune. Of course, this was not the Marines’ first deployment to Panama. In 1856, Marines went to Panama to guarantee the security of American fortune hunters while en route to California via the Isthmus.
Given Roosevelt’s interest in constructing a canal, Major Lejeune realized that a Marine presence in Panama would continue. So, with that foresight, Lejeune established a permanent barracks there in 1904. Between 1904 and 1911, the principal mission of the Marine Corps was to safeguard the canal while under construction (and its workers/executive managers). Marines established a permanent barracks at the US Navy’s submarine base at Coco Solo in 1923 — known simply as Marine Barracks (MB), Panama. From that year forward, the size of the barracks expanded and contracted according to the needs of the Navy.
In February 1945, the MB had 36 officers, three warrant officers, and 1,571 enlisted men at its peak strength. The Marines also experienced several “re-designations” and relocations. In 1943, Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) consolidated all Marines serving in Panama under the Marine Barracks, Fifteenth Naval District, Rodman, Canal Zone. In 1987, HQMC renamed the barracks as Marine Corps Security Force Company (MCSFC), Panama.
Responsibility for the Canal Zone (CZ) security fell to the U. S. Army under the Commanding General, U. S. Army South (CG USASouth), headquartered in San Antonio, Texas. USASouth became a subordinate command of the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), headquartered in Miami, Florida, as one of eleven unified combatant commands. The mission assigned to the Marine Security Forces was in providing security for U. S. Navy installations in Panama.
Panama — US Relations
The agreement between Panama and the United States vis-à-vis the canal was that the United States would lease a twelve-mile swath of land across the Isthmus for 100 years, construct the channel, and control it as sovereign US territory during the period of the lease. Over time, with technological advances in ship sizes, the canal proved no longer adequate for the largest naval and maritime vessels. Within this period, relations between the US and Panama were not always amiable. Marine battalion landing teams infrequently went to Panama as a show of force and a demonstration that the United States intended to exercise its control over canal zone operations, particularly during periods of political and civil unrest.
By agreement between Panama and the US in 1977, complete control of the Panama Canal would shift to the Panamanians in 2000. In 1981, however, General Omar Torrijos, then serving as “Maximum Leader of the Panamanian Revolution,” the man who negotiated this treaty, died in a plane crash — which opened the door for General Manuel Antonio Noriega to succeed him as a revolutionary leader and de facto head of state in Panama. During Noriega’s tenure, five men served as puppet heads of state to give Noriega’s dictatorship international credibility.
General Noriega consolidated his power in Panama by seizing control of the armed forces, renaming them as Panamanian Defense Forces. By 1988, Noriega controlled the national police, the army and paramilitary organizations, the air forces, and the small naval force — in total (on paper), around 15,000 men. In terms of combat troops, Noriega could field roughly 3,500 men organized as two light battalions in each of Panama’s thirteen military zones, ten independent companies, a cavalry squadron, and a handful of “special operations” forces. Noriega’s air force consisted of 50 aircraft, and his navy operated twelve small vessels. He also controlled 14 battalions of civilian laborers, the so-called Dignity Battalions, which consisted of unemployed workers shepherded by low-ranking officers and NCOs.
Manuel Noriega was a caudillo in the finest tradition of post-Spanish petty dictators. He was arrogant, corrupt, dangerous, and stupid. His arrogance led him to misjudge the United States’ continuing interest in the Canal Zone (CZ). While the United States turned a blind eye to Noriega’s involvement in narcotics, Noriega’s time was fast running out. In January 1988, two federal grand juries in Florida indicted Noriega on racketeering and drug trafficking charges. Subsequently, puppet-President Eric Arturo Delvalle attempted to depose Noriega, but Noriega engineered Delvalle’s dismissal. Civil disorder one more returned to Panama, with threats made to the lives and safety of American personnel and military installations.
The Culture War
As relations between the US and Panama deteriorated, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a warning order to various military commands ordinarily responsible for the security of the canal zone. Marines at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, began updating their contingency plans for Panama. With only one MCSFC in Panama, a platoon from the Marine Corps Security Force Battalion (at Norfolk, Virginia), known as a Fleet Anti-terrorist Security Team (FAST), was quickly dispatched to reinforce the Marines of MCSFC Panama.
Of course, the FAST platoon was an inadequate measure, but the National Military Command Authority (NMCA) or JCS had yet to decide what to do about Noriega. With so few men to provide security to naval installations, Major E. A. Keith, CO MCSFC Panama, had to prioritize his security concerns. With the concurrence of the Commander, US Naval Forces (South), Keith identified the fuel storage facility, known as the Arraijan Tank Farm (ATF), as his first security concern.
The ATF is located within two square kilometers of rolling grassland, surrounded by dense jungle, which provided excellent avenues of approach should Noriega’s PDF attempt to seize the ATF or threaten the adjacent Howard Air Force Base. Major Keith did not have a sufficient number of men to maintain a formal defense perimeter around the ATF, so his only recourse was to employ irregular area security patrols.
Patrol leaders almost immediately reported the presence of PDF forces dressed in black field uniforms using night vision goggles (NVGs) and evidence of recently prepared foxholes in the jungle areas surrounding the ATF. When Marines reported this intelligence up the chain of command, US Army South dismissed it out-of-hand, claiming that US troops prepared the fighting holes during recent training exercises. US Army South also emphatically denied that Noriega’s PDF had any NGVs. Subsequently, however, Navy intelligence officers learned that the Army had not conducted any training exercises adjacent to the ATF for several years; moreover, that the Army had (in fact) transferred NGVs to the PDF.
Despite the Army’s lack of interest in further reinforcing the MCSFC, the navy requested that the Marine Corps ready a combat brigade for possible deployment to the Canal Zone. Accordingly, the 6th Marine Brigade (6thMEB) was issued a warning order. In developing his operation plan, the Brigade Commander suggested an “all or nothing” approach. Either the Brigade deployed as a fully functional combat brigade (two battalion landing teams, two combat aircraft squadrons) or not at all.
Even as the JCS fretted about a proper response to deteriorating conditions in Panama, 6thMEB received a “stand up” order on 31 March 1988. While this was going on, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (CG FMFLant) ordered an advance combat element to proceed to Panama to reinforce the MCSFC. The Marines viewed this advanced element as a nucleus for a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) around which a brigade might later form, although one without any air support.
Why was there no aviation support for the Marines? Given the amount of Army and Air Force assets stationed at Howard Air Force Base, COMUSSOUTHCOM did not see a need for additional Marine Corps combat aircraft. SOUTHCOM didn’t see a need for any Marines at all, but at that stage, the employment of Marines wasn’t up to SOUTHCOM if their mission was to reinforce security for naval installations.
The unit assigned as the brigade’s advance element was Company I, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines (India 3/4), under the command of Captain Joseph P. Valore. Upon arrival in Panama on 6 April, Valore reported to Rear Admiral Jerry G. Gnecknow, Commander, Naval Forces, Southern Command. Colonel William J. Conley, who served as brigade chief of staff, accompanied Captain Valore to Panama. As part of the advance team, Conley’s mission was to arrange logistical support for the brigade, should it actually deploy. Admiral Gnecknow assigned Colonel Conley as Senior Marine Officer, Naval Forces, Panama, when the brigade’s deployment did not appear likely.
The selection of India 3/4 (Reinforced) to serve as the brigade’s advance element was that the brigade earmarked its parent battalion as one of the brigade’s battalion landing teams and because the company, who at the time was the 2nd Marine Divisions air alert/rapid response team, had completed extensive pre-deployment training. The 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines reinforced India Company with an 81mm mortar section, a Sensor Control and Management Platoon (SCAMP), a counterintelligence team, and a squad of combat engineers. Colonel Conley assigned responsibility for securing the ATF to Captain Valore, who embraced Major Keith’s aggressive patrolling strategy. Suddenly, on 9 April, operational control of India Company passed from Admiral Gnecknow to the Commander, Joint Task Force (JTF), Panama — who also served as Commander, U. S. Army South.
At the time of his deployment, Captain Valore felt obligated to address two issues affecting his company’s performance in Panama. The first was a standing policy decision that precluded armed Marines from chambering a round in their weapons until fired upon, and the second involved rules of engagement. Captain Valore correctly believed that sending Marines into harm’s way with unchambered weapons was foolish; indeed, it is. He raised this issue with Colonel Conley, who agreed with Valore and authorized the Marines to patrol with chambered weapons. As to the rules of engagement, Conley allowed Valore’s Marines to “return fire if fired upon.”
What made these two issues “hot button” topics was the 1983 Beirut bombing incident. Because of the restricted weapons policy, Marine sentries were unable to stop the bomb-laden truck that drove through the security perimeter and kill 241 American servicemen. As to the rules of engagement, no one fired on the Marines standing guard that day — the terrorist simply drove through the perimeter at a high rate of speed. Thus, Conley’s cautionary instruction, to “return fire if fired upon,” was woefully inadequate. There are occasions when initiating hostile action is unquestionably appropriate.
But COMJTFPANAMA/COMUSARMYSOUTH had a different perspective. He did not want Marines firing on Panamanians. The mission, he argued, was to safeguard American interests in Panama, not make the deteriorating political condition worse. In his view, the Marines — by their very presence — were making matters worse by their aggressive behavior. At this point, one may wonder, what would be the purpose of arming military personnel to guard US installations if the men charged with executing that mission weren’t taking their responsibilities seriously?
This particular kerfuffle leads one to consider the cultural differences between the U. S. Army and the United States Marines. There is a unique and very distinctive Marine Corps culture that sets the Marines apart from every other branch of service. First, Marines never lose sight of their primary mission: winning battles. Locating, closing with, and destroying the enemy is at the forefront of every Marine Corps mission. It is the only reason Marines exist. Second, a bended knee and/or erring on the side of caution in a kinder-gentler world is not a Marine Corps tradition. Marines are warriors — it is their ethos. There is something very different going on inside the heads of (too many) senior army officers.
So, while senior Army officers berated the Marines for doing what they’re best at, senior Marine Corps officers remained adamant: they would not employ a lethal combat company and then tie its hands by ridiculously simple-minded restrictions.
Moreover, in 1988, a bolstered Marine presence in Panama resulted from the PDF’s aggressiveness, not the cause of it. It may be true that army personnel in Panama were serving a fantasy tour, accompanied by their families, enjoying an exotic and leisurely lifestyle, but that wasn’t what India Company was doing in Panama. India Company arrived in Panama in combat mode.
A test of each of the preceding presumptions transpired during the night of 10-11 April. Soon after the arrival of India Company, unknown intruders began probing Marine positions at the ATF. Early in the morning of 11 April, a Marine patrol operating in the northeast sector contacted an unknown number of intruders. The patrol leader, Corporal Ricardo Villahermosa, determined to apprehend these unknown trespassers. To accomplish that, Villahermosa split his force, intending to envelop them. The jungle was pitch black, and the only sound was an occasional snap of vegetation, which suggested human movement. A short time later, a flare accidentally “popped,” emulating the sound of the discharge of a weapon, and then ignited. Marines from the split force opened fire, and Corporal Villahermosa was mortally wounded. It was a frightful accident — but one that prompted a renewal of the ‘weapons ready’ debate.
Major General Bernard Loeffke, U. S. Army, CG USASouth, also serving as JTF commander, critically challenged the Marines at a meeting on 12 April. Major Alfred F. Clarkson, the operations officer of the MEB’s advance element, rigorously defended the “weapons ready” policy, informing General Loeffke in no uncertain terms that the Marine chain of command would not deny the use of weapons to their troops. Doing otherwise, he said, was morally indefensible. Colonel Conley concurred and made certain that Loeffke’s concerns did not impede Marine combat operations.
Shortly after nightfall on 12 April, remote battlefield sensors alerted Valore’s Marines that approximately 40 unknown persons were approaching the ATF perimeter. SCAMP Marines confirmed the presence of these unknown persons, and a USAF AC-130 gunship provided the third verification. Captain Valore immediately consolidated his force in the center of the ATF. Soon after that, Marines received and returned fire into the line of tracers aimed at them from this unknown force.
To the west of the company, a SCAMP detachment reported another probe. The detachment NCOIC, Sergeant Michael A. Cooper, requested illumination, revealing well-armed hostiles were moving toward his position. Captain Valore approved Cooper’s request for a mortar fire mission, and sixteen HE rounds were dropped on the approaching hostile force. Valore also authorized Cooper to return fire. As Cooper engaged the hostiles, an additional force assaulted Valore’s company. The Marines returned fire with an M19 chain gun that spits out 220 rounds of 40mm grenades, and the enemy withdrew.
At around 2200, General Loeffke arrived at Valore’s position in civilian attire, demanding to know what had transpired. After Captain Valore briefed Loeffke, the general ordered him to cease fire and not re-engage unless first fired upon. Loeffke also ordered the Marines to remain in place and allow the intruders to withdraw from the area. Loeffke assured Valore that he had contacted the PDF command structure, who assured him that there were no Panamanian forces in the area.
In compliance with Loeffke’s order, Valore moved the SCAMP detachment back from the perimeter. Through the use of NVGs, Valore witnessed several intruders administering first aid and evacuating casualties from the jungle. Marines from the MCSFC, who had established a roadblock on the Pan American highway and observed the PDFs evacuation of dead and wounded, confirmed Captain Valore’s after-action report.
In the aftermath of this incident, Valore and his Marines were set upon by a bevy of Naval Investigative Service (NIS) and Army Intelligence Service (AIS) agents. The repetitious questioning lasted several days. Additionally, Loeffke ordered Valore and his Marines to submit to urinalysis testing — all of which were negative.
More than anything else, Major General Loeffke and his JTF Staff wanted to discredit Captain Valore, India Company Marines, and the U. S. Marine Corps. Loeffke publicly stated that the Marines had fired at ghosts and shadows. General Noriega and the anti-American Panamanian press exploited this opportunity and began planting stories about drug abuse among the Marines. For their part, the Marine hierarchy closed ranks around Captain Valore and his Marines. Colonel Conley rejected Loeffke’s and Noriega’s nonsense and may have even confided some concern about Loeffke’s loyalty to his superiors.
Undeterred, Loeffke replaced India 3/4 at the ATF with an Army battalion. On 14 April 1988, Army sentries guarding the ammunition supply point came under fire from an unknown size of PDF forces. The same night, an Army patrol of the 7th Special Forces Group operating west of Howard AFB came under fire. It, therefore, became apparent to everyone (except General Loeffke) that the Marines did not imagine the PDF assault at the ATF. In retrospect, the Marines developed the appropriate response to PDF aggression, and Loeffke’s general incompetence as a field commander countermanded it.
Over the next several months, the PDF continued to initiate aggressive actions against US forces in Panama, but nothing on the scale of the firefight in April 1988, which suggested that Captain Valore’s response had the desired effect on PDF activities. Between April and December 1988, the US decided on diplomatic maneuvers rather than military.
This period of calm allowed the Marines to undergo additional jungle training and exercise command and control systems, particularly between the Army and Marines. COMUSSOUTHCOM formally appointed Colonel Conley as commander overall Marine forces in Panama and Army units temporarily attached to the Marines for training. Under Conley’s direction, Marine intelligence assets began to revise contingency plans based on needed updates to the “enemy situation” in Panama.
