Category: Navy Cross

Operation Kansas (1966)

The Quế Sơn Valley, located in Quảng Nam Province, is bounded by mountain ranges north, south, and west.  It extends some 24 miles from east to west from Route 1 to Hiệp Đức.  The Ly Ly River and Routes 534 and 535 traverses most of the valley’s length.  In 1965/1966, the valley supported a Vietnamese population of around 60,000 farmers and salt miners.  Whoever held Quế Sơn Valley owned the keys to the struggle for the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ).

The struggle for the Quế Sơn Valley began in December 1965 (Operation Harvest Moon) and February 1966 (Operation Double Eagle II).  Brigadier General William A. Stiles, USMC, reported to the 1st Marine Division in late April to assume the duties of Assistant Division Commander, 1stMarDiv.  Shortly after his arrival, the Division Commander directed Stiles to assume command of Task Force X-Ray.  His mission was to plan for and direct a reconnaissance-in-force in the region of Đỗ Xá, South Vietnam.[1] 

In June, the Commanding General III Marine Amphibious Force and Commanding General 1stMarDiv received intelligence information compiled by the U.S. Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (USMACV) indicating that a suspected enemy base of operations was operating some thirty miles southwest of Chu Lai, near the western border of I CTZ.  MACV placed the headquarters of the enemy’s Military Region v in the area of Đỗ Xá.  They had been asking for Marine Corps intervention for several months.  Army intelligence had wanted Marines to mount an operation throughout the Valley for several months.

After a few unavoidable delays, Stiles and his staff completed their plan of action but almost immediately became aware of the presence of an entire enemy combat division within the Quế Sơn Valley.  The 620th NVA Division operated with three full-strength infantry regiments (3rd, 21st, and 1st VC) in the area straddling the Quang Tin/Quang Nam provinces northwest of Chu Lai.  Stiles’ reconnaissance operation, designated Operation KANSAS, was placed on hold until the Marines could address a significant enemy presence close to Chu Lai.

But on June 13, 1966, the III MAF Commander directed the 1stMarDiv to commence an extensive reconnaissance campaign between Tam Kỳ and Hiệp Đức.  Stiles was ordered to plan for a joint combat operation with the 2nd ARVN Division.  The plan called for the aerial insertion of six Marine reconnaissance teams from the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion and an additional 1st Force Reconnaissance Company team into selected landing zones (LZs) to determine the extent of NVA penetrations.

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J. Sullivan (1920 – 1995), the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (1stRecon) commander, would exercise control over all reconnaissance missions.  On schedule, a thirteen-man team was airlifted to Nui Loc Son, a small mountain in the center of the Quế Sơn Valley (seven miles northeast of Hiệp Đức.  Another eighteen-man team landed on the Nui Vu hill mass that dominates the terrain ten miles west of Tam Kỳ.

These initial landings would be followed up the next morning by two teams to the higher ground south of the valley, two teams to the northwest of the valley, and one in the south of  Hiệp Đức.  The last team would parachute onto Hill 555, east of the Tranh River.  These Marines experienced a single injury as one of the team twisted his ankle upon contact with Terra Firma.

As the operation evolved, the 1st Force Recon Company parachutists were the first to be extracted.  After landing, these Marines followed procedure by burying their parachutes and then moved away to establish observation posts.  At around 1400 hours, the Marines observed an estimated forty enemy soldiers undergoing tactical training.  Four hours later, a woodcutter team appeared with a sentry dog.  The animal alerted on the buried parachutes, and a short time later, an enemy combat patrol appeared to be searching for the Marines.  The Recon Team Leader, 1stLt Jerome T. Paull, requested that his men be extracted.  These Marines were airlifted back to Chu Lai.

The 18-man team inserted on Nui Vu was led by Staff Sergeant Jimmie E. Howard, USMC.  After their insertion on June 13, Howard found the hill an excellent observation platform, and for the next two days, Howard’s team reported extensive enemy activities.  This team, supported by an ARVN 105mm Howitzer Battery (located seven miles south of Nui Vu), was able to call in artillery missions on “targets of opportunity.”

