Operation Kansas (1966)

The Quế Sơn Valley, located in Quảng Nam Province, is bounded by mountain ranges north, south, and west.  It extends some 24 miles from east to west from Route 1 to Hiệp Đức.  The Ly Ly River and Routes 534 and 535 traverses most of the valley’s length.  In 1965/1966, the valley supported a Vietnamese population of around 60,000 farmers and salt miners.  Whoever held Quế Sơn Valley owned the keys to the struggle for the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ).

The struggle for the Quế Sơn Valley began in December 1965 (Operation Harvest Moon) and February 1966 (Operation Double Eagle II).  Brigadier General William A. Stiles, USMC, reported to the 1st Marine Division in late April to assume the duties of Assistant Division Commander, 1stMarDiv.  Shortly after his arrival, the Division Commander directed Stiles to assume command of Task Force X-Ray.  His mission was to plan for and direct a reconnaissance-in-force in the region of Đỗ Xá, South Vietnam.[1] 

In June, the Commanding General III Marine Amphibious Force and Commanding General 1stMarDiv received intelligence information compiled by the U.S. Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (USMACV) indicating that a suspected enemy base of operations was operating some thirty miles southwest of Chu Lai, near the western border of I CTZ.  MACV placed the headquarters of the enemy’s Military Region v in the area of Đỗ Xá.  They had been asking for Marine Corps intervention for several months.  Army intelligence had wanted Marines to mount an operation throughout the Valley for several months.

After a few unavoidable delays, Stiles and his staff completed their plan of action but almost immediately became aware of the presence of an entire enemy combat division within the Quế Sơn Valley.  The 620th NVA Division operated with three full-strength infantry regiments (3rd, 21st, and 1st VC) in the area straddling the Quang Tin/Quang Nam provinces northwest of Chu Lai.  Stiles’ reconnaissance operation, designated Operation KANSAS, was placed on hold until the Marines could address a significant enemy presence close to Chu Lai.

But on June 13, 1966, the III MAF Commander directed the 1stMarDiv to commence an extensive reconnaissance campaign between Tam Kỳ and Hiệp Đức.  Stiles was ordered to plan for a joint combat operation with the 2nd ARVN Division.  The plan called for the aerial insertion of six Marine reconnaissance teams from the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion and an additional 1st Force Reconnaissance Company team into selected landing zones (LZs) to determine the extent of NVA penetrations.

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J. Sullivan (1920 – 1995), the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (1stRecon) commander, would exercise control over all reconnaissance missions.  On schedule, a thirteen-man team was airlifted to Nui Loc Son, a small mountain in the center of the Quế Sơn Valley (seven miles northeast of Hiệp Đức.  Another eighteen-man team landed on the Nui Vu hill mass that dominates the terrain ten miles west of Tam Kỳ.

These initial landings would be followed up the next morning by two teams to the higher ground south of the valley, two teams to the northwest of the valley, and one in the south of  Hiệp Đức.  The last team would parachute onto Hill 555, east of the Tranh River.  These Marines experienced a single injury as one of the team twisted his ankle upon contact with Terra Firma.

As the operation evolved, the 1st Force Recon Company parachutists were the first to be extracted.  After landing, these Marines followed procedure by burying their parachutes and then moved away to establish observation posts.  At around 1400 hours, the Marines observed an estimated forty enemy soldiers undergoing tactical training.  Four hours later, a woodcutter team appeared with a sentry dog.  The animal alerted on the buried parachutes, and a short time later, an enemy combat patrol appeared to be searching for the Marines.  The Recon Team Leader, 1stLt Jerome T. Paull, requested that his men be extracted.  These Marines were airlifted back to Chu Lai.

The 18-man team inserted on Nui Vu was led by Staff Sergeant Jimmie E. Howard, USMC.  After their insertion on June 13, Howard found the hill an excellent observation platform, and for the next two days, Howard’s team reported extensive enemy activities.  This team, supported by an ARVN 105mm Howitzer Battery (located seven miles south of Nui Vu), was able to call in artillery missions on “targets of opportunity.”

Staff Sergeant Howard, a seasoned combat veteran, exercised care to only call artillery missions when an American aircraft spotter or helicopter was in the region, but the enemy was aware of the presence of these Marines and was determined to neutralize the threat.

On the 14th, the NVA began organizing a force to attack the post.  On the night of June 15, a U.S. Army Special Forces Team leading a South Vietnamese irregular defense group (popular forces) radioed a warning to General Stiles’ command post (C.P.) — a company-sized unit of between 200 and 250 NVA soldiers closing in on the Marine reconnaissance unit on Hill 448.  Word was passed down to the platoon leader, Staff Sergeant Jimmie L. Howard, USMC, through his parent unit, Company C, 1st Recon Battalion, 1st Marine Division.

Later that night, between 2130 and 2330, Lance Corporal Ricardo C. Binns, USMC, detected the sound of troops marshaling for an assault and fired the first shots from his M-14 Rifle.  The NVA quickly closed in, surrounding the Marine perimeter.  The enemy closed in because they had learned through practical experience that the closer they were to the Marines, the less likely they would become targets of USMC Close Air Support (CAS).  Unlike the Air Force, Marine pilots routinely flew CAS missions at tree top level (give or take five inches).

After Corporal Binns opened fire, outpost Marines withdrew from their listening posts to reposition themselves within the rocky knoll.  Automatic weapons fire from a DShK machine gun (shown right) and 60mm mortar fire kept the Marines from maneuvering away from their hilltop positions.  After their initial fire, the NVA tossed hand grenades into the Marine positions, followed by a short-lived frontal assault.  The Marine’s well-aimed rifle fire repelled the enemy’s assault, causing the communists to fall back.  After reorganizing, the NVA assaulted the Marines again and again — each time being pushed back by the Marine’s murderous fire.

Near midnight, Staff Sergeant Howard radioed his company commander, Captain Tim Geraghty, to ask for an extraction and close air support.  These requests were delayed at the III MAF Direct Air Support Center (DASC).[2]  The violence of the enemy attack convinced Howard that his team was being overrun, so he again called for assistance.  Colonel Sullivan radioed Howard to reassure him that help was on the way.

At around 0200, a Marine C-47 (DC-3) arrived on station and began dropping flares to light up the area and prepare for the arrival of fixed-wing and rotor gunships.  Jet aircraft screamed in and dropped their bombs and napalm within 100 meters of the Marine perimeter.  Helicopter gunships from VMO-6 strafed to within twenty meters of the Marine perimeter.

At 0300, enemy ground fire drove off a flight of MAG-36 helicopters that were trying to extract Howard’s Marines.  When that attempt failed, Colonel Sullivan informed Howard that he should not expect reinforcements until dawn and urged him to hold on as best he could.

By then, the fight devolved into small, scattered, individual fights between Marine defenders and probing enemies.  The NVA, wary of U.S. aircraft, decided against organizing another mass assault but continued to fire at the Marines throughout the night.  Enemy snipers had placed themselves close to and above the Marine’s defenses.

Staff Sergeant Howard’s Marines were running out of ammunition; their situation was critical.  Howard ordered his men to fire only well-aimed single shots at the enemy.  The Marines complied with their team leaders’ instructions but also began throwing rocks at suspected enemy positions,  hoping the enemy would think that the Marines were lobbing in grenades.  By 0400, every Marine in Howard’s team had been wounded; six Marines lay dead.  Staff Sergeant Howard was struck in the back by a ricochet, which temporarily paralyzed his legs.  Unable to stand, Howard pulled himself from one fighting hole to the next, encouraging his men and directing their fire.

At dawn on June 16, UH-34s, with Huey gunship cover, successfully landed Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (C/1/5) at the base of Nui Vu.  The helicopter piloted by Major William J. Goodsell, the Commanding Officer of VMO-6, was shot down.  While Goodsell was successfully evacuated, he later died from his wounds.

Charlie Company encountered enemy resistance as it moved to relieve Howard’s team.  When Charlie Company’s lead element reached Howard’s position, he shouted a warning to “get down” because enemy snipers were helping themselves to any Marine that appeared in their rear sight aperture.  The company commander, First Lieutenant Marshal “Buck” Darling, later reported that when he arrived at Howard’s position, every Marine still alive had armed themselves with enemy AK-47s taken from dead communists lying within the Marine perimeter.

Everyone associated with the defensive operation assumed that Howard and his men had held off an NVA rifle company.  Military intelligence later clarified that Howard’s 18 Marines had held off a battalion of NVA regulars from the 3rd NVA Regiment.  The enemy continued to battle the Marines for the hill until around noon and then disengaged.  When the enemy pulled out, they left behind 42 dead.  Charlie Company lost two KIA and two WIA.

Meanwhile, General Stiles’ completed plan of action involved eight battalions (four Marine and four ARVN) with air and artillery support.  The initial assault force included two battalions from the 5th Marines and two Vietnamese Army battalions.  Stiles and his Vietnamese counterpart would control the action from Tam Kỳ.  Anticipating the need for massive firepower, Stiles prepositioned artillery units from Da Nang and Chu Lai into forward firing positions on Hill 29, west of the railroad line seven miles north of Tam Kỳ.

The 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (3/1) accompanied artillery units from Da Nang and provided security for the artillery positions on Hill 29 and Thang Binh.  Artillery support units included HQ Battery 4/11 (command and control), Kilo Battery 4/12 (6 155mm Howitzers at Hill 29), and Provisional Yankee Battery 4/12 (2 155mm Howitzers) at Thang Binh.

On the morning of June 17, the South Vietnamese military high command notified the Marines that the two Vietnamese infantry battalions would not participate in the Marine Corps operation.  Accordingly, Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt (III MAF) delayed Operation Kansas again — and then modified General Stiles’ plan of action.[3]  Rather than a multi-battalion heliborne operation in the Quế Sơn Valley, Walt elected to continue the reconnaissance in force.  Note: Walt’s decision placed fewer than 1,800 Marines against an entire NVA infantry division.

The Fifth Marines (5thMar) remained at Chu Lai, ready to support the Recon Marines on-call.  Stiles continued in command of the operation.  He repositioned some of his assets to provide better coverage for the recon teams.  On June 18, Kilo 4/11 (4 155mm guns) joined the other artillery units on Hill 29, and an additional provisional battery from the 12th Marines deployed to a new firing position 6,000 meters from Thang Binh.  Kilo 4/12 joined the new provisional battery the next day.  On June 19, CH-46 aircraft lifted two 105mm howitzers from Chu Lai to the Tien Phuoc Special Forces Camp, some 30 miles distant.  Operational control of 3/1 was transferred to the 5th Marines.

With these support units repositioned, Colonel Sullivan shifted his CP to Tien Phuoc.  For the next ten days, the reconnaissance battalion (reinforced) continued to conduct extensive patrolling operations throughout the Quế Sơn Valley.  Twenty-five recon teams were involved in this operation.

Operation Kansas, which officially began on June 17, ended on June 22nd when General Stiles relocated his command post.  Marine infantry participation, with the exception of the relief of Staff Sergeant Howard’s platoon, was confined to a one-company exploitation of a B-52 Arc Light strike on June 21, some 3,500 meters east of Hiệp Đức.[4]  Despite Operation Kansas’s official end on June 22, Marines remained in the area for six additional days.

Four of Howard’s Marines were awarded the Navy Cross: Corporal Binns, Hospital Man Second Class Billee Don Holmes, Corporal Jerrald Thompson, and Lance Corporal John Adams.  Thompson and Adams, killed in action, were awarded posthumous medals.  Silver Star Medals were awarded to the remaining thirteen Marines, four posthumously, along with two Marines from Charlie Company, also posthumously.

Staff Sergeant Howard received a meritorious combat promotion to Gunnery Sergeant and was later awarded the Medal of Honor—our nation’s highest combat award.  Howard was eventually promoted to First Sergeant, retired from the Marine Corps in 1977, and became a high school football coach.  He passed away in 1993, aged 64.

Notes:

[1] Stiles graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Class of 1939, and was an officer with extensive combat experience. 

[2] The DASC is the principal USMC aviation command and control system and the air control agency responsible for directing air operations directly supporting ground forces.  It functions in a decentralized mode of operations but is directly supervised by the Marine Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) or Navy Tactical Air Control Center (NTACC).  The parent unit of DASCs is the Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS) of the Marine Air Control Group (MACG). 

[3] Lew Walt (1913 – 1989) served in World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam.  During his military service, he was awarded two Navy Cross medals, two Navy Distinguished Service medals, the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit (with Combat V), the Bronze Star (with Combat V), and two Purple Heart medals.  Following his promotion to four-star general and service as the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Walt retired in 1971.  General Walt passed away on March 26, 1989.   

[4] Following the Arc Light strike, Echo Company 2/5 surveyed the strike area and found no evidence of a large body of enemy forces. 


The Bloodiest Battle — Part 2

Back at Phu Bai, Lieutenant Colonel Ernest C. Cheatham reviewed Marine Corps urban combat doctrine, which recommended staying off the streets and moving forward by blasting through walls and buildings.  Accordingly, he continued to gather the necessary equipment he would need to accomplish his mission, including M20 Rocket Launchers, M40 106mm Recoilless Rifles (mounted on flatbed vehicles called “mules”), C-4 explosives, flamethrowers, tear gas, and gas masks.

Cheatham received this equipment early in the afternoon of February 3.  After a council of war, Cheatham deployed his battalion to recapture the southern section of Huế.  Many Marines serving under Task Force X-Ray had no previous combat experience in urban warfare/close-quarters combat.  Because of the cultural and religious significance of Huế City, Allied forces were ordered not to bomb or shell the city.  In any case, seasonal monsoons prevented allied forces from employing air support.  However, as the intensity of the battle increased, the “no bombing” restriction was lifted.

The NVA’s tactics were to remain as close to the Marines as possible, which enemy planners imagined would negate the effective use of artillery and close air support.  The NVA maintained a forward fighting line directly opposite the Marine’s positions, with a secondary line only two blocks to the rear.  Snipers and machine guns intensely defended each building within the battle zone.

The enemy also prepared spider holes (fox holes) in gardens and streets to create crossed fires between all buildings and streets.  If the Marines penetrated the forward line, the NVA would withdraw to the secondary line, and the business would begin anew.  At dusk, the NVA and VC would attempt to reinfiltrate their former positions.

On the night of February 3, the NVA commander, seeing the buildup of Marines at Huế University, thinned out his frontline forces, leaving just a platoon to defend the Treasury building and adjacent Post Office.  Then, on the morning of February 4, when the Marines launched their attack on the Treasury building, murderous enemy crossfires penned the Marines down for hours.

The only way to break out of their stalemate was to blow a hole into the side of buildings and clear it, room by room.  These actions were costly to the Marines performing such missions, but they were also costly to the overall operation because the process was time-consuming.  Under cover of tear gas and the residue of overwhelming M48 and M40 fires, Marines were able to cross city streets to employ plastique explosives and rocket launchers.

Slowly but steadily, Marines pushed into the Treasury building, post office, and the Jeanne d’Arc High School, killing the enemy in massive numbers.  Marines also suffered the fate of combat.  Company A 1/1 lost half of his men (wounded and killed) in a single day’s fighting.  In addition to locating the enemy and destroying them, Marines also rescued and protected Vietnamese civilians trapped by the NVA and VC assault.  That evening, VC sappers succeeded in blowing up the An Cuu bridge, cutting the road link to Phu Bai.

Following the capture of the Treasury, Cheatham continued his methodical advance to the west, leading with tear gas, M48s, and Ontos—followed by Mules and Marine grunts.  As NVA-VC’s manpower and ammunition were depleted, resistance lessened.  The enemy no longer tenaciously defended each building; they relied more on sniper fire, mortars, and rockets.

On February 5, Marines recaptured the Huế Central Hospital complex, rescuing Lieutenant Colonel Pham Van Khoa (the Mayor of Huế and Thua Thien Province chief), hiding in the grounds.  The next day, Marines attacked the Provincial Headquarters, which served as the command post of the NVA 4th Regiment.  While the Marines were seizing the surrounding walls, the area between the wall and buildings was covered by fire from every enemy-held window and spider-hole inside the grounds.

Marines sent an Ontos forward to blast an entry into the building, but the enemy disabled it with a B-40 rocket.  Next, the Marines sent a Mule forward to blow a hole in the building, which allowed the Marines to advance under cover of tear gas.  Once they entered the building, Marines fought room by room to clear out the enemy — but many of the NVA slipped away.  After securing the building, Marines cleared the spider-holes, giving no quarter to their occupants.

To celebrate their victory, Marines raised an American flag, but they were ordered to lower it because Vietnamese law prohibited the flying of any foreign flag unless the flag of the Republic of Vietnam accompanied it.

After resting his men at the Provincial Headquarters, Cheatham advanced west toward the Phu Cam Canal.  He swung south and east to clear the area with the canal to his right.  On February 7, the NVA twice ambushed a 25-vehicle supply convoy on Route 547 from Phu Bai to the 11th Marines firebase Rocket Crusher.  The 11th Marines provided artillery support to Allied forces fighting in and around Huế.  

Enemy ambuscades killed twenty Marines and wounded thirty-nine.  NVA sappers finally succeeded in destroying the Trường Tiền bridge, which restricted all movement between the old and new cities.  NVA forces in the new town, worn down by more than a week of constant combat and effectively cut off from their comrades on the other side of the river, began to abandon the city slowly.  The 815th and 2nd Sapper Battalions moved to the southern side of the Phu Cam Canal, joining the 818th Battalion.  The 804th Battalion and the 1st Sapper Battalion remained south of the canal near the An Cuu Bridge.  At the same time, the 810th Battalion began preparing to sneak west across the Perfume River by raft and boat to Gia Hoi Island.

Colonel Gravel’s 1/1 had been engaged in clearing operations to the east and south of the MACV compound.  On February 10, they captured the soccer stadium, giving the Marines a second (and much safer) helicopter landing zone.  Combat engineers built a pontoon bridge across the Phu Cam Canal, restoring the road access that had been lost when the An Cuu Bridge was blown up.

On February 11, Hotel Company 2/5 secured a bridge over the Phu Cam Canal and the city block on the other side of the canal.  The next day, Fox Company swept the west bank of the canal, fighting through houses and the Huế Railway Station that had been sheltering NVA snipers.  On February 13, Fox and Hotel companies crossed the bridge again to secure the entire area.  As Marines advanced into the open countryside towards the Từ Đàm Pagoda, they located freshly dug NVA graves and then were hit by a barrage of mortar fire, forcing them to withdraw.  Two-Five had inadvertently stumbled on the NVA’s field command post.

On February 13, General Creighton Abrams established his forward headquarters at Phu Bai, replacing General Cushman and assuming overall command of U.S. forces in CTZ I.

