The Quế Sơn Valley, located in Quảng Nam Province, is bounded by mountain ranges north, south, and west. It extends some 24 miles from east to west from Route 1 to Hiệp Đức. The Ly Ly River and Routes 534 and 535 traverses most of the valley’s length. In 1965/1966, the valley supported a Vietnamese population of around 60,000 farmers and salt miners. Whoever held Quế Sơn Valley owned the keys to the struggle for the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ).
The struggle for the Quế Sơn Valley began in December 1965 (Operation Harvest Moon) and February 1966 (Operation Double Eagle II). Brigadier General William A. Stiles, USMC, reported to the 1st Marine Division in late April to assume the duties of Assistant Division Commander, 1stMarDiv. Shortly after his arrival, the Division Commander directed Stiles to assume command of Task Force X-Ray. His mission was to plan for and direct a reconnaissance-in-force in the region of Đỗ Xá, South Vietnam.[1]
In June, the Commanding General III Marine Amphibious Force and Commanding General 1stMarDiv received intelligence information compiled by the U.S. Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (USMACV) indicating that a suspected enemy base of operations was operating some thirty miles southwest of Chu Lai, near the western border of I CTZ. MACV placed the headquarters of the enemy’s Military Region v in the area of Đỗ Xá. They had been asking for Marine Corps intervention for several months. Army intelligence had wanted Marines to mount an operation throughout the Valley for several months.
After a few unavoidable delays, Stiles and his staff completed their plan of action but almost immediately became aware of the presence of an entire enemy combat division within the Quế Sơn Valley. The 620th NVA Division operated with three full-strength infantry regiments (3rd, 21st, and 1st VC) in the area straddling the Quang Tin/Quang Nam provinces northwest of Chu Lai. Stiles’ reconnaissance operation, designated Operation KANSAS, was placed on hold until the Marines could address a significant enemy presence close to Chu Lai.
But on June 13, 1966, the III MAF Commander directed the 1stMarDiv to commence an extensive reconnaissance campaign between Tam Kỳ and Hiệp Đức. Stiles was ordered to plan for a joint combat operation with the 2nd ARVN Division. The plan called for the aerial insertion of six Marine reconnaissance teams from the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion and an additional 1st Force Reconnaissance Company team into selected landing zones (LZs) to determine the extent of NVA penetrations.
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J. Sullivan (1920 – 1995), the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (1stRecon) commander, would exercise control over all reconnaissance missions. On schedule, a thirteen-man team was airlifted to Nui Loc Son, a small mountain in the center of the Quế Sơn Valley (seven miles northeast of Hiệp Đức. Another eighteen-man team landed on the Nui Vu hill mass that dominates the terrain ten miles west of Tam Kỳ.
These initial landings would be followed up the next morning by two teams to the higher ground south of the valley, two teams to the northwest of the valley, and one in the south of Hiệp Đức. The last team would parachute onto Hill 555, east of the Tranh River. These Marines experienced a single injury as one of the team twisted his ankle upon contact with Terra Firma.
As the operation evolved, the 1st Force Recon Company parachutists were the first to be extracted. After landing, these Marines followed procedure by burying their parachutes and then moved away to establish observation posts. At around 1400 hours, the Marines observed an estimated forty enemy soldiers undergoing tactical training. Four hours later, a woodcutter team appeared with a sentry dog. The animal alerted on the buried parachutes, and a short time later, an enemy combat patrol appeared to be searching for the Marines. The Recon Team Leader, 1stLt Jerome T. Paull, requested that his men be extracted. These Marines were airlifted back to Chu Lai.
The 18-man team inserted on Nui Vu was led by Staff Sergeant Jimmie E. Howard, USMC. After their insertion on June 13, Howard found the hill an excellent observation platform, and for the next two days, Howard’s team reported extensive enemy activities. This team, supported by an ARVN 105mm Howitzer Battery (located seven miles south of Nui Vu), was able to call in artillery missions on “targets of opportunity.”
Staff Sergeant Howard, a seasoned combat veteran, exercised care to only call artillery missions when an American aircraft spotter or helicopter was in the region, but the enemy was aware of the presence of these Marines and was determined to neutralize the threat.
On the 14th, the NVA began organizing a force to attack the post. On the night of June 15, a U.S. Army Special Forces Team leading a South Vietnamese irregular defense group (popular forces) radioed a warning to General Stiles’ command post (C.P.) — a company-sized unit of between 200 and 250 NVA soldiers closing in on the Marine reconnaissance unit on Hill 448. Word was passed down to the platoon leader, Staff Sergeant Jimmie L. Howard, USMC, through his parent unit, Company C, 1st Recon Battalion, 1st Marine Division.
Later that night, between 2130 and 2330, Lance Corporal Ricardo C. Binns, USMC, detected the sound of troops marshaling for an assault and fired the first shots from his M-14 Rifle. The NVA quickly closed in, surrounding the Marine perimeter. The enemy closed in because they had learned through practical experience that the closer they were to the Marines, the less likely they would become targets of USMC Close Air Support (CAS). Unlike the Air Force, Marine pilots routinely flew CAS missions at tree top level (give or take five inches).
After Corporal Binns opened fire, outpost Marines withdrew from their listening posts to reposition themselves within the rocky knoll. Automatic weapons fire from a DShK machine gun (shown right) and 60mm mortar fire kept the Marines from maneuvering away from their hilltop positions. After their initial fire, the NVA tossed hand grenades into the Marine positions, followed by a short-lived frontal assault. The Marine’s well-aimed rifle fire repelled the enemy’s assault, causing the communists to fall back. After reorganizing, the NVA assaulted the Marines again and again — each time being pushed back by the Marine’s murderous fire.
Near midnight, Staff Sergeant Howard radioed his company commander, Captain Tim Geraghty, to ask for an extraction and close air support. These requests were delayed at the III MAF Direct Air Support Center (DASC).[2] The violence of the enemy attack convinced Howard that his team was being overrun, so he again called for assistance. Colonel Sullivan radioed Howard to reassure him that help was on the way.
At around 0200, a Marine C-47 (DC-3) arrived on station and began dropping flares to light up the area and prepare for the arrival of fixed-wing and rotor gunships. Jet aircraft screamed in and dropped their bombs and napalm within 100 meters of the Marine perimeter. Helicopter gunships from VMO-6 strafed to within twenty meters of the Marine perimeter.
At 0300, enemy ground fire drove off a flight of MAG-36 helicopters that were trying to extract Howard’s Marines. When that attempt failed, Colonel Sullivan informed Howard that he should not expect reinforcements until dawn and urged him to hold on as best he could.
By then, the fight devolved into small, scattered, individual fights between Marine defenders and probing enemies. The NVA, wary of U.S. aircraft, decided against organizing another mass assault but continued to fire at the Marines throughout the night. Enemy snipers had placed themselves close to and above the Marine’s defenses.
Staff Sergeant Howard’s Marines were running out of ammunition; their situation was critical. Howard ordered his men to fire only well-aimed single shots at the enemy. The Marines complied with their team leaders’ instructions but also began throwing rocks at suspected enemy positions, hoping the enemy would think that the Marines were lobbing in grenades. By 0400, every Marine in Howard’s team had been wounded; six Marines lay dead. Staff Sergeant Howard was struck in the back by a ricochet, which temporarily paralyzed his legs. Unable to stand, Howard pulled himself from one fighting hole to the next, encouraging his men and directing their fire.
At dawn on June 16, UH-34s, with Huey gunship cover, successfully landed Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (C/1/5) at the base of Nui Vu. The helicopter piloted by Major William J. Goodsell, the Commanding Officer of VMO-6, was shot down. While Goodsell was successfully evacuated, he later died from his wounds.
Charlie Company encountered enemy resistance as it moved to relieve Howard’s team. When Charlie Company’s lead element reached Howard’s position, he shouted a warning to “get down” because enemy snipers were helping themselves to any Marine that appeared in their rear sight aperture. The company commander, First Lieutenant Marshal “Buck” Darling, later reported that when he arrived at Howard’s position, every Marine still alive had armed themselves with enemy AK-47s taken from dead communists lying within the Marine perimeter.
Everyone associated with the defensive operation assumed that Howard and his men had held off an NVA rifle company. Military intelligence later clarified that Howard’s 18 Marines had held off a battalion of NVA regulars from the 3rd NVA Regiment. The enemy continued to battle the Marines for the hill until around noon and then disengaged. When the enemy pulled out, they left behind 42 dead. Charlie Company lost two KIA and two WIA.
Meanwhile, General Stiles’ completed plan of action involved eight battalions (four Marine and four ARVN) with air and artillery support. The initial assault force included two battalions from the 5th Marines and two Vietnamese Army battalions. Stiles and his Vietnamese counterpart would control the action from Tam Kỳ. Anticipating the need for massive firepower, Stiles prepositioned artillery units from Da Nang and Chu Lai into forward firing positions on Hill 29, west of the railroad line seven miles north of Tam Kỳ.
The 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (3/1) accompanied artillery units from Da Nang and provided security for the artillery positions on Hill 29 and Thang Binh. Artillery support units included HQ Battery 4/11 (command and control), Kilo Battery 4/12 (6 155mm Howitzers at Hill 29), and Provisional Yankee Battery 4/12 (2 155mm Howitzers) at Thang Binh.
