First Battle of the Naktong Bulge

Background

Late in 1945, President Harry S. Truman appointed Dean Gooderham Acheson (1893-1971) to serve as Undersecretary of State, a position Acheson retained through three successive cabinet secretaries of state.  In this role, Acheson was conciliatory toward the Soviet Union, a position he kept even through Joseph Stalin’s attempts to seize Eastern Europe and Southwest Asia.  It was only late in the game that Acheson “changed his thinking” and became more than an observer of the Cold War; he became its architect.

Due to the frequent absences of the Secretary of State, Undersecretary Dean Acheson often served as “Acting Secretary,” and this placed him in constant contact with the President.  Eventually, Acheson and Truman formed a close relationship, and Acheson became the author of President Truman’s containment policy (Truman Doctrine).  Undersecretary Acheson also directed the formulation of the US economic aid program to Europe, also known as the Marshall Plan.  Acheson and Truman both believed that the best way to curb the Soviet Union’s aggressive policies was to restore economic prosperity to Western Europe and encourage interstate cooperation.

Acheson became Secretary of State in 1949.  He refined the Truman Doctrine and became the primary designer of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  That summer, the press and political opposition began asking questions about Mao Zedong’s success in the Chinese Civil War.  Acheson prepared a 1,054-page report titled United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 — also known as the China White Paper.  Acheson argued that US intervention in China (1945-1947) was doomed to failure.  Whatever Acheson hoped to achieve in writing this voluminous document failed.  The American press blamed the Truman administration for the spread of communism in China — and they were probably right.

On January 12, 1950, Mr. Acheson appeared before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., to deliver a speech about the Cold War in East Asia.  In his speech, he carefully defined the so-called American Defense Perimeter as a warning to China and the Soviet Union that the United States was committed to its containment policy.  Acheson said that the defense perimeter in the Pacific extended as a line running through Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines.  He neglected to mention the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China (Taiwan), which signaled to the Chinese and Soviets that the United States would not guarantee the security of either.  In the minds of many, the United States had betrayed the Koreans and Taiwanese.  In a little over six months, in the early morning hours of 25 June 1950, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) launched a full-scale invasion of South Korea.  They were backed, trained, supplied, and advised by the Soviet Union.

The timing of the North Korean attack could not have been better.  In June 1950, Truman’s Defense policies had almost completely dismantled the United States military.  Truman’s demobilization of the armed forces substantially reduced the number of combat-experienced soldiers assigned to forward units.  The Army’s forward-most combat unit was the US 24th Infantry Division (24 ID), stationed in Japan as part of the post-war occupation force.  Truman’s cuts had reduced the 24 ID to about fifty percent of its wartime strength.

The Commanding General of the 24 ID was Major General William F. Dean.  Most of the men assigned to this division were poorly trained conscripts.  Their combat equipment was obsolete, poorly maintained, and barely operable.  In the entire infantry division, General Dean had one combat-ready battalion.

The 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment (1/21), under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith, consisted of two reinforced rifle companies and an artillery battery (540 men).[1]  Designated Task Force Smith, the Army promptly dispatched 2/21 to Taejon, South Korea.  From Taejon, Smith was to proceed to Osan to confront North Korea’s 75,000-man invasion force.  Smith’s mission was to block advancing North Korean forces until the rest of 24 ID could be organized and dispatched to South Korea.[2]

General Dean’s orders to Smith were, “When you get to Pusan, head for Taejon.  Block the main road as far north as possible.  Establish contact with [Brigadier] General [John H.] Church.[3]  If you can’t find him, go to Taejon and beyond if you can.  Sorry, I can’t give you more information — that’s all I’ve got.”

As Smith’s task force began moving north to Osan, Major General Dean flew into the Taejon airfield to take charge of the 24 ID’s advance element; the US 34th Infantry Regiment soon followed to reinforce Task Force Smith.  Dean determined to hold the NKPA advance at Osan.  He assigned Brigadier General George B. Barth, the Division’s artillery commander, to assume overall command of Task Force Smith.

At Task Force Smith’s point of contact with the enemy on July 3, Smith’s six 105mm howitzers unleashed a barrage upon the enemy’s lead T-34 tanks.  Since none of his artillery munitions were powerful enough to stop the Russian-built tanks, Smith’s effort had no effect on the advancing NKPA.  It was only when Smith’s howitzers fired High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) rounds at point-blank range that they had any impact on the Russian tanks.  Still, it wasn’t enough to stop the advance of an NKPA infantry regiment following behind the tanks, and Smith’s position was quickly overrun.  When 1/21’s untrained troops ran out of ammunition, an orderly withdrawal soon turned into a massive foot race to the rear.

Smith did accomplish his mission, however.  He delayed the NKPA advance for about two hours.  The reinforced battalion of 540 men suffered 60 dead, 21 wounded, 82 captured (32 of whom died in captivity),[4], and around 150 temporarily displaced stragglers during the route.

After the defeat of Task Force Smith, MajGen Dean ordered the US 34th to implement delaying tactics south of Osan, but it too suffered a defeat at Pyongtaek.  Upset by the regiment’s poor performance, General Dean fired the regimental commander, Colonel J. B. Loveless, and replaced him with a friend of Dean’s, Colonel Robert R. Martin.  Dean ordered Martin to stop the NKPA at Chonan.  The following day, Dean and General Walker visited Chonan to inspect the regiment and observe the battle’s outcome.  They found Colonel Martin dead, the regiment defeated, and its survivors in disarray.  Dean ordered the remnants of the regiment to withdraw to the Kum River and directed the two remaining battalions of the 21st Regiment to conduct a delaying action.

On 12 July, MajGen Dean ordered his three regiments (19th, 34th, and 21st) to cross the Kum River, destroy all bridges behind them, and establish a defensive line around Taejon.  The 19th Regiment had 2,276 men; the 34th had around 2,020; after suffering 1,433 casualties, the 21st Regiment could field 1,100 men.  Dean had an additional 2,007 men in his artillery units.  Between 13-16 July, the 24 ID suffered an additional 650 casualties as two NKPA infantry divisions pushed the Americans out of Taejon city, block by block.

On 20 July, Major General Dean ordered the 34th Regiment to withdraw while he remained behind to help evacuate wounded men.  Dean took command of the rear element of the withdrawal, which enemy forces ambushed.  Dean, having been separated from his command, was ultimately taken prisoner.  General Church assumed command of the division.

Naktong

The Naktong River curves westward opposite the town of Yongsan in a wide semicircular loop.  For most of this loop, the river’s width is around 400 meters, and its depth averages six feet.  Military troops can wade across rivers, but it is a grueling task given bottom silt and currents.  A depth of six feet is too deep for fording vehicles.

24 ID occupied an area 16 miles long adjacent to the Naktong River.  The division’s perimeter consisted of lightly defended observation posts on the surrounding high ground.  The killing ground between the river and eastward hills was suitable for pre-registered artillery and mortar fire.  Still, the understrength division was too widely dispersed to allow for interlocking fields of small arms and automatic weapons fire.  The 34th Regiment occupied the southern half, west of Yongsan, and the 21st Regiment occupied the northern half, west of Changyong.  General Church placed the 19th Regiment in reserve.  On August 5, 1950, the division’s total strength was 14,540.

During the night of August 5-6, an 800-man KPA force crossed the river undetected near Yongsan.  Another force attempted to cross the river further north, but the Americans detected them,  pummeled them, and forced them back.  North Koreans engaged 3/34 at around 0200, forcing the battalion to abandon its command post and establish secondary positions.  The attack threatened to split 24 ID.

1/34 was dispatched to reclaim the lost ground but was ambushed enroute.  The Korean force penetrated three miles east of the Naktong, halfway to Yongsan.  Several units of the 34th began a retreat northward into the lines of the 21st, but General Church ordered them to turn around.  The 19th launched a counter-attack along the 34th Regiment’s northern flank, trapping three hundred North Korean soldiers in a nearby village, killing most of them.  While the 19th and elements of the 34th managed to push enemy forces back, the NKPA stubbornly held onto their bridgehead.  During the night of August 6-7, the North Koreans made several attempts to cross the river.  South Korean (ROK) forces repulsed one attempt, but the NKPA succeeded in another.

24 ID continued counter-attacking on August 7, but their gains were slow, hampered by a determined enemy, extremely high temperatures, and a shortage of drinking water.  The NKPA pressed to regain territory adjacent to Oblong-ni, to them, critical terrain that sat astride the main road in the Naktong bulge.  Late that afternoon, the US 9th Regiment reinforced 24 ID.  The 9th Regiment was a fresh, well-equipped regiment, but its men needed combat experience.  Nevertheless, a vigorous attack enabled the American Army to reclaim part of Cloverleaf Hill before being held off by a well-entrenched enemy.

The battle continued to rage on August 7-8 as the NKPA attempted to send two additional battalions across the river.  The 21st Regiment repulsed this enemy.  Undeterred, however, the NKPA relocated their battalions south, where they successfully crossed the river at the bridgehead.  By mid-morning on August 8, a full enemy regiment was poised to assault the American positions.  North Korean gains were expensive to both sides, but neither side was able to achieve a decisive advantage over the other.

Meanwhile, the NKPA had constructed an underwater bridge of sandbags, logs, and rocks to move trucks, heavy artillery, additional infantry, and tanks across the river.  On August 10, the North Koreans had two fully resupplied regiments across the Naktong and occupied fortified positions.

General Church assembled a large force under Colonel John G. Hill, Commanding the 9th Regiment.  Dubbed Task Force Hill, Colonel Hill commanded elements of the 9th, 19th, 21st, and 34th regiments, with supporting artillery.  Hill’s mission was to drive the NKPA from the east river bank on August 11.  While Hill organized his assault force, the NKPA 4th Division moved southward, outflanking Task Force Hill. 

General Walker realized that the upcoming fight would be desperate.  To strengthen the 24th Infantry Division, General Walker ordered the recently arrived 2nd and 24th Infantry Divisions to tie in with Church’s beleaguered division.  Meanwhile, General Church began forming provisional infantry units from his supply and maintenance units.  On August 13, the 23rd and 27th Regiments were able to push NKPA troops out of Yongsan.  Early in the morning of August 14, Colonel Hill launched an assault against the North Korean cloverleaf defenses.  A series of attacks and counterattacks continued for most of the day, and both sides took many casualties.

Hill’s force could not penetrate the NKPA defenses.  The number of officers killed threatened the effectiveness of the assault units, and there were significant disruptions to unit communications.  By the end of the next day, the fight had become one of attrition.  Frustrated, General Walker turned to the United States Marines.

How Battles Are Won

Truman’s inept post-World War II demobilization of the Armed Forces affected the smaller Marine Corps in greater proportion than any of the other services, mainly because Truman detested the idea of maintaining a Marine Corps and had no tolerance for doing so.  A Marine Corps wasn’t necessary, he argued.  The United States already had the Army.  Nor did Truman or his Defense Secretary, Louis Johnson, think America needed a Navy; they had the Air Force.  Secretary Johnson informed the Chief of Naval Operations that the Navy was obsolete.  That argument fell apart early in the morning of June 25, 1950.

On 25 June 1950, the 1st Marine Division was in cadre status; the division had one under-strength infantry regiment (the 5th Marines) and a substantially reduced number of supporting units.  Instead of three battalions, the 5th Marine Regiment had only two.  Each battalion had two rifle companies (rather than three), a reduced weapons company, and half of what was needed for a fully supportive headquarters and service company.  The regiment’s combat equipment was left over from the Second World War.

If there was a miracle surrounding the early part of the Korean War, it was that the Marines at Camp Pendleton could form a combat brigade and set sail for Korea within forty days.  To achieve this miracle, the Marines undertook two massive efforts between 25 June and 3 August: (1) Form, equip, and transport a lethal 4,700-man combat brigade across the Pacific Ocean to Pusan, South Korea, and (2) the Marines reactivated, staffed, trained, and reequipped the 1st Marine Division for service in Korea.  To achieve these goals, the Marine Corps reduced its support establishment by two-thirds, activated the Marine Corps Reserve, and shifted seven thousand Marines from East Coast units to Camp Pendleton, California.

The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (1stMarBde) was activated on July 7 and sailed within a week for Pusan, arriving on August 3.  Brigadier General Edward A. Craig commanded the brigade, which consisted of the under-strength 5th Marine Regiment and Provisional Marine Aircraft Group-33.[5]  Upon arrival in Korea, General Craig reported to the CG 8th US Army, LtGen Walker.

The 1stMarBde went into action on the day of its arrival in Korea.  Walker assigned the Marines to reinforce the 25 ID and the Army’s 5th Regimental Combat Team (5RCT) under Major General William B. Kean, US Army.  In total, Kean commanded roughly 20,000 men.  The Brigade’s first mission was to attack enemy forces in the area of Masan, seize Chinju, and mount a push toward the Nam and Kum rivers.  Designated Task Force Kean, 25 ID, began its offensive on 7 August.

General Craig’s Marines surged forward to Pansong, rapidly inflicting nearly 400 casualties on the NKPA 6th Division and overrunning its headquarters.  Army units, however, were stalled by fierce enemy resistance.[6]  Task Force (TF) Kean trudged toward Chindong-ni, but the fragmented force produced a confused battle zone where American units were too often isolated and necessitated resupply by air.  Not long after Kean initiated his offensive, the NKPA began one of their own.

Marine Aircraft Group 33 provided air support to TF Kean by delivering air strikes on enemy positions.  On August 10, Marine pilots destroyed the NKPA 83rd Motorized Regiment, allowing Craig’s Marines to make a fast advance toward Chindong-ni — only to be halted by General Kean and redeployed to another sector of what became a fragmented battlefield.  Four days passed, and Kean still failed to achieve his two primary objectives: divert NKPA forces from the north and prevent them from reaching the Chinju Pass.

Meanwhile, General Walker became frustrated with the lack of progress of 24 ID against the NKPA 4th Division, which had pushed elements of the 34th Regiment from their several positions and, in the process, captured much of its organic combat equipment — including artillery.  The North Koreans were poised to split the US defensive line and cut off the American’s main supply route (MSR).  Despite repeated efforts to dislodge the NKPA from their well-fortified positions, 24 ID suffered one devastating setback after another.  Mounting Army casualties prompted Walker to redirect Craig’s Marines into the cloverleaf.[7]

Colonel Raymond L. Murray, Commanding Officer of the 5th Marines, launched his assault on 17 August.[8]  Initially, NKPA resistance was tenacious, but these communists were no longer facing untested US soldiers.  A large percentage of the officers and NCOs serving in the 5th Marines were combat veterans of the Pacific War.  By August 17, the Marines had been fighting for 14 days and were pretty well pissed off.  As Marines have always done, they followed their gutsy leaders into the bowels of hell.  Employing well-coordinated combined arms, Murray’s Marines forced the NKPA out of their fortifications and overwhelmed them, one hill at a time.

How bad was it for the NKPA 4th Division?  General George S. Patton, were he still alive, might have felt sorry for the North Koreans.  By the time one understrength Marine regiment was finished with the 4th NKPA Infantry Division, it had no more than 300 troops left alive in each of its regiments — not all of whom were interested in sticking around for the finale.  Murray’s Marines had killed 1,200 communists; another 2-3,000 North Koreans (the smarter ones) had thrown down their weapons and deserted.  The 5th Marines gave up 67 dead and 278 wounded to achieve this victory.  Co-located Army units suffered 1,800 losses (one-third of those were killed in action).

But the battle for the Pusan Perimeter was far from over.

Meanwhile, General Douglas A. MacArthur had a plan in the works, and the U. S. Navy/Marine Corps team would play a key role in its execution.  They were the only American forces who could have pulled it off.

Sources:

1. Alexander, B.  Korea: The First War We Lost.  Hippocrene Books, 2003.
2. Blair, C., Jr.  The Forgotten War.  Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
3. Fehrenbach, T. R.  This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness.  New York: Macmillan Co., 1963.
4. Gugeler, R. A.  Combat Actions in Korea.  Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2005.
5. Halberstam, D.  The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War.  New York, Hyperion Books, 2007.
6. Malkasian, C.  The Korean War.  Osprey Publishing, 2001.
7. Simmons, E. H.  The United States Marines: A History.  Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
8. Tucker, S. C., ed.  Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History.  Santa Barbara: Checkmark Books, 2002.
9. Varhola, M. J.  Fire and Ice: The Korean War, 1950-1953.  Mason City: Da Capo Press, 2000.

Endnotes:

[1] A normal infantry battalion consists of a command element, headquarters staff, organic logistics support, and reinforcements as necessary for assigned missions.  Subordinate units include an H&S Company, three rifle companies, and a weapons company. 

[2] Most of Smith’s men were inexperienced teenagers without adequate training.  Only a third of the battalion’s officers and around sixteen percent of Smith’s NCOs had previous combat experience.

[3] On 27 June, General MacArthur detached Brigadier General John H. Church from his assignment as Assistant Division Commander, 24th ID, and sent him to Korea to establish an Advance HQ and liaison with the Republic of (South) Korea Army (ROK).  Upon the Church’s recommendation, MacArthur ordered Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker to deploy the 24th ID to Korea.

[4] Several of the dead soldiers had been executed by North Korean forces, their bodies later found in shallow graves with their hands bound behind them and shot through the back of the head.

[5] See also: Edward A. Craig — Marine!

[6] To reiterate a previous point, most of the Army’s combat units were manned with young, insufficiently trained soldiers, led by barely competent junior officers and NCOs — all of which can be attributed to Truman’s policy of gutting the US Armed Forces.  Truman’s policy in this regard was criminally malfeasant.  The evidence for this statement would only grow more convincing over the next six months.

[7] See also: Locating the Enemy and Advance to Kosong.

[8] Raymond L. Murray (1913-2004) was a Marine’s Marine.  In his thirty-three years of Marine Corps service, he was awarded two Navy Cross medals, one Distinguished Service Cross, four (4) Silver Star medals, two Legions of Merit, and the Purple Heart medal.  I was honored to have met General Murray several times; he was an exceptional leader.

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