The Citadel

While the ARVN 1/3 and 2nd and 7th Airborne Battalions were busy clearing out the north and western parts of the Citadel, including the Chanh Tay Gate, the ARVN 4/2 moved south from Mang Ca toward the Imperial Palace.  In those operations, South Vietnamese forces killed over 700 NVA-VC troops.  On February 5, NVA-VC units managed to stall ARVN airborne units, prompting General Trưởng to replace them with his 4th battalion, 2nd Regiment (4/2).  Meanwhile, the ARVN 4/3, operating south of the river, assaulted the Thuong Tu Gate near the eastern corner of the Citadel.

After seven successive attempts to breach the gate failed, 4/3 was ordered to reinforce the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 4th regiment.  On 6 February, the ARVN 1/3 captured the An Hoa Gate and the northwest corner of the Citadel, and the 4th Battalion seized the southwest wall.  That night, the NVA counterattacked with a battalion from the NVA 29th Regiment, scaling the southwest wall and pushing the 4th Battalion back to Tây Lộc.

On February 7, the ARVN 3rd Regiment, which had been futilely trying to break into the southeast corner of the Citadel, was moved by LCM-8s (Mike Boats) to Mang Ca to reinforce units inside the Citadel.  The ARVN 2nd Troop, 7th Cavalry (equipped with fifteen M113s) arrived at Mang Ca from Quảng Trị to relieve the 3rd Troop.  To avoid enemy ambushes, the 2nd Troop turned off Highway One a few miles north of the city, traveled east cross-country and swung around to the rear of Mang Ca through the Trai Gate.    

Also, on 7 February, the North Vietnamese tried to bring their air support into the battle, sending four North Vietnamese Air Force (Il-14) transport aircraft from Hanoi.  The Ilyushin IL-14 was a Soviet production of the Douglas DC-3.  Two of the aircraft carrying explosives, antitank ammunition, and field telephone cables managed to find an opening in the cloud layer about six miles north of Huế.  They dropped their cargo in a large lagoon for local forces to retrieve.  One of the aircraft returned safely, but the other, flying through dense fog, crashed into a mountain, losing all on board.

Meanwhile, the other two Il−14s, modified to drop bombs, were ordered to bomb Mang Ca. However, neither aircraft could find the city in the fog, so they returned to their base with all their artillery.  Five days later, they tried again, but bad weather prevented them from locating Mang Ca.  The two aircraft radioed that they were scrubbing the mission and then headed to sea to jettison their bombs.  A short time later, both aircraft disappeared while over water.

On February 10, two forward observers from the Marines’ 1st Field Artillery Group were flown into Tây Lộc to help coordinate artillery and naval gunfire to support the fighting inside the Citadel.  However, General Ngô Quang Trưởng directed that the Marines should not target the Imperial Palace under any circumstances.

On February 11, The South Vietnamese Marines (Task Force Alfa) (the 1st and 5th Battalions) began to replace the Vietnamese Airborne units by helicopter, as Bravo Company 1/5 was airlifted to Mang Ca.  Intense enemy fire precluded a full insertion, however.  On February 13, Alpha and Charlie Companies 1/5, supported by five M-48s from the 1st Tank Battalion, were loaded into LCM-8s (Mike Boats) and ferried across to Mang Ca.  Once there, the Marines moved south along the eastern wall of the Citadel while Bravo Company remained in reserve.

Unknown to the Marines, the ARVN Airborne withdrew from the area two days earlier when the Vietnamese Marines began arriving at Mang Ca.  NVA defenders had used the opportunity of the delay to reoccupy several blocks of the Citadel and reinforce their defenses.  Communist forces engaged Alpha Company, which almost immediately suffered 35 casualties.  The CO of 1/5, Major Robert Thompson, ordered Bravo Company to relieve Alpha, and the advance continued slowly until NVA flanking fire halted it.

The next day, Marines resumed their attack, supported by Marine artillery, Naval gunfire, and Marine Corps close air support.  Despite this, the Marines made little progress and had to withdraw.  As soon as the Marines withdrew, the communists reoccupied those positions.

Delta Company arrived at the Citadel on the evening of February 14 after taking fire while crossing the Perfume River. On February 15, Delta Company led a renewed attack against the Dong Ba Gate, with Charlie Company defending its flank.  After Bravo Company joined the assault, Marines secured the gate.  The Marines suffered six deaths and fifty wounded, while the enemy sustained twenty deaths. 

Also, on February 14, the South Vietnamese Marine Task Force joined the battle.  The operational plan called for the VN Marines to move west from Tây Lộc and then turn south.  However, they were soon halted by a strong NVA defense.  After two days of fighting, the VN Marines had only advanced 400 meters.  Meanwhile, the ARVN 3rd Regiment fought off an NVA counterattack in the northwest corner of the Citadel.

Despite their many setbacks, the communists appeared determined to prolong the battle.  The 6th Battalion, 24th Regiment, 304th Division (originally located near Khe Sanh) reached the Citadel after following an intentionally convoluted route through Thon La Chu.  The 7th Battalion, 90th Regiment, 324-B Divison was due to arrive within a few days — after a forced march from the DMZ.

On February 16, two companies from the 1st Battalion, U.S. 8th Cavalry Regiment, fought elements of the NVA 803rd Regiment, 324-B Division, about twelve miles northeast of Huế, killing 29 enemies before breaking contact the following day.  Also, on February 16, 1/5 advanced 140 meters at the cost of seven Marines killed and 47 wounded.  The Marines killed 63 of the enemy. 

That same day, at a meeting at Phu Bai involving Generals Abrams, LaHue, Trưởng, and South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, Kỳ approved the use of all necessary force to clear the NVA-VC forces from the Citadel, regardless of any damages to historic structures.

On the night of February 16, a radio intercept indicated that a battalion-size NVA force was about to launch a counterattack over the west wall of the Citadel.  Artillery and naval gunfire was called in, and a later radio intercept indicated that a senior NVA officer had been killed in the barrage.  Another intercept stated that the battalion commander requested permission to withdraw from the city, but his request was denied, and he was ordered to stand and fight.

Vietnamese forces resumed their attacks on February 17, and the Hac Bao Company was moved to support 1/5’s right flank.  Over the next three days, these forces slowly reduced the NVA’s defensive perimeter.

On February 18, 1/8th Cav was attacked by elements of the 803rd Regiment twelve miles northeast of Huế.  This second engagement convinced the NVA commander that the regiment could not reach the Citadel.

By February 20, the 1/5 advance had stalled.  After conferring with senior commanders, Major Thompson launched a night attack against three NVA strongpoints, blocking further movement.  At dawn, the entire battalion would assault NVA positions.  At 0300 on February 21, three ten-man teams from the 2nd Platoon of Alpha Company launched their assault, quickly capturing the sparsely defended position the NVA had withdrawn from during the night.

As the NVA sought to reoccupy those positions the following day, they were caught in the open by the assaulting Marines from 1/5.  Thompson lost three Marines in the fight, but 16 NVA were killed.  At that moment, the Marines were only 100 meters from the south wall of the Citadel.  That evening, Bravo Company was replaced by Lima Company, 3/5.

Unknown to either the Americans or South Vietnamese, the NVA had begun a phased withdrawal from the Citadel, making their way southwest to return to their bases in the western hills.  Lima 3/5 was tasked with clearing the area through the Thuong Tu Gate to the Trường Tiền Bridge.  They completed their mission, meeting little enemy resistance.

But to the west, South Vietnamese forces continued to meet stubborn resistance.  On February 22, after a barrage of 122mm rockets, the NVA counterattacked Vietnamese Marines, who unmercifully pushed them back with the support of the Hac Bao Company.

Little progress was made on February 23, prompting a very frustrated General Abrams to suggest that the Vietnamese Marines should be disbanded.  That night, the NVA attempted another counterattack but was forced back (again) by intense artillery.  The ARVN 3rd Regiment launched a night attack along the southern wall of the Citadel.  At 0500 the following day, they raised the South Vietnamese flag over the Citadel and secured the south wall by mid-morning.

General Trưởng then ordered the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, and the Hac Bao Company to recapture the Imperial Palace, which was achieved against minimal resistance by late afternoon.  The last pocket of NVA at the southwest corner of the Citadel was eliminated in an attack by the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalion in the early hours of February 25.

Mopping Up

On February 22, the ARVN 21st and 39th Ranger battalions boarded junks and traveled to Gia Hoi Island, where the communist provisional government had been headquartered since the offensive started.  The Rangers swept the island as thousands of residents emerged from hiding and ran through their ranks to escape the battle.  The most brutal fight of the day centered on a pagoda that contained an NVA battalion command post.  The sweep continued through February 25.  The three-day operation netted hundreds of VC cadre, many of whom were university students who, according to residents, had played a key role in rounding up government officials and intellectuals the NVA/VC targeted as threats to their new regime.

On February 23, a mechanized task force involving the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and Troop A, 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry swept along the northwestern wall toward the An Hoa Bridge, flushing out several NVA troops who had taken refuge in the thick grasses and weeds.

Meanwhile, a mile further to the northwest, the remainder of the 5/7th Cav resumed its advance toward Thon An.  These troops fought their way into the NVA-occupied hamlet and found a honeycomb of tunnels and bunkers beneath its shattered remains.  They spent the rest of the day searching the ruins for survivors.  They also combed through the adjacent cemetery, where the 806th Battalion had ambushed the ARVN 7th Airborne Battalion on 31 January.

On February 24th, the 5/7th Cav rejoined its detached company and the armored cavalry platoon from the 3/5th Cavalry near the western corner of the Citadel.  The combined force then swept toward the Bach Ho Railroad Bridge along the southwestern face of the Citadel, where a few NVA continued to hold out in a narrow band of trees.

While 1st Battalion, 1st Marines conducted clearing operations in southern Huế, 2/5 conducted security patrols south of the Phu Cam Canal.  On February 24, 2/5 Marines launched an operation to the southwest of Huế to relieve the ARVN 101st Combat Engineers, which had been under siege by the NVA since the start of the battle.

As 2/5 approached the base at 0700, they were met by NVA mortar and machine-gun fire.  Marine artillery pushed the enemy into a hasty withdrawal, and 2/5 entered the base at 0850.  The base remained under fire from enemy positions in a Buddhist temple to the south and from a ridgeline to the west.  At 0700 on February 25, Fox and Golf Companies 2/5 began their assault on the ridgeline.  They were met by intense mortar fire.  With support from Marine artillery, Marines secured part of the ridge, killing three communists.

The attack resumed the following morning.  Hotel Company attacked a nearby hill, and after meeting stubborn resistance, the Marines pulled back so that air strikes could neutralize the enemy.  Twenty enemy soldiers were killed, along with four Marines, from friendly fire.  The Marines renewed their attack the following day, killing fourteen additional enemy.

On February 28, 1/5 and 2/5 Marines launched a combined operation to the east of Huế to try to cut off any NVA forces moving from Huế towards the coast.  Only a few NVA were encountered and dealt with.

Operation Huế City officially concluded on March 2, 1968.  ARVN losses included 452 killed and 2,123 wounded.  American losses were 216 dead and 1,584 wounded.  However, the numbers don’t add up.  According to after-action reports, the NVA executed 4,856 captured civilians and ARVN personnel, but the official toll, as reported by the Vietnamese command authority, only 844 civilians were killed, with 1,900 (estimated) receiving combat injuries.

NVA/VC losses are also a matter of debate.  North Vietnamese records indicate 2,400 killed and 3,000 wounded.  General Abrams’ headquarters reported twice the number of enemies killed. What is not debated is that the imperial city was utterly destroyed, making over 100,000 people homeless and terrorized.

Medals of Honor, Battle of Huế  

CWO Frederick Ferguson, U. S. Army

GySgt John L. Canley, USMC

SSgt Clifford Sims, U.S. Army

SSgt Joe Hooper, U.S. Army

Sgt Alfredo Gonzalez, USMC

The bloodiest battle — Part 1

Some background …

In 1967, North Vietnamese military officials realized that their war strategy in South Vietnam wasn’t working out quite the way they had hoped.  It was time to try something else.  The government of North Vietnam wanted a massive offensive, one that would reverse the course of the war.  When defense minister and senior army commander General Vo Nguyen Giap[1] voiced opposition to such an offensive, believing that a significant reversal of the war would not be the likely result of such an undertaking, North Vietnamese officials stripped Giap of his position, gave him a pocket watch, and sent him into retirement.

The politburo then appointed General Nguyen Chi Thanh to direct the offensive.  At the time, Thanh was commander of all Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam.  When General Thanh unexpectedly died, senior politburo members scrambled to reinstate General Giap.

Earlier — in the Spring of 1966 — Giap wondered how far the United States would go in defending the regime of South Vietnam.  To answer this question, he executed a series of attacks south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) with two objectives in mind.  First, he wanted to draw US forces away from densely populated urban and lowland areas where the NVA would have an advantage.  Second, Giap wished to know if the United States could be provoked into invading North Vietnam.

Both questions seem ludicrous since luring the military out of towns and cities was the last thing he should have wanted, and unless China was willing to rush to the aid of its pro-communist “little brothers,” tempting the US to invade North Vietnam was fool-hardy.  In any case, General Giap began a massive buildup of military forces and placed them in the northern regions of South Vietnam.  Their route of infiltration into South Vietnam was through Laos.  General Giap completed his work at the end of 1967 — with six infantry divisions massed within the Quang Tri Province.

US Army General William C. Westmoreland, commander of the United States Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (COMUSMACV or MACV), led all US and allied forces in Vietnam.  Westmoreland responded to Giap’s buildup by increasing US/allied forces in Quang Tri, realizing that if he wanted the enemy to dance, he would have to send his men into the dance hall.

What Westmoreland could not do, however, was invade either North Vietnam or Laos[2].  Realizing this, Giap gained confidence in creating more significant battles inside South Vietnam.  But even this wasn’t working out as Giap imagined.  Westmoreland was not the same kind of man as French General Henri Navarre, whom Giap had defeated in 1954.  For one thing, Westmoreland was far more tenacious, and meeting the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) away from populated areas would allow Westmoreland to make greater use of his air and artillery assets.

In phases, Giap increased North Vietnam’s military footprint in the northern provinces of South Vietnam.  One example of this was the NVA’s siege of the Khe Sanh combat base.  President Lyndon Johnson was concerned that the NVA was attempting another coup de guerre, such as at Dien Bien Phu, where Navarre was thoroughly defeated.  Johnson ordered Khe Sanh held at all costs.  With everyone’s eyes now focused on those events, Giap launched a surprise offensive at the beginning of the Tet (Lunar New Year) celebration.  He gave his attack order on January 31, 1968.  It was a massive assault involving 84,000 NVA and Viet Cong (VC) soldiers executing simultaneous attacks on 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of the six autonomous cities (including Saigon and Huế), 64 of 242 district capitals, and 50 hamlets.

Giap chose to violate the Tet cease-fire accord because he knew that many South Vietnamese soldiers would be granted leave to celebrate the holiday with their families.  It was an intelligent move that gave Giap a series of early successes.  VC forces even managed to breach the US Embassy enclosure in Saigon.  Within days, however, the offensive faltered as US/ARVN forces turned back the communist onslaught.  Heavy fighting continued in Kontum, Can Tho, Ben Tre, and Saigon … but the largest occurred in the City of Huế[3].  The Battle of Huế was the longest and the bloodiest battle of the Tet Offensive. 

In 1968, Huế was the third-largest city in South Vietnam; its population was around 140,000, and about a third of those living inside the Citadel, north of the Hương River, which flows through the city.[4]  Huế also sat astride Highway One, a major north-south main supply route about 50 miles south of the DMZ.  Huế was the former imperial capital of Vietnam.  Up to this point, Huế had only occasionally experienced the ravages of war—mortar fire, saboteurs, and acts of terrorism, but a large enemy force had never before appeared at the city’s gates.  But, as a practical matter, given the city’s cultural and intellectual importance to the Vietnamese people (and its status as the capital of Thua Thien Province), hostile actions were only a matter of time.

The people who lived in Huế enjoyed a tradition of civic independence dating back several hundred years.  The city’s religious monks viewed the war with disdain, but it is also true that few religious leaders felt any attachment to the government in Saigon.  They wanted national reconciliation — a coalition where everyone could get along.

Ancient tradition held that Huế had sprung to life as a lotus flower blossoming from a mud puddle.  It is a fascinating myth.  The city is situated on a bend of the Perfume (Hương) River just five miles southwest of the South China Sea.  The river divided Huế into two sections.  On the north bank stood the Citadel, a fortress encompassing nearly four square miles (modeled after China’s Forbidden City).  The Citadel was shaped like a diamond, its four corners pointing to the cardinal directions of the compass.  Stone walls encircled the Imperial City, and just beyond those, a wide moat filled with water.  The walls stood 8 meters high and several meters thick.

On the southeastern wall, the Perfume River ran a parallel course, which offered additional protection from that quarter.  There were ten gates; four of these (along the southeastern side) were made of carved stone.  The remaining walls each had two less elaborate gates.  A winding shallow canal ran through the Citadel, from southwest to northeast.  Two culverts connected the inner-city canal with those on the outside.

A newer section of the city lay south of the Perfume River.  It was the center for residential and business communities, including government offices (and a US Consulate), a university, provincial headquarters, a prison, a hospital, a treasury, and the forward headquarters element of MACV sited within a separate compound.  Referred to as “New City,” it was half the size of the old town.  It was also called The Triangle because of its irregular shape between the Phu Cam Canal in the south, a stream called Phat Lac on the east, and in the north by the Perfume River.  A pair of bridges linked the modern city to the Citadel: the Nguyen Hương Bridge (part of Highway 1) at the eastern corner of the Citadel, and fifteen hundred meters to the southwest was the Bach Ho Railroad Bridge.  Another bridge, called the An Cuu Bridge, was a modest arch on Highway 1 that conveyed traffic across the Phu Cam Canal.

Despite Huế’s importance, fewer than a thousand soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) were on duty.  Security for Huế was assigned to the First Infantry Division (ARVN) under the command of Brigadier General Ngo Quant Truong.  The 1st ARVN was headquartered within the fortified Mang Ca compound in the northeast corner of the Citadel.