On the morning of June 17, the South Vietnamese military high command notified the Marines that the two Vietnamese infantry battalions would not participate in the Marine Corps operation. Accordingly, Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt (III MAF) delayed Operation Kansas again — and then modified General Stiles’ plan of action.[3] Rather than a multi-battalion heliborne operation in the Quế Sơn Valley, Walt elected to continue the reconnaissance in force. Note: Walt’s decision placed fewer than 1,800 Marines against an entire NVA infantry division.
The Fifth Marines (5thMar) remained at Chu Lai, ready to support the Recon Marines on-call. Stiles continued in command of the operation. He repositioned some of his assets to provide better coverage for the recon teams. On June 18, Kilo 4/11 (4 155mm guns) joined the other artillery units on Hill 29, and an additional provisional battery from the 12th Marines deployed to a new firing position 6,000 meters from Thang Binh. Kilo 4/12 joined the new provisional battery the next day. On June 19, CH-46 aircraft lifted two 105mm howitzers from Chu Lai to the Tien Phuoc Special Forces Camp, some 30 miles distant. Operational control of 3/1 was transferred to the 5th Marines.
With these support units repositioned, Colonel Sullivan shifted his CP to Tien Phuoc. For the next ten days, the reconnaissance battalion (reinforced) continued to conduct extensive patrolling operations throughout the Quế Sơn Valley. Twenty-five recon teams were involved in this operation.
Operation Kansas, which officially began on June 17, ended on June 22nd when General Stiles relocated his command post. Marine infantry participation, with the exception of the relief of Staff Sergeant Howard’s platoon, was confined to a one-company exploitation of a B-52 Arc Light strike on June 21, some 3,500 meters east of Hiệp Đức.[4] Despite Operation Kansas’s official end on June 22, Marines remained in the area for six additional days.
Four of Howard’s Marines were awarded the Navy Cross: Corporal Binns, Hospital Man Second Class Billee Don Holmes, Corporal Jerrald Thompson, and Lance Corporal John Adams. Thompson and Adams, killed in action, were awarded posthumous medals. Silver Star Medals were awarded to the remaining thirteen Marines, four posthumously, along with two Marines from Charlie Company, also posthumously.
Staff Sergeant Howard received a meritorious combat promotion to Gunnery Sergeant and was later awarded the Medal of Honor—our nation’s highest combat award. Howard was eventually promoted to First Sergeant, retired from the Marine Corps in 1977, and became a high school football coach. He passed away in 1993, aged 64.
Notes:
[1] Stiles graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Class of 1939, and was an officer with extensive combat experience.
[2] The DASC is the principal USMC aviation command and control system and the air control agency responsible for directing air operations directly supporting ground forces. It functions in a decentralized mode of operations but is directly supervised by the Marine Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) or Navy Tactical Air Control Center (NTACC). The parent unit of DASCs is the Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS) of the Marine Air Control Group (MACG).
[3] Lew Walt (1913 – 1989) served in World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam. During his military service, he was awarded two Navy Cross medals, two Navy Distinguished Service medals, the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit (with Combat V), the Bronze Star (with Combat V), and two Purple Heart medals. Following his promotion to four-star general and service as the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Walt retired in 1971. General Walt passed away on March 26, 1989.
[4] Following the Arc Light strike, Echo Company 2/5 surveyed the strike area and found no evidence of a large body of enemy forces.
In 1967, North Vietnamese military officials realized that their war strategy in South Vietnam wasn’t working out quite the way they had hoped. It was time to try something else. The government of North Vietnam wanted a massive offensive, one that would reverse the course of the war. When defense minister and senior army commander General Vo Nguyen Giap[1]voiced opposition to such an offensive, believing that a significant reversal of the war would not be the likely result of such an undertaking, North Vietnamese officials stripped Giap of his position, gave him a pocket watch, and sent him into retirement.
The politburo then appointed General Nguyen Chi Thanh to direct the offensive. At the time, Thanh was commander of all Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam. When General Thanh unexpectedly died, senior politburo members scrambled to reinstate General Giap.
Earlier — in the Spring of 1966 — Giap wondered how far the United States would go in defending the regime of South Vietnam. To answer this question, he executed a series of attacks south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) with two objectives in mind. First, he wanted to draw US forces away from densely populated urban and lowland areas where the NVA would have an advantage. Second, Giap wished to know if the United States could be provoked into invading North Vietnam.
Both questions seem ludicrous since luring the military out of towns and cities was the last thing he should have wanted, and unless China was willing to rush to the aid of its pro-communist “little brothers,” tempting the US to invade North Vietnam was fool-hardy. In any case, General Giap began a massive buildup of military forces and placed them in the northern regions of South Vietnam. Their route of infiltration into South Vietnam was through Laos. General Giap completed his work at the end of 1967 — with six infantry divisions massed within the Quang Tri Province.
US Army General William C. Westmoreland, commander of the United States Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (COMUSMACV or MACV), led all US and allied forces in Vietnam. Westmoreland responded to Giap’s buildup by increasing US/allied forces in Quang Tri, realizing that if he wanted the enemy to dance, he would have to send his men into the dance hall.
What Westmoreland could not do, however, was invade either North Vietnam or Laos[2]. Realizing this, Giap gained confidence in creating more significant battles inside South Vietnam. But even this wasn’t working out as Giap imagined. Westmoreland was not the same kind of man as French General Henri Navarre, whom Giap had defeated in 1954. For one thing, Westmoreland was far more tenacious, and meeting the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) away from populated areas would allow Westmoreland to make greater use of his air and artillery assets.
In phases, Giap increased North Vietnam’s military footprint in the northern provinces of South Vietnam. One example of this was the NVA’s siege of the Khe Sanh combat base. President Lyndon Johnson was concerned that the NVA was attempting another coup de guerre, such as at Dien Bien Phu, where Navarre was thoroughly defeated. Johnson ordered Khe Sanh held at all costs. With everyone’s eyes now focused on those events, Giap launched a surprise offensive at the beginning of the Tet (Lunar New Year) celebration. He gave his attack order on January 31, 1968. It was a massive assault involving 84,000 NVA and Viet Cong (VC) soldiers executing simultaneous attacks on 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of the six autonomous cities (including Saigon and Huế), 64 of 242 district capitals, and 50 hamlets.
Giap chose to violate the Tet cease-fire accord because he knew that many South Vietnamese soldiers would be granted leave to celebrate the holiday with their families. It was an intelligent move that gave Giap a series of early successes. VC forces even managed to breach the US Embassy enclosure in Saigon. Within days, however, the offensive faltered as US/ARVN forces turned back the communist onslaught. Heavy fighting continued in Kontum, Can Tho, Ben Tre, and Saigon … but the largest occurred in the City of Huế[3]. The Battle of Huế was the longest and the bloodiest battle of the Tet Offensive.
In 1968, Huế was the third-largest city in South Vietnam; its population was around 140,000, and about a third of those living inside the Citadel, north of the Hương River, which flows through the city.[4] Huế also sat astride Highway One, a major north-south main supply route about 50 miles south of the DMZ. Huế was the former imperial capital of Vietnam. Up to this point, Huế had only occasionally experienced the ravages of war—mortar fire, saboteurs, and acts of terrorism, but a large enemy force had never before appeared at the city’s gates. But, as a practical matter, given the city’s cultural and intellectual importance to the Vietnamese people (and its status as the capital of Thua Thien Province), hostile actions were only a matter of time.
The people who lived in Huế enjoyed a tradition of civic independence dating back several hundred years. The city’s religious monks viewed the war with disdain, but it is also true that few religious leaders felt any attachment to the government in Saigon. They wanted national reconciliation — a coalition where everyone could get along.
Ancient tradition held that Huế had sprung to life as a lotus flower blossoming from a mud puddle. It is a fascinating myth. The city is situated on a bend of the Perfume (Hương) River just five miles southwest of the South China Sea. The river divided Huế into two sections. On the north bank stood the Citadel, a fortress encompassing nearly four square miles (modeled after China’s Forbidden City). The Citadel was shaped like a diamond, its four corners pointing to the cardinal directions of the compass. Stone walls encircled the Imperial City, and just beyond those, a wide moat filled with water. The walls stood 8 meters high and several meters thick.
On the southeastern wall, the Perfume River ran a parallel course, which offered additional protection from that quarter. There were ten gates; four of these (along the southeastern side) were made of carved stone. The remaining walls each had two less elaborate gates. A winding shallow canal ran through the Citadel, from southwest to northeast. Two culverts connected the inner-city canal with those on the outside.
A newer section of the city lay south of the Perfume River. It was the center for residential and business communities, including government offices (and a US Consulate), a university, provincial headquarters, a prison, a hospital, a treasury, and the forward headquarters element of MACV sited within a separate compound. Referred to as “New City,” it was half the size of the old town. It was also called The Triangle because of its irregular shape between the Phu Cam Canal in the south, a stream called Phat Lac on the east, and in the north by the Perfume River. A pair of bridges linked the modern city to the Citadel: the Nguyen Hương Bridge (part of Highway 1) at the eastern corner of the Citadel, and fifteen hundred meters to the southwest was the Bach Ho Railroad Bridge. Another bridge, called the An Cuu Bridge, was a modest arch on Highway 1 that conveyed traffic across the Phu Cam Canal.
Despite Huế’s importance, fewer than a thousand soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) were on duty. Security for Huế was assigned to the First Infantry Division (ARVN) under the command of Brigadier General Ngo Quant Truong. The 1st ARVN was headquartered within the fortified Mang Ca compound in the northeast corner of the Citadel.