Staff Sergeant Howard, a seasoned combat veteran, exercised care to only call artillery missions when an American aircraft spotter or helicopter was in the region, but the enemy was aware of the presence of these Marines and was determined to neutralize the threat.

On the 14th, the NVA began organizing a force to attack the post.  On the night of June 15, a U.S. Army Special Forces Team leading a South Vietnamese irregular defense group (popular forces) radioed a warning to General Stiles’ command post (C.P.) — a company-sized unit of between 200 and 250 NVA soldiers closing in on the Marine reconnaissance unit on Hill 448.  Word was passed down to the platoon leader, Staff Sergeant Jimmie L. Howard, USMC, through his parent unit, Company C, 1st Recon Battalion, 1st Marine Division.

Later that night, between 2130 and 2330, Lance Corporal Ricardo C. Binns, USMC, detected the sound of troops marshaling for an assault and fired the first shots from his M-14 Rifle.  The NVA quickly closed in, surrounding the Marine perimeter.  The enemy closed in because they had learned through practical experience that the closer they were to the Marines, the less likely they would become targets of USMC Close Air Support (CAS).  Unlike the Air Force, Marine pilots routinely flew CAS missions at tree top level (give or take five inches).

After Corporal Binns opened fire, outpost Marines withdrew from their listening posts to reposition themselves within the rocky knoll.  Automatic weapons fire from a DShK machine gun (shown right) and 60mm mortar fire kept the Marines from maneuvering away from their hilltop positions.  After their initial fire, the NVA tossed hand grenades into the Marine positions, followed by a short-lived frontal assault.  The Marine’s well-aimed rifle fire repelled the enemy’s assault, causing the communists to fall back.  After reorganizing, the NVA assaulted the Marines again and again — each time being pushed back by the Marine’s murderous fire.

Near midnight, Staff Sergeant Howard radioed his company commander, Captain Tim Geraghty, to ask for an extraction and close air support.  These requests were delayed at the III MAF Direct Air Support Center (DASC).[2]  The violence of the enemy attack convinced Howard that his team was being overrun, so he again called for assistance.  Colonel Sullivan radioed Howard to reassure him that help was on the way.

At around 0200, a Marine C-47 (DC-3) arrived on station and began dropping flares to light up the area and prepare for the arrival of fixed-wing and rotor gunships.  Jet aircraft screamed in and dropped their bombs and napalm within 100 meters of the Marine perimeter.  Helicopter gunships from VMO-6 strafed to within twenty meters of the Marine perimeter.

At 0300, enemy ground fire drove off a flight of MAG-36 helicopters that were trying to extract Howard’s Marines.  When that attempt failed, Colonel Sullivan informed Howard that he should not expect reinforcements until dawn and urged him to hold on as best he could.

By then, the fight devolved into small, scattered, individual fights between Marine defenders and probing enemies.  The NVA, wary of U.S. aircraft, decided against organizing another mass assault but continued to fire at the Marines throughout the night.  Enemy snipers had placed themselves close to and above the Marine’s defenses.

Staff Sergeant Howard’s Marines were running out of ammunition; their situation was critical.  Howard ordered his men to fire only well-aimed single shots at the enemy.  The Marines complied with their team leaders’ instructions but also began throwing rocks at suspected enemy positions,  hoping the enemy would think that the Marines were lobbing in grenades.  By 0400, every Marine in Howard’s team had been wounded; six Marines lay dead.  Staff Sergeant Howard was struck in the back by a ricochet, which temporarily paralyzed his legs.  Unable to stand, Howard pulled himself from one fighting hole to the next, encouraging his men and directing their fire.

At dawn on June 16, UH-34s, with Huey gunship cover, successfully landed Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (C/1/5) at the base of Nui Vu.  The helicopter piloted by Major William J. Goodsell, the Commanding Officer of VMO-6, was shot down.  While Goodsell was successfully evacuated, he later died from his wounds.