Over half of Truong’s men were on leave for the holiday when the Giap commenced his offensive at Huế.   His subordinate commands’ location was spread along Highway 1 from north Huế to the DMZ.  The closest unit of any size to the division CP was the 3rd ARVN Regiment.  The regiment’s three battalions were located five miles northwest of Huế.  The only combat unit inside the city was a 36-man platoon belonging to an elite unit called the Black Panthers, a field reconnaissance and rapid reaction company.  Internal security for Huế was the responsibility of the National Police.[5]

The nearest US combat base was Phu Bai, six miles south on Highway 1.  Phu Bai was a major U. S. Marine Corps command post and support facility that included the forward headquarters element of the 1st Marine Division (designated Task Force X-Ray).  The Commanding General of Task Force X-Ray[6] was Brigadier General Foster C. LaHue, who also served as the Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Marine Division.  Also situated at Phu Bai were the headquarters elements of the 1st Marine Regiment (Stanley S. Hughes, Commanding) and the 5th Marine Regiment (Robert D. Bohn, Commanding).  There were also three battalions of Marines: 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (1/1) (Lt. Col. Marcus J. Gravel, Commanding), 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (1/5) (LtCol Robert P. Whalen, Commanding), and 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (2/5) (LtCol Ernest C. Cheatham, Jr., Commanding).

In addition to the Marines, several US Army commands were present, including two brigades of the 1st Air Cavalry Division (AIR CAV), which included the 7th and 12th Cavalry Regiments (dispersed over a wide area, from Phu Bai in the south to Quang Tri in the north), and the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division at Camp Evans, between Huế and Quang Tri.  Operational control of the 1st Brigade was assigned to the 1st Air Cav.

NVA forces included 8,000 well-trained and equipped soldiers.  The majority of these were NVA regulars.  The NVA was reinforced by six VC main force battalions (between 300 and 600 men each).  The field commander of these forces was General Tran Van Quang.  The NVA plan called for a division-sized assault on the Imperial City, with other units serving as a blocking force to stop or frustrate the efforts of any allied reinforcing units.  True to form, the communists knew all they needed about their civilian and military objectives within the city.  VC cadres had also prepared a list of “tyrants” who were to be located and terminated — nearly all of these South Vietnamese civilian and military officials.  Added to the lists were US civilians, clergy, educators, and other foreigners.  The communists also knew all they needed to know about the weather.

The NVA plan (termed the General Offensive/General Uprising) was designed to incorporate both conventional and guerilla operations intending to destroy any vestige of the South Vietnam government and its Western allies, and if not that, then discredit the enemy and cause a popular uprising among the people.  If everything worked according to plan, the Western allies would be forced to withdraw their forces from Vietnam.

A few senior NVA planners thought a popular uprising was highly unlikely; a few more expected that ARVN and US forces would drive the NVA out of the city within a few days —but, of course, such defeatist notions were best left unsaid.  Meanwhile, the young, idealistic, gullible soldiers believed the propaganda and went into combat, convinced of a great victory.  When these same young men departed their training camps, they had no intention of returning.  Many wouldn’t.

The Fight Begins

In January 1968, everyone sensed that something was off-kilter.  Tet was approaching.  The people were uneasy.  The cancellation of the Tet Truce and enemy attacks at Da Nang and elsewhere in southern I Corps dampened the normally festive spirit at Tet.[7]  The first indication of trouble came shortly after midnight during the night of January 30-31 — a five-pronged assault on all five provincial capitals in II Corps and the city of Da Nang in I Corps.  VC attacks began with mortar and rocket fire, followed by large-scale ground assaults by NVA regulars.  However, these were not well-coordinated attacks, and by dawn on January 31, most communists had been driven back from their objectives.

These initial attacks turned out to have been launched prematurely, but while US forces and ARVN units were placed on operational alert, there was no immediate sense of urgency.  ARVN commands sent our orders, which canceled all leaves for the Tet holiday, but most of these arrived too late, and besides that, General Truong did not believe the NVA had the intent or capability of attacking Huế City.  Allied intelligence kept tabs on two NVA regiments in Thua Thien Province, but there was little evidence of enemy activity in and around Huế City.  When Truong positioned his reduced force around the city, he intended to defend the urban areas outside the Citadel.

General Truong was not necessarily wrong in his conclusions —he was only misinformed.  According to US intelligence, the 6th NVA Regiment (with 804th Battalion) was reported operational 15 miles west of Huế.  The 806th Battalion was positioned outside Phong Dien, 22 miles northeast of Huế.  The 802nd Battalion was placed 12 miles south of Huế.  Analysts also placed the 4th NVA Regiment between Phu Bai and Da Nang.  Unknown to anyone, both regiments were en route to Huế.  The 6th NVA Regiment’s primary objectives were the Mang Ca headquarters compound, the Tay Loc Airfield, and the Imperial Palace.  The 4th NVA Regiment was assigned to attack New City, including the Provincial headquarters, the prison, and the MACV (forward) headquarters compound.  NVA planners assigned 200 specific targets between these two regiments, including radio stations, police stations, government officials, recruiting centers, and the Imperial Museum.  Viet Cong main force battalions were specifically targeting individuals — those sympathetic to the South Vietnam regime.

On January 30, enemy shock troops and sappers entered the city disguised as simple peasants, their uniforms and weapons concealed in baggage or under their street clothes.  VC and NVA regulars mingled with the Tet holiday crowds.  Many of these covert agents dressed in ARVN uniforms and then took up pre-designated positions to await the signal to attack.  The 6th NVA Regiment was only a few miles from the city’s western edge.  About 1900, the Regiment stopped for an evening meal, and regimental officers inspected their troops.  The regiment resumed its march one hour later in three columns, each with an objective within the Citadel.

At 2200 hours, Lieutenant Nguyen Van Tan, Commanding Officer of the 1st ARVN Division Reconnaissance Company, was leading a 30-man surveillance mission when a Regional Force Company east of his position reported it was under attack.[8]  Remaining concealed, Tan observed two enemy battalions filter past his position toward Huế City.  Tan radioed this information back to the 1st ARVN.  These were likely the 800th and 802nd Battalions, 6th NVA Regiment.  Despite Tan’s report, the communist troops continued toward Huế unmolested.

The NVA country-wide general offensive began at 0300; the only ARVN force inside Huế was the Black Panther Company, responsible for guarding the Tai Loc Airstrip (northwestern corner of the Citadel).  By then, large numbers of VC guerillas had already infiltrated the city.  In the early morning hours, the enemy took up positions in the town and awaited the arrival of NVA and VC assault troops.

At 0340, the NVA launched a rocket and mortar barrage from the mountains west of the city and followed this up with a three-pronged assault.  A small sapper team dressed in ARVN uniforms killed guards and opened the western gate to the Citadel.  The lead elements of the assault thus penetrated the city; the 6th NVA Regiment led the attack.  As communist fighters poured into Huế, the 800th and 802nd Battalions rapidly overran most of the Citadel.  General Truong and his staff held off the attackers at the ARVN compound, and the Black Panther Company held its ground at the eastern end of the airfield.  Truong later withdrew the Black Panther company from the airfield to reinforce the ARVN compound.  Except for this area, the NVA held the entire citadel, including the Imperial Palace.

The situation was similar across the Perfume River in southern Huế.  The sound of explosions awakened allied advisors in the MACV compound.  Grabbing any weapon they could get their hands on, advisors were able to repulse the ground assault, which lacked a coordinated effort.  When the initial assault faltered, the 804th Battalion, 4th NVA Regiment, encircled the compound and began their siege.  Two VC main force battalions seized the Thua Thien Provincial headquarters, the police station, and several other government buildings south of the river.  The NVA 810th Battalion took up blocking positions on the city’s southern edge.  By dawn on January 31, the North Vietnamese flag was flying over the Citadel, communist troops patrolled the streets, and political officers had begun their purge of South Vietnamese officials and American civilians.

The U. S. Marines

While the NVA were launching their attacks at Huế, the Marine Base at Phu Bai began receiving enemy rockets and mortars targeting the airstrip and Marine and ARVN infantry units.  General LaHue started receiving reports of enemy strikes along Highway 1 between the Hai Van Pass and the City of Huế.  Altogether, the NVA launched assaults against 18 targets.  Intelligence was jumbled; no one was sure what was happening or where.  LaHue knew that the 1st ARVN and MACV compounds had been hit, and because of the attack against the Navy’s LCU facility, all river traffic had ceased.

Meanwhile, General Truong realized that, at best, he had a tenuous hold on his headquarters.  He ordered the 3rd Regiment (reinforced by two ARVN airborne battalions and a troop of armored cavalry) to fight into the Citadel from the northeast.  The regiment finally arrived in the late afternoon, but only after intense fighting and a costly fight in terms of soldiers killed and wounded.  Pleas for reinforcements at the MACV compound went unanswered because none of the senior commanders knew the extent of the enemy’s strength or their success in entering Huế. 

Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam (Commander, ARVN Forces I CTZ) and Lieutenant General Robert Cushman (CG III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF)) began ordering subordinate commands to prevent enemy reinforcements from reaching the city. The NVA had the same idea—to prevent Western allies from entering the city.  The NVA 806th and 810th blocked positions in southern Huế and along Highway 1.

Having received no reliable intelligence, General LaHue surmised that the attacks might have been a diversionary strike.  General LaHue, who was only newly assigned to the Phu Bai area, was still unfamiliar with this tactical region (also, TAOR), let alone the fast-developing situation in Huế City.[9]  This wasn’t the only problem for the Marines.  Task Force X-Ray was created to help manage a major shift in the locations of the various combat elements of the First Marine Division and Third Marine Division, necessitated by MACV’s realignment of forces in I Corps.[10]

Colonel Bohn arrived at Phu Bai with General LaHue on 13th January.  1/1 under Colonel Gravel began making its move from Quang Tri at about the same time.  His subordinate units, Charlie Company and Delta Company, reached Phu Bai on January 26, while Bravo Company and Headquarters Company arrived three days later.  Alpha Company, Captain Gordon D. Batcheller, Commanding, arrived piecemeal.  Two of his platoon commanders failed to arrive with their platoons, and a third platoon commander was attending leadership school in Da Nang.[11]

On January 30th, the First Marine Regiment (1st Marines) replaced the 5th Marines in operational responsibility for the Phu Bai TAOR.  Colonel Hughes formally took operational control of the 1st Battalion (consisting of Company B, C, and D).  In effect, Hughes commanded a paper regiment with barely a single battalion of Marines. 

1/1 had already relieved 2/5, providing security on various bridges along Highway 1 and other key positions.  When Company A finally arrived at Phu Bai on January 30, it was designated battalion reserve (also Bald Eagle Reaction Force).  2/5 moved into the Phu Loc sector and assumed responsibility for the area south of the Truoi River and east of the Cao Dai Peninsula.  1/5 retained responsibility for the balance of the Phu Loc region, extending to the Hai Van Pass.

At around 1730 hours on January 30, a Marine Recon unit (code name Pearl Chest) made lethal contact with what was believed to be an NVA company moving north toward Huế, resulting in around 15 enemy killed in action (KIA).  After the unit fell back, it regrouped and encircled the Marines.  Poor weather prevented Allied air support; the Recon Marines called for relief.  LtCol Robert P. Whalen, commanding 1/5, sent his Bravo Company to relieve the Recon team.  The NVA attacked Bravo Company as it approached the location of the embattled Recon Marines.  Company B proceeded slowly with known enemies in the area and no understanding of how many.  Whalen requested Bohn to send additional reinforcements from 2/5 so as not to diminish his battalion’s ability to defend the town of Phu Loc.

Colonel Bohn tasked Cheatham to send in a reinforcing company.  Cheatham assigned this mission to Fox Company 2/5 (Captain Michael P. Downs, Commanding).  NVA units ambushed Fox Company as it moved into 1/5’s sector.  This action occurred at around 2300 hours, with Marines suffering one KIA and three wounded in action (WIA).  After this contact, the NVA faded into the night.  Fox Company secured an LZ to evacuate the injured and then returned to the 2/5 perimeter.

Realizing that his force was thin — and that his meager force could not sustain a significant engagement, Colonel Hughes ordered the Recon team to break out and return to Phu Bai.  Whalen also directed Bravo Company to return to base.  Colonel Bohn was puzzled about the purpose of these engagements.

As NVA units assaulted Huế City, they also attacked the Marines at Phu Bai with rockets and mortars, targeting the airstrip, known Marine positions around the airfield,  and nearby Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) and local Popular Forces/Regional Forces (PF/RF) units.[12]  An NVA company-sized unit attacked the South Vietnamese bridge security detachment along with CAP Hotel-Eight.  LtCol Cheatham ordered Hotel Company 2/5 (Captain G. Ronald Christmas, Commanding) to relieve the embattled CAP unit.  Marines from Hotel Company caught the NVA in the act of withdrawing from the CAP enclave and took it under fire.  Seeing an opportunity to trap the NVA unit, Cheatham reinforced Hotel Company with his command group and Fox Company, which had just returned from its Phu Loc operation.

With his other companies in a blocking position, Cheatham hoped to catch the enemy against the Truoi River.  However, after initiating the engagement with the NVA unit, events inside Huế City interrupted his plans.  At around 1030 on January 31, Golf Company 2/5 was ordered to assume Task Force X-Ray reserve.  The company detached from 2/5 and headed back to Phu Bai.  Later that day, 2/5 also lost operational control of Fox Company, which allowed the NVA units to complete their withdrawal.  Hotel and Echo Companies established night defensive positions.

While 2/5 engaged NVA along the Truoi River and Phu Loc, 1/1 began to move into Huế City.  Task Force X-Ray had received reports of enemy strikes all along Highway 1 between Hai Van Pass and Huế.  Eighteen separate attacks had occurred against everything from bridges to CAP units.  With Alpha Company 1/1/ as Phu Bai reserve, Colonel Hughes directed Gravel to stage Alpha Company for any contingency.  At 0630 on January 31, Hughes ordered Alpha Company to reinforce the Truoi River Bridge.  All that the company commander knew was that he was to strengthen ARVN forces south of Phu Bai.

What occurred over the next several hours is best described as a “cluster fuck.”  Alpha Company was convoyed to liaison with ARVN units.  There were no ARVN units.  The company commander encountered a few Marines from a nearby CAP unit and was told that Beau coupé VC were moving toward Huế.  Gravel then ordered Batcheller to reverse course and reinforce an Army unit north of Huế.  General LaHue rescinded that order, and Alpha Company was then ordered to assist a CAP unit south of Phu Bai.  Thirty minutes later, Task Force X-Ray directed Alpha Company to proceed to the Navy LCU ramp to investigate reports of an enemy assault.  In effect, the Marines of Alpha Company were being ground down by false starts.

Up to this point, the battle of Huế had been a South Vietnamese problem.  General LaHue had little worthwhile information, and Alpha Company continued north toward Huế.  The convoy met up with four tanks from the 3rd Tank Battalion.  Batcheller invited the tanks to join him, and they accepted.  Alpha Company, now reinforced with M-48 tanks, moved toward the MACV compound.

As Alpha Company approached the southern suburbs, the Marines came under increased sniper fire.  At one village, the Marines were forced to dismount their vehicles and conduct clearing operations before proceeding further.  The convoy no sooner crossed the An Cuu Bridge, which spanned the Phu Cam Canal into the city, when they were caught in a murderous crossfire from enemy automatic weapons and rockets.  NVA were on both sides of the road.  The lead tank commander was killed.  Alpha Company pushed forward —albeit cautiously.  Batcheller maintained “sporadic” communications with Gravel at Phu Bai.  For the most part, the only thing Batcheller heard on the artillery and air nets were the voices of frantic Vietnamese.  When Alpha Company reached the causeway, they once more came under sniper fire.  Batcheller was seriously wounded.  Gunnery Sergeant J. L. Canley assumed command of the company.[13]

Colonel Hughes requested permission from LaHue to reinforce Alpha Company.  The only available reinforcing units were  Headquarters & Service Company (H&SCo), 1/1, and Golf Company, 2/5.  Colonel Gravel’s battalion was strung out from Phu Bai to Quang Tri (a distance of 46 miles).  For whatever reason, Gravel had never met his Golf Company Commander, Captain Charles L. Meadows.  Worse, Captain Meadows had no idea what was happening or what his upcoming mission would entail.  All Meadows understood was that Golf Company would help escort the Commanding General to the 1st ARVN Division and back to Phu Bai.

Gravel’s hodge-podge column reached Alpha Company in the early afternoon.  Gravel assumed control of the tanks but sent the trucks loaded with WIAs back to Phu Bai (including Captain Batcheller).   With tanks taking point, Alpha Company, H&S Company, and Golf Company —in that order— raced toward the MACV compound.  They arrived at about 1500 hours.  By this time, the enemy had pulled back.  Gravel met with the US Army senior advisor at the MACV compound, Colonel George O. Adkisson.  Gravel was trying to understand the enemy situation, but this conversation may have ended with Gravel having even less understanding than when the discussion had begun.

Gravel ordered Alpha Company to establish a defensive perimeter at the MACV compound.  With armor reinforcements from the Marines and 7th ARVN, Gavel took Golf Company in tow and attempted to cross the main bridge over the Perfume River.  Marine armor was too heavy for the bridge, so Gravel left them on the south bank of the river.  Available Vietnamese M-24 tank crews refused to go across the bridge.[14]  Gravel directed two platoons to cross the bridge, but they were saturated with enemy fire when they reached the other side.  Realizing he was outgunned, Gravel withdrew his Golf Company and returned to the MACV compound.  One-third of Company G’s Marines were killed or wounded in this engagement.

The Americans still had scant information about the situation in Huế at 2000 hours.  If General LaHue was confused, he knew far more about the situation than did Westmoreland.  According to Westmoreland’s message to the JCS Chairman, three NVA companies were inside the Citadel, and a battalion of Marines had been sent in to clear them out.

The Struggle —

On February 1, senior allied commanders agreed that the 1st ARVN Division would assume responsibility for the Citadel while Task Force X-Ray would clear the New City.  General LaHue ordered Gravel to advance from the MACV compound to the Thua Thien provincial headquarters and the prison — a distance of about six city blocks.  General LaHue briefed reporters, saying, “… very definitely, we control the city’s southside.”

In reality, the Marine footprint was too small to control anything.  CG III MAF secured Westmoreland’s permission to send in the Cavalry.  Major General John J. Tolson, commanding the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile), intended to insert his Third Brigade from Camp Evans into the sector west of Huế City.  Two battalions would be airlifted into the northwest sector: 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, and 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry (and Brigade CP).  Their mission was to close off the enemy’s supply line into Huế.  Additionally, the 2nd Battalion, 101st Airborne, would cover security for Camp Evans, and the division’s First Brigade would continue operations in Quang Tri Province.  At mid-afternoon on February 2, CAV 2/12 landed 10 miles northwest of Huế and began pushing toward the city.