Over half of Truong’s men were on leave for the holiday when the Giap commenced his offensive at Huế. His subordinate commands’ location was spread along Highway 1 from north Huế to the DMZ. The closest unit of any size to the division CP was the 3rd ARVN Regiment. The regiment’s three battalions were located five miles northwest of Huế. The only combat unit inside the city was a 36-man platoon belonging to an elite unit called the Black Panthers, a field reconnaissance and rapid reaction company. Internal security for Huế was the responsibility of the National Police.[5]
The nearest US combat base was Phu Bai, six miles south on Highway 1. Phu Bai was a major U. S. Marine Corps command post and support facility that included the forward headquarters element of the 1st Marine Division (designated Task Force X-Ray). The Commanding General of Task Force X-Ray[6] was Brigadier General Foster C. LaHue, who also served as the Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Marine Division. Also situated at Phu Bai were the headquarters elements of the 1st Marine Regiment (Stanley S. Hughes, Commanding) and the 5th Marine Regiment (Robert D. Bohn, Commanding). There were also three battalions of Marines: 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (1/1) (Lt. Col. Marcus J. Gravel, Commanding), 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (1/5) (LtCol Robert P. Whalen, Commanding), and 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (2/5) (LtCol Ernest C. Cheatham, Jr., Commanding).
In addition to the Marines, several US Army commands were present, including two brigades of the 1st Air Cavalry Division (AIR CAV), which included the 7th and 12th Cavalry Regiments (dispersed over a wide area, from Phu Bai in the south to Quang Tri in the north), and the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division at Camp Evans, between Huế and Quang Tri. Operational control of the 1st Brigade was assigned to the 1st Air Cav.
NVA forces included 8,000 well-trained and equipped soldiers. The majority of these were NVA regulars. The NVA was reinforced by six VC main force battalions (between 300 and 600 men each). The field commander of these forces was General Tran Van Quang. The NVA plan called for a division-sized assault on the Imperial City, with other units serving as a blocking force to stop or frustrate the efforts of any allied reinforcing units. True to form, the communists knew all they needed about their civilian and military objectives within the city. VC cadres had also prepared a list of “tyrants” who were to be located and terminated — nearly all of these South Vietnamese civilian and military officials. Added to the lists were US civilians, clergy, educators, and other foreigners. The communists also knew all they needed to know about the weather.
The NVA plan (termed the General Offensive/General Uprising) was designed to incorporate both conventional and guerilla operations intending to destroy any vestige of the South Vietnam government and its Western allies, and if not that, then discredit the enemy and cause a popular uprising among the people. If everything worked according to plan, the Western allies would be forced to withdraw their forces from Vietnam.
A few senior NVA planners thought a popular uprising was highly unlikely; a few more expected that ARVN and US forces would drive the NVA out of the city within a few days —but, of course, such defeatist notions were best left unsaid. Meanwhile, the young, idealistic, gullible soldiers believed the propaganda and went into combat, convinced of a great victory. When these same young men departed their training camps, they had no intention of returning. Many wouldn’t.
The Fight Begins
In January 1968, everyone sensed that something was off-kilter. Tet was approaching. The people were uneasy. The cancellation of the Tet Truce and enemy attacks at Da Nang and elsewhere in southern I Corps dampened the normally festive spirit at Tet.[7] The first indication of trouble came shortly after midnight during the night of January 30-31 — a five-pronged assault on all five provincial capitals in II Corps and the city of Da Nang in I Corps. VC attacks began with mortar and rocket fire, followed by large-scale ground assaults by NVA regulars. However, these were not well-coordinated attacks, and by dawn on January 31, most communists had been driven back from their objectives.
These initial attacks turned out to have been launched prematurely, but while US forces and ARVN units were placed on operational alert, there was no immediate sense of urgency. ARVN commands sent our orders, which canceled all leaves for the Tet holiday, but most of these arrived too late, and besides that, General Truong did not believe the NVA had the intent or capability of attacking Huế City. Allied intelligence kept tabs on two NVA regiments in Thua Thien Province, but there was little evidence of enemy activity in and around Huế City. When Truong positioned his reduced force around the city, he intended to defend the urban areas outside the Citadel.
General Truong was not necessarily wrong in his conclusions —he was only misinformed. According to US intelligence, the 6th NVA Regiment (with 804th Battalion) was reported operational 15 miles west of Huế. The 806th Battalion was positioned outside Phong Dien, 22 miles northeast of Huế. The 802nd Battalion was placed 12 miles south of Huế. Analysts also placed the 4th NVA Regiment between Phu Bai and Da Nang. Unknown to anyone, both regiments were en route to Huế. The 6th NVA Regiment’s primary objectives were the Mang Ca headquarters compound, the Tay Loc Airfield, and the Imperial Palace. The 4th NVA Regiment was assigned to attack New City, including the Provincial headquarters, the prison, and the MACV (forward) headquarters compound. NVA planners assigned 200 specific targets between these two regiments, including radio stations, police stations, government officials, recruiting centers, and the Imperial Museum. Viet Cong main force battalions were specifically targeting individuals — those sympathetic to the South Vietnam regime.
On January 30, enemy shock troops and sappers entered the city disguised as simple peasants, their uniforms and weapons concealed in baggage or under their street clothes. VC and NVA regulars mingled with the Tet holiday crowds. Many of these covert agents dressed in ARVN uniforms and then took up pre-designated positions to await the signal to attack. The 6th NVA Regiment was only a few miles from the city’s western edge. About 1900, the Regiment stopped for an evening meal, and regimental officers inspected their troops. The regiment resumed its march one hour later in three columns, each with an objective within the Citadel.
At 2200 hours, Lieutenant Nguyen Van Tan, Commanding Officer of the 1st ARVN Division Reconnaissance Company, was leading a 30-man surveillance mission when a Regional Force Company east of his position reported it was under attack.[8] Remaining concealed, Tan observed two enemy battalions filter past his position toward Huế City. Tan radioed this information back to the 1st ARVN. These were likely the 800th and 802nd Battalions, 6th NVA Regiment. Despite Tan’s report, the communist troops continued toward Huế unmolested.
The NVA country-wide general offensive began at 0300; the only ARVN force inside Huế was the Black Panther Company, responsible for guarding the Tai Loc Airstrip (northwestern corner of the Citadel). By then, large numbers of VC guerillas had already infiltrated the city. In the early morning hours, the enemy took up positions in the town and awaited the arrival of NVA and VC assault troops.
At 0340, the NVA launched a rocket and mortar barrage from the mountains west of the city and followed this up with a three-pronged assault. A small sapper team dressed in ARVN uniforms killed guards and opened the western gate to the Citadel. The lead elements of the assault thus penetrated the city; the 6th NVA Regiment led the attack. As communist fighters poured into Huế, the 800th and 802nd Battalions rapidly overran most of the Citadel. General Truong and his staff held off the attackers at the ARVN compound, and the Black Panther Company held its ground at the eastern end of the airfield. Truong later withdrew the Black Panther company from the airfield to reinforce the ARVN compound. Except for this area, the NVA held the entire citadel, including the Imperial Palace.
The situation was similar across the Perfume River in southern Huế. The sound of explosions awakened allied advisors in the MACV compound. Grabbing any weapon they could get their hands on, advisors were able to repulse the ground assault, which lacked a coordinated effort. When the initial assault faltered, the 804th Battalion, 4th NVA Regiment, encircled the compound and began their siege. Two VC main force battalions seized the Thua Thien Provincial headquarters, the police station, and several other government buildings south of the river. The NVA 810th Battalion took up blocking positions on the city’s southern edge. By dawn on January 31, the North Vietnamese flag was flying over the Citadel, communist troops patrolled the streets, and political officers had begun their purge of South Vietnamese officials and American civilians.
The U. S. Marines
While the NVA were launching their attacks at Huế, the Marine Base at Phu Bai began receiving enemy rockets and mortars targeting the airstrip and Marine and ARVN infantry units. General LaHue started receiving reports of enemy strikes along Highway 1 between the Hai Van Pass and the City of Huế. Altogether, the NVA launched assaults against 18 targets. Intelligence was jumbled; no one was sure what was happening or where. LaHue knew that the 1st ARVN and MACV compounds had been hit, and because of the attack against the Navy’s LCU facility, all river traffic had ceased.
Meanwhile, General Truong realized that, at best, he had a tenuous hold on his headquarters. He ordered the 3rd Regiment (reinforced by two ARVN airborne battalions and a troop of armored cavalry) to fight into the Citadel from the northeast. The regiment finally arrived in the late afternoon, but only after intense fighting and a costly fight in terms of soldiers killed and wounded. Pleas for reinforcements at the MACV compound went unanswered because none of the senior commanders knew the extent of the enemy’s strength or their success in entering Huế.
Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam (Commander, ARVN Forces I CTZ) and Lieutenant General Robert Cushman (CG III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF)) began ordering subordinate commands to prevent enemy reinforcements from reaching the city. The NVA had the same idea—to prevent Western allies from entering the city. The NVA 806th and 810th blocked positions in southern Huế and along Highway 1.
Having received no reliable intelligence, General LaHue surmised that the attacks might have been a diversionary strike. General LaHue, who was only newly assigned to the Phu Bai area, was still unfamiliar with this tactical region (also, TAOR), let alone the fast-developing situation in Huế City.[9] This wasn’t the only problem for the Marines. Task Force X-Ray was created to help manage a major shift in the locations of the various combat elements of the First Marine Division and Third Marine Division, necessitated by MACV’s realignment of forces in I Corps.[10]
Colonel Bohn arrived at Phu Bai with General LaHue on 13th January. 1/1 under Colonel Gravel began making its move from Quang Tri at about the same time. His subordinate units, Charlie Company and Delta Company, reached Phu Bai on January 26, while Bravo Company and Headquarters Company arrived three days later. Alpha Company, Captain Gordon D. Batcheller, Commanding, arrived piecemeal. Two of his platoon commanders failed to arrive with their platoons, and a third platoon commander was attending leadership school in Da Nang.[11]
On January 30th, the First Marine Regiment (1st Marines) replaced the 5th Marines in operational responsibility for the Phu Bai TAOR. Colonel Hughes formally took operational control of the 1st Battalion (consisting of Company B, C, and D). In effect, Hughes commanded a paper regiment with barely a single battalion of Marines.