Charlie Company encountered enemy resistance as it moved to relieve Howard’s team.  When Charlie Company’s lead element reached Howard’s position, he shouted a warning to “get down” because enemy snipers were helping themselves to any Marine that appeared in their rear sight aperture.  The company commander, First Lieutenant Marshal “Buck” Darling, later reported that when he arrived at Howard’s position, every Marine still alive had armed themselves with enemy AK-47s taken from dead communists lying within the Marine perimeter.

Everyone associated with the defensive operation assumed that Howard and his men had held off an NVA rifle company.  Military intelligence later clarified that Howard’s 18 Marines had held off a battalion of NVA regulars from the 3rd NVA Regiment.  The enemy continued to battle the Marines for the hill until around noon and then disengaged.  When the enemy pulled out, they left behind 42 dead.  Charlie Company lost two KIA and two WIA.

Meanwhile, General Stiles’ completed plan of action involved eight battalions (four Marine and four ARVN) with air and artillery support.  The initial assault force included two battalions from the 5th Marines and two Vietnamese Army battalions.  Stiles and his Vietnamese counterpart would control the action from Tam Kỳ.  Anticipating the need for massive firepower, Stiles prepositioned artillery units from Da Nang and Chu Lai into forward firing positions on Hill 29, west of the railroad line seven miles north of Tam Kỳ.

The 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (3/1) accompanied artillery units from Da Nang and provided security for the artillery positions on Hill 29 and Thang Binh.  Artillery support units included HQ Battery 4/11 (command and control), Kilo Battery 4/12 (6 155mm Howitzers at Hill 29), and Provisional Yankee Battery 4/12 (2 155mm Howitzers) at Thang Binh.

On the morning of June 17, the South Vietnamese military high command notified the Marines that the two Vietnamese infantry battalions would not participate in the Marine Corps operation.  Accordingly, Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt (III MAF) delayed Operation Kansas again — and then modified General Stiles’ plan of action.[3]  Rather than a multi-battalion heliborne operation in the Quế Sơn Valley, Walt elected to continue the reconnaissance in force.  Note: Walt’s decision placed fewer than 1,800 Marines against an entire NVA infantry division.

The Fifth Marines (5thMar) remained at Chu Lai, ready to support the Recon Marines on-call.  Stiles continued in command of the operation.  He repositioned some of his assets to provide better coverage for the recon teams.  On June 18, Kilo 4/11 (4 155mm guns) joined the other artillery units on Hill 29, and an additional provisional battery from the 12th Marines deployed to a new firing position 6,000 meters from Thang Binh.  Kilo 4/12 joined the new provisional battery the next day.  On June 19, CH-46 aircraft lifted two 105mm howitzers from Chu Lai to the Tien Phuoc Special Forces Camp, some 30 miles distant.  Operational control of 3/1 was transferred to the 5th Marines.

With these support units repositioned, Colonel Sullivan shifted his CP to Tien Phuoc.  For the next ten days, the reconnaissance battalion (reinforced) continued to conduct extensive patrolling operations throughout the Quế Sơn Valley.  Twenty-five recon teams were involved in this operation.

Operation Kansas, which officially began on June 17, ended on June 22nd when General Stiles relocated his command post.  Marine infantry participation, with the exception of the relief of Staff Sergeant Howard’s platoon, was confined to a one-company exploitation of a B-52 Arc Light strike on June 21, some 3,500 meters east of Hiệp Đức.[4]  Despite Operation Kansas’s official end on June 22, Marines remained in the area for six additional days.

Four of Howard’s Marines were awarded the Navy Cross: Corporal Binns, Hospital Man Second Class Billee Don Holmes, Corporal Jerrald Thompson, and Lance Corporal John Adams.  Thompson and Adams, killed in action, were awarded posthumous medals.  Silver Star Medals were awarded to the remaining thirteen Marines, four posthumously, along with two Marines from Charlie Company, also posthumously.

Staff Sergeant Howard received a meritorious combat promotion to Gunnery Sergeant and was later awarded the Medal of Honor—our nation’s highest combat award.  Howard was eventually promoted to First Sergeant, retired from the Marine Corps in 1977, and became a high school football coach.  He passed away in 1993, aged 64.