In mid-May 1988, India 3/4 went back on the line for another two weeks. In addition to regular patrolling (day and night), the Marines improved their hardened observation and listening posts surrounding the tank farm and ammo depot and rehearsed rapid reaction operations. Operations Purple Storm and Purple Blitz were joint-service exercises designed to improve command and control procedures between Marine and Army units and combat casualty evacuations. Army and Air Force dog teams joined the Marines during their security patrols. Army specialists installed a loudspeaker system designed to inform intruders that they were on US government property. Air Force C-130 gunships flew nightly missions in support of the Marines.
Lima Company 3/4 relieved India 3/4 in June 1988.
Crandall, R. Gunboat Democracy: US interventions in the Dominican Republic, Granada, and Panama. Rowman & Littlefield Publications, 2006.
Donnelly, T. Operation Just Cause: The storming of Panama. Lexington Books, 1991.
Reynolds, N. E. Just Cause: Marine Operations in Panama 1988-1990. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1996.
Yates, L. A. The US Military Intervention in Panama: Origins, Planning, and Crisis Management, June 1987-December 1989. Army Center of Military History, 2008.
 On 9 January 1964, grievances between native Panamanians and the “Zonians” (Americans living within the US-controlled Canal Zone) boiled over into a series of anti-American riots that resulted in an evacuation of the US Embassy in Panama City, assaults on US citizens — including the lynching of several US Army personnel — widespread looting and substantial damage to US-owned property. The United States responded to this unrest by dispatching the 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines (BLT 2/8) to Panama to protect American lives and property. At the time, I had the privilege of serving as a rifleman in Company E (Captain William R. Wildpret, commanding). Echo Company was assigned responsibility for the security of the naval base at Coco Solo.
 The density of the jungle limited Marine patrols to about 500 yards over two hours.
 At this time, security for Howard Air Force Base was not a Marine Corps responsibility.
 USMA graduate in 1957, Loeffke has a degree in engineering, an MA in Russian language and Soviet Era studies, and a PhD in international relations. He is a combat decorated officer, served as the Army Attaché with the US Embassy in Moscow, served on the White House staff, served as the Defense Attaché with the US Embassy in China, befriended Chinese general Xu Xin, is fluent in Chinese, and is a self-professed expert on Sino-American affairs. After leaving the Army in 1992, Loeffke earned a medical degree and served as a physician in Bosnia, Haiti, Kenya, Iraq, Niger, and Darfur. According to Loeffke, China is not the United States’ enemy. While instructing at the USMA, Loeffke urged his students to increase their understanding of the Chinese and Russians as they are just like us.
 It normally takes an army regiment to replace a Marine rifle company.
 Documents uncovered after the December 1989 invasion of Panama confirmed the PDF assault on the Marines at the ATF. Analysts subsequently concluded that the ATF was not the focus of the PDF, but rather the Marines themselves, as perpetrated by Noriega’s 7th Rifle Company, also known as Macho de Monte, one of Noriega’s few elite units, possibly reinforced by a few members of the Special Anti-terrorist Security Unit, and that they were likely augmented by several Cuban military advisors.
The story of Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus, as with most of what we know about the ancient world, is wrapped in both fact and myth. Historians believe this because ancient record-keepers were more storytellers than historians. It is also likely that what they didn’t know as an absolute fact, they made up. That’s what storytellers do — and it usually does make for a good story.
In any case, according to the story, Cincinnatus saved Rome on two occasions. In 458 BC and 439 BC, the Senate of Rome summoned Cincinnatus, a modest farmer, and gave him dictatorial powers to raise an army to defend Rome — which he accomplished. Then, when the fighting was over, Cincinnatus promptly relinquished his power and returned to his beets.
If the story is true, then the account of Cincinnatus could provide us with the earliest example of a citizen-soldier (also known as militia). A militia is a military force raised from the civilian population during an emergency to serve in defense of the state (or community) or enforce the laws thereof.
Four hundred years later, during the Gallic Wars (a series of conflicts between 58-50 BC), Julius Caesar invaded Britannia because the Celts aided and assisted the enemies of Rome. Once Caesar had completed his punitive campaign, he returned to the continent — mission accomplished.
Rome’s formal occupation of Britain occurred between 43-410 AD. Roman government in Britain started well enough, but bribery, fraud, and treasonous behavior soon followed — presumably because corruption was part of Rome’s political landscape. Apparently, this is something the United States inherited from the ancients, as well. But life in Roman-Britain was further complicated by a more-or-less constant stream of invasions and assaults on Roman settlements by those who objected to Rome’s presence: the Picts, Irish/Scots, and later, the Anglo-Saxon hordes. By the beginning of the fifth century, Rome’s military resources were stretched to the limit. A more pressing need for military manpower at home forced the Romans to withdraw their legions.
During Britain’s Anglo-Saxon period (410-660), also known as the Migration Period, massive numbers of Germanic people escaped the chaos of their homeland and made their way to the Albion shore. Upon arrival, they quickly learned that they were no safer in Britain because of the constant presence of marauders from northern Europe. At best, these invaders helped create a sense of insecurity among the British people — at worst, the seeds of national paranoia. Of course, when people are trying to kill you, then you aren’t paranoid.
During this period of great peril, Anglo-Saxons established a tradition called “the common burden.” It was an obligation of community service toward the collective defense of towns and villages, and it was particularly noteworthy in the ancient settlements of Kent, Mercia, and Wessex. It would be safe to say that thousands of able-bodied men were called upon to defend their boroughs from evil-doers over several hundred years. By the 10th century, the common burden tradition had evolved, and it became the duty of landowners to assume the responsibility for organizing and maintaining armed militias.
Following the Norman invasion of England in 1066, William I saw the wisdom and prudence of local militias, and he incorporated the Anglo-Saxon tradition of the common burden. William’s grandson, Henry I of England, mandated the following: “He will possess these arms and will bear allegiance to the Lord King Henry, namely the son of Empress Maud, and he will bear these arms in His service according to His order and in allegiance to the Lord King and his realm.” — The Assize of Arms, 1181.
The Assize of Arms established armed militias (on-call) by dividing the free populations into socio-economic categories. Those who were wealthiest had the greater obligation to acquire and maintain various prescribed weapons. In 1285, the Statute of Winchester expanded the Assize to include every able-bodied male person regardless of their status (free men or those bonded to the land), who were between 15 and 60. Local gentry made the decision which of them served and under what circumstances. The Statute stated, “Every man shall have in his house arms for keeping peace according to the ancient Assize.” When called upon, the duty of these men might include expeditions away from their shire, local guard duty, local defense, and occasionally escort duties. Feudal military service ended during the reign of Edward III (1327-1377) — replaced by indentured service.
Indentured soldiers incurred an obligation to serve their lord for a specified length of time. It was the beginning of the profession of arms. When the lord no longer needed professional soldiers or could no longer afford them, he might sell the contract to another, or the lord might have permitted the soldier to serve another as a mercenary. In this way, soldiers began migrating from one conflict to another — mainly because the profession of arms is all they knew how to do.
A problem arose when there were no conflicts. In these instances, it was common to find that soldiers turned to outlawry — marauders who preyed on defenseless hamlets, villages, or towns. Circumstances like these caused town officials to return to the idea of local militias, and once more, locals served “on-call” of their community’s needs.
In 1581, British law stipulated, “If any [highborn] man being a Queen’s subject, and not having a reasonable cause or impediment, and being within the age of sixty years (except spiritual men, justices of the bench, or other justices of Assize, or barons of the Exchequer) have not a longbow and arrows ready in his house, or have not for every man child in his house between seven years and seventeen of age, a bow and two shafts, and every such being above seventeen years a bow and four shafts, or have not brought them up in shooting, if any man under the age of four and twenty years have not shot at standing targets (being above that age) have shot at any marks under eleven score yards with any pick shaft or flight,” shall be punished.
Translated, the Latin term Posse Comitatus means “force of the county.” It refers to a citizens group assembled by officials to deal with an emergency. The term also applied to any force or band called forth to confront hostiles.
By the time the English fixed their sights on North America, France and Spain already claimed much of it, and neither kingdom was well-disposed to share it with Englishmen. There was no regular English soldiery in the early formation of British colonies, so to protect themselves from assaults by Spanish coastal raiders and from hostile Indians sicced upon them by French colonial officials, English settlers created local militias modeled on those of the mother country. These early American militias were crucial to the survival of the British colonies.
Naturally, the Englishmen who migrated to North America took with them their long-held British values and traditions. Among these traditions was a general loathing for standing armies and the profession of arms. The reason for their profound contempt for the military was simple enough: British soldiers were instruments of government tyranny. Even after more than 100 years, British-American colonists viewed the Redcoat as a clear and present danger to colonial autonomy and liberty.
Beyond the preceding, British-American settlements were bastions of Puritan values. Outside instruments of a tyrannical parliament and king, American settlers were deeply offended by the uncouth Redcoat. He was profane, bawdy, and addicted to Satan’s beverages. Besides, the professional soldier was an outsider. Militia, on the other hand, was part of the community. They were family by blood or marriage, they were neighbors, and they were people who everyone could count on when needed — and so it was understandable that organized militia also viewed the Redcoats with suspicion.
The issue of suspicion and contempt was a two-way street because British regulars also had little regard for local militias. In the view of professional soldiers, militias were undisciplined and unreliable mobs who tended to bolt once the sound of that first shot reverberated through their ranks. This claim was, of course, valid. Colonial militia were not soldiers; they were farmers. They were undisciplined because they followed their own hook. They decided for themselves whether they liked the odds on the battlefield. More often than not, they made these decisions at the spur of the moment, prompted by others with similar fears, and usually, at the worst possible time.
The American militia was not an ideal defense mechanism, although some militias were more reliable than others. Some militia refused to fight outside their county/colony — but there were also great successes, such as demonstrated at the Battle of Louisbourg in Nova Scotia. But the militia was generally useful to colonial governments because once they activated the militia, officials could reposition the Redcoats elsewhere — where the need was greater.
Each British colony had a unique system for creating and maintaining its militia force. In most cases, regulations specified “able-bodied white males between the ages of 18 to 45.” Militias were formed under the auspices of the colonial charter, which required militia members to furnish their own armaments.
The first colonial militia was formed in Massachusetts in 1636. Historians tell us that the early organization of the Massachusetts militia explains how the New England militias became part of the political framework. More than one hundred years later, New England militia, having been thoroughly infiltrated by the Sons of Liberty, became the fuse that lit the American Revolution.
From Colonial to American Militia
American militia became the foundation of the Continental Army and played an important role in General Washington’s strategies throughout the war of independence. Militia carried out the siege of Boston, which gave Washington the time to organize his army and decide how best to prosecute the war. It was the militia that later became part of Washington’s sophisticated spy network.
After the war, the colonist’s distrust of standing armies carried over to the new United States, and Congress disbanded the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. A small American Legion was restored, but the only seaborne force remaining was the Revenue Cutter Service. Issues involving a state militia (and who should control it/pay for it) became hotly debated.
Despite the traditional distrust of standing armies, President Washington realized that the United States could not remain sovereign if it did not have the capacity of protecting its communities, ports, coastal regions, or its commerce — and so began the process of reconstituting the armed forces. The timing of Washington’s initiatives could not have been better; the Quasi-War (with France) and the War of 1812 (in which the American militia played an important role) were just around the corner.
The militia is a long-held American tradition — part of our British heritage — and, one might argue, one that has maintained faith with its original purpose. If modern Americans understood this history, they would realize that the strength of a community is that everyone belongs to it; everyone carries the burden of community obligation. Community watch programs are one manifestation of this. Community militias do not force membership — they are volunteer organizations. Such militias offer no monetary benefit; there is only a sense of accomplishment by serving the community’s interests. What are those interests? Common cause, mutual security, and survival.
In early America, militia organizations combined military defense with community policing. Militiamen served because their community needed them. But as we all know, time changes all things. In the past, American militia played a key role in the common burden even if it was not always professionally competent or efficient — but this is because they weren’t regular soldiers. They were homeboys who did the best they could with what they had and, much like another militia unit that we’ve all learned to respect — the Texas Rangers — militiamen were often shoddy looking characters, undisciplined, and would only follow the orders of the officers they themselves respected and elected. American militiaman decided whether and when to fight — and they chose when they’d had enough of it.
The American Civil War was a crossover period. There were militia organizations back then, but they became fewer once the regular army assumed responsibility for protecting settlers from Indian hostilities. They also became fewer in number when the law took hold. County sheriffs could hire deputies and raise (volunteer) posses. The United States had an army in 1861, but it wasn’t large enough to complete the task of preserving the Union. It fell upon the states to raise a force of volunteers to augment the regular armies on both sides of the issue. The people who volunteered to serve their state were the same kinds of people from an earlier period, albeit identifying more with their respective states than with their counties. Even so, recruitment for state regiments came from one or more counties. There were exceptions, of course. The Kansas Red Legs and Missouri Bushwhackers are two — but it is difficult to say whether these were truly area militias or simply armed thugs with a mean streak.
Today there are state guard units and national guard organizations. As one example, the Military Department of Texas includes the Texas State Guard and the Texas National Guard. Together, these two organizations are regarded as the Texas State Militia. The commander-in-chief of all state military forces is the governor, directed by the Adjutant General of Texas. The governor of Texas commands the Texas Department of Public Safety similarly, including the Texas Rangers and other state troopers. Unrelated to state government, there are also numerous volunteer militia groups throughout the United States.
Good vs. Bad, Right vs. Left
Lately, almost every discussion about the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States — the right to bear arms, has become a political narrative. There is nothing ambiguous about the Second Amendment, which states, “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.” Nevertheless, some continue to argue against this Constitutional right and regularly seek ways to limit or deny that right to citizens of the United States. Nearly every state addresses “the right of the people to keep and bear arms,” which is every state’s right under our system of constitutional federalism. Still, the debate continues. Pro-gun groups (including almost every private militia group) insist that the Second Amendment means what it says. Anti-gun groups insist that guns in the hands of private citizens pose a danger to public safety. Still, to make that argument, they must also ignore the history of the American militia. Criminals in Chicago have managed to elevate their city to a murder capital in the United States; yet, not one of these murdering thugs has ever belonged to a militia organization.
By claiming that anyone who supports the Second Amendment is a racist or a domestic terrorist, anti-gun arguments have become particularly nasty. In response, pro-gun enthusiasts echo the Gonzalez Flag of 1835: Come and take it.
Today, in making word associations between “militia” and “white supremacy” and “Bible-thumping Christians,” anti-gun criminals (those acting in contravention of the law) have increased the intensity of the debate, even claiming that gun-carrying citizens are un-American. It is an interesting argument given the entire history of militias and the people’s right and responsibility to bear arms dating back to 500 AD.
The English Bill of Rights of 1689 allowed citizens to “have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by the Law.” In modern arguments, particularly among those with a pro-gun point of view, and given Sir William Blackstone’s ageless opinion, we may argue that U.S. gun rights indeed are a primary example of American exceptionalism. Moreover, gun-rights advocates strenuously argue that the Second Amendment is an American’s only protection from federal totalitarianism. When one considers the numerous instances where the federal government has violated the constitutional rights of the American people, it is impossible to find fault with that reasoning.
Among those who argue that militias of an earlier time were ‘white supremacists,’ it is only accurate in the sense that many American communities (north, south, southwest, midwest, and northwest) were mired in the filth of Democratic Party politics and remained in that morass through the early 1970s. In the post-Civil War period, when radical Republicans placed the Freedman’s Bureau in charge of state governments, racial hatred increased — which serves as another example that too much government benefits no one.