1/1 had already relieved 2/5, providing security on various bridges along Highway 1 and other key positions. When Company A finally arrived at Phu Bai on January 30, it was designated battalion reserve (also Bald Eagle Reaction Force). 2/5 moved into the Phu Loc sector and assumed responsibility for the area south of the Truoi River and east of the Cao Dai Peninsula. 1/5 retained responsibility for the balance of the Phu Loc region, extending to the Hai Van Pass.
At around 1730 hours on January 30, a Marine Recon unit (code name Pearl Chest) made lethal contact with what was believed to be an NVA company moving north toward Huế, resulting in around 15 enemy killed in action (KIA). After the unit fell back, it regrouped and encircled the Marines. Poor weather prevented Allied air support; the Recon Marines called for relief. LtCol Robert P. Whalen, commanding 1/5, sent his Bravo Company to relieve the Recon team. The NVA attacked Bravo Company as it approached the location of the embattled Recon Marines. Company B proceeded slowly with known enemies in the area and no understanding of how many. Whalen requested Bohn to send additional reinforcements from 2/5 so as not to diminish his battalion’s ability to defend the town of Phu Loc.
Colonel Bohn tasked Cheatham to send in a reinforcing company. Cheatham assigned this mission to Fox Company 2/5 (Captain Michael P. Downs, Commanding). NVA units ambushed Fox Company as it moved into 1/5’s sector. This action occurred at around 2300 hours, with Marines suffering one KIA and three wounded in action (WIA). After this contact, the NVA faded into the night. Fox Company secured an LZ to evacuate the injured and then returned to the 2/5 perimeter.
Realizing that his force was thin — and that his meager force could not sustain a significant engagement, Colonel Hughes ordered the Recon team to break out and return to Phu Bai. Whalen also directed Bravo Company to return to base. Colonel Bohn was puzzled about the purpose of these engagements.
As NVA units assaulted Huế City, they also attacked the Marines at Phu Bai with rockets and mortars, targeting the airstrip, known Marine positions around the airfield, and nearby Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) and local Popular Forces/Regional Forces (PF/RF) units.[12] An NVA company-sized unit attacked the South Vietnamese bridge security detachment along with CAP Hotel-Eight. LtCol Cheatham ordered Hotel Company 2/5 (Captain G. Ronald Christmas, Commanding) to relieve the embattled CAP unit. Marines from Hotel Company caught the NVA in the act of withdrawing from the CAP enclave and took it under fire. Seeing an opportunity to trap the NVA unit, Cheatham reinforced Hotel Company with his command group and Fox Company, which had just returned from its Phu Loc operation.
With his other companies in a blocking position, Cheatham hoped to catch the enemy against the Truoi River. However, after initiating the engagement with the NVA unit, events inside Huế City interrupted his plans. At around 1030 on January 31, Golf Company 2/5 was ordered to assume Task Force X-Ray reserve. The company detached from 2/5 and headed back to Phu Bai. Later that day, 2/5 also lost operational control of Fox Company, which allowed the NVA units to complete their withdrawal. Hotel and Echo Companies established night defensive positions.
While 2/5 engaged NVA along the Truoi River and Phu Loc, 1/1 began to move into Huế City. Task Force X-Ray had received reports of enemy strikes all along Highway 1 between Hai Van Pass and Huế. Eighteen separate attacks had occurred against everything from bridges to CAP units. With Alpha Company 1/1/ as Phu Bai reserve, Colonel Hughes directed Gravel to stage Alpha Company for any contingency. At 0630 on January 31, Hughes ordered Alpha Company to reinforce the Truoi River Bridge. All that the company commander knew was that he was to strengthen ARVN forces south of Phu Bai.
What occurred over the next several hours is best described as a “cluster fuck.” Alpha Company was convoyed to liaison with ARVN units. There were no ARVN units. The company commander encountered a few Marines from a nearby CAP unit and was told that Beau coupé VC were moving toward Huế. Gravel then ordered Batcheller to reverse course and reinforce an Army unit north of Huế. General LaHue rescinded that order, and Alpha Company was then ordered to assist a CAP unit south of Phu Bai. Thirty minutes later, Task Force X-Ray directed Alpha Company to proceed to the Navy LCU ramp to investigate reports of an enemy assault. In effect, the Marines of Alpha Company were being ground down by false starts.
Up to this point, the battle of Huế had been a South Vietnamese problem. General LaHue had little worthwhile information, and Alpha Company continued north toward Huế. The convoy met up with four tanks from the 3rd Tank Battalion. Batcheller invited the tanks to join him, and they accepted. Alpha Company, now reinforced with M-48 tanks, moved toward the MACV compound.
As Alpha Company approached the southern suburbs, the Marines came under increased sniper fire. At one village, the Marines were forced to dismount their vehicles and conduct clearing operations before proceeding further. The convoy no sooner crossed the An Cuu Bridge, which spanned the Phu Cam Canal into the city, when they were caught in a murderous crossfire from enemy automatic weapons and rockets. NVA were on both sides of the road. The lead tank commander was killed. Alpha Company pushed forward —albeit cautiously. Batcheller maintained “sporadic” communications with Gravel at Phu Bai. For the most part, the only thing Batcheller heard on the artillery and air nets were the voices of frantic Vietnamese. When Alpha Company reached the causeway, they once more came under sniper fire. Batcheller was seriously wounded. Gunnery Sergeant J. L. Canley assumed command of the company.[13]
Colonel Hughes requested permission from LaHue to reinforce Alpha Company. The only available reinforcing units were Headquarters & Service Company (H&SCo), 1/1, and Golf Company, 2/5. Colonel Gravel’s battalion was strung out from Phu Bai to Quang Tri (a distance of 46 miles). For whatever reason, Gravel had never met his Golf Company Commander, Captain Charles L. Meadows. Worse, Captain Meadows had no idea what was happening or what his upcoming mission would entail. All Meadows understood was that Golf Company would help escort the Commanding General to the 1st ARVN Division and back to Phu Bai.
Gravel’s hodge-podge column reached Alpha Company in the early afternoon. Gravel assumed control of the tanks but sent the trucks loaded with WIAs back to Phu Bai (including Captain Batcheller). With tanks taking point, Alpha Company, H&S Company, and Golf Company —in that order— raced toward the MACV compound. They arrived at about 1500 hours. By this time, the enemy had pulled back. Gravel met with the US Army senior advisor at the MACV compound, Colonel George O. Adkisson. Gravel was trying to understand the enemy situation, but this conversation may have ended with Gravel having even less understanding than when the discussion had begun.
Gravel ordered Alpha Company to establish a defensive perimeter at the MACV compound. With armor reinforcements from the Marines and 7th ARVN, Gavel took Golf Company in tow and attempted to cross the main bridge over the Perfume River. Marine armor was too heavy for the bridge, so Gravel left them on the south bank of the river. Available Vietnamese M-24 tank crews refused to go across the bridge.[14] Gravel directed two platoons to cross the bridge, but they were saturated with enemy fire when they reached the other side. Realizing he was outgunned, Gravel withdrew his Golf Company and returned to the MACV compound. One-third of Company G’s Marines were killed or wounded in this engagement.
The Americans still had scant information about the situation in Huế at 2000 hours. If General LaHue was confused, he knew far more about the situation than did Westmoreland. According to Westmoreland’s message to the JCS Chairman, three NVA companies were inside the Citadel, and a battalion of Marines had been sent in to clear them out.
The Struggle —
On February 1, senior allied commanders agreed that the 1st ARVN Division would assume responsibility for the Citadel while Task Force X-Ray would clear the New City. General LaHue ordered Gravel to advance from the MACV compound to the Thua Thien provincial headquarters and the prison — a distance of about six city blocks. General LaHue briefed reporters, saying, “… very definitely, we control the city’s southside.”
In reality, the Marine footprint was too small to control anything. CG III MAF secured Westmoreland’s permission to send in the Cavalry. Major General John J. Tolson, commanding the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile), intended to insert his Third Brigade from Camp Evans into the sector west of Huế City. Two battalions would be airlifted into the northwest sector: 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, and 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry (and Brigade CP). Their mission was to close off the enemy’s supply line into Huế. Additionally, the 2nd Battalion, 101st Airborne, would cover security for Camp Evans, and the division’s First Brigade would continue operations in Quang Tri Province. At mid-afternoon on February 2, CAV 2/12 landed 10 miles northwest of Huế and began pushing toward the city.
But on February 2, the Marines were still struggling. There was some minor progress, but only after a 3-hour firefight. 1/1 finally reached the university, and the Army radio center was relieved. During the night, NVA managed to destroy the railroad bridge across the Perfume River. Commanding Hotel Company 2/5, Captain Ron Christmas crossed the An Cuu Bridge at around 1100. Hotel Company was reinforced with Army trucks equipped with Quad-50 machine guns and two ONTOS, each armed with six 106mm recoilless rifles, which devastated enemy positions wherever they were found.
