A new biography puts an end to the idea that we could not win
By Max Boot in the Wall Street Journal, October 7, 2011
Note: Max Boot (b. 1969) is a Russian-born naturalized U.S. citizen, author, editor, lecturer, and military historian. He has worked as a writer/editor for The Christian Science Monitor, and Wall Street Journal. He has been a senior fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a contributor to The Washington Post. What follows is his review of a book by Lewis Sorely titled Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam (2011). It is part of an interesting analysis of the man who led the Vietnam War (1964 – 1968), relevant because Westmoreland was also the man who some define as the least competent general in the U.S. Army.
September 2006. Violence levels are spiking in Iraq. Every day brings reports of more suicide bombings, more IEDs, more death and destruction. So bad has it gotten that The Washington Post reveals that a senior Marine intelligence officer has concluded ” … that the prospects for securing that country’s western Anbar province are dim and that there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do to improve the political and social situation there.”
This was the situation when I was among a dozen conservative pundits escorted into the Oval Office for a chat with President George W. Bush. I asked him why he didn’t change a strategy that was clearly failing. He replied that he had no intention of micromanaging the war like Lyndon Johnson, who was said to have personally picked bombing targets in Vietnam. This commander-in-chief vowed to respect the judgment of his chain of command.
Within a few months, of course, Mr. Bush did change defense secretaries, generals and strategies. We can only speculate how events might have unfolded if he had subscribed to a different interpretation of Vietnam — one that did not blame political interference for our defeat. Could violence levels have been reduced earlier, saving untold numbers of American and Iraqi lives?
It is hard to think of a more compelling argument for the importance of studying history and, in particular, the history of the Vietnam War, which, 36 years after the fall of Saigon, continues to cast a long shadow over the American military and American politics. Whether Mr. Bush realized it or not, he was taking sides in a contentious debate — the war over the Vietnam War — that continues to divide scholars and commentators. The debates may be less rancorous than they were a few decades ago, but there is still little agreement over why the United States became involved in Vietnam, why we lost, whether defeat was inevitable, what the consequences were — and what it all means for current policy.
Among historians, the biggest division has pitted those who think that the Vietnam War was immoral and unwinnable against those who think it was a worthy effort that could have been won with different tactics and strategies. The antiwar view has been the dominant one, expressed in such celebrated books as Frances FitzGerald’s “Fire in the Lake” (1972), David Halberstam’s “The Best and the Brightest” (1972), Michael Herr’s “Dispatches” (1977), Stanley Karnow’s “Vietnam: A History (1983) and Neil Sheehan’s “A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam” (1988). All share the questionable assumptions that Ho Chi Minh was not a dedicated Communist but a nationalist leading a popular liberation struggle, that his enemies in Saigon were hopelessly corrupt and illegitimate, and that American policymakers were blinded to these facts by an excess of Cold War zeal. A recent exposition of this view can be found in Gordon Goldstein’s “Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam” (2008), which became a hot item in the fall of 2009 among White House aides opposed to sending more troops to Afghanistan.
The antiwar orthodoxy was challenged from the start by many military officers (and some civilian officials), but while agreeing that the war could and should have been won, the “revisionists” divided over how. Some authors claimed the United States should have been less conventional in approach, concentrating more on counterinsurgency and less on “search and destroy.” Others argued that we should have been more conventional: invading Cambodia and Laos to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail, bombing North Vietnam more heavily, perhaps even marching on Hanoi. As Curtis LeMay, the Air Force chief of staff in the 1960s, memorably put it: “We should stop swatting flies and go after the manure pile.” The “manure pile” argument — which ignored the fact that the French had occupied the entire country and still lost to a Communist insurgency with secure bases in China — found its most eloquent expression in “On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War” (1982), a surprise bestseller from Col. Harry G. Summers Jr.
The rejoinder was published in 1986 by an Army major named Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. (today long-retired and president of his own think tank in Washington). In “The Army and Vietnam,” he argued that the Army had no one else to blame for defeat — it had squandered public support by devoting far too many resources to fruitless big-unit operations in the sparsely populated Highlands while failing to secure the coastal areas where the bulk of Vietnam’s population lived. Mr. Krepinevich argued that less firepower should have been used and more resources devoted to “population-centric” programs such as the Combined Action Platoons, which sent small groups of Marines to live in villages and secure them in cooperation with South Vietnamese militia.
Some conventionally minded Army officers still cite Summers (who died in 1999), but the Krepinevich view has become more influential in the military. His critique influenced the development of the counterinsurgency doctrine that was implemented in Iraq in 2007-08. Gen. David Petraeus (who wrote his Princeton dissertation on “The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam”) was determined to implement the principles of counterinsurgency that had been ignored by his predecessors in both Iraq and Vietnam. He told his troopers to “live among the people,” “patrol on foot and engage the population,” and “hold areas that have been secured.”
While Mr. Krepinevich was the trailblazer, in recent years, his argument has been taken up and extended by Lewis Sorley, a West Point graduate, Vietnam veteran, and former CIA official. In his 1999 book, “A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam,” he forcefully argued that Gen. Creighton Abrams, who took over as head of Military Assistance Command Vietnam after the 1968 Tet Offensive, changed the course of the conflict for the better by moving away from big-unit sweeps. Mr. Sorley believes that the United States had essentially won the war by 1972. The “final tragedy” of his subtitle refers to the fact that Washington [Democrats] then abandoned South Vietnam, allowing it to fall to an armored invasion by the North in 1975.
Mr. Sorley, who also wrote an admiring biography of Abrams (“Thunderbolt,” 1992), has now focused on the war’s early years by producing a biography of Abrams’s predecessor — William Childs Westmoreland. The subtitle says it all: “The General Who Lost Vietnam.” This judgment flies in the face of the common view — enunciated by no less than George W. Bush and a dominant strain in the 2005 obituaries for Westmoreland — that it was the politicians (with a big assist from the news media) who lost the war. Mr. Sorley makes mincemeat of this myth. While he concedes that Lyndon Johnson was deeply involved in “actions taken outside South Vietnam” (such as the bombing of the North), he argues: “Within South Vietnam, the U.S. commander had very wide latitude in deciding how to fight the war. That was true for Westmoreland and equally true for his eventual successor.”
It was Westmoreland — not Lyndon Johnson or even Robert McNamara — who decided to fight a “war of attrition,” sending large and cumbersome American formations to thrash through the jungle and rice paddies in search of elusive enemy units. It was Westmoreland who kept demanding more American troops and who encouraged them to fire as many artillery rounds as possible — even if they lacked specific targets. It was Westmoreland who made “body counts” the key metric of the entire war effort in the futile hope that the United States could inflict enough casualties on the Communists to make them cry “Uncle!” He did not seem to realize or care that in the process, he was inflicting lesser but still considerable casualties on American forces — and that a democracy like the United States was much more casualty-averse than a one-party dictatorship like North Vietnam.
Why did Westmoreland bungle so badly? It was not, as the most extreme antiwar protesters would have it, because he was a war criminal or psychopath. Mr. Sorley shows that Westmoreland was well-intentioned and conscientious but also dense, arrogant, vain, humorless, and not too honest. Is that too harsh a judgment? You won’t think so if you read all the damning assessments compiled by Mr. Sorley from the late general’s associates. Air Force Gen. Robert Beckel thought that “he seemed rather stupid. He didn’t seem to grasp things or follow the proceedings very well.” Or Army Gen. Charles Simmons: “General Westmoreland was intellectually very shallow and made no effort to study, read, or learn. He would just not read anything. His performance was appalling.”
Those comments were made by officers who worked closely with Westmoreland during his years as Army chief of staff —1968 to 1972— a time when “briefers were dismayed to find that Westmoreland would occupy himself during one-on-one deskside briefings by signing photographs of himself, one after another, while they made their presentations.” But the warning signs had been apparent long before. In 1964, when Westmoreland was first being considered for an assignment in Vietnam, one general privately warned that “it would be a grave mistake to appoint him”: “He is spit and polish . . . This is a counterinsurgency war, and he would have no idea how to deal with it.”
Westmoreland’s appointment was further validation of the Peter Principle — that eventually, every employee is promoted beyond his level of competence. “Westy” was a good division commander who had compiled an impressive record in World War II and Korea. Mr. Sorley summarizes his sterling, pre-Vietnam CV: “Eagle Scout at 15, journeyer to Europe and the World Scout Jamboree, president of the high school senior class, Citadel cadet, First Captain at West Point, battalion commander at age 28, with the Presidential Unit Citation, earned in combat in North Africa, a full colonel at 30, then a brigadier at 38 while leading the airborne regimental combat team in Korea, major general — youngest in the Army — at 42, serving at the right hand of the famous Maxwell Taylor, then sent by him to command the 101st Airborne Division, on to West Point as the dashing Superintendent with the young and beautiful Kitsy and the three attractive children she had borne him, familiar then with so many greats of an earlier day — MacArthur, Eisenhower, Omar Bradley — then corps command, again with his beloved airborne, and the third star.”
Alas, none of that experience prepared Westmoreland to deal with a foe that refused to stand and fight like the Wehrmacht. The North Vietnamese preferred to wear down U.S. forces with ambushes and hit-and-run raids, and Westmoreland blundered straight into their trap. By the time he was finally sent home in 1968 — kicked upstairs to become chief of staff — he had been thoroughly discredited.
He spent the rest of his life fighting unsuccessfully to reclaim his reputation — often by twisting the truth. In a 1972 Washington Post article, he was quoted saying that “we had full warning that the [Tet] offensive was coming” even though Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker testified that “we had no inkling of the scope, the timing, or the targets of the offensive” and South Vietnam’s top intelligence officer said that “the enemy had really achieved the element of surprise.” In 1982, Westmoreland even sued CBS News for a “60 Minutes” report that claimed he had deliberately minimized estimates of enemy strength prior to Tet. (He settled out of court without getting any money from CBS.)
Mr. Sorley has stripped away Westmoreland’s after-the-fact mythologizing, leaving us with a deeply unflattering portrait of an army careerist who unintentionally did much damage to an institution —and a country— that he loved dearly. “Westmoreland” is a valuable addition to the growing “revisionist” literature that shows the Vietnam War was winnable if we had fought differently — and, contra President Bush, that did not mean simply letting the generals do whatever they wanted.
Mr. Boot, the author of “The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power,” is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow in national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Sergeant Alfredo Cantu Gonzalez (1946 – 1968), a Texas-American, was posthumously awarded the MEDAL OF HONOR for courageous conduct during the Battle of Hue (1968).
“Freddy” was born in Edinburg, Texas on May 23, 1946. He was Dolia Gonzalez’s only child. He attended Lamar Grammar School through 1955 and graduated from Edinburg High School in 1965. Despite his comparatively small size, Gonzalez was an all-district football champion in high school.
He enlisted in the United States Marine Corps Reserve in San Antonio, Texas, on June 3, 1965, but was discharged from the reserve forces and integrated into the regular Marine Corps on July 6. In September, he completed recruit training at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot in San Diego, California, and in October, individual combat training at Camp Pendleton, California.
Afterward, the Marine Corps assigned Gonzalez to the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Marine Division, where he served as a rifleman with Headquarters & Service Company. Promoted to Private First Class on January 1, 1966, he was transferred to Company L, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, 3rd Marine Division for service in the Republic of Vietnam. During this time, he served as a rifleman and a squad leader. While in Vietnam, he was promoted to Lance Corporal on 1 October 1966 and to Corporal on 1 December 1966. His tour of combat duty ended in February 1967.
Upon his return to the United States, Corporal Gonzalez was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines, 2nd Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. There, he served as a tactics instructor, emphasizing the techniques of guerrilla warfare. During this assignment, Gonzalez learned that an entire platoon, including some men that he had served with in Vietnam, had been killed during an enemy ambush. Gonzalez requested to be reassigned to Vietnam for a second tour of duty.
In May 1967, Gonzalez joined the 3rd Replacement Company, Staging Battalion, at Camp Pendleton, California. After pre-deployment training, Gonzalez and the replacement company boarded an MSTS ship for transportation to Southeast Asia. En route, the Marine Corps promoted Gonzalez to Sergeant. After arriving in Vietnam for his second tour of duty, he was assigned as a squad leader and later, as the platoon sergeant, 3rd Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 1st Marine Division.
During the initial phases of the Battle of Huế in late January 1968, Gonzalez and his unit were sent by truck convoy to reinforce beleaguered units inside the city. When the convoy came under enemy fire near the village of Lang Van Luong on January 31, Sgt Gonzalez led his men in clearing/pacifying the area.[1] Further down the road, he received shrapnel wounds while carrying an injured man to safety.
After the convoy continued moving toward Huế, it was again halted by enemy fire, in this instance, an enemy machine gun bunker. Although wounded, Gonzalez led his men in an attack against the machine gun position, destroying it with hand grenades. Eventually reaching Huế City, the 3rd Platoon engaged the enemy in heavy combat. On February 3, Gonzalez was once more wounded, this time seriously, but he refused medical evacuation.
\On February 4, a large North Vietnamese force inflicted many casualties on Alpha Company 1/1. During the battle, Sgt Gonzales employed anti-tank weapons to fire on enemy positions. The next day, when a large North Vietnamese force inflicted heavy casualties on his company, Gonzalez directed the employment of anti-tank weapons against the enemy’s fortified positions. He successfully checked the North Vietnamese advance at that location and silenced a rocket emplacement before being mortally wounded by a rocket. Seriously injured, Sgt Gonzalez took cover in the Saint Joan of Arc Catholic Church, where he died.
Vice President Spiro T. Agnew presented Mrs. Dolia Gonzalez with her son’s posthumous Medal of Honor on October 31, 1969, during a ceremony at the White House. Sergeant Gonzalez was laid to rest at the Hillcrest Memorial Park, Edinburg, Texas.
Honors
In 1996, the U.S. Navy named its guided missile destroyer (DDG-66) after Sergeant Gonzalez. From the beginning, Freddy’s mother, Dolia, formed an uncommonly close relationship with the ship’s crew. She attends many of the ship’s ceremonies, such as change of command. Dolia has become, in many ways, the ship’s mother.
In McAllen, Texas, the Texas State Veteran’s Home is also named in his honor. Additionally, Sergeant Gonzalez was awarded the Texas Legislative Medal of Honor.
Sergeant Gonzalez’s decorations and awards include:
The Medal of Honor
The Purple Heart Medal (3 awards)
Combat Action Medal
Presidential Unit Citation
Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal
National Defense Service Medal
Vietnam Service Medal (4 bronze stars)
Vietnam Military Merit Medal (equivalent of Vietnam’s Medal of Honor)
Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm and Bronze Star
Vietnam Campaign Medal (with ’60-‘ device)
Notes:
[1] Since the end of the war, the Vietnamese government has renamed many of the places where battles were fought. The village of Long Van Luong may now be called something entirely different. Of possible interest to readers, the North Vietnamese won the war (despite losing every major battle) because American Democrats in Congress gave their fellow communists in North Vietnam “a win.” This was apparently okay with most Americans, including those who gave up their children to a war Democrats started and never intended to win.
The Quế Sơn Valley, located in Quảng Nam Province, is bounded by mountain ranges north, south, and west. It extends some 24 miles from east to west from Route 1 to Hiệp Đức. The Ly Ly River and Routes 534 and 535 traverses most of the valley’s length. In 1965/1966, the valley supported a Vietnamese population of around 60,000 farmers and salt miners. Whoever held Quế Sơn Valley owned the keys to the struggle for the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ).
The struggle for the Quế Sơn Valley began in December 1965 (Operation Harvest Moon) and February 1966 (Operation Double Eagle II). Brigadier General William A. Stiles, USMC, reported to the 1st Marine Division in late April to assume the duties of Assistant Division Commander, 1stMarDiv. Shortly after his arrival, the Division Commander directed Stiles to assume command of Task Force X-Ray. His mission was to plan for and direct a reconnaissance-in-force in the region of Đỗ Xá, South Vietnam.[1]
In June, the Commanding General III Marine Amphibious Force and Commanding General 1stMarDiv received intelligence information compiled by the U.S. Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (USMACV) indicating that a suspected enemy base of operations was operating some thirty miles southwest of Chu Lai, near the western border of I CTZ. MACV placed the headquarters of the enemy’s Military Region v in the area of Đỗ Xá. They had been asking for Marine Corps intervention for several months. Army intelligence had wanted Marines to mount an operation throughout the Valley for several months.
After a few unavoidable delays, Stiles and his staff completed their plan of action but almost immediately became aware of the presence of an entire enemy combat division within the Quế Sơn Valley. The 620th NVA Division operated with three full-strength infantry regiments (3rd, 21st, and 1st VC) in the area straddling the Quang Tin/Quang Nam provinces northwest of Chu Lai. Stiles’ reconnaissance operation, designated Operation KANSAS, was placed on hold until the Marines could address a significant enemy presence close to Chu Lai.
But on June 13, 1966, the III MAF Commander directed the 1stMarDiv to commence an extensive reconnaissance campaign between Tam Kỳ and Hiệp Đức. Stiles was ordered to plan for a joint combat operation with the 2nd ARVN Division. The plan called for the aerial insertion of six Marine reconnaissance teams from the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion and an additional 1st Force Reconnaissance Company team into selected landing zones (LZs) to determine the extent of NVA penetrations.
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J. Sullivan (1920 – 1995), the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (1stRecon) commander, would exercise control over all reconnaissance missions. On schedule, a thirteen-man team was airlifted to Nui Loc Son, a small mountain in the center of the Quế Sơn Valley (seven miles northeast of Hiệp Đức. Another eighteen-man team landed on the Nui Vu hill mass that dominates the terrain ten miles west of Tam Kỳ.
These initial landings would be followed up the next morning by two teams to the higher ground south of the valley, two teams to the northwest of the valley, and one in the south of Hiệp Đức. The last team would parachute onto Hill 555, east of the Tranh River. These Marines experienced a single injury as one of the team twisted his ankle upon contact with Terra Firma.
As the operation evolved, the 1st Force Recon Company parachutists were the first to be extracted. After landing, these Marines followed procedure by burying their parachutes and then moved away to establish observation posts. At around 1400 hours, the Marines observed an estimated forty enemy soldiers undergoing tactical training. Four hours later, a woodcutter team appeared with a sentry dog. The animal alerted on the buried parachutes, and a short time later, an enemy combat patrol appeared to be searching for the Marines. The Recon Team Leader, 1stLt Jerome T. Paull, requested that his men be extracted. These Marines were airlifted back to Chu Lai.
The 18-man team inserted on Nui Vu was led by Staff Sergeant Jimmie E. Howard, USMC. After their insertion on June 13, Howard found the hill an excellent observation platform, and for the next two days, Howard’s team reported extensive enemy activities. This team, supported by an ARVN 105mm Howitzer Battery (located seven miles south of Nui Vu), was able to call in artillery missions on “targets of opportunity.”
Staff Sergeant Howard, a seasoned combat veteran, exercised care to only call artillery missions when an American aircraft spotter or helicopter was in the region, but the enemy was aware of the presence of these Marines and was determined to neutralize the threat.
On the 14th, the NVA began organizing a force to attack the post. On the night of June 15, a U.S. Army Special Forces Team leading a South Vietnamese irregular defense group (popular forces) radioed a warning to General Stiles’ command post (C.P.) — a company-sized unit of between 200 and 250 NVA soldiers closing in on the Marine reconnaissance unit on Hill 448. Word was passed down to the platoon leader, Staff Sergeant Jimmie L. Howard, USMC, through his parent unit, Company C, 1st Recon Battalion, 1st Marine Division.
Later that night, between 2130 and 2330, Lance Corporal Ricardo C. Binns, USMC, detected the sound of troops marshaling for an assault and fired the first shots from his M-14 Rifle. The NVA quickly closed in, surrounding the Marine perimeter. The enemy closed in because they had learned through practical experience that the closer they were to the Marines, the less likely they would become targets of USMC Close Air Support (CAS). Unlike the Air Force, Marine pilots routinely flew CAS missions at tree top level (give or take five inches).
After Corporal Binns opened fire, outpost Marines withdrew from their listening posts to reposition themselves within the rocky knoll. Automatic weapons fire from a DShK machine gun (shown right) and 60mm mortar fire kept the Marines from maneuvering away from their hilltop positions. After their initial fire, the NVA tossed hand grenades into the Marine positions, followed by a short-lived frontal assault. The Marine’s well-aimed rifle fire repelled the enemy’s assault, causing the communists to fall back. After reorganizing, the NVA assaulted the Marines again and again — each time being pushed back by the Marine’s murderous fire.
Near midnight, Staff Sergeant Howard radioed his company commander, Captain Tim Geraghty, to ask for an extraction and close air support. These requests were delayed at the III MAF Direct Air Support Center (DASC).[2] The violence of the enemy attack convinced Howard that his team was being overrun, so he again called for assistance. Colonel Sullivan radioed Howard to reassure him that help was on the way.
At around 0200, a Marine C-47 (DC-3) arrived on station and began dropping flares to light up the area and prepare for the arrival of fixed-wing and rotor gunships. Jet aircraft screamed in and dropped their bombs and napalm within 100 meters of the Marine perimeter. Helicopter gunships from VMO-6 strafed to within twenty meters of the Marine perimeter.
At 0300, enemy ground fire drove off a flight of MAG-36 helicopters that were trying to extract Howard’s Marines. When that attempt failed, Colonel Sullivan informed Howard that he should not expect reinforcements until dawn and urged him to hold on as best he could.
By then, the fight devolved into small, scattered, individual fights between Marine defenders and probing enemies. The NVA, wary of U.S. aircraft, decided against organizing another mass assault but continued to fire at the Marines throughout the night. Enemy snipers had placed themselves close to and above the Marine’s defenses.
Staff Sergeant Howard’s Marines were running out of ammunition; their situation was critical. Howard ordered his men to fire only well-aimed single shots at the enemy. The Marines complied with their team leaders’ instructions but also began throwing rocks at suspected enemy positions, hoping the enemy would think that the Marines were lobbing in grenades. By 0400, every Marine in Howard’s team had been wounded; six Marines lay dead. Staff Sergeant Howard was struck in the back by a ricochet, which temporarily paralyzed his legs. Unable to stand, Howard pulled himself from one fighting hole to the next, encouraging his men and directing their fire.
At dawn on June 16, UH-34s, with Huey gunship cover, successfully landed Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (C/1/5) at the base of Nui Vu. The helicopter piloted by Major William J. Goodsell, the Commanding Officer of VMO-6, was shot down. While Goodsell was successfully evacuated, he later died from his wounds.
Charlie Company encountered enemy resistance as it moved to relieve Howard’s team. When Charlie Company’s lead element reached Howard’s position, he shouted a warning to “get down” because enemy snipers were helping themselves to any Marine that appeared in their rear sight aperture. The company commander, First Lieutenant Marshal “Buck” Darling, later reported that when he arrived at Howard’s position, every Marine still alive had armed themselves with enemy AK-47s taken from dead communists lying within the Marine perimeter.
Everyone associated with the defensive operation assumed that Howard and his men had held off an NVA rifle company. Military intelligence later clarified that Howard’s 18 Marines had held off a battalion of NVA regulars from the 3rd NVA Regiment. The enemy continued to battle the Marines for the hill until around noon and then disengaged. When the enemy pulled out, they left behind 42 dead. Charlie Company lost two KIA and two WIA.
Meanwhile, General Stiles’ completed plan of action involved eight battalions (four Marine and four ARVN) with air and artillery support. The initial assault force included two battalions from the 5th Marines and two Vietnamese Army battalions. Stiles and his Vietnamese counterpart would control the action from Tam Kỳ. Anticipating the need for massive firepower, Stiles prepositioned artillery units from Da Nang and Chu Lai into forward firing positions on Hill 29, west of the railroad line seven miles north of Tam Kỳ.
The 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (3/1) accompanied artillery units from Da Nang and provided security for the artillery positions on Hill 29 and Thang Binh. Artillery support units included HQ Battery 4/11 (command and control), Kilo Battery 4/12 (6 155mm Howitzers at Hill 29), and Provisional Yankee Battery 4/12 (2 155mm Howitzers) at Thang Binh.
On the morning of June 17, the South Vietnamese military high command notified the Marines that the two Vietnamese infantry battalions would not participate in the Marine Corps operation. Accordingly, Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt (III MAF) delayed Operation Kansas again — and then modified General Stiles’ plan of action.[3] Rather than a multi-battalion heliborne operation in the Quế Sơn Valley, Walt elected to continue the reconnaissance in force. Note: Walt’s decision placed fewer than 1,800 Marines against an entire NVA infantry division.
The Fifth Marines (5thMar) remained at Chu Lai, ready to support the Recon Marines on-call. Stiles continued in command of the operation. He repositioned some of his assets to provide better coverage for the recon teams. On June 18, Kilo 4/11 (4 155mm guns) joined the other artillery units on Hill 29, and an additional provisional battery from the 12th Marines deployed to a new firing position 6,000 meters from Thang Binh. Kilo 4/12 joined the new provisional battery the next day. On June 19, CH-46 aircraft lifted two 105mm howitzers from Chu Lai to the Tien Phuoc Special Forces Camp, some 30 miles distant. Operational control of 3/1 was transferred to the 5th Marines.
With these support units repositioned, Colonel Sullivan shifted his CP to Tien Phuoc. For the next ten days, the reconnaissance battalion (reinforced) continued to conduct extensive patrolling operations throughout the Quế Sơn Valley. Twenty-five recon teams were involved in this operation.
Operation Kansas, which officially began on June 17, ended on June 22nd when General Stiles relocated his command post. Marine infantry participation, with the exception of the relief of Staff Sergeant Howard’s platoon, was confined to a one-company exploitation of a B-52 Arc Light strike on June 21, some 3,500 meters east of Hiệp Đức.[4] Despite Operation Kansas’s official end on June 22, Marines remained in the area for six additional days.
Four of Howard’s Marines were awarded the Navy Cross: Corporal Binns, Hospital Man Second Class Billee Don Holmes, Corporal Jerrald Thompson, and Lance Corporal John Adams. Thompson and Adams, killed in action, were awarded posthumous medals. Silver Star Medals were awarded to the remaining thirteen Marines, four posthumously, along with two Marines from Charlie Company, also posthumously.
Staff Sergeant Howard received a meritorious combat promotion to Gunnery Sergeant and was later awarded the Medal of Honor—our nation’s highest combat award. Howard was eventually promoted to First Sergeant, retired from the Marine Corps in 1977, and became a high school football coach. He passed away in 1993, aged 64.
Notes:
[1] Stiles graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Class of 1939, and was an officer with extensive combat experience.
[2] The DASC is the principal USMC aviation command and control system and the air control agency responsible for directing air operations directly supporting ground forces. It functions in a decentralized mode of operations but is directly supervised by the Marine Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) or Navy Tactical Air Control Center (NTACC). The parent unit of DASCs is the Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS) of the Marine Air Control Group (MACG).
[3] Lew Walt (1913 – 1989) served in World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam. During his military service, he was awarded two Navy Cross medals, two Navy Distinguished Service medals, the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit (with Combat V), the Bronze Star (with Combat V), and two Purple Heart medals. Following his promotion to four-star general and service as the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Walt retired in 1971. General Walt passed away on March 26, 1989.
[4] Following the Arc Light strike, Echo Company 2/5 surveyed the strike area and found no evidence of a large body of enemy forces.
Back at Phu Bai, Lieutenant Colonel Ernest C. Cheatham reviewed Marine Corps urban combat doctrine, which recommended staying off the streets and moving forward by blasting through walls and buildings. Accordingly, he continued to gather the necessary equipment he would need to accomplish his mission, including M20 Rocket Launchers, M40 106mm Recoilless Rifles (mounted on flatbed vehicles called “mules”), C-4 explosives, flamethrowers, tear gas, and gas masks.
Cheatham received this equipment early in the afternoon of February 3. After a council of war, Cheatham deployed his battalion to recapture the southern section of Huế. Many Marines serving under Task Force X-Ray had no previous combat experience in urban warfare/close-quarters combat. Because of the cultural and religious significance of Huế City, Allied forces were ordered not to bomb or shell the city. In any case, seasonal monsoons prevented allied forces from employing air support. However, as the intensity of the battle increased, the “no bombing” restriction was lifted.
The NVA’s tactics were to remain as close to the Marines as possible, which enemy planners imagined would negate the effective use of artillery and close air support. The NVA maintained a forward fighting line directly opposite the Marine’s positions, with a secondary line only two blocks to the rear. Snipers and machine guns intensely defended each building within the battle zone.
The enemy also prepared spider holes (fox holes) in gardens and streets to create crossed fires between all buildings and streets. If the Marines penetrated the forward line, the NVA would withdraw to the secondary line, and the business would begin anew. At dusk, the NVA and VC would attempt to reinfiltrate their former positions.
On the night of February 3, the NVA commander, seeing the buildup of Marines at Huế University, thinned out his frontline forces, leaving just a platoon to defend the Treasury building and adjacent Post Office. Then, on the morning of February 4, when the Marines launched their attack on the Treasury building, murderous enemy crossfires penned the Marines down for hours.
The only way to break out of their stalemate was to blow a hole into the side of buildings and clear it, room by room. These actions were costly to the Marines performing such missions, but they were also costly to the overall operation because the process was time-consuming. Under cover of tear gas and the residue of overwhelming M48 and M40 fires, Marines were able to cross city streets to employ plastique explosives and rocket launchers.
Slowly but steadily, Marines pushed into the Treasury building, post office, and the Jeanne d’Arc High School, killing the enemy in massive numbers. Marines also suffered the fate of combat. Company A 1/1 lost half of his men (wounded and killed) in a single day’s fighting. In addition to locating the enemy and destroying them, Marines also rescued and protected Vietnamese civilians trapped by the NVA and VC assault. That evening, VC sappers succeeded in blowing up the An Cuu bridge, cutting the road link to Phu Bai.
Following the capture of the Treasury, Cheatham continued his methodical advance to the west, leading with tear gas, M48s, and Ontos—followed by Mules and Marine grunts. As NVA-VC’s manpower and ammunition were depleted, resistance lessened. The enemy no longer tenaciously defended each building; they relied more on sniper fire, mortars, and rockets.
On February 5, Marines recaptured the Huế Central Hospital complex, rescuing Lieutenant Colonel Pham Van Khoa (the Mayor of Huế and Thua Thien Province chief), hiding in the grounds. The next day, Marines attacked the Provincial Headquarters, which served as the command post of the NVA 4th Regiment. While the Marines were seizing the surrounding walls, the area between the wall and buildings was covered by fire from every enemy-held window and spider-hole inside the grounds.
Marines sent an Ontos forward to blast an entry into the building, but the enemy disabled it with a B-40 rocket. Next, the Marines sent a Mule forward to blow a hole in the building, which allowed the Marines to advance under cover of tear gas. Once they entered the building, Marines fought room by room to clear out the enemy — but many of the NVA slipped away. After securing the building, Marines cleared the spider-holes, giving no quarter to their occupants.
To celebrate their victory, Marines raised an American flag, but they were ordered to lower it because Vietnamese law prohibited the flying of any foreign flag unless the flag of the Republic of Vietnam accompanied it.
After resting his men at the Provincial Headquarters, Cheatham advanced west toward the Phu Cam Canal. He swung south and east to clear the area with the canal to his right. On February 7, the NVA twice ambushed a 25-vehicle supply convoy on Route 547 from Phu Bai to the 11th Marines firebase Rocket Crusher. The 11th Marines provided artillery support to Allied forces fighting in and around Huế.
Enemy ambuscades killed twenty Marines and wounded thirty-nine. NVA sappers finally succeeded in destroying the Trường Tiền bridge, which restricted all movement between the old and new cities. NVA forces in the new town, worn down by more than a week of constant combat and effectively cut off from their comrades on the other side of the river, began to abandon the city slowly. The 815th and 2nd Sapper Battalions moved to the southern side of the Phu Cam Canal, joining the 818th Battalion. The 804th Battalion and the 1st Sapper Battalion remained south of the canal near the An Cuu Bridge. At the same time, the 810th Battalion began preparing to sneak west across the Perfume River by raft and boat to Gia Hoi Island.
Colonel Gravel’s 1/1 had been engaged in clearing operations to the east and south of the MACV compound. On February 10, they captured the soccer stadium, giving the Marines a second (and much safer) helicopter landing zone. Combat engineers built a pontoon bridge across the Phu Cam Canal, restoring the road access that had been lost when the An Cuu Bridge was blown up.
On February 11, Hotel Company 2/5 secured a bridge over the Phu Cam Canal and the city block on the other side of the canal. The next day, Fox Company swept the west bank of the canal, fighting through houses and the Huế Railway Station that had been sheltering NVA snipers. On February 13, Fox and Hotel companies crossed the bridge again to secure the entire area. As Marines advanced into the open countryside towards the Từ Đàm Pagoda, they located freshly dug NVA graves and then were hit by a barrage of mortar fire, forcing them to withdraw. Two-Five had inadvertently stumbled on the NVA’s field command post.
On February 13, General Creighton Abrams established his forward headquarters at Phu Bai, replacing General Cushman and assuming overall command of U.S. forces in CTZ I.
The Citadel
While the ARVN 1/3 and 2nd and 7th Airborne Battalions were busy clearing out the north and western parts of the Citadel, including the Chanh Tay Gate, the ARVN 4/2 moved south from Mang Ca toward the Imperial Palace. In those operations, South Vietnamese forces killed over 700 NVA-VC troops. On February 5, NVA-VC units managed to stall ARVN airborne units, prompting General Trưởng to replace them with his 4th battalion, 2nd Regiment (4/2). Meanwhile, the ARVN 4/3, operating south of the river, assaulted the Thuong Tu Gate near the eastern corner of the Citadel.
After seven successive attempts to breach the gate failed, 4/3 was ordered to reinforce the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 4th regiment. On 6 February, the ARVN 1/3 captured the An Hoa Gate and the northwest corner of the Citadel, and the 4th Battalion seized the southwest wall. That night, the NVA counterattacked with a battalion from the NVA 29th Regiment, scaling the southwest wall and pushing the 4th Battalion back to Tây Lộc.
On February 7, the ARVN 3rd Regiment, which had been futilely trying to break into the southeast corner of the Citadel, was moved by LCM-8s (Mike Boats) to Mang Ca to reinforce units inside the Citadel. The ARVN 2nd Troop, 7th Cavalry (equipped with fifteen M113s) arrived at Mang Ca from Quảng Trị to relieve the 3rd Troop. To avoid enemy ambushes, the 2nd Troop turned off Highway One a few miles north of the city, traveled east cross-country and swung around to the rear of Mang Ca through the Trai Gate.
Also, on 7 February, the North Vietnamese tried to bring their air support into the battle, sending four North Vietnamese Air Force (Il-14) transport aircraft from Hanoi. The Ilyushin IL-14 was a Soviet production of the Douglas DC-3. Two of the aircraft carrying explosives, antitank ammunition, and field telephone cables managed to find an opening in the cloud layer about six miles north of Huế. They dropped their cargo in a large lagoon for local forces to retrieve. One of the aircraft returned safely, but the other, flying through dense fog, crashed into a mountain, losing all on board.
Meanwhile, the other two Il−14s, modified to drop bombs, were ordered to bomb Mang Ca. However, neither aircraft could find the city in the fog, so they returned to their base with all their artillery. Five days later, they tried again, but bad weather prevented them from locating Mang Ca. The two aircraft radioed that they were scrubbing the mission and then headed to sea to jettison their bombs. A short time later, both aircraft disappeared while over water.
On February 10, two forward observers from the Marines’ 1st Field Artillery Group were flown into Tây Lộc to help coordinate artillery and naval gunfire to support the fighting inside the Citadel. However, General Ngô Quang Trưởng directed that the Marines should not target the Imperial Palace under any circumstances.
On February 11, The South Vietnamese Marines (Task Force Alfa) (the 1st and 5th Battalions) began to replace the Vietnamese Airborne units by helicopter, as Bravo Company 1/5 was airlifted to Mang Ca. Intense enemy fire precluded a full insertion, however. On February 13, Alpha and Charlie Companies 1/5, supported by five M-48s from the 1st Tank Battalion, were loaded into LCM-8s (Mike Boats) and ferried across to Mang Ca. Once there, the Marines moved south along the eastern wall of the Citadel while Bravo Company remained in reserve.
Unknown to the Marines, the ARVN Airborne withdrew from the area two days earlier when the Vietnamese Marines began arriving at Mang Ca. NVA defenders had used the opportunity of the delay to reoccupy several blocks of the Citadel and reinforce their defenses. Communist forces engaged Alpha Company, which almost immediately suffered 35 casualties. The CO of 1/5, Major Robert Thompson, ordered Bravo Company to relieve Alpha, and the advance continued slowly until NVA flanking fire halted it.
The next day, Marines resumed their attack, supported by Marine artillery, Naval gunfire, and Marine Corps close air support. Despite this, the Marines made little progress and had to withdraw. As soon as the Marines withdrew, the communists reoccupied those positions.
Delta Company arrived at the Citadel on the evening of February 14 after taking fire while crossing the Perfume River. On February 15, Delta Company led a renewed attack against the Dong Ba Gate, with Charlie Company defending its flank. After Bravo Company joined the assault, Marines secured the gate. The Marines suffered six deaths and fifty wounded, while the enemy sustained twenty deaths.
Also, on February 14, the South Vietnamese Marine Task Force joined the battle. The operational plan called for the VN Marines to move west from Tây Lộc and then turn south. However, they were soon halted by a strong NVA defense. After two days of fighting, the VN Marines had only advanced 400 meters. Meanwhile, the ARVN 3rd Regiment fought off an NVA counterattack in the northwest corner of the Citadel.
Despite their many setbacks, the communists appeared determined to prolong the battle. The 6th Battalion, 24th Regiment, 304th Division (originally located near Khe Sanh) reached the Citadel after following an intentionally convoluted route through Thon La Chu. The 7th Battalion, 90th Regiment, 324-B Divison was due to arrive within a few days — after a forced march from the DMZ.
On February 16, two companies from the 1st Battalion, U.S. 8th Cavalry Regiment, fought elements of the NVA 803rd Regiment, 324-B Division, about twelve miles northeast of Huế, killing 29 enemies before breaking contact the following day. Also, on February 16, 1/5 advanced 140 meters at the cost of seven Marines killed and 47 wounded. The Marines killed 63 of the enemy.
That same day, at a meeting at Phu Bai involving Generals Abrams, LaHue, Trưởng, and South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, Kỳ approved the use of all necessary force to clear the NVA-VC forces from the Citadel, regardless of any damages to historic structures.
On the night of February 16, a radio intercept indicated that a battalion-size NVA force was about to launch a counterattack over the west wall of the Citadel. Artillery and naval gunfire was called in, and a later radio intercept indicated that a senior NVA officer had been killed in the barrage. Another intercept stated that the battalion commander requested permission to withdraw from the city, but his request was denied, and he was ordered to stand and fight.
Vietnamese forces resumed their attacks on February 17, and the Hac Bao Company was moved to support 1/5’s right flank. Over the next three days, these forces slowly reduced the NVA’s defensive perimeter.
On February 18, 1/8th Cav was attacked by elements of the 803rd Regiment twelve miles northeast of Huế. This second engagement convinced the NVA commander that the regiment could not reach the Citadel.
By February 20, the 1/5 advance had stalled. After conferring with senior commanders, Major Thompson launched a night attack against three NVA strongpoints, blocking further movement. At dawn, the entire battalion would assault NVA positions. At 0300 on February 21, three ten-man teams from the 2nd Platoon of Alpha Company launched their assault, quickly capturing the sparsely defended position the NVA had withdrawn from during the night.
As the NVA sought to reoccupy those positions the following day, they were caught in the open by the assaulting Marines from 1/5. Thompson lost three Marines in the fight, but 16 NVA were killed. At that moment, the Marines were only 100 meters from the south wall of the Citadel. That evening, Bravo Company was replaced by Lima Company, 3/5.
Unknown to either the Americans or South Vietnamese, the NVA had begun a phased withdrawal from the Citadel, making their way southwest to return to their bases in the western hills. Lima 3/5 was tasked with clearing the area through the Thuong Tu Gate to the Trường Tiền Bridge. They completed their mission, meeting little enemy resistance.
But to the west, South Vietnamese forces continued to meet stubborn resistance. On February 22, after a barrage of 122mm rockets, the NVA counterattacked Vietnamese Marines, who unmercifully pushed them back with the support of the Hac Bao Company.
Little progress was made on February 23, prompting a very frustrated General Abrams to suggest that the Vietnamese Marines should be disbanded. That night, the NVA attempted another counterattack but was forced back (again) by intense artillery. The ARVN 3rd Regiment launched a night attack along the southern wall of the Citadel. At 0500 the following day, they raised the South Vietnamese flag over the Citadel and secured the south wall by mid-morning.
General Trưởng then ordered the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, and the Hac Bao Company to recapture the Imperial Palace, which was achieved against minimal resistance by late afternoon. The last pocket of NVA at the southwest corner of the Citadel was eliminated in an attack by the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalion in the early hours of February 25.
Mopping Up
On February 22, the ARVN 21st and 39th Ranger battalions boarded junks and traveled to Gia Hoi Island, where the communist provisional government had been headquartered since the offensive started. The Rangers swept the island as thousands of residents emerged from hiding and ran through their ranks to escape the battle. The most brutal fight of the day centered on a pagoda that contained an NVA battalion command post. The sweep continued through February 25. The three-day operation netted hundreds of VC cadre, many of whom were university students who, according to residents, had played a key role in rounding up government officials and intellectuals the NVA/VC targeted as threats to their new regime.
On February 23, a mechanized task force involving the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and Troop A, 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry swept along the northwestern wall toward the An Hoa Bridge, flushing out several NVA troops who had taken refuge in the thick grasses and weeds.
Meanwhile, a mile further to the northwest, the remainder of the 5/7th Cav resumed its advance toward Thon An. These troops fought their way into the NVA-occupied hamlet and found a honeycomb of tunnels and bunkers beneath its shattered remains. They spent the rest of the day searching the ruins for survivors. They also combed through the adjacent cemetery, where the 806th Battalion had ambushed the ARVN 7th Airborne Battalion on 31 January.
On February 24th, the 5/7th Cav rejoined its detached company and the armored cavalry platoon from the 3/5th Cavalry near the western corner of the Citadel. The combined force then swept toward the Bach Ho Railroad Bridge along the southwestern face of the Citadel, where a few NVA continued to hold out in a narrow band of trees.
While 1st Battalion, 1st Marines conducted clearing operations in southern Huế, 2/5 conducted security patrols south of the Phu Cam Canal. On February 24, 2/5 Marines launched an operation to the southwest of Huế to relieve the ARVN 101st Combat Engineers, which had been under siege by the NVA since the start of the battle.
As 2/5 approached the base at 0700, they were met by NVA mortar and machine-gun fire. Marine artillery pushed the enemy into a hasty withdrawal, and 2/5 entered the base at 0850. The base remained under fire from enemy positions in a Buddhist temple to the south and from a ridgeline to the west. At 0700 on February 25, Fox and Golf Companies 2/5 began their assault on the ridgeline. They were met by intense mortar fire. With support from Marine artillery, Marines secured part of the ridge, killing three communists.
The attack resumed the following morning. Hotel Company attacked a nearby hill, and after meeting stubborn resistance, the Marines pulled back so that air strikes could neutralize the enemy. Twenty enemy soldiers were killed, along with four Marines, from friendly fire. The Marines renewed their attack the following day, killing fourteen additional enemy.
On February 28, 1/5 and 2/5 Marines launched a combined operation to the east of Huế to try to cut off any NVA forces moving from Huế towards the coast. Only a few NVA were encountered and dealt with.
Operation Huế City officially concluded on March 2, 1968. ARVN losses included 452 killed and 2,123 wounded. American losses were 216 dead and 1,584 wounded. However, the numbers don’t add up. According to after-action reports, the NVA executed 4,856 captured civilians and ARVN personnel, but the official toll, as reported by the Vietnamese command authority, only 844 civilians were killed, with 1,900 (estimated) receiving combat injuries.
NVA/VC losses are also a matter of debate. North Vietnamese records indicate 2,400 killed and 3,000 wounded. General Abrams’ headquarters reported twice the number of enemies killed. What is not debated is that the imperial city was utterly destroyed, making over 100,000 people homeless and terrorized.
In 1967, North Vietnamese military officials realized that their war strategy in South Vietnam wasn’t working out quite the way they had hoped. It was time to try something else. The government of North Vietnam wanted a massive offensive, one that would reverse the course of the war. When defense minister and senior army commander General Vo Nguyen Giap[1]voiced opposition to such an offensive, believing that a significant reversal of the war would not be the likely result of such an undertaking, North Vietnamese officials stripped Giap of his position, gave him a pocket watch, and sent him into retirement.
The politburo then appointed General Nguyen Chi Thanh to direct the offensive. At the time, Thanh was commander of all Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam. When General Thanh unexpectedly died, senior politburo members scrambled to reinstate General Giap.
Earlier — in the Spring of 1966 — Giap wondered how far the United States would go in defending the regime of South Vietnam. To answer this question, he executed a series of attacks south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) with two objectives in mind. First, he wanted to draw US forces away from densely populated urban and lowland areas where the NVA would have an advantage. Second, Giap wished to know if the United States could be provoked into invading North Vietnam.
Both questions seem ludicrous since luring the military out of towns and cities was the last thing he should have wanted, and unless China was willing to rush to the aid of its pro-communist “little brothers,” tempting the US to invade North Vietnam was fool-hardy. In any case, General Giap began a massive buildup of military forces and placed them in the northern regions of South Vietnam. Their route of infiltration into South Vietnam was through Laos. General Giap completed his work at the end of 1967 — with six infantry divisions massed within the Quang Tri Province.
US Army General William C. Westmoreland, commander of the United States Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (COMUSMACV or MACV), led all US and allied forces in Vietnam. Westmoreland responded to Giap’s buildup by increasing US/allied forces in Quang Tri, realizing that if he wanted the enemy to dance, he would have to send his men into the dance hall.
What Westmoreland could not do, however, was invade either North Vietnam or Laos[2]. Realizing this, Giap gained confidence in creating more significant battles inside South Vietnam. But even this wasn’t working out as Giap imagined. Westmoreland was not the same kind of man as French General Henri Navarre, whom Giap had defeated in 1954. For one thing, Westmoreland was far more tenacious, and meeting the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) away from populated areas would allow Westmoreland to make greater use of his air and artillery assets.
In phases, Giap increased North Vietnam’s military footprint in the northern provinces of South Vietnam. One example of this was the NVA’s siege of the Khe Sanh combat base. President Lyndon Johnson was concerned that the NVA was attempting another coup de guerre, such as at Dien Bien Phu, where Navarre was thoroughly defeated. Johnson ordered Khe Sanh held at all costs. With everyone’s eyes now focused on those events, Giap launched a surprise offensive at the beginning of the Tet (Lunar New Year) celebration. He gave his attack order on January 31, 1968. It was a massive assault involving 84,000 NVA and Viet Cong (VC) soldiers executing simultaneous attacks on 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of the six autonomous cities (including Saigon and Huế), 64 of 242 district capitals, and 50 hamlets.
Giap chose to violate the Tet cease-fire accord because he knew that many South Vietnamese soldiers would be granted leave to celebrate the holiday with their families. It was an intelligent move that gave Giap a series of early successes. VC forces even managed to breach the US Embassy enclosure in Saigon. Within days, however, the offensive faltered as US/ARVN forces turned back the communist onslaught. Heavy fighting continued in Kontum, Can Tho, Ben Tre, and Saigon … but the largest occurred in the City of Huế[3]. The Battle of Huế was the longest and the bloodiest battle of the Tet Offensive.
In 1968, Huế was the third-largest city in South Vietnam; its population was around 140,000, and about a third of those living inside the Citadel, north of the Hương River, which flows through the city.[4] Huế also sat astride Highway One, a major north-south main supply route about 50 miles south of the DMZ. Huế was the former imperial capital of Vietnam. Up to this point, Huế had only occasionally experienced the ravages of war—mortar fire, saboteurs, and acts of terrorism, but a large enemy force had never before appeared at the city’s gates. But, as a practical matter, given the city’s cultural and intellectual importance to the Vietnamese people (and its status as the capital of Thua Thien Province), hostile actions were only a matter of time.
The people who lived in Huế enjoyed a tradition of civic independence dating back several hundred years. The city’s religious monks viewed the war with disdain, but it is also true that few religious leaders felt any attachment to the government in Saigon. They wanted national reconciliation — a coalition where everyone could get along.
Ancient tradition held that Huế had sprung to life as a lotus flower blossoming from a mud puddle. It is a fascinating myth. The city is situated on a bend of the Perfume (Hương) River just five miles southwest of the South China Sea. The river divided Huế into two sections. On the north bank stood the Citadel, a fortress encompassing nearly four square miles (modeled after China’s Forbidden City). The Citadel was shaped like a diamond, its four corners pointing to the cardinal directions of the compass. Stone walls encircled the Imperial City, and just beyond those, a wide moat filled with water. The walls stood 8 meters high and several meters thick.
On the southeastern wall, the Perfume River ran a parallel course, which offered additional protection from that quarter. There were ten gates; four of these (along the southeastern side) were made of carved stone. The remaining walls each had two less elaborate gates. A winding shallow canal ran through the Citadel, from southwest to northeast. Two culverts connected the inner-city canal with those on the outside.
A newer section of the city lay south of the Perfume River. It was the center for residential and business communities, including government offices (and a US Consulate), a university, provincial headquarters, a prison, a hospital, a treasury, and the forward headquarters element of MACV sited within a separate compound. Referred to as “New City,” it was half the size of the old town. It was also called The Triangle because of its irregular shape between the Phu Cam Canal in the south, a stream called Phat Lac on the east, and in the north by the Perfume River. A pair of bridges linked the modern city to the Citadel: the Nguyen Hương Bridge (part of Highway 1) at the eastern corner of the Citadel, and fifteen hundred meters to the southwest was the Bach Ho Railroad Bridge. Another bridge, called the An Cuu Bridge, was a modest arch on Highway 1 that conveyed traffic across the Phu Cam Canal.
Despite Huế’s importance, fewer than a thousand soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) were on duty. Security for Huế was assigned to the First Infantry Division (ARVN) under the command of Brigadier General Ngo Quant Truong. The 1st ARVN was headquartered within the fortified Mang Ca compound in the northeast corner of the Citadel.
Over half of Truong’s men were on leave for the holiday when the Giap commenced his offensive at Huế. His subordinate commands’ location was spread along Highway 1 from north Huế to the DMZ. The closest unit of any size to the division CP was the 3rd ARVN Regiment. The regiment’s three battalions were located five miles northwest of Huế. The only combat unit inside the city was a 36-man platoon belonging to an elite unit called the Black Panthers, a field reconnaissance and rapid reaction company. Internal security for Huế was the responsibility of the National Police.[5]
The nearest US combat base was Phu Bai, six miles south on Highway 1. Phu Bai was a major U. S. Marine Corps command post and support facility that included the forward headquarters element of the 1st Marine Division (designated Task Force X-Ray). The Commanding General of Task Force X-Ray[6] was Brigadier General Foster C. LaHue, who also served as the Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Marine Division. Also situated at Phu Bai were the headquarters elements of the 1st Marine Regiment (Stanley S. Hughes, Commanding) and the 5th Marine Regiment (Robert D. Bohn, Commanding). There were also three battalions of Marines: 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (1/1) (Lt. Col. Marcus J. Gravel, Commanding), 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (1/5) (LtCol Robert P. Whalen, Commanding), and 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (2/5) (LtCol Ernest C. Cheatham, Jr., Commanding).
In addition to the Marines, several US Army commands were present, including two brigades of the 1st Air Cavalry Division (AIR CAV), which included the 7th and 12th Cavalry Regiments (dispersed over a wide area, from Phu Bai in the south to Quang Tri in the north), and the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division at Camp Evans, between Huế and Quang Tri. Operational control of the 1st Brigade was assigned to the 1st Air Cav.
NVA forces included 8,000 well-trained and equipped soldiers. The majority of these were NVA regulars. The NVA was reinforced by six VC main force battalions (between 300 and 600 men each). The field commander of these forces was General Tran Van Quang. The NVA plan called for a division-sized assault on the Imperial City, with other units serving as a blocking force to stop or frustrate the efforts of any allied reinforcing units. True to form, the communists knew all they needed about their civilian and military objectives within the city. VC cadres had also prepared a list of “tyrants” who were to be located and terminated — nearly all of these South Vietnamese civilian and military officials. Added to the lists were US civilians, clergy, educators, and other foreigners. The communists also knew all they needed to know about the weather.
The NVA plan (termed the General Offensive/General Uprising) was designed to incorporate both conventional and guerilla operations intending to destroy any vestige of the South Vietnam government and its Western allies, and if not that, then discredit the enemy and cause a popular uprising among the people. If everything worked according to plan, the Western allies would be forced to withdraw their forces from Vietnam.
A few senior NVA planners thought a popular uprising was highly unlikely; a few more expected that ARVN and US forces would drive the NVA out of the city within a few days —but, of course, such defeatist notions were best left unsaid. Meanwhile, the young, idealistic, gullible soldiers believed the propaganda and went into combat, convinced of a great victory. When these same young men departed their training camps, they had no intention of returning. Many wouldn’t.
The Fight Begins
In January 1968, everyone sensed that something was off-kilter. Tet was approaching. The people were uneasy. The cancellation of the Tet Truce and enemy attacks at Da Nang and elsewhere in southern I Corps dampened the normally festive spirit at Tet.[7] The first indication of trouble came shortly after midnight during the night of January 30-31 — a five-pronged assault on all five provincial capitals in II Corps and the city of Da Nang in I Corps. VC attacks began with mortar and rocket fire, followed by large-scale ground assaults by NVA regulars. However, these were not well-coordinated attacks, and by dawn on January 31, most communists had been driven back from their objectives.
These initial attacks turned out to have been launched prematurely, but while US forces and ARVN units were placed on operational alert, there was no immediate sense of urgency. ARVN commands sent our orders, which canceled all leaves for the Tet holiday, but most of these arrived too late, and besides that, General Truong did not believe the NVA had the intent or capability of attacking Huế City. Allied intelligence kept tabs on two NVA regiments in Thua Thien Province, but there was little evidence of enemy activity in and around Huế City. When Truong positioned his reduced force around the city, he intended to defend the urban areas outside the Citadel.
General Truong was not necessarily wrong in his conclusions —he was only misinformed. According to US intelligence, the 6th NVA Regiment (with 804th Battalion) was reported operational 15 miles west of Huế. The 806th Battalion was positioned outside Phong Dien, 22 miles northeast of Huế. The 802nd Battalion was placed 12 miles south of Huế. Analysts also placed the 4th NVA Regiment between Phu Bai and Da Nang. Unknown to anyone, both regiments were en route to Huế. The 6th NVA Regiment’s primary objectives were the Mang Ca headquarters compound, the Tay Loc Airfield, and the Imperial Palace. The 4th NVA Regiment was assigned to attack New City, including the Provincial headquarters, the prison, and the MACV (forward) headquarters compound. NVA planners assigned 200 specific targets between these two regiments, including radio stations, police stations, government officials, recruiting centers, and the Imperial Museum. Viet Cong main force battalions were specifically targeting individuals — those sympathetic to the South Vietnam regime.
On January 30, enemy shock troops and sappers entered the city disguised as simple peasants, their uniforms and weapons concealed in baggage or under their street clothes. VC and NVA regulars mingled with the Tet holiday crowds. Many of these covert agents dressed in ARVN uniforms and then took up pre-designated positions to await the signal to attack. The 6th NVA Regiment was only a few miles from the city’s western edge. About 1900, the Regiment stopped for an evening meal, and regimental officers inspected their troops. The regiment resumed its march one hour later in three columns, each with an objective within the Citadel.
At 2200 hours, Lieutenant Nguyen Van Tan, Commanding Officer of the 1st ARVN Division Reconnaissance Company, was leading a 30-man surveillance mission when a Regional Force Company east of his position reported it was under attack.[8] Remaining concealed, Tan observed two enemy battalions filter past his position toward Huế City. Tan radioed this information back to the 1st ARVN. These were likely the 800th and 802nd Battalions, 6th NVA Regiment. Despite Tan’s report, the communist troops continued toward Huế unmolested.
The NVA country-wide general offensive began at 0300; the only ARVN force inside Huế was the Black Panther Company, responsible for guarding the Tai Loc Airstrip (northwestern corner of the Citadel). By then, large numbers of VC guerillas had already infiltrated the city. In the early morning hours, the enemy took up positions in the town and awaited the arrival of NVA and VC assault troops.
At 0340, the NVA launched a rocket and mortar barrage from the mountains west of the city and followed this up with a three-pronged assault. A small sapper team dressed in ARVN uniforms killed guards and opened the western gate to the Citadel. The lead elements of the assault thus penetrated the city; the 6th NVA Regiment led the attack. As communist fighters poured into Huế, the 800th and 802nd Battalions rapidly overran most of the Citadel. General Truong and his staff held off the attackers at the ARVN compound, and the Black Panther Company held its ground at the eastern end of the airfield. Truong later withdrew the Black Panther company from the airfield to reinforce the ARVN compound. Except for this area, the NVA held the entire citadel, including the Imperial Palace.
The situation was similar across the Perfume River in southern Huế. The sound of explosions awakened allied advisors in the MACV compound. Grabbing any weapon they could get their hands on, advisors were able to repulse the ground assault, which lacked a coordinated effort. When the initial assault faltered, the 804th Battalion, 4th NVA Regiment, encircled the compound and began their siege. Two VC main force battalions seized the Thua Thien Provincial headquarters, the police station, and several other government buildings south of the river. The NVA 810th Battalion took up blocking positions on the city’s southern edge. By dawn on January 31, the North Vietnamese flag was flying over the Citadel, communist troops patrolled the streets, and political officers had begun their purge of South Vietnamese officials and American civilians.
The U. S. Marines
While the NVA were launching their attacks at Huế, the Marine Base at Phu Bai began receiving enemy rockets and mortars targeting the airstrip and Marine and ARVN infantry units. General LaHue started receiving reports of enemy strikes along Highway 1 between the Hai Van Pass and the City of Huế. Altogether, the NVA launched assaults against 18 targets. Intelligence was jumbled; no one was sure what was happening or where. LaHue knew that the 1st ARVN and MACV compounds had been hit, and because of the attack against the Navy’s LCU facility, all river traffic had ceased.
Meanwhile, General Truong realized that, at best, he had a tenuous hold on his headquarters. He ordered the 3rd Regiment (reinforced by two ARVN airborne battalions and a troop of armored cavalry) to fight into the Citadel from the northeast. The regiment finally arrived in the late afternoon, but only after intense fighting and a costly fight in terms of soldiers killed and wounded. Pleas for reinforcements at the MACV compound went unanswered because none of the senior commanders knew the extent of the enemy’s strength or their success in entering Huế.
Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam (Commander, ARVN Forces I CTZ) and Lieutenant General Robert Cushman (CG III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF)) began ordering subordinate commands to prevent enemy reinforcements from reaching the city. The NVA had the same idea—to prevent Western allies from entering the city. The NVA 806th and 810th blocked positions in southern Huế and along Highway 1.
Having received no reliable intelligence, General LaHue surmised that the attacks might have been a diversionary strike. General LaHue, who was only newly assigned to the Phu Bai area, was still unfamiliar with this tactical region (also, TAOR), let alone the fast-developing situation in Huế City.[9] This wasn’t the only problem for the Marines. Task Force X-Ray was created to help manage a major shift in the locations of the various combat elements of the First Marine Division and Third Marine Division, necessitated by MACV’s realignment of forces in I Corps.[10]
Colonel Bohn arrived at Phu Bai with General LaHue on 13th January. 1/1 under Colonel Gravel began making its move from Quang Tri at about the same time. His subordinate units, Charlie Company and Delta Company, reached Phu Bai on January 26, while Bravo Company and Headquarters Company arrived three days later. Alpha Company, Captain Gordon D. Batcheller, Commanding, arrived piecemeal. Two of his platoon commanders failed to arrive with their platoons, and a third platoon commander was attending leadership school in Da Nang.[11]
On January 30th, the First Marine Regiment (1st Marines) replaced the 5th Marines in operational responsibility for the Phu Bai TAOR. Colonel Hughes formally took operational control of the 1st Battalion (consisting of Company B, C, and D). In effect, Hughes commanded a paper regiment with barely a single battalion of Marines.
1/1 had already relieved 2/5, providing security on various bridges along Highway 1 and other key positions. When Company A finally arrived at Phu Bai on January 30, it was designated battalion reserve (also Bald Eagle Reaction Force). 2/5 moved into the Phu Loc sector and assumed responsibility for the area south of the Truoi River and east of the Cao Dai Peninsula. 1/5 retained responsibility for the balance of the Phu Loc region, extending to the Hai Van Pass.
At around 1730 hours on January 30, a Marine Recon unit (code name Pearl Chest) made lethal contact with what was believed to be an NVA company moving north toward Huế, resulting in around 15 enemy killed in action (KIA). After the unit fell back, it regrouped and encircled the Marines. Poor weather prevented Allied air support; the Recon Marines called for relief. LtCol Robert P. Whalen, commanding 1/5, sent his Bravo Company to relieve the Recon team. The NVA attacked Bravo Company as it approached the location of the embattled Recon Marines. Company B proceeded slowly with known enemies in the area and no understanding of how many. Whalen requested Bohn to send additional reinforcements from 2/5 so as not to diminish his battalion’s ability to defend the town of Phu Loc.
Colonel Bohn tasked Cheatham to send in a reinforcing company. Cheatham assigned this mission to Fox Company 2/5 (Captain Michael P. Downs, Commanding). NVA units ambushed Fox Company as it moved into 1/5’s sector. This action occurred at around 2300 hours, with Marines suffering one KIA and three wounded in action (WIA). After this contact, the NVA faded into the night. Fox Company secured an LZ to evacuate the injured and then returned to the 2/5 perimeter.
Realizing that his force was thin — and that his meager force could not sustain a significant engagement, Colonel Hughes ordered the Recon team to break out and return to Phu Bai. Whalen also directed Bravo Company to return to base. Colonel Bohn was puzzled about the purpose of these engagements.
As NVA units assaulted Huế City, they also attacked the Marines at Phu Bai with rockets and mortars, targeting the airstrip, known Marine positions around the airfield, and nearby Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) and local Popular Forces/Regional Forces (PF/RF) units.[12] An NVA company-sized unit attacked the South Vietnamese bridge security detachment along with CAP Hotel-Eight. LtCol Cheatham ordered Hotel Company 2/5 (Captain G. Ronald Christmas, Commanding) to relieve the embattled CAP unit. Marines from Hotel Company caught the NVA in the act of withdrawing from the CAP enclave and took it under fire. Seeing an opportunity to trap the NVA unit, Cheatham reinforced Hotel Company with his command group and Fox Company, which had just returned from its Phu Loc operation.
With his other companies in a blocking position, Cheatham hoped to catch the enemy against the Truoi River. However, after initiating the engagement with the NVA unit, events inside Huế City interrupted his plans. At around 1030 on January 31, Golf Company 2/5 was ordered to assume Task Force X-Ray reserve. The company detached from 2/5 and headed back to Phu Bai. Later that day, 2/5 also lost operational control of Fox Company, which allowed the NVA units to complete their withdrawal. Hotel and Echo Companies established night defensive positions.
While 2/5 engaged NVA along the Truoi River and Phu Loc, 1/1 began to move into Huế City. Task Force X-Ray had received reports of enemy strikes all along Highway 1 between Hai Van Pass and Huế. Eighteen separate attacks had occurred against everything from bridges to CAP units. With Alpha Company 1/1/ as Phu Bai reserve, Colonel Hughes directed Gravel to stage Alpha Company for any contingency. At 0630 on January 31, Hughes ordered Alpha Company to reinforce the Truoi River Bridge. All that the company commander knew was that he was to strengthen ARVN forces south of Phu Bai.
What occurred over the next several hours is best described as a “cluster fuck.” Alpha Company was convoyed to liaison with ARVN units. There were no ARVN units. The company commander encountered a few Marines from a nearby CAP unit and was told that Beau coupé VC were moving toward Huế. Gravel then ordered Batcheller to reverse course and reinforce an Army unit north of Huế. General LaHue rescinded that order, and Alpha Company was then ordered to assist a CAP unit south of Phu Bai. Thirty minutes later, Task Force X-Ray directed Alpha Company to proceed to the Navy LCU ramp to investigate reports of an enemy assault. In effect, the Marines of Alpha Company were being ground down by false starts.
Up to this point, the battle of Huế had been a South Vietnamese problem. General LaHue had little worthwhile information, and Alpha Company continued north toward Huế. The convoy met up with four tanks from the 3rd Tank Battalion. Batcheller invited the tanks to join him, and they accepted. Alpha Company, now reinforced with M-48 tanks, moved toward the MACV compound.
As Alpha Company approached the southern suburbs, the Marines came under increased sniper fire. At one village, the Marines were forced to dismount their vehicles and conduct clearing operations before proceeding further. The convoy no sooner crossed the An Cuu Bridge, which spanned the Phu Cam Canal into the city, when they were caught in a murderous crossfire from enemy automatic weapons and rockets. NVA were on both sides of the road. The lead tank commander was killed. Alpha Company pushed forward —albeit cautiously. Batcheller maintained “sporadic” communications with Gravel at Phu Bai. For the most part, the only thing Batcheller heard on the artillery and air nets were the voices of frantic Vietnamese. When Alpha Company reached the causeway, they once more came under sniper fire. Batcheller was seriously wounded. Gunnery Sergeant J. L. Canley assumed command of the company.[13]
Colonel Hughes requested permission from LaHue to reinforce Alpha Company. The only available reinforcing units were Headquarters & Service Company (H&SCo), 1/1, and Golf Company, 2/5. Colonel Gravel’s battalion was strung out from Phu Bai to Quang Tri (a distance of 46 miles). For whatever reason, Gravel had never met his Golf Company Commander, Captain Charles L. Meadows. Worse, Captain Meadows had no idea what was happening or what his upcoming mission would entail. All Meadows understood was that Golf Company would help escort the Commanding General to the 1st ARVN Division and back to Phu Bai.
Gravel’s hodge-podge column reached Alpha Company in the early afternoon. Gravel assumed control of the tanks but sent the trucks loaded with WIAs back to Phu Bai (including Captain Batcheller). With tanks taking point, Alpha Company, H&S Company, and Golf Company —in that order— raced toward the MACV compound. They arrived at about 1500 hours. By this time, the enemy had pulled back. Gravel met with the US Army senior advisor at the MACV compound, Colonel George O. Adkisson. Gravel was trying to understand the enemy situation, but this conversation may have ended with Gravel having even less understanding than when the discussion had begun.
Gravel ordered Alpha Company to establish a defensive perimeter at the MACV compound. With armor reinforcements from the Marines and 7th ARVN, Gavel took Golf Company in tow and attempted to cross the main bridge over the Perfume River. Marine armor was too heavy for the bridge, so Gravel left them on the south bank of the river. Available Vietnamese M-24 tank crews refused to go across the bridge.[14] Gravel directed two platoons to cross the bridge, but they were saturated with enemy fire when they reached the other side. Realizing he was outgunned, Gravel withdrew his Golf Company and returned to the MACV compound. One-third of Company G’s Marines were killed or wounded in this engagement.
The Americans still had scant information about the situation in Huế at 2000 hours. If General LaHue was confused, he knew far more about the situation than did Westmoreland. According to Westmoreland’s message to the JCS Chairman, three NVA companies were inside the Citadel, and a battalion of Marines had been sent in to clear them out.
The Struggle —
On February 1, senior allied commanders agreed that the 1st ARVN Division would assume responsibility for the Citadel while Task Force X-Ray would clear the New City. General LaHue ordered Gravel to advance from the MACV compound to the Thua Thien provincial headquarters and the prison — a distance of about six city blocks. General LaHue briefed reporters, saying, “… very definitely, we control the city’s southside.”
In reality, the Marine footprint was too small to control anything. CG III MAF secured Westmoreland’s permission to send in the Cavalry. Major General John J. Tolson, commanding the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile), intended to insert his Third Brigade from Camp Evans into the sector west of Huế City. Two battalions would be airlifted into the northwest sector: 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, and 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry (and Brigade CP). Their mission was to close off the enemy’s supply line into Huế. Additionally, the 2nd Battalion, 101st Airborne, would cover security for Camp Evans, and the division’s First Brigade would continue operations in Quang Tri Province. At mid-afternoon on February 2, CAV 2/12 landed 10 miles northwest of Huế and began pushing toward the city.
But on February 2, the Marines were still struggling. There was some minor progress, but only after a 3-hour firefight. 1/1 finally reached the university, and the Army radio center was relieved. During the night, NVA managed to destroy the railroad bridge across the Perfume River. Commanding Hotel Company 2/5, Captain Ron Christmas crossed the An Cuu Bridge at around 1100. Hotel Company was reinforced with Army trucks equipped with Quad-50 machine guns and two ONTOS, each armed with six 106mm recoilless rifles, which devastated enemy positions wherever they were found.
Gravel launched a two-company assault toward his two objectives. The enemy stopped the attack as effectively as a brick wall, and the Marines withdrew to the MACV compound. It was then that General LaHue realized that he had underestimated the enemy’s strength. Shortly after noon, LaHue gave Colonel Hughes tactical control of Marine forces in the southern city. Hughes promised Gravel reinforcements and directed that he commence “sweep and clear operations: destroy the enemy, protect US nationals, and restore that portion of the city to US Control.”
On the afternoon of February 2, Hughes decided to move his command group from Phu Bai into Huế, where he could more directly control the battle. Accompanying Hughes in the convoy was Lt. Col. Ernest Cheatham, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, who, up until then, had been sitting frustrated in Phu Bai while three of his companies (F, G, and H) fought in Huế under Gravel’s command.[15]
Hughes quickly established his command post in the MACV compound. The forces at his disposal included Cheatham’s three companies from 2/5 and Gravel’s depleted battalion consisting of A Company, 1/1; a provisional company made up of one platoon of B Company, 1/1; and several dozen cooks and clerks who had been sent to the front to fight alongside the infantry.
Endnotes:
[1] General Giap defeated the Imperial French after eight years of brutal warfare following the end of World War II.
[2] The United States did deploy covert and special forces into Laos at a later time.
[4] The Hương River (also Hương Giang) crosses the city of Huế in the central province of Thừa Thiên-Huế. The translation for Hương is Perfume. It is called the Perfume River because, in autumn, flowers from upriver orchards fall into the river, giving it a perfume-like aroma. Of course, this phenomenon likely happened a thousand years ago because, in 1968, the river smelled more like an open sewer.
[5] The National Police were sometimes (derisively) referred to as white mice. They were un-professional, non-lethal, timid, and about a third of them were giving information to the enemy on a regular basis.
[6] Task Force X-Ray went operational on 13 January 1968.
[7] In 1962, South Vietnam was divided into four tactical zones: CTZs or numbered Corps. These included I CTZ (Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, and Quang Tin); II CTZ (Quang Ngai, Kontum, Pleiku, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Phu Bon); III CTZ (16 provinces); IV CTZ (13 provinces), and the Capital Zone (Saigon and Gia Dinh provinces).
[9] Equally valid for most subordinate commanders and units at Phu Bai.
[10] Operation Checkers was a shift in responsibility for guarding the western approaches to Huế City. To that end, the 1st and 5th Marine Regiments moved into Thua Thien Province from Da Nang. It was a massive shift of American military units, which also involved US Army units operating in I Corps. This shifting of major subordinate commands played right into General Giap’s hands.
[11] I will probably never understand why sending a recently commissioned officer to a leadership school in Vietnam was necessary.
[12] Thirteen-man rifle squads with medical support and reinforced by Vietnamese militia platoons assigned to provide area security within rural hamlets. See Also: Fix Bayonets on 02/05/2016 (series)
[13] Initially awarded the Navy Cross medal, the award was upgraded to the Medal of Honor in 2017.
[14] The M-24 Chafee light tank weighed 18 tons; the M-48 Patton tank weighed 40 tons. The Vietnamese tank crews were likely ordered not to attempt to cross the bridge.
[15] At this time, Ernie Cheatham was a 38-year-old veteran of two wars and 14 years removed from a professional football career. The Pittsburgh Steelers picked him in the 1951 draft. He put his NFL career on hold to fight in the Korean War, afterward suiting up as a defensive tackle with the Steelers for the 1954 season. But after being traded to the Baltimore Colts, Cheatham left professional football and rejoined the Marine Corps. Lieutenant General Ernest C. Cheatham retired from active service in 1988; he passed away on 14 June 2014.
Even though he only stood around 5’9” tall, people came away with the impression that he was taller. I think this was because Sergeant Giacalone[1] scrupulously maintained his military bearing; his uniform and appearance were always impeccable; he stood tall, he walked tall, and he expected the same from anyone wearing the uniform of a United States Marine. He would not tolerate a slovenly Marine — no matter what his rank.
Sergeant Giacalone’s posture was so correct that I never once observed his head turning without the rest of his body turning with it. This was likely the result of Sergeant Giacalone having once served as a Marine Corps Drill Instructor — before the Korean War. The Korean War was when Giacalone earned a silver star, a bronze star, and two Purple Heart medals.
When I knew Sergeant Giacalone, he had only recently been promoted to sergeant — for the second time. No one in the squad knew any of the details of his court-martial; there was no reason why anyone should. In those days, a Marine who screwed up could be redeemed. It was a simple formula: charge him, court-martial him, punish him, and send him back to duty. I lament this is no longer true.
In Sergeant Giacalone’s case, somewhere in his career (which began sometime in 1948), this squared-away former drill instructor developed a drinking problem. It wasn’t a frequent problem — and it never happened while on duty, but when it did happen, it was always noteworthy. Maybe he had woman troubles. We never knew. It wasn’t something a squared-away sergeant would ever discuss with the snuffies. What we did know about our squad leader was all we had to know. What we learned was that he was one hell of a field Marine; what we knew was that while our Lord might lay claim to our souls, our miserable snuffy asses belonged to Sergeant Giacalone.
Our squad leader was up before reveille; he only hit the rack long after taps. He kept himself and his squad squared away. Inspecting officers never found our uniforms or equipment deficient — that’s because Sergeant Giacalone made it his business to inspect us long before any officers showed up. We would not embarrass him in front of the company officers or the rest of the platoon.
Whether in garrison or the field, Sergeant Giacalone expected us to act so that we brought credit to ourselves, our squad, and our unit. It was hard to turn around anywhere and not see Sergeant Giacalone observing us. He lived in the barracks, in the NCO quarters at the end of the squad bay. Whether we were in the field or not, there would be no horsing around. If there was time for horsing around, there was time to study our guidebooks or complete an MCI course. The Marine Corps is a serious business — no time for slouching around. Those were the rules. I can hear him now, reminding us, “Focus people.”
The third squad stood in awe of Sergeant Giacalone, but then so too did everyone else. Even our company commander respected what Giacalone knew about field operations. Sergeant Giacalone took what our drill instructors taught us about teamwork to the next level. He was patient, repetitive, and direct. Time permitting, he would explain why this or why that, but no matter what, he issued his orders, and we obeyed them.
It was impossible not to admire Sergeant Giacalone, and it wasn’t long before we began to emulate his mannerisms. In formations, we stood tall because he demanded it. We learned to square ourselves away because he expected no less of us. No other squad in Echo Company could stand up to us; we were in Giacalone’s third herd. Looking back, 61 years, he was a worthy example. I cannot speak for the rest of the men, but for me personally, I carried a part of Sergeant Giacalone with me for the next three decades and into retirement.
There were, admittedly, a few occasions when Sergeant Giacalone was “too direct,” particularly when addressing seniors. He had no patience with officers when they meddled in matters that fell into the exclusive realm of the Marine Corps NCO. In such instances, he might suggest, “Excuse me, sir, but isn’t there something else you could be doing that is more suitable for an officer of your rank?”
Sergeant Giacalone may have been a rank-conscious snob, albeit in reverse. He avoided officers whenever possible, but when trapped, he was always correct and professional, as befitting an experienced NCO. Among those of us who were learning the trade, there was no such thing as a stupid question; officers, however, didn’t have that luxury. He expected more from college-educated lieutenants, and a silly question from one of these fellows may have elicited, “Sir, as you may recall from your second or third week of basic training …”
Sergeant Giacalone did have his biases, however. He did not like navy officers, swabbies, women Marines, disbursing pogues, shore patrol/military police, or mess sergeants.
I was one of Sergeant Giacalone’s snuffles in 1963 — snuffy being anyone below the rank of corporal. Since I was unprivileged, I don’t have any details about the events that allegedly occurred in the parking lot adjacent to the NCO Club. The rumor, however, was that there was a sergeant, an officer of the day, and several military police, the initial group of whom called for a backup. Sergeant Giacalone, it seemed, periodically went on a binge. I never saw the man in his cups, but snuffles didn’t run with the big dogs.
In any case, Sergeant Giacalone became a corporal a few days later. Rumor control had it that when Sergeant Giacalone went in to see the old man for nonjudicial punishment, he took his medicine, offered no excuses, apologized for his behavior, and agreed to talk to the “doc” about dealing with his demons. The company commander had a good size chunk of his ass, of course, broke him down in rank, fined him … but then sent him back to work. That’s how it was back then: mess up, pay up, get back to work. Giacalone was the only corporal in our company to serve as a squad leader.
Eighteen months later, I received orders sending me to another duty station. I checked out of the company and said goodbye to my squad mates. I thanked Corporal Giacalone for his leadership and his patience. He shook my hand and said, “Take care of yourself. And don’t embarrass me, goddamn it.” The last time I heard anything about Giacalone, he served as a gunnery sergeant in Vietnam. It’s where he died while trying to save one of his men. Semper Fidelis.
Lunar New Year is the first new moon of a lunar calendar whose months are organized according to moon cycles. Numerous cultures celebrate the event in various ways on a diverse range of dates. The more well-known of these include New Year’s Day (or week) of the Chinese calendar, the Tibetan calendar of East Asia, the Buddhist and Hindu calendars of Southeast and South Asia, the Islamic calendar, and the Jewish calendar that originated in the Middle East.
In Vietnam, the Lunar New Year is known as Tết. It has Sino-Vietnamese origins, celebrating the arrival of spring according to the Vietnamese calendar, which usually falls in late January or early February.
In 1965, Tết began on 10 February; it celebrated the year of the snake.
Before Tết in 1965, South Vietnamese insurgents, known as the Viet Cong (VC), began a new phase of their war against the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) by shifting from their classic hit-and-run tactics to mass assaults against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Their first salvo was devastating to the RVN because no one expected it and because its result produced heavy casualties to both ARVN and Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) forces at Binh Gia (forty miles east of Saigon, RVN’s capital city).[1] When mechanized and armored units attempted to reinforce the beleaguered ARVN forces at Binh Gia, the VC destroyed them. This VC victory over ARVN military units created considerable political instability within the RVN government.
Warning Order
On January 21, 1965, Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch, U. S. Marine Corps, was assigned as the Assistant Division Commander, 3rd Marine Division (3rdMarDiv). The following day, he was directed to assume command of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (9thMEB). The MEB was a task-organized Marine Air-Ground task force formed around the 9th Marine Regiment (9th Marines) of the 3rdMarDiv. The ground combat element included two battalion landing teams (BLTs). The air combat element had two 1st Marine Aircraft Wing helicopter squadrons. Both BLTs and air squadrons formed the Special Landing Force (SLF) of the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) of the U. S. Seventh Fleet.
On January 22, 1965, General Karch was preparing for an amphibious landing in South Vietnam when the national command authority put a hold on the introduction of US combat forces to South Vietnam. President Johnson was still “thinking” on February 7 when VC forces attacked the US installation at Pleiku in the central highlands. This assault ended with the deaths of nine American soldiers, the injury of 128 military and civilian personnel, and the destruction of 129 US military aircraft. The following day, the Marine Corps 1st Light Anti-aircraft Missile Battalion (1stLAAMBn) arrived at Da Nang, South Vietnam, with the mission of protecting the joint US-VNAF airfield in the event of an attack by the North Vietnamese air forces.[2] Advanced elements of the battalion began arriving on February 8.
Meanwhile, as senior American military leaders and diplomats were “re-thinking” their commitment to South Vietnam (and consulting with South Vietnamese officials), the VC geared up for another assault, which materialized on February 11 at Qui Non.
The Commander of US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), requested a 3-battalion Marine Expeditionary Brigade to provide a ground defense of the joint RVN/US air base at Da Nang. President Lyndon B. Johnson approved MACV’s request on March 2, 1965. BLT 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines (1//3) was almost immediately flown to Da Nang from Okinawa. Additional elements of the 9thMEB began moving ashore on March 8.
The Special Landing Force (SLF) included BLTs 1/9 and 3/9 — both were serving at sea off South Vietnam’s coast under the overall authority of the Commander, U. S. Seventh Fleet. The brigade’s air combat element was increased to include Marine Aircraft Group 16, which, while operating out of Da Nang Air Base, conducted support operations and combat air patrols for two months.
The birth of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) occurred on May 7, 1965, when President Johnson approved the deployment of the 3rdMarDiv and 1stMAW to Da Nang.[3] The first general to command III MEF was Major General William R. Collins, who concurrently served as Commanding General, 3rdMarDiv. General Collins also served as Naval Component Commander, Vietnam. With General Collins’s arrival in Vietnam, the 9thMEB was deactivated, and General Karch resumed his duty as Assistant Division Commander. The 9th Marine Regiment folded back into the 3rdMarDiv.[4]
On background, the 3rdMarDiv was dispatched to the Far East in 1953 to support the 1st Marine Division (1stMarDiv), which was then engaged in the defense of South Korea (the Korean War), taking up station on the Island of Okinawa — where it remained until early 1965.
By the end of 1965, the entire 3rdMarDiv had relocated to Vietnam (including its command element, three infantry regiments, and all supporting combat and service support elements). By March 1966, communist insurgents and regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units had learned there was a new sheriff in town. What this meant in terms of combat was that (a) communist forces should think twice before shooting at US Marines, and (b) if they ever felt the need for a thorough ass-whipping, they could get one from the 3rd Marine Division.
Culturally, the Vietnamese have always allowed their sense of self-worth to interfere with basic common sense. Accordingly, the 3rdMarDiv and its 24,000 cranky Marines parried several communist thrusts into the RVN’s northernmost provinces (designated as the I Corps Tactical Zone (also, I CTZ). COMUSMACV directed the 3rdMarDiv to assume responsibility for the defense of I CTZ.[5]
By 1966, the 3rdMarDiv was the largest (ever) combat division in the Marine Corps. It controlled five infantry regiments, one artillery regiment, all of its usual supporting elements, U. S. Army artillery units, Navy logistical support units (including Seabees), and two regiments of ARVN. While the division was significantly reinforced, I Corps was an unbelievably large area to defend. Quang Tri Province alone extended 1,800 miles in diameter. Beyond its size, Quang Tri Province was marked by rugged terrain and impenetrable forests and bordered two hostile nations: Laos and North Vietnam. U.S. Marines called it “Indian country.”[6]
In defending this terrain, the Marines operated under heavily restrictive rules of engagement imposed upon them by MACV. Theater command didn’t want the Marines shooting “friendlies,” so U. S. Forces had first to encounter hostile fire before they could respond. The problem was that a hefty percentage of the friendlies in Quang Tri Province were part-time hostiles — but it wouldn’t do to shoot innocents if you were also trying to pacify them.
It was a complicated war.
The importance of terrain is that it dictates the tactical employment of troops. Given the size of the province and its thick canopied terrain (and other limiting factors), the 3rdMarDiv assigned its regiments to critical locations — each regimental commander with a unique tactical area of responsibility (TAOR). High elevations frequently separated marine combat regiments, which affected the ability of the units to coordinate offensive and defensive operations and line-of-sight communications. The thick canopy of dense jungles and severe weather patterns restricted ground and air operations.
The need for highway infrastructure restricted the rapid and unfettered movement of men and materials within Quang Tri Province. There was one main north-south highway (Route 1). It connected Marine operating bases at Dong Ha and Quang Tri City in the North to Phu Bai and Da Nang in the South. The Cua Viet River in Quang Tri Province provided the 3rdMarDiv with its primary logistics artery. The Cua Viet ran from its mouth into Dong Ha, where the river was as wide as a mountain pathway.
A second highway (Route 9) linked Dong Ha with Khe Sanh. Eastward from Khe Sanh, 3rdMarDiv units established a series of outposts that offered a defense of Route 9 and the Cam Lo River Valley, which extends from Dong Ha to the coastal plain. The critical outposts were Ca Lu (10 miles east of Khe Sanh), the Rockpile (a 700-foot outcrop 8 miles north), Camp Carroll (10 miles eastward), and Leatherneck Square (a quadrilateral region outlined by Cam Lo, Con Thien, Gio Linh, and Dong Ha).
The 3rdMarDiv’s defensive mission frustrated most senior commanders because (a) Marine Corps doctrine holds that the only reason for a defensive posture is to prepare for the next attack. Static defense is not how the Marine Corps wins battles, and (b) even though the Marines defeated the enemy whenever they appeared, it was a costly strategy that the Marines could not sustain. Static warfare imposed unacceptable casualties, and there was nothing to show for it. The North Vietnamese were happy to fight a war of attrition, but no one wearing a Marine Corps uniform could understand Westmoreland’s willingness to pursue the same game plan. Within the first year of Vietnam service, Marines suffered 5,000 casualties.
In 1967, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, serving as the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, warned senior commanders in Vietnam that for the Marines to succeed, they must be allowed to wage war on their terms, not as part of a static defense scheme that subjected them to the will and dictates of the enemy.[7] Marines, he argued, could be trusted to set their own rules of engagement consistent with their areas of responsibility.
The NVA had already demonstrated that it was willing to lose large numbers of men in exchange for a fewer number of ours — but over a sustained period, our losses would work against the interests of the American people. North Vietnam wanted to drag the war out for as long as possible. Marine commanders wanted to put an end to it. Washington politicians (also known as America’s weak Willies), however, did not want a confrontation with North Vietnam’s primary ally, China.
General Krulak identified three options along the DMZ: (1) Withdraw the Marines further south, out of range of NVA artillery (which, while tactically sound, offered a propaganda victory to the NVA), (2) Invade North Vietnam (tactically and logistically challenging, and politically impossible), or (3) Reinforce the 3rdMarDiv, and intensify air and artillery bombardments of North Vietnam. It was up to General Westmoreland to decide — the ball was in his court.
General Westmoreland had to agree with Krulak’s assessments, even to the extent of putting together a planning group to consider the feasibility of an amphibious landing north of the DMZ. However, this wasn’t how President Lyndon B. Johnson wanted to fight the war. Westmoreland’s only political option was reinforcing the 3rdMarDiv with an Army brigade. Doing so allowed the CG 3rdMarDiv to realign his force within the I CTZ. Increased air, artillery, and naval gunfire support imposed significant losses on NVA forces north of the DMZ. It prompted the North Vietnamese command structure to rethink its long-term strategy. Within a short time, while bureaucrats in Washington toyed with U. S. warfare doctrine, the NVA was preparing for a bloody confrontation.
McNamara’s Fiasco
Robert S. McNamara began serving as Secretary of Defense during the Kennedy administration in 1961; after John Kennedy’s assassination, President Lyndon B. Johnson retained him in that capacity. Known as one of the “Whiz Kids,” McNamara was instrumental in reshaping Ford Motor Company to increase its American automobile industry market share. He was also the genius behind Ford’s failed Edsel model.
In December 1965, McNamara met with former Kennedy-era National Security Council staff member Carl Kaysen.[8] It was from Kaysen that McNamara developed his idea for an electric barrier to limit infiltration from North Vietnam. The so-called McNamara line became a metaphor for Bob McNamara’s arbitrary, personal, and aggressive management style that tended to by-pass proven Defense protocols, ignored or rebuffed DoD experts, and preferred relying on technology rather than superbly trained members of the Armed Forces.[9] In essence, senior military leaders either conformed to McNamara’s dictates, or they quite suddenly retired from active military service.
McNamara’s preference for untested technology led him to implement programs without full coordination among defense experts. The only danger to this in peacetime is an extraordinary squandering of taxpayer resources. In combat, lives are lost, and soldiers are critically or permanently injured. Nevertheless, McNamara rejected every criticism of his policies and programs.[10]
Before 1965, the Department of Defense experimented with various schemes for defensive lines along South Vietnam’s northern border, at the DMZ and its border with Laos. Defense experts rejected many of Kaysen’s ideas for two reasons. First, to implement them, the United States would have to increase the number of its static positions, and second, because it would encourage the NVA to establish safe areas deeper inside Laos.[11] Kaysen’s (later, McNamara’s) electronic wall would limit NVA infiltration into South Vietnam. From his meeting with Kaysen, McNamara ordered a feasibility study involving several science technologists.
McNamara’s panel provided their conclusions in March 1966. He passed their proposals to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for comments. The JCS was lukewarm on the idea. Creating an electronic barrier, they argued, would still require a large number of troops and cost a large sum of money. Moreover, the project would cause potentially insurmountable logistical challenges. JCS members may have wondered if McNamara had heard of Hadrian’s Wall (122-138 AD).
Secretary McNamara then turned to a federally funded research study group (the JASON Group) for their assessment. These individuals supported the notion of a barrier wall primarily because, in their opinion, President Johnson’s air campaign over North Vietnam was an utter failure. The JASON Group thought it would be a good idea to create two barrier systems — the first along the southern edge of the DMZ and another along South Vietnam’s western border with Laos. Electronic signals, they argued, could trigger air interdiction and remotely controlled minefields. Moreover, they added, the system could be in place within a year.
McNamara sent the JASON Group’s proposal to the JCS for additional consideration. Except for JCS Chairman General Earle Wheeler, every JCS member rejected the idea. Wheeler nevertheless sent the recommendation to Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, Commander, U. S. Pacific, for his review. Admiral Sharp concluded that the plan, at best, was impractical. Amazingly, General Westmoreland agreed with Admiral Sharp.
Ignoring this advice, McNamara took his plan to President Johnson, recommending approval. The price tag was around $2.5 billion ($23.7 billion in 2024). McNamara’s scheme had several code names. At first, it was named PRACTICE NINE; it later changed to ILLINOIS CITY and then to PROJECT DYE MARKER. In early 1967, Marine Corps engineers began bulldozing a strip of land 500 meters wide from Gio Linh westward to Con Thien.
At the beginning of 1968, the western end of McNamara’s wall, from Khe Sanh through the Special Forces camp at Lang Vei, which was still under construction, was attacked by NVA forces. The NVA overran Lang Vei and established a siege of Khe Sanh. The Battle of Khe Sanh lasted 77 days. General Creighton W. Abrams, Westmoreland’s newly arrived replacement, ordered Khe Sanh abandoned in July. He also ordered the destruction of all infrastructure along Route 9 toward Laos, including all bridges and roads. In October, all work relating to DYE MARKER ceased. Instead, Abrams ordered McNamara’s wall converted into fortifications and support bases for his new strategy: mobile operations. McNamara’s Wall quickly became known as McNamara’s Folly. Significantly, the entire episode with McNamara’s line diverted Marine combat units from their traditional role of beating the enemy to a pulp. Casualties mounted.
A Confusing Structure
During the summer and fall of 1966, the NVA initiated two major thrusts across the DMZ. III MAF realigned around 10,000 Marines to meet these new threats. In October, Major General Wood B. Kyle, Commanding General, 3rdMarDiv, assumed operational control of all U. S. Forces operating in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces. He moved his command post from Da Nang to Phu Bai, north of the Hai Van Mountains, which separated the two northern provinces of I Corps from the three remaining southern provinces. The main Marine force in Quang Tri Province consisted of seven (of 18 available) battalions.[12]
At the same time, the 1stMarDiv, under Major General Herman Nickerson, moved its CP from Chu Lai to Da Nang. Nickerson left Brigadier General William A. Stiles in charge of Task Force X-Ray at Chu Lai. X-Ray was a brigade-size force of four battalions between Quang Tri and Quang Ngai. In addition to the two Marine battalions in Quang Ngai, Brigadier General Run Sang Kim of the South Korean Marine Corps commanded three ROK Marine battalions.[13]
To any average person, the organizational structure of Marine Corps combat units in Vietnam would be confusing and nonsensical, but the fluid nature of nonlinear warfare in Vietnam caused senior commanders to view individual battalions as their primary maneuver elements (rather than regiments, which traditionally controlled subordinate battalions). Task organization took on new meaning when separate battalions from the 3rd Marine Regiment (for example) were operationally assigned to other command elements. A battalion of the 7th Marines might be attached to the 4th Marines for a specific purpose or length of time (such as a combat operation). Another contributing factor was the implementation of battalion rotations between Vietnam and Okinawa. Whenever a battalion from the 3rd Marines was rotated out of Vietnam for rest and refit, another battalion would rotate in to take its place — one perhaps from the 9th Marines.
To further confuse the casual observer, the U. S. Seventh Fleet exercised authority over an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), which, after March 1966, included the 9th MAB as part of the Special Landing Force (SLF) (See also Note 2). The SLF could be deployed as part of U. S. Seventh Fleet operations, operating independently from the forces under III MAF, or it could be employed to reinforce III MAF units if necessary.
Air support for Marines in the I CTZ was provided by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1stMAW), elements of which occupied airfields at Da Nang, Chu Lai, Phu Bai, Marble Mountain, and Ky Ha. Fixed-wing units operated from Da Nang and Chu Lai; helicopter squadrons were distributed among all five.
Finally, ARVN units operated independently but in close coordination with III MAF. The ARVN I Corps consisted of the 1st ARVN Division (Hue City), 2nd ARVN Division (Quang Ngai), the independent 51st Regiment (Quang Nam), a ranger group, and three battalions of Vietnamese Marines (temporarily attached) moved throughout I CTZ. The total Vietnamese force included 34 battalions. Regional and Popular (territorial reserve) forces augmented the ARVN I Corps. The number of South Vietnamese forces assigned to I Corps was 77,000 combat troops.
The Bottom Line
From the beginning of the United States’ involvement in Vietnam in 1945, when U. S. politicians imagined that it would be prudent to assist post-World War II France in reclaiming its Indochinese colonies —even though the Vietnamese people had had enough of the Frenchman’s abuse, the thinking of highly placed American officials was deeply flawed.
The problem for President Harry S. Truman was that the individual who first proclaimed Vietnam’s independence from France, a man calling himself Ho Chi Minh, was a committed communist. Truman concluded that supporting a brutal French colony was preferable to the creation of a new communist (nationalist) state and ignored Ho Chi Minh. It never entered Truman’s mind that a gently guiding capitalist hand might have moved Minh toward the center of his idealistically socialist goals. Neither Truman nor anyone in his administration anticipated that if Ho Chi Minh could not obtain support for Vietnamese independence from the United States, he could get it from China … after the Chinese Revolution (1945-1949). China threw its support behind Vietnam in July 1950 and began transforming North Vietnamese insurgents into a regular army.
French colonial forces battled the communists through 1954 before their overwhelming defeat at Dien Binh Phu. It was time for the French to withdraw from Vietnam, but who would take France’s place? Eisenhower, who replaced Truman, acknowledged the United States’ commitment to support a non-communist state in Vietnam but opposed any American ground effort except for the participation of military and civilian political advisors supporting the Republic of Vietnam. President Kennedy expanded the role of military advisors but opposed direct military involvement. It wasn’t until after President Lyndon B. Johnson concocted the story of a North Vietnamese attack on a U. S. destroyer that a surge in American air, ground, and naval involvement took shape. By then, the United States had spent tens of billions of dollars supporting a corrupt and thoroughly inept political structure in South Vietnam.
Still, one must wonder how, after investing so many lives, so much money, time, and effort into “defending” South Vietnam, the United States could lose a war when it had so many advantages. Nearly 3 million Americans served in Vietnam. In addition to 1.4 million South Vietnamese forces, the United States was also assisted by South Korea (320,000), Australia (50,190), New Zealand (3,500), Laos (72.000), Cambodia (200,000), The Philippines (2,061), and Thailand (32,000). Casualty rates were extraordinary: allied military forces experienced 392,365 dead and nearly 2 million wounded in action. Almost 4 million Vietnamese civilians were killed, 400,000 Cambodian civilians and 62,000 Laotian civilians lost their lives, as well. There were so many troops, such utter defeat, and David Berger wanted to attack China with 28 battalions of U.S. Marines. God help us!
There are several explanations for America’s failure, not the least of which was its failure to maintain the moral high ground from the beginning of World War II. American politicians during this period were not our “best and brightest.” They still aren’t. Presidents responsible for that bloody war were near-sighted, closed-minded, immoral, vain, and malfeasant. The American diplomatic corps was inept; high-ranking political appointees were incompetent — few to none ever having served in uniform — they decided they could run the war from inside the Beltway. Over time, these know-nothings decided they knew more than our military professionals. Among those military careerists, far too many put their promotions ahead of their sacred duty.
It was a complicated war, easily avoided if only the American voter had made better choices for their national leaders. North Vietnam’s celebrated military leader, Võ Nguyên Giáp, later wrote that no one was more surprised than he when American politicians suddenly withdrew their armed forces from South Vietnam. The US Military had won all the battles, North Vietnam could no longer sustain such huge battle losses, and it was only a matter of time before the United States and RVN could claim victory. But, of course, the politicians in Congress knew best. America’s defeat was political, not military. Even now, wise voting is not one of America’s strong points.
Sources:
Berman, L. Lyndon Johnson’s War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam. New York: Norton & Company, 1989.
Eisenhower, D. D. Mandate for Change. Doubleday, 1963.
Fall, B. B. The Two Viet Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. New York: Praeger, 1967.
Giap, V. N. Military Art of People’s War: Selected Writings. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970.
Karnow, S. Vietnam: A History. New York: Penguin Books, 1997 (second edition).
Shulimson, J. And Charles M. Johnson. U. S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965. Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1978.
Telfer, G. L. and Lane Rogers (et. al.) U. S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967. Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1984.
Endnotes:
[1] After the Vietnam War, the Communist victors renamed the city after their revolutionary leader, Ho Chi Minh.
[3] US Marines are an expeditionary force. The original designation of the task-organized force was III Marine Expeditionary Force. However, this designation was temporarily changed at the request of General Westmoreland to III Marine Amphibious Force (and for similar reasons, 9thMEB was redesignated 9thMAB). Given their history of foreign expeditionary occupations (1887-1954), the word expeditionary offended Vietnamese sensitivities.
[4] 9thMAB reactivated on 1 March 1966 on Okinawa; its new mission was to serve as the Special Landing Force (SLF) of the U. S. Seventh Fleet. In this capacity, 9thMAB exercised operational authority over Regimental Landing Team (RLT) 5 (formed around the 5th Marines (a 1stMarDiv regiment), BLT 2/5, and service support elements of the 1st Service Battalion. Its air element was MAG-13. In the spring of 1966, RLT-5 was relieved by RLT-26. Throughout the war, the 9thMAB was instrumental in destroying VC regiments and elements of NVA infantry divisions operating in the Thua Thien Province as part of Operation Deckhouse.
[5] COMUSMACV was General William C. Westmoreland (1914-2005). Westmoreland foolishly adopted the NVA’s strategy of a war of attrition. He served as COMUSMACV from 1964-68 and then as U. S. Army Chief of Staff until his retirement in 1972. In fairness to General Westmoreland, his failed strategy in Vietnam was imposed on him by Washington politicians and bureaucrats — he simply lacked the moral courage to do the right thing irrespective of any political consequences. In my view, Westmoreland was under no obligation to obey presidential orders that he found unconscionable. Since Westmoreland became President Johnson’s lackey, we can only infer that he intentionally placed his career ahead of the welfare of his men.
[6] Offensive and defensive combat operations are limited by weather and terrain. These factors are more important than any other physical elements (equipment, communications, weapons, resupply). See also U. S. Army Field Manual 100-5 (Operations).
[7] FMFPAC (1941-Present) is the world’s most significant maritime landing force. The general officer commanding reports to the Commander, U. S. Pacific, and exercises command authority over all subordinate commands of the Navy/Marine Corps expeditionary units operating in the Pacific, from California to the Far East. During the Vietnam War, CG FMFPac did not exercise operational control over Marines in Vietnam. Still, he did have something to say about how the Marines were employed within COMUSMACV’s theater of operations.
[8] Kaysen was an academic policy advisory and international security specialist at MIT who co-chaired the Committee on International Security Studies at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. What Kaysen knew about warfighting wouldn’t fill a thimble. Why he had any credibility with Kennedy, Johnson, or McNamara is anyone’s guess.
[9] This same inane thinking destroyed the Central Intelligence Agency’s human intelligence capability, preferring to rely, instead, on satellite technology. This, too, was a fiasco with long-term consequences.
[10] This is why presidential elections matter. The President appoints his cabinet, unelected men who make momentous decisions impacting the welfare of the American people. We should know who presidential candidates are considering for high level l cabinet posts before we elect them to the presidency. Who in their right mind would have voted for John F. Kennedy knowing that he intended to appoint, as Secretary of Defense, the man who gave them Edsel?
[11] Pro-technology advocates believed that constructing such a wall would serve the long-term interests of South Vietnam after US forces had been withdrawn. Such a belief was part of the fallacy U. S. Officials cultivated about the mission assigned to the American armed forces operating in Vietnam. Everyone was told that the role of our military was to defend South Vietnam from the aggression of North Vietnam. This fallacy may have morphed into the truth of our Vietnam experience — after the assassination of South Vietnam’s president, Ngo Dinh Diem — but it was always Diem’s long-term goal to unify Vietnam (conquer North Vietnam) under his leadership. Diem’s goal, therefore, was almost identical to that of North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, albeit in reverse. Every succeeding president of South Vietnam had but one goal: to enrich themselves at the American taxpayer’s expense.
[12] Between 2019 and 2023, while serving as Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Berger directed training and equipping 28 infantry battalions to confront the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Navy (PLAN). First, land warfare is not the mission of the U.S. Marine Corps. Berger must also not have been aware that 18 battalions were insufficient to defeat the much smaller North Vietnamese Army. Dolt.
[13] the Republic of Korea (South Korea) contributed substantially to the Allied war effort during the Vietnam conflict. The Korean Marine Corps Blue Dragon Brigade served with distinction in ICTZ, the Fierce Tiger Mechanized Infantry Division, ROK Army, served in Binh Dinh Province (7,652 officers, 107,340 enlisted men), and the ROK Army 9th Infantry Division, served in the Phu Yen, Tuy Hoa, and Khanh Hoa provinces (6,445 officers and 98,891 enlisted men. I cannot speak to the performance of the Korean Army units, but the Korean Marines put the fear of God into NVA and VC troops in equal measure. The Korean Marines didn’t play fair.
Whenever a British-American colony faced hostile Indians or threats from a foreign military presence, colonial governors and legislatures raised provisional (temporary) regiments to defend colonial settlements. Interim organizations were full-time military units but served for specific emergencies or pre-specified periods. Provisional troops differed from regular British army units in several ways:
The length of local military service for those serving in the ranks lasted for the campaign season’s duration; field officers usually served over many years.
The colonies recruited enlisted men through a quota system that might incorporate local militia.[1]
All officers received their appointments from colonial governors or legislatures. Field officers were usually men of social or political importance, such as landowners and colonial legislature members;[2] junior officers were usually appointed because they had previously served as popular militia officers[3].
The recruitment standards were lower within the provincial regiments than in the militia.
Provincial recruitment included a demand for individuals experienced in logistical support, such as providing and transporting food, surgical supplies, and munitions.
The officers and ranks of provisional regiments received pay for their services, for infantry privates around one shilling, sixpence per month (in today’s currency, £8.53).
The first provincial forces organized in British North America occurred during King William’s War in the 1670s, consisting primarily of men from the Massachusetts Bay Colony. During Queen Anne’s War, provincial regiments were raised from Massachusetts Bay, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, making up most British forces. During King George’s War, most provincial regiments originated in Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. In the Seven Years’ War, the British commander relegated local forces to non-combat roles supporting the regular British Army — primarily as pioneers and freight haulers. Those men were essential to the operation of the regular army.
In 1670, around half of the men living in the British colonies were literate, but they weren’t the most effective fighting force despite their intellect. There are reasons for this. Whatever training provincial forces did receive, they obtained from British regular forces — usually from the salty old color sergeant who drilled the men in battlefield tactics. This training might have been okay, except that British regular forces serving in North America were organized and trained for European-style engagements. European battle organizations/formations were ill-suited for frontier warfare because Indians employed guerilla-style tactics; they made good use of camouflage and concealment before launching surprise attacks. While the British grouped their ranks in orderly ranks and formations, an Indian attack was more on the order of a free-for-all. What the colonies needed — and what they produced, were Ranger companies. Rangers were frontiersmen and accomplished Indian fighters.[4]
Enter the Rangers
John Smith provides the earliest record of ranger operations in British America, dated around 1622. “When I had ten men able to go abroad, our commonwealth was very strong. With such a number, I ranged that unknown country 14 weeks.” Smith tells us that many ranger units were small, around the same number of men as present-day infantry squads. Note that army squads consist of ten men, including the squad leader and two fire teams of four men each. Marine squads involve thirteen men, including the squad leader and three fire teams of four men each.
Benjamin Church (b. 1639) was the grandson of Richard Warren, one of the original Mayflower passengers who landed at Plymouth. In 1667, he married Alice Southworth in Duxbury, Massachusetts. During King Philip’s War, Church was the principal military aide to Governor Josiah Winslow of the Plymouth Colony.[5] Governor Winslow commissioned Church as a captain on 24 July 1675. He commanded a mixed independent company of Indian allies and English settlers — the first company of which successfully raided the camps of hostile Indians in the upper regions of the Massachusetts colony.
Captain Church (realizing that European-style battle formations were ineffective against the Indians) began to imagine a different style of warfare on the frontier. Many of his Indian recruits were Christians (called Praying Indians); from them, he learned the Indian skill set of tracking, stalking, blending in with one’s surroundings, ambushing, and raiding.
On 19 December 1675, colonial forces representing Massachusetts, Plymouth, and Connecticut (and their Indian allies) engaged and killed 300 Narragansett warriors. The battle was significant because the survivors of the Narragansett tribe withdrew from the conflict and remained in hiding until after the war and also because Captain Church had started an American tradition. One of the men serving under Church was the father of John Lovewell (1691-1725), whose ruthless warfighting skills made him the most famous ranger of the early colonial period.[6]
Another famous American ranger was John Gorham (1709-1751). Gorham was the first “significant” British military presence in the Nova Scotia and Acadia frontier to remain in the region for a substantial period. Gorham’s Rangers included two armed ships (the Anson and Warren — about 70 tons each) that performed regular patrols off the coast of Nova Scotia. He was first commissioned as a captain in 1744, later promoted to lieutenant colonel in the 7th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment in 1745, and two years later received a commission as a captain in an independent company in the British Army. Gorham’s father (1686-1746) also served as a colonel in the provincial forces during King George’s War. Gorham was among the few American colonists to receive a regular British Army commission.[7]
Few people today have ever heard of Church, Lovewell, or Gorham — but nearly everyone has heard of Robert Rogers (1731-1795), if for no other reason than he played a conspicuous role in Alexander Rose’s book, Washington’s Spies: The Story of America’s First Spy Ring (2007) and the subsequent television series titled Turn: Washington’s Spies.
Robert Rogers was a British-American frontiersman who served in the British Army during the French and Indian War (1754-1763) and the American Revolution (1765-1783).[8] Rogers raised and commanded Rogers’ Rangers with service in the New York colony’s Lake George and Lake Champlain regions. These rangers frequently mounted winter raids against French towns and military emplacements.[9] Despite the rangers’ ability to fight in inhospitable environments, the regular British Army looked upon these frontiersmen with disdain. Today, the Queen’s York Rangers (Canada), U. S. Army Rangers, and the US 119th Field Artillery claim military lineage to Rogers’ Rangers. Rogers’ Standing Orders appear in the U. S. Army Ranger Handbook.
According to some historians, Major Richard Rogers offered his services to General George Washington at the outset of the American Revolution. Washington, fearing that Rogers was a British plant, refused the offer. We then understand that a much-put-out Rogers joined forces with British loyalists, raised the Queen’s Rangers, and fought against the American rebels. Rogers is credited with capturing the American spy Nathan Hale — which was no major achievement because Nathan Hale may have been America’s most incompetent spy. In 1779, Rogers traveled to Nova Scotia, where he created the King’s Rangers Regiment, with service through the end of the revolution.
In January 1812, the US War Department authorized six companies of U. S. Rangers — a mounted infantry regiment charged with protecting the western frontier. A year later, an additional ten companies were raised. Official Army records in 1813 list twelve companies of Rangers. The Army disbanded these companies in 1815.
During the Black Hawk War (1832), a battalion of mounted rangers (dragoons were an early version of the United States cavalry) recruited frontiersmen to serve for one year.[10] The Army required each man to provide his own horses and weapons. The battalion consisted of six companies of 100 men each. The battalion commander was Major Henry Dodge.[11]
During the American Civil War, the Army fielded three ranging units: Loudoun’s Rangers, consisting primarily of Quaker and German soldiers; Blazer’s Scouts, who mainly confronted other irregular forces (such as the Bushwhackers), and for the Confederacy, John Mosby’s Rangers.
Entering the Modern Era
Early in World War II, Major General Lucian Truscott proposed creating an Army commando unit modeled on the British Commandos. Subsequently, five ranger battalions served in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Battalions, U. S. Rangers). Another battalion (the 6th) was organized for service in the Pacific (PTO). Additional battalions (numbered 7th through 10th) were organized on paper as part of the American disinformation campaign, also known as Operation Quicksilver.
Eighty percent of the 1st Ranger Battalion came from the US 34th Infantry Division; of those, following commando training at Carrickfergus, Northern Ireland, fifty men were selected to serve with British Commandos during the raid at Dieppe. These men were the first US soldiers to serve in ground combat in the ETO. The 1st, 3rd, and 4th Battalions fought in North Africa and Italy as Darby’s Rangers. At the Battle of Cisterna on 29 January 1944, most of the men assigned to the 1st and 3rd battalions were either killed or captured, with the remaining rangers reassigned and absorbed into the First Special Service Force under Brigadier General Robert L. Frederick (also known as the Devil’s Brigade), a joint United States-Canadian ranger brigade. A temporary ranger battalion was formed from the US 29th Infantry Division in December 1942, which served until November 1943.
During the invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944, Company D, Company E, and Company F of the 2nd Ranger Battalion landed at Pointe du Hoc — an assault force of 225 men. Members of the 29th Ranger Battalion augmented the 2nd and 5th battalions. Several landing craft capsized in the stormy waters, resulting in several men drowning during the initial assault. A navigation error caused a one-hour delay in the operation and the loss of the element of surprise, resulting in an additional loss of 30 men. The remaining 190 Rangers scaled the cliffs utilizing rope ladders. At the top of Pointe du Hoc, only 90 men remained capable of carrying firearms. Although the Germans had removed the heavy artillery pieces overlooking Pointe du Hoc, the battalion successfully seized the position and disabled a battery of 155mm artillery placed 1,000 yards behind the Atlantic Wall.
Company A, Company B, and Company C of the 2nd battalion landed with the 5th Rangers at Omaha Beach, completing their assigned mission despite suffering tremendous casualties during the assault. Company A lost 96% of its men on Omaha Beach; only two men survived the landing unscathed.
Two separate Ranger units fought in the Pacific War: the 98th Field Artillery, activated on 16 December 1940, was re-designated the 6th Ranger Battalion on 20 September 1944. This battalion led the invasion of the Philippines and executed the raid on the Cabanatuan Prisoner of War Camp. At the end of the war, the battalion was deactivated while still serving in Japan on 30 December 1945. In 1943, a nearly 3,000-man composite unit was formed around Frank Merrill —known as Merrill’s Marauders. The training of these men followed the training scheme of Major General Orde Wingate, British Army, whose field of expertise and specialization involved deep penetration raids behind enemy lines. Merrill’s Marauders were employed against the Japanese in the Burma Campaign.
Korea and Vietnam
The United States initiated general demobilization of the armed forces almost immediately following the surrender of Germany (7 May 1945) and Japan (2 Sep 1945). As with all the other armed services under the post-war presidency of Harry S. Truman and Defense Secretary Louis A. Johnson, the Army was gutted and, therefore, unprepared for major combat on 25 June 1950. The re-activation of a unique ranger unit was needed in the earliest days of the Korean War. In mid-August 1950, the 8th Ranger Company was formed under the command of Second Lieutenant Ralph Puckett.[12]
The company was a light infantry force specializing in finding and engaging the enemy in fire and close combat. The 8th Ranger Company became the model for all subsequent ranger units. Rather than companies within light infantry battalions, U. S. Army rangers in Korea and Vietnam operated as companies attached to larger units as special mission forces. Between mid-August 1950 and April 1951, the Army activated sixteen additional ranger companies, designated 1st through 15th Ranger Company. To form these new units, the Army solicited volunteers from the 505th Airborne Regiment, the 80th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division.
In the Korean War, rangers patrolled, probed, scouted, and conducted raids and ambushes against Chinese and North Korean units. In one nighttime raid, the 1st Ranger Company destroyed the headquarters element of the 12th North Korean Division. In another, Lieutenant Puckett’s company became famous when they captured and held a strategic hill overlooking the Chongchon River — and held it against overwhelming enemy forces. During this battle, Puckett was wounded several times by grenades and mortar fire. Puckett’s injuries were so severe that he required hospitalization for over a year.
During the Vietnam War, the Army formed Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) companies to perform heavily armed reconnaissance teams to patrol inside enemy-controlled areas. LRRP teams and companies were attached to every brigade/division. Company E, 52nd Infantry (LRP)[13] pulled off one of the more daring missions in the Vietnam War on 19 April 1968 by seizing Signal Hill on Dong Re Lao Mountain in the A Shau Valley.
On 1 January 1969, the Army’s LRRP units were re-named Ranger Companies, 75th Infantry Regiment. Fifteen companies were raised from LRRP units serving at locations around the globe. The 75th Infantry Regiment’s lineage was linked to Merrill’s Marauders. The independent companies were designated Alpha through Papa (excluding Juliet).[14] In addition to scouting and reconnaissance patrols, the Ranger companies provided terrain assessment, security missions, recovery operations, interrogation of captured soldiers, enemy communications intercept, and disruption of enemy supply routes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Most Ranger team leaders and assistants graduated from the 5th Special Forces Group Recon School at Nha Trang.
Late Twentieth Century
In January 1974, the Army directed the formation of a Ranger battalion — the first such battalion since World War II. The 1st Ranger Battalion was activated on 1 July 1974 at Fort Stewart, Georgia; the 2nd Ranger Battalion was activated on 1 October 1974. In 1980, soldiers of the 1st Battalion participated in Operation Eagle Claw, the Iranian hostage rescue mission. The mission was subsequently aborted due to numerous coordination and equipment failures, none of which were the fault of the assigned soldiers. Of eight aircraft assigned to the mission, only five arrived at the pre-operation staging location — three experienced mechanical issues. As available helicopters prepared to withdraw from staging, one of the aircraft crashed into a C-130, killing eight soldiers.
In October 1983, the 1st and 2nd Ranger Battalions participated in Operation Urgent Fury — the rescue of American medical students on the island of Grenada. On 1 October 1984, the Army activated the 3rd Ranger Battalion at Fort Benning, GA. In February 1986, the 75th Ranger Regiment was re-activated, incorporating the three ranger battalions.
Operation Just Cause
Relations between the United States and Panama had been deteriorating over several years. In May 1989, after political opponents revealed that Panamanian President Manuel Noriega had stolen the election, Noriega officially canceled the election and retained power by force of arms, which was unpopular among the Panamanian people. President George H. W. Bush called upon Noriega to honor the people’s will while directing the reinforcement of military installations of the U.S. Canal Zone.
In October, Noriega survived an attempt by the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) to overthrow him. Urged on by Noriega, the Panamanian general assembly passed a resolution on 15 December 1989, which declared war on the United States. The next day, four US military personnel were stopped at a roadblock outside the PDF headquarters in Panama City. Four officers (Marine Corps Captain Richard E. Haddad, Navy Lieutenant Michael J. Wilson, Army Captain Barry L. Rainwater, and Marine First Lieutenant Robert Paz) were en route to a downtown hotel for dinner. Their privately owned vehicle was surrounded by a mob of citizens, accompanied by members of the PDF. The PDF opened fire and mortally wounded Lieutenant Paz. Hadded, who was driving, was also wounded. Because a Navy officer and his wife witnessed the incident, the PDF arrested the couple. While in custody, Panamanian troops assaulted the Naval officer’s wife. It was then that President Bush ordered the invasion of Panama, citing the shooting incident and Panama’s declaration of war.
The entire Ranger regiment participated in Operation Just Cause in late December 1989 — their mission was the capture of two airfields and Noriega’s beach house. In the process of completing that mission, they took over 1,000 Panamanian soldiers into custody.
War on Terror
Beginning in 1991, American Rangers (along with other US and coalition armed forces) began participating in what has become the Middle Eastern wars, a substantial commitment of American personnel and financial resources. Since then, Rangers have deployed to Somalia (1993) and Kosovo (2000), and deployments to Iraq, Syria, Waziristan, and Afghanistan have been so frequent and so widely dispersed that each of the three battalions has added an additional light infantry company to help shoulder the regiment’s world-wide responsibilities.
Today, Army rangers operate within the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), a unified command that supervises the special operations components of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. USSOCOM was created in the aftermath of the failed attempt to rescue diplomats from the US Embassy in Tehran. The command’s activities involve clandestine operations involving direct action, reconnaissance/intelligence gathering, counter-terrorism, unconventional measures, psychological operations, civil affairs, and counter-narcotics. Each armed force has its unique operations component, but each is structured to work together as a joint-force team.
USSOCOM comprises the Joint Special Operations Command, Special Operations Command — Joint Capabilities, the Army Special Operations Command, Marine Corps Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, and Air Force Special Operations Command.
The Army Special Operations Command includes 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment (Delta Force), 75th Ranger Regiment (the US Army’s premier light infantry organization), and Army Special Operations Aviation Command (Airborne). There are also unique units, such as two psychological operations groups (airborne) and the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, who help sustain civilian populations who suffer the trauma of war and natural disasters.
No one ever said war was easy.
Sources:
American Forces in Action (series), “Pointe du Hoc and the 2nd Ranger Battalion.” U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1946.
Black, R. W. Ranger Dawn: The American Ranger from the Colonial Era to the Mexican War. Penn: Stackpole Books, 2009.
Burhans, R. D. The First Special Service Force: A Canadian/American Wartime Alliance: The Devil’s Brigade. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947.
Bahmanyar, M. U. S. Army Ranger, 1983-2002. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003.
Church, B., and Thomas Church. The History of Philip’s War, Commonly Called The Great Indian War of 1675 and 1676. S. G. Drake, ed. J & B Williams, 1829 (online).
Cuneo, J. R. Robert Rogers of the Rangers. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959
Faragher, J. M. A Great and Noble Scheme. New York: Norton & Company, 2005.
Grenier, J. The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Harrison, G. A. Cross Channel Attack. U. S. Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1951.
O’Donnell, P. K. Dog Company: The Boys of Pointe Du Hoc: The Rangers Who Accomplished D-Day’s Toughest Mission and Led the Way Across Europe. Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2012.
Taylor, T. H., and R. J. Martin. Ranger — Lead the Way. Turner Publishing, 1996.
Werner, B. First Special Service Force, 1942-44. Osprey Publishing, 2006.
Zaboly, G. S. A True Ranger: The Life and Many Wars of Major Robert Rogers. Garden City Park: Royal Blockhouse, 2004.
Endnotes:
[1] Militia (also called minutemen) consisted of local able-bodied men between the ages of 16 and 60 who, beginning in 1645, were drawn from local settlements and underwent rudimentary training to respond (within minutes) of an emergency. Over time, service with the militia became the ‘moral obligation’ of the more prominent men within the community. From within this upper class body of men, militia officers were elected by the men they would lead in conflict.
[2] George Washington, who started the Seven Years War, was commissioned by Robert Dinwiddie, Royal Governor of Virginia. Washington, therefore, was a provincial officer vs. a militia officer.
[3] Militia officers were generally “elected” by the men whom they led, hence the expression “popular” officers.
[4] By use of the term “accomplished Indian fighters,” I mean to suggest that if they were still alive, then they were survivors of one or more bloody confrontations with hostile Indians.
[5] Known variously as King Philip’s War, the First Indian War, Metacom’s War, and Pometacomet’s Rebellion, was a conflict between 1675-1678 between American Indians in the New England region and its colonists and their Indian allies. King Philip was an Indian chief named Metacom who adopted the name Philip because of the friendly relations between his father and the New England colonists. In this instance, relations deteriorated because in attempting to seize all firearms in possession of the Wampanoags, the colonists hanged three of the tribe.
[6] More than 100 years after his death, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Henry David Thoreau wrote stories about John Lovewell’s clash with the Abenaki Indians. A description of Lovewell includes “scalp hunter,” which reflects the training Ranger’s received from their Indian allies. There are several explanations for the removal of a dead enemy’s hair and all of them may be factually based — it is another small matter lost in time. One theory is that in taking scalps, Indian warriors proved their valor in combat; another is that scalping denied the victim a special place in the afterlife. Either way, the Indians taught American Rangers how to do it and why they should. Suffice to say that Natty Bumppo was a figment of James Fenimore Cooper’s imagination, but John Lovewell was the real deal.
[7] The few officers who received a regular British Army commission included John Gorham, Joseph Gorham, Benoni Danks, and Richard Rogers.
[8] The year 1764 is generally regarded as the beginning of the American Revolution (in philosophical discourse) because it was around that time when the British-American colonists began to question the right of the British Parliament to tax the colonies without the participation of colonial members of the Parliament or any colonial representation in the British Parliament. From the viewpoint of British prime ministers, the series of taxes levied upon the colonists, beginning in 1765 (subsequently withdrawn in some cases) was necessary because (according to PM George Grenville), the whole of revenues of the American customs houses in 1764 amounted to only £2,000 annually, while the British government was paying between £7-8,000 annually to collect them. Even in the opinion of Adam Smith, Parliament “… has never hitherto demanded of [the American colonies] anything which even approached to a just proportion to what was paid by their fellow subjects as home.”
[9] Significant because at that time, opposing military forces frequently went into winter camps during frigid weather.
[10] Mounted infantry are also frequently referred to as dragoons.
[11] Henry Dodge also served in the US House of Representatives, and as Governor of the Wisconsin Territory. In earlier years, he was indicted as a co-conspirator of Aaron Burr but the charges against him were later dropped.
[12] Ralph Puckett, Jr., (1926—) (USMA ’49) volunteered to command the newly activated ranger company soon after his arrival in Japan. The company, a light infantry force, specialized in searching for enemy forces and engaging them in direct fire and close combat.
There are two reasons for people to clash. First, because some people believe they have no other choice. A second reason is that it suits them. During OPERATION STARLITE, the 1st V.C. Regiment lost 615 men, either as killed in action or detained as prisoners of war. Following the operation, the regiment needed a break. The Americans do not know how many of the remaining 886 men were wounded in action. They figured it was a substantial number. What the regiment needed was time for replacements and resupply. American Marines, however, were not well disposed to allow them to accomplish that. The Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), decided to destroy the 1st V.C. Regiment.[1]
III MAF intelligence sources knew that remnants of the enemy regiment had withdrawn to the Batangan Peninsula, located eight miles south of Van Tuong. After consulting with his South Vietnamese counterpart, the Commanding General, I Corps Tactical Zone, General Chi,[2] Walt issued a warning order to the Commanding Officer, 7th Marine Regiment.[3]
In contrast with Operation Starlite, the planning and preparations for the new operation were unusually excessive. For several days, Navy and Marine Corps commanders traveled between Da Nang and Chu Lai to receive briefings from the III MAF staff. The Commander, Amphibious Ready Group, and Colonel Peatross coordinated their activities with the South Vietnamese. Operation Order 423-65 became Operation Piranha.
The concept of this operation was similar to that of Starlite. Two Marine battalions (1/7 and 3/3) would embark with the U.S. Seventh Fleet, while another battalion (3/7) would conduct a vertical assault inside the objective area. The battalion commanders were Lieutenant Colonel Kelly, Lieutenant Colonel Muir, and Lieutenant Colonel Bodley.
Kelly would land 1/7 across White Beach, north of the Batangan Peninsula, and move south. Bodley’s air assault Marines would set up a blocking position some 4,000 meters inland. Muir’s battalion would serve as the regiment’s reserve force. Participating South Vietnamese battalions included the ARVN 2nd Battalion, 4th Regiment, and the Vietnamese Marine Corps’ 3rd Battalion. Vietnamese Marines would conduct a vertical (helicopter) insertion south of Bodley’s battalion and conduct search and clear operations on the An Ky Peninsula, which was separated from Batangan by the Sa Ky River.
On 6 September 1965, the Ready Group assembled its participating ships: the attack transport ship (U.S.S. Bayfield), two dock landing ships (LSDs), U.S.S. Belle Grove, and Cabildo, and three landing ships tank (LSTs) in the amphibious assembly area. On station, these ships were joined by three naval gunfire ships, the cruiser U.S.S. Oklahoma City (CLG-5), and two destroyers, U.S.S. Prichett and Orleck. A high-speed destroyer transport ship, U.S.S. Diachenko (APD-123), stood offshore to provide direct fire support.[4] Small boats from the South Vietnamese Navy “screened” local fishing craft from the naval task group.[5]
Marine Corps KC-130 aircraft served as Airborne Direct Air Support Centers (DASC) during the operation. U.S. Air Force aircraft provided night illumination support. Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12) provided close air support (CAS) with A-4 Skyhawks. MAG-11 provided eight F-4 fighter/attack aircraft to help prepare helicopter landing zones (LZs). Marine Aircraft were still bombing LZs when 1/7 landed at White Beach. Alpha and Charlie Companies 1/7 were the primary assault elements. Within twenty minutes, the entire battalion was ashore, having experienced only light opposition from sporadic sniper fire. Supported by LTV-E amphibian tractors, the Marines avoided enemy booby traps.
As Kelly’s 1/7 secured the beachhead, forty helicopters from MAG-16 landed Bodley’s 3/7 at LZ Oak, four miles to the west, over a period of around three hours. Once landed, Bodley established his command post (C.P.) and set up blocking positions on the surrounding high ground. Once Bodley’s battalion was on the ground, MAG-16’s helicopters began shuttling South Vietnamese battalions into LZ Birch and LZ Pine.
Only Kelly’s battalion encountered a significant enemy force during the three-day operation. On 8 September, Bravo Company discovered a V.C. field hospital inside a large cave near the peninsula’s center. The Marines captured four prisoners before coming under fire from other V.C. deeper inside the cave. Marines returned fire and attempted to convince the enemy inside to surrender. Failing that, Marine engineers set in explosives and destroyed the cave, killing 66 enemy and destroying medical supplies, small arms, and some munitions. In the aftermath of the explosion, One Marine officer succumbed to asphyxiation.
During Operation Piranha, Allied forces killed 178 Viet Cong and took 360 prisoners. Kelly’s battalion accounted for 106 of the enemy’s dead. Allied losses included 2 Marines, 5 South Vietnamese military killed, 14 Marines and 33 Vietnamese troops wounded. Essentially, the enemy (then in retreat) was not looking for a fight with Marines and Vietnamese troops. This would seem proven because, during Piranha, allied forces placed very little demand on field artillery and naval gunfire. There were ten fire missions in the first twenty-four hours — 110 rounds.[6]
Operation Piranha was not a success. The target of the operation had successfully withdrawn before the Marines initiated hostilities. No doubt, information about the pending operation had been leaked to the Viet Cong — not from inside sources, but from the easily observable increases in military activities: planners shuttling back and forth between Da Nang and Chu Lai, increased helicopter operations, and increased naval screening activities.
Additionally, Piranha taught the Marines that they would have to learn how to clear enemy caves while limiting injury to themselves (or innocents). One of Colonel Kelly’s recommendations was that Marines be allowed to use riot-control (C.S.) gas to save both Marine and enemy lives. As it turned out, Colonel Kelly’s recommendation created a political firestorm.
Operation Stomp
Due to a massive outcry against using C.S. gas in military operations, the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments suspended its use in the spring of 1965. The suspension may not seem very important in the overall scheme of things in times of war, but it was. Using non-lethal gas to suppress enemy forces and their civilian support structures gave way to uninformed public opinion, which subjected a greater number of people to lethal means of combat — including our own men and women. Significantly, not a single American general or admiral insisted on its use. By this time, America had entered the age of the spineless flag officer.
The Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV),[7] knew about the prohibition of using C.S. gas, but not every command operating in Vietnam knew about it. Second Battalion, 7th Marines (2/7) had been detached from I CTZ operations and assigned to II CTZ under U.S. Army command as Task Force Alpha.[8]
Just days before Piranha, 2/7’s command structure became aware of a communist stronghold some ten miles north of Qui Nhon. During a command visit to an Army special forces camp on Ky Son Mountain, and after reviewing intelligence reports over the past several months, and because the entire region was honeycombed with natural tunnels, 2/7’s executive officer (X.O.) determined that the whole region had become a major operating base for a North Vietnamese main force command structure.[9] Major Wilson recommended to his superior, Colonel Utter, that 2/7 plan for a series of search and clear operations. Utter agreed, plans were made, and all that remained was the approval of the senior combat commander, Major General Stanley R. Larsen, U.S. Army. General Larsen did approve the operation — which involved a two-company sweep of the area surrounding Kay Son Mountain. Colonel Utter appointed his X.O. as overall operational commander, with Captain Alvin J. Doublet, the Battalion Operations Officer, as Wilson’s second in command.[10]
The operation was not easily planned or executed. The plan to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy was complicated because nearly everyone in the region was a Viet Cong shooter or supporter. Captain Doublet recommended using riot-control agents to route enemy forces from their well-concealed shelters and underground complexes to avoid unnecessary collateral damage to the civilian populace. The proposed use of C.S. gas was always in the plan as there was nothing in regular operational instructions prohibiting its use.
Operation Stomp unfolded according to plan. Hotel Company initiated the assault in LVTs through the mudflats of Qui Nhon Bay; Fox Company landed by helicopter to cut off the V.C.’s likely avenues of escape. Marines killed twenty-six enemies in the initial assault. Being denied escape, cutoff V.C. went underground, taking many local civilians with them to act as human shields or protect their avid supporters and family members as much as possible.
During the operation’s final phases, Marines conducted a systematic search for the enemy within the tunnel complexes, which involved tossing in C.S. gas grenades to flush out the enemy. Seventeen V.C. were forced from hiding, along with 300 women, children, and elderly villagers. Not one of those people were harmed. However, when the press published the story, Communist propaganda, and its American allies asserted that the American Marines had imprudently used toxic gas, “killing or seriously affecting many civilians.” The accusation was a total fabrication, but the press has been lying to the American people for a long time.
COMUSMACV sided with the propagandists, stating that the battalion commander should have known about the prohibition (as everyone did know about it) (except that hardly anyone knew about it), and following a complete investigation, Major General Larsen not only stated that he had approved the operation, but he also stated that he didn’t know about the prohibition, either. More than that, General Larsen said that had Utter not proposed using C.S. gas, he would have directed it to avoid collateral damage.
Reflecting the opinion of most Americans at the time, an editorial appearing in the 11 September 1965 New York Times stated, “If the government prohibits the use of tear gas, it will thereby order certain death or injury more Americans and Vietnamese than the absolute necessities of war demand. Nonlethal riot-control gases can be far more humane and will cause far fewer casualties than many of the weapons used in Vietnam.”
By the end of September, Washington reversed its previous decision and allowed General Westmoreland to use riot-control munitions in tunnel-clearing operations. Westmoreland later informed Utter that his successful use of non-toxic gas had altered “world opinion” to accept its employment in combat. The Vietnam War may have been the first war the United States ever fought pursuant to world opinion — but it was certainly not the last.
Sources:
Lehrack, O. The First Battle: Operation Starlite and the Beginning of the Blood Debt in Vietnam. Casemate Publications, 2004.
Shulimson, J. and C. M. Johnson. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, 1978.
[2] Major General Nguyễn Chánh Thi. General Thi was a flamboyant South Vietnamese officer who, despite his hatred for the communists, harbored hostilities toward the Americans and their “advice” on how to fight the war. Soon after the arrival of III MAF in South Vietnam, General Thi provided Walt with information about Viet Cong insurgents operating near Chu Lai — resulting in Operation Starlite. Thi died in 2007 at the age of 84 years in Lancaster, Pennsylvania.
[3] (Then) Colonel Oscar F. Peatross, USMC. Peatross retired as a major general in 1971. Senior commanders issue warning orders to notify their subordinates that a major order will soon follow. It enables subordinate commanders to begin planning for an operation, to organize their command in a way that will help them to succeed in combat, It also allows his staff to plan for necessary supplies and ammunition, for field rations, and anticipate medical support.
[4] The APD was a “High-Speed Transport” or Auxiliary Personnel Destroyer. It reached higher speeds than cargo ships. The ship retained some self-defense firepower but sacrificed its best anti-ship weapons (torpedoes) in order to carry landing craft suitable for carrying 120 Marines ashore.
[5] The very fact that South Vietnamese naval units were pushing fishing boats away from the assembly area was sufficient to warn communist units that “something” was up.
[6] Despite efforts by Colonel Kelly to protect Vietnamese villagers from harm, local citizens remained aloof from the Americans and made no friendly overtures.
Robert Emmett O’Malley (b. 3 June 1943) is a veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps and the first Marine Corps recipient of the Medal of Honor in the Vietnam War. Raised in Queens, O’Malley graduated from Woodside High School in the early summer of 1961. He joined the Marine Corps in October 1961.
After completing recruit training at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina, and individual infantry training at Camp Geiger, North Carolina, Private O’Malley transferred to Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California, where he was assigned as a rifleman in the 5th Marines. The Marine Corps promoted O’Malley to Private First Class in May 1962.
Early in 1963, the Marines assigned O’Malley to an overseas tour of duty. He joined the 3rd Battalion 9th Marines on Okinawa. His battalion promoted him to Lance Corporal in March 1963 and to Corporal in November 1963. Upon his return to Camp Pendleton in 1964, Marine officials assigned him to the 1st Marine Regiment.
Once again serving with the 3rd Marine Division in 1965, Corporal O’Malley served as a squad leader, Company I, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines. O’Malley’s unit was assigned to a combat base south of Chu Lai.
Operation Starlite
Operation Starlite was the first major offensive action conducted by purely U.S. military units in the Vietnam War. The operation lasted from 18 – 24 August 1965. The purpose of the operation was to locate, close with, and destroy the 1st Viet Cong Regiment and thereby nullify its threat to the Chu Lai air base.
At dawn on 18 August, O’Malley’s battalion performed an amphibious landing near the village of An Cu’ong 2. Shortly after coming ashore, Marines from India Company 3/3 came under mortar and small arms fire from enemy defenders. During the ensuing firefight, Corporal O’Malley single-handedly attacked a Viet Cong trench and killed its occupants. He then turned to help evacuate wounded Marines from his platoon. Eventually, the company commander ordered O’Malley’s squad to withdraw from the battle area.
In compliance with these orders, while leading his men to the helicopter extraction point, Corporal O’Malley was struck by fragments of a mortar, wounding him in the legs, arm, and chest. Despite these painful wounds, Corporal O’Malley refused evacuation and directed suppressive fire on suspected enemy positions until all his Marines boarded the extraction helicopter.
Corporal O’Malley’s wounds were significant, warranting aeromedical evacuation to Japan for medical treatment and life-saving surgery. While recuperating, the Marine Corps promoted O’Malley to sergeant. Sergeant O’Malley returned to Camp Pendleton, where he served out the balance of his enlistment. He left the Marine Corps in April 1966.
Bob O’Malley was flown on Air Force One to the Texas White House where, on 6 December 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson awarded him the nation’s highest medal for bravery under fire: the Medal of Honor.
Medal of Honor Citation
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to
CORPORAL ROBERT E. O’MALLEY UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
For service as set forth in the following CITATION:
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action against the communist (Viet Cong) forces at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Squad Leader in Company “I,” Third Battalion, Third Marines, Third Marine Division (Reinforced) near An Cu’ong 2, South Vietnam, on 18 August 1965. While leading his squad in the assault against a strongly entrenched enemy force, his unit came under intense small arms fire. With complete disregard for his personal safety, Corporal O’Malley raced across an open rice paddy to a trench line where the enemy forces were located. Jumping into the trench, he attacked the Viet Cong with his rifle and grenades and singly killed eight of the enemy. He then led his squad to the assistance of an adjacent Marine unit which was suffering heavy casualties. Continuing to press forward, he reloaded his weapon and fired with telling effect into enemy emplacements. He personally assisted in the evacuation of several wounded Marines, and again regrouping the remnants of his squad, he returned to the point of the heaviest fighting. Ordered to an evacuation point by an officer, Corporal O’Malley gathered his besieged and badly wounded squad and boldly led them under fire to a helicopter for withdrawal. Although three times wounded in this encounter and facing imminent death from a fanatic and determined enemy, he steadfastly refused evacuation and continued to cover his squad’s boarding of the helicopters while, from an exposed position, he delivered fire against the enemy until his wounded men were evacuated. Only then, with his last mission accomplished, did he permit himself to be removed from the battlefield. By his valor, leadership, and courageous efforts on behalf of his comrades, he inspired all who observed him and reflected the highest credit upon the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.
/s/ LYNDON B. JOHNSON
Sergeant O’Malley’s military decorations include the Medal of Honor, Purple Heart, Combat Action Ribbon, Meritorious Unit Citation, Good Conduct Medal, National Defense Service Medal, Vietnam Service Medal, and the Vietnam Campaign Medal. Sergeant O’Malley is entitled to wear the Rifle Expert Badge.
Note: One of Sergeant O’Malley’s high school friends, Thomas P. Noonan, was also awarded the Medal of Honor (posthumously). After Noonan died in Vietnam, O’Malley remained in contact with the Noonan family. It has been reported that O’Malley visited with Noonan’s mother every year on Memorial Day.
Fix Bayonets! 