But on February 2, the Marines were still struggling.  There was some minor progress, but only after a 3-hour firefight.  1/1 finally reached the university, and the Army radio center was relieved.  During the night, NVA managed to destroy the railroad bridge across the Perfume River.  Commanding Hotel Company 2/5, Captain Ron Christmas crossed the An Cuu Bridge at around 1100.  Hotel Company was reinforced with Army trucks equipped with Quad-50 machine guns and two ONTOS, each armed with six 106mm recoilless rifles, which devastated enemy positions wherever they were found.    

Gravel launched a two-company assault toward his two objectives.  The enemy stopped the attack as effectively as a brick wall, and the Marines withdrew to the MACV compound.  It was then that General LaHue realized that he had underestimated the enemy’s strength.  Shortly after noon, LaHue gave Colonel Hughes tactical control of Marine forces in the southern city.  Hughes promised Gravel reinforcements and directed that he commence “sweep and clear operations: destroy the enemy, protect US nationals, and restore that portion of the city to US Control.” 

On the afternoon of February 2, Hughes decided to move his command group from Phu Bai into Huế, where he could more directly control the battle.  Accompanying Hughes in the convoy was Lt. Col. Ernest Cheatham, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, who, up until then, had been sitting frustrated in Phu Bai while three of his companies (F, G, and H) fought in Huế under Gravel’s command.[15]

Hughes quickly established his command post in the MACV compound.  The forces at his disposal included Cheatham’s three companies from 2/5 and Gravel’s depleted battalion consisting of A Company, 1/1; a provisional company made up of one platoon of B Company, 1/1; and several dozen cooks and clerks who had been sent to the front to fight alongside the infantry.

Endnotes:

[1] General Giap defeated the Imperial French after eight years of brutal warfare following the end of World War II.

[2] The United States did deploy covert and special forces into Laos at a later time.

[3] Pronounced as “Way.”

[4] The Hương River (also Hương Giang) crosses the city of Huế in the central province of Thừa Thiên-Huế.  The translation for Hương is Perfume.  It is called the Perfume River because, in autumn, flowers from upriver orchards fall into the river, giving it a perfume-like aroma.  Of course, this phenomenon likely happened a thousand years ago because, in 1968, the river smelled more like an open sewer.   

[5] The National Police were sometimes (derisively) referred to as white mice.  They were un-professional, non-lethal, timid, and about a third of them were giving information to the enemy on a regular basis.

[6] Task Force X-Ray went operational on 13 January 1968.

[7] In 1962, South Vietnam was divided into four tactical zones: CTZs or numbered Corps.  These included I CTZ (Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, and Quang Tin); II CTZ (Quang Ngai, Kontum, Pleiku, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Phu Bon); III CTZ (16 provinces); IV CTZ (13 provinces), and the Capital Zone (Saigon and Gia Dinh provinces).

[8] South Vietnamese militia.

[9] Equally valid for most subordinate commanders and units at Phu Bai.

[10] Operation Checkers was a shift in responsibility for guarding the western approaches to Huế City.  To that end, the 1st and 5th Marine Regiments moved into Thua Thien Province from Da Nang.  It was a massive shift of American military units, which also involved US Army units operating in I Corps.  This shifting of major subordinate commands played right into General Giap’s hands.

[11] I will probably never understand why sending a recently commissioned officer to a leadership school in Vietnam was necessary. 

[12] Thirteen-man rifle squads with medical support and reinforced by Vietnamese militia platoons assigned to provide area security within rural hamlets.  See Also: Fix Bayonets on 02/05/2016 (series)

[13] Initially awarded the Navy Cross medal, the award was upgraded to the Medal of Honor in 2017.

[14] The M-24 Chafee light tank weighed 18 tons; the M-48 Patton tank weighed 40 tons.  The Vietnamese tank crews were likely ordered not to attempt to cross the bridge.

[15] At this time, Ernie Cheatham was a 38-year-old veteran of two wars and 14 years removed from a professional football career.  The Pittsburgh Steelers picked him in the 1951 draft.  He put his NFL career on hold to fight in the Korean War, afterward suiting up as a defensive tackle with the Steelers for the 1954 season.  But after being traded to the Baltimore Colts, Cheatham left professional football and rejoined the Marine Corps.  Lieutenant General Ernest C. Cheatham retired from active service in 1988; he passed away on 14 June 2014.


Our disaster in brief

By Bing West

Following 9/11, a bit of wreckage from the Twin Towers was buried at the American embassy in Kabul, with the inscription: “Never Again.” Now Again has come.  On the 20th anniversary of 9/11, the Taliban flag will fly over the abandoned American embassy and al-Qaeda will be operating inside Afghanistan. Fifty years from now, Americans will stare in sad disbelief at the photo of an American Marine plucking a baby to safety over barbed wire at Kabul airport. What a shameful, wretched way to quit a war.

The root cause was extreme partisanship in Congress. By default, this bequeathed to the presidency the powers of a medieval king. The Afghanistan tragedy unfolded in four phases, culminating in the whimsy of one man consigning millions to misery.

Phase One. 2001–2007. After 9/11, America unleashed a swift aerial blitzkrieg that shattered the Taliban forces. Inside three months, al-Qaeda’s core unit was trapped inside the Tora Bora caves in the snowbound Speen Ghar mountains. A force of American Marines and multinational special forces commanded by Brigadier General James Mattis (later secretary of defense) was poised to cut off the mountain passes and systematically destroy al-Qaeda. Instead, General Tommy Franks, the overall commander, sent in the undisciplined troops of Afghan warlords, who allowed al-Qaeda to escape into Pakistan. Thus was lost the golden opportunity to win a fast, decisive war and leave.

Acting upon his Evangelical beliefs, President George W. Bush then made the fateful decision to change the mission from killing terrorists to creating a democratic nation comprising 40 million mostly illiterate tribesmen. Nation-building was a White House decision made without gaining true congressional commitment. Worse, there was no strategy specifying the time horizon, resources, and security measures. This off-handed smugness was expressed by Vice President Dick Cheney early in 2002 when he remarked, “The Taliban is out of business, permanently.”

On the assumption that there was no threat, a scant 5,000 Afghan soldiers were trained each year. But the fractured Taliban could not be tracked down and defeated in detail because their sponsor, Pakistan, was sheltering them. Pakistan was also providing the U.S.–NATO supply line into landlocked Afghanistan, thus limiting our leverage to object to the sanctuary extended to the Taliban.

In 2003, the Bush administration, concerned about the threat of Saddam’s presumed weapons of mass destruction, invaded Iraq. This sparked a bitter insurgency, provoked by Islamist terrorists, that required heavy U.S. military resources. Iraq stabilized in 2007, but by that time the Taliban had regrouped inside Pakistan and were attacking in eastern Afghanistan, where the dominant tribe was Pashtun, their own.

Phase Two. 2008–2013. For years, the Democratic leadership had been battering the Republicans about the Iraq War, claiming that it was unnecessary. By default, Afghanistan became the “right war” for the Democrats. Once elected, President Obama, who said that Afghanistan was the war we could not afford to lose, had no way out. With manifest reluctance, in 2010 he ordered a “surge” of 30,000 U.S. troops, bringing the total to 100,000 U.S. soldiers plus 30,000 allied soldiers. The goal was to implement a counterinsurgency strategy, yet Obama pledged to begin withdrawing troops in 2011, an impossibly short time frame.

The strategy aimed to clear villages of the Taliban, then leave Afghan soldiers — askaris — to hold them and to build infrastructure and governance linked to the Kabul central government. In a 2011 book titled “The Wrong War,” I described why this strategy could not succeed. In Vietnam, I had served in a combined-action platoon of 15 Marines and 40 local Vietnamese. It had taken 385 days of constant patrolling to bring security to one village of 5,000. In Afghanistan, there were 7,000 Pashtun villages to be cleared by fewer than a thousand U.S. platoons, an insurmountable mismatch. Counterinsurgency would have required dedicated troops inserted for years. President Obama offered a political gesture, not a credible strategy.

Admiral James Stavridis was the supreme Allied commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization during the surge period. He recently wrote, “We trained the wrong kind of army for Afghanistan. . . . A decade ago, we debated all this at senior levels but kept coming back to a firmly held belief that we could succeed best by modeling what we knew and found comfortable: ducks like ducks, in the end.” According to the admiral, our top command knew they were creating “the wrong kind of army.” Yet they did so regardless.

My experience was different. In trips to Afghanistan over ten years, I embedded with dozens of U.S. platoons. When accompanying our grunts, the askaris did indeed fight. But ten years later, it remains a mystery to me why our generals refused to acknowledge what our grunts knew: namely, that the Afghan soldiers would not hold the villages once our troops left.

This wasn’t due to the structure of their army. The fault went deeper. The askaris lacked faith in the steadfastness of their own chain of command. Afghan president Hamid Karzai reigned erratically from 2004 through 2014, ranting against the American government while treating the Taliban with deference. His successor, Ashraf Ghani, a technocrat devoid of leadership skills, antagonized both his political partners and tribal chieftains. Neither man instituted promotion based upon merit or imbued confidence in the security forces. Familial and tribal patronage pervaded.

From the Kabul capital to province to district, from an Afghan general to a lieutenant, positions and rank depended upon paying bribes upward and extorting payments downward. We were caught on the horns of a dilemma caused by our political philosophy. Because we wanted to create a democracy, we chose not to impose slates of our preferred leaders. On the other hand, the askaris had no faith in the durability or tenacity of their own chain of command.

In contrast, the Taliban promoted upward from the subtribes in the different provinces. While decentralized, they were united in a blazing belief in their Islamist cause and encouraged by Pakistan. The Afghan army and district, provincial, and Kabul officials lacked a comparable spirit and vision of victory.

Phase Three. 2014–2020. From 2001 to 2013, one group of generals — many of them household names — held sway in the corridors of power, convinced they could succeed in counterinsurgency and nation-building. That effort, while laudable, failed.

But that did not mean that a Taliban victory was inevitable. Quite the opposite. A second group of generals came forward, beginning with General Joseph Dunford. The mission changed from counterinsurgency to supporting the Afghan army with intelligence, air assets, and trainers. President Obama lowered expectations about the end state, saying Afghanistan was “not going to be a source of terrorist attacks again.” U.S. troop strength dropped from 100,000 in 2011 to 16,000 in 2014. With the exception of Special Forces raids, we were not in ground combat, so there were few American casualties.

Battlefield tactics shifted to what the Afghan army could do: play defense and prevent the Taliban from consolidating. By 2018, U.S. troop strength was lower than 10,000. Nonetheless, General Scott Miller orchestrated an effective campaign to keep control of Afghanistan’s cities. Afghan soldiers, not Americans or allies, did the fighting and dying. The last U.S. combat death occurred in February of 2020.

Nevertheless, narcissistic President Trump, desperate to leave, promised the Taliban that America would depart by mid 2021. He cut the number of American troops in country to 2,500. With those few troops, General Miller nonetheless held the line. The U.S. military presence, albeit tiny, motivated the beleaguered Afghan soldiers. When the Taliban massed to hit the defenses of a city, the askaris defended their positions and the U.S. air pounced on targets. In addition, our presence provided a massive spy network and electronic listening post in central Asia, able to monitor Russia, China, Pakistan, and Iran. At a cost of no American lives and 5 percent of the defense budget, Afghanistan had reached a stalemate sustainable indefinitely at modest cost.

Phase Four. Bug-out in 2021. President Biden broke that stalemate in April of 2021, when he surprised our allies and delighted the Taliban by declaring that all U.S. troops would leave by 9/11, a singularly inappropriate date. As our military packed up, the miasma of abandonment settled into the Afghan psyche. In early July, our military sneaked away from Bagram Air Base in the middle of the night, which triggered a cascading collapse. Once Afghan units across the country grasped that they were being abandoned, they dissolved. What followed was a chaotic evacuation from the Kabul airport, with the Taliban triumphantly entering the city.

Asked why he had pulled out entirely, President Biden said, “What interest do we have in Afghanistan at this point, with al-Qaeda gone?” That stunning fabrication was a denial of reality: Al-Qaeda are commingled with the Taliban in Kabul. As the world watched, America had to rely upon Taliban forbearance to flee. President Biden had handed America a crushing defeat without precedent.

President Biden has claimed that the ongoing evacuation occurred because the Afghan army ran away instead of fighting. In truth, the Afghan soldiers did fight, suffering 60,000 killed in the war. Their talisman was the American military. No matter how tough the conditions, somehow an American voice crackled over the radio, followed by thunder from the air. Those few Americans were the steel rods in the concrete. When that steel was pulled out, the concrete crumbled. The spirit of the Afghan army was broken.

During the month following the abandonment of Bagram Air Base, the Pentagon remained passive. In contrast, a month before the abrupt fall of Saigon in 1975, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger was concerned about the North Vietnamese advances. As a former grunt in Vietnam, I was his special assistant during that turbulent time. He in­formed State and the White House that he was ordering an air evacuation; 50,000 Vietnamese were rescued before Saigon fell. In the case of Kabul, the Pentagon took no such preemptive action.

Worse, selecting which Afghans can fly to safety has been left to State Department bureaucrats, although State has an abysmal ten-year record, with 18,000 applicants stuck in the queue. Each day approximately 7,000 undocumented immigrants walk into America; about 2,000 Afghans are flown out daily from Kabul. In the midst of an epic foreign-policy catastrophe, the priorities of the Biden administration remain driven by domestic politics and constipated bureaucratic processes.

What comes after the botched evacuation finally ends?

  • A course correction inside the Pentagon is sorely needed. Our military reputation has been gravely diminished. The 1 percent of American youths who volunteer to serve are heavily influenced by their families. About 70 percent of service members have a relative who served before them. The Afghanistan War spanned an entire generation. What they took away from this defeat will be communicated from father to son, from aunt to niece.

To avoid alienating this small warrior class, the secretary of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs must put aside their obsession with alleged racism and diversity in the ranks. Former secretary of defense Mattis said that lethality must be the lodestone of our military. Sooner or later in the next six months, we will be challenged. Instead of again waiting passively for instructions, the Pentagon should recommend swift, decisive action.

  • President Biden’s image as a foreign-policy expert is indelibly tarnished. As vice president in 2011, he vigorously supported the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Iraq. Three years later, U.S. troops were rushed back in to prevent Iraq from falling to the radical Islamists. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote at the time, “he has been wrong on nearly every major foreign-policy and national-security issue over the past four decades.”

President Biden bragged that under his leadership, America was “back.” Instead, while denying that our allies were upset with his performance, he has destroyed his credibility. Per­haps there will be changes in his foreign-policy team, but President Biden himself will not be trusted by our allies as a reliable steward.

  • In his Farewell Address, Washington wrote, “The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge, natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism.”

As Washington warned, due to extreme partisanship, the American presidency has accumulated the powers of a king or a despot. In matters of war, over the past several decades one party in Congress or the other has gone along with whatever the president decided. This tilts power decisively in favor of the White House. Congress has abdicated from providing either oversight or a broad base of public support. The White House as an institution has become regal and aloof — the opposite of the intention of the Founding Fathers.

Afghanistan, from start to finish, was a White House war, subject to the whims and political instincts of our president. The result was an erraticism that drove out strategic consistency and perseverance. A confident President Bush invaded Afghanistan, blithely expanded the mission, and steered a haphazard course from 2001 through 2007. Presidents Obama and Trump were overtly cynical, surging (2010–2013) and reducing (2014–2020) forces while always seeking a way out divorced from any strategic goal. President Biden (2021) was a solipsistic pessimist who ignored the calamitous consequences and quit because that had been his emotional instinct for a decade.

  • Our Vietnam veterans were proud of their service. The same is true of our Afghanistan veterans. In both wars, they carried out their duty, correctly believing their cause was noble. After nation-building was designated a military mission, our troops both fought the Taliban enemy and improved life for millions of Afghans. With the Taliban now the victors, it hurts to lose the war, especially when the decision rested entirely with one man.

Who are we as a country? Who will fight for us the next time?

This article appears as “Who Will Trust Us the Next Time?” in the September 13, 2021, print edition of National Review.

Francis J. “Bing” West, Jr. (b. 1940) is an American author, Marine Corps combat veteran, and former Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) during the Reagan Administration.

West writes about the military, warfighting, and counterinsurgency.  In the Vietnam War, he fought in major operations and conducted over a hundred combat patrols in 1966–1968.  He wrote the Marine Corps training manual Small Unit Action in Vietnam, describing how to fight in close combat.  As an analyst at the RAND Corporation, he wrote a half dozen detailed monographs about fighting against an insurgency.  Later, as Assistant Secretary of Defense, he dealt with the insurgencies in El Salvador.  From 2003 – 2008, he made sixteen extended trips to Iraq, going on patrols and writing three books and numerous articles about the war.  From 2007 through 2011, he made numerous trips to embed with U.S. troops serving in Afghanistan.

Squad Leader

Even though he only stood around 5’9” tall, people came away with the impression that he was taller.  I think this was because Sergeant Giacalone[1] scrupulously maintained his military bearing; his uniform and appearance were always impeccable; he stood tall, he walked tall, and he expected the same from anyone wearing the uniform of a United States Marine.  He would not tolerate a slovenly Marine — no matter what his rank.

Sergeant Giacalone’s posture was so correct that I never once observed his head turning without the rest of his body turning with it.  This was likely the result of Sergeant Giacalone having once served as a Marine Corps Drill Instructor — before the Korean War.  The Korean War was when Giacalone earned a silver star, a bronze star, and two Purple Heart medals.

When I knew Sergeant Giacalone, he had only recently been promoted to sergeant — for the second time.  No one in the squad knew any of the details of his court-martial; there was no reason why anyone should.  In those days, a Marine who screwed up could be redeemed.  It was a simple formula: charge him, court-martial him, punish him, and send him back to duty.  I lament this is no longer true.

In Sergeant Giacalone’s case, somewhere in his career (which began sometime in 1948), this squared-away former drill instructor developed a drinking problem.  It wasn’t a frequent problem — and it never happened while on duty, but when it did happen, it was always noteworthy.  Maybe he had woman troubles.  We never knew.  It wasn’t something a squared-away sergeant would ever discuss with the snuffies.  What we did know about our squad leader was all we had to know.  What we learned was that he was one hell of a field Marine; what we knew was that while our Lord might lay claim to our souls, our miserable snuffy asses belonged to Sergeant Giacalone.

Our squad leader was up before reveille; he only hit the rack long after taps.  He kept himself and his squad squared away.  Inspecting officers never found our uniforms or equipment deficient — that’s because Sergeant Giacalone made it his business to inspect us long before any officers showed up.  We would not embarrass him in front of the company officers or the rest of the platoon.