Notes:

[1] Stiles graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Class of 1939, and was an officer with extensive combat experience. 

[2] The DASC is the principal USMC aviation command and control system and the air control agency responsible for directing air operations directly supporting ground forces.  It functions in a decentralized mode of operations but is directly supervised by the Marine Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) or Navy Tactical Air Control Center (NTACC).  The parent unit of DASCs is the Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS) of the Marine Air Control Group (MACG). 

[3] Lew Walt (1913 – 1989) served in World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam.  During his military service, he was awarded two Navy Cross medals, two Navy Distinguished Service medals, the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit (with Combat V), the Bronze Star (with Combat V), and two Purple Heart medals.  Following his promotion to four-star general and service as the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Walt retired in 1971.  General Walt passed away on March 26, 1989.   

[4] Following the Arc Light strike, Echo Company 2/5 surveyed the strike area and found no evidence of a large body of enemy forces. 

Fighting Withdrawal, Korea 1950

Webb D. Sawyer (1918 – 1995), a son of the State of Ohio, graduated from the University of Toledo and received his Marine Corps commission in 1941.  During World War II, he served in the 24th Marines and participated in the battles of Kwajalein, Saipan, and Tinian as the Third Battalion’s operations officer.  When the battalion executive officer was wounded in action, Captain Sawyer assumed that role.  He received the Bronze Star Medal for valor during the Battle of Saipan.  Upon promotion to major, he assumed the duties as Regimental Operations Officer during the Battle of Iwo Jima.

When the Korean War broke out, Major Sawyer assumed command of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division.  In that capacity, he took part in the landing at Inchon and the Battle of Seoul in September 1950.

On the night of 3 November, during the regiment’s advance into North Korea from Wonsan, enemy forces fiercely assaulted Sawyer’s battalion, but under his leadership and direction, the men resisted and then defeated their attackers.  Two weeks later, sub-zero temperatures arrived in the area of the Chosin Reservoir — accompanied by thirteen Chinese infantry divisions (compromising the Ninth Chinese Army) — all in time for the celebration of Thanksgiving, 1950.  The Chinese would receive a warm welcome from the 1st Marine Division and what remained alive of the U.S. Army’s Task Force Faith.  Thus began a fighting withdrawal lasting eleven days over the most inhospitable terrain in North Korea.  The American’s withdrawal cost the Chinese ten of their infantry divisions.

On 6 December 1950, Sawyer’s Battalion encountered a heavily reinforced Chinese roadblock position.  Sawyer led the battalion in its assault, defeated the roadblock, and continued directing close combat for the next twenty-two hours.  Despite a painful wound to his foot from enemy shrapnel, Sawyer continued fighting his rapidly depleting battalion.

During the continued withdrawal, Sawyer’s battalion was ordered to provide flanking security on Hill 1304 for the Division’s main body.  Note: Marines providing flanking security along the surrounding hills of the main supply route (MSR) were constantly climbing or descending mountainous terrain, engaging the enemy wherever found.  Hill 1304 indicated that the top of that hill measured 1,304 meters above sea level.

At one point, Sawyer noted an enemy rifle company attempting to outflank one of his companies.  Again, Sawyer led the attack and routed the enemy from his position, inflicting heavy losses.  After seizing the hill, he led his battalion four miles down the steep incline.  Webb Sawyer was awarded three Silver Star medals during the Chosin Reservoir Campaign.  In total, Sawyer earned the Navy Cross, Silver Star (3), Legion of Merit (2), Bronze Star with “V”, and the Purple Heart Medal.  After service in the Vietnam War, Sawyer retired from active duty.  By then, he was serving as a Brigadier General.

One of Sawyer’s men was Private First Class Hector A. Cafferata, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.  PFC Cafferata was born in New York City in 1929; his father was a Peruvian migrant.  In high school, Hector played football, moving to the semi-professional league in 1943.  Following Cafferata’s enlistment in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve in 1948, the  Marines assigned him to the 21st Infantry Battalion (Reserve) for service and training at Dover, New Jersey.  In September 1950, Cafferata was ordered to active duty and pre-deployment training at Camp Pendleton, California.  He embarked for Korea in October and, upon arrival, was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines.