Gravel launched a two-company assault toward his two objectives. The enemy stopped the attack as effectively as a brick wall, and the Marines withdrew to the MACV compound. It was then that General LaHue realized that he had underestimated the enemy’s strength. Shortly after noon, LaHue gave Colonel Hughes tactical control of Marine forces in the southern city. Hughes promised Gravel reinforcements and directed that he commence “sweep and clear operations: destroy the enemy, protect US nationals, and restore that portion of the city to US Control.”
On the afternoon of February 2, Hughes decided to move his command group from Phu Bai into Huế, where he could more directly control the battle. Accompanying Hughes in the convoy was Lt. Col. Ernest Cheatham, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, who, up until then, had been sitting frustrated in Phu Bai while three of his companies (F, G, and H) fought in Huế under Gravel’s command.[15]
Hughes quickly established his command post in the MACV compound. The forces at his disposal included Cheatham’s three companies from 2/5 and Gravel’s depleted battalion consisting of A Company, 1/1; a provisional company made up of one platoon of B Company, 1/1; and several dozen cooks and clerks who had been sent to the front to fight alongside the infantry.
Endnotes:
[1] General Giap defeated the Imperial French after eight years of brutal warfare following the end of World War II.
[2] The United States did deploy covert and special forces into Laos at a later time.
[4] The Hương River (also Hương Giang) crosses the city of Huế in the central province of Thừa Thiên-Huế. The translation for Hương is Perfume. It is called the Perfume River because, in autumn, flowers from upriver orchards fall into the river, giving it a perfume-like aroma. Of course, this phenomenon likely happened a thousand years ago because, in 1968, the river smelled more like an open sewer.
[5] The National Police were sometimes (derisively) referred to as white mice. They were un-professional, non-lethal, timid, and about a third of them were giving information to the enemy on a regular basis.
[6] Task Force X-Ray went operational on 13 January 1968.
[7] In 1962, South Vietnam was divided into four tactical zones: CTZs or numbered Corps. These included I CTZ (Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, and Quang Tin); II CTZ (Quang Ngai, Kontum, Pleiku, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Phu Bon); III CTZ (16 provinces); IV CTZ (13 provinces), and the Capital Zone (Saigon and Gia Dinh provinces).
[9] Equally valid for most subordinate commanders and units at Phu Bai.
[10] Operation Checkers was a shift in responsibility for guarding the western approaches to Huế City. To that end, the 1st and 5th Marine Regiments moved into Thua Thien Province from Da Nang. It was a massive shift of American military units, which also involved US Army units operating in I Corps. This shifting of major subordinate commands played right into General Giap’s hands.
[11] I will probably never understand why sending a recently commissioned officer to a leadership school in Vietnam was necessary.
[12] Thirteen-man rifle squads with medical support and reinforced by Vietnamese militia platoons assigned to provide area security within rural hamlets. See Also: Fix Bayonets on 02/05/2016 (series)
[13] Initially awarded the Navy Cross medal, the award was upgraded to the Medal of Honor in 2017.
[14] The M-24 Chafee light tank weighed 18 tons; the M-48 Patton tank weighed 40 tons. The Vietnamese tank crews were likely ordered not to attempt to cross the bridge.
[15] At this time, Ernie Cheatham was a 38-year-old veteran of two wars and 14 years removed from a professional football career. The Pittsburgh Steelers picked him in the 1951 draft. He put his NFL career on hold to fight in the Korean War, afterward suiting up as a defensive tackle with the Steelers for the 1954 season. But after being traded to the Baltimore Colts, Cheatham left professional football and rejoined the Marine Corps. Lieutenant General Ernest C. Cheatham retired from active service in 1988; he passed away on 14 June 2014.
At the beginning of August 1950, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) had been in South Korea for thirty-six days. Within that time, the 75,000-man invasion force had pushed the South Korean Army and a few American advisory units into Pusan, South Korea, a major port city on the southeast coast of South Korea. The US Army had tried to halt the NKPA advance, but the effort failed, and the units, thrown in from their base in Japan, were soon destroyed. The South Korean people were badly frightened, and — at least so far in the war — the United States and South Korean government had done nothing to give them confidence.
Every day, thousands of refugees streamed into Pusan, seeking the protection of United Nations forces. They brought with them what they knew, what they had seen with their own eyes, and what they had heard from others about the resounding defeat of American and South Korean military units. They knew about the soldiers who had run away from the NKPA, who had dropped their weapons and surrendered, only to be shot down in cold blood. The fear among the people was palpable. According to one eye-witness in Pusan, one could almost smell the fear in the people — a peculiar odor that seemed to worsen with each passing day.
But then, a remarkable and easily observable transition took place. On the evening of 2 August, ships began to arrive from the United States carrying a brigade of United States Marines and all their equipment. On the morning of 3 August, the American Marines started unloading their combat equipment. The Marines soon formed on the pier. Close to 5,000 men dressed in field uniforms with field transport packs on their backs. They held their weapons at rest along their right side.
A color guard stood in front of the formation; two riflemen stood guard over the United States Flag and the Marine Corps battle standard. If any of the young Marines standing in formation behind the color guard were fearful, it wasn’t reflected in their demeanor or facial expressions. South Korean observers noted this, and “the word” quickly spread throughout the city.
The average age of these young Marines was 19 ½ years. They came from the same land as the other youngsters, who had been fighting in South Korea since early July — and thoroughly defeated by a numerically superior, well-trained, well-armed, and determined enemy. The poorly trained, poorly led, unresolved, and highly fearful soldier was easily defeated. In some cases, they threw their weapons away and surrendered. Korean refugees reported seeing the bodies of dozens of young men lying alongside the dusty roads, their hands tied behind them and murdered in cold blood. But these young Marines seemed different, somehow. They exuded confidence. They did not arrive in South Korea to die but to locate their enemy.
As the Marines were in the process of assembling on the pier, the Commanding General, 1st (Provisional) Marine Brigade, Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, U. S. Marine Corps, met with his senior staff, which included the Commanding Officer, 5th Marine Regiment, and the Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group -33. He finalized his order with a strict warning:
“The Pusan perimeter is like a weakened dike; the Army intends to use us to plug the holes as they open. We’re a brigade —a fire brigade. It will be costly fighting against a numerically superior enemy. Marines have never lost a battle; this brigade will not be the first to establish such a precedent. Prepare to move.”
Within an hour, U.S. Marines marched smartly toward a small town named Chang-won. Chang-won was a dedicated assembly point for elements of the Eighth US Army’s Reserve.
Before the arrival of the Marine Brigade, General Walton Walker, commanding the Eighth US Army, prepared a plan for the United States’ first counteroffensive in the Korean War. Walker’s idea was to use reserve elements to initiate a thrust toward Chinju through Masan, which was in the hands of the NKPA 6th Infantry Division. In this way, Walker would force the NKPA to divert some of its forces to confront the reserve while he continued building up his main force. Once achieving this objective, Walker intended to initiate an even more significant push to the Kum River. Still, his main thrust would depend upon the arrival in Korea of the US 2nd Infantry Division.
Walker believed his greatest threat was the NKPA 6th Infantry Division, a well-disciplined, supremely confident combat unit with a history of defeating American forces ever since the NKPA invasion of South Korea. The enemy division was centered in the town of Chinju. What Walker didn’t know was that the 6th NKPA Division was also preparing for offensive operations. The NKPA intended to strike the southwestern corner of the Pusan perimeter and capture the town of Masan, 35 miles from Pusan.
Walker’s attack force would form around the US 25th Infantry Division (25 ID), known as Task Force (TF) Kean — after the 25th’s commanding general, William B. Kean. The division’s regiments included the 27th Infantry Regiment (27 INF), 35th Infantry Regiment (35 INF) 5th Regimental Combat Team (and subordinate units) (5 RCT)[1] and the 1st Marine Brigade (1stMarBde). Altogether, TF Kean would consist of about 20,000 troops.
Walker’s plan called for TF Kean to kick off operations in the area of Masan, South Korea, with his objectives including the seizure of Chinju from the NKPA 6th Infantry Division. This would be followed by a larger push to the Kum River by mid-August. A secondary objective was to divert NKPA units from the Naktong to areas south of Masan.
TF Kean initiated its assault on 7 August. At the Notch, a northern pass into the city and site of a previous battle, the 35 INF encountered stiff resistance but ultimately defeated 850 NKPA forces. Kean’s force overran the NKPA 6th Division’s command post, but the Korean division was well trained and nearly fanatical in its own defense. Remarkably, the NKPA initiated an offensive of their own at about the same time and the two attacking forces clashed. As the American attack slowed and then stalled, Kean radioed General Craig and gave him operational command of the forward-most units. General Craig and Colonel Raymond L. Murray, Commanding the 5th Marine Regiment, were relentless in taking the battle to the NKPA despite war-stopping weather. Relying on Marine Aircraft to dislodge the enemy and air resupply to sustain the offensive, heavy fighting continued for three days. By 9 August, TF Kean was poised to take Chinju.
On 10 August, Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett[2], Commanding the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5), knocked on the enemy’s door at Kosong. With radio in hand, he contacted the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines (1/11) and requested a fire mission. The artillery Marines responded by delivering a lethal salvo of 105mm howitzer fire. Inside the village, an NKPA motorized regiment panicked and made a mad dash for safety. The enemy probably acted rationally, but it was a huge mistake. Overhead, combat aircraft from VMF-323[3] were searching for targets of opportunity.
