Advance to Kosong

“The Pusan perimeter is like a weakened dike; the Army intends to use us to plug the holes as they open.  We’re a brigade —a fire brigade.  It will be costly fighting against a numerically superior enemy.  Marines have never lost a battle; this brigade will not be the first to establish such a precedent.  Prepare to move.” – BrigGen Edward A. Craig, August 3, 1950

There were many notable American participants during the Korean War (1950-53), some of them bona fide heroes.  But if all of them were not this, they at least performed their demanding duties heroically and with great distinction in the most troubling of times.  The reader will find many of their stories on these pages. 

The Korean War began on 25 June 1950 when nine North Korean infantry divisions and an armored brigade suddenly invaded the Republic of South Korea.  It marked the beginning of the first hot encounter of the so-called Cold War Era.  By the time the 1st Marine Brigade arrived in South Korea on 3 August 1950, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) was already a shamble.  The North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) had already pushed elements of the Eighth U.S. Army as far south as they could go and prepared to either destroy the American Army or force it into the Sea of Japan.

In 1950, the United States’ entire defense structure was at less than half its wartime strength, according to previously authorized tables of organization and equipment (also, T/O & E).  The U.S. Marines were no exception.  When the Marine Corps Commandant dispatched his “warning order” to the 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, California, the division was ineffective as a combat organization.  The division mainly existed on paper — a cadre staff of Marines available to accomplish the minimum work to keep them functioning at reduced manpower and equipment levels.

The senior officer at Camp Pendleton was Brigadier General Edward A. Craig.  Major General Graves B. Erskine, its previous commander, had already departed Camp Pendleton en route to his new duty assignment.  Erskine’s replacement was Major General Oliver P. Smith, who, at that moment, was en route to Camp Pendleton with his family.  The Korean Peninsula emergency would not wait for Smith’s arrival; the Commandant ordered Brigadier General Craig, as senior officer present, to form a provisional brigade for combat duty in Korea.

The brigade would consist of a ground combat element, an air combat element, and necessary combat support units.  The brigade would form around the Fifth Marine Regiment (which consisted of three understrength infantry battalions).  The air component would include three squadrons designated Provisional Marine Aircraft Group (MAG)-33.  Brigadier General Thomas H. Cushman commanded MAG-33 and served Craig as Deputy Commander.

The Commanding Officer, 5th Marines, was Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray (selected for promotion to Colonel).  Murray was a highly decorated combat veteran.  His battalion commanders were Lieutenant Colonel George R. Newton[1] (1/5), Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise[2] (2/5), and Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett[3] (3/5).

Upon arrival in Pusan, Korea, on 3 August 1950, Brigadier General Craig briefed his officers: “The situation is serious.  With the forces available, it is obvious that the [Pusan] perimeter cannot be held in strength.  Eighth Army has adopted the plan of holding thinly and counter-attacking enemy penetrations to keep them off-balance, to prevent them from launching a coordinated effort.”

So began the march of an under-strength brigade of Marines into the breach of combat once more.  The fighting was brutal; there would be no immediate replacements for casualties.  The Marines would fight with what they had.  Fortunately, General Craig commanded several extraordinary Marine officers, all seasoned combat officers, who exuded the warrior ethos and shared with their men the misery and depredations of hostile contact with a numerically superior enemy.

By 6 August 1950, the Marines had been fighting the enemy for three days.  While Colonel Roise’s 2/5 battled two enemies —the North Korean People’s Army and the South Korean heat— Colonel Taplett’s 3/5 calmly perched on Hills 255 and 99, observing enemy movement.  Captain Joseph C. Fegan and Lieutenant Robert D. Bohn were on the radio calling in artillery fire on enemy movements north of Chindong-ni[4].

Around mid-morning, Second Lieutenant Lawrence W. Hetrick’s 3rd Platoon, Company A (Engineers), completed laying landmines on the Haman Road about a half-mile above Chindong-ni.  Newton’s 1/5 reached the village during the afternoon of 7 August and relieved Company G’s two platoons on Hill 99.  Bohn led his company across the valley and deployed along the lower slopes of Hill 255.  Enemy snipers harassed Bohn’s Marines throughout the night of 7-8 August.  At dawn, Golf Company Marines discovered several enemy soldiers setting up firing positions less than 100 yards outside their defensive perimeter.  While the Marines promptly destroyed these enemy troops, they were astonished that the North Koreans had gotten so close without making a sound.

Shortly after daybreak on 8 August, Captain Fegan’s men calmly observed a formation of troops climbing Hill 255 from the direction of the Haman Road.  Fegan believed the troops were South Korean replacements and watched as they filed to the top of the hill beyond the plateau, forward of the Marine’s positions.

When this formation began setting up facing the Marines, Fegan and his Marines hunkered down.  Within a few minutes, the formation opened fire.  Their possession of the high ground above 3/5 opened the door for harassing fire and blockage of the Masan-Chindong-ni road, the U.S. force’s main supply route.  When the Army’s 2/24 advanced to relieve 2/5 and 3/5, NKPA fire drove them off the road.  Fegan might have mentioned the presence of these troops but failed to do so.

When Taplett became aware of these NKPA troops, he ordered Fegan’s company to remove them.  Captain Fegan maneuvered two platoons to execute Taplett’s order, but the terrain made their advance difficult.  When Lieutenant Williams’ platoon faltered in its climb, Fegan led his 3rd Platoon forward.  Eventually, the 3rd Platoon was able to work its way through the NKPA position, one fighting hole at a time; the North Korean soldiers resisted until death.  The fight cost the Marines of Company H six dead and 32 wounded.

During this action, Company G spotted another enemy formation bound for Hill 255 from Haman Road.  The enemy soldiers moved across the valley from the high ground north of Hill 99 and attempted to climb Hill 255 via the same route used earlier in the day.  Company G and supporting arms unleashed hellacious fire upon the NKPA formation, and what remained of their number scuttled back to their starting point.

Colonel Murray ordered Taplett to cease fire and dig in for the night.  As Captain Fegan’s Company H began preparing for night defense, artillery, and close air support pounded the saddle north of the company, which forced the NKPA to withdraw from Fegan’s immediate front.

During the night of August 8-9, Marine artillery and mortar fire dropped hot steel across the entire battalion front, which appeared to discourage nocturnal enemy activities.  At 0825, Marine artillery resumed its bombardment.  After the artillery fires, Marine aircraft worked the enemy over with napalm —its first such use in the Korean War.   Company H then launched an assault against negligible enemy resistance.

Colonel Murray’s plan for eliminating the enemy threat to the MSR called for a Marine advance along Hill 255.  North of this, U.S. Army units would clear the ridge, approaching from Masan.  At noon, Company H observed soldiers from the 24th Infantry moving southward; the long ridge was considered secure, but removing the enemy was costly.  In total, Captain Fegan lost 16 men killed in action, with 36 wounded.  There would be no replacements.

Overall, Task Force Kean’s[5] assaults on Chinju and Sachon did not succeed within its first 48 hours.  During this period, the only advance Kean made was on his TAOR’s[6] right flank by the 35th U.S. Infantry.  In General Craig’s capacity as provisional commander of all units along the Masan-Chinju axis, Craig directed Army operations within his sector.

On 8 August, Craig ordered the Army’s 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) to continue attacking Tosan so that the 5th Marines could proceed to Sachon.  Following preparatory artillery fires, the 5thRCT pushed forward with some gain near the line of departure, but enemy resistance increased near the village of Sin-gi.  Additionally, excessive military traffic and inadequate roadways hampered the Army’s progress.  Fighting on Hills 255 and 342 increased the fog of war over such large operating areas.

Colonel Murray ordered LtCol Newton’s 1/5 forward from Chindong-ni at 0600.  Newton’s mission was to attack along the south fork of the Tosan junction in preparation to seize a yet-determined regimental objective.  Heavy military traffic (intermingled with refugee flow) stalled Newton’s progress along the MSR.  Newton reported the situation to Murray, who told Newton to suspend his march.  Captain Tobin remounted Hill 99 for security, and the battalion went into a holding pattern. 

When word finally came to “move out,” 1/5 worked its way along the still-crowded roadway.  LtCol Newton walked ahead to the 1/5thRCT command post.  He learned that the enemy occupied low-lying areas, and the Army’s rifle companies occupied the high ground.  The Army battalion commander reported, “My companies are cut off.”  At 14:00, vehicle congestion again halted Newton’s advance; he was still more than a mile from his designated line of departure.

At this moment, a much-dispirited Army NCO arrived.  He was dripping with mud and water.  He informed Newton that he had just returned from Hill 308, where his company was heavily engaged with enemy forces.  He reported that enemy machine guns covered all approaches to adjacent rice paddies, which forced him to low-crawl the entire distance.

While Colonel Murray was en route to Chindong-ni, Major General Kean flagged him down and ordered Murray to provide a night relief of 1/5thRCT.  Kean said he would inform Craig of his order as soon as possible.   At this particular stage in the operation, the Marines began to question who controlled the area: General Keen or the enemy division commander.  Newton radioed Murray for clarification; his new order was to postpone jumping off until nightfall.

Newton withdrew his battalion to the outskirts of Sangnyong-ni and set up at the base of Hill 342.  At around 20:00, Newton received orders to relieve 1/5thRCT at midnight and secure the troublesome road junction.  Colonel Murray was tired of the Army’s dithering around; he wanted a final solution to the “who’s doing what” dilemma.  He ordered Newton to report to 1/5thRCT no later than 23:00.  According to the “plan,” an Army guide would lead Newton across a broad rice paddy to Hill 308.  Newton was in place by 22:00, only to find that the Army’s rifle companies were already bugging out.  Worse, there were no guides[7].

Newton’s battalion proceeded west, through Sin-gi, and halted on the MSR about a half-mile outside Tosan.  A narrow dike branched southward from the road, a well-trodden trail from Hill 308 to the MSR.  The footpath was evident because the steady stream of soldiers and 1/5 had no choice but to wait until the Army units had completed their hasty retreat.  At midnight, Newton and his Marines stood alone in a rice field reported crawling with communists.  A short time later, two South Korean civilians approached Newton and identified themselves as the Army’s “official guides.” The skeptical Marine led his battalion along the footpath toward Hill 308.

The pathway took Newton some 1,200 yards in complete darkness.  The march was time-consuming and nerve-racking.  The lead element of the battalion, moving in single file, reached the base of Hill 308 without incident.  The dawn of 9 August was breaking when the last Marine completed the crossing.  Soon after reporting his position, Newton received a radio order from Murray to continue his assault on Hill 308.  Captain John L. Tobin’s Company B took the point.  The climb involved 1,000 feet in elevation and 2,000 yards southward.  It wasn’t long before the sun began taking its toll on the struggling Marines.  While en route, Marines encountered harassing fire from enemy snipers.  By the end of the day, Hill 308 belonged to 1/5.

At 17:00 on 9 August, operational control of all Army and Marine Corps forces in Task Force Kean’s TAOR passed from Craig.  As 1/5 settled in atop Hill 308 and began searching for water sources, Murray radioed Newton. He ordered him to withdraw his unit to the road below and continue his movement to Paedun-ni.  It was an order Newton could not entirely obey because most of his Marines were suffering from heat exhaustion.  Murray was adamant, however, so Newton instructed Captain Tobin and Captain John R. Stevens (Company A) to rest their Marines while he led Captain Walter E. Godenius (H&S Company) and Major John R. Russel (Weapons Company) and a platoon of tanks in the battalion’s vanguard.

When Newton once more reached the base of Hill 308, he discovered that his Japanese maps (which is all he had) were as accurate as Army artillery.  There were no accurate maps in South Korea.  Map grids were incorrect, villages were misnamed and misplaced, and road systems were erroneously plotted.  Maps also lacked contour lines, meaning that elevation was impossible to determine.  Inaccurate maps presented a dangerous situation because ground artillery spotters would have to adjust fire.  The first round out could land on friendly positions, and there was simply no way around it.

Newton had only proceeded a few hundred yards down the MSR when his lead element held up.  There were land mines on the road.  1st Platoon, Company A (Engineers) responded.  The engineers discovered that the obstacles were American anti-tank mines spilled on the roadway from an Army cargo vehicle.  A short time later, Colonel Murray arrived by jeep and informed Newton that he was on the wrong road and traveling in the wrong direction.  It was late afternoon when the column had turned around and resumed the march.  Company A and B rejoined the main body at the top of a 400-foot pass.  Colonel Murray ordered Newton to halt in place and set up a defensive perimeter astride the pass.  At dusk, 1/5 was in position two miles south of the Tosan line of departure — that is, according to Newton’s Japanese maps.

The absence of enemy resistance along the MSR convinced General Craig that the enemy was unprepared to confront the Marines.  To exploit this advantage, he radioed Newton to execute a night attack and capture Paedun-ni before daylight on 10 August.  Since Kean had relieved the Brigade from further “mopping up” duties, 2/5 was once more available for offensive operations.  Roise trucked his Marines to an assembly area near the base of Hill 308, arriving at 21:00.  Within two hours, 2/5 began the march southward to participate in the seizure of Paedun-ni.  2/5 passed through 1/5 at around 01:00.  By this time, the Marines were weary and needed rest.  Luckily, they met no enemy resistance.

Roise’s advance element included three M-26 tanks.  Just outside Paedun-ni, one of the tanks fell through the concrete bridge and wedged between two abutments.  A second tank, attempting to negotiate a narrow bypass next to the bridge, threw a track.  The incident halted Roise’s column for two hours.

2/5 finally reached Paedun-ni at 08:00.  The town was empty of enemy troops.  By 0930, Roise’s reformed battalion was again marching toward Kosong.  Colonel Murray wanted to expedite the movement of Roise’s battalion, so he devised a plan to shuttle the Marines forward with the available vehicles.  It took some time to arrange the shuttle.  Craig arrived by helicopter around 11:00 and expressed his unhappiness with Murray’s progress.  He told them to “march at all speed,” but with an impassable bridge blocking the way of heavy vehicles, there was only so much Murray could do.  He did manage to get five 2½-ton trucks beyond the bridge.  The trucks and ten jeeps began ferrying the Marines forward with what they could carry; the rest continued on foot until more vehicles became available.

Roise’s orders were to seize Kosong and coordinate its defense with the town mayor.  This was probably what Roise was thinking about when lead vehicles began to climb through the Taedabok Pass, a defile about 1,000 yards in length.  Just beyond the defile, entering the village of Pugok, the road skirted the base of a large hill that overlooked the entire length of the pass.  Just abreast of Pugok, enemy machine guns opened up, raking Company D Marines.

The Marines scrambled out of the vehicles and took cover in roadside ditches.  An NKPA anti-tank gun opened up and hit one of the abandoned jeeps.  Captain Zimmer, commanding Company D, ordered his first platoon to seize the high ground on the right side of the road.  First Platoon Marines quickly set in and engaged enemy anti-tank guns.  The second platoon moved up and eradicated small groups of enemies at the entrance to the defile.  Zimmer directed mortar fire at the anti-tank gun, which silenced it but also expended all available 60 mm munitions.  Zimmer decided to hold his company in place until resupplied.  Two tanks arrived at 16:30 —their 90 mm guns driving out the enemy.

Once Taplett’s 3/5 arrived at Paedun-ni, Colonel Murray ordered him to prepare to pass through 2/5 and continue the advance.  3/5 began moving through 2/5 at the entrance to the Taedabok Pass.  Company G had just crossed the departure line and deployed to assault the hill at the bend in the road.  In consultation with Roise, Murray determined that the Marines didn’t know enough about the enemy’s position or strength.

To answer this question, 2/5’s operations officer, Major Morgan J. McNeely, offered to lead a patrol.  At 17:30, McNeely took a jeep with a radio operator and a fire team from Company D to conduct a reconnaissance.  From Taplett’s observation post on the high ground to the left of the road, he saw McNeely heading into danger.  Taplett radioed Captain Bohn to stop the jeep, but it was too late.  As McNeely and his men vanished around the bend in the road around a large hill, there was suddenly a loud clatter of machine guns and small arms fire.  The fate of McNeely’s patrol remained in doubt as Captain Bohn’s Company G moved into the attack.  First Lieutenant Jack Westerman’s platoon took the lead.  Captain Bohn dispatched Second Lieutenant Edward F. Duncan’s platoon to make a sweeping envelopment to the right, which outflanked the NKPA force and drove them from the high ground.

From the crest of the hill, Lieutenant Westerman observed the bullet-riddled jeep with McNeely and his men stretched out motionless on the ground beneath and behind the jeep.  At significant risk to his safety, Westerman made a dash to the jeep, recovered the mortally wounded McNeely, and carried him back to the protection of his platoon.  Westerman reported three of McNeely’s men KIA, with two additional men severely injured, who remained undercover.

When Company G resumed their assault, two additional enemy machine guns opened up.  Taplett dispatched Captain Fegan’s Company H along the left of the MSR.  Fegan seized the hill opposite Bohn’s position.  It was dusk before the Marines silenced the machine gun.  Murray ordered 3/5 to secure for the night set in a defensive perimeter of the two hills already occupied.  The two wounded men would have to wait for a corpsman until the following day.

Except for scattered rifle fire, the night passed quietly.  Taplett fragged his two rifle companies to continue their attack at first light … but before dawn on 11 August, a small force of NKPA troops charged Captain Bohn’s front.  A furious hand-to-hand clash erupted as the enemy charged toward Bohn’s centerline observation post.  Bohn directed the defense as the enemy tossed hand grenades into the company line.  Fragments of one enemy grenade pierced Bohn’s shoulder.  Staff Sergeant Charles F. Kurtz, Jr. called down mortar support while throwing grenades into the enemy’s midst and ducking submachine gun bursts.  The fight lasted 30 minutes, with Bohn’s Marines driving the enemy off the hill.  Despite his wound, Bohn remained with his company and prepared to continue the assault on Kosong.

At 08:00, Taplett’s 3/5 stepped off as the regiment’s advance element; Company G took the battalion front.  Second Lieutenant John D. Counselman’s third platoon assumed the point behind Corporal Raymond Giaquinto.  A mile into the March, Giaquinto called a halt.  The by-now highly pissed off, Giaquinto led his fire team forward at a dead run and captured an enemy machine-gun emplacement, killing five enemies before they could fire a single shot.  Giaquinto swept aside three additional enemy positions.  A series of envelopments brought Captain Bohn to the bridge north of Kosong at 10:00.  At that juncture, Captain Fegan’s company passed through Company G and pushed into town.

Captain Fegan cleared northern Kosong of light enemy resistance using one platoon and two tanks, wheeled right, and continued to Sachon.  Two additional platoons continued moving south and seized the high ground below Sunam-dong.  As Colonel Taplett set up his command post, General Craig arrived in a jeep to confer.  At that moment, enemy snipers opened up from positions around a schoolhouse.  Marines returned fire immediately, and the Koreans dived off life’s stage.   

Shortly after Captain Fegan entered Kosong, Captain Bohn turned his company southwest and assaulted Hill 88 to eliminate what turned out to be a somewhat stubborn group of NKPA soldiers.  Bohn called in for air and artillery support.  When delivered, the communists decided they’d had enough and made a hasty retreat.  General Craig called a halt to Taplett’s mission to secure Kosong; instead, he wanted an immediate attack on Sachon.  Taplett recalled Captain Bohn and organized his battalion for an attack on Sachon.

Moments, before Captain Fegan stepped off with Company H, Navy Corpsman William H. Anderson, raced his jeep ambulance to pick up casualties from Company G below Hill 88.  Passing through Fegan’s lead element, Anderson failed to make the turn southward and sped toward Sachon.  Two enemy anti-tank guns waiting west of Kosong blasted Anderson’s jeep, killing him and spilling two casualties out of the wrecked vehicle.  Captain Fegan led two tanks forward.  Technical Sergeant Johnnie C. Cottrell blasted the NKPA positions with rounds of 90 mm death—and Taplett’s 3/5 continued their drive for Sachon.

Sources:

1. Appleman, R. E.  South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu.  Washington: Department of the Army, 1998.
2. Catchpole, B.  The Korean War.  London: Robinson Publishing, 2001.
3. Geer, A.  The New Breed: The Story of the U.S. Marines in Korea. New York: Harper & Bros., 1952.
4. Hastings, M.  The Korean War.  New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988.
5. Varhola, M. J.  Fire and Ice: The Korean War, 1950-1953.  Mason City: Da Capo Press, 2000.

Endnotes:

[1] There is not much information available about Colonel Newton.  In 1941, 1stLt Newton served at the U.S. Embassy, Peking, China, when the Japanese captured and interned him as a prisoner of war until 1945.  Newton’s combat decorations include the Silver Star medal and Legion of Merit in recognition of his courageous and meritorious service in the Korean War.  Colonel Newton retired from active service in 1962.

[2] Colonel Harold S. Roise (1916-1991) commanded the Marine Detachment, USS Maryland on 7 Dec 1941, the USS Alabama on station in the North Atlantic, and during the Battle for Okinawa in World War II.  Colonel Roise’s combat decorations include two (2) Navy Cross medals, the Silver Star medal, Legion of Merit, and Purple Heart.  Roise retired from active service in 1964.

[3] Colonel Robert D. Taplett (1918-2004) commanded the Marine Detachment, USS Salt Lake City on 7 Dec 1941.  The ship, undamaged, later participated in the Battle of the Coral Sea (1942) and Battle of the Aleutian Islands (1943).  Taplett’s combat decorations include the Navy Cross Medal, two (2) Silver Star medals, the Bronze Star medal, and Legion of Merit.  Taplett retired from active service in 1960.  Taplett authored a book entitled Dark Horse Six (2003) about his Korean War service.

[4] Both Fegan and Bohn attained flag rank; Fegan retired as a lieutenant general, and Bohn retired as a major general.

[5] The task force included elements of the 25th U.S. Infantry Division under Major General William B. Kean (minus one regiment and one artillery battalion), reinforced by the 5th Marine Regiment.  LtGen Walker (CG 8thArmy) intended a counter-offensive to deny the NKPA 6th Division from operating in Masan and Chinju.

[6] Tactical Area of Responsibility.

[7] Night reliefs are complex at best — and treacherous.  It is hard to know who is stumbling around in the dark.

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