Modern militias see themselves as a check against the totalitarian government — and while this would not have been possible in 1776, it certainly was the case a few years later during Shay’s Rebellion (Massachusetts) and the Whiskey Rebellion (western Pennsylvania). Oddly, some militias supported the rebellion, and other militias joining President Washington’s ranks. But returning to today, modern militias (generally) are not part of state mechanisms; they are privately organized, loosely connected groups of men and women who, for some reason, scare the hell out of the Democratic/Progressive Party apparatus.
Less than a year ago, federal authorities charged thirteen so-called Wolverine Watchmen (a Michigan-based militia) with terrorism, conspiracy, and weapons charges. Six men faced additional charges, which included conspiracy to commit the kidnapping of Governor Gretchen Whitmer. Lately, however, there is information that the entire episode was an FBI entrapment operation. Among those who have no trust or confidence in the federal government, they will argue that this isn’t the first time the FBI has created a crime in order to make an arrest. The ploy, so the argument goes, is first to outline a criminal act, plan it, participate in it, arrest the “perpetrators,” lay on them every possible criminal charge, and then let the event play out for years until no one even remembers what happened. Meanwhile, if none of these fellows are convicted, the federal government has destroyed them financially. There must be a lesson in all this, somewhere.
We should know that there are “bad actors” everywhere in our society, but if we hope to restore civil society, then we have to let the facts lead us to proper conclusions. There may be some off-center militias in America today, but they are few in number, and we serve no good purpose by applying a too-broad brush stroke to militias that see themselves as serving their communities.
AL Schuler, A. Sir William Blackstone and the Shaping of American Law. New Law Journal, 1994.
Beckett, I. F. W. Britain’s Part-Time Soldiers: The Amateur Military Tradition, 1558-1945. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Publishing, 2011.
Barnett, R. E., and Heather Gerken. Article I, Section 8: Federalism and the Overall Scope of Federal Power. National Constitution Center online.
Chermak, S. M. Searching for a Demon: The Media Construction of the Militia Movement. Dartmouth, 2002.
Tucker, S. G. Blackstone’s Commentaries: With Notes of Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Volumes 5. Philadelphia, 1803; Reprint 1969.
United States Constitution, Amendment II, 1792.
 Britannia is a personification of the ancient Roman Province, of the isles Britain and the British people; she is a helmeted female warrior, armed with a trident and a shield. In earlier times, the Roman name for Britain was Albion.
 Occupation rather than conquest because it is doubtful that any historian can make the argument that the Romans ever conquered the British people.
 By this time, of course, there was already a substantial Roman civilian presence in Britain. It was a Roman custom to award large land grants to legionnaires once they had served 25-30 years under Rome’s standard. These people and their descendants, became British farmers, blacksmiths, shopkeepers, and teamsters.
 Henry II of England, (also Henry Plantagenet) (1133-1189) (Reign 1150-1189) laid the foundation of English Common Law and influenced the development of societies in Brittany, Wales, and Scotland. Henry’s creation of armed militia to serve on call of the lord king was a reaction no to the so-called Great Revolt (1173-75).
 A court that convened at various intervals in each county of England and Wales to administer civil and criminal law. These courts existed until 1972 when the civil jurisdiction of Assizes was transferred to the High Court, and criminal jurisdiction was assigned to the Crown Court.
 Military indenture was a legal contract between a soldier and the man he served. The contract was written out twice on one sheet of paper and then cut into two in such a way that the jagged edges would fit together (hence the name indenture). The soldier retained one part, his captain the other. Any subsequent dispute would require that both parties fit the copies together to resolve the problem.
 Later reflected in the US Constitution: Article I, Section 8, Clause 12: [The Congress shall have the power …] “To raise and support armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer term than two years.”
 Initially formed as a secret society/separatist group to advance the rights of citizens and oppose the arbitrary imposition of taxes. The group disbanded after repeal of the Stamp Act, but the name was taken up by other local groups prior to the outbreak of hostilities between the British government and the colonies. Some might argue that secret societies and clandestine raids is a mark of cowards, bolstered by the fact that during the so-called Tea Party, they dressed themselves as Indians.
 “This may be the true palladium of liberty … The right of self-defence is the first law of nature. In most governments it has been the study of rulers to confine this right within the narrowest limits possible. Whenever standing armies are kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction.” Sir William Blackstone, 1803.
 In an article by R. E. Barnett, Georgetown University Law Center and Heather Gerken, Professor of Law at Yale, the authors provided an overview of Article 1, Section 8: Federalism and the Overall Scope of Federal Power. Historically, federal-state relations have always contested, with federalism undergoing four distinct phases: Enumerated Powers Federalism (1787), Fundamental Rights Federalism (1865), New Deal Federalism (1933), and State Sovereignty Federalism (1986-). The authors credit the Rehnquist Court with the revival of Enumerated Powers Federalism, and the Roberts Court, which continues the work of Rehnquist favoring state sovereignty over federal authoritarianism.
Kǒng Fūzǐ, otherwise known in the western world as Confucius (551-479 BC), was a paragon of Chinese philosophers and sages and, perhaps, one of the most influential individuals in all human history. His teachings emphasized personal morality, justice, kindness, and sincerity — but his school of thought was only one of a hundred philosophical and legalistic academies during China’s Qin dynasty. He once warned, “Before you embark on a journey of revenge, dig two graves.”
Operation Cyclone was the brainchild of Texas Congressman Charles Nesbit Wilson (also known as Charlie Wilson). It was the codename for a Central Intelligence Agency program to arm and finance the Afghan mujahideen (1979-1989) during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. It was one of the most protracted and most expensive covert CIA operations ever undertaken.
Wilson’s idea was to funnel black money through the CIA to financially support radical Islamists who more or less worked under the control of Pakistani military dictator Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988). We don’t know how much of this money Zia diverted to his atomic weapons project, but it may have been substantial. Between 1980-1986, the CIA sent between $20-40 million to Afghanistan annually; in 1987, this amount increased to $640 million annually. CIA funding continued after the Soviet Union departed Afghanistan in 1989 to support the Afghan Civil War (1989-1992). Before Zia’s death, he successfully wooed both the United States and China into a ménage à trois — which was “just fine” with Charlie Wilson, a Democrat, who leaned in that direction anyway.
The CIA’s arms deal included the state-of-the-art Stinger surface-to-air shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapon that cost around $38,000 each. We sent thousands of these to Afghanistan to help the Islamists rid themselves of the Soviet MI-24 (Hind) helicopter. Once CIA operatives instructed the Islamists how to employ these weapons, no Russian helicopter was safe. How many of these Stinger missiles remained in Afghanistan after the CIA withdrew its support is unknown. Still, at some point, the supplies diminished — driving Islamists to employ a much cheaper and easier to obtain weapon: the Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG).
The RPG fires a shaped charge explosive warhead. There are various warheads, but the most common is the high explosive (HE) round and high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) round. Either of these is devastating to helicopters.
As it turned out, the Americans instructing mujahideen on fighting a sophisticated enemy combat force did an extraordinary job. Radical Islamists later turned these skills toward the Americans once the United States decided to replace the Russian invaders in 2003. Americans in Afghanistan have been digging graves ever since.
Extortion One Seven
Members of the U. S. Navy’s Seal Team Six assaulted a Pakistani compound on 2 May 2011, killing the founder and leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden. It was a CIA-led operation with the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) codenamed Operation Neptune Spear. Operating alongside the Navy’s special warfare group was an element of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (Night Stalkers). This operation ended a nearly ten-year search for bin Laden, the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attack upon the United States.
One month earlier, the US Tenth Mountain Division turned control of Combat Outpost Tangi over to Afghan government forces. It was an interesting “turnover” since the Afghan Defense Force (ADF) never actually occupied the base, so Taliban forces took the initiative to seize it for their use. There could be a connection here, but I hesitate to judge. In any event, US forces continued to operate in the Tangi area. By 2011, the number of Taliban in Tangi was significant. On 8 June, Taliban ground forces engaged a US Army CH-47 Chinook helicopter from five or six different locations with 14 separate RPG attacks forcing the overwhelmed helicopter to abandon its mission.
At about this same time, US intelligence determined that senior Taliban leader Qari Tahir might have operated from within the Tangi Valley. Thus, the International Security Force (ISF) command group ordered American/Coalition forces working within Wardak Province to locate Tahir and capture or kill him.
Beginning around 22:30 hours (local time) on 5 August, a platoon of 47 Army Rangers departed their forward operating base in Logar Province aboard two CH-47D aircraft. After a thirty-minute flight, the two helicopters landed near a compound believed to be the location of Tahir. After disembarking the Rangers, the helicopters departed the area. It was a high-risk operation. Two AH-64 Apache gunships and an AC-130 gunship remained on station to provide intelligence, surveillance, and aerial reconnaissance of the area. Seventeen SEALS served as a reserve force.
As the Rangers approached the designated compound, ISR aircraft observed numerous individuals leaving the compound, but the Rangers did not engage these people. Apache aircraft did engage a different group of around eight insurgents, reporting six of these insurgents killed in action. Meanwhile, ISR assets continued to observe the disengaged group, estimating between 9-11 fighters. The on-site commander believed that these individuals might include Tahir. At 0100, the task force commander directed the SEALS to engage these suspected insurgents. The Aviation Brigade Commander took nearly an hour to approve a new landing zone for the SEAL infiltration. At 02:00, the task force commander decided to increase the size of the SEAL Team from 17 to 33 warriors and then, to reduce transportation time, command authority loaded SEAL reinforcements into a single CH-47D; another aircraft served as a decoy that would land at a separate landing site.
While this part of the operation was unfolding, the Taliban force split into two sections. At around 02:15, one team of three insurgents went to a stand of trees; the other group entered a building located 1.2 miles from the original compound. Since the Apache helicopters were involved in tracking these two groups of insurgents, they could not offer security or fire support to either of the two in-bound CH-47Ds.
Six minutes out, the decoy CH-47D split off and returned to base. The remaining helicopter, callsign Extortion One Seven, proceeded to the earlier landing zone. One minute out, Extortion One Seven descended to an altitude of 100 feet and reduced its airspeed to around 58 knots. A third group of Taliban previously undetected by the Americans fired 2-3 RPGs from a two-story building. The second round fired struck Extortion One Seven’s aft rotor assembly. Within five seconds, the CH-47D crashed and exploded, killing everyone on board. It took the Apache aircraft another thirty seconds to report the 47’s destruction.
The official determination in the after-action report was “wrong place/wrong time.” Such things do happen in war. People die. Suddenly. But former Navy JAG Officer, Lieutenant Commander Don Brown, disagrees. He claims the US military intentionally concealed what happened to Extortion One Seven, much in the way the Army lied about the circumstances of Patrick Tillman’s death in 2004.
After reviewing all the evidence available to him (unclassified material), Brown concluded that military command sacrificed the SEAL Team through gross negligence during mission planning and covering up what happened. As Brown understood the facts, seven ADF personnel slipped aboard Extortion One Seven without authority (a significant security breach), men who had no role in the operation. Moreover, the rules of engagement (ROE) precluded pre-landing suppression fire within the CH-47D’s designated landing zone. Brown argued that a pre-landing suppression fire would have saved Extortion One Seven from destruction.
On the issue of the seven ADF personnel, Brown contends that the remains of these men were flown to the United States and cremated, as reported in the Washington Times, leading Brown to conclude, “Something went terribly wrong inside that helicopter, and whatever went wrong was most likely beyond the pilot’s control.” Brown also raises the question about a so-called helicopter black box, which the Army contends does not exist in that model aircraft. But Commander Brown was adamant, asking why the Brigade commander sent Rangers back to the crash site looking for something that doesn’t exist.
Brown additionally claimed that the AC-130 gunship circling above the LZ spotted suspected Taliban insurgents moving on the ground toward Extortion One Seven’s designated landing site and requested permission to engage those insurgents. According to Brown’s investigation, the task force commander denied the gunship permission to engage. US Air Force Captain Joni Marquez, assigned to the AC-130 gunship at the time as firing officer, confirmed Brown’s assertions, and agreed with his conclusion that denying the gunship permission to engage sealed the fate of the CH-47D.
The cost in American lives from the US teaching a potential enemy how to kill our sons and daughters has been too high. It is incomprehensible that any official of the US government would plant the seeds for a lethal future conflict for no other reason than to engage in an illicit relationship with a socialite. Worse, Wilson soon had the full cooperation of the White House, CIA, and House of Representatives.
How many graves have we dug so far in the war on terror — graves that a US Congressman helped to dig?
Bergen, P. Manhunt: The Ten Year Search for Bin Laden. Crown Publishing, 2012.
Bowden, M. The Finish: The Killing of Osama Bin Laden. Atlantic Monthly Press, 2012.
Carter, S. “Retired Air Force Captain says Pentagon covered up the real cause of deadly chopper crash.” On-air broadcast, 18 April 2017.
Herring, J. K. Diplomacy and Diamonds: My Wars from the Ballroom to the Battlefield. Center Street Publications, 2011.
 Wilson’s motivation for starting the so-called Charlie Wilson War was his infatuation with Joanne Herring, a quite-wealthy anti-Communist crusader. Herring, appalled by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, employed her feminine wiles in convincing Wilson to take up her cause of revenge against the Soviet Union. Joanne Herring is also believed to have had an intimate relationship with Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq while serving as “Honorary Consul” at the Pakistani Consulate in Houston, Texas. Osama bin-Laden may have been the founder and leader of al-Qaeda, but it may have been Joanne Herring who started it. Treason, anyone? Anyone?
 Brown served as legal counsel to Army Lieutenant Clint Lorance, who was charged and convicted for war crimes. Brown’s subsequent book Travesty of Justice: The Shocking Persecution of Lt. Clint Lorance was a major factor in Lorance’s pardon by President Donald J. Trump in 2019.
Within American naval history, John Paul Jones is one of the more revered Revolutionary War heroes. How esteemed is John Paul Jones in Navy society? Such that his remains are today enshrined at the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland.
Today, it is possible to observe not one but two John Paul Jones. The first Jones is the man who saw in himself a hero and a gentleman, one who, despite his low birth, glorified in his ability to rise to high social rank. While there is little doubt that Jones’s accomplishments in service to the American Revolution were impressive, there was another Jones: arrogant, quarrelsome, immature, rash, and dishonest. As one example, John Paul Jones designed a fake coat of arms to push forward his agenda. He did this by combining the coat of arms of Paul with those of Jones — neither of which he could rightly claim. His crass behavior sullied his reputation. He was not someone to invite to a dinner party; he was inconsiderate, tiresome, and he would likely steal the silverware.
There are two groups of John Paul Jones “experts.” The first consists of those who rely too heavily upon the personal (and deeply exaggerated) stories told by John Paul Jones himself; the second group involves those who believe that the life and times of Captain Jones deserve deeper reflection. As an example, early historians declare John Paul Jones as the father of the American Navy. This claim is altogether untrue — but even worse, it is a claim so often repeated that it serves as an insult to those other early gentlemen who served with equal distinction.
This so-called standard-bearer of the Continental Navy was named John Paul at birth. John had family living in the American colonies. His brother William Paul settled near present-day Fredericksburg, Virginia. When John was thirteen years old, his father apprenticed him to a sea captain named Benson, master of the commercial ship Friendship, which took John Paul to the Americas as part of a circuitous trade route.