PFC Cafferata distinguished himself in combat during the Chosin Reservoir campaign.  After all the men in his fireteam had been killed, Cafferata single-handedly held off the advanced element of a Chinese infantry regiment and personally annihilated two enemy rifle platoons.  He and PFC Kenneth Benson were the only two Marines able to resist the enemy’s assault.  After a fragmentation grenade temporarily blinded him, PFC Benson assumed responsibility for reloading Cafferata’s M-1 Rifle.  Hector, a crack shot, fought the enemy without either his coat or boots — neither of which he could locate in the early morning darkness.  Cafferata’s battle lasted well over five hours.

According to Hector’s testimony, “For the rest of the night, I was batting hand grenades away with my entrenching tool while firing my rifle at them.  I must have whacked a dozen grenades that night with my e-tool.”  When a grenade landed in the shallow entrenchment occupied by wounded Marines, he grabbed the grenade and lobbed it toward the enemy, thereby saving the lives of many Marines but also receiving several painful wounds.  He was finally wounded and disabled by an enemy sniper, but by then, he was rescued by reinforcing Marines.

The Marines airlifted PFC Cafferata to Japan, and he returned to the United States in December 1950.  On 1 September 1951, PFC Cafferata was ordered to the retired list.  On 24 November 1952, President Harry S. Truman awarded PFC Cafferata the Medal of Honor.  His citation reads as follows:

PRIVATE HECTOR A. CAFFERATA Jr.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE

For service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Rifleman with Company F, Second Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea on 28 November 1950.  When all the other members of his fire team became casualties, creating a gap in the lines, during the initial phase of a vicious attack launched by a fanatical enemy of regimental strength against his company’s hill position, Private CAFFERATA waged a lone battle with grenades and rifle fire as the attack gained momentum and the enemy threatened penetration through the gap and endangered the integrity of the entire defensive perimeter. Making a target of himself under the devastating fire from automatic weapons, rifles, grenades, and mortars, he maneuvered up and down the line.  He delivered accurate and effective fire against the onrushing force, killing fifteen, wounding many more, and forcing the others to withdraw so that reinforcements could move up and consolidate the position.  Again fighting desperately against a renewed onslaught later that same morning when a hostile grenade landed in a shallow entrenchment occupied by wounded Marines, Private CAFFERATA rushed into the gully under heavy fire, seized the deadly missile in his right hand, and hurled it free of his comrades before it detonated, severing part of one finger, and seriously wounding him in the right hand and arm.  Courageously ignoring the intense pain, he staunchly fought on until he was struck by a sniper’s bullet and forced to submit to evacuation for medical treatment. Stouthearted and indomitable, Private CAFFERATA, by his fortitude, great personal valor, and dauntless perseverance in the face of almost certain death, saved the lives of several of his fellow Marines and contributed essentially to the success achieved by his company in maintaining its defensive position against tremendous odds. His extraordinary heroism throughout was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

/S/ HARRY S. TRUMAN

In addition to his Medal of Honor, PFC Cafferata was awarded the Purple Heart Medal, Combat Action Ribbon, Presidential Unit Citation, National Defense Service Medal, Korean Service Medal, Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, and the United Nations Korean Service Medal.  Note: The U.S. Presidential Unit Citation is equivalent to the Silver Star Medal (awarded to every man in the unit cited).

After his wartime service, Hector worked as a salesman, a game warden, and a tavern owner in Alpha, New Jersey.  Upon learning that fellow Marine PFC Kenneth Benson (1932-2012) had not received any recognition for his part in the battle, Cafferata petitioned the Marine Corps to have Benson similarly recognized with the Medal of Honor.  As a result of Cafferata’s efforts, PFC Benson was awarded the Silver Star Medal in 2000. Hector retired to Florida, where he passed away on 12 April 2016.  He was survived by his wife, four children, six grandchildren, three great-grandchildren, and his brother. 