Looking down from his cockpit flight leader Major Arnold A. Lund witnessed around a hundred vehicles of the NKPA 83rd Motorcycle Regiment (including jeeps and troop-carrying trucks), dashing off down the road leading out of Kosong. Lund’s Corsairs screamed downward from cruising altitude to strafe the entire length of the column. The effect of the Marine air attack was akin to the proverbial Chinese Fire Drill. Korean vehicles zigzagged and crashed into one another and ran off the road into a ditch to get out of the way of Marine Corps aircraft. The NKPA’s Soviet-made jeeps and motorcycles were sitting ducks for F4U aircraft, which worked their targets with rocket or 20-mm fire. After the Marine aircraft had set about 40 vehicles on fire, another flight from VMF-323 arrived, and they were, in turn, followed by USAF F-51s, which put the icing on the cake and the NKPA lost an entire regiment.
The Marine aviators didn’t walk away unscathed. Two of the lead Corsairs were badly damaged in the initial attack and had to make emergency landings. Lieutenant Doyle Cole ditched into the bay at the very-moment General Craig was making a tour of the battle area in a helicopter. Craig operated the hoist that pulled Doyle out of the water to safety. Captain Vivian Moses was not as fortunate. While putting his aircraft down in enemy territory, he was thrown unconscious from the cockpit and drowned in a rice paddy moments before a rescue bird reached his position. He was the first Marine aviator from MAG-33 killed in the Korean War.[4]
After securing the village of Kosong, 3/5 resumed its attack toward Sachon and soon came upon the scene of chaos left by the F4U’s. Some of these vehicles were undamaged but wisely abandoned by the NKPA. Taplett’s Marines were suitably impressed by the motorcycles and sidecars; they noted that the sleek black Russian jeeps were nearly identical to American jeeps. Curious Marines found the jeeps to contain Ford engines — provided to the Russians under Franklin D. Roosevelt’s lend-lease program of World War II.[5]
The air assault at Kosong was a dramatic example of the capabilities of the Marine Air-Ground Team. MAG-33 aircraft were constantly in the sky above Marine ground units. Marine Corps pilots, trained as infantry officers, were relentlessly aware of the ground game; MAG-33 made its aircraft available to the grunts on short notice. Rendering close air support (CAS) isn’t simple, but it is effective in killing and demoralizing an enemy. With VMF-214 and VMF-323 based on separate aircraft carriers, combat aircraft could arrive on station with more fuel and ordnance than Air Force missions flying in from Japan. Overall control of tactical air operations in Korea fell under the Fifth Air Force, of course, but Marine tactical air operations were integrated with a priority support for Marine ground forces. Other United Nations forces also benefitted from Marine air, but at a lower priority.
Within the Brigade, Tactical Air Control Parties were placed within each battalion, with a regimental TACP exercising overall coordination. Each TACP consisted of an officer and six enlisted men. They were equipped with radio-jeeps, portable radios, and other equipment. General Craig’s headquarters had an air section that planned and advised the brigade commander in matters of tactical use of aircraft.
Company H, 3/5 (also, “How Company”) (letter designated companies used a phonetic alphabet to ensure easily understood radio communications[6]) led the attack into Sachon; M-26 (Pershing) tanks led the way as reconnaissance by fire. At around 18:00 hours, after Taplett’s column had covered several miles, a lone enemy machine gun in a valley on the left of the battalion’s front wounded three Marines, temporarily holding up the battalion’s advance. By the time Marine tanks had silenced the enemy machine gun, it was growing dark. Taplett decided to halt his advance. He set his battalion in on two hills north of the road. The Marines prepared their defensive perimeter and settled in for the night. All the Marines could talk about was the Marine air attack on the NKPA motorized regiment and what a waste of good motorcycles it was.
Offshore and paralleling Taplett’s advance was a Landing Ship Tank (LST) manned by a team from Major William L. Batchelor’s Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion.[7] Batchelor’s Marines set up supply stations along the Main Supply Route (MSR) in order to keep the ground-pounders supplied with food stores, ammunition, and medical supplies. The LST also served the Marines as a makeshift hospital ship manned by Company C, 1st Medical Battalion. For the first time in Marine Corps history helicopters were used in evacuating wounded Marines to the field medical facilities.
As Taplett settled his battalion into a night defense, NKPA forces were in disarray. For the first time since the North Korean invasion began, an American counterattack not only stopped the enemy’s advance, but it also sent them into a full retreat. On the morning of 12 August, Taplett’s Marines were but a day’s march from Sachon. The Army’s 5th Regimental Combat Team (5th RCT) moved in the same direction north along the Chinju route where, although enemy opposition had been light, the RCT’s advance was slow due to several factors, which included streams of refugees constricting primitive roadways.[8]
General Craig anticipated stiffening enemy resistance and passed his concerns along to the senior officers of the Brigade. Events proved General Craig correct. Colonel Raymond L. Murray, Commanding Officer of the 5th Marines, was an outstanding combat commander who understood that by demanding aggressive behavior from his battalion commanders and placing unrelenting pressure on the enemy, he would reduce the number of his regiment’s casualties. Within the next 48 hours, the brigade would carry out one of the most astonishing operations in the history of the Marine Corps: simultaneous battalion assaults, in opposite directions, on two fronts, twenty-five miles apart.
But there was no hint of these developments at 06:30 on 12 August 1950 when LtCol George R. Newton’s 1/5 passed through LtCol Taplett’s 3/5 with the continuing mission to seizing Sachon. The countryside was quiet when 1/5 stepped off. Too quiet. Veteran NCOs grumbled to themselves; the enemy was up to something — but what?
The Brigade Recon Company took the battalion point under Captain Kenneth J. Houghton. Captain John L. Tobin’s Company B followed Houghton. Two M-24[9] tanks were placed in line between the 1st and 2nd platoons of Company B. Three more tanks followed Company B. There was no hint of an enemy presence. The unnatural calm lasted nearly five hours as Newton’s Marines advanced eleven miles. At noon, Sachon was only four miles further down the road.
Captain Houghton and his Marines rounded a bend in the road leading into the thatched-hut village of Changchon and immediately spotted two enemy soldiers scrambling for cover in the distance. When several Marines opened fire, a well-concealed enemy responded with a massive amount of automatic weapons fire from both sides of the road.
The NKPA’s apparent plan was to wait until the entire Marine column had entered their killing zone, but Marine rifle fire spooked enemy machine gunners into a premature response. Captain Tobin quickly dispatched his first platoon to reinforce Houghton. First Lieutenant Hugh C. Schryver led his men forward along the roadside ditches at the cost of three casualties but successfully reinforced Houghton’s small reconnaissance detachment. Tobin then deployed his second platoon under First Lieutenant David L. Taylor to move up behind the three tanks. The tanks were unable to maneuver off the road because of the possibility that they would become bogged down in adjacent rice paddies, but as mobile fortresses, they provided some protection to the grunts and added firepower to the forward element.
NKPA fire from the hill on the right pinned down the balance of Tobin’s third platoon and the headquarters section. LtCol Newton requested that the battalion air controller, First Lieutenant James W. Smith, call for an air strike to suppress or neutralize the enemy ambush. Mortar and artillery crews began setting up their weapons in hastily selected positions, but Newton wasn’t looking for a protracted fight; he needed overwhelming fire, and he needed it sooner rather than later. Marine Air was the only external supporting arm available. After the Corsairs attacked Hill 250, Tobin ordered Second Lieutenant David R. Cowling to lead his third platoon into an attack on the hill. Newton ordered Company A to dispatch a rifle platoon and a machine gun section to seize Hill 301 (on the right side of the roadway).
As Cowling’s platoon began its movement across an open rice paddy, enemy automatic weapons laid down a murderous crossfire forcing Cowling and his men to withdraw. Tank and mortar fire had scant effect on the enemy guns. Cowling lost one Marine killed, and four others seriously wounded.
Company A’s platoon occupied Hill 301 without encountering NKPA resistance. Smith advised Newton that the overhead aircraft had five minutes remaining on station. Newton requested that the aircraft engage targets of opportunity along the road to Changchon, which resulted in a repetition of the Kosong turkey shoot, albeit on a smaller scale. The aviators destroyed a convoy of enemy reinforcements rushing forward to engage Newton’s battalion.
While Lieutenant Cowling withdrew to the base of Hill 301, Newton ordered Captain John R. Stevens, Commanding Able Company, to secure the high ground on the right side of the road with the rest of his men. Hill 250 was the center of NKPA resistance. Mortar crews delivered 115 rounds on the enemy’s suspected positions. Following a second air strike, enemy guns fell silent. Tobin’s remaining two platoons supported Houghton’s force on the left. Artillery augmented Marine rifle fire, and one enemy position after another was systematically targeted and eliminated. Colonel Newton called for three additional air strikes, which allowed Tobin’s 1st and 2nd platoons to cross the road and attack the enemy’s positions.
When Lieutenant Taylor spotted an enemy formation approaching the crest of Hill 202 from the reverse slope, he dispatched Technical Sergeant F. J. Lischeski with a squad of Marines to welcome them to the party. Lischeski ordered his Marines to hold fire until the enemy was within 75 feet. The enemy unit was eliminated. Of the 39 men in the NKPA ambush detachment, 38 died instantly; the remaining survivor died from his wounds a short time later.
With darkness approaching, Tobin ordered his company into a night defense. Colonel Newton suspected that an NKPA force remained behind to provide security for what remained of the withdrawing 6th NKPA Infantry Division and remnants of the 83rd Motorized Regiment. At the end of the day, Newton had lost three Marines killed and 13 wounded. Newton orchestrated the evacuation of his casualties by road, protected by tanks. Newton’s response to the NKPA ambush was an excellent demonstration of a Marine infantry battalion’s lethality.
Mission Redirect
While Newton engaged the enemy at Changchon, Brigadier General Craig received another hot potato. General Kean ordered Craig to provide a reinforced infantry battalion back to Chindong-ni. Kean reported that the situation was critical; NKPA forces had penetrated and overran three batteries of artillery. Kean expected the Marines to move immediately because the MSR was in grave danger of being cut. A Marine counterattack was needed “now.” General Kean advised Craig, “The assault into Sachon is no longer a priority.”
At nightfall, Newton expected to lead his weary battalion into Sachon early the following day. However, at midnight on 12 August, Colonel Murray[10] radioed Newton and ordered him to prepare to move by truck at 0630 to a new sector.
Endnotes:
[1] The 5RCT was a heavily reinforced regiment consisting of the US 5th Infantry Regiment, 555th Field Artillery Battalion, 72nd Engineer Company, 5th Tank Company, a heavy mortar company, 5th Medical Company, and the 5th Aviation Section.
[2] Bob Taplett (1918-2004) served with distinction as a Marine officer for twenty years, serving in World War II and the Korean War. He was awarded the Navy Cross and two awards of the Silver Star medal in recognition of his courage under fire. Retiring in 1960, Taplett authored an autobiography titled Darkhorse Six, published in 2003.
[4] On the previous day, Moses had been shot down and rescued behind enemy lines. Despite this harrowing experience, Moses volunteered to fly the mission on 11 August.
[5] It is bad enough to have to face a determined enemy but having to confront them with weapons made in the United States adds insult to injury.
[6] For example, in 1950, the phonetic alphabet for A, B, C, D, and E was Able, Baker, Charlie, Dog, and Easy. To standardize the phonetic alphabet among Allied radiophone spellings, again for clarity and consistency, the phonetic alphabet was later changed to Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, and Echo. How Company later became Hotel Company.
[7] A Marine shore party battalion were mostly task organized units, the size and makeup of which depended on their assigned mission. Battalion strengths ranged from 273 Marines and 8 Navy medical personnel to 567 Marines and 19 corpsmen. The battalion’s table of organization called for an H&S Company and three letter designated companies. The letter companies were cargo handlers moving necessary supplies from sea to shore or from air terminal to the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).
[8] Civilian refugees are “war stoppers” for several reasons. Not only do American commanders avoid civilian casualties whenever possible, according to the law of land warfare, but large groups of refugees interrupt the flow of military traffic and enemy infiltrators use these groups to get behind American lines to sabotage and disrupt main supply routes (MSRs).
[9] The M-24 Chaffee light tank fielded a 75mm gun and a .50 caliber Browning machine gun. The 75mm gun was insufficient in knocking out the Russian made T-34 medium tank.
[10] Major General Raymond L. Murray (1913-2004) was a highly decorated officer who earned two Navy Cross medals, one during World War II and one during the Korean War. During World War II, he participated in the battles for Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Saipan. In Korea, he served in the Pusan Perimeter, Inchon, the Second Battle of Seoul, and the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir. He was also awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, four Silver Star medals, the Legion of Merit, and the Purple Heart Medal. General Murray retired from the Marine Corps in 1968. I met General Murray on several occasions. He was always cordial, and once we met, he never forgot your name or when he had last spoken to you. Semper Fi, General.
In March 1952, U.S. Marines of the 1st Marine Division redeployed from east-central to western Korea, joining the United States First Corps (I Corps) in defense of the Main Line of Resistance (M.L.R.) — a section of which was code-named the Jamestown Line extending 35 miles east-to-west. The Jamestown sector was located between People’s Volunteer Army (P.V.A.) line units to the north of the South Korean capital of Seoul. Marine Corps aviation units assigned to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st M.A.W.) provided air support to their ground-combat brothers.
Marine battalions defending the so-called Nevada Cities Outposts included First Battalion, Fifth Marines (1/5), 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (2/1), and 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (3/1). The Nevada Cities were a series of outposts code-named Vegas, Reno, and Carson. According to Colonel Tony Caputa, the outposts were called Nevada Cities because it was a gamble that the Marines could them. Joining the Marines on the Jamestown Line as part of the 1st Marine Division was the Provisional Regiment of the Republic of Korea Army (including a detachment of Korean Marines) and the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion. The 1st Marine Division’s supporting units included artillery, tanks, and elements of the 1st M.A.W.
The Chinese were active and aggressive in patrolling, reconnaissance, and ambuscades throughout March. Enemy forces included the 19th P.V.A. Division 65th Chinese People’s Army. The 19th Division had three infantry regiments placed in forward positions. The 120th Division of the 40th Army (under temporary control of the 46th Army) also had three forward regiments.
An overview
In mid-March, the P.V.A. began a series of limited objective assaults against U.S. outposts. The missions varied from squad to regimental-sized attacks against Outpost Reno and Vegas. They were designed to deny the American’s observation into the P.V.A.’s rear areas. A significant battle erupted on 26 March, lasting five days — referred to in history as the Battle of the Outposts.
The U.S. Army’s First Corps assigned the mission of denying a tactical advantage to Chinese Communist Forces (C.C.F.) to the 1st Marine Division. The Tactical Area of Responsibility (T.A.O.R.) included defending a series of hills north of the Allied main line of resistance (M.L.R.). Outpost Vegas was the highest in elevation of the so-called Nevada Cities Outposts, located some 1,300 yards north of the M.L.R. Ranging north to south, Outpost Vegas included a 180-degree sweep toward the enemy held Hill 57 (to the right), U.S. Outpost Berlin, the M.L.R., and key Marine defensive highpoints on Hills 229 and 191 in the Marine sector, and the intervening terrain.
However, what the Marines could not see from Outpost Vegas, was Outpost Reno. A rifle platoon (forty Marines and two Navy Corpsmen) manned each outpost. A trench line surrounded the outpost. The trench measured from 4 to 8 feet deep. Beyond the trenches, two parallel lines of barbed wire lay linked with more parallel aprons of wire connecting the two. Marines referred to this configuration as the Canadian System.
Outpost Reno (previously named Outpost Bruce) was the location of intense fighting on 5-6 September 1952 during the Battle of Bunker Hill. During that fight, three Marines earned the Medal of Honor — two posthumously.
The Nevada outposts differed according to location, terrain, and enemy threat. On the left, Carson guarded a barren hilltop where a cave provided living quarters for the Marines manning an oval perimeter protected by barbed wire, bunkers, and tunnel trenches with fighting holes. Except for the slopes nearest the Jamestown Line (where a deeper entrenchment was dug), the main trench on Carson averaged 5 feet deep by 2 feet wide. Most of the 28 fighting holes had excellent fields of fire, though overhead cover on some of them restricted observation and firing position. During darkness, Marines manned two listening posts covering the likeliest avenues of a Chinese attack (from the Ungok hills to the west and Hill 67 to the north).
The most vulnerable of the three outposts was Reno, in the center. It was closest to enemy lines and occupied terrain that forced Marines into a perimeter vaguely resembling a wishbone — the open end facing north. As at Carson, a cave served as living quarters for the Marines and might also serve as a final redoubt. A tunnel provided access to the cave from the main trench, ranging from 5–7 feet deep.
Relying exclusively on fighting holes in the trenches, the Marines at Reno built no bunkers. Their cave would be their last resort. Reno has limited fields of fire in the direction of Chinese forces (Hill 67), which the Marines called Arrowhead Hill, but Carson (on the left) provided fire support in the battle area. The approach that seemed to pose the greatest danger to Reno’s defenders followed a ridge extending southward from Hill 150.
As with the Marines defending the other two outposts, those at Reno were sustained by C-rations. When the Marines finished their meals, they threw empty tin cans into the nearby gullies. At night, clattering tin cans signaled the possibility of enemy activity at the base of the hill.[1]
To the south of Outpost Reno lay the Reno Block — an L-shaped trench with a small bunker at the end of the shorter leg and a machine gun position where the legs joined. At night a reinforced squad was sent to man the blocking position, which also served as a listening post. Reno Block, sited at the top of a hill, afforded excellent visibility for the Marines — which was also easily observed by the Chinese. Marines manning Reno’s east–west trench could fire to support the blocking position, as could the garrison at Carson.
This brings us back to Outpost Vegas, the highest elevation of the three, which was located to the right of Reno and afforded the best view of the entire region. Barbed wire and a well-constructed trench encircled the egg-shaped perimeter of Vegas. There were three bunkers (two living cubicles and one warming bunker). Despite its elevation, the fields of fire on Vegas were handicapped by irregularly sloped hills, which gave the enemy concealed firing positions. The Marines at Outpost Vegas could not see Reno but had pre-registered their long-range weapons to support Reno Marines.
In the daylight, Marines on Outpost Vegas were targeted by Chinese snipers and harassing mortar and artillery fire, which forced the Marines to remain undercover for extended periods. In late March, Allied intelligence anticipated no major enemy offensives. The frigid winter turned into spring, and the melting snow turned the roads and pathways into muddy ruts, making resupply nearly impossible. The newly deployed 1st Marine Regiment expected a comparatively quiet front in western Korea — it would be a welcome change to the fighting they experienced elsewhere. In any case, the battle lines had remained (more or less) static for most of the war.
