Background
When North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) forces invaded the Republic of South Korea (ROK), they did so with superiority in both manpower and equipment. The NKPA benefitted from the training, arms, and equipment provided by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). North Korea’s President Kim Il-sung took his orders directly from Joseph Stalin.
The NKPA’s mission was to aggressively pursue United Nations forces and the fledgling ground forces of the Republic of South Korea, attacking them frontally and from the flanks until they had surrounded and destroyed all resistance.[1] The strategy worked well enough in the first three months of their invasion; between 25 June and late August 1950, the NKPA continually attacked, mauled, and demoralized ROC and UN forces, pushing them ever southward to what became the Pusan Perimeter. As numerically inferior ROC and UN forces withdrew southward in an often disorderly manner, they left behind their dead, their wounded, and their “missing in action.” They also abandoned critical wartime equipment, which the NKPA later used against the Allied forces.
When the NKPA approached the Pusan Perimeter, however, their frontal attacks were only marginally successful; envelopment operations were even less so. It was from within the Pusan Perimeter that UN forces, primarily the United States Army with only token participation by UN and NATO allies, began the process of reorganization, reinforcement, and resupply.[2]
See also: First Battle of the Naktong Bulge.
Following the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge, Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, commanding the U.S. Eighth Army, assigned the defense of the Naktong Line to the inexperienced Second U.S. Infantry Division (2 ID).[3] His decision made 2 ID the main target of several enemy infantry divisions. The NKPA intended to split 2 ID, thus rendering it incapable of massed resistance. The NKPA’s success enabled the communists to penetrate Yongsan.
A Second Battle Evolves
The 5th Marine’s earlier assault upon the NKPA 4th Infantry Division at the cloverleaf rendered that division ineffective as a combat force. Similarly, US Army units pushed the NKPA 6th Infantry Division back across the Naktong River. In the Taegu region of South Korea in late August, three U.S. divisions repulsed five enemy infantry/armored divisions. The main battles in this engagement included the Battle of Masan, the Battle of Chindong-ni, the Battle of Komam-ni, the Battle of the Mountain, and the Battle of the Bowling Alley, which rendered the NKPA 13th Infantry Division ineffective. On South Korea’s east coast, ROK infantry divisions pushed back three additional NKPA divisions at Pohang-dong. [Pictured: Captain Francis Ike Fenton, Jr., Commanding Officer, Company B 1/5 August 1950 (titled: The face of war).][4]
Reeling from the American assault, the enemy commander decided to reinitiate offensive operations. Still, in light of the U.S. Navy’s lethal naval gunfire support to ground forces, they avoided future flanking movements. Instead, the NKPA opted for a series of frontal assaults to breach the U.S. perimeter. The communists reasoned that it was their only hope of achieving victory.
Supplied with intelligence from the USSR, the NKPA was well aware that MacArthur’s U.N. command was building up its forces within the Pusan Perimeter. The defeat of these new units was critical to the NKPA’s overall success in pushing the Americans into the Sea of Japan. Moreover, to achieve a final victory, the NKPA would have to surround Taegu and destroy all UN/US forces defending it. Cutting the main supply route (MSR) into Taegu would be critical to achieving that objective.
The NKPA plan called for a five-pronged assault. In the center, the 9th, 4th, 2nd, and 10th NKPA divisions would overwhelm 2 ID at the Naktong Bulge and seize Miryang and Yongsan. The attack would commence on September 1, 1950.
On September 1, the 35th Regiment (25 ID) engaged the enemy in the Battle of the Nam River, north of Masan. On the 35th’s right was the 9th Regiment (part of 2 ID). The 9th occupied a front extending over 18,000 meters (11.2 miles), which included a portion of the Naktong Bulge. Each regiment’s rifle company had a defensive front of 910 to 1,220 meters, but in reality, these units only held the key hills and observation points. The area assigned to the 9th Regiment was unrealistic, far exceeding its defense capability. The regiment had been observing enemy activity to their front for several days. The regimental operations officer assumed that the NKPA was reinforcing their defensive positions. One indication of likely lethal action was when civilian laborers supporting the NKPA fled the front lines.
The NKPA 9th Infantry Division intended to outflank and destroy the US army at the Naktong Bulge by capturing Miryang and Samnang-jin. This action would cut off 2 ID’s MSR and escape route between Taegu and Pusan. The NKPA also planned to attack 24 ID, an organization the North Koreans knew was exhausted after several weeks of fighting. Unknown to the North Koreans, the American 2 ID replaced 24 ID on the line. On the night of August 31, elements of the NKPA 9th began crossing the Naktong River.