Whether in garrison or the field, Sergeant Giacalone expected us to act so that we brought credit to ourselves, our squad, and our unit.  It was hard to turn around anywhere and not see Sergeant Giacalone observing us.  He lived in the barracks, in the NCO quarters at the end of the squad bay.  Whether we were in the field or not, there would be no horsing around.  If there was time for horsing around, there was time to study our guidebooks or complete an MCI course.  The Marine Corps is a serious business — no time for slouching around.  Those were the rules.  I can hear him now, reminding us, “Focus people.”

The third squad stood in awe of Sergeant Giacalone, but then so too did everyone else.  Even our company commander respected what Giacalone knew about field operations.  Sergeant Giacalone took what our drill instructors taught us about teamwork to the next level.  He was patient, repetitive, and direct.  Time permitting, he would explain why this or why that, but no matter what, he issued his orders, and we obeyed them.

It was impossible not to admire Sergeant Giacalone, and it wasn’t long before we began to emulate his mannerisms.  In formations, we stood tall because he demanded it.  We learned to square ourselves away because he expected no less of us.  No other squad in Echo Company could stand up to us; we were in Giacalone’s third herd.  Looking back, 61 years, he was a worthy example.  I cannot speak for the rest of the men, but for me personally, I carried a part of Sergeant Giacalone with me for the next three decades and into retirement.

There were, admittedly, a few occasions when Sergeant Giacalone was “too direct,” particularly when addressing seniors.  He had no patience with officers when they meddled in matters that fell into the exclusive realm of the Marine Corps NCO.  In such instances, he might suggest, “Excuse me, sir, but isn’t there something else you could be doing that is more suitable for an officer of your rank?”

Sergeant Giacalone may have been a rank-conscious snob, albeit in reverse.  He avoided officers whenever possible, but when trapped, he was always correct and professional, as befitting an experienced NCO.  Among those of us who were learning the trade, there was no such thing as a stupid question; officers, however, didn’t have that luxury.  He expected more from college-educated lieutenants, and a silly question from one of these fellows may have elicited, “Sir, as you may recall from your second or third week of basic training …”

Sergeant Giacalone did have his biases, however.  He did not like navy officers, swabbies, women Marines, disbursing pogues, shore patrol/military police, or mess sergeants.

I was one of Sergeant Giacalone’s snuffles in 1963 — snuffy being anyone below the rank of corporal.  Since I was unprivileged, I don’t have any details about the events that allegedly occurred in the parking lot adjacent to the NCO Club.  The rumor, however, was that there was a sergeant, an officer of the day, and several military police, the initial group of whom called for a backup.  Sergeant Giacalone, it seemed, periodically went on a binge.  I never saw the man in his cups, but snuffles didn’t run with the big dogs. 

In any case, Sergeant Giacalone became a corporal a few days later.  Rumor control had it that when Sergeant Giacalone went in to see the old man for nonjudicial punishment, he took his medicine, offered no excuses, apologized for his behavior, and agreed to talk to the “doc” about dealing with his demons.  The company commander had a good size chunk of his ass, of course, broke him down in rank, fined him … but then sent him back to work.  That’s how it was back then: mess up, pay up, get back to work.  Giacalone was the only corporal in our company to serve as a squad leader.

Eighteen months later, I received orders sending me to another duty station.  I checked out of the company and said goodbye to my squad mates.  I thanked Corporal Giacalone for his leadership and his patience.  He shook my hand and said, “Take care of yourself.  And don’t embarrass me, goddamn it.” The last time I heard anything about Giacalone, he served as a gunnery sergeant in Vietnam.  It’s where he died while trying to save one of his men.  Semper Fidelis.

Notes:

[1] The story is true; the name is fictional.


Second Battle of the Naktong Bulge

Background

When North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) forces invaded the Republic of South Korea (ROK), they did so with superiority in both manpower and equipment.  The NKPA benefitted from the training, arms, and equipment provided by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).  North Korea’s President Kim Il-sung took his orders directly from Joseph Stalin.

The NKPA’s mission was to aggressively pursue United Nations forces and the fledgling ground forces of the Republic of South Korea, attacking them frontally and from the flanks until they had surrounded and destroyed all resistance.[1]  The strategy worked well enough in the first three months of their invasion; between 25 June and late August 1950, the NKPA continually attacked, mauled, and demoralized ROC and UN forces, pushing them ever southward to what became the Pusan Perimeter.  As numerically inferior ROC and UN forces withdrew southward in an often disorderly manner, they left behind their dead, their wounded, and their “missing in action.”  They also abandoned critical wartime equipment, which the NKPA later used against the Allied forces.

When the NKPA approached the Pusan Perimeter, however, their frontal attacks were only marginally successful; envelopment operations were even less so.  It was from within the Pusan Perimeter that UN forces, primarily the United States Army with only token participation by UN and NATO allies, began the process of reorganization, reinforcement, and resupply.[2]

See also: First Battle of the Naktong Bulge.

Following the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge, Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, commanding the U.S. Eighth Army, assigned the defense of the Naktong Line to the inexperienced Second U.S. Infantry Division (2 ID).[3]  His decision made 2 ID the main target of several enemy infantry divisions.  The NKPA intended to split 2 ID, thus rendering it incapable of massed resistance.  The NKPA’s success enabled the communists to penetrate Yongsan.

A Second Battle Evolves

The 5th Marine’s earlier assault upon the NKPA 4th Infantry Division at the cloverleaf rendered that division ineffective as a combat force.  Similarly, US Army units pushed the NKPA 6th Infantry Division back across the Naktong River.  In the Taegu region of South Korea in late August, three U.S. divisions repulsed five enemy infantry/armored divisions.  The main battles in this engagement included the Battle of Masan, the Battle of Chindong-ni, the Battle of Komam-ni, the Battle of the Mountain, and the Battle of the Bowling Alley, which rendered the NKPA 13th Infantry Division ineffective.  On South Korea’s east coast, ROK infantry divisions pushed back three additional NKPA divisions at Pohang-dong.  [Pictured: Captain Francis Ike Fenton, Jr., Commanding Officer, Company B 1/5 August 1950 (titled: The face of war).][4]

Reeling from the American assault, the enemy commander decided to reinitiate offensive operations.  Still, in light of the U.S. Navy’s lethal naval gunfire support to ground forces, they avoided future flanking movements.  Instead, the NKPA opted for a series of frontal assaults to breach the U.S. perimeter.  The communists reasoned that it was their only hope of achieving victory.

Supplied with intelligence from the USSR, the NKPA was well aware that MacArthur’s U.N. command was building up its forces within the Pusan Perimeter.  The defeat of these new units was critical to the NKPA’s overall success in pushing the Americans into the Sea of Japan.  Moreover, to achieve a final victory, the NKPA would have to surround Taegu and destroy all UN/US forces defending it.  Cutting the main supply route (MSR) into Taegu would be critical to achieving that objective.

The NKPA plan called for a five-pronged assault.  In the center, the 9th, 4th, 2nd, and 10th NKPA divisions would overwhelm 2 ID at the Naktong Bulge and seize Miryang and Yongsan.  The attack would commence on September 1, 1950.

On September 1, the 35th Regiment (25 ID) engaged the enemy in the Battle of the Nam River, north of Masan.  On the 35th’s right was the 9th Regiment (part of 2 ID).  The 9th occupied a front extending over 18,000 meters (11.2 miles), which included a portion of the Naktong Bulge.  Each regiment’s rifle company had a defensive front of 910 to 1,220 meters, but in reality, these units only held the key hills and observation points.  The area assigned to the 9th Regiment was unrealistic, far exceeding its defense capability.  The regiment had been observing enemy activity to their front for several days.  The regimental operations officer assumed that the NKPA was reinforcing their defensive positions.  One indication of likely lethal action was when civilian laborers supporting the NKPA fled the front lines.

The NKPA 9th Infantry Division intended to outflank and destroy the US army at the Naktong Bulge by capturing Miryang and Samnang-jin.  This action would cut off 2 ID’s MSR and escape route between Taegu and Pusan.  The NKPA also planned to attack 24 ID, an organization the North Koreans knew was exhausted after several weeks of fighting.  Unknown to the North Koreans, the American 2 ID replaced 24 ID on the line.  On the night of August 31, elements of the NKPA 9th began crossing the Naktong River.

The soldiers of 2 ID were fresh — but most of the men were inexperienced and without a clue about what would happen when the enemy attacked.  The NKPA overran the young troopers amid green flares and shrill whistles and pushed many of them to the 25 ID line.   

Another call for the Fire Brigade

The Pusan perimeter is like a weakened dike; the Army intends to use us to plug the holes as they open.  We’re a brigade —a fire brigade.  It will be costly fighting against a numerically superior enemy.  Marines have never lost a battle; this brigade will not be the first to establish such a precedent.  Prepare to move.”  — Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, USMC.

By September 1, less than thirty days from the beginning of their fight, the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade (1stMarBde) was down to around 4,300 men; in less than 30 days, the Marines had taken 500 casualties.  Word had come down to the Brigade Commander, Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, that the Marines would come off the line.  They were needed elsewhere.  No one in the ranks knew where, exactly, and no one asked, but it would have to be better than the Pusan Perimeter.  Craig knew what was coming — as did General Douglas A. MacArthur and Major General Oliver P. Smith, USMC.  However, preparations for moving the Marines came to a halt early in the morning of September 1, 1950.

The following day, the 1st and 2nd Regiments of the NKPA (9th Infantry Division) stood a few miles short of Yongsan.  Facing them were the shattered remains of Easy Company, 2nd Battalion, US 9th.  There were no other UN/US troops to defend Yongsan.  The 2 ID commander, Major General Lawrence B. Keiser, had formed ad hoc units from his support troops to shore up Easy Company.  Still, it would not be enough to withstand a further assault by the enemy division.

In Tokyo, Major General Doyle O. Hickey, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, United Nations Far East Command, wanted to know when General Walker intended to release the Marines for further assignment.  In his answer, General Walker described the situation: “The 2nd ID has been shattered, and the ground between what remained of it, and the 25 ID line, is in grave peril.”  Walker said he did not think he could save the 2nd ID without the Marines.  MacArthur approved Walker’s further use of the 1stMarBde, and they soon became attached to General Keiser’s command.[5]

 Subsequently, Walker ordered Keiser to destroy enemy units east of the Naktong River and restore the 2 ID main line of resistance (MLR).  Walker informed Keiser and Craig that he would release the Marines as soon as Keiser accomplished that mission.  Following a council of war between the Eighth Army, 2 ID, and 1stMarBde on September 2, a decision was taken to mount a counterattack the next morning.  The 5th Marines would commence its attack to the west at 08:00 on September 3, astride the Yongsan-Naktong Road.  Army units would attack northwest from a position above the Marines and attempt to tie in with the 23rd Regiment.  On the Marines’ left, what remained of the 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion, 1/9th, and the 72nd Tank Battalion would attack south to reestablish contact with 25 ID.

Marines were scheduled to relieve George and Fox companies 2/9th and 2nd Combat Engineers at 0300 and 0430 on September 3.  The second battalion, 5th Marines (2/5) under Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise, assembled north of Yongsan.  Lieutenant Colonel George R. Newton’s 1/5 assembled south of Yongsan.  Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett’s 3/5 provided area security southwest of Yongsan, covering the enemy’s likely avenues of approach.  Fighting began during the night of September 2-3, with Marines gaining high ground to serve as their line of departure.  With the help of Marine tank fire, G 2/5 overcame heavy NKPA resistance, but the fight delayed a coordinated advance of the two line battalions.  The Marines “jumped off” at 0855 toward the NKPA high ground, one-half mile distant.

A coordinated assault by aircraft, artillery, and pissed-off Marine infantry caused NKPA forces in front of them to break off and withdraw.  Machine gun fire from 1/5 caught the NKPA reinforcements in the open and slaughtered them in the hundreds.  By noon, 1/5 possessed Hill 91.

North of the road, 2/5 had a more difficult time in their advance.  Heavy NKPA fire halted the Marines short of Hill 116, 2 miles west of Yongsan.  Owing to the Koreans’ stubborn resistance, the battle raged through most of the night, and D 1/5 found itself isolated in the cut between Hill 91 and Hill 116.  West of Yongsan, Marine tanks knocked out four T-34 tanks; a fifth tank was abandoned when the communist crew decided to seek employment elsewhere.  During the fight, 2/5 gave up 34 dead and 77 wounded.

Just before midnight on September 3, the CO 5th Marines (Colonel Murray) ordered Taplett to lead his 3/5 through Roise’s 2/5 and prepare for a resumption of the attack the following day.  That night, heavy rain brought an end to a perfectly crappy day for the Marines.  3/5 held up just short of 2/5’s rear.  By dawn, the sky was clear, and 2/5 continued its advance — at first, against little opposition.

At 0800, 2/5 resumed its advance north of the road and seized Hill 116.  During the night, under cover of dense rain, the NKPA 9th Division withdrew.  South of the road, 1/5 occupied what appeared to have been the enemy Division’s command post.  The Marines found abandoned tents and equipment, including two fully functional T-34 tanks.  Advancing Marines, supported by tanks, found enemy dead strewn all about.  By nightfall, the Marines had advanced another 5 kilometers.

On September 5, 1950, Murray called for preparatory artillery fire before the Marine’s third day in the assault.  The heavy rain soaked the Marines and placed them in the right frame of mind for intense combat.  The ground was soggy and slippery.  While slogging forward toward Obong-ni Ridge, the 9th Regiment moved into the cloverleaf where the battle had raged in the previous month.  At midmorning, after the Marines spotted the enemy digging in on the high ground ahead, they took positions between two hills.  At around 1430, 300 enemy infantry suddenly appeared from concealed positions inside the village of Tugok and fanatically charged the Marines of B 1/5.  Able Company, supporting Army artillery, and 81mm mortars repelled the attack, but not before Baker Company suffered 25 casualties. Pictured right, Navy Corpsmen aid wounded Marines.

As the NKPA began its assault on Company B, two T-34 tanks surprised and knocked out two of the Marine’s leading M-26 (Pershing) tanks.  Because the two wounded tanks blocked their field of fire, four other Marine tanks withdrew to better firing positions.  Tank assault teams from Company B took the T-34s under fire, destroying both, along with an enemy armored personnel carrier.

September 5 was a tough day for US forces.  Army units suffered 105 killed, 430 wounded, and 587 missing in action (1,119 total casualties.  Marine casualties were 35 dead and 91 wounded (126 total).  The Allied offensive of September 3-5 was one of the bloodiest battles of the Korean War.  It was a time when the enemy’s 4th and 9th Infantry Divisions ceased to exist as combat units.

Against his will, Lieutenant General Walker released the Marines late at night on September 4th; they began pulling out for Pusan just a little after midnight.  General MacArthur replaced the 5th Marine Regiment with two Army regiments: the 17th and 65th Infantry Regiments.  General Walker did not think two Army regiments were a suitable replacement for one understrength Marine regiment, but he had no further say in the matter.

The First Marine Brigade traveled to Japan and was absorbed into the 1st Marine Division.  In ten days, the men of the 5th Marine Regiment and Marine Aircraft Group 33 would participate in one of the world’s most spectacular and difficult amphibious landings.  They called it INCHON.

Sources:

  1. Alexander, B.  Korea: The First War We Lost.  Hippocrene Books, 2003.
  2. Blair, C., Jr.  The Forgotten War.  Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
  3. Fehrenbach, T. R.  This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness.  New York: Macmillan Co., 1963.
  4. Gugeler, R. A.  Combat Actions in Korea.  Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2005.
  5. Halberstam, D.  The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War.  New York, Hyperion Books, 2007.
  6. Malkasian, C.  The Korean War.  Osprey Publishing, 2001.
  7. Simmons, E. H.  The United States Marines: A History.  Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
  8. Tucker, S. C., ed.  Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History.  Santa Barbara: Checkmark Books, 2002.
  9. Varhola, M. J.  Fire and Ice: The Korean War, 1950-1953.  Mason City: Da Capo Press, 2000.

Endnotes:

[1] The United Nations Command (also UNC) is the multinational military force that supported the Republic of Korea during and after the Korean War (which, technically, is still underway).  As Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) and Commander of the United Nations Command, Douglas MacArthur commanded all Allied forces during the Korean War.

[2] U.S. logistical power provided the wherewithal for the beleaguered Army units to resist overwhelming North Korean forces and begin planning a counter-offensive.

[3] Walker (1889-1950) graduated from the USMA in 1907 and served in the First and Second World Wars and the early months of the Korean War.  While commanding the 8th US Army, Walker was killed in a jeep accident. 

[4] Captain (later Colonel Fenton) (1922-1998) was the son of Brigadier General Francis I. Fenton, Sr.  During the Battle of Okinawa, F. I. Fenton, Sr., served as the 1st Marine Division combat engineer.  It was during this battle that he learned that his youngest son, PFC Michael Fenton, serving as a scout sniper with Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, had been killed near Sugar Loaf Hill.

[5] This was the second time in Marine Corps history that Marines served with the U.S.  Second Infantry Division—the first time within the 4th Marine Brigade in World War I.


First Battle of the Naktong Bulge

Background

Late in 1945, President Harry S. Truman appointed Dean Gooderham Acheson (1893-1971) to serve as Undersecretary of State, a position Acheson retained through three successive cabinet secretaries of state.  In this role, Acheson was conciliatory toward the Soviet Union, a position he kept even through Joseph Stalin’s attempts to seize Eastern Europe and Southwest Asia.  It was only late in the game that Acheson “changed his thinking” and became more than an observer of the Cold War; he became its architect.

Due to the frequent absences of the Secretary of State, Undersecretary Dean Acheson often served as “Acting Secretary,” and this placed him in constant contact with the President.  Eventually, Acheson and Truman formed a close relationship, and Acheson became the author of President Truman’s containment policy (Truman Doctrine).  Undersecretary Acheson also directed the formulation of the US economic aid program to Europe, also known as the Marshall Plan.  Acheson and Truman both believed that the best way to curb the Soviet Union’s aggressive policies was to restore economic prosperity to Western Europe and encourage interstate cooperation.

Acheson became Secretary of State in 1949.  He refined the Truman Doctrine and became the primary designer of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  That summer, the press and political opposition began asking questions about Mao Zedong’s success in the Chinese Civil War.  Acheson prepared a 1,054-page report titled United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 — also known as the China White Paper.  Acheson argued that US intervention in China (1945-1947) was doomed to failure.  Whatever Acheson hoped to achieve in writing this voluminous document failed.  The American press blamed the Truman administration for the spread of communism in China — and they were probably right.