Little Ships — Massive Punch

Most people may know what an aircraft carrier is, but they may need help recognizing the designations CVA, CVB, CVL, CVS, CVAN, or CVN.  And there are ample reasons why they should.  The designations only have significance to the Navy and Marine Corps.  In essence, the designations are Carrier-Aircraft-Attack, Carrier-Large, Carrier-Small, Carrier-Anti-submarine, Carrier-Nuclear Powered Attack, and Carrier-Nuclear.[1]

If you imagined that the Navy has other nautical designations, you’d be right — we will talk about a couple of them.  Designations BB stood for battleships, and SS stands for submarine.  But the topic of our conversation today is DD and DE.  DD is the designation for destroyer, and DE stands for destroyer escort.  Some see these ships as tiny little fellows similar to coastal patrol boats (PCs) and torpedo patrol boats (PTs) — but they’d be wrong.

A destroyer is a fast, maneuverable, long-endurance warship intended to escort larger vessels of the fleet, convoy, or carrier battle groups and defend them against a wide range of general threats.  The destroy was a concept of the Spanish naval architect Fernando Villaamil as a defense against torpedo boats.  They were initially called torpedo boat destroyers (TBDs), shortened to Destroyer since World War I.  Between then and the beginning of the Second World War, destroyers were light ships with little endurance for unattended ocean operations.  In the U.S. Navy, the Allen M. Sumner class Destroyer grew to a displacement of 2,200 tons.  The more modern Arleigh Burke Class ship has a displacement of 9,600 tons.  The Burke-class guided-missile destroyer packs quite a wallop.

Currently, destroyers are the global standard for surface-combat ships.  Only the United States and Russia operate heavier cruisers.  No battleships or battle cruisers remain on active duty.  In terms of weight and size, today’s destroyers are the equivalent of cruisers from World War II.  In terms of firepower, there is no comparison.  Today, the destroyer averages 510 feet in length, displaces 9,200 tons, and carries more than 90 missiles.  Many navies use the term “frigate” for their destroyers, which leads to some confusion.[2]

Only a foolish sea captain will want to “take on” an American destroyer or escort — true from around 1931 – 1932, the U.S. Navy’s first post-World War I design.  The Navy’s redesign of the destroyer led to the Destroyer Escort.  During the interwar years, the Navy’s school of ship design, favoring some smaller destroyer design, drove home the point that the fleet should have a small ship favoring many of the destroyer’s features but constructed to perform chores too minor for the newer, larger, destroyers.  The debate was an important one leading up to the Second World War.

The destroyer escort originated in 1940, around fifteen months before Pearl Harbor.  On paper, the Navy was already wrestling with the problem of transatlantic convoys.  Fortunately, the quest for a smaller substitute for destroyers began when the British Navy completed its trial of small destroyers.  These were the twenty Hunt class ships measuring 272 feet, 28-foot beam, and 904 tons displacement.  According to a United States naval officer familiar with the background of the DEs, the Royal Navy ships came in for intensive study by U. S. naval observers.[3]  At top speed, they logged 32½ knots (37 mph), which took them out of the slow-poke escort category.  The Hunt class lent itself nicely to the evolution of the type of U. S. vessel under consideration. However, it must have been patent that a U. S. ship intended for transatlantic convoy rather than North Sea sweeps should place cruising radius ahead of speed.  At any rate, the small British destroyers furnished so many fundamental hints that what we can say about these World War II-era vessels is that they did bear a resemblance to their British cousins.

There were two geniuses behind the U.S. Navy’s development of destroyer escorts.  In 1940, the son of U.S. Marine Corps Brigadier General Henry Clay Cochrane, (then) Captain Edward L. Cochrane, and Commander Earle W. Mills, U.S. Navy.[4]  Both went to work with a will. While showing some kindship to the British Hunt class, the result was a distinctly new ship designed for convoy protection over long stretches of sea.