The soldiers of 2 ID were fresh — but most of the men were inexperienced and without a clue about what would happen when the enemy attacked. The NKPA overran the young troopers amid green flares and shrill whistles and pushed many of them to the 25 ID line.
Another call for the Fire Brigade
“The Pusan perimeter is like a weakened dike; the Army intends to use us to plug the holes as they open. We’re a brigade —a fire brigade. It will be costly fighting against a numerically superior enemy. Marines have never lost a battle; this brigade will not be the first to establish such a precedent. Prepare to move.” — Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, USMC.
By September 1, less than thirty days from the beginning of their fight, the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade (1stMarBde) was down to around 4,300 men; in less than 30 days, the Marines had taken 500 casualties. Word had come down to the Brigade Commander, Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, that the Marines would come off the line. They were needed elsewhere. No one in the ranks knew where, exactly, and no one asked, but it would have to be better than the Pusan Perimeter. Craig knew what was coming — as did General Douglas A. MacArthur and Major General Oliver P. Smith, USMC. However, preparations for moving the Marines came to a halt early in the morning of September 1, 1950.
The following day, the 1st and 2nd Regiments of the NKPA (9th Infantry Division) stood a few miles short of Yongsan. Facing them were the shattered remains of Easy Company, 2nd Battalion, US 9th. There were no other UN/US troops to defend Yongsan. The 2 ID commander, Major General Lawrence B. Keiser, had formed ad hoc units from his support troops to shore up Easy Company. Still, it would not be enough to withstand a further assault by the enemy division.
In Tokyo, Major General Doyle O. Hickey, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, United Nations Far East Command, wanted to know when General Walker intended to release the Marines for further assignment. In his answer, General Walker described the situation: “The 2nd ID has been shattered, and the ground between what remained of it, and the 25 ID line, is in grave peril.” Walker said he did not think he could save the 2nd ID without the Marines. MacArthur approved Walker’s further use of the 1stMarBde, and they soon became attached to General Keiser’s command.[5]
Subsequently, Walker ordered Keiser to destroy enemy units east of the Naktong River and restore the 2 ID main line of resistance (MLR). Walker informed Keiser and Craig that he would release the Marines as soon as Keiser accomplished that mission. Following a council of war between the Eighth Army, 2 ID, and 1stMarBde on September 2, a decision was taken to mount a counterattack the next morning. The 5th Marines would commence its attack to the west at 08:00 on September 3, astride the Yongsan-Naktong Road. Army units would attack northwest from a position above the Marines and attempt to tie in with the 23rd Regiment. On the Marines’ left, what remained of the 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion, 1/9th, and the 72nd Tank Battalion would attack south to reestablish contact with 25 ID.
Marines were scheduled to relieve George and Fox companies 2/9th and 2nd Combat Engineers at 0300 and 0430 on September 3. The second battalion, 5th Marines (2/5) under Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise, assembled north of Yongsan. Lieutenant Colonel George R. Newton’s 1/5 assembled south of Yongsan. Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett’s 3/5 provided area security southwest of Yongsan, covering the enemy’s likely avenues of approach. Fighting began during the night of September 2-3, with Marines gaining high ground to serve as their line of departure. With the help of Marine tank fire, G 2/5 overcame heavy NKPA resistance, but the fight delayed a coordinated advance of the two line battalions. The Marines “jumped off” at 0855 toward the NKPA high ground, one-half mile distant.
A coordinated assault by aircraft, artillery, and pissed-off Marine infantry caused NKPA forces in front of them to break off and withdraw. Machine gun fire from 1/5 caught the NKPA reinforcements in the open and slaughtered them in the hundreds. By noon, 1/5 possessed Hill 91.
North of the road, 2/5 had a more difficult time in their advance. Heavy NKPA fire halted the Marines short of Hill 116, 2 miles west of Yongsan. Owing to the Koreans’ stubborn resistance, the battle raged through most of the night, and D 1/5 found itself isolated in the cut between Hill 91 and Hill 116. West of Yongsan, Marine tanks knocked out four T-34 tanks; a fifth tank was abandoned when the communist crew decided to seek employment elsewhere. During the fight, 2/5 gave up 34 dead and 77 wounded.
Just before midnight on September 3, the CO 5th Marines (Colonel Murray) ordered Taplett to lead his 3/5 through Roise’s 2/5 and prepare for a resumption of the attack the following day. That night, heavy rain brought an end to a perfectly crappy day for the Marines. 3/5 held up just short of 2/5’s rear. By dawn, the sky was clear, and 2/5 continued its advance — at first, against little opposition.
At 0800, 2/5 resumed its advance north of the road and seized Hill 116. During the night, under cover of dense rain, the NKPA 9th Division withdrew. South of the road, 1/5 occupied what appeared to have been the enemy Division’s command post. The Marines found abandoned tents and equipment, including two fully functional T-34 tanks. Advancing Marines, supported by tanks, found enemy dead strewn all about. By nightfall, the Marines had advanced another 5 kilometers.
On September 5, 1950, Murray called for preparatory artillery fire before the Marine’s third day in the assault. The heavy rain soaked the Marines and placed them in the right frame of mind for intense combat. The ground was soggy and slippery. While slogging forward toward Obong-ni Ridge, the 9th Regiment moved into the cloverleaf where the battle had raged in the previous month. At midmorning, after the Marines spotted the enemy digging in on the high ground ahead, they took positions between two hills. At around 1430, 300 enemy infantry suddenly appeared from concealed positions inside the village of Tugok and fanatically charged the Marines of B 1/5. Able Company, supporting Army artillery, and 81mm mortars repelled the attack, but not before Baker Company suffered 25 casualties. Pictured right, Navy Corpsmen aid wounded Marines.
As the NKPA began its assault on Company B, two T-34 tanks surprised and knocked out two of the Marine’s leading M-26 (Pershing) tanks. Because the two wounded tanks blocked their field of fire, four other Marine tanks withdrew to better firing positions. Tank assault teams from Company B took the T-34s under fire, destroying both, along with an enemy armored personnel carrier.
September 5 was a tough day for US forces. Army units suffered 105 killed, 430 wounded, and 587 missing in action (1,119 total casualties. Marine casualties were 35 dead and 91 wounded (126 total). The Allied offensive of September 3-5 was one of the bloodiest battles of the Korean War. It was a time when the enemy’s 4th and 9th Infantry Divisions ceased to exist as combat units.
Against his will, Lieutenant General Walker released the Marines late at night on September 4th; they began pulling out for Pusan just a little after midnight. General MacArthur replaced the 5th Marine Regiment with two Army regiments: the 17th and 65th Infantry Regiments. General Walker did not think two Army regiments were a suitable replacement for one understrength Marine regiment, but he had no further say in the matter.
The First Marine Brigade traveled to Japan and was absorbed into the 1st Marine Division. In ten days, the men of the 5th Marine Regiment and Marine Aircraft Group 33 would participate in one of the world’s most spectacular and difficult amphibious landings. They called it INCHON.
Sources:
- Alexander, B. Korea: The First War We Lost. Hippocrene Books, 2003.
- Blair, C., Jr. The Forgotten War. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
- Fehrenbach, T. R. This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness. New York: Macmillan Co., 1963.
- Gugeler, R. A. Combat Actions in Korea. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2005.
- Halberstam, D. The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War. New York, Hyperion Books, 2007.
- Malkasian, C. The Korean War. Osprey Publishing, 2001.
- Simmons, E. H. The United States Marines: A History. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
- Tucker, S. C., ed. Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History. Santa Barbara: Checkmark Books, 2002.
- Varhola, M. J. Fire and Ice: The Korean War, 1950-1953. Mason City: Da Capo Press, 2000.
Endnotes:
[1] The United Nations Command (also UNC) is the multinational military force that supported the Republic of Korea during and after the Korean War (which, technically, is still underway). As Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) and Commander of the United Nations Command, Douglas MacArthur commanded all Allied forces during the Korean War.
[2] U.S. logistical power provided the wherewithal for the beleaguered Army units to resist overwhelming North Korean forces and begin planning a counter-offensive.
[3] Walker (1889-1950) graduated from the USMA in 1907 and served in the First and Second World Wars and the early months of the Korean War. While commanding the 8th US Army, Walker was killed in a jeep accident.
[4] Captain (later Colonel Fenton) (1922-1998) was the son of Brigadier General Francis I. Fenton, Sr. During the Battle of Okinawa, F. I. Fenton, Sr., served as the 1st Marine Division combat engineer. It was during this battle that he learned that his youngest son, PFC Michael Fenton, serving as a scout sniper with Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, had been killed near Sugar Loaf Hill.
[5] This was the second time in Marine Corps history that Marines served with the U.S. Second Infantry Division—the first time within the 4th Marine Brigade in World War I.
Fix Bayonets! 