On January 12, 1950, Mr. Acheson appeared before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., to deliver a speech about the Cold War in East Asia.  In his speech, he carefully defined the so-called American Defense Perimeter as a warning to China and the Soviet Union that the United States was committed to its containment policy.  Acheson said that the defense perimeter in the Pacific extended as a line running through Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines.  He neglected to mention the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China (Taiwan), which signaled to the Chinese and Soviets that the United States would not guarantee the security of either.  In the minds of many, the United States had betrayed the Koreans and Taiwanese.  In a little over six months, in the early morning hours of 25 June 1950, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) launched a full-scale invasion of South Korea.  They were backed, trained, supplied, and advised by the Soviet Union.

The timing of the North Korean attack could not have been better.  In June 1950, Truman’s Defense policies had almost completely dismantled the United States military.  Truman’s demobilization of the armed forces substantially reduced the number of combat-experienced soldiers assigned to forward units.  The Army’s forward-most combat unit was the US 24th Infantry Division (24 ID), stationed in Japan as part of the post-war occupation force.  Truman’s cuts had reduced the 24 ID to about fifty percent of its wartime strength.

The Commanding General of the 24 ID was Major General William F. Dean.  Most of the men assigned to this division were poorly trained conscripts.  Their combat equipment was obsolete, poorly maintained, and barely operable.  In the entire infantry division, General Dean had one combat-ready battalion.

The 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment (1/21), under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith, consisted of two reinforced rifle companies and an artillery battery (540 men).[1]  Designated Task Force Smith, the Army promptly dispatched 2/21 to Taejon, South Korea.  From Taejon, Smith was to proceed to Osan to confront North Korea’s 75,000-man invasion force.  Smith’s mission was to block advancing North Korean forces until the rest of 24 ID could be organized and dispatched to South Korea.[2]

General Dean’s orders to Smith were, “When you get to Pusan, head for Taejon.  Block the main road as far north as possible.  Establish contact with [Brigadier] General [John H.] Church.[3]  If you can’t find him, go to Taejon and beyond if you can.  Sorry, I can’t give you more information — that’s all I’ve got.”

As Smith’s task force began moving north to Osan, Major General Dean flew into the Taejon airfield to take charge of the 24 ID’s advance element; the US 34th Infantry Regiment soon followed to reinforce Task Force Smith.  Dean determined to hold the NKPA advance at Osan.  He assigned Brigadier General George B. Barth, the Division’s artillery commander, to assume overall command of Task Force Smith.

At Task Force Smith’s point of contact with the enemy on July 3, Smith’s six 105mm howitzers unleashed a barrage upon the enemy’s lead T-34 tanks.  Since none of his artillery munitions were powerful enough to stop the Russian-built tanks, Smith’s effort had no effect on the advancing NKPA.  It was only when Smith’s howitzers fired High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) rounds at point-blank range that they had any impact on the Russian tanks.  Still, it wasn’t enough to stop the advance of an NKPA infantry regiment following behind the tanks, and Smith’s position was quickly overrun.  When 1/21’s untrained troops ran out of ammunition, an orderly withdrawal soon turned into a massive foot race to the rear.

Smith did accomplish his mission, however.  He delayed the NKPA advance for about two hours.  The reinforced battalion of 540 men suffered 60 dead, 21 wounded, 82 captured (32 of whom died in captivity),[4], and around 150 temporarily displaced stragglers during the route.

After the defeat of Task Force Smith, MajGen Dean ordered the US 34th to implement delaying tactics south of Osan, but it too suffered a defeat at Pyongtaek.  Upset by the regiment’s poor performance, General Dean fired the regimental commander, Colonel J. B. Loveless, and replaced him with a friend of Dean’s, Colonel Robert R. Martin.  Dean ordered Martin to stop the NKPA at Chonan.  The following day, Dean and General Walker visited Chonan to inspect the regiment and observe the battle’s outcome.  They found Colonel Martin dead, the regiment defeated, and its survivors in disarray.  Dean ordered the remnants of the regiment to withdraw to the Kum River and directed the two remaining battalions of the 21st Regiment to conduct a delaying action.

On 12 July, MajGen Dean ordered his three regiments (19th, 34th, and 21st) to cross the Kum River, destroy all bridges behind them, and establish a defensive line around Taejon.  The 19th Regiment had 2,276 men; the 34th had around 2,020; after suffering 1,433 casualties, the 21st Regiment could field 1,100 men.  Dean had an additional 2,007 men in his artillery units.  Between 13-16 July, the 24 ID suffered an additional 650 casualties as two NKPA infantry divisions pushed the Americans out of Taejon city, block by block.

On 20 July, Major General Dean ordered the 34th Regiment to withdraw while he remained behind to help evacuate wounded men.  Dean took command of the rear element of the withdrawal, which enemy forces ambushed.  Dean, having been separated from his command, was ultimately taken prisoner.  General Church assumed command of the division.

Naktong

The Naktong River curves westward opposite the town of Yongsan in a wide semicircular loop.  For most of this loop, the river’s width is around 400 meters, and its depth averages six feet.  Military troops can wade across rivers, but it is a grueling task given bottom silt and currents.  A depth of six feet is too deep for fording vehicles.

24 ID occupied an area 16 miles long adjacent to the Naktong River.  The division’s perimeter consisted of lightly defended observation posts on the surrounding high ground.  The killing ground between the river and eastward hills was suitable for pre-registered artillery and mortar fire.  Still, the understrength division was too widely dispersed to allow for interlocking fields of small arms and automatic weapons fire.  The 34th Regiment occupied the southern half, west of Yongsan, and the 21st Regiment occupied the northern half, west of Changyong.  General Church placed the 19th Regiment in reserve.  On August 5, 1950, the division’s total strength was 14,540.

During the night of August 5-6, an 800-man KPA force crossed the river undetected near Yongsan.  Another force attempted to cross the river further north, but the Americans detected them,  pummeled them, and forced them back.  North Koreans engaged 3/34 at around 0200, forcing the battalion to abandon its command post and establish secondary positions.  The attack threatened to split 24 ID.

1/34 was dispatched to reclaim the lost ground but was ambushed enroute.  The Korean force penetrated three miles east of the Naktong, halfway to Yongsan.  Several units of the 34th began a retreat northward into the lines of the 21st, but General Church ordered them to turn around.  The 19th launched a counter-attack along the 34th Regiment’s northern flank, trapping three hundred North Korean soldiers in a nearby village, killing most of them.  While the 19th and elements of the 34th managed to push enemy forces back, the NKPA stubbornly held onto their bridgehead.  During the night of August 6-7, the North Koreans made several attempts to cross the river.  South Korean (ROK) forces repulsed one attempt, but the NKPA succeeded in another.

24 ID continued counter-attacking on August 7, but their gains were slow, hampered by a determined enemy, extremely high temperatures, and a shortage of drinking water.  The NKPA pressed to regain territory adjacent to Oblong-ni, to them, critical terrain that sat astride the main road in the Naktong bulge.  Late that afternoon, the US 9th Regiment reinforced 24 ID.  The 9th Regiment was a fresh, well-equipped regiment, but its men needed combat experience.  Nevertheless, a vigorous attack enabled the American Army to reclaim part of Cloverleaf Hill before being held off by a well-entrenched enemy.

The battle continued to rage on August 7-8 as the NKPA attempted to send two additional battalions across the river.  The 21st Regiment repulsed this enemy.  Undeterred, however, the NKPA relocated their battalions south, where they successfully crossed the river at the bridgehead.  By mid-morning on August 8, a full enemy regiment was poised to assault the American positions.  North Korean gains were expensive to both sides, but neither side was able to achieve a decisive advantage over the other.

Meanwhile, the NKPA had constructed an underwater bridge of sandbags, logs, and rocks to move trucks, heavy artillery, additional infantry, and tanks across the river.  On August 10, the North Koreans had two fully resupplied regiments across the Naktong and occupied fortified positions.

General Church assembled a large force under Colonel John G. Hill, Commanding the 9th Regiment.  Dubbed Task Force Hill, Colonel Hill commanded elements of the 9th, 19th, 21st, and 34th regiments, with supporting artillery.  Hill’s mission was to drive the NKPA from the east river bank on August 11.  While Hill organized his assault force, the NKPA 4th Division moved southward, outflanking Task Force Hill. 

General Walker realized that the upcoming fight would be desperate.  To strengthen the 24th Infantry Division, General Walker ordered the recently arrived 2nd and 24th Infantry Divisions to tie in with Church’s beleaguered division.  Meanwhile, General Church began forming provisional infantry units from his supply and maintenance units.  On August 13, the 23rd and 27th Regiments were able to push NKPA troops out of Yongsan.  Early in the morning of August 14, Colonel Hill launched an assault against the North Korean cloverleaf defenses.  A series of attacks and counterattacks continued for most of the day, and both sides took many casualties.

Hill’s force could not penetrate the NKPA defenses.  The number of officers killed threatened the effectiveness of the assault units, and there were significant disruptions to unit communications.  By the end of the next day, the fight had become one of attrition.  Frustrated, General Walker turned to the United States Marines.

How Battles Are Won

Truman’s inept post-World War II demobilization of the Armed Forces affected the smaller Marine Corps in greater proportion than any of the other services, mainly because Truman detested the idea of maintaining a Marine Corps and had no tolerance for doing so.  A Marine Corps wasn’t necessary, he argued.  The United States already had the Army.  Nor did Truman or his Defense Secretary, Louis Johnson, think America needed a Navy; they had the Air Force.  Secretary Johnson informed the Chief of Naval Operations that the Navy was obsolete.  That argument fell apart early in the morning of June 25, 1950.

On 25 June 1950, the 1st Marine Division was in cadre status; the division had one under-strength infantry regiment (the 5th Marines) and a substantially reduced number of supporting units.  Instead of three battalions, the 5th Marine Regiment had only two.  Each battalion had two rifle companies (rather than three), a reduced weapons company, and half of what was needed for a fully supportive headquarters and service company.  The regiment’s combat equipment was left over from the Second World War.

If there was a miracle surrounding the early part of the Korean War, it was that the Marines at Camp Pendleton could form a combat brigade and set sail for Korea within forty days.  To achieve this miracle, the Marines undertook two massive efforts between 25 June and 3 August: (1) Form, equip, and transport a lethal 4,700-man combat brigade across the Pacific Ocean to Pusan, South Korea, and (2) the Marines reactivated, staffed, trained, and reequipped the 1st Marine Division for service in Korea.  To achieve these goals, the Marine Corps reduced its support establishment by two-thirds, activated the Marine Corps Reserve, and shifted seven thousand Marines from East Coast units to Camp Pendleton, California.

The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (1stMarBde) was activated on July 7 and sailed within a week for Pusan, arriving on August 3.  Brigadier General Edward A. Craig commanded the brigade, which consisted of the under-strength 5th Marine Regiment and Provisional Marine Aircraft Group-33.[5]  Upon arrival in Korea, General Craig reported to the CG 8th US Army, LtGen Walker.

The 1stMarBde went into action on the day of its arrival in Korea.  Walker assigned the Marines to reinforce the 25 ID and the Army’s 5th Regimental Combat Team (5RCT) under Major General William B. Kean, US Army.  In total, Kean commanded roughly 20,000 men.  The Brigade’s first mission was to attack enemy forces in the area of Masan, seize Chinju, and mount a push toward the Nam and Kum rivers.  Designated Task Force Kean, 25 ID, began its offensive on 7 August.

General Craig’s Marines surged forward to Pansong, rapidly inflicting nearly 400 casualties on the NKPA 6th Division and overrunning its headquarters.  Army units, however, were stalled by fierce enemy resistance.[6]  Task Force (TF) Kean trudged toward Chindong-ni, but the fragmented force produced a confused battle zone where American units were too often isolated and necessitated resupply by air.  Not long after Kean initiated his offensive, the NKPA began one of their own.

Marine Aircraft Group 33 provided air support to TF Kean by delivering air strikes on enemy positions.  On August 10, Marine pilots destroyed the NKPA 83rd Motorized Regiment, allowing Craig’s Marines to make a fast advance toward Chindong-ni — only to be halted by General Kean and redeployed to another sector of what became a fragmented battlefield.  Four days passed, and Kean still failed to achieve his two primary objectives: divert NKPA forces from the north and prevent them from reaching the Chinju Pass.

Meanwhile, General Walker became frustrated with the lack of progress of 24 ID against the NKPA 4th Division, which had pushed elements of the 34th Regiment from their several positions and, in the process, captured much of its organic combat equipment — including artillery.  The North Koreans were poised to split the US defensive line and cut off the American’s main supply route (MSR).  Despite repeated efforts to dislodge the NKPA from their well-fortified positions, 24 ID suffered one devastating setback after another.  Mounting Army casualties prompted Walker to redirect Craig’s Marines into the cloverleaf.[7]

Colonel Raymond L. Murray, Commanding Officer of the 5th Marines, launched his assault on 17 August.[8]  Initially, NKPA resistance was tenacious, but these communists were no longer facing untested US soldiers.  A large percentage of the officers and NCOs serving in the 5th Marines were combat veterans of the Pacific War.  By August 17, the Marines had been fighting for 14 days and were pretty well pissed off.  As Marines have always done, they followed their gutsy leaders into the bowels of hell.  Employing well-coordinated combined arms, Murray’s Marines forced the NKPA out of their fortifications and overwhelmed them, one hill at a time.

How bad was it for the NKPA 4th Division?  General George S. Patton, were he still alive, might have felt sorry for the North Koreans.  By the time one understrength Marine regiment was finished with the 4th NKPA Infantry Division, it had no more than 300 troops left alive in each of its regiments — not all of whom were interested in sticking around for the finale.  Murray’s Marines had killed 1,200 communists; another 2-3,000 North Koreans (the smarter ones) had thrown down their weapons and deserted.  The 5th Marines gave up 67 dead and 278 wounded to achieve this victory.  Co-located Army units suffered 1,800 losses (one-third of those were killed in action).

But the battle for the Pusan Perimeter was far from over.

Meanwhile, General Douglas A. MacArthur had a plan in the works, and the U. S. Navy/Marine Corps team would play a key role in its execution.  They were the only American forces who could have pulled it off.

Sources:

  1. Alexander, B.  Korea: The First War We Lost.  Hippocrene Books, 2003.
  2. Blair, C., Jr.  The Forgotten War.  Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
  3. Fehrenbach, T. R.  This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness.  New York: Macmillan Co., 1963.
  4. Gugeler, R. A.  Combat Actions in Korea.  Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2005.
  5. Halberstam, D.  The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War.  New York, Hyperion Books, 2007.
  6. Malkasian, C.  The Korean War.  Osprey Publishing, 2001.
  7. Simmons, E. H.  The United States Marines: A History.  Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
  8. Tucker, S. C., ed.  Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History.  Santa Barbara: Checkmark Books, 2002.
  9. Varhola, M. J.  Fire and Ice: The Korean War, 1950-1953.  Mason City: Da Capo Press, 2000.

Endnotes:

[1] A normal infantry battalion consists of a command element, headquarters staff, organic logistics support, and reinforcements as necessary for assigned missions.  Subordinate units include an H&S Company, three rifle companies, and a weapons company. 

[2] Most of Smith’s men were inexperienced teenagers without adequate training.  Only a third of the battalion’s officers and around sixteen percent of Smith’s NCOs had previous combat experience.

[3] On 27 June, General MacArthur detached Brigadier General John H. Church from his assignment as Assistant Division Commander, 24th ID, and sent him to Korea to establish an Advance HQ and liaison with the Republic of (South) Korea Army (ROK).  Upon the Church’s recommendation, MacArthur ordered Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker to deploy the 24th ID to Korea.

[4] Several of the dead soldiers had been executed by North Korean forces, their bodies later found in shallow graves with their hands bound behind them and shot through the back of the head.

[5] See also: Edward A. Craig — Marine!

[6] To reiterate a previous point, most of the Army’s combat units were manned with young, insufficiently trained soldiers, led by barely competent junior officers and NCOs — all of which can be attributed to Truman’s policy of gutting the US Armed Forces.  Truman’s policy in this regard was criminally malfeasant.  The evidence for this statement would only grow more convincing over the next six months.

[7] See also: Locating the Enemy and Advance to Kosong.

[8] Raymond L. Murray (1913-2004) was a Marine’s Marine.  In his thirty-three years of Marine Corps service, he was awarded two Navy Cross medals, one Distinguished Service Cross, four (4) Silver Star medals, two Legions of Merit, and the Purple Heart medal.  I was honored to have met General Murray several times; he was an exceptional leader.


The Soul of a Regiment

By Talbot Mundy

First published in Adventure magazine, February 1912


Talbot Mundy, perhaps the most incredible adventure writer of the 20th century, wrote “The Soul Of A Regiment” at the beginning of his career.  Voted the greatest story ever published in “Adventure,” this story cemented Mundy’s reputation.[1]

I


So long as its colors remain, and there is one man left to carry them, a regiment can never die; they can recruit it again around that one man, and the regiment will continue on its road to future glory with the same old traditions behind it and the same atmosphere surrounding it that made brave men of its forbears.       So, although the colors are not exactly the soul of a regiment, they are the concrete embodiment of it and are even more sacred than the person of a reigning sovereign.

The First Egyptian Foot had colors — and has them still, thanks to Billy Grogram; so the First Egyptian Foot is still a regiment.  It was the first of all the regiments raised in Egypt, and the colors were lovely crimson things on a brand new polished pole, cased in the regulation jacket of black waterproof and housed with all pomp and ceremony in the mess-room at the barracks.  There were people who said it was bad policy to present colors to a native regiment; that they were nothing more than a symbol of a decadent and waning monarchism in any case, and that the respect which would be due them might lead dangerously near to fetish-worship.  As a matter of cold fact, though, the raw recruits of the regiment failed utterly to understand them, and it was part of Billy Grogram’s business to instill in them a wholesome respect for the sacred symbol of regimental honor.

He was Sergeant-Instructor William Stanford Grogram, V.C., D.S.M., to give him his full name and title, late a sergeant-major of the True and Tried, time expired, and retired from service on a pension.  His pension would have been enough for him to live on, for he was unmarried, his habits were exemplary, and his wants were few; but an elder brother had been a ne’er-do- well, and Grogram, who was the type that will die rather than let any one of his depend on charity, left the army with a sister-in-law and a small tribe of children dependent on him.  Work, of course, was the only thing left for it, and he applied promptly for the only kind of work that he knew how to do.