The compromise between destroyer and escort vessel is reflected even in the designation of the DE. Admiral Cochrane returned to the United States with his findings early in 1941.  He was Assistant to the Head of the Design Division of the Bureau of Ships until November 1942, when he was promoted to Rear Admiral and made Chief of the Bureau.  Commander Mills, promoted to Rear Admiral, became Assistant Chief.  In the meantime, the DE took substance on the drawing boards and then on the shipways.  Everyone in the Navy with surface combat experience immediately recognized the worthiness of these “small ships.”

There is adequate proof of this — forever embedded in the heroism of the men who manned these fantastic ships in World War II — and who man their newer versions today.

Destroyers (DDs) and Destroyer Escorts (DEs) are named after U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps heroes.  And some are even named for combat ships — to honor the memories of their entire crews.  USS Samuel B. Roberts is one of these.

Samuel Booker Roberts, Jr. (1921 –1942) was a Coxswain (pronounced Cox’in) killed in the Battle of Guadalcanal and the namesake of three U.S. Navy warships.  Roberts enlisted in the Navy in 1939.  He served aboard USS California (BB-44), USS Heywood (AP-12), and USS Bellatrix (AK-20).  Bellatrix was assigned to Task Group Four and became part of the Guadalcanal assault force.  As a coxswain in command of small boats, Roberts helped ferry supplies from the transport ships to the beachhead.

Japanese counterattacks began on August 7, 1942, forcing Admiral Fletcher to withdraw his landing fleet (for their own preservation).  Roberts volunteered to remain behind to support the Marines who had recently gone ashore.  He was attached to the beach master at Lunga Point.  The unit included both Navy and Coast Guard personnel, transporting Marines and supplies to beaches along the island’s northern coast — and evacuating wounded Marines.

On the morning of September 27, 1942, Roberts again volunteered — this time for a rescue mission to save a company of Marines that an estimated Japanese battalion of naval infantry had surrounded.  The rescue group of several Higgins boats was taken under heavy fire, which brought the mission perilously close to failure.  Roberts distracted the enemy fire by taking his boat directly before the Japanese firing line, drawing away their fire.  Roberts’s efforts permitted the evacuation of the Marines, but Roberts was mortally wounded.  Coxswain Samuel B. Roberts was awarded the Navy Cross medal for his valor in the face of enemy fire.  Three warships have been named in the young warrior’s honor: DE-413 (sunk on October 25, 1944).  Sam Roberts’s younger brother, Jack, was a USS Samuel B. Roberts crew member.  DD-823 was commissioned in 1946 and struck in 1970.  FFG-58, a guided missile destroyer, was commissioned in 1986 and decommissioned in 2015.

Our friend at Pacific Paratrooper recently publicized the announcement by Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro to name an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer in honor of Ernest Edwin Evans, the first American Indian in the U.S. Navy, to earn the Medal of Honor — and one of only two World War II destroyer captains to attain it.

Taffy Three 

The Battle of Samar was the centermost action of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, one of the most significant naval battles in history, which took place in the Philippine Sea off Samar Island in the Philippines on October 25, 1944.  It was the only major action in the larger battle in which the Americans were largely unprepared.  After the previous day’s fighting, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) mobile striking force, under the command of Admiral Takeo Kurita, had suffered significant damages and appeared to be retreating westward.  However, by the next morning, the Japanese force had turned around and resumed its advance toward the Leyte Gulf.  With Admiral William Halsey lured into taking his powerful Third Fleet north after a decoy, the Seventh Fleet engaged to the south and recently landed 130,000 men of the Sixth U.S. Army, who were left vulnerable to Japanese assault at Leyte.

Admiral Kurita, aboard Yamato, took his large force of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers from the San Bernardino Strait and headed south toward Leyte, where they encountered Task Unit 77.4.3 (Call Sign Taffy Three), the northernmost of the three escort carrier groups under Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague (comprising the only American forces remaining in the area).  Composed of only six small escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts, Taffy 3 was intended to provide shore support and anti-submarine patrols and did not have guns capable of penetrating Japanese naval armor.

The Japanese opened fire shortly after dawn, targeting Taffy 3’s escort carriers, which Kurita mistook for the main carriers of the Third Fleet.  The escort carriers fled for the cover of rain squalls and launched their aircