Squad Leader

Even though he only stood around 5’9” tall, people came away with the impression that he was taller.  I think this was because Sergeant Giacalone[1] scrupulously maintained his military bearing; his uniform and appearance were always impeccable; he stood tall, he walked tall, and he expected the same from anyone wearing the uniform of a United States Marine.  He would not tolerate a slovenly Marine — no matter what his rank.

Sergeant Giacalone’s posture was so correct that I never once observed his head turning without the rest of his body turning with it.  This was likely the result of Sergeant Giacalone having once served as a Marine Corps Drill Instructor — before the Korean War.  The Korean War was when Giacalone earned a silver star, a bronze star, and two Purple Heart medals.

When I knew Sergeant Giacalone, he had only recently been promoted to sergeant — for the second time.  No one in the squad knew any of the details of his court-martial; there was no reason why anyone should.  In those days, a Marine who screwed up could be redeemed.  It was a simple formula: charge him, court-martial him, punish him, and send him back to duty.  I lament this is no longer true.

In Sergeant Giacalone’s case, somewhere in his career (which began sometime in 1948), this squared-away former drill instructor developed a drinking problem.  It wasn’t a frequent problem — and it never happened while on duty, but when it did happen, it was always noteworthy.  Maybe he had woman troubles.  We never knew.  It wasn’t something a squared-away sergeant would ever discuss with the snuffies.  What we did know about our squad leader was all we had to know.  What we learned was that he was one hell of a field Marine; what we knew was that while our Lord might lay claim to our souls, our miserable snuffy asses belonged to Sergeant Giacalone.

Our squad leader was up before reveille; he only hit the rack long after taps.  He kept himself and his squad squared away.  Inspecting officers never found our uniforms or equipment deficient — that’s because Sergeant Giacalone made it his business to inspect us long before any officers showed up.  We would not embarrass him in front of the company officers or the rest of the platoon.

Whether in garrison or the field, Sergeant Giacalone expected us to act so that we brought credit to ourselves, our squad, and our unit.  It was hard to turn around anywhere and not see Sergeant Giacalone observing us.  He lived in the barracks, in the NCO quarters at the end of the squad bay.  Whether we were in the field or not, there would be no horsing around.  If there was time for horsing around, there was time to study our guidebooks or complete an MCI course.  The Marine Corps is a serious business — no time for slouching around.  Those were the rules.  I can hear him now, reminding us, “Focus people.”

The third squad stood in awe of Sergeant Giacalone, but then so too did everyone else.  Even our company commander respected what Giacalone knew about field operations.  Sergeant Giacalone took what our drill instructors taught us about teamwork to the next level.  He was patient, repetitive, and direct.  Time permitting, he would explain why this or why that, but no matter what, he issued his orders, and we obeyed them.

It was impossible not to admire Sergeant Giacalone, and it wasn’t long before we began to emulate his mannerisms.  In formations, we stood tall because he demanded it.  We learned to square ourselves away because he expected no less of us.  No other squad in Echo Company could stand up to us; we were in Giacalone’s third herd.  Looking back, 61 years, he was a worthy example.  I cannot speak for the rest of the men, but for me personally, I carried a part of Sergeant Giacalone with me for the next three decades and into retirement.

There were, admittedly, a few occasions when Sergeant Giacalone was “too direct,” particularly when addressing seniors.  He had no patience with officers when they meddled in matters that fell into the exclusive realm of the Marine Corps NCO.  In such instances, he might suggest, “Excuse me, sir, but isn’t there something else you could be doing that is more suitable for an officer of your rank?”

Sergeant Giacalone may have been a rank-conscious snob, albeit in reverse.  He avoided officers whenever possible, but when trapped, he was always correct and professional, as befitting an experienced NCO.  Among those of us who were learning the trade, there was no such thing as a stupid question; officers, however, didn’t have that luxury.  He expected more from college-educated lieutenants, and a silly question from one of these fellows may have elicited, “Sir, as you may recall from your second or third week of basic training …”

Sergeant Giacalone did have his biases, however.  He did not like navy officers, swabbies, women Marines, disbursing pogues, shore patrol/military police, or mess sergeants.

I was one of Sergeant Giacalone’s snuffles in 1963 — snuffy being anyone below the rank of corporal.  Since I was unprivileged, I don’t have any details about the events that allegedly occurred in the parking lot adjacent to the NCO Club.  The rumor, however, was that there was a sergeant, an officer of the day, and several military police, the initial group of whom called for a backup.  Sergeant Giacalone, it seemed, periodically went on a binge.  I never saw the man in his cups, but snuffles didn’t run with the big dogs. 

In any case, Sergeant Giacalone became a corporal a few days later.  Rumor control had it that when Sergeant Giacalone went in to see the old man for nonjudicial punishment, he took his medicine, offered no excuses, apologized for his behavior, and agreed to talk to the “doc” about dealing with his demons.  The company commander had a good size chunk of his ass, of course, broke him down in rank, fined him … but then sent him back to work.  That’s how it was back then: mess up, pay up, get back to work.  Giacalone was the only corporal in our company to serve as a squad leader.

Eighteen months later, I received orders sending me to another duty station.  I checked out of the company and said goodbye to my squad mates.  I thanked Corporal Giacalone for his leadership and his patience.  He shook my hand and said, “Take care of yourself.  And don’t embarrass me, goddamn it.” The last time I heard anything about Giacalone, he served as a gunnery sergeant in Vietnam.  It’s where he died while trying to save one of his men.  Semper Fidelis.

Notes:

[1] The story is true; the name is fictional.


Second Battle of the Naktong Bulge

Background

When North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) forces invaded the Republic of South Korea (ROK), they did so with superiority in both manpower and equipment.  The NKPA benefitted from the training, arms, and equipment provided by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).  North Korea’s President Kim Il-sung took his orders directly from Joseph Stalin.

The NKPA’s mission was to aggressively pursue United Nations forces and the fledgling ground forces of the Republic of South Korea, attacking them frontally and from the flanks until they had surrounded and destroyed all resistance.[1]  The strategy worked well enough in the first three months of their invasion; between 25 June and late August 1950, the NKPA continually attacked, mauled, and demoralized ROC and UN forces, pushing them ever southward to what became the Pusan Perimeter.  As numerically inferior ROC and UN forces withdrew southward in an often disorderly manner, they left behind their dead, their wounded, and their “missing in action.”  They also abandoned critical wartime equipment, which the NKPA later used against the Allied forces.

When the NKPA approached the Pusan Perimeter, however, their frontal attacks were only marginally successful; envelopment operations were even less so.  It was from within the Pusan Perimeter that UN forces, primarily the United States Army with only token participation by UN and NATO allies, began the process of reorganization, reinforcement, and resupply.[2]

See also: First Battle of the Naktong Bulge.

Following the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge, Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, commanding the U.S. Eighth Army, assigned the defense of the Naktong Line to the inexperienced Second U.S. Infantry Division (2 ID).[3]  His decision made 2 ID the main target of several enemy infantry divisions.  The NKPA intended to split 2 ID, thus rendering it incapable of massed resistance.  The NKPA’s success enabled the communists to penetrate Yongsan.

A Second Battle Evolves

The 5th Marine’s earlier assault upon the NKPA 4th Infantry Division at the cloverleaf rendered that division ineffective as a combat force.  Similarly, US Army units pushed the NKPA 6th Infantry Division back across the Naktong River.  In the Taegu region of South Korea in late August, three U.S. divisions repulsed five enemy infantry/armored divisions.  The main battles in this engagement included the Battle of Masan, the Battle of Chindong-ni, the Battle of Komam-ni, the Battle of the Mountain, and the Battle of the Bowling Alley, which rendered the NKPA 13th Infantry Division ineffective.  On South Korea’s east coast, ROK infantry divisions pushed back three additional NKPA divisions at Pohang-dong.  [Pictured: Captain Francis Ike Fenton, Jr., Commanding Officer, Company B 1/5 August 1950 (titled: The face of war).][4]

Reeling from the American assault, the enemy commander decided to reinitiate offensive operations.  Still, in light of the U.S. Navy’s lethal naval gunfire support to ground forces, they avoided future flanking movements.  Instead, the NKPA opted for a series of frontal assaults to breach the U.S. perimeter.  The communists reasoned that it was their only hope of achieving victory.

Supplied with intelligence from the USSR, the NKPA was well aware that MacArthur’s U.N. command was building up its forces within the Pusan Perimeter.  The defeat of these new units was critical to the NKPA’s overall success in pushing the Americans into the Sea of Japan.  Moreover, to achieve a final victory, the NKPA would have to surround Taegu and destroy all UN/US forces defending it.  Cutting the main supply route (MSR) into Taegu would be critical to achieving that objective.

The NKPA plan called for a five-pronged assault.  In the center, the 9th, 4th, 2nd, and 10th NKPA divisions would overwhelm 2 ID at the Naktong Bulge and seize Miryang and Yongsan.  The attack would commence on September 1, 1950.