The British are always making new regiments out of native material in some part of the world; they come cheaper than white troops, and, with a sprinkling of white troops among them, they do wonderfully good service in time of war — thanks to the sergeant instructors.  The officers get the credit for It, but it is the ex-noncommissioned officers of the Line who do the work, as Grogram was destined to discover. They sent him out to Instruct the First Egyptian Foot, and it turned out to be the toughest proposition that anyone lonely, determined, homesick, fighting man ever ran up against.

He was not looking for a life of idleness and ease, so the discomfort of his new quarters did not trouble him overmuch, though they would have disgusted another man at the very beginning.  They gave him a little, white-washed, mud-walled hut with two bare rooms in it and a lovely view on three sides of aching desert sand; on the fourth, a blind wall.

It was as hot inside as a baker’s oven, but It had the one great advantage of being easily kept clean, and Grogram, whose fetish was cleanliness, bore that in mind and forbore to grumble at the absence of a sergeant’s mess and the various creature comforts that his position had entitled him to for years.

What did disgust him, though, was the unfairness of saddling the task that lay in front of him on the shoulders of one lone man; his officers made it quite clear that they had no intention of helping him in the least; from the Colonel downward they were ashamed of the regiment, and they expected Grogram to work it into something like shape before they even began to take an interest in it.  The Colonel went even further than that; he appeared at Orderly Room every morning and once a week attended a parade out on the desert where nobody could see the awful evolutions of his raw command, but he actually threw cold water on Grogram’s efforts at enthusiasm.

“You can’t make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear,” he told him a few mornings after Grogram joined, “or well-drilled soldiers out of Gyppies.  Heaven only knows what the Home Government means by trying to raise a regiment out here; at the very best, we’ll only be teaching the enemy to fight us! But you’ll find they won’t learn.  However, until the Government finds out what a ghastly mistake’s being made, there’s nothing for it but to obey orders and drill Gyppies.  Go ahead, Grogram; I give you a free hand.  Try anything you like on them, but don’t ask me to believe there’ll be any result from it.  Candidly, I don’t.”

But Grogram happened to be a different type of man from his new Colonel.  After a conversation such as that, he could have let things go hang had he chosen to, drawing his pay, doing his six hours’ work a day along the line of least resistance, and blaming the inevitable consequences on the Colonel.  But to him, a duty was something to be done; an impossibility was something to set his clean-shaven, stubborn jaw at and to overcome; and a regiment was a regiment to be kneaded, pummeled, damned, coaxed, and drilled till it began to look as the true and tried used to look in the days when he was sergeant-major.  So he twisted his little brown mustache and drew himself up to the full height of his five feet eight inches, spread his well-knit shoulders, straightened his ramrod of a back, and got busy on the job while his Colonel and the other officers did the social rounds in Cairo and cursed their luck.

The material that Grogram had to work with were fellaheen — good, honest coal-black negroes, giants in stature, the embodiment of good-humored incompetence, children of the soil weaned on raw-hide whips under the blight of Turkish misrule and Arab cruelty.[2]  They had no idea that they were even men till Grogram taught them, and he had to learn Arabic first before he could teach them even that.

They began by fearing him, as their ancestors had feared every new breed of task-master for centuries; gradually, they learned to look for instant and amazing justice at his hands, and from then on, they respected him.  He caned them instead of getting them fined by the Colonel or punished with pack drill for failing things they did not understand; they were thoroughly accustomed to the lash, and his light swagger cane laid on their huge shoulders was a joke that served merely to point his arguments and fix his lessons in their memories; they would not have understood the Colonel’s wrath had he known that the men of his regiment were being beaten by a non-commissioned officer.

They began to love him when he harked back to the days when he was a recruit himself and remembered the steps of a double shuffle that he had learned in the barrack room; when he danced a buck and wing dance for them, they recognized him as a man and a brother, and from that time on, instead of giving him all the trouble they could and laughing at his lectures when his back was turned, they genuinely tried to please him.

So he studied out more steps and danced his way into their hearts, growing daily stricter on parade, daily more exacting of pipe-clay and punctuality, and slowly, but surely as the march of time, molding them into something like a regiment.

Even he could not teach them to shoot, though he sweated over them on the dazzling range until the sun dried every drop of sweat out of him.  And for a long time, he could not even teach them how to march; they would keep step for a hundred yards or so and then lapse into the listless shrinking stride that was the birthright of centuries.

He pestered the Colonel for a band of sorts until the Colonel told him angrily to go to blazes; then, he wrote home and purchased six fifes with his own money, bought a native drum in the bazaar, and started a band on his own account.

Had he been able to read music himself, he would have been no better off because, of course, the fellaheen he had to teach could not have read it either, though possibly he might have slightly increased the number of tunes in their repertoire.

As it was, he knew only two tunes himself: “The Campbells Are Coming” and the National Anthem.

 He picked the six most intelligent men he could find and whistled those two tunes to them until his lips were dry, his cheeks ached, and his very soul revolted at the sound of them.  But the six men picked them up, and, of course, any negro in the world can beat a drum.  One golden morning before the sun had heated the desert air, the regiment marched past in really good formation, all in step and tramping to the tune of “God Save the Queen.”

The Colonel nearly had a fit, but the regiment tramped on, and the band played them back to barracks with a swing and a rhythm that was new not only to the First Egyptian Foot; it was new to Egypt!  The tune was half a tone flat, maybe, and the drum was a sheepskin business bought in the bazaar, but a new regiment marched behind it.  And behind the regiment — two paces right flank, as the regulations specify — marched a sergeant-instructor with a new light in his eyes — the gray eyes that had looked out so wearily from beneath the shaggy eyebrows and that shone now with the pride of a deed well done.

Of course, the Colonel was still scornful.  But Billy Grogram, who had handled men when the Colonel was cutting his teeth at Sandhurst and who knew men from the bottom up, knew that the mob of unambitious countrymen, who had grinned at him in uncomfortable silence when he first arrived, was beginning to forget its mobdom.  He, who spent his hard-earned leisure talking to them and answering their childish questions in hard-won Arabic, knew that they were slowly grasping the theory of the thing — that a soul was forming in the regiment — an indefinable, unexplainable but obvious change, perhaps not unlike the change from infancy to manhood.

And Billy Grogram, who above all was a man of clean ideals, began to feel content.  He still described them in his letters home as “blooming mummies made of Nile mud, roasted black for their sins, and good for nothing but the ash-heap.”  He still damned them on parade, whipped them when the Colonel wasn’t looking, and worked at them until he was much too tired to sleep, but he began to love them.  And to a big, black, grinning man of them, they loved him.  To encourage that wondrous band of his, he set them to playing their two tunes on guest nights outside the officers’ mess, and the officers endured it until the Colonel returned from furlough.  He sent for Grogram and offered to pay him back all he had spent on instruments, provided the band should keep away in the future.

Grogram refused the money and took the hint, inventing weird and hitherto unheard-of reasons why it should be unrighteous for the band to play outside the mess and preaching respect for officers in spite of it.  Like all great men, he knew when he had made a mistake and how to minimize it.

His hardest task was teaching the Gyppies what their colors meant. The men were Mohammedans; they believed in Allah; they had been taught from the time when they were old enough to speak that idols and the outward symbols of religion are the signs of heresy, and Grogram’s lectures, delivered in stammering and uncertain Arabic, seemed to them like the ground-plan of a new religion.  But Grogram stuck to it.  He made opportunities for saluting the colors — took them down each morning and uncased them, and treated them with an ostentatious respect that would have been laughed at among his own people.

When his day’s work was done and he was too tired to dance for them, he would tell them long tales, done into halting Arabic, of how regiments had died rallying around their colors, of a brand new paradise, invented by himself and suitable to all religions, where soldiers went who honored their colors as they ought to do; of the honor that befell a man who died fighting for them, and of the tenfold honor of the man whose privilege it was to carry them into action.  And in the end, although they did not understand him, they respected the colors because he told them to.


II

WHEN England hovered on the brink of indecision and sent her greatest general to hold Khartoum with only a handful of native troops to help him, the First Egyptian Foot refused to leave their gaudy crimson behind them.  They marched with colors flying down to the steamer that was to take them on the first long stage of their journey up the Nile, and there were six fifes and a drum in front of them that told whoever cared to listen that “The Campbells are coming — hurrah! hurrah!”

They marched with the measured tramp of a real regiment; they carried their chins high; their tarbooshes were cocked at a knowing angle, and they swung from the hips like grown men.[3]  At the head of the regiment rode a Colonel whom the regiment scarcely knew, and beside it marched a dozen officers in a like predicament; but behind it, his sword strapped to his side and his little swagger-cane tucked under his left arm-pit, Inconspicuous, smiling and content, marched Sergeant-Instructor Grogram, whom the regiment knew and loved, and who had made and knew the regiment.

The whole civilized world knows — and England knows to her enduring shame — what befell General Gordon and his handful of men when they reached Khartoum.  Gordon surely guessed what was in store for him even before he started, his subordinates may have done so, and the native soldiers knew.  But Sergeant-Instructor Grogram neither knew nor cared.

He looked no further than his duty, which was to nurse the big black babies of his regiment and to keep them good tempered, grinning and efficient; he did that as no other living man could have done it and kept on doing it until the bitter end.

And his task can have been no sinecure.  The Mahdi — the ruthless terror of the Upper Nile who ruled by systematized and savage cruelty and lived by plunder — was as much a bogy to peaceful Egypt as Napoleon used to be in Europe and with far more reason.[4]  Mothers frightened their children into prompt obedience by mentioning his name, and the coal-black natives of the Nile-mouth country are never more than grown-up children.

It must have been as easy to take that regiment to Khartoum as to take a horse into a burning building, but when they reached there not a man was missing; they marched in with colors flying and their six-fife band playing, and behind them — two paces right flank rear — marched Billy Grogram, his little swagger-cane under his left arm-pit, neat, respectful and very wide awake.  For a little while, Cairo kept in touch with them, and then communication ceased.  Nobody ever learned all the details of the tragedy that followed; a curtain was drawn — of mystery and silence such as has always veiled the heart of darkest Africa.

Lord Wolseley took his expedition up the Nile, whipped the Dervishes at El Teb and Tel-el-Kebir, and reached Khartoum to learn of Gordon’s death but not the details of it.  Then he came back again, and the Mahdi followed him, closing up the route behind him, wiping all trace of civilization off the map and placing what he imagined was an insuperable barrier between him and the British — a thousand miles of plundered, ravished, depopulated wilderness.

So a clerk in a musty office drew a line below the record of the First Egyptian Foot; widows were duly notified; a pension or two was granted; and the regiment that Billy Grogram had worked so hard to build was relegated to the past like Billy Grogram.

Rumors had come back along with Wolseley’s men that Grogram had gone down fighting with his regiment; there was a story that the band had been taken alive and turned over to the Mahdi’s private service, and one prisoner, taken near Khartoum, swore that he had seen Grogram speared as he lay wounded before the Residency.  There was a battalion of the True and Tried with Wolseley, and the men used methods that may have been not strictly ethical in seeking tidings of their old sergeant-major, but even they could get no further details; he had gone down fighting with his regiment, and that was all about him.

Then, men forgot him.  The long, steady preparation soon began for the new campaign that was to wipe the Mahdi off the map, restore peace to Upper Egypt, regain Khartoum, and incidentally avenge Gordon. Regiments were slowly drafted out from home as barracks could be built for them; new regiments of native troops were raised and drilled by ex-sergeants of the Line who never heard of Grogram; new men took charge; and the Sirdar superintended everything and laid his reputation brick by brick, of bricks which he made himself, and men were too busy under him to think of anything except the work in hand.[5]

But rumors kept coming in, as they always do in Egypt, filtering in from nowhere over the illimitable desert, borne by stray camel drivers, carried by Dervish spies, tossed from tongue to tongue through the fish market, and carried up back stairs to Clubs and Department Offices.  There were tales of a drummer and three men who played the fife and a wonderful mad feringhee who danced as no man surely ever danced before.  The tales varied, but there were always four musicians and a feringhee.[6]

When one Dervish spy was caught and questioned, he swore by the beard of the prophet that he had seen the men himself.  He was told promptly that he was a liar; how came it that a feringhee — a pork-fed, infidel Englishman — should be allowed to live anywhere the Mahdi’s long arm reached?

“Whom God hath touched—” the Dervish quoted, and men remembered that madness is the surest passport throughout the whole of Northern Africa.  But nobody connected Grogram with the feringhee who danced.

But another man was captured who told a similar tale, and then a Greek trader turned Mohammedan to save his skin, who had made good his escape from the Mahdi’s camp. He swore to have seen this man as he put in one evening at a Nile bank village in a native dhow.  He was dressed in an ancient khaki tunic and a loin-cloth; he was bare-legged, shoeless, and his hair was long over his shoulders and plastered thick with mud.  No, he did not look in the least like a British soldier, though he danced as soldiers sometimes did beside the campfires.

Three natives who were with him played fifes while the feringhee danced, and one man beat a drum.     Yes, the tunes were English tunes, though very badly played; he had heard them before and recognized them.  No, he could not hum them; he knew no music.  Why had he not spoken to the man who danced?  He had not dared.  The man appeared to be a prisoner, and so were the natives with him; the man had danced that evening until he could dance no longer, and then the Dervishes had beaten him with a kurbash for encouragement: the musicians had tried to interfere, and they had all been beaten and left lying there for dead.[7] He was not certain, but he was almost certain they were dead before he came away.

Then, more than three years after Gordon died, there came another rumor, this time from closer at hand — somewhere in the neutral desert zone that lay between the Dervish outpost and the part of Lower Egypt that England held.  This time, the dancer was reported to be dying, but the musicians were still with him.  They got the name of the dancer this time; it was reported to be Goglam, and though that was not at all a bad native guess for Grogram, nobody apparently noted the coincidence.

Men were too busy with their work; the rumor was only one of a thousand that filtered across the desert every month, and nobody remembered the non-commissioned officer who had left for Khartoum with the First Egyptian Foot; they could have recalled the names of all the officers almost without an effort, but not Grogram’s.

III


And with the proficiency, of course, came competition — matches between regiments for the regimental cup and, finally, the biggest event of the Cairo season, the match between the Civil Service and the Army of Occupation, or, as it was more usually termed, “The Army vs. The Rest.”  That was the one society event that the Sirdar made a point of presiding over in person.

EGYPT was busy with the hum of building — empire-building under a man who knew his job.  Almost the only game the Sirdar countenanced was polo, and that was only because it kept officers and civilians fit.  He gave them all the polo, though, that they wanted, and the men grew keen on it, spent money on it, and, needless to say, grew extraordinarily proficient.

He attended it in mufti always but sat in the seat of honor, just outside the touch-line, halfway down the field, and behind him, held back by ropes, clustered the whole of Cairene society, on foot, on horseback and in dog carts, buggies, gigs and every kind of carriage imaginable. Opposite and at either end, the garrison lined up — all the British and native troops rammed in together, and the native population crowded in between them and wherever they could find standing-room.

It was the one event of the year for which all Egypt, Christian and Mohammedan, took a holiday.  Regimental bands were there to play before the game and between the chukkers, and nothing was left undone that could in any way tend to make the event spectacular.

Two games had been played since the cup had been first presented by the Khedive, and honors lay even — one match for the Army and one for the Civil Service.[8]  So on the third anniversary feeling ran fairly high.  It ran higher still when half time was called and honors still lay even at one goal all; to judge by the excitement of the crowd, a stranger might have guessed that polo was the most important thing in Egypt.  The players rode off the pavilion for the half-time interval, and the infantry band that came out onto the field was hard put to drown the noise of conversation, laughter, and argument. At that minute, there was surely nothing in the world to talk about but polo.

But suddenly, the band stopped playing, as suddenly as though the music were a concrete thing and had been severed with an ax.  The Sirdar turned his head suddenly and gazed at one corner of the field, and the noise of talking ceased — not so suddenly as the music had done, for not everybody could see what was happening at first — but dying down gradually and fading away to nothing as the amazing thing came into view.

It was a detachment of five men — a drummer, three fifes, and one other man who marched behind them — though he scarcely resembled a man.  He marched, though, like a British soldier.

He was ragged — they all were — dirty and unkempt.  He seemed very nearly starved, for his bare legs were thinner than a mummy’s; round his loins was a native loincloth, and his hair was plastered down with mud like a religious fanatic’s.  His only other garment was a tattered khaki tunic that might once have been a soldier’s, and he wore no shoes or sandals of any kind.

He marched, though, with a straight back and his chin up, and anybody who was half observant might have noticed that he was marching two paces right flank rear; it is probable, though, that in the general amazement, nobody did notice it.

As the five debouched upon the polo ground, four of them abreast and one behind, the four men raised their arms, the man behind issued a sharp command, the right-hand man thumped his drum, and a wail proceeded from the fifes.  They swung into a regimental quickstep now, and the wail grew louder, rising and falling fitfully and distinctly, keeping time with the drum.

Then, the tune grew recognizable.  The crowd listened now in awe-struck silence.  The five approaching figures were grotesque enough to raise a laugh, and the tune was more grotesque and more pitiable still. Still, there was something electric in the atmosphere that told of tragedy, and not even the natives made a sound as the five marched straight across the field to where the Sirdar sat beneath the Egyptian flag.

Louder and louder grew the tune as the fifes warmed up to it; louder thumped the drum.  It was flat, and notes were missing here and there.  False notes appeared at unexpected intervals, but the tune was unmistakable.  “The Campbells are coming! Hurrah! Hurrah!” wailed the three fifes, and the five men marched to it as no undrilled natives ever did.

“Halt!” ordered the man behind when the strange cortege had reached the Sirdar, and his “Halt!” rang out in good, clean military English.

“Front!” he ordered, and they “fronted” like a regiment.  “Right Dress!”  They were in line already, but they went through the formality of shuffling their feet. “Eyes Front!”  The five men faced the Sirdar, and no one breathed. “General salute — pre-sent arms!”

They had no arms. The band stood still at attention.  The fifth man the bare legs and plastered hair — whipped his right hand to his forehead in the regulation military salute — held it there for the regulation six seconds, swaying as he did so and tottering from the knees, then whipped it to his side again, and stood at rigid attention.  He seemed able to stand better that way, for his knees left off shaking.

“Who are you?” asked the Sirdar then.

“First Egyptian Foot, sir.”

The crowd behind was leaning forward, listening; those that had been near enough to hear that gasped. The Sirdar’s face changed suddenly to the look of cold indifference behind which a certain type of Englishman hides his emotion.

Then came the time-honored question, prompt as the ax of a guillotine — inevitable as Fate itself:

“Where are your colors?”

The fifth man — he who had issued the commands fumbled with his tunic.  The buttons were missing, and the front of it was fastened up with a string; his fingers seemed to have grown feeble; he plucked at it, but it would not come undone.

“Where are—”

The answer to that question should be like an echo, and nobody should need to ask it twice. But the string burst suddenly, and the first time of asking sufficed.  The ragged, unkempt, long-haired mummy undid his tunic and pulled it open.

“Here, sir!” he answered.

The colors, blood-soaked, torn — unrecognizable almost — were around his body!  As the ragged tunic fell apart, the colors fell with it; Grogram caught them and stood facing the Sirdar with them in his hand.  His bare chest was seared with half-healed wounds and crisscrossed with the marks of floggings, and his skin seemed to be drawn tight as a mummy’s across his ribs.  He was a living skeleton!

The Sirdar sprang to his feet and raised his hat, for the colors of a regiment are second, in holiness, to the Symbols of the Church.  The watching, listening crowd followed suit; there was a sudden rustling as a sea of hats and helmets rose and descended.  The band of four, who had stood in stolid silence while all this was happening, realized that the moment was auspicious to play their other tune.

They had only one other, and they had played “The Campbells are coming” across the polo field; so up went the fifes, “Bang!” went the drum, and “God Save Our Gracious Queen” wailed the three in concert, while strong men hid their faces and women sobbed.

Grogram whipped his hand up to the answering salute, faced the crowd in front of him for six palpitating seconds, and fell dead at the Sirdar’s feet.

And so they buried him; his shroud was the flag that had flown above the Sirdar at that ever-memorable match, and his soul went into the regiment.

They began recruiting it again the next day around the blood-soaked colors he had carried with him, and the First Egyptian Foot did famously at the Atbara and Omdurman.  They buried him in a hollow square formed by massed brigades, European and native regiments alternating, and saw him on his way with twenty-one parting volleys instead of the regulation five.  His tombstone is a monolith of rough-hewn granite, tucked away in a quiet corner of the European graveyard at Cairo — quiet and inconspicuous as Grogram always was — but the truth is graven on it in letters two inches deep:

HERE LIES A MAN.

Endnotes:

[1] Talbot Mundy (born William Lancaster Gribbon, 23 April 1879 – 5 August 1940) was an English writer of adventure fiction.  Based for most of his life in the United States, he also wrote under the pseudonym of Walter Galt.  Best known as the author of King of the Khyber Rifles and the Jimgrim series, much of his work was published in pulp magazines.

[2] Fellah, plural fellaheen (Arabic) — a peasant or cultivator of the soil among the Egyptians, Syrians, etc. Webster’s Dictionary, 1913 edition.

[3] Tarboosh, tarbush (Arabic) — a red cap worn by Turks and other Eastern nations, sometimes alone and sometimes swathed with linen or other stuff to make a turban. Webster’s Dictionary, 1913 edition.

[4] Mahdi — Muhammad Ahmad ibn as Sayyid Abd Allah (1844-1885) – otherwise known as The Mahdi or Mohammed Ahmed – was a Muslim religious leader, a fakir, in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.  He declared a jihad and raised an army after declaring himself the Mahdi in 1881 and led a successful war of liberation from the Ottoman-Egyptian military occupation. He died soon after his liberation of Khartoum, and the state he founded fell victim to colonial maneuverings that doomed it to reconquest in 1899.

[5] Sirdar (Hindi from Persian) — here, the title given to the British commander of the Egyptian army.  For other meanings of this term, see the articles in The Hobson-Jobson Dictionary. 

[6] Feringhee (Hindi from Farangistan, “Land of the Franks,” i.e., Europe) — a European.  Platt’s Dictionary of Urdu, Classical Hindi, and English.

[7] Kurbash (Arabic) — a whip or strap about a yard in length, made of the hide of the hippopotamus or rhinoceros.  It is an instrument of punishment and torture that was used in various Muslim countries.

[8] Khedive – Vicroy


Algiers Revisited

Some Background

The practice of state-supported piracy was a common practice in the 18th and 19th centuries.  One may recall that the fledgling United States went to war with Great Britain for a second time because the British navy accosted U.S.-flagged ships and impressed their crew to serve involuntarily aboard British ships of the line.  The U.S. government regarded this sort of behavior as a form of piracy.  If not that, then bullying.[1]  Additionally, European maritime states hired privateers to attack each other’s shipping.  The decision of Great Britain and France to pay tribute to the Barbary pirates encouraged the scallywags to increase their piracy — which benefitted England and France through less competition in the Mediterranean.  And, of course, the navies of England or France were not huckleberries a pirate vessel would want to challenge.

Before American independence, extortion along the North African coast was not an American problem.  The North American colonies were British Colonies, so the problem belonged solely to the Royal Navy and British Parliament.  After independence, however, American shipping enjoyed no protection from England or France.  After independence, our English cousins quickly informed the Barbary Pirates that they could avail themselves of American shipping at their leisure.  It didn’t take long; in 1785, Dey Mohammed of Algiers declared war on the United States and captured several U.S. commercial ships.  The financially troubled American Confederation could not pay exorbitant ransoms for the return of ships, crews, or cargo.  Nor could the Americans afford to raise a navy — or pay tribute.  So, the United States attempted to negotiate with Islamic pirates.

The Barbary Coast included several North African states.  Morocco, an independent kingdom, seized U.S. merchant vessels in 1784 after the Americans ignored its diplomatic overtures.  However, once the U.S. acknowledged Morocco’s strategic position, negotiations progressed smoothly and productively; by 1786, a trade agreement did exist between the U.S. and Morocco.  Conversely, Algiers assumed a belligerent, condescending tone in demanding tributes that the United States could not afford.  To circumvent Algiers, the U.S. Minister of France attempted to establish a coalition of weaker naval powers to defeat Algiers.  Our minister was unsuccessful in this; his name was Thomas Jefferson.  However, Portugal was also at war with Algiers.  Its navy was strong enough to block Algerian ships from sailing past the Straits of Gibraltar, so American merchantmen had safe passage for a time.

A brief Portuguese-Algerian peace again exposed American merchant ships to extortion in 1793.  The efforts of diplomats sent to North Africa in 1795 concluded treaties with Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli.  The treaties agreed to pay tribute to these states, and the treaty with Algiers resulted in the release of about 80 sailors.

It wasn’t until after the ratification of the US Constitution in 1789 that the federal government had the authority to levy taxes and raise and maintain an armed force.  When Algiers seized American ships in 1794, Congress authorized the construction of six ships for a re-instituted U. S. Navy.

In 1797, William Eaton (a former Army officer) was appointed Consul General of the United States.  President Adams sent him to Tunis to negotiate peace and trade agreements with Tunis’s governor (Bey).  Tunis was the closest neighbor to Tripoli and the place of exile of the former Pasha of Tripoli, Hamet Karamanli (the elder brother of the reigning Pasha, Yusuf Karamanli).

While in Tripoli, Easton devised a plan whereby the United States would support the restoration of the deposed Pasha.  This, Eaton argued, would garner respect for the United States throughout the Mohammedan world.  However, Eaton had no support for his plan in Philadelphia.  Meanwhile, the Bey continued to demand tributes, and Eaton refused to convey his demands to the U.S. government.  Accordingly, the Bey of Tunis ordered Eaton to leave his country.  Hamet Karamanli, in fear for his life, fled Tunis for Egypt.

In 1801, the Pasha of Tripoli sought to punish the United States for its failure to make timely payments of tribute; he demanded higher tributes and polished off these demands by declaring war on the United States.  Algiers followed suit.  This was the first Barbary War — fought between 1801 and 1805.

For additional background about the United States’ involvement in two Barbary Coast Wars, seeAt Tripoli, Part I and At Tripoli, Part II.

The Fire Reignites

There was a continuing campaign by various European navies and the American navy to suppress Berber piracy.  The specific aim of this expedition, however, was to free Christian slaves and to stop the practice of enslaving Europeans, holding them for ransom, and stealing and selling ship’s cargo.  To this end, the campaign was partially successful.  However, Islamic barbarity did not completely end until the French conquered Algeria (c. 1830) and, in the process, sent many Algerians to meet their heavenly father.  Shamefully, the French were thrown out of Algeria in 1962. 

Yet, despite having been severely chastised by the United States Navy on two occasions, the Ottoman rulers of North Africa refused to cease their uncivilized behavior — which led to further confrontations with the Royal Navy in 1816.

Following the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1815), the Royal Navy no longer needed assistance from the Barbary States to provide supplies for Gibraltar and their Mediterranean fleet.  This lack of dependency allowed the British to exert political pressure on the Barbary states to end their piracy and practice of enslaving European Christians.

In 1816, Admiral Edward Pellew, 1st Viscount Exmouth (Lord Exmouth), conducted a diplomatic mission to Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers, backed by a small squadron of ships of the line, to convince the North African Ottoman Deys to stop the practice and free their Christian slaves.[2]  The Deys of Tunis and Tripoli unequivocally agreed to comply, but the Dey of Algiers was recalcitrant and the negotiations tempestuous.

Lord Exmouth, believing he had negotiated a successful treaty to stop Christian slavery, returned to England.  Sadly, confused orders sent Algerian troops to massacre 200 Corsican, Sicilian, and Sardinian fishermen who had been placed under British protection just after the treaty was signed.  The act caused outrage in Britain; Lord Exmouth’s negotiations were seen as a diplomatic failure, and his government ordered him back to sea to complete the job correctly and punish the Algerians.  Pellew’s squadron consisted of ships of the line HMS Queen Charlotte, Impregnable, Albion, Minden, and Superb, HMS Leander (a 50-gun frigate), HMS Severn, Glasgow, Granicus, and Hebrus (regular frigates), and four bomb ships, HMS Beelzebub, Fury, Hecla, and Infernal.

HMS Queen Charlotte (100 guns) served as Lord Exmouth’s flagship, with Rear Admiral David Milne as second-in-command aboard HMS Impregnable (98 guns).  The squadron was considered by many to be inadequate for the mission.  Still, Exmouth had already unobtrusively surveyed the defenses of Algiers, was very familiar with the town, and was aware of a weakness in the defensive batteries’ fire field.  He believed that more large ships would have interfered with each other without being able to bring much more fire to bear.  In addition to his main fleet, Lord Exmouth commanded five sloops, eight boats armed with Congreve rockets, and some transports to carry the rescued slaves.  When the British arrived in Gibraltar, Dutch Vice Admiral Frederik van Capellen (commanding a squadron of frigates) offered to join the expedition.  Lord Exmouth accepted van Capellen’s offer and assigned him to cover the main force from Algerian flanking batteries.

Preparation

The day before Lord Exmouth’s assault, HMS Prometheus arrived at the station.  Admiral Pellew assigned the commanding officer, Captain W. B. Dashwood, to rescue the British Consul and his family.  The Algerians discovered the rescue attempt and arrested some of the party.

Pellew’s plan of attack was for the larger ships to approach in a column, sail into the zone where the majority of the Algerian guns could not be brought to bear, and then come to anchor and bombard the batteries and fortifications on the breakwater (mole) to destroy the Algerian defenses.  Simultaneously, HMS Leander was to anchor off the mouth of the harbor and bombard the shipping inside the mole.  To protect Leander from the shore battery, HMS Severn and Glasgow were to sail inshore and bombard the battery.  Troops would then storm ashore on the mole with sappers and the Corps of Royal Engineers.

Go Signal

Admiral Pellew, aboard Queen Charlotte,anchored approximately eight yards off the mole facing the Algerian guns.  Several other ships anchored out of their position, notably Admiral Milne aboard Impregnable, 400 yards from his assigned station.  This error reduced the effectiveness of these ships and exposed them to accurate enemy fire.  Some other ships sailed past Impregnable and anchored in positions closer to the plan.  The frigate Granicus and the sloop Heron closed the gap created by the misplaced Impregnable.

Before hostilities, Lord Exmouth and the Dey of Algiers agreed that neither would fire the first shot.  Why Exmouth would even converse with an enemy about this is beyond me.  But the Dey’s plan was to allow the British fleet to anchor, sortie from the harbor, and board the ships with an overwhelming force of men.  Poorly disciplined Algerians mistakenly fired a gun at around 1515 hours, prompting Pellew to order an immediate response.

The Algerian assault force attempted to board Queen Charlotte, but that was a mistake of epic proportions — British broadsides sank 28 boats — running the rest to shore.  After an hour, the British silenced the cannon on the mole, which allowed Lord Exmouth to turn his attention to the shipping in the harbor, destroying those ships by 1930 hours.  The British destroyed one unmanned Algerian frigate by boarding her and setting it on fire.  Mortars and rockets destroyed three additional frigates and five corvettes.

The battle produced flotsam adrift in the harbor, some of it on fire and drifting toward ships at anchor.  These conditions forced some of Exmouth’s ships to weigh anchor and relocate for safety.  As these ships maneuvered out of the way, Impregnable became isolated from the other ships and vulnerable to enemy attack.  It didn’t take the Algerian gunners long to target the ship and began raking the 98 fore to aft.  Impregnable took 268 hits, suffering injury to her hull and damage to the mainmast in fifteen places.  Algerians killed fifty crew members and wounded 164 others.  At around 2000 hours, Admiral Milne asked Pellew to send an explosion vessel against a lighthouse battery that was mauling his ship.  The British exploded the vessel but to little effect.

With Algerian batteries unable to maintain their rate of fire, Lord Exmouth ordered the squadron to weigh anchor and withdraw out of range, leaving Minden behind to offer suppressive fires to further Algerian fire.  Wind changes permitted Exmouth’s squadron to move out of range, and by 0130, all ships were re-anchored, and the ship’s officers were caring for their wounded crews.

British casualties exceeded 900 men.  The British/Dutch force had fired over 50,000 shots and used 118 tons of gunpowder and 960 mortars.  Algerian forces employed 308 guns and seven mortars.  A covert inspection of the city by British cease-fire negotiators revealed that the Deylik of Algiers was destroyed.  The bay was filled with the smoking hulks of what was left of the Algerian navy; floating dead bodies filled the harbor.

Aftermath of Battle (August 28, 1816)

At noon, Lord Exmouth sent a letter to the Dey:

Sir:

For your atrocities at Bona on defenseless Christians and your unbecoming disregard of the demands I made yesterday in the name of the Prince Regent of England, the fleet under my orders has given you a signal chastisement by the destruction of your navy storehouse and arsenal, with half your batteries.  As England does not war for the destruction of cities, I am unwilling to visit your personal cruelties upon the unoffending inhabitants of the country, and I therefore offer you the same terms of peace which I conveyed to you yesterday in my Sovereign’s name.  Without your acceptance of these terms, you can have no peace with England.

Admiral Pellew warned the Dey that the action would continue if he did not accept his terms.  Wisely, the Dey took Lord Exmouth’s terms, not realizing that Exmouth was bluffing.  His squadron was out of shot and gunpowder.  If the action were to continue, it would have to be after replenishment at Gibraltar. Upon the signing of the formal treaty on September 24, 1816, the Dey freed 1,083 enslaved Christians.  He would later free 3,000 more.

Endnotes:

[1] The Royal Navy was not without some justification for at-sea impressments.  Service in the Royal Navy was at all times a hard life, and more than a few English sailors deserted their ships and signed on as deck-hands aboard commercial vessels, where life was easier, as a means of earning their income.  It was bad enough that the Royal Navy began the practice of stopping ships at sea and apprehending deserters.

[2] Dey is a title given to commanders or (from 1710) governors of the Janissaries of Algiers and extended to other Ottoman officials by Western writers—also, Bey.


Japanese Self-Defense Force (Ground)

We previously discovered only a few similarities between the Special Naval Landing Force of World War II — and U. S. Marines.  In modern times, Japanese amphibious forces still aren’t called marines, but they have taken on the unique missions assigned to marines, and to achieve this capability, one element of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) is training alongside the United States Marines.  It is called the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB) of the JGSDF (the Japanese Army).

Today, Japan only has one military department called the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF).  Within this department are Japan’s three major defense organizations.  They are the Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), and Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF).

The ARDB (in Japanese, Sui-riku-ki-do-dan) (also, 水陸機動団) is an army amphibious brigade posted adjacent to the JMSDF Base at Sasebo, Nagasaki Prefecture.  The genesis of the ARDB was tensions between China and Japan that occurred when the Chinese illegally occupied Japanese territory and established a coast guard station there.  Known as the Senkaku Islands Incident, the Japanese government created a rapid deployment special operation force manned, armed, and trained to respond to all such encroachments.

Whatever the Chinese did at Senkaku, they did it with full intention.  Perhaps it was a stratagem to test Japan’s resolve in defending Japanese territory.  Such “tests” are a regular component of China’s regional strategy.  It is an untoward behavior displayed along coastal Vietnam, the South China Sea, the Gulf of Tonkin, and the waters surrounding the Philippine Islands.

In committing to defend its territory, the Japanese government expanded the JSDF by creating a rapid deployment brigade as a special operations-capable organization.  Authorized by the Defense Programs and Self-Defense Budget, the Brigade formed after war planners studied the various tables of organization of the U. S. Marine Corps.

Long before the brigade was officially approved and organized, JGSDF provided army units to the U.S. Marine Corps for essential training and reorganization.  These were usually platoon and company-size units that trained within and alongside regular Marine light infantry units.  The Japanese units excelled during joint exercises Iron Fist and Dawn Blitz.

Such training exercises continued in 2014 as part of the so-called Rim of the Pacific Exercises and numerous other (smaller) exercises where members of the JGSDF trained alongside U. S. Marines on mainland Japan, Okinawa, and California.

The Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade was activated on April 7, 2018 — Japan’s first amphibious (landing force) organization since World War II.  A short time later, 150 Japanese troops of the ARDB deployed with American and Filipino Marines.  This instance marked the first time since World War II that Japanese amphibious vehicles operated on foreign shores.

The Brigade also dispatched 300 troops to participate in Exercise Talisman Saber in July 2019 in Queensland, Australia, where they joined with Australian, American, and British Marines.  It was during this exercise that the ARDB suffered its first training death: Sergeant First Class Suguru Maehara was tragically killed in a vehicle accident.  On March 10, 2021, 55 Japanese recruits passed the training qualification course for the ARDB.  Two of these recruits were female, the brigade’s first such candidates.

Although the brigade organization reflects subordinate “regiments,” they are actually battalion-sized units suitable for task-organized missions.  A third “regiment” was added to the Brigade in 2023, now based on Kyushu Island, the southernmost of Japan’s main islands. Looking to the future, one key component of brigade operations will include an air support component based at Saga Airfield, sixty miles away from the main navy base at Sasebo.  The air component will eventually consist of 17 V-22 Tiltrotor aircraft and 50 Black Hawk and Apache Longbow helicopters.  The air squadron will join the Kyushu-based regiment in 2025.