Commercial shipping in those days was profitable for ship’s officers and crew because, in addition to the standard pay rate, ship’s owners often paid bonuses as a percentage of the cargo’s profits. Between 1760 and 1768, John Paul served on several commercial ships. In 1764, he served as Third Mate aboard King George. In 1766, while serving aboard Two Friends, Paul advanced to First Mate. In 1768, he abandoned that profitable position and returned to Scotland to seek a new appointment. Later that year, while serving aboard the brig John at sea, the ship’s captain died from Yellow Fever. Paul successfully navigated the ship back to port. The ship’s owners were so pleased that they rewarded John by giving him command of the vessel and a guaranteed percentage of its profits. He made two successful journeys to the West Indies in that capacity.
During the third voyage in 1770, one of the ship’s crew initiated a mutiny over crew wages. Jones, then 23-years old, had the crewman flogged. The flogging was severe, but what killed the man was Yellow Fever. As it happened, the crewman was the son of a wealthy Scottish family. Upon return to port, authorities arrested Paul, and he spent some time in prison until granted bail. Although the crewman died of disease, the flogging incident damaged Paul’s reputation. The incident prompted John Paul to change his name to John Paul Jones.
A second incident occurred while in command of the commercial ship Betsy when a crewman initiated a mutiny over crew wages. Jones killed this crewman, whose name was Blackton, by running him through with a sword. Jones later claimed the killing was in self-defense, but at the time, Jones refused to submit to the authority of an Admiral’s court. Jones instead went to Virginia to help manage the affairs of his brother William, who had died intestate.
With the supporting endorsement of Richard Henry Lee, a Virginia statesman and signer of the Declaration of Independence, Jones successfully applied for a commission in the Continental Navy. Congress offered a lieutenant’s commission to Jones in December 1775; his first assignment was the 24-gun frigate, USS Alfred. After Alfred’s raid in Nassau, the Congresses Naval Committee appointed Jones to command the sloop USS Providence. By the end of 1776, after seizing sixteen British vessels, Jones earned the reputation of a daring and resourceful officer.
USS Ranger was a 116-foot long sloop of war weighing around 314 tons. The Continental Navy first commissioned this ship in 1777 and appointed John Paul Jones to command her. On the ship’s first voyage across the Atlantic Ocean as a packet carrier, carrying messages to Benjamin Franklin in Paris, Jones captured two British vessels and sold them in France. Arriving in France, Ranger was the first American navy ship to receive a salute from a foreign navy vessel.
In 1777, however, the French monarch had not decided to support the rebellious Americans. The United States Minister to France, Benjamin Franklin, may have hedged his bet on the outcome of the American independence movement by establishing regular communications with British Prime Minister Frederick (Lord) North — or he may have initiated correspondence with North for no other purpose than to increase pressure on the French to support American independence. If it was the second reason, it worked. French statesman Charles Gravier, Count Vergennes, concerned that the American rebels and the British might solve their differences, urged King Louis XVI to support the American independence cause. When the French government communicated its intent to help the Americans, Benjamin Franklin assumed (as an extension of his position as America’s foreign minister to France) the role of advanced base force commander.
Jones arrived in France believing that he would command L’Indien, an American ship under construction in Amsterdam. Jones made several efforts to press Franklin on this matter, but he was always put off and instructed to bide his time; he would receive his orders in due course.
On 16th January 1778, Benjamin Franklin summoned Jones to Paris. Among Jones’s instructions, Franklin ordered him to equip his ship (Ranger) and prepare for operations against the British mainland. As opportunity presented itself, Jones would assault British shipping and coastal settlements as a means of creating havoc among “enemies of the United States,” by sea or otherwise, consistent with the laws of war.
Franklin further directed Jones that since France was still a neutral power, he must avoid returning to France upon completion of his mission. Franklin knew that the United States and France had reached an alliance agreement, but ratification of the accord was still pending. Franklin and Silas Deane then sternly admonished Jones to give no offense to the subjects of France or any other neutral power lest he destroys any pendant diplomatic framework.
John Paul Jones, having accepted the views of Robert Morris, believed that effective use of the American navy entailed sending ships against an unsuspecting British enemy, to surprise them, to divert the enemy’s attention away from America’s seacoast, and force them to defend their coastal ports and settlements. This, too, appears to have been the brainchild of Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane in Paris.
It was several more weeks before Ranger was ready to sail. The ship, although only recently commissioned, required new sails. Shipwrights mounted Swivel guns in the fighting tops, altered bow ports to allow firing over the bow, and reprovisioning.
But Captain Jones did not command a happy ship. Ranger‘s officers were tired of Jones’s dalliances in Nantes and Loire, and they had no confidence in their captain’s “crazy schemes.” Jones’s officers believed that his poorly contrived ideas would only bring them into mortal danger without the benefit of any subsequent prize money. While still in Portsmouth, as part of his recruiting campaign, Jones promised his officers that they would make a fortune from seizing ships and selling them. Still, so far in the Atlantic assignment, the crew had not received a single farthing after taking two enemy ships.
There was another problem, as well. The Naval officers serving aboard USS Ranger thoroughly detested the Marine commanding officer, Captain Matthew Parke. Captain Parke intended to enforce the observance of proper decorum among the ship’s company. He insisted, for example, on being addressed by his rank. Ship’s officers complained, “Since no captain of Marines is allowed to any ship or vessel under twenty guns, we take it as hardship peculiar to us, that a person in his capacity should remain in the ship to take the fourth part of the three twentieths which are the shares belonging solely to us (as lieutenants and master of the ship) of any prize money to be divided for her Officers and men.” The navy officers wanted to dispose of Parke and so requested that Captain Jones do so.
Captain Parke, fully aware of this animosity, submitted his resignation to Captain Jones, who, although disgusted with his lieutenants, accepted Parke’s resignation “with regret.” When Ranger arrived in Brest, Jones discharged Parke and replaced him with an army lieutenant named Jean Meijer.
When asked to explain his operational plan to Lieutenant Général le Comte d’Orviliers (Commander of the French Fleet at Brest), Jones proposed to descend upon some part of England, destroy merchant shipping, and kidnap a member of the nobility as a means of guaranteeing the lives (or possible exchange) of imprisoned Americans in England. Shortly afterward, Jones received orders to move Ranger to the Bay of Brest where the crew might enjoy liberty ashore and partake of French allurements. Several of the crew, including Marines, took this opportunity to abandon naval service.
As Ranger made final preparations for sea, Marine Second Lieutenant Samuel Wallingford drilled the Ranger’s Marines in small arms proficiency. The ship sailed on 8 April 1778. On the 10th, Jones captured a brigantine carrying flaxseed, seized the cargo, and sank the vessel. On the 17th, he seized a merchantman. He detailed a prize crew to return the cargo ship to Brest. A British revenue vessel challenged Ranger the next day but quickly withdrew when Jones went to battle stations. Ranger’s surgeon later criticized Jones for not employing his Marines to fire into the cutter, as in his opinion, Jones could have quickly taken the enemy vessel.
On 19 April, Captain Jones seized a schooner and a sloop near the entrance of Firth of Clyde. When Jones decided to sink both ships, his officers threw a tantrum. The next day, while operating offshore from Carrickfergus, Jones learned from a fishing vessel that HMS Drake, a 20-gun sloop, was anchored nearby. Jones decided to target Drake for a cutting out — but his officers refused. They consented, instead, to surprise the British ship by entering the lough and anchoring to her windward side, which would expose the ship to Jones’ musketry. Owing to poor weather, Jones decided to abandon his Plan B.
Whitehaven, England — on the northwest coast — was a small, insignificant port town. A man like Stephen Decatur Sr. would never think of attacking Whitehaven. On the other hand, Jones knew the British Isles like the back of his hand, and Whitehaven was the place from which he first began his maritime career.
By 22nd April, with the understanding that several commercial ships were at anchor at Whitehaven, Captain Jones prepared to execute a raid. His officers, however, saw no point in the attack because it promised neither prize money nor naval advantage. Navy lieutenants Thomas Simpson and Elijah Hall fomented rebellion among the crew. Jones later observed that these men were inferior officers, for rather than building morale, they excited the men toward disobedience to orders. Simpson and Hall managed to convince the crew that Ranger was a voting precinct, with the right to judge for themselves whether the captain’s plan was a good one. Jones contributed to these officer’s further insubordination by failing to press the matter.
The raid on Whitehaven may have been audacious, but it was poorly executed and its result embarrassing. As Ranger approached Solway Firth, the wind died away, and the ship was left to languish in swells. At midnight, still, several miles away from Whitehaven, Jones ordered two boats lowered. He would command one, with Lieutenant Meijer serving as his assistant; Second Lieutenant Wallingford would command the other boat, with Midshipman Benjamin Hill as his second. In total, thirty men manned the boats. It took several hours for both boats to arrive at the outer pier.
By then, dawn was just breaking. Without any noticeable concern about his discovery, Jones sent Wallingford’s boat to the northern end of the harbor with orders to set fire to the estimated 150 merchant ships at anchor. Jones and his men scaled the port’s southern battery walls, spiked the guns, and apprehended four sentinels found asleep on post. When Jones returned to his boat, he expected to see dozens of ships on fire — there were none. Wallingford explained that he had lost his “fire” to light the ships. Jones managed to set one ship on fire before realizing that the town was now up and about, and, as a deserter alerted the town that a raid was in progress, defenders began assembling along the water’s edge.
Captain Jones decided it was time to withdraw his raiders. As the American navy rowed back to Ranger, the townspeople fired cannon at them and an occasional pistol, causing no damage to the raiding party. Jones and his weary men arrived back aboard the ship at around 0700.
The second stage of Jones’s plan was to sail across to St. Mary’s Isle, where he hoped to kidnap the Earl of Selkirk and carry him to France as a hostage for the better treatment of American prisoners. The landing party included Jones, Wallingford, Ship’s Master David Cullam, and a dozen Marines and sailors. After assigning one man to guard the boat, Jones led his party toward the Selkirk manor.
Jones led his party ashore with Wallingford, Ship’s Master David Cullam, and a dozen sailors and Marines. After posting a sentry to guard the boat, Jones led his party toward the Selkirk manor. En route, Jones learned from the gardener that the Earl was away from home. His mission a failure, Jones turned about intending to return to the ship. Master Cullam objected, however, arguing that he and his crew should be allowed to loot the house. Jones acquiesced, insofar as the sailors would be allowed to steal the silver, but nothing more.
Lady Selkirk handed over her silver upon Cullam’s demand. In her later testimony, Lady Selkirk described Master Cullam as a disagreeable-looking man with the look of a blackguard. On the other hand, she was quite impressed with Marine lieutenant Wallingford. She characterized him as “…a civil young man, in a green uniform, an anchor on his buttons, which were white,” and “he seemed naturally well-bred and not to like his employment.” After filling several sacks of silver, Cullam and Wallingford accepted Lady Selkirk’s offer of a glass of wine, and they returned to the ship.
The Whitehaven raid was barely a footnote in history; the value of damage to enemy ships, cannon, and Lady Selkirk’s stolen silver was minuscule. The operation did qualify as an early land action involving Continental Marines, but it was nothing worth remembering.
Conversely, the effects of Jones’s raid were tremendous. The London Chronicle reported the raid stating, “A number of expresses have been dispatched to all capital seaports in the kingdom where any depredations are likely to be made; all strangers in this town are, but an order of the magistrates, to be secured and examined; similar notices have been forwarded through the country and, in short, every caution taken that the present alarming affair could suggest.”
Jones’s Whitehaven raid so aroused England that the Admiralty was forced to recall ships operating off the American seacoast to patrol the United Kingdom’s lengthy coastline — as Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane knew it would.
Feld, J. John Paul Jones’s Locker: The Mutinous Men of the Continental Ship Ranger and the Confinement of Lieutenant Thomas Simpson. Washington: Naval History and Heritage Command, 2017.
Hill, F. S. Twenty-six Historic Ships: The story of certain famous vessels of war and of their successors in the navies of the United States and of the Confederate States of America from 1775-1902. New York: Putnam, 1903.
Smith, C. R. Marines in the Revolution: A History of the Continental Marines in the American Revolution, 1775-1783. Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1975.
Griffiths, J. The 1778 Whitehaven Raid. United Kingdom History (online), 2015.
U. S. Continental Congress, Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789. W. C. Ford & Gaillard Hunt, eds. Library of Congress, 1904-37.
 Esek Hopkins, John Burroughs Hopkins, Abraham Whipple, Stephen Decatur, Sr., and Nicholas Biddle.
Indien, later commissioned South Carolina was captured by the British in 1782.
 A farthing was valued at one-quarter of a penny.
 The poor treatment of Americans under lock and key in England was well known to American sailors. Jones apparently hoped to change Britain’s neglect of humanitarian treatment of its prisoners.
 As a demonstration of varying perspectives about the same event, British historians claim that on their way to the port, Jones’s men became distracted by the strong allure of the nearby public house. It was here that this half of the crew became intoxicated and were unable to complete their mission. American historians of the same period argue that heavy rain and gales stopped the operation in its tracks. The weather conditions were so bad that none of the men were able to strike a light to set the ships on fire.
In the days of the Merovingian dynasty (c. 450 – 751 AD), when Latin was still the language of the high-born, some people were called cappellani. In the fourth century, the word referred to priests who dedicated themselves to preserving the religious relics of St. Martin of Tours. St. Martin (b. 316 – d. 397 AD) was the patron saint of France, the father of the monastic life in Gaul, and the first “great leader” of Western Monasticism. One of these relics was St. Martin’s half-cape (cappella). St. Martin’s Cappella gave its name to the tent, later chapel, where the Cappella was preserved — over time, adding religious relics to the collection. During the Carolingian dynasty (751 – 880 AD), and in particular, during the reign of Charlemagne, the priests who guarded St. Martin’s relics were called, in Old French,Chapelain.
In those days, Chaplains were appointed by the King, later Holy Roman Emperor. They lived in the palace, and in addition to guarding the sacred relics, performed mass for the monarch on feast days, worked with the royal notaries , and prepared any documents the emperor required of them. In these duties, Chaplains gradually evolved into ecclesiastical and secular advisors to the king/emperor. It became a tradition throughout western Christendom for monarchs to appoint their own chaplains. Many of these chaplains became bishops. This tradition continues today, as evidenced by the fact that the British Crown appoints members of the Royal College of Chaplains, although they no longer serve as the official keepers of records.
In modern usage, the term chaplain no longer addresses itself to any particular church or denomination. Clergy and ministers appointed to various institutions (cemeteries, prisons, legislatures, hospitals, colleges, embassies, legations, and within the armed forces) are called chaplains.
Chaplains serve in the armed forces of most countries, usually as commissioned officers. They are non-combatants and, as such, are not required to bear arms. They may bear arms, if they choose, in defense of themselves and the sick or wounded. In the United States, Roman Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and Moslem chaplains serve as chaplains in the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Navy Chaplains provide the ecclesiastical needs of the Marine Corps.
U. S. Armed Forces chaplains provide religious services and advise their commander and fellow staff officers on religion, morality, and ethics. They offer counseling services to service members and their families, operate pre-marriage counseling programs, make regular visitations to the sick and wounded, and provide opportunities for prayer services and last rites. The Army, Navy, and Air Force Chief of Chaplains provide similar advice to the U. S. Secretary of Defense.
All military chaplains must be ordained and endorsed by a recognized religious organization. A military chaplain’s rank is determined by years of service and criteria established by the military organization in which commissioned. Chaplains are recognized in uniform by rank and religious affiliation. The symbol for Christian Chaplains is the Roman Cross; a symbol of the Ten Commandments identifies Jewish Chaplains. Moslem Chaplains wear a crescent as their religious symbol.