On September 1, the 35th Regiment (25 ID) engaged the enemy in the Battle of the Nam River, north of Masan.  On the 35th’s right was the 9th Regiment (part of 2 ID).  The 9th occupied a front extending over 18,000 meters (11.2 miles), which included a portion of the Naktong Bulge.  Each regiment’s rifle company had a defensive front of 910 to 1,220 meters, but in reality, these units only held the key hills and observation points.  The area assigned to the 9th Regiment was unrealistic, far exceeding its defense capability.  The regiment had been observing enemy activity to their front for several days.  The regimental operations officer assumed that the NKPA was reinforcing their defensive positions.  One indication of likely lethal action was when civilian laborers supporting the NKPA fled the front lines.

The NKPA 9th Infantry Division intended to outflank and destroy the US army at the Naktong Bulge by capturing Miryang and Samnang-jin.  This action would cut off 2 ID’s MSR and escape route between Taegu and Pusan.  The NKPA also planned to attack 24 ID, an organization the North Koreans knew was exhausted after several weeks of fighting.  Unknown to the North Koreans, the American 2 ID replaced 24 ID on the line.  On the night of August 31, elements of the NKPA 9th began crossing the Naktong River.

The soldiers of 2 ID were fresh — but most of the men were inexperienced and without a clue about what would happen when the enemy attacked.  The NKPA overran the young troopers amid green flares and shrill whistles and pushed many of them to the 25 ID line.   

Another call for the Fire Brigade

The Pusan perimeter is like a weakened dike; the Army intends to use us to plug the holes as they open.  We’re a brigade —a fire brigade.  It will be costly fighting against a numerically superior enemy.  Marines have never lost a battle; this brigade will not be the first to establish such a precedent.  Prepare to move.”  — Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, USMC.

By September 1, less than thirty days from the beginning of their fight, the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade (1stMarBde) was down to around 4,300 men; in less than 30 days, the Marines had taken 500 casualties.  Word had come down to the Brigade Commander, Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, that the Marines would come off the line.  They were needed elsewhere.  No one in the ranks knew where, exactly, and no one asked, but it would have to be better than the Pusan Perimeter.  Craig knew what was coming — as did General Douglas A. MacArthur and Major General Oliver P. Smith, USMC.  However, preparations for moving the Marines came to a halt early in the morning of September 1, 1950.

The following day, the 1st and 2nd Regiments of the NKPA (9th Infantry Division) stood a few miles short of Yongsan.  Facing them were the shattered remains of Easy Company, 2nd Battalion, US 9th.  There were no other UN/US troops to defend Yongsan.  The 2 ID commander, Major General Lawrence B. Keiser, had formed ad hoc units from his support troops to shore up Easy Company.  Still, it would not be enough to withstand a further assault by the enemy division.

In Tokyo, Major General Doyle O. Hickey, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, United Nations Far East Command, wanted to know when General Walker intended to release the Marines for further assignment.  In his answer, General Walker described the situation: “The 2nd ID has been shattered, and the ground between what remained of it, and the 25 ID line, is in grave peril.”  Walker said he did not think he could save the 2nd ID without the Marines.  MacArthur approved Walker’s further use of the 1stMarBde, and they soon became attached to General Keiser’s command.[5]

 Subsequently, Walker ordered Keiser to destroy enemy units east of the Naktong River and restore the 2 ID main line of resistance (MLR).  Walker informed Keiser and Craig that he would release the Marines as soon as Keiser accomplished that mission.  Following a council of war between the Eighth Army, 2 ID, and 1stMarBde on September 2, a decision was taken to mount a counterattack the next morning.  The 5th Marines would commence its attack to the west at 08:00 on September 3, astride the Yongsan-Naktong Road.  Army units would attack northwest from a position above the Marines and attempt to tie in with the 23rd Regiment.  On the Marines’ left, what remained of the 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion, 1/9th, and the 72nd Tank Battalion would attack south to reestablish contact with 25 ID.

Marines were scheduled to relieve George and Fox companies 2/9th and 2nd Combat Engineers at 0300 and 0430 on September 3.  The second battalion, 5th Marines (2/5) under Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise, assembled north of Yongsan.  Lieutenant Colonel George R. Newton’s 1/5 assembled south of Yongsan.  Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett’s 3/5 provided area security southwest of Yongsan, covering the enemy’s likely avenues of approach.  Fighting began during the night of September 2-3, with Marines gaining high ground to serve as their line of departure.  With the help of Marine tank fire, G 2/5 overcame heavy NKPA resistance, but the fight delayed a coordinated advance of the two line battalions.  The Marines “jumped off” at 0855 toward the NKPA high ground, one-half mile distant.

A coordinated assault by aircraft, artillery, and pissed-off Marine infantry caused NKPA forces in front of them to break off and withdraw.  Machine gun fire from 1/5 caught the NKPA reinforcements in the open and slaughtered them in the hundreds.  By noon, 1/5 possessed Hill 91.

North of the road, 2/5 had a more difficult time in their advance.  Heavy NKPA fire halted the Marines short of Hill 116, 2 miles west of Yongsan.  Owing to the Koreans’ stubborn resistance, the battle raged through most of the night, and D 1/5 found itself isolated in the cut between Hill 91 and Hill 116.  West of Yongsan, Marine tanks knocked out four T-34 tanks; a fifth tank was abandoned when the communist crew decided to seek employment elsewhere.  During the fight, 2/5 gave up 34 dead and 77 wounded.

Just before midnight on September 3, the CO 5th Marines (Colonel Murray) ordered Taplett to lead his 3/5 through Roise’s 2/5 and prepare for a resumption of the attack the following day.  That night, heavy rain brought an end to a perfectly crappy day for the Marines.  3/5 held up just short of 2/5’s rear.  By dawn, the sky was clear, and 2/5 continued its advance — at first, against little opposition.

At 0800, 2/5 resumed its advance north of the road and seized Hill 116.  During the night, under cover of dense rain, the NKPA 9th Division withdrew.  South of the road, 1/5 occupied what appeared to have been the enemy Division’s command post.  The Marines found abandoned tents and equipment, including two fully functional T-34 tanks.  Advancing Marines, supported by tanks, found enemy dead strewn all about.  By nightfall, the Marines had advanced another 5 kilometers.

On September 5, 1950, Murray called for preparatory artillery fire before the Marine’s third day in the assault.  The heavy rain soaked the Marines and placed them in the right frame of mind for intense combat.  The ground was soggy and slippery.  While slogging forward toward Obong-ni Ridge, the 9th Regiment moved into the cloverleaf where the battle had raged in the previous month.  At midmorning, after the Marines spotted the enemy digging in on the high ground ahead, they took positions between two hills.  At around 1430, 300 enemy infantry suddenly appeared from concealed positions inside the village of Tugok and fanatically charged the Marines of B 1/5.  Able Company, supporting Army artillery, and 81mm mortars repelled the attack, but not before Baker Company suffered 25 casualties. Pictured right, Navy Corpsmen aid wounded Marines.

As the NKPA began its assault on Company B, two T-34 tanks surprised and knocked out two of the Marine’s leading M-26 (Pershing) tanks.  Because the two wounded tanks blocked their field of fire, four other Marine tanks withdrew to better firing positions.  Tank assault teams from Company B took the T-34s under fire, destroying both, along with an enemy armored personnel carrier.

September 5 was a tough day for US forces.  Army units suffered 105 killed, 430 wounded, and 587 missing in action (1,119 total casualties.  Marine casualties were 35 dead and 91 wounded (126 total).  The Allied offensive of September 3-5 was one of the bloodiest battles of the Korean War.  It was a time when the enemy’s 4th and 9th Infantry Divisions ceased to exist as combat units.

Against his will, Lieutenant General Walker released the Marines late at night on September 4th; they began pulling out for Pusan just a little after midnight.  General MacArthur replaced the 5th Marine Regiment with two Army regiments: the 17th and 65th Infantry Regiments.  General Walker did not think two Army regiments were a suitable replacement for one understrength Marine regiment, but he had no further say in the matter.

The First Marine Brigade traveled to Japan and was absorbed into the 1st Marine Division.  In ten days, the men of the 5th Marine Regiment and Marine Aircraft Group 33 would participate in one of the world’s most spectacular and difficult amphibious landings.  They called it INCHON.

Sources:

  1. Alexander, B.  Korea: The First War We Lost.  Hippocrene Books, 2003.
  2. Blair, C., Jr.  The Forgotten War.  Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
  3. Fehrenbach, T. R.  This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness.  New York: Macmillan Co., 1963.
  4. Gugeler, R. A.  Combat Actions in Korea.  Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2005.
  5. Halberstam, D.  The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War.  New York, Hyperion Books, 2007.
  6. Malkasian, C.  The Korean War.  Osprey Publishing, 2001.
  7. Simmons, E. H.  The United States Marines: A History.  Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
  8. Tucker, S. C., ed.  Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History.  Santa Barbara: Checkmark Books, 2002.
  9. Varhola, M. J.  Fire and Ice: The Korean War, 1950-1953.  Mason City: Da Capo Press, 2000.

Endnotes:

[1] The United Nations Command (also UNC) is the multinational military force that supported the Republic of Korea during and after the Korean War (which, technically, is still underway).  As Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) and Commander of the United Nations Command, Douglas MacArthur commanded all Allied forces during the Korean War.

[2] U.S. logistical power provided the wherewithal for the beleaguered Army units to resist overwhelming North Korean forces and begin planning a counter-offensive.