The P.V.A. had several reasons for their assault on 26 March. One prevailing argument is that the Chinese and North Korean negotiators wanted to capture the Nevada outposts before the end of the war to gain leverage at the Panmunjom peace talks. If the P.V.A. gained a victory at the Jamestown Line, they could threaten Seoul, embarrass, and pressure United Nations negotiators at the peace talks. Marine Corps historical analysts agree.
Battle
The P.V.A. launched their assault on 26 March, hitting all Nevada outposts along with Dagmar, Esther, Bunker, and Hedy. The assault came as a complete surprise to the United Nations forces. When Marine headquarters issued its orders, they were simple and to the point: contact the enemy, take prisoners, and deny the ground to the enemy.
The attack began at 1900 with small arms and machine gun fire focused against 1/5. This was followed by fifteen minutes of mortar and artillery fire on the regiment’s rear areas and supply routes. Ten minutes later, thirty-five hundred Chinese troops from the 358th Regiment assaulted Carson, Reno, and Vegas. One enemy infantry company attacked the Marine platoon atop Vegas. Marine artillery responded with Variable Time (V.T.) proximity fuses targeting areas around the outposts and the enemy’s avenues of approach.[2]
When VT was fired at P.V.A. soldiers close to the Marine positions — as was often the case — the Marines would withdraw into previously dug caves on the opposite slope of the hills. With that protection, the Marines waited until the overwhelming numbers of P.V.A. soldiers were pushed off the hill by the V.T. shells, and then the Marines would reemerge from the caves to man their prepared defensive positions.
Overwhelming numbers of Chinese troops and enemy artillery fire forced the Marines on Vegas to abandon the outer ring of less easily defended trenches. During the Chinese assault, Marine tanks and artillery began supporting an infantry raid intending to destroy the P.V.A. bunkers. It was called Operation Clambake. It was pure chance that the Marines started their raid just as the Chinese attacked along the same front.
Forty minutes into the attack, enemy artillery and mortar fire disrupted communications between Vegas and the 1/5 command post (C.P.). Marine communicators and engineers repaired the landlines (telephone wire), which would only last until the next enemy barrage. In another ten minutes, a hundred or so Chinese communist forces occupied the lower trenches of outpost Vegas taking cover from Marine Corps artillery — but the number of enemies overwhelmed the Marine platoon, causing them to withdraw from Vegas.
An hour later, the 1/5 commander directed that a rifle platoon be sent to reinforce the Vegas Marines, but before the backup could tie in with the withdrawing Marines, the enemy pinned them down with intense fire. Three minutes before midnight, the battalion C.P. lost communications with the Marines at Outpost Vegas. All of those Marines were either killed or captured.
After five hours of ferocious combat, the P.V.A. assault had been partially successful. The enemy captured two outposts (Vegas and Reno), thwarting Marine efforts to reinforce the outposts. The Marines still had possession of Carson. Shortly after midnight, “FRED” Company 2/1 tried to recapture Vegas, but the lead platoon could only close with the enemy sufficiently to know that the P.V.A. controlled Outpost Vegas. By 0300 on 27 March, reinforcing Marines retreated to the M.L.R. Wounded Marines were either carried to the aid stations or, in extreme instances, evacuated by helicopter to hospital ships in Inchon Harbor. On the other side, in the first eight hours of fighting, C.C.F. lost an estimated six-hundred men, four times the number of U.S. Marines.
Counterattack
The general commanding the 1st Marine Division was Major General Edwin A. Pollock. Early on 27 March, he ordered observation planes to direct ground artillery fire at detectable P.V.A. artillery positions and enemy fortifications atop outposts Reno and Vegas. Marines delivered more than sixty fire missions on the Chinese communists. Additionally, two dozen Air Force and Marine Corps aircraft delivered ordnance on the enemy-held outposts.
Instead of attacking both Reno and Vegas outposts, General Pollock ordered concentrated air attacks on outpost Vegas. “DAVID” Company, 2/1, was the first to assault Vegas, but those Marines never reached their objective. When the company finally withdrew, only nine able-bodied men remained. After ten hours of intense combat, “FRED” Company was still four hundred yards behind the advanced units approaching Outpost Vegas. At the end of daylight, Marines held the lower slope of the hill, and the P.V.A. maintained the opposite lower slope. There was no one left alive on the summit, inside the outpost.
The Third Day
On the morning of 28 March, General Pollock directed an aerial attack against Outpost Vegas. 1stMAW dumped an estimated 28 tons of ordnance on Vegas, enough to cause irredeemable harm to most of the enemy holding it. After heavy fighting, Marines from “EASY” Company 2/1 gained control of outpost Vegas at around 1300 hours. An hour and a half later, the outpost was back in U.S. hands. Navy doctors set up a temporary field hospital on the slope of Vegas, where 200 wounded Marines received treatment. Just after 2300 hours, the medical staff learned that a battalion-sized unit of P.V.A. was moving toward the hospital. Armed with as many grenades as they could carry, wounded Marines threw the grenades down the slope to blunt the enemy’s maneuver.
The fourth and fifth days
For two days, Chinese communist forces continued to attack the Marines to retake Outpost Vegas. Historians tell us that in these two days, the Chinese lost 4,000 men, an equivalent of two infantry regiments, killed or wounded in action. On 30 March, Marine Artillery and air attacks devastated whatever remained of the People’s Volunteer Army, and given such tremendous losses in manpower, the Chinese accepted their defeat and withdrew. The battle for Outpost Vegas was over. A Turkish Brigade replaced the 1st Marine Division in May, which went into reserve after a week of heavy fighting.
Marine casualties in March were 141 killed in action (K.I.A.), 29 died of wounds, 701 wounded and evacuated, 510 wounded and not evacuated, and 104 missing in action. P.V.A. forces suffered 1,351 killed in action, 3,631 wounded, and four captured. The U.S. Marines’ counterparts, the Korean Marines, had a minor presence during the battle for Outpost Vegas, but they suffered 26 killed in action, 97 wounded, and five missing in action.
The Battle for Outpost Vegas (and surrounding outposts) was among the bloodiest fighting in western Korea (1950 – 1953). It was also unique because of a war horse named Reckless — a war horse.
Staff Sergeant Reckless, U.S.M.C.
Marines assigned to the 5th Marine regiment purchased the Mongolian horse from a Korean stable boy. The popular story is that the stable boy needed money to buy an artificial leg for his sister and sold the animal to a Marine for $250.00. They named the animal Reckless. The horse was a chestnut-colored animal with a blaze and three white stockings. Her date of birth and parentage are unconfirmed, but she was estimated to be around three or four years old.
Reckless was assigned to the Recoilless Rifle Platoon, Weapons Company, 5th Marines. Note: The weapon used during the Korean War was the M20 75mm Recoilless Rifle. This crew-served weapon (crew of two) included a gun tube and the M1917A1 tripod. The weapon’s mass was 103 pounds, and its length was 82 inches (barrel length 65 inches). Each 75mm round weighed from 20.5 to 22.6 pounds. The shells were high explosive (HE), high explosive anti-tank (HEAT), and smoke rounds. There were five guns in the Recoilless Rifle Platoon (two officers and 14 enlisted men). Reckless meant the Marines would not have to haul these heavy weapons up and down Korea’s mountainous terrain.
Reckless quickly became part of the weapons company and was allowed to roam freely through camp, helping herself to Marine’s tents during cold nights and sharing their chow of green scrambled eggs and warm Black Label beer.
Reckless served in numerous combat actions, carrying supplies and ammunition and helping to evacuate casualties to field medical facilities. Learning each supply route after only a few trips, Reckless could make the resupply runs on her own without the benefit of a wrangler (even during intense enemy fire).
Reckless had been moving between the Nevada Cities when the P.V.A. attacked on 26 March 1953. When artillery began to hit Outposts Vegas and the support network behind it on the M.L.R., the shocked animal ran unassisted to the nearest bunker, remaining until fitted for her next mission.
The next morning, on the 26th, as the 5th Marines recovered from the previous day’s assault, the Marines readied the horse for her duties as an ammunition carrier. She was fitted with eight recoilless rifle projectiles (192 pounds of weight) and led by her wrangler to firing positions opposite the southern slopes of Outpost Vegas. Even though she was twice wounded by enemy fire, she remained steadfast and calm while completing her ammunition resupply missions. Reckless made 52 solo trips to resupply multiple front-line units during the battle.
Reckless was the first (and only) horse to make an amphibious landing with her Marines. She received a “battlefield promotion” to corporal and sergeant in 1953 and 1954. After the war, the Marine Corps awarded her two Purple Heart Medals, the Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal, and two Presidential Unit Citations. The Saturday Evening Post and Life Magazine featured the animal’s wartime exploits — where she was recognized as one of America’s 100 all-time animal heroes.
After the war, the Marines transported Reckless to the United States. While quartered at Camp Pendleton, California, she made several “P.R.” appearances on television and participated in the Marine Corps Birthday Ball celebrations. In 1959, Reckless was promoted to staff sergeant by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In her life, she birthed four foals. Admirers of Reckless placed a bronze statue of the horse in the Kentucky Horse Park, Lexington. Staff Sergeant Reckless passed away in May 1968. She was buried at Camp Pendleton, California.
Notes:
[1] During the Vietnam War, Marines continued using C-Rats cans to alert against possible enemy movement — or rock apes, more than a few of which died from multiple gunshot wounds.
[2] A proximity fuse is an explosive device that detonates automatically when the distance to the target exceeds a predetermined value. They were designed for such targets as planes, missiles, ships at sea, and animated ground forces. They are five to ten times more lethal than other fuses.
Fix Bayonets! 