On 29 July 1775, the Continental Congress established the military chaplaincy, but chaplains did not wear a symbol of their faith until 1880. In 1835, Army regulations required chaplains to wear black uniform coats without shoulder boards or symbols of rank. The first symbol for chaplain was a shepherd’s crook or staff, approved in 1880; the Latin Cross replaced the shepherd crook was adopted in 1898. The first Jewish Chaplain was appointed during the American Civil War, but it wasn’t until World War I that Jewish Chaplains had their own religious symbol.
On 28 November 1775, the Continental Navy published its regulations provided that, “The Commanders of the ships of the Thirteen United Colonies are to take care that divine service be performed twice a day on board, and a sermon preached on Sundays unless bad weather or other extraordinary accidents prevent.” The Navy recognized the need for chaplains but did not foresee a requirement for uniformed attire or insignia of rank or religious affiliation until 1847. At that time, the prescribed uniform was a black coat with a black collar and cuffs with no insignia. In 1864, the Navy Department authorized Navy Chaplains to wear the standard uniform of commissioned officers and the symbol of the Latin Cross. Essentially, Navy chaplains served “as officers without rank.”
In 1905, Navy Uniform Regulations provided that Chaplains would have ranks equivalent to line officers; they were to wear the standard navy officer’s uniform with the service braid in lustrous black (not gold as with line officers). The Navy later modified this requirement in 1918 to include both the officer rank insignia and a gold cross.
Naval Staff Corps regulations discontinued the black braid and replaced it with the same gold braid worn by other officers – along with the Latin Cross.
In modern times, the Navy accepts clergy from religious denominations and faith groups, but an applicant’s request is contingent upon a favorable recommendation by their religious governing authority. An applicant must meet the Navy’s requirements, including appropriate age and physical fitness. Even after acceptance, the endorsing religious authority can revoke their endorsement at any time, the effect of which leads to the separation of the chaplain from naval service.
An applicant for service as a chaplain in the Navy must be a US citizen, be at least 21 years old, hold a post-graduate degree which includes 72-hours of study in theology, religious philosophy, ethics, and foundational writing. Upon acceptance and commission, chaplains attend the Navy Chaplain School at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. There is also a Chaplain Candidate Program Officer program for seminary students interested in obtaining a commission before completing their graduate studies.
The modern mission for Navy chaplains includes religious ministry, religious facilitation for all religious beliefs, caring for Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard personnel (and their families), advising their commanding officers in spiritual matters, promote ethical and moral behavior, increase combat readiness through ministerial programs, improve morale and retention, and employ modern technology to support their missions. Assisting Navy chaplains are enlisted religious program specialists.
Several Navy chaplains have distinguished themselves in combat, including Lieutenant Vincent Capodanno (Medal of Honor), Lieutenant Commander Joseph T. O’Callahan (Medal of Honor), Commander George S. Rentz (Navy Cross), Lieutenant Thomas N. Conway (Navy Cross), and Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Aloysius H. Schmitt (Silver Star). Navy ships were named in honor of O’Callahan, Rentz, and Schmitt.
There has seldom been a Navy chaplain far from the forward edge of the battle area, whether serving aboard ship or in the field with the Marines. Pictured right, Navy chaplains conduct religious serves on Mount Suribachi, on Iwo Jima, Easter Sunday, 1945.
My personal salute to all military chaplains, particularly those of the U. S. Navy who, at the risk of their own lives, provide injured and dying Marines with comfort in their final moments. In many cases, the face of a Navy Chaplain or a Navy Corpsman is the last face our mortally wounded Marines see.
Burgsma, H. L. Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam (1962-1971). Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1985.
Drury, C. M. History of the Chaplain Corps. Washington: Navy Publications Center, 1994.
 In Gaul and early France, the title of Notary was an employee of the Royal Chancelleries, titled “Notaries of the King” and served as scribes in the royal seigniorial and communal courts of justice who maintained records of all official proceedings.
 I have only known one chaplain who wore a sidearm in combat – a Presbyterian.
 A Catholic Priest, Lieutenant Conway was assigned as the chaplain aboard USS Indianapolis when a Japanese submarine torpedoed the vessel off the Philippine Island of Leyte on 30 July 1945. More than 800 crewmen were forced into the ocean, some of whom were badly injured, and remained at the mercy of nature for three days. These men were severely dehydrated and suffered numerous shark attacks. Only 316 men survived the ordeal. Conway was recognized for swimming through shark infested waters to administer to suffering crewmen, saving as many as 67 men. Conway was one of the crew who didn’t survive; he stood by these men when they needed him most. His award was delayed for 75 years, finally presented to family members on 8 January 2021.
The entry to the Playboy Club was not what you might suspect. No sophisticated foyer with muted music and a warm greeting by a Bunny that an aerospace engineer would reject due to her high drag profile. Our entry had curious names, like the Bicycle Seat, the Heart, the Parrot’s Beak, or the Light Bulb. Through those doorways, we entered the Ho Chi Minh Trail area in Laos, adjacent to the North-South Vietnamese demilitarized zone.
The names referred to geographical landmarks easily made out from the air, shaped like the title they carried. We flew the TA-4 aircraft; our mission was high speed, low-level visual reconnaissance. In short, we were after intelligence concerning troop movements, truck parks, supply areas, guns—anything to help take the guesswork out of the command estimate of enemy capabilities.
We weren’t always called Playboys. In 1966, we used the call sign Condole and did mostly support work: calling in close air support, adjusting artillery, and coordinating naval gunfire. Some referred to us as “Fast FAC,” or fast moving forward air controllers. We used a trusty old two-seater called the TF-9J Cougar, which proved slow and ill designed for mission requirements. The most frequent gripe was the radio: we had to wire an infantry backpack PRC-25 radio to the glare shield in the back seat, remove the flight helmet, and talk over a hand-held mike.
In 1969, the tandem seat TA-4 Skyhawk replaced the Cougar, and with it came the call sign “Playboy.”
We were a rag tag outfit, much like Pappy Boyington’s Black Sheep in World War II. We became an integral part of the Marine Air Group’s Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron (H&MS), which performed the important job of intermediate maintenance for the fighter and attack squadrons within the Group. In that respect, it was NOT rag tag. When it came to flying, the aircrews came from everywhere. Usually they were shuffling paper in a staff section somewhere within the Air Wing. The nucleus was, of course, a handful of pilots assigned to H&MS.
The men who joined the Da Nang Playboy Club were volunteers, and carefully screened by the skipper. The crews were selected based on reputation, experience (one previous combat tour), and demonstrated professionalism. Initially composed of only pilots, four Naval Flight Officers (NFOs) were accepted during 1970. Three of the four were FAA rated pilots, and two of the three were eventually able to use their flying skills during the course of the program. Toward the end of the mission, the process of selecting pilots and aircrew was highly discriminating.
Our working area on the trail covered about 2,700 square miles, and we flew between one hundred and 1,500 feet above ground level as fast as that little bucket of bolts would go. It took quite a few flights before pilots and aircrew developed their 400-knot eyeball, but we did engage our targets, and we did collect valuable intelligence. The key to our mission effectiveness was “trail experience.” Aircrew eventually developed the capability of determining whether a group of bushes had moved from one day to the next, or if a clump of vegetation hadn’t been there the day before. Moving bushes usually received a bomb, or two.
And, we learned to respect the enemy. Under constant surveillance and attack, he moved people, supplies, and constructed vast road networks with only basic equipment. And he did this in a systematic and successful way against the most highly industrialized and technologically sophisticated nation in the world. From that experience came the frustrating question, “How can they do that when we’re working so hard to oppose them?” The answer is both simple and complex; it forms the basis of our question of involvement in the first place.
We considered ourselves an unusual group, yet looking back we were only a cross section from any town in the United States. We had a Baptist preacher, and a hard-drinking, cigar chewing poker player. Some of these men became legends in their own time, now forgotten except among their comrades.
In the 19 months of the Playboy operations, we lost only one aircraft. Rick Lewis won the Silver Star by helping his back-seater during a rescue effort, and calling in air strikes against enemy gun emplacements. Don Schwaby, in another incident, had just entered the operations area when a small arms round hit the nose of his aircraft, went through the instrument panel, and continued into his oxygen mask. The slug came to rest between his lips, against his teeth, and never even broke the skin. Not many guys catch bullets that way.
The only death that resulted from the program was a shock to the squadron. After operating for so long in such a high-threat environment, we all had taken several hits. But we all came back. After all, Rick Lewis was a walking example. Lieutenant Colonel George Ward, groomed to take command of the squadron in only a few weeks, was shot through the head while on a mission. The back-seater flew the plane back to the base. A squadron commander shapes the personality of his unit; we all felt his loss. Reacting to his loss, higher authority imposed an altitude restriction on the squadron —no lower than five grand. But that was too high to do the job, so back down into the grass we flew. Later, as I watched the evacuation of Saigon on television, I thought about George Ward.
The Playboy Program ended during September 1970. I returned to the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing at Cherry Point, North Carolina in December of that year. For a long time, I felt that I had been involved in the most exciting, professionally demanding, and personally challenging era of my life. And I was content in the knowledge that, as Patton suggested, if my son asked me what I did in Viet Nam, I would NOT have to tell him, I shoveled shit in Louisiana.
In the years that have passed, several Playboys have tried to hold a reunion. It has never been successful. In the past, our duty assignments spread us so far apart, and since then we have all retired from active service. I’m quite certain our after-action reports gather dust in an obscure file drawer somewhere… As a group, we paid some very special dues to our country, to our Corps, and ourselves. Yet, if my son asks me what is or has been especially exciting to me as a Marine, I’ll have to answer, “The job I did today, and the one I get to do tomorrow.”
At dawn on 25 June 1950, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) unleashed massive artillery fire into the Republic of (South) Korea (ROK). On the heels of the barrage, the NKPA invaded the ROK with a force of 135,000 troops organized into eight infantry divisions, 24 artillery regiments, 120 Soviet T-34 tanks, five constabulary brigades, and 180 Soviet aircraft.
Understandably, the South Korean people were terrified, illustrated by a massive surge of refugees heading south from Seoul to safer locations. However, they wouldn’t find any haven because the NKPA seized the ROK capital in two days and then continued their attack south. The communists intended to seize the entire Korean peninsula. Thousands of refugees preceded the NKPA forces — their legs moving as fast as possible to escape the slaughter. The people were terrified, and by mid-July 1950, the United States and South Korean governments had done nothing to allay those fears.
The U. S. Army occupation forces stationed in Japan did what they could to stop the invasion, but they were young soldiers, untrained, inexperienced, inadequately equipped, poorly led, and sent to confront the NKPA in insufficient strength to stop the onslaught. Throughout July, US Army forces experienced one defeat after another. In time, victory over the Americans is what the NKPA commanders came to expect.
Every day, thousands of refugees streamed into the southeastern city of Pusan, seeking protection. For the most part, the South Korean refugees were simple people. They didn’t understand any of the reasons for this sudden war. What they did know was that their lives were in jeopardy. They had witnessed the NKPA’s ruthlessness; they had seen American Army slaughtered and overwhelmed. The fear among the refugees was palpable. One American journalist noted that in Pusan, one could almost smell the fear in the people — their panic worsening with each passing day.
But then, beginning in the late afternoon of 2 August 1950, a remarkable and easily observable transition began taking shape. American ships began arriving in the port city of Pusan. The word went out. These ships were carrying United States Marines. People started crowding around the docks; they wanted to know more. Unloading operations began as soon as the ships tied up along a pier.
Early the next morning, Marines began to form upon the pier. They were dressed in combat uniforms, were well-armed, and carried field packs on their backs. There were close to 5,000 men when assembled—a color guard formed in front of the Brigade. A large crowd of Korean civilians stood back and observed the goings-on. The Koreans no doubt wondered if these soldiers would save them; they may have noted that if any of these American Marines were fearful, it didn’t show in their demeanor or expressions. Word quickly spread throughout the city. There was still hope.
Although the average age of these young men was only 19½ years, they exuded discipline, confidence, and determination. There was nothing timid about these youngsters; they understood their mission: find the enemy and kill him. It didn’t take long for NKPA commanders to realize that the tide was turning against them.
While company and platoon officers and NCOs mustered Marines on the pier, their Commanding General, Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, concluded his meeting with his subordinate commanders and senior staff. Colonel (select) Raymond L. Murray commanded the 5th Marine Regiment. Lieutenant Colonel George Newton commanded 1st Battalion; Lieutenant Colonel Harold Roise commanded 2nd Battalion, and Lieutenant Colonel Robert Taplett commanded 3rd Battalion. Craig issued his “commander’s guidance” (See also: The Fire Brigade), concluding with this strict admonition:
“The Pusan perimeter is like a weakened dike; the Army intends to use us to plug the holes as they open. We’re a brigade —a fire brigade. It will be costly fighting against a numerically superior enemy. Marines have never lost a battle; this Brigade will not be the first to establish such a precedent. Prepare to move.”
Within an hour, the Marines of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade were en route toward a small town named Chang-won, the designated assembly area for the Eighth US Army reserve.
The Tactical Situation
The Battle of Osan was the first significant US engagement inf the Korean War. Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army, ordered Task Force Smith (1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment (reinforced)) (1/21 INF) to set up a blocking position against an overwhelming NKPA force on 5 July. It was an unreasonable assignment and failed to slow the NKPA assault for more than a couple of hours. Task Force Smith suffered 180 dead, wounded, scattered, and/or captured. NKPA soldiers bound some of the American prisoners with their hands behind their backs and then executed them.
As elements of the 24th Infantry Division (24 ID) arrived in Korea from Japan, the NKPA continued to press south, pushing American and South Korean forces back at Pyeongtaek, Cho-nan, and Chochiwon. At the Battle of Taejon, 24 ID suffered 3,602 dead and wounded. Nearly 3,000 U.S. soldiers were taken, prisoner. The NKPA continued their attack.
By the time the Marines arrived on 2 August Eighth Army’s position was unsustainable. US/ROK forces occupied a tiny section of the Pusan Perimeter’s southeast corner. General Walton H. Walker, commanding the Eighth Army, had traded space for time. All that remained in US hands was a small sector 90 miles long and 60 miles wide. General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), ordered soldiers in by the thousands. Not only did Walker need fighting units, but he also needed replacements for the dead and wounded. The first to arrive included the 1st Cavalry Division (1 CAV), 2nd Infantry Division (2 ID), and 25th Infantry Division (25 ID).
Walker faced two critical challenges. First, because replacements were arriving in piecemeal fashion, General Walker could only plug them into units positioned at critical junctions. They could not attack the enemy; they could only hold these key positions — and even that was dicey. The second problem was that Walker’s reinforcements, while fresh from stateside or territorial commands, were still only minimally trained. Most of these men had no previous combat experience. Walker worried because if the Eighth Army lost the Pusan Perimeter, there would be no way to land further replacements or supplies — and no way to withdraw any survivors.
General Walker designated the 25th ID as Task Force Kean, after the division commander, Major General William B. Kean. Walker assigned Craig’s Brigade to reinforce Task Force Kean. Kean’s subordinate units included the 24 INF, 27 INF, 35 INF, and the 5th Regimental Combat Team (5 RCT).
On 6th August, Colonel Murray led his 5th Marines toward Chindong-ni. General Kean intended to replace the 27 INF with the 5th Marines. Lieutenant Colonel Taplett’s 3/5 (reinforced) moved toward Changwon to replace 2/27 INF on the line two miles outside Chindong-ni, where the road to Mason takes a sharp northward turn into the village of Tosan.