[3] Walker (1889-1950) graduated from the USMA in 1907 and served in the First and Second World Wars and the early months of the Korean War.  While commanding the 8th US Army, Walker was killed in a jeep accident. 

[4] Captain (later Colonel Fenton) (1922-1998) was the son of Brigadier General Francis I. Fenton, Sr.  During the Battle of Okinawa, F. I. Fenton, Sr., served as the 1st Marine Division combat engineer.  It was during this battle that he learned that his youngest son, PFC Michael Fenton, serving as a scout sniper with Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, had been killed near Sugar Loaf Hill.

[5] This was the second time in Marine Corps history that Marines served with the U.S.  Second Infantry Division—the first time within the 4th Marine Brigade in World War I.


First Battle of the Naktong Bulge

Background

Late in 1945, President Harry S. Truman appointed Dean Gooderham Acheson (1893-1971) to serve as Undersecretary of State, a position Acheson retained through three successive cabinet secretaries of state.  In this role, Acheson was conciliatory toward the Soviet Union, a position he kept even through Joseph Stalin’s attempts to seize Eastern Europe and Southwest Asia.  It was only late in the game that Acheson “changed his thinking” and became more than an observer of the Cold War; he became its architect.

Due to the frequent absences of the Secretary of State, Undersecretary Dean Acheson often served as “Acting Secretary,” and this placed him in constant contact with the President.  Eventually, Acheson and Truman formed a close relationship, and Acheson became the author of President Truman’s containment policy (Truman Doctrine).  Undersecretary Acheson also directed the formulation of the US economic aid program to Europe, also known as the Marshall Plan.  Acheson and Truman both believed that the best way to curb the Soviet Union’s aggressive policies was to restore economic prosperity to Western Europe and encourage interstate cooperation.

Acheson became Secretary of State in 1949.  He refined the Truman Doctrine and became the primary designer of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  That summer, the press and political opposition began asking questions about Mao Zedong’s success in the Chinese Civil War.  Acheson prepared a 1,054-page report titled United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 — also known as the China White Paper.  Acheson argued that US intervention in China (1945-1947) was doomed to failure.  Whatever Acheson hoped to achieve in writing this voluminous document failed.  The American press blamed the Truman administration for the spread of communism in China — and they were probably right.

On January 12, 1950, Mr. Acheson appeared before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., to deliver a speech about the Cold War in East Asia.  In his speech, he carefully defined the so-called American Defense Perimeter as a warning to China and the Soviet Union that the United States was committed to its containment policy.  Acheson said that the defense perimeter in the Pacific extended as a line running through Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines.  He neglected to mention the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China (Taiwan), which signaled to the Chinese and Soviets that the United States would not guarantee the security of either.  In the minds of many, the United States had betrayed the Koreans and Taiwanese.  In a little over six months, in the early morning hours of 25 June 1950, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) launched a full-scale invasion of South Korea.  They were backed, trained, supplied, and advised by the Soviet Union.

The timing of the North Korean attack could not have been better.  In June 1950, Truman’s Defense policies had almost completely dismantled the United States military.  Truman’s demobilization of the armed forces substantially reduced the number of combat-experienced soldiers assigned to forward units.  The Army’s forward-most combat unit was the US 24th Infantry Division (24 ID), stationed in Japan as part of the post-war occupation force.  Truman’s cuts had reduced the 24 ID to about fifty percent of its wartime strength.

The Commanding General of the 24 ID was Major General William F. Dean.  Most of the men assigned to this division were poorly trained conscripts.  Their combat equipment was obsolete, poorly maintained, and barely operable.  In the entire infantry division, General Dean had one combat-ready battalion.

The 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment (1/21), under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith, consisted of two reinforced rifle companies and an artillery battery (540 men).[1]  Designated Task Force Smith, the Army promptly dispatched 2/21 to Taejon, South Korea.  From Taejon, Smith was to proceed to Osan to confront North Korea’s 75,000-man invasion force.  Smith’s mission was to block advancing North Korean forces until the rest of 24 ID could be organized and dispatched to South Korea.[2]

General Dean’s orders to Smith were, “When you get to Pusan, head for Taejon.  Block the main road as far north as possible.  Establish contact with [Brigadier] General [John H.] Church.[3]  If you can’t find him, go to Taejon and beyond if you can.  Sorry, I can’t give you more information — that’s all I’ve got.”

As Smith’s task force began moving north to Osan, Major General Dean flew into the Taejon airfield to take charge of the 24 ID’s advance element; the US 34th Infantry Regiment soon followed to reinforce Task Force Smith.  Dean determined to hold the NKPA advance at Osan.  He assigned Brigadier General George B. Barth, the Division’s artillery commander, to assume overall command of Task Force Smith.

At Task Force Smith’s point of contact with the enemy on July 3, Smith’s six 105mm howitzers unleashed a barrage upon the enemy’s lead T-34 tanks.  Since none of his artillery munitions were powerful enough to stop the Russian-built tanks, Smith’s effort had no effect on the advancing NKPA.  It was only when Smith’s howitzers fired High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) rounds at point-blank range that they had any impact on the Russian tanks.  Still, it wasn’t enough to stop the advance of an NKPA infantry regiment following behind the tanks, and Smith’s position was quickly overrun.  When 1/21’s untrained troops ran out of ammunition, an orderly withdrawal soon turned into a massive foot race to the rear.

Smith did accomplish his mission, however.  He delayed the NKPA advance for about two hours.  The reinforced battalion of 540 men suffered 60 dead, 21 wounded, 82 captured (32 of whom died in captivity),[4], and around 150 temporarily displaced stragglers during the route.

After the defeat of Task Force Smith, MajGen Dean ordered the US 34th to implement delaying tactics south of Osan, but it too suffered a defeat at Pyongtaek.  Upset by the regiment’s poor performance, General Dean fired the regimental commander, Colonel J. B. Loveless, and replaced him with a friend of Dean’s, Colonel Robert R. Martin.  Dean ordered Martin to stop the NKPA at Chonan.  The following day, Dean and General Walker visited Chonan to inspect the regiment and observe the battle’s outcome.  They found Colonel Martin dead, the regiment defeated, and its survivors in disarray.  Dean ordered the remnants of the regiment to withdraw to the Kum River and directed the two remaining battalions of the 21st Regiment to conduct a delaying action.

On 12 July, MajGen Dean ordered his three regiments (19th, 34th, and 21st) to cross the Kum River, destroy all bridges behind them, and establish a defensive line around Taejon.  The 19th Regiment had 2,276 men; the 34th had around 2,020; after suffering 1,433 casualties, the 21st Regiment could field 1,100 men.  Dean had an additional 2,007 men in his artillery units.  Between 13-16 July, the 24 ID suffered an additional 650 casualties as two NKPA infantry divisions pushed the Americans out of Taejon city, block by block.

On 20 July, Major General Dean ordered the 34th Regiment to withdraw while he remained behind to help evacuate wounded men.  Dean took command of the rear element of the withdrawal, which enemy forces ambushed.  Dean, having been separated from his command, was ultimately taken prisoner.  General Church assumed command of the division.

Naktong

The Naktong River curves westward opposite the town of Yongsan in a wide semicircular loop.  For most of this loop, the river’s width is around 400 meters, and its depth averages six feet.  Military troops can wade across rivers, but it is a grueling task given bottom silt and currents.  A depth of six feet is too deep for fording vehicles.

24 ID occupied an area 16 miles long adjacent to the Naktong River.  The division’s perimeter consisted of lightly defended observation posts on the surrounding high ground.  The killing ground between the river and eastward hills was suitable for pre-registered artillery and mortar fire.  Still, the understrength division was too widely dispersed to allow for interlocking fields of small arms and automatic weapons fire.  The 34th Regiment occupied the southern half, west of Yongsan, and the 21st Regiment occupied the northern half, west of Changyong.  General Church placed the 19th Regiment in reserve.  On August 5, 1950, the division’s total strength was 14,540.

During the night of August 5-6, an 800-man KPA force crossed the river undetected near Yongsan.  Another force attempted to cross the river further north, but the Americans detected them,  pummeled them, and forced them back.  North Koreans engaged 3/34 at around 0200, forcing the battalion to abandon its command post and establish secondary positions.  The attack threatened to split 24 ID.

1/34 was dispatched to reclaim the lost ground but was ambushed enroute.  The Korean force penetrated three miles east of the Naktong, halfway to Yongsan.  Several units of the 34th began a retreat northward into the lines of the 21st, but General Church ordered them to turn around.  The 19th launched a counter-attack along the 34th Regiment’s northern flank, trapping three hundred North Korean soldiers in a nearby village, killing most of them.  While the 19th and elements of the 34th managed to push enemy forces back, the NKPA stubbornly held onto their bridgehead.  During the night of August 6-7, the North Koreans made several attempts to cross the river.  South Korean (ROK) forces repulsed one attempt, but the NKPA succeeded in another.

24 ID continued counter-attacking on August 7, but their gains were slow, hampered by a determined enemy, extremely high temperatures, and a shortage of drinking water.  The NKPA pressed to regain territory adjacent to Oblong-ni, to them, critical terrain that sat astride the main road in the Naktong bulge.  Late that afternoon, the US 9th Regiment reinforced 24 ID.  The 9th Regiment was a fresh, well-equipped regiment, but its men needed combat experience.  Nevertheless, a vigorous attack enabled the American Army to reclaim part of Cloverleaf Hill before being held off by a well-entrenched enemy.

The battle continued to rage on August 7-8 as the NKPA attempted to send two additional battalions across the river.  The 21st Regiment repulsed this enemy.  Undeterred, however, the NKPA relocated their battalions south, where they successfully crossed the river at the bridgehead.  By mid-morning on August 8, a full enemy regiment was poised to assault the American positions.  North Korean gains were expensive to both sides, but neither side was able to achieve a decisive advantage over the other.

Meanwhile, the NKPA had constructed an underwater bridge of sandbags, logs, and rocks to move trucks, heavy artillery, additional infantry, and tanks across the river.  On August 10, the North Koreans had two fully resupplied regiments across the Naktong and occupied fortified positions.

General Church assembled a large force under Colonel John G. Hill, Commanding the 9th Regiment.  Dubbed Task Force Hill, Colonel Hill commanded elements of the 9th, 19th, 21st, and 34th regiments, with supporting artillery.  Hill’s mission was to drive the NKPA from the east river bank on August 11.  While Hill organized his assault force, the NKPA 4th Division moved southward, outflanking Task Force Hill. 

General Walker realized that the upcoming fight would be desperate.  To strengthen the 24th Infantry Division, General Walker ordered the recently arrived 2nd and 24th Infantry Divisions to tie in with Church’s beleaguered division.  Meanwhile, General Church began forming provisional infantry units from his supply and maintenance units.  On August 13, the 23rd and 27th Regiments were able to push NKPA troops out of Yongsan.  Early in the morning of August 14, Colonel Hill launched an assault against the North Korean cloverleaf defenses.  A series of attacks and counterattacks continued for most of the day, and both sides took many casualties.

Hill’s force could not penetrate the NKPA defenses.  The number of officers killed threatened the effectiveness of the assault units, and there were significant disruptions to unit communications.  By the end of the next day, the fight had become one of attrition.  Frustrated, General Walker turned to the United States Marines.

How Battles Are Won

Truman’s inept post-World War II demobilization of the Armed Forces affected the smaller Marine Corps in greater proportion than any of the other services, mainly because Truman detested the idea of maintaining a Marine Corps and had no tolerance for doing so.  A Marine Corps wasn’t necessary, he argued.  The United States already had the Army.  Nor did Truman or his Defense Secretary, Louis Johnson, think America needed a Navy; they had the Air Force.  Secretary Johnson informed the Chief of Naval Operations that the Navy was obsolete.  That argument fell apart early in the morning of June 25, 1950.

On 25 June 1950, the 1st Marine Division was in cadre status; the division had one under-strength infantry regiment (the 5th Marines) and a substantially reduced number of supporting units.  Instead of three battalions, the 5th Marine Regiment had only two.  Each battalion had two rifle companies (rather than three), a reduced weapons company, and half of what was needed for a fully supportive headquarters and service company.  The regiment’s combat equipment was left over from the Second World War.

If there was a miracle surrounding the early part of the Korean War, it was that the Marines at Camp Pendleton could form a combat brigade and set sail for Korea within forty days.  To achieve this miracle, the Marines undertook two massive efforts between 25 June and 3 August: (1) Form, equip, and transport a lethal 4,700-man combat brigade across the Pacific Ocean to Pusan, South Korea, and (2) the Marines reactivated, staffed, trained, and reequipped the 1st Marine Division for service in Korea.  To achieve these goals, the Marine Corps reduced its support establishment by two-thirds, activated the Marine Corps Reserve, and shifted seven thousand Marines from East Coast units to Camp Pendleton, California.

The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (1stMarBde) was activated on July 7 and sailed within a week for Pusan, arriving on August 3.  Brigadier General Edward A. Craig commanded the brigade, which consisted of the under-strength 5th Marine Regiment and Provisional Marine Aircraft Group-33.[5]  Upon arrival in Korea, General Craig reported to the CG 8th US Army, LtGen Walker.

The 1stMarBde went into action on the day of its arrival in Korea.  Walker assigned the Marines to reinforce the 25 ID and the Army’s 5th Regimental Combat Team (5RCT) under Major General William B. Kean, US Army.  In total, Kean commanded roughly 20,000 men.  The Brigade’s first mission was to attack enemy forces in the area of Masan, seize Chinju, and mount a push toward the Nam and Kum rivers.  Designated Task Force Kean, 25 ID, began its offensive on 7 August.

General Craig’s Marines surged forward to Pansong, rapidly inflicting nearly 400 casualties on the NKPA 6th Division and overrunning its headquarters.  Army units, however, were stalled by fierce enemy resistance.[6]  Task Force (TF) Kean trudged toward Chindong-ni, but the fragmented force produced a confused battle zone where American units were too often isolated and necessitated resupply by air.  Not long after Kean initiated his offensive, the NKPA began one of their own.

Marine Aircraft Group 33 provided air support to TF Kean by delivering air strikes on enemy positions.  On August 10, Marine pilots destroyed the NKPA 83rd Motorized Regiment, allowing Craig’s Marines to make a fast advance toward Chindong-ni — only to be halted by General Kean and redeployed to another sector of what became a fragmented battlefield.  Four days passed, and Kean still failed to achieve his two primary objectives: divert NKPA forces from the north and prevent them from reaching the Chinju Pass.

Meanwhile, General Walker became frustrated with the lack of progress of 24 ID against the NKPA 4th Division, which had pushed elements of the 34th Regiment from their several positions and, in the process, captured much of its organic combat equipment — including artillery.  The North Koreans were poised to split the US defensive line and cut off the American’s main supply route (MSR).  Despite repeated efforts to dislodge the NKPA from their well-fortified positions, 24 ID suffered one devastating setback after another.  Mounting Army casualties prompted Walker to redirect Craig’s Marines into the cloverleaf.[7]

Colonel Raymond L. Murray, Commanding Officer of the 5th Marines, launched his assault on 17 August.[8]  Initially, NKPA resistance was tenacious, but these communists were no longer facing untested US soldiers.  A large percentage of the officers and NCOs serving in the 5th Marines were combat veterans of the Pacific War.  By August 17, the Marines had been fighting for 14 days and were pretty well pissed off.  As Marines have always done, they followed their gutsy leaders into the bowels of hell.  Employing well-coordinated combined arms, Murray’s Marines forced the NKPA out of their fortifications and overwhelmed them, one hill at a time.

How bad was it for the NKPA 4th Division?  General George S. Patton, were he still alive, might have felt sorry for the North Koreans.  By the time one understrength Marine regiment was finished with the 4th NKPA Infantry Division, it had no more than 300 troops left alive in each of its regiments — not all of whom were interested in sticking around for the finale.  Murray’s Marines had killed 1,200 communists; another 2-3,000 North Koreans (the smarter ones) had thrown down their weapons and deserted.  The 5th Marines gave up 67 dead and 278 wounded to achieve this victory.  Co-located Army units suffered 1,800 losses (one-third of those were killed in action).

But the battle for the Pusan Perimeter was far from over.

Meanwhile, General Douglas A. MacArthur had a plan in the works, and the U. S. Navy/Marine Corps team would play a key role in its execution.  They were the only American forces who could have pulled it off.

Sources:

  1. Alexander, B.  Korea: The First War We Lost.  Hippocrene Books, 2003.
  2. Blair, C., Jr.  The Forgotten War.  Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
  3. Fehrenbach, T. R.  This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness.  New York: Macmillan Co., 1963.
  4. Gugeler, R. A.  Combat Actions in Korea.  Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2005.
  5. Halberstam, D.  The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War.  New York, Hyperion Books, 2007.
  6. Malkasian, C.  The Korean War.  Osprey Publishing, 2001.
  7. Simmons, E. H.  The United States Marines: A History.  Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
  8. Tucker, S. C., ed.  Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History.  Santa Barbara: Checkmark Books, 2002.
  9. Varhola, M. J.  Fire and Ice: The Korean War, 1950-1953.  Mason City: Da Capo Press, 2000.

Endnotes:

[1] A normal infantry battalion consists of a command element, headquarters staff, organic logistics support, and reinforcements as necessary for assigned missions.  Subordinate units include an H&S Company, three rifle companies, and a weapons company. 

[2] Most of Smith’s men were inexperienced teenagers without adequate training.  Only a third of the battalion’s officers and around sixteen percent of Smith’s NCOs had previous combat experience.

[3] On 27 June, General MacArthur detached Brigadier General John H. Church from his assignment as Assistant Division Commander, 24th ID, and sent him to Korea to establish an Advance HQ and liaison with the Republic of (South) Korea Army (ROK).  Upon the Church’s recommendation, MacArthur ordered Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker to deploy the 24th ID to Korea.

[4] Several of the dead soldiers had been executed by North Korean forces, their bodies later found in shallow graves with their hands bound behind them and shot through the back of the head.

[5] See also: Edward A. Craig — Marine!

[6] To reiterate a previous point, most of the Army’s combat units were manned with young, insufficiently trained soldiers, led by barely competent junior officers and NCOs — all of which can be attributed to Truman’s policy of gutting the US Armed Forces.  Truman’s policy in this regard was criminally malfeasant.  The evidence for this statement would only grow more convincing over the next six months.

[7] See also: Locating the Enemy and Advance to Kosong.

[8] Raymond L. Murray (1913-2004) was a Marine’s Marine.  In his thirty-three years of Marine Corps service, he was awarded two Navy Cross medals, one Distinguished Service Cross, four (4) Silver Star medals, two Legions of Merit, and the Purple Heart medal.  I was honored to have met General Murray several times; he was an exceptional leader.


The Soul of a Regiment

By Talbot Mundy

First published in Adventure magazine, February 1912


Talbot Mundy, perhaps the most incredible adventure writer of the 20th century, wrote “The Soul Of A Regiment” at the beginning of his career.  Voted the greatest story ever published in “Adventure,” this story cemented Mundy’s reputation.[1]

I


So long as its colors remain, and there is one man left to carry them, a regiment can never die; they can recruit it again around that one man, and the regiment will continue on its road to future glory with the same old traditions behind it and the same atmosphere surrounding it that made brave men of its forbears.       So, although the colors are not exactly the soul of a regiment, they are the concrete embodiment of it and are even more sacred than the person of a reigning sovereign.

The First Egyptian Foot had colors — and has them still, thanks to Billy Grogram; so the First Egyptian Foot is still a regiment.  It was the first of all the regiments raised in Egypt, and the colors were lovely crimson things on a brand new polished pole, cased in the regulation jacket of black waterproof and housed with all pomp and ceremony in the mess-room at the barracks.  There were people who said it was bad policy to present colors to a native regiment; that they were nothing more than a symbol of a decadent and waning monarchism in any case, and that the respect which would be due them might lead dangerously near to fetish-worship.  As a matter of cold fact, though, the raw recruits of the regiment failed utterly to understand them, and it was part of Billy Grogram’s business to instill in them a wholesome respect for the sacred symbol of regimental honor.

He was Sergeant-Instructor William Stanford Grogram, V.C., D.S.M., to give him his full name and title, late a sergeant-major of the True and Tried, time expired, and retired from service on a pension.  His pension would have been enough for him to live on, for he was unmarried, his habits were exemplary, and his wants were few; but an elder brother had been a ne’er-do- well, and Grogram, who was the type that will die rather than let any one of his depend on charity, left the army with a sister-in-law and a small tribe of children dependent on him.  Work, of course, was the only thing left for it, and he applied promptly for the only kind of work that he knew how to do.

The British are always making new regiments out of native material in some part of the world; they come cheaper than white troops, and, with a sprinkling of white troops among them, they do wonderfully good service in time of war — thanks to the sergeant instructors.  The officers get the credit for It, but it is the ex-noncommissioned officers of the Line who do the work, as Grogram was destined to discover. They sent him out to Instruct the First Egyptian Foot, and it turned out to be the toughest proposition that anyone lonely, determined, homesick, fighting man ever ran up against.

He was not looking for a life of idleness and ease, so the discomfort of his new quarters did not trouble him overmuch, though they would have disgusted another man at the very beginning.  They gave him a little, white-washed, mud-walled hut with two bare rooms in it and a lovely view on three sides of aching desert sand; on the fourth, a blind wall.

It was as hot inside as a baker’s oven, but It had the one great advantage of being easily kept clean, and Grogram, whose fetish was cleanliness, bore that in mind and forbore to grumble at the absence of a sergeant’s mess and the various creature comforts that his position had entitled him to for years.

What did disgust him, though, was the unfairness of saddling the task that lay in front of him on the shoulders of one lone man; his officers made it quite clear that they had no intention of helping him in the least; from the Colonel downward they were ashamed of the regiment, and they expected Grogram to work it into something like shape before they even began to take an interest in it.  The Colonel went even further than that; he appeared at Orderly Room every morning and once a week attended a parade out on the desert where nobody could see the awful evolutions of his raw command, but he actually threw cold water on Grogram’s efforts at enthusiasm.

“You can’t make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear,” he told him a few mornings after Grogram joined, “or well-drilled soldiers out of Gyppies.  Heaven only knows what the Home Government means by trying to raise a regiment out here; at the very best, we’ll only be teaching the enemy to fight us! But you’ll find they won’t learn.  However, until the Government finds out what a ghastly mistake’s being made, there’s nothing for it but to obey orders and drill Gyppies.  Go ahead, Grogram; I give you a free hand.  Try anything you like on them, but don’t ask me to believe there’ll be any result from it.  Candidly, I don’t.”

But Grogram happened to be a different type of man from his new Colonel.  After a conversation such as that, he could have let things go hang had he chosen to, drawing his pay, doing his six hours’ work a day along the line of least resistance, and blaming the inevitable consequences on the Colonel.  But to him, a duty was something to be done; an impossibility was something to set his clean-shaven, stubborn jaw at and to overcome; and a regiment was a regiment to be kneaded, pummeled, damned, coaxed, and drilled till it began to look as the true and tried used to look in the days when he was sergeant-major.  So he twisted his little brown mustache and drew himself up to the full height of his five feet eight inches, spread his well-knit shoulders, straightened his ramrod of a back, and got busy on the job while his Colonel and the other officers did the social rounds in Cairo and cursed their luck.

The material that Grogram had to work with were fellaheen — good, honest coal-black negroes, giants in stature, the embodiment of good-humored incompetence, children of the soil weaned on raw-hide whips under the blight of Turkish misrule and Arab cruelty.[2]  They had no idea that they were even men till Grogram taught them, and he had to learn Arabic first before he could teach them even that.

They began by fearing him, as their ancestors had feared every new breed of task-master for centuries; gradually, they learned to look for instant and amazing justice at his hands, and from then on, they respected him.  He caned them instead of getting them fined by the Colonel or punished with pack drill for failing things they did not understand; they were thoroughly accustomed to the lash, and his light swagger cane laid on their huge shoulders was a joke that served merely to point his arguments and fix his lessons in their memories; they would not have understood the Colonel’s wrath had he known that the men of his regiment were being beaten by a non-commissioned officer.

They began to love him when he harked back to the days when he was a recruit himself and remembered the steps of a double shuffle that he had learned in the barrack room; when he danced a buck and wing dance for them, they recognized him as a man and a brother, and from that time on, instead of giving him all the trouble they could and laughing at his lectures when his back was turned, they genuinely tried to please him.

So he studied out more steps and danced his way into their hearts, growing daily stricter on parade, daily more exacting of pipe-clay and punctuality, and slowly, but surely as the march of time, molding them into something like a regiment.

Even he could not teach them to shoot, though he sweated over them on the dazzling range until the sun dried every drop of sweat out of him.  And for a long time, he could not even teach them how to march; they would keep step for a hundred yards or so and then lapse into the listless shrinking stride that was the birthright of centuries.

He pestered the Colonel for a band of sorts until the Colonel told him angrily to go to blazes; then, he wrote home and purchased six fifes with his own money, bought a native drum in the bazaar, and started a band on his own account.

Had he been able to read music himself, he would have been no better off because, of course, the fellaheen he had to teach could not have read it either, though possibly he might have slightly increased the number of tunes in their repertoire.

As it was, he knew only two tunes himself: “The Campbells Are Coming” and the National Anthem.

 He picked the six most intelligent men he could find and whistled those two tunes to them until his lips were dry, his cheeks ached, and his very soul revolted at the sound of them.  But the six men picked them up, and, of course, any negro in the world can beat a drum.  One golden morning before the sun had heated the desert air, the regiment marched past in really good formation, all in step and tramping to the tune of “God Save the Queen.”

The Colonel nearly had a fit, but the regiment tramped on, and the band played them back to barracks with a swing and a rhythm that was new not only to the First Egyptian Foot; it was new to Egypt!  The tune was half a tone flat, maybe, and the drum was a sheepskin business bought in the bazaar, but a new regiment marched behind it.  And behind the regiment — two paces right flank, as the regulations specify — marched a sergeant-instructor with a new light in his eyes — the gray eyes that had looked out so wearily from beneath the shaggy eyebrows and that shone now with the pride of a deed well done.

Of course, the Colonel was still scornful.  But Billy Grogram, who had handled men when the Colonel was cutting his teeth at Sandhurst and who knew men from the bottom up, knew that the mob of unambitious countrymen, who had grinned at him in uncomfortable silence when he first arrived, was beginning to forget its mobdom.  He, who spent his hard-earned leisure talking to them and answering their childish questions in hard-won Arabic, knew that they were slowly grasping the theory of the thing — that a soul was forming in the regiment — an indefinable, unexplainable but obvious change, perhaps not unlike the change from infancy to manhood.

And Billy Grogram, who above all was a man of clean ideals, began to feel content.  He still described them in his letters home as “blooming mummies made of Nile mud, roasted black for their sins, and good for nothing but the ash-heap.”  He still damned them on parade, whipped them when the Colonel wasn’t looking, and worked at them until he was much too tired to sleep, but he began to love them.  And to a big, black, grinning man of them, they loved him.  To encourage that wondrous band of his, he set them to playing their two tunes on guest nights outside the officers’ mess, and the officers endured it until the Colonel returned from furlough.  He sent for Grogram and offered to pay him back all he had spent on instruments, provided the band should keep away in the future.

Grogram refused the money and took the hint, inventing weird and hitherto unheard-of reasons why it should be unrighteous for the band to play outside the mess and preaching respect for officers in spite of it.  Like all great men, he knew when he had made a mistake and how to minimize it.

His hardest task was teaching the Gyppies what their colors meant. The men were Mohammedans; they believed in Allah; they had been taught from the time when they were old enough to speak that idols and the outward symbols of religion are the signs of heresy, and Grogram’s lectures, delivered in stammering and uncertain Arabic, seemed to them like the ground-plan of a new religion.  But Grogram stuck to it.  He made opportunities for saluting the colors — took them down each morning and uncased them, and treated them with an ostentatious respect that would have been laughed at among his own people.

When his day’s work was done and he was too tired to dance for them, he would tell them long tales, done into halting Arabic, of how regiments had died rallying around their colors, of a brand new paradise, invented by himself and suitable to all religions, where soldiers went who honored their colors as they ought to do; of the honor that befell a man who died fighting for them, and of the tenfold honor of the man whose privilege it was to carry them into action.  And in the end, although they did not understand him, they respected the colors because he told them to.


II

WHEN England hovered on the brink of indecision and sent her greatest general to hold Khartoum with only a handful of native troops to help him, the First Egyptian Foot refused to leave their gaudy crimson behind them.  They marched with colors flying down to the steamer that was to take them on the first long stage of their journey up the Nile, and there were six fifes and a drum in front of them that told whoever cared to listen that “The Campbells are coming — hurrah! hurrah!”

They marched with the measured tramp of a real regiment; they carried their chins high; their tarbooshes were cocked at a knowing angle, and they swung from the hips like grown men.[3]  At the head of the regiment rode a Colonel whom the regiment scarcely knew, and beside it marched a dozen officers in a like predicament; but behind it, his sword strapped to his side and his little swagger-cane tucked under his left arm-pit, Inconspicuous, smiling and content, marched Sergeant-Instructor Grogram, whom the regiment knew and loved, and who had made and knew the regiment.

The whole civilized world knows — and England knows to her enduring shame — what befell General Gordon and his handful of men when they reached Khartoum.  Gordon surely guessed what was in store for him even before he started, his subordinates may have done so, and the native soldiers knew.  But Sergeant-Instructor Grogram neither knew nor cared.

He looked no further than his duty, which was to nurse the big black babies of his regiment and to keep them good tempered, grinning and efficient; he did that as no other living man could have done it and kept on doing it until the bitter end.

And his task can have been no sinecure.  The Mahdi — the ruthless terror of the Upper Nile who ruled by systematized and savage cruelty and lived by plunder — was as much a bogy to peaceful Egypt as Napoleon used to be in Europe and with far more reason.[4]  Mothers frightened their children into prompt obedience by mentioning his name, and the coal-black natives of the Nile-mouth country are never more than grown-up children.

It must have been as easy to take that regiment to Khartoum as to take a horse into a burning building, but when they reached there not a man was missing; they marched in with colors flying and their six-fife band playing, and behind them — two paces right flank rear — marched Billy Grogram, his little swagger-cane under his left arm-pit, neat, respectful and very wide awake.  For a little while, Cairo kept in touch with them, and then communication ceased.  Nobody ever learned all the details of the tragedy that followed; a curtain was drawn — of mystery and silence such as has always veiled the heart of darkest Africa.

Lord Wolseley took his expedition up the Nile, whipped the Dervishes at El Teb and Tel-el-Kebir, and reached Khartoum to learn of Gordon’s death but not the details of it.  Then he came back again, and the Mahdi followed him, closing up the route behind him, wiping all trace of civilization off the map and placing what he imagined was an insuperable barrier between him and the British — a thousand miles of plundered, ravished, depopulated wilderness.

So a clerk in a musty office drew a line below the record of the First Egyptian Foot; widows were duly notified; a pension or two was granted; and the regiment that Billy Grogram had worked so hard to build was relegated to the past like Billy Grogram.

Rumors had come back along with Wolseley’s men that Grogram had gone down fighting with his regiment; there was a story that the band had been taken alive and turned over to the Mahdi’s private service, and one prisoner, taken near Khartoum, swore that he had seen Grogram speared as he lay wounded before the Residency.  There was a battalion of the True and Tried with Wolseley, and the men used methods that may have been not strictly ethical in seeking tidings of their old sergeant-major, but even they could get no further details; he had gone down fighting with his regiment, and that was all about him.

Then, men forgot him.  The long, steady preparation soon began for the new campaign that was to wipe the Mahdi off the map, restore peace to Upper Egypt, regain Khartoum, and incidentally avenge Gordon. Regiments were slowly drafted out from home as barracks could be built for them; new regiments of native troops were raised and drilled by ex-sergeants of the Line who never heard of Grogram; new men took charge; and the Sirdar superintended everything and laid his reputation brick by brick, of bricks which he made himself, and men were too busy under him to think of anything except the work in hand.[5]

But rumors kept coming in, as they always do in Egypt, filtering in from nowhere over the illimitable desert, borne by stray camel drivers, carried by Dervish spies, tossed from tongue to tongue through the fish market, and carried up back stairs to Clubs and Department Offices.  There were tales of a drummer and three men who played the fife and a wonderful mad feringhee who danced as no man surely ever danced before.  The tales varied, but there were always four musicians and a feringhee.[6]

When one Dervish spy was caught and questioned, he swore by the beard of the prophet that he had seen the men himself.  He was told promptly that he was a liar; how came it that a feringhee — a pork-fed, infidel Englishman — should be allowed to live anywhere the Mahdi’s long arm reached?

“Whom God hath touched—” the Dervish quoted, and men remembered that madness is the surest passport throughout the whole of Northern Africa.  But nobody connected Grogram with the feringhee who danced.

But another man was captured who told a similar tale, and then a Greek trader turned Mohammedan to save his skin, who had made good his escape from the Mahdi’s camp. He swore to have seen this man as he put in one evening at a Nile bank village in a native dhow.  He was dressed in an ancient khaki tunic and a loin-cloth; he was bare-legged, shoeless, and his hair was long over his shoulders and plastered thick with mud.  No, he did not look in the least like a British soldier, though he danced as soldiers sometimes did beside the campfires.

Three natives who were with him played fifes while the feringhee danced, and one man beat a drum.     Yes, the tunes were English tunes, though very badly played; he had heard them before and recognized them.  No, he could not hum them; he knew no music.  Why had he not spoken to the man who danced?  He had not dared.  The man appeared to be a prisoner, and so were the natives with him; the man had danced that evening until he could dance no longer, and then the Dervishes had beaten him with a kurbash for encouragement: the musicians had tried to interfere, and they had all been beaten and left lying there for dead.[7] He was not certain, but he was almost certain they were dead before he came away.

Then, more than three years after Gordon died, there came another rumor, this time from closer at hand — somewhere in the neutral desert zone that lay between the Dervish outpost and the part of Lower Egypt that England held.  This time, the dancer was reported to be dying, but the musicians were still with him.  They got the name of the dancer this time; it was reported to be Goglam, and though that was not at all a bad native guess for Grogram, nobody apparently noted the coincidence.

Men were too busy with their work; the rumor was only one of a thousand that filtered across the desert every month, and nobody remembered the non-commissioned officer who had left for Khartoum with the First Egyptian Foot; they could have recalled the names of all the officers almost without an effort, but not Grogram’s.

III


And with the proficiency, of course, came competition — matches between regiments for the regimental cup and, finally, the biggest event of the Cairo season, the match between the Civil Service and the Army of Occupation, or, as it was more usually termed, “The Army vs. The Rest.”  That was the one society event that the Sirdar made a point of presiding over in person.

EGYPT was busy with the hum of building — empire-building under a man who knew his job.  Almost the only game the Sirdar countenanced was polo, and that was only because it kept officers and civilians fit.  He gave them all the polo, though, that they wanted, and the men grew keen on it, spent money on it, and, needless to say, grew extraordinarily proficient.

He attended it in mufti always but sat in the seat of honor, just outside the touch-line, halfway down the field, and behind him, held back by ropes, clustered the whole of Cairene society, on foot, on horseback and in dog carts, buggies, gigs and every kind of carriage imaginable. Opposite and at either end, the garrison lined up — all the British and native troops rammed in together, and the native population crowded in between them and wherever they could find standing-room.

It was the one event of the year for which all Egypt, Christian and Mohammedan, took a holiday.  Regimental bands were there to play before the game and between the chukkers, and nothing was left undone that could in any way tend to make the event spectacular.

Two games had been played since the cup had been first presented by the Khedive, and honors lay even — one match for the Army and one for the Civil Service.[8]  So on the third anniversary feeling ran fairly high.  It ran higher still when half time was called and honors still lay even at one goal all; to judge by the excitement of the crowd, a stranger might have guessed that polo was the most important thing in Egypt.  The players rode off the pavilion for the half-time interval, and the infantry band that came out onto the field was hard put to drown the noise of conversation, laughter, and argument. At that minute, there was surely nothing in the world to talk about but polo.

But suddenly, the band stopped playing, as suddenly as though the music were a concrete thing and had been severed with an ax.  The Sirdar turned his head suddenly and gazed at one corner of the field, and the noise of talking ceased — not so suddenly as the music had done, for not everybody could see what was happening at first — but dying down gradually and fading away to nothing as the amazing thing came into view.

It was a detachment of five men — a drummer, three fifes, and one other man who marched behind them — though he scarcely resembled a man.  He marched, though, like a British soldier.

He was ragged — they all were — dirty and unkempt.  He seemed very nearly starved, for his bare legs were thinner than a mummy’s; round his loins was a native loincloth, and his hair was plastered down with mud like a religious fanatic’s.  His only other garment was a tattered khaki tunic that might once have been a soldier’s, and he wore no shoes or sandals of any kind.

He marched, though, with a straight back and his chin up, and anybody who was half observant might have noticed that he was marching two paces right flank rear; it is probable, though, that in the general amazement, nobody did notice it.

As the five debouched upon the polo ground, four of them abreast and one behind, the four men raised their arms, the man behind issued a sharp command, the right-hand man thumped his drum, and a wail proceeded from the fifes.  They swung into a regimental quickstep now, and the wail grew louder, rising and falling fitfully and distinctly, keeping time with the drum.

Then, the tune grew recognizable.  The crowd listened now in awe-struck silence.  The five approaching figures were grotesque enough to raise a laugh, and the tune was more grotesque and more pitiable still. Still, there was something electric in the atmosphere that told of tragedy, and not even the natives made a sound as the five marched straight across the field to where the Sirdar sat beneath the Egyptian flag.

Louder and louder grew the tune as the fifes warmed up to it; louder thumped the drum.  It was flat, and notes were missing here and there.  False notes appeared at unexpected intervals, but the tune was unmistakable.  “The Campbells are coming! Hurrah! Hurrah!” wailed the three fifes, and the five men marched to it as no undrilled natives ever did.

“Halt!” ordered the man behind when the strange cortege had reached the Sirdar, and his “Halt!” rang out in good, clean military English.

“Front!” he ordered, and they “fronted” like a regiment.  “Right Dress!”  They were in line already, but they went through the formality of shuffling their feet. “Eyes Front!”  The five men faced the Sirdar, and no one breathed. “General salute — pre-sent arms!”

They had no arms. The band stood still at attention.  The fifth man the bare legs and plastered hair — whipped his right hand to his forehead in the regulation military salute — held it there for the regulation six seconds, swaying as he did so and tottering from the knees, then whipped it to his side again, and stood at rigid attention.  He seemed able to stand better that way, for his knees left off shaking.

“Who are you?” asked the Sirdar then.

“First Egyptian Foot, sir.”

The crowd behind was leaning forward, listening; those that had been near enough to hear that gasped. The Sirdar’s face changed suddenly to the look of cold indifference behind which a certain type of Englishman hides his emotion.

Then came the time-honored question, prompt as the ax of a guillotine — inevitable as Fate itself:

“Where are your colors?”

The fifth man — he who had issued the commands fumbled with his tunic.  The buttons were missing, and the front of it was fastened up with a string; his fingers seemed to have grown feeble; he plucked at it, but it would not come undone.

“Where are—”

The answer to that question should be like an echo, and nobody should need to ask it twice. But the string burst suddenly, and the first time of asking sufficed.  The ragged, unkempt, long-haired mummy undid his tunic and pulled it open.

“Here, sir!” he answered.

The colors, blood-soaked, torn — unrecognizable almost — were around his body!  As the ragged tunic fell apart, the colors fell with it; Grogram caught them and stood facing the Sirdar with them in his hand.  His bare chest was seared with half-healed wounds and crisscrossed with the marks of floggings, and his skin seemed to be drawn tight as a mummy’s across his ribs.  He was a living skeleton!

The Sirdar sprang to his feet and raised his hat, for the colors of a regiment are second, in holiness, to the Symbols of the Church.  The watching, listening crowd followed suit; there was a sudden rustling as a sea of hats and helmets rose and descended.  The band of four, who had stood in stolid silence while all this was happening, realized that the moment was auspicious to play their other tune.

They had only one other, and they had played “The Campbells are coming” across the polo field; so up went the fifes, “Bang!” went the drum, and “God Save Our Gracious Queen” wailed the three in concert, while strong men hid their faces and women sobbed.

Grogram whipped his hand up to the answering salute, faced the crowd in front of him for six palpitating seconds, and fell dead at the Sirdar’s feet.

And so they buried him; his shroud was the flag that had flown above the Sirdar at that ever-memorable match, and his soul went into the regiment.

They began recruiting it again the next day around the blood-soaked colors he had carried with him, and the First Egyptian Foot did famously at the Atbara and Omdurman.  They buried him in a hollow square formed by massed brigades, European and native regiments alternating, and saw him on his way with twenty-one parting volleys instead of the regulation five.  His tombstone is a monolith of rough-hewn granite, tucked away in a quiet corner of the European graveyard at Cairo — quiet and inconspicuous as Grogram always was — but the truth is graven on it in letters two inches deep:

HERE LIES A MAN.

Endnotes:

[1] Talbot Mundy (born William Lancaster Gribbon, 23 April 1879 – 5 August 1940) was an English writer of adventure fiction.  Based for most of his life in the United States, he also wrote under the pseudonym of Walter Galt.  Best known as the author of King of the Khyber Rifles and the Jimgrim series, much of his work was published in pulp magazines.

[2] Fellah, plural fellaheen (Arabic) — a peasant or cultivator of the soil among the Egyptians, Syrians, etc. Webster’s Dictionary, 1913 edition.

[3] Tarboosh, tarbush (Arabic) — a red cap worn by Turks and other Eastern nations, sometimes alone and sometimes swathed with linen or other stuff to make a turban. Webster’s Dictionary, 1913 edition.

[4] Mahdi — Muhammad Ahmad ibn as Sayyid Abd Allah (1844-1885) – otherwise known as The Mahdi or Mohammed Ahmed – was a Muslim religious leader, a fakir, in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.  He declared a jihad and raised an army after declaring himself the Mahdi in 1881 and led a successful war of liberation from the Ottoman-Egyptian military occupation. He died soon after his liberation of Khartoum, and the state he founded fell victim to colonial maneuverings that doomed it to reconquest in 1899.

[5] Sirdar (Hindi from Persian) — here, the title given to the British commander of the Egyptian army.  For other meanings of this term, see the articles in The Hobson-Jobson Dictionary. 

[6] Feringhee (Hindi from Farangistan, “Land of the Franks,” i.e., Europe) — a European.  Platt’s Dictionary of Urdu, Classical Hindi, and English.

[7] Kurbash (Arabic) — a whip or strap about a yard in length, made of the hide of the hippopotamus or rhinoceros.  It is an instrument of punishment and torture that was used in various Muslim countries.

[8] Khedive – Vicroy


Algiers Revisited

Some Background

The practice of state-supported piracy was a common practice in the 18th and 19th centuries.  One may recall that the fledgling United States went to war with Great Britain for a second time because the British navy accosted U.S.-flagged ships and impressed their crew to serve involuntarily aboard British ships of the line.  The U.S. government regarded this sort of behavior as a form of piracy.  If not that, then bullying.[1]  Additionally, European maritime states hired privateers to attack each other’s shipping.  The decision of Great Britain and France to pay tribute to the Barbary pirates encouraged the scallywags to increase their piracy — which benefitted England and France through less competition in the Mediterranean.  And, of course, the navies of England or France were not huckleberries a pirate vessel would want to challenge.

Before American independence, extortion along the North African coast was not an American problem.  The North American colonies were British Colonies, so the problem belonged solely to the Royal Navy and British Parliament.  After independence, however, American shipping enjoyed no protection from England or France.  After independence, our English cousins quickly informed the Barbary Pirates that they could avail themselves of American shipping at their leisure.  It didn’t take long; in 1785, Dey Mohammed of Algiers declared war on the United States and captured several U.S. commercial ships.  The financially troubled American Confederation could not pay exorbitant ransoms for the return of ships, crews, or cargo.  Nor could the Americans afford to raise a navy — or pay tribute.  So, the United States attempted to negotiate with Islamic pirates.

The Barbary Coast included several North African states.  Morocco, an independent kingdom, seized U.S. merchant vessels in 1784 after the Americans ignored its diplomatic overtures.  However, once the U.S. acknowledged Morocco’s strategic position, negotiations progressed smoothly and productively; by 1786, a trade agreement did exist between the U.S. and Morocco.  Conversely, Algiers assumed a belligerent, condescending tone in demanding tributes that the United States could not afford.  To circumvent Algiers, the U.S. Minister of France attempted to establish a coalition of weaker naval powers to defeat Algiers.  Our minister was unsuccessful in this; his name was Thomas Jefferson.  However, Portugal was also at war with Algiers.  Its navy was strong enough to block Algerian ships from sailing past the Straits of Gibraltar, so American merchantmen had safe passage for a time.

A brief Portuguese-Algerian peace again exposed American merchant ships to extortion in 1793.  The efforts of diplomats sent to North Africa in 1795 concluded treaties with Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli.  The treaties agreed to pay tribute to these states, and the treaty with Algiers resulted in the release of about 80 sailors.

It wasn’t until after the ratification of the US Constitution in 1789 that the federal government had the authority to levy taxes and raise and maintain an armed force.  When Algiers seized American ships in 1794, Congress authorized the construction of six ships for a re-instituted U. S. Navy.

In 1797, William Eaton (a former Army officer) was appointed Consul General of the United States.  President Adams sent him to Tunis to negotiate peace and trade agreements with Tunis’s governor (Bey).  Tunis was the closest neighbor to Tripoli and the place of exile of the former Pasha of Tripoli, Hamet Karamanli (the elder brother of the reigning Pasha, Yusuf Karamanli).

While in Tripoli, Easton devised a plan whereby the United States would support the restoration of the deposed Pasha.  This, Eaton argued, would garner respect for the United States throughout the Mohammedan world.  However, Eaton had no support for his plan in Philadelphia.  Meanwhile, the Bey continued to demand tributes, and Eaton refused to convey his demands to the U.S. government.  Accordingly, the Bey of Tunis ordered Eaton to leave his country.  Hamet Karamanli, in fear for his life, fled Tunis for Egypt.

In 1801, the Pasha of Tripoli sought to punish the United States for its failure to make timely payments of tribute; he demanded higher tributes and polished off these demands by declaring war on the United States.  Algiers followed suit.  This was the first Barbary War — fought between 1801 and 1805.

For additional background about the United States’ involvement in two Barbary Coast Wars, seeAt Tripoli, Part I and At Tripoli, Part II.

The Fire Reignites

There was a continuing campaign by various European navies and the American navy to suppress Berber piracy.  The specific aim of this expedition, however, was to free Christian slaves and to stop the practice of enslaving Europeans, holding them for ransom, and stealing and selling ship’s cargo.  To this end, the campaign was partially successful.  However, Islamic barbarity did not completely end until the French conquered Algeria (c. 1830) and, in the process, sent many Algerians to meet their heavenly father.  Shamefully, the French were thrown out of Algeria in 1962. 

Yet, despite having been severely chastised by the United States Navy on two occasions, the Ottoman rulers of North Africa refused to cease their uncivilized behavior — which led to further confrontations with the Royal Navy in 1816.

Following the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1815), the Royal Navy no longer needed assistance from the Barbary States to provide supplies for Gibraltar and their Mediterranean fleet.  This lack of dependency allowed the British to exert political pressure on the Barbary states to end their piracy and practice of enslaving European Christians.

In 1816, Admiral Edward Pellew, 1st Viscount Exmouth (Lord Exmouth), conducted a diplomatic mission to Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers, backed by a small squadron of ships of the line, to convince the North African Ottoman Deys to stop the practice and free their Christian slaves.[2]  The Deys of Tunis and Tripoli unequivocally agreed to comply, but the Dey of Algiers was recalcitrant and the negotiations tempestuous.

Lord Exmouth, believing he had negotiated a successful treaty to stop Christian slavery, returned to England.  Sadly, confused orders sent Algerian troops to massacre 200 Corsican, Sicilian, and Sardinian fishermen who had been placed under British protection just after the treaty was signed.  The act caused outrage in Britain; Lord Exmouth’s negotiations were seen as a diplomatic failure, and his government ordered him back to sea to complete the job correctly and punish the Algerians.  Pellew’s squadron consisted of ships of the line HMS Queen Charlotte, Impregnable, Albion, Minden, and Superb, HMS Leander (a 50-gun frigate), HMS Severn, Glasgow, Granicus, and Hebrus (regular frigates), and four bomb ships, HMS Beelzebub, Fury, Hecla, and Infernal.

HMS Queen Charlotte (100 guns) served as Lord Exmouth’s flagship, with Rear Admiral David Milne as second-in-command aboard HMS Impregnable (98 guns).  The squadron was considered by many to be inadequate for the mission.  Still, Exmouth had already unobtrusively surveyed the defenses of Algiers, was very familiar with the town, and was aware of a weakness in the defensive batteries’ fire field.  He believed that more large ships would have interfered with each other without being able to bring much more fire to bear.  In addition to his main fleet, Lord Exmouth commanded five sloops, eight boats armed with Congreve rockets, and some transports to carry the rescued slaves.  When the British arrived in Gibraltar, Dutch Vice Admiral Frederik van Capellen (commanding a squadron of frigates) offered to join the expedition.  Lord Exmouth accepted van Capellen’s offer and assigned him to cover the main force from Algerian flanking batteries.

Preparation

The day before Lord Exmouth’s assault, HMS Prometheus arrived at the station.  Admiral Pellew assigned the commanding officer, Captain W. B. Dashwood, to rescue the British Consul and his family.  The Algerians discovered the rescue attempt and arrested some of the party.

Pellew’s plan of attack was for the larger ships to approach in a column, sail into the zone where the majority of the Algerian guns could not be brought to bear, and then come to anchor and bombard the batteries and fortifications on the breakwater (mole) to destroy the Algerian defenses.  Simultaneously, HMS Leander was to anchor off the mouth of the harbor and bombard the shipping inside the mole.  To protect Leander from the shore battery, HMS Severn and Glasgow were to sail inshore and bombard the battery.  Troops would then storm ashore on the mole with sappers and the Corps of Royal Engineers.

Go Signal

Admiral Pellew, aboard Queen Charlotte,anchored approximately eight yards off the mole facing the Algerian guns.  Several other ships anchored out of their position, notably Admiral Milne aboard Impregnable, 400 yards from his assigned station.  This error reduced the effectiveness of these ships and exposed them to accurate enemy fire.  Some other ships sailed past Impregnable and anchored in positions closer to the plan.  The frigate Granicus and the sloop Heron closed the gap created by the misplaced Impregnable.

Before hostilities, Lord Exmouth and the Dey of Algiers agreed that neither would fire the first shot.  Why Exmouth would even converse with an enemy about this is beyond me.  But the Dey’s plan was to allow the British fleet to anchor, sortie from the harbor, and board the ships with an overwhelming force of men.  Poorly disciplined Algerians mistakenly fired a gun at around 1515 hours, prompting Pellew to order an immediate response.

The Algerian assault force attempted to board Queen Charlotte, but that was a mistake of epic proportions — British broadsides sank 28 boats — running the rest to shore.  After an hour, the British silenced the cannon on the mole, which allowed Lord Exmouth to turn his attention to the shipping in the harbor, destroying those ships by 1930 hours.  The British destroyed one unmanned Algerian frigate by boarding her and setting it on fire.  Mortars and rockets destroyed three additional frigates and five corvettes.

The battle produced flotsam adrift in the harbor, some of it on fire and drifting toward ships at anchor.  These conditions forced some of Exmouth’s ships to weigh anchor and relocate for safety.  As these ships maneuvered out of the way, Impregnable became isolated from the other ships and vulnerable to enemy attack.  It didn’t take the Algerian gunners long to target the ship and began raking the 98 fore to aft.  Impregnable took 268 hits, suffering injury to her hull and damage to the mainmast in fifteen places.  Algerians killed fifty crew members and wounded 164 others.  At around 2000 hours, Admiral Milne asked Pellew to send an explosion vessel against a lighthouse battery that was mauling his ship.  The British exploded the vessel but to little effect.

With Algerian batteries unable to maintain their rate of fire, Lord Exmouth ordered the squadron to weigh anchor and withdraw out of range, leaving Minden behind to offer suppressive fires to further Algerian fire.  Wind changes permitted Exmouth’s squadron to move out of range, and by 0130, all ships were re-anchored, and the ship’s officers were caring for their wounded crews.

British casualties exceeded 900 men.  The British/Dutch force had fired over 50,000 shots and used 118 tons of gunpowder and 960 mortars.  Algerian forces employed 308 guns and seven mortars.  A covert inspection of the city by British cease-fire negotiators revealed that the Deylik of Algiers was destroyed.  The bay was filled with the smoking hulks of what was left of the Algerian navy; floating dead bodies filled the harbor.

Aftermath of Battle (August 28, 1816)

At noon, Lord Exmouth sent a letter to the Dey:

Sir:

For your atrocities at Bona on defenseless Christians and your unbecoming disregard of the demands I made yesterday in the name of the Prince Regent of England, the fleet under my orders has given you a signal chastisement by the destruction of your navy storehouse and arsenal, with half your batteries.  As England does not war for the destruction of cities, I am unwilling to visit your personal cruelties upon the unoffending inhabitants of the country, and I therefore offer you the same terms of peace which I conveyed to you yesterday in my Sovereign’s name.  Without your acceptance of these terms, you can have no peace with England.

Admiral Pellew warned the Dey that the action would continue if he did not accept his terms.  Wisely, the Dey took Lord Exmouth’s terms, not realizing that Exmouth was bluffing.  His squadron was out of shot and gunpowder.  If the action were to continue, it would have to be after replenishment at Gibraltar. Upon the signing of the formal treaty on September 24, 1816, the Dey freed 1,083 enslaved Christians.  He would later free 3,000 more.

Endnotes:

[1] The Royal Navy was not without some justification for at-sea impressments.  Service in the Royal Navy was at all times a hard life, and more than a few English sailors deserted their ships and signed on as deck-hands aboard commercial vessels, where life was easier, as a means of earning their income.  It was bad enough that the Royal Navy began the practice of stopping ships at sea and apprehending deserters.

[2] Dey is a title given to commanders or (from 1710) governors of the Janissaries of Algiers and extended to other Ottoman officials by Western writers—also, Bey.