Taplett effected the relief of 2/27 INF within two hours, establishing his command post (CP) on the first step of Hill 255 co-located with Weapons Company, 3/5. Temporarily under the operational control of HQ 27 INF, Taplett answered to Colonel John H. Michaelis, the army regiment’s commander. Taplett’s mission was to provide a blocking force; he needed a tight defensive line to do that.
Lieutenant Colonel Taplett ordered Captain Fegan to set in his Company H (How Company) above his CP to have a good field of observation of enemy movements. Taplett directed First Lieutenant Robert D. Bohn, commanding Company G (George Company), to set in two rifle platoons on Hill 99, situated west of Hill 255, and one platoon on a small knoll at the base of Hill 255.
Lieutenant Bohn directed the 1st Platoon to take the knoll position. Commanding 1st Platoon was Second Lieutenant John J. H. Cahill, USMC. Cahill’s platoon was reinforced by a 75mm recoilless rifle platoon.
The six platoons of George and How companies shared a tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) extending some 3,000 yards. Taplett’s only reserve force consisted of the headquarters element. Shortly after midnight on 7th August, Colonel Michaelis ordered Taplett to dispatch a rifle platoon to reinforce Baker Company, 1/27 INF atop Hill 342. Taplett contacted Colonel Murray (CO, 5th Marines) to argue that he could ill-afford lose one-sixth of his infantry force. Murray explained that General Dean had ordered Hill 342 held at all costs, and Taplett must provide the platoon.
Taplett assigned the mission to First Lieutenant Bohn; Bohn tasked Blackie Cahill.
Hill 342 was a massive molar-shaped structure rising steeply from the MSR west of Chindong-ni, extending northward 2,000 yards to another hill mass that was nearly 2,000 feet in elevation. Elements of the NKPA 6th Infantry Division occupied the second hill mass. The terrain was steep, the footing unsure, and the hillside inundated with shrub vegetation. Before leaving 3/5’s perimeter, Taplett ordered Cahill reinforced with a machinegun squad and a radio operator. None of Cahill’s men had more than a couple of hours of rest before embarking on this relief mission.
There was one minor glitch: Cahill reached Colonel Michaelis’ CP near a bridge south of Hill 99 at around 03:00. Michaelis being absent, the regimental operations officer directed Cahill to proceed 700 yards further down the MSR and reported to the CO 2nd Battalion, 5 RCT (2/5 RCT), whose CP was located just north of the MSR at the tip of Hill 342’s eastern-most base. The Army operations officer informed Cahill that he wasn’t reinforcing Company B; he was replacing it. 27 INF needed this rifle company as part of General Kean’s reserve force. 5 RCT could not relieve Company B because 5 RCT was scheduled to begin an offensive within a few hours.
2ndLt Cahill no doubt wondered how a rifle platoon could realistically replace an infantry company, but Cahill was a combat veteran, and he made no bones about it. After a quick briefing by an operations officer at 2/5 RCT’s CP, a guide led Cahill and his platoon northward, skirting the western base of Hill 352. A few hundred yards along, the army guide discovered that he had lost his way in the darkness. A few enemy artillery shells landed nearby, but there were no casualties. When Cahill’s column reached the end of the valley, rifle fire erupted, wounding two Marines. The army guide advised Cahill that he should not begin his climb until dawn because of the slippery footing and the nervous condition of Baker Company’s soldiers. At 0500, Cahill’s Marines had marched 3 miles from Hill 99.
At dawn, Cahill realized that the earlier rifle fire had come from soldiers of 2/5 RCT, spooked by the Marine’s movements in the pitch-black early morning hours. Cahill took the lead in the climb. At first, the Marines made good progress, but the heat soon became a war-stopper. The temperature was around 112 degrees. Cahill’s Marines began gasping for air, sweating profusely, and stumbling on the steep, slippery pathways. For every five steps upward, they slipped back three. Water discipline collapsed, and canteens soon emptied. It wasn’t long before Cahill’s Marines began collapsing from heat exhaustion, and some of these young men lost consciousness — they were on the verge of having a heat stroke. Cahill’s platoon became a ragged file, but as Cahill’s NCOs urged the men forward, Cahill increased his pace and proceeded to the crest of the hill.
Cahill finally reached Hill 342’s summit at around 08:30, where he met the Army company commander. The captain began briefing Cahill on his company’s defensive positions. Baker Company, he explained, had been under continuous enemy fire within their triangle-shaped perimeter. All three of the Company’s platoons were shattered. Just as Cahill’s platoon began straggling into the army perimeter, NKPA forces opened fire from well-concealed positions from an adjacent hill. Cahill’s NCOs quickly set the Marines into firing positions. So far, Cahill had lost one man killed, six others wounded. Considering both combat and heat casualties, Cahill’s 52-man platoon at the base of Hill 342 had only 37 effectives at its summit. NKPA intensive fire had a demoralizing effect on the soldiers, and it was all the unit’s officers could do to keep them in their defensive positions. In a brilliant move, Cahill suggested to the Army commander that he set Marines into positions among the soldiers. Cahill understood service rivalry; knowing that the soldiers and Marines were eyeing one another, service pride kicked in, and the troops on the line, both Army and Marine, settled down to the business at hand. Cahill lost two additional Marines to enemy fire as his NCOs were setting them into position.
Improvise — Adapt — Overcome
At noon, several companies of NKPA troops assaulted the summit of Hill 342 supported by intense machine gunfire. Despite the onslaught, Marines and soldiers delivered well-aimed return fire. However, the situation was desperate, and Baker Company was ordered by 5 RCT to remain in-place until a larger force of Marines could relieve them. 2ndLt Cahill used his radio to call in Army artillery support to silence enemy mortars. As the artillery unit registered its fires, Cahill looked for and spotted an enemy, forward observer. Yet, despite the artillery battery’s accurate barrage, NKPA mortars continued to rain down on the soldiers and Marines. Then, with water and ammunition becoming in short supply, Cahill radioed in for an airdrop. Within a short time, a USAF R4D flew over Hill 342 and dropped badly needed ammunition and water — the resupply landed amid the enemy positions.
Cahill was back on the radio in short order. 1stMarBde handed the resupply mission to Marine Observation Squadron (VMO)-6, whose OY-2 aircraft dropped ammunition and water inside the Baker Company perimeter. But, as the water cans hit the earth, most exploded, and the Marines and soldiers had to make do with only a few mouthfuls of water each. Cahill’s Sergeant Macy volunteered to lead a patrol in search of water. With permission granted, Macy and a few volunteers descended the southeastern slope under enemy fire, lugging 5-gallon cans along with them. Meanwhile, the NKPA was working to surround and cut off Hill 342
While Cahill was making his way toward Hill 342, the rest of Taplett’s 3/5 (set in along the base of Hill 255) came under enemy mortar fire beginning at around 02:30 on 7 August. Taplett was anxious about the situation with Cahill, but there was nothing he could do about it until sun up.
At around 02:00, Lieutenant Colonel Roise’s 2/5 began moving by truck to its terminus at the base of Hill 255. NKPA delivered devastating mortar fire. Roise was fortunate to lose only one Marine killed and eleven wounded — including Captain George E. Kittredge, the CO of Easy Company, 2/5. Once 2/5 arrived in the vicinity of Hill 255, operational control of 2/5 and 3/5 reverted to Colonel Murray. Murray ordered Roise to occupy Hill 99. After repositioning 1/5, George Company 3/5 rejoined Taplett’s main body.
General Keane planned for 5 RCT to begin its assault at 0500, but the advance was stopped cold in the first hour. The NKPA were not particularly impressed with Kean’s assault; they launched an attack of their own. Cahill’s fight on Hill 342 constrained the entire 2nd Battalion, 5 RCT, in its attempt to hold open the Chinju Road. Attaching Cahill’s platoon to Baker Company — and leaving the army company in place — was helping to do that, but the 5 RCT’s second battalion was temporarily lost to the regiment.
General Keane was desperate. He ordered Murray to provide a battalion to relieve 2/5 RCT, and the mission assigned to 1/5. Colonel Roise’s mission was to relieve the army battalion and clear the area of enemy forces. Keane then ordered Craig to assume command of all forward units in the Chindong-ni area.
When 2/5 reached the base of Hill 342, Colonel Roise ordered Dog Company to ascend the north fork toward Hill 342’s eastern spur and seize both the spur and the great hill. First Lieutenant William E. Sweeney, newly appointed commander of Easy Company, was ordered to pass behind Sangnyong-ni and seize the western spur. It was a wide dispersal of a light battalion, but Murray needed Roise to protect the valley between the two spurs and this was the only way he could do it. The CO of D Company was Captain John Finn. As the company ascended Hill 342, the Marines, having spent a sleepless night, began to experience the effects of rapidly increasing heat. Thirty minutes into the climb, Finn’s Marines encountered rifle and machine gun fire. Roise’s Operations Officer, Major Morgan J. McNeely, had previously told Finn that he would encounter no organized enemy resistance. The constant chatter of Chinese-made burp guns proved McNeely wrong.
Finn called together his platoon commanders, assigning each a route to ascend Hill 342. 2nd Platoon, under Second Lieutenant Wallace J. Reid, was ordered to push through Taepyong-ni and begin his climb at its juncture with the spur. Second Lieutenant Edward T. Emmelman would lead his 3rd Platoon to the top of the spur from the left. Second Lieutenant Arthur A. Oakley, commanding 1st Platoon, would hold the right flank and ascend the southern slope of Hill 342. Enemy opposition was scattered, but before Dog Company reached the crest of the spur, five Marines had received gunshot wounds. As with Cahill’s Marines, Captain Finn’s men were suffering the effects of heat exhaustion in the triple-digit heat.
Captain Finn ordered his executive officer (XO), First Lieutenant Robert T. Hannifin, to establish the company headquarters and mortar section on the high ground directly above Taepyong-ni. At dusk, Dog Company was still several hundred yards from the summit of Hill 342. Finn radioed Roise for permission to rest his men for the night. While Finn was communicating with Roise, 2ndLt Oakley climbed to the summit and contacted Cahill and the Baker Company commander — both of whom accompanied Oakley to Finn’s position. The Army CO advised Finn to remain in place until early the next morning and Roise agreed.
During the early morning hours of 8 August, NKPA troops covertly approached the perimeter of Hill 342. At first light, the enemy assaulted the crest of the hill. The fight turned into a gruesome hand-to-hand struggle. Soldiers and Marines repelled the attack, but not without taking serious casualties. One Marine died from gunshot and bayonet wounds. Captain Finn’s three platoons assaulted the hill, brushing aside enemy resistance and joining what was left of Baker Company and Cahill’s platoon. While effecting the relief, NKPA rifle and automatic weapons punished the perimeter with intensive fire.
Once Dog Company was in possession of the summit perimeter, Baker Company and Cahill’s Marines descended the hill. Cahill had lost one-third of his men. Captain Finn fared no better. NKPA fire killed several of his men while setting in their defenses, including 2ndLt Oakley and 2ndLt. Reid. 2ndLt Emmelman received a serious head wound. As Captain Finn moved forward to recover Reid’s body, he too was struck in the shoulder and head.
First Lieutenant Hannifin, assigned to direct the company headquarters and mortar platoon, moved forward to join the rest of Company D at the summit. Just below the summit, he encountered the First Sergeant, who was helping to evacuate Captain Finn. Hannifin learned that he was now the CO of Dog Company. He was also the only officer remaining alive in the company. In the absence of officers commanding platoons, the NCOs stepped up.
1stLt Hannifin reached the summit of Hill 342 with just enough time to organize the defenses and set in his mortars before the NKPA initiated a second attack. The Marines beat back the assault, killing dozens of the attackers, but the company had lost and additional six killed and 25 wounded. While speaking with Roise on the field radio, Hannifin collapsed due to heat exhaustion. Master Sergeant Harold Reeves assumed command of Dog Company. Second Lieutenant Leroy K. Wirth, a forward observer from 1/11 assumed responsibility for all supporting arms, including aircraft from MAG-33 circling overhead. Both Reeves and Wirth exposed themselves to enemy fire by ranging forward to call in airstrikes and reassess their tactical situation.
Easy Company 2/5 moved forward along the western spur of Hill 342 and dug in. Colonel Roise dispatched Captain Andrew M. Zimmer, who was serving as 2/5’s assistant operations officer, to take command of Dog Company. NKPA forces continued to harass Zimmer’s Marines at the summit, but because the enemy had taken a massive number of casualties in the fight, they gave the Marines of Dog Company a wide birth.
Major Walter Gall, commanding Weapons Company 2/5, dispatched a combat patrol to eliminate NKPA machine guns in Tokkong-ni. Unable to dislodge the communists, the patrol returned to Gall and briefed him on the enemy situation. With this information, 1stLt Ira T. Carr unleashed his 81mm mortar section and all enemy activity in Tokkong-ni ended.
On the afternoon of 9 August, an Army unit relieved Dog Company at the summit and 2/24 INF relieved Roise’s 2/5 of its responsibility for Hill 342. Documents later retrieved from enemy dead revealed that the NKPA forces engaged with soldiers and Marines at the summit were members of the 13th and 15th Regiments of the NKPA 6th Infantry Division. Cahill reported a conservative estimate of 150 dead communists in the hill fight, in total around 400 enemy KIA, but the actual number is unknown. What is known is that between 500 to 600 communist troops challenged the Marines and soldiers to the right to possess Hill 342 — and lost.
For his effort atop Hill 342, then Second Lieutenant Blackie Cahill received the Silver Star medal and a Purple Heart. The courageous Marine officer would later receive three additional Purple Heart medals and the Bronze Star.
Appleman, R. E. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu. Washington: Department of the Army, 1998.
Catchpole, B. The Korean War. London: Robinson Publishing, 2001.
Geer, A. The New Breed: The Story of the U.S. Marines in Korea. New York: Harper & Bros., 1952.
Hastings, M. The Korean War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988.
Varhola, M. J. Fire and Ice: The Korean War, 1950-1953. Mason City: Da Capo Press, 2000.
 Sixty-five percent of the Brigade’s officers and NCOs were combat veterans from World War II.
 Bob Taplett (1918-2004) served with distinction as a Marine officer for twenty years, serving in World War II and the Korean War. He was awarded the Navy Cross and two awards of the Silver Star medal in recognition of his courage under fire. Retiring in 1960, Taplett authored an autobiography titled Darkhorse Six, which was published in 2003.
 Hill 342 stood 342 meters above sea level (1,122 feet), a substantial climb in full combat gear in 112° temperatures.
 General Kean’s plan was to withdraw 27 INF to serve in division reserve, replacing it with 5th Marines. The Army’s 5 RCT would serve on the Marine’s right flank.
 The 5th Marines, hastily formed for combat duty at Camp Pendleton, departed California on 7 July. The regiment was understrength. Typically, a Marine infantry battalion consists of an H&S Company, Weapons Company, and three rifle companies. This is the standard configuration for a maneuver unit. In July 1950, Murray’s battalions consisted of an H&S Company, Weapons Company, and two rifle companies. These personnel shortages were the result of President Truman’s scheme to gut the U.S. military following World War II.
 Second Lieutenant John J. H. (“Blackie”) Cahill (1924-2005) served in the U. S. Marine Corps (1939-1974). There is not much that we know about Cahill, beyond the fact that he likely served aboard ship during the New Guinea campaign, later participated in the island campaigns of the Gilbert Islands, at Cape Gloucester, Peleliu, and Okinawa as an enlisted Marine. He may have left active service at the end of World War II to attend college. In 1950, Cahill was a 2nd Lieutenant with Company G, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines during the battle for Pusan. He later served with the 5th Marines at the Chosin Reservoir. He later served three tours of duty in Vietnam, notably at the Battle of Khe Sanh when he commanded 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. Cahill’s twin brother Vincent also served in World War II in the Army Air Corps. Colonel Vincent S. Cahill retired from the U.S. Air Force in 1976.
 The 75mm Recoilless Rifle was a tripod-mounted weapon weighing 114.5 pounds. It fired HE, HEAT, and WP rounds, had a range of 7,000 yards, and was effective against T-34 tanks within 400 yards. A RR platoon consisted of four rifles/14 Marines.
 Every Marine, regardless of MOS, is a qualified infantry rifleman.
 General Craig was underwhelmed with 5 RCT’s performance; there was, in his opinion, no good reason for the army regiment’s lack of advance — except that the forward area was confused. In the one-lane dirt roads, military traffic had jammed the MSR and none of the US forces could advance or withdraw. Craig realized that the slowness of the 5 RCT’s advance had opened the door to the NKPA, which had launched its own attack.
As summarized in McNamara’s Folly, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara threw a costly wrench into the contest for control of the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ). His inane plan not only escalated the material costs of fighting the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), but it also dramatically increased the number of Marines, soldiers, and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops who were killed and wounded while building it.
Not a single Marine commander favored the so-called McNamara Line in I CTZ. Shaking his head in disgust, one Marine officer said, “With these bastards, you’d have to build the [wall] all the way to India and it would take the entire Marine Corps and half the Army to guard it — and even then, they’d probably burrow under it.” Even the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in his testimony before Congress, rigorously opposed the McNamara Line.
The Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) assigned overall operational responsibility for I CTZ to the Third Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF). In land area, I CTZ involved roughly 18,000 square miles. III MAF included the 1st Marine Division (1stMarDiv), 3rd Marine Division (3rdMarDiv), 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1stMAW), 3rd Force Logistics Command (3rdFLC), Provisional Corps, Vietnam, 1st Cavalry Division, 101st Airborne Division, Americal Division, Sub Unit 1, First Radio Battalion, 29th Civil Affairs Company, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion, and several ARVN and Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) commands.
The McNamara Line placed US Forces in I CTZ in a dangerous position because in order to construct the barrier, III MAF had to divert Marines away from their combat assignments to build it. With the 1stMarDiv operating near Chu Lai, in Quang Nam Province (65 miles south of Da Nang), responsibility for northern I Corps (abutting the demilitarized zone (DMZ)) fell to the 3rdMarDiv. Despite the fact that the 3rdMarDiv was the largest Marine division ever formed in the history of the Marine Corps, it still didn’t have the men it needed to defend northern I Corps.
The task of building the McNamara Line fell upon Navy and Marine Corps combat engineers; Marine infantrymen provided much of the manual labor, and 3rdMarDiv regiments and separate battalions had to provide protection to those who labored in its construction. Beside the already complicated matter of building the line, COMUSMACV wanted to project completed “yesterday.”
NVA commanders watched the construction activities with keen interest, no doubt asking themselves how the NVA could use the McNamara disruption to their advantage. At the beginning of July 1967, the NVA had 35,000 troops assembled just north of the DMZ. Their intention was to swarm across the Marine outpost at Con Thien, overwhelm US forces operating in Leatherneck Square, and invade en mass all of Quang Tri Province.
Con Thien (The Hill of Angels) was important to the Marines because the location was situated high enough in elevation to provide an excellent observation post over one of the primary NVA routes into South Vietnam. Moreover, anyone standing atop the 160-meter hill at Con Thien looking southeast could observe the entire forward logistics base at Dong Ha.
The NVA (supported by heavy artillery and mortar fire) made two thrusts at Con Thien. The first (and largest) of these attacks specifically targeted the Marine position at Hill 160. Operation Buffalo commenced on 2 July. Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. “Spike” Schening deployed his 1st Battalion, 9th Marines (1/9) in and around Con Thien. Alpha Company and Bravo Company operated north-northeast of a strong point along Route 561, Delta Company and H&S Company occupied the battalion’s perimeter, and Charlie Company was detached to provide security for HQ 9th Marines at Dong Ha.
According to the 9th Marine’s commander, Colonel George E. Jerue, “The TAOR assigned to the 9th Marines was so large that the regiment did not have the option of conducting security patrols on a regular basis. The NVA, realizing these limitations, would withdraw from the area until after a patrol had completed its mission, and then re-infiltrate the area just cleared.” It was for this reason that Alpha and Bravo companies were sent to control Route 561.
On the morning of 2 July, Captain Sterling K. Coates led his Bravo Company into its heaviest engagement of the Vietnam War. Bravo Company and Captain Albert C. Slater’s Alpha Company moved abreast in a northward direction along Route 561. Both companies stepped off at 08:00. Alpha Company was on the right. Route 561 was a ten-foot-wide cart path bordered by waist-high hedgerows. Unknown to either Coates or Slater, two NVA infantry battalions were waiting for them behind well-prepared fighting positions. The next few hours would transform the Hill of Angels into a meat grinder.
Within an hour, 2nd Platoon (2ndPlt) Bravo Company achieved its first objective, a small crossroad some 1,200 meters north of the trace. Enemy snipers began taking 3rdPlt and the company command element under fire as soon as they reached the crossroad. As Captain Coates shifted the 3rdPlt to suppress the enemy fire, the NVA intensified its delivery. Coates halted the 3rdPlt’s advance and directed 2ndPlt to shift right in an attempt to outflank the enemy’s position. At the same time, Captain Coates ordered 1stPlt to move forward for rear area security and/or reinforcement if required. NVA fire halted 2ndPlt’s advance. Within a few moments, Bravo Company began receiving heavy small arms fire from the front and both flanks. With the Marines halted and assuming a defense, the NVA began to deliver artillery and mortar fire.
Alpha Company Marines tripped two booby traps, injuring several Marines. The company advance was halted while Captain Slater called for a medevac. Once the wounded Marines had been evacuated, Slater moved forward in an attempt to link up with Coates but was prevented from doing so by heavy enemy fire.
Bravo Company casualties were mounting by the second — its position rapidly deteriorating as the NVA successfully cut 3rdPlt and the command element from 2ndPlt. With the Marines under heavy fire, enemy soldiers armed with flame weapons ignited the hedgerows on both sides of the road. 2ndPlt launched an assault to help 3rdPlt, but enemy artillery and mortar fire increased. With a grass fire threatening to overwhelm them, Marines withdrew only to enter into a killing zone of NVA machine guns.
Enemy artillery killed Captain Coates, his radio operator, two platoon commanders, and the company artillery forward observer. The Forward Air Controller, Captain Warren O. Keneipp, assumed command of Bravo Company, but without a radio operator, Captain Keneipp lost contact with 2ndPlt and had no control over subsequent events (please see comment below). The company executive officer (XO) (2nd in command) was with 2ndPlt; his radio was the only source of comms with the battalion command post (CP), but cut off from the rest of the company, the XO was in no position to influence the action.
Staff Sergeant Leon R. Burns commanded 1stPlt. He led the platoon forward to reinforce 2ndPlt and 3rdPlt, but enemy assaults hindered his advance. Burns called in air strikes and specifically asked for napalm. The strike delivered the much-needed munitions within twenty meters of the 1stPlt’s position. After the airstrike, the enemy assault faltered, which allowed Burns to move forward and incorporate what remained of the 2ndPlt. After placing his Marines into a hasty defense, the company’s Navy Corpsmen began treating their wounded Marines.
Upon learning that Alpha and Bravo companies had run into a hornet’s nest, and the Bravo Company commander had been killed, Colonel Schening dispatched Captain Henry J. Radcliffe (the Battalion Operations Officer) to take command of Bravo Company. Radcliffe led forward an additional rifle platoon from Delta Company and four tanks. First Lieutenant Gatlin J. Howell (the Battalion Intelligence Officer) accompanied Radcliffe because his familiarity with the terrain surrounding Con Thien.
Radcliffe’s arrival at the point of contact was timely because his relief platoon foiled an NVA attempt to encircle Bravo Company. As the tanks and helicopter gunships dispersed the NVA, Delta Company moved forward with its two remaining rifle platoons. Radcliffe directed the Delta Company commander to secure a landing zone. Within minutes, Charlie Company began to arrive by helicopter from Dong Ha.
With additional support from Charlie and Delta companies, Radcliffe continued his assault. When Captain Radcliffe made contact with Staff Sergeant Burns, he asked, “Where is the rest of Bravo Company?” Burns answered, “Sir, you’re looking at all that’s left of Bravo Company.”
With Burns supervising the evacuation of wounded and dead Marines, Radcliffe continued forward to Bravo Company’s furthest advance. At that point, Radcliffe established defensive positions and began attending to the 3rdPlt’s dead and wounded. Lieutenant Howell, who had previously commanded 3rdPlt, quickly searched for Marines and helped move them back to the corpsman for triage. At that moment, the enemy re-initiated artillery fire and the company’s withdrawal was made more difficult when two of the supporting tanks triggered landmines.
Radcliffe shepherded the casualties into the landing zone for medevac. While waiting for the airlift, NVA dropped mortars into the LZ, inflicting even more casualties on the medical corpsmen and litter bearers. By this time, the fog of war had completely descended upon 1/9’s forward elements. With officers and senior NCOs killed and wounded, corporals took charge. The NVA’s artillery assault on the landing zone precluded additional helicopter support, so ambulatory Marines began carrying their wounded brothers back to Con Thien.
Throughout the battle, Marine and naval gunfire engaged the enemy in a furious duel. During that day, Schening’s CP received over 700 enemy artillery rounds. Marine aircraft flew 28 sorties, dropping 90 tons of munitions on the well-fortified enemy positions.
Meanwhile, Captain Slater’s Alpha Company remained heavily engaged. The number of Marine casualties brought the company to a standstill, prompting Slater to order his 3rdPlt to establish a hasty landing zone defense in the company rear area. After the first flight of evac helicopters departed the zone, NVA hit the 3rdPlt with mortar fire and a ground assault. Slater moved his 2ndPlt and command group to reinforce the 3rdPlt. The NVA moved to within 50 meters of the company line before Marine fire broke the attack, but owing to the number of their casualties, Alpha Company was relegated to a defensive position until the NVA force withdrew later that evening.
As Colonel Schening moved his CP forward, he sent his XO, Major Darrell C. Danielson, ahead with additional reinforcements and transport to help evacuate the casualties. When Danielson contacted the fifty remaining Marines, he organized a medical evaluation and called for medevacs. Several Marines were bleeding out, everyone appeared to be in a state of shock. Despite on-going enemy artillery and mortar fire, Danielson managed to extricate Alpha and Bravo companies back to Con Thien.
Colonel Schening reported his situation to the Colonel Jerue, the regimental commander: situation critical. Jerue ordered Major Willard J. Woodring, commanding 3/9, to reinforce Schening. Upon arrival, Schening directed Woodring to assume operational control of Alpha and Charlie companies (1/9). Major Woodring directed a five-company assault on the enemy flanks while what remained of Bravo and the LZ security platoon from Delta company withdrew into Con Thien. Woodring’s aggressive assault caused the NVA units to withdraw. Later in the day, Staff Sergeant Burns reported only 27 combat effectives remained in Bravo Company. In total, 1/9 had lost 84 killed in action, 190 wounded, and 9 missing. Of enemy casualties, no precise number exists.
Enemy contact continued for the next three days. At 09:00 on 3 July, an Air Force aerial observer reported several hundred NVA soldiers advancing on Marine positions north of Con Thien. Echo Battery 3/12 dropped a massive number of rounds on the NVA position killing an estimated 75 communists. To the east, Major Woodring called in artillery strikes for twelve hours in preparation for an assault scheduled for 4 July.
Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Wickwire’s BLT 1/3 (Special Landing Force Alpha) reinforced the 9th Marines and tied in with Woodring’s right flank. Colonel George E. Jerue, commanding the 9th Marines, planned his assault to push the NVA out of the Long Son area, some 4,000 meters north of Con Thien. Woodring began his assault at around 0630, encountering heavy resistance from well-concealed enemy positions southwest of Bravo Company’s engagement on 2 July. A prolonged battle involving tanks, artillery, and close air support ensued for most of the day. At 18:30, when Woodring halted his advance, 3/9 had lost 15 dead and 33 wounded. Wickwire’s 1/3 had lost 11 wounded in the same action.
BLT 2/3 (SLF Bravo) under Major Wendell O. Beard’s BLT 2/3 effected an air assault at Cam Lo, joining Operation Buffalo at mid-afternoon on 4 July. This battalion moved west and then northward toward the western edge of the battle area toward Con Thien.
At daylight on 5 July, NVA artillery began firing on Marine units located northeast of Con Thien but kept its ground units away from the Marines as they advanced. Meanwhile, search and recovery teams had begun the grim task of retrieving Bravo Company’s dead.
On 6 July, all battalions continued moving north. Beard’s 2/3 ran into an enemy force supported by mortars less than two miles south of Con Thien. Within an hour, 2/3 killed 35 NVA, while suffering 5 killed and 25 wounded. Major Woodring and Colonel Wickwire advanced their battalions under intermittent artillery fire. At around 09:00, Woodring decided to send a reinforced rifle company 1,500 meters to the north-northwest to cover his left flank. Captain Slater’s Alpha Company, which now included the survivors of Charlie Company and a detachment from 3rd Recon Battalion, moved into position without enemy resistance and established a strong combat outpost.
Slater’s movement went unnoticed, but that wasn’t the case with the main elements of Woodring’s and Wickwire’s battalions. Both units encountered heavy artillery fire. By 16:00, neither of the battalions could go any further. Wickwire had lost a tank but due to concentrated enemy artillery fire, was forced to pull back without recovering it. Captain Burrell H. Landes, commanding Bravo Company 1/3, received a report from an aerial observer that 400 or more NVA were heading directly to confront Woodring and Wickwire. A short time later, accurate NVA artillery fire began blasting the Marines. As Woodring and Wickwire prepared to meet the approaching NVA under the enemy’s artillery assault, Captain Slater’s recon patrol reported that the approaching NVA was heading directly into Alpha Company’s position.
The NVA force was unaware of Slater’s blocking position until they were within 500 feet, at which time Slater’s Marines engaged the NVA. Since the NVA didn’t know where the Marine’s fire was coming from, they scattered in every direction, some of them running directly into the Marine line. Once the enemy had figured out where Slater’s Marines were positioned, they organized an assault. The Marine lines held, however. At one point, NVA troops began lobbing grenades into the Marine position. Lance Corporal James L. Stuckey began picking the grenades up and tossing them back. Stucky lost his right hand on the third toss when the grenade exploded as it left his hand. Stuckey remained with his fireteam throughout the night without any medical assistance.
While the Alpha Company fight was underway, elements of the 90th NVA Regiments attacked Woodring’s and Wickwire’s Marine with blocks of TNT. Marines called in air support, artillery, and naval gunfire. By 21:30, the Marines had repelled the enemy assault and caused the NVA regiment to withdraw. At around 22:00, Woodring radioed Slater to return to the battalion perimeter at first light.
Alpha Company mustered before daylight on 7 July. As the sun began to light the sky, Slater’s Marines discovered 154 dead NVA just beyond the Marine perimeter. About an hour later, after Slater had returned to Woodring’s lines, the NVA unleashed a terrible barrage on Slater’s old position. In front of Woodring and Wickwire’s battalion lay an additional 800 dead communists. Later that morning, however, an NVA artillery shell found its way to 1/9’s command bunker, killing eleven Marines, including First Lieutenant Gatlin J. Howell, who had gone to the aid of Bravo Company on 2 July. Lieutenant Colonel Schening was wounded in the same incident.
Operation Buffalo ended on 14 July. Marines reported enemy losses at 1,290 dead, two captured. Total Marine losses were 159 killed, 345 wounded. The NVA attack at Con Thien was relatively short in duration but particularly vicious and the communists paid a heavy price. Since the enemy dead were so horribly chewed up from air, artillery, and naval gunfire, the Marines were forced into counting the NVA solder’s water canteens for a sense of enemy dead.
Telfer, G. L. and Lane Rogers. U. S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967. Washington: Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, 1984.
Bowman, J. S. The Vietnam War: Day by Day. New York: Mallard Books, 1989.
Nolan, K. W. Operation Buffalo: USMC Fight for the DMZ. Dell Publishing, 1992.
 In this context, Robert McNamara was a war criminal.
 Located south of the DMZ, Leatherneck Square was a TAOR extending six miles (east-west) by nine miles (north-south); it’s corners were measured from Con Thien (northwest) to Firebase Gio Linh (northeast), and from Dong Ha to Cam Lo on its southern axis (an area of more than 54 square miles). Between March 1967 to February 1969, 1,500 Marines and Navy Corpsmen were killed in this area, with an additional 9,265 wounded in action.
 Awarded Silver Star Medal for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action between 2 July – 9 July 1967. Colonel Woodring passed away in 2003.
 After 14 July, estimates of enemy KIA ranged from 525 to 1,200.
 Colonel Wickwire was awarded the Silver Star Medal for conspicuous gallantry for service on 6 July 1967.
 Retired Lieutenant Colonel Wendell Otis “Moose” Beard, a former NFL football player with the Washington Redskins, served in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam Wars. He was the recipient of the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal. He passed away in 1980.
 First Lieutenant Howell was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross for his actions on 2 July 1967.
 Colonel Schening was also wounded at Cape Gloucester, Peleliu, and during the Korean War. This was his fourth Purple Heart Medal. He was awarded the Silver Star Medal for service during the Korean War while serving as XO, Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. Colonel Schening passed away in 1996.
Late in October 1914, two Ottoman warships (operating under the command of German officers) conducted a raid in the Black Sea. They bombarded the Ukrainian port of Odessa and sank several ships. Two days later, the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War on the side of Germany against Russia. Before the end of the year, the central powers had badly mauled British and French forces on the Western Front and effectively cut off overland trade routes by blockading the entrance to the Black Sea through the Dardanelles and cutting Russia off from resupply.
Although the idea to attack the Ottoman Empire originally came from French Minister Aristide Briand, the United Kingdom defeated the motion because the British hoped to convince the Turks to join the Allied effort. Later, however, First Sea Lord Winston Churchill (who was then 41-years old) proposed a naval campaign to attack the Ottoman Empire at Gallipoli, a peninsula located in the southern portion of East Thrace, east of the Aegean Sea and west of the Dardanelles. Churchill’s plan intended to threaten Constantinople, protect the Suez Canal, and open up a warm-water supply route through the Black Sea.
All good plans fall apart sooner or later. In this case, the First Sea Lord didn’t know much about military operations beyond the small unit level and virtually nothing about naval warfare. Consequently, the intelligence used to formulate the Gallipoli campaign was flawed. After eight months of fighting, each side lost a quarter of a million men. It was a resounding defeat for the Entente Powers, Turkey gained international prestige, and Churchill nearly lost his political career. However, the operation did help propel the Turks toward their war of independence eight years later and prompted Australia and New Zealand to reconsider their relationship with the British Empire.
Following the First World War, the Gallipoli campaign led many military theorists to conclude that amphibious warfare was folly. These experts decided that given the weapons of modern warfare, there was no way that a seaborne organization could force its way ashore and defeat a well-entrenched enemy. It was not a belief shared by intellectuals in the United States Navy and Marine Corps, who began a protracted study of amphibious warfare capability in the 1920s. They became convinced that successful amphibious operations were possible and set about discovering how to do it.
Between 1921 and 1939, Navy-Marine Corps war planners created the capabilities necessary for success in both the European and Pacific theaters of World War II. Through innovative thinking, trial, and error, the work accomplished by Navy and Marine Corps officers allowed the allied powers to project military power across vast oceans, wrest the continent of Europe away from the Axis powers, and seize Pacific bases on the long road to Japan. Not only did the Navy-Marine Corps develop Amphibious Warfare Doctrine, but they also taught it to the armies of the United States and Great Britain for use in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the invasion of the Atlantic.
Since then, the Navy and Marine Corps have continually evaluated and improved US amphibious doctrine. Today, naval operations include pre-positioned logistics ships, carrier-borne close air support of amphibious forces, and vertical lift assault capabilities. These competencies are what makes the Navy-Marine Corps team relevant to America’s national defense — even despite the ridiculous assertion of General of the Army Omar Bradley, who while serving as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1949 said, “I predict that large scale amphibious operations will never occur again.” He could not have been more wrong. General Bradley was apparently unaware of the observation by Karl von Clausewitz in 1832: “A swift and vigorous transition to attack — the flashing sword of vengeance — is the most brilliant point of the defense.” Modern naval warfare capability is America’s flashing sword. The only question is whether political leaders have the will to employ it in the nation’s defense.
The Navy and Marine Corps meet the challenges of a wide range of contingencies through task force organization. All naval task forces are mission-centered, which is to say that both the Navy and Marine Corps organize their combat units for one or more specific missions. All Marine Corps combat units are capable of becoming part of an air-ground task force, referred to as MAGTF, which consists of a ground combat element (GCE), air combat element (ACE), and a combat logistics element (CLE).
MAGTFs are organized under a single commander and structured to accomplish one or more specific missions. According to official Marine Corps doctrine, “A Marine air-ground task force with separate air-ground headquarters is normally formed for combat operations and training exercises in which substantial combat forces of both Marine aviation and Marine ground units are part of the task organization of participating Marine forces.”
The basic organization of a MAGTF is the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) — generally organized as follows:
The MEU command element (CE) includes a colonel (commanding officer) supported by a regular staff: S-1 (Manpower), S-2 (Intelligence), S-3 (Operations/Training), S-4 (Logistics), S-6 (Communications), naval gunfire liaison, and other special staff personnel. The MEU CE includes about 200 Marines and sailors.
The GCE is a reinforced infantry battalion called a battalion landing team (BLT), commanded by a lieutenant colonel. A BLT is a reinforced battalion consisting of three rifle companies, a weapons company, and a headquarters and service company. Depending on the MEU’s mission, reinforcements may include an artillery battery, armored vehicle platoons, reconnaissance platoons, attached U. S. Navy field corpsmen, and a detachment of combat engineers. All members of the BLT are trained to conduct seaborne operations in several landing craft variants and tiltrotor vertical assault operations. A BLT will contain between 950-1,200 Marines.
The ACE is usually a composite air squadron (reinforced) commanded by a lieutenant colonel. The ACE includes a medium tiltrotor squadron augmented by detachments of heavy, light, and attack helicopters, one detachment of amphibious flight deck capable jet aircraft, and a Marine air control group detachment with tactical air, traffic control, direct air support, and anti-aircraft defense assets. The ACE also includes headquarters, communications, and logistical support personnel. The number of personnel in a typical MEU ACE is around 600 troops.
The CLE is Combat Logistics Battalion. A major or lieutenant colonel commands the CLB, responsible for providing service support, intermediate maintenance, intermediate supply, transportation, explosive ordnance technology, utilities, and bulk fuel. The CLB consists of approximately 400-500 Marines.
The size of a MAGTF may expand if its mission increases in scope. A more extensive operation may demand a larger MAGTF organization, such as a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). The MEB consists of a regimental combat team (RCT), a composite Marine Aircraft Group, and a Combat Logistics Regiment. The officer commanding an MEB is usually a brigadier general. The MEB can function as part of a joint task force, as the lead element of a Marine Expeditionary Force, or alone.
Any mission that exceeds the capability of a brigade will involve a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). A MEF commander is usually a lieutenant general who exercises operational authority over a reinforced Marine infantry division, reinforced Marine aircraft wing, and a Combat Logistics Group.
Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force
The Navy’s Amphibious Ready Group consists of an amphibious task force (ATF) and an amphibious landing force called Special Landing Force (SLF). The ARG/SLF was first established in 1960. The SLF deployed to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) as part of the first deployment of American ground forces. The 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines (BLT 2/9) served as the SLF to support the Marine expeditionary landing at Da Nang in March 1965. In mid-April, III MAF temporarily dissolved the SLF because its amphibious assets were required to support the 3rd Marine Amphibious Brigade (3rdMAB) landing at Chu Lai.
Subsequently, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) and the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (CG FMFPac) outlined the advantages of maintaining an amphibious capability in support of the Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) — a dedicated force for conducting amphibious raids, assaults, and floating reserve.
President Lyndon Johnson’s formal commitment of US military forces to RVN in March 1965 presented General William C. Westmoreland (COMUSMACV) with a dilemma. As a military assistance/advisory commander, Westmoreland lacked sufficient ground combat forces to meet threats imposed by North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) forces operating in the central highlands. Without adequate ground troops, General Westmoreland had no way of defending US military installations, particularly those in the area of Qui Nhon, where the threat of VC hostilities was most imminent. US Army units and allied forces from South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand would not arrive in RVN until June. Westmoreland didn’t like it, but he had no choice but to turn to the Marines for security. Accordingly, the National Military Command Center (NMCC) directed the Commanding General, Third Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), to provide air/ground security operations until the arrival of the Army’s ground combat forces.
III MEF headquarters was located in Okinawa. Its ground combat subordinate was the 3rd Marine Division (3rdMarDiv), also located in Okinawa. 3rdMarDiv routinely provided two BLTs to the Commander, US Seventh Fleet (COMSEVENTHFLT), to satisfy the landing force requirement for two special landing forces (designated SLF(A) and SLF(B)). Tasked to provide Marines to support COMUSMACV, III MAF requested the support of COMSEVENTHFLT), who promptly made the ARG/SLF available to Westmoreland.
Action in the Central Highlands
Qui Nhon was a densely populated agricultural region located along the coastal plain southwest of Da Nang. Population density and agricultural production were the magnets that attracted VC and NVA forces in the area. Within three days of the NMCC’s tasking, the Special Landing Force conducted combat operations in the central highlands.
Operations in and around Qui Nhơn could not have been better timed. The Marine’s surprise assault threw the VC force structure into confusion and delayed their hostilities along the coastal plain, but the landing also helped facilitate the gathering of local intelligence and allowed the Marines to test hypotheses for the pacification of local civilians. The actual operation was uneventful, but it did demonstrate the flexibility and responsiveness of the ARG and the SLF to achieve limited objectives within a more extensive operation.
In mid-August 1965, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) intelligence officers communicated their belief that the 1st VC Regiment was preparing to attack the Marines at Chu Lai in Quảng Tri Province. The basis for this assessment was an early July VC assault that overran ARVN units stationed at Ba Gia. Accordingly, III MAF developed a plan to launch a preemptive assault against the enemy regiment, then located on the Van Tuong Peninsula, ten miles south of Chu Lai. Its precursor was Operation Thunderbolt, conducted adjacent to the Trà Bồng River, a two-day area security/information collection mission jointly assigned to the 4th Marines and 51st ARVN Regiment.
The Marine assault against the 1st VC Regiment, designated Operation Starlight, occurred between 18-24 August 1965. It was the first major offensive campaign conducted by the US military in South Vietnam. Colonel Oscar Peatross commanded the RLT. His subordinate commanders and their battalions included Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. Fisher, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines (2/4), Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Muir, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines (3/3), and Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Bodley, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (3/7), which operated as the SLF reserve force.
The combined arms assault of three battalions of Marines on the 1,500-man 1st VC Regiment, located in and around the village of Van Tuong, was overwhelmingly effective; the Marines reduced the communist regiment to half of its effective strength.
Meanwhile, in late July, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), approved Operations Dagger Thrust and Harvest Moon. Dagger Thrust was a series of amphibious raids on suspected enemy concentrations along the coastal regions of South Vietnam. Of the five raids, only two produced significant contact with communist forces, but three uncovered notable stores of arms and munitions. The raids were so effective that the enemy never knew when the Marines would come — only that they eventually would come, and the result of their visitations would not be pleasant. As a consequence, some VC soldiers began floating their resumes for a new line of work.
In December 1965, Operation Harvest Moon was a reaction to the 1st VC Regiment’s attack on the Regional Force garrison at Hiệp Đức near the entrance to the Quế Son Valley. Initially serving as a reserve force, heavy fighting prompted the operational commander to commit the SLF, quickly turning the tide against the Viet Cong regiment. The staggering losses imposed on VC forces by the Marines caused General Võ Nguyên Giáp to increase the NVA’s footprint in South Vietnam, and this redirection of the American’s attention would enable new VC cadres to infiltrate population centers. Apparently, Giáp assumed that the U. S. Marine Corps was a one-trick pony. He was wrong.
By 1969, the ARG/SLF had conducted sixty-two amphibious landings against VC/NVA elements operating inside the Republic of Vietnam. The SLFs made significant contributions to MACV’s operational mobility and flexibility by offering a timely striking power.
Among the significant benefits of the two SLFs were their flexibility, the element of surprise from “over-the-horizon” assaults, and their on-shore maneuverability. Once ashore, operational control of the SLF passed from the ARG Commander to the senior ground combat commander. Another plus was the SLF’s self-sustaining character, which stood in contrast to regular force ground units that relied on static functional organizations for airlift, logistics/resupply, fire support, and medical triage capabilities.
In the early 1990s, the Navy-Marine Corps planners began a re-examination of the ARG/SLF concept and developed an innovation they termed Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG). Currently, there are nine ESGs, ten Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs), and several Surface Warfare Action Groups (SWAGs). ESGs allow the Navy to provide highly mobile/self-sustaining naval forces for missions in all parts of the world. The ESG incorporates the capabilities of CSGs, SWAGs, ARGs, and MEUs to enhance the capabilities of combat commanders within six geographical regions.
Currently, there are seven Marine Expeditionary Units — three under the I Marine Expeditionary Force (US West Coast), three operating under the II Marine Expeditionary Force (US East Coast), and one operating under the III Marine Expeditionary Unit (Japan).
No one in the Navy and Marine Corps wants to go to war, but they know how to go to war. They are America’s flashing sword. Quite frankly, only an idiot would like to see these forces come knocking on their door, but we will need the Navy-Marine Corps combat team until the world has finally rid itself of idiots.
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Broadbent, H. Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore. Camberwell: Viking Press, 2005.
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Simmons, E. H. The United States Marines: A History (Fourth Edition). Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
 Temporarily changed to III MAF because the government of RVN objected to the word “expeditionary.”
 My reference to places in Vietnam, used in past tense, speaks to events in locations that then existed. Since the end of the Vietnam War, the government of Vietnam has renamed many of the hamlets, villages, and districts of the former South Vietnamese republic. Qui Nhơn is now known as Quy Nhơn.
 Short name for the National Liberation Front of Southern Vietnam, an armed communist revolutionary organization that operated in South Vietnam and Cambodia. The VC organized both regular and guerrilla forces to combat the South Vietnamese and United States military forces.
 ESGs are part of the Navy’s Expeditionary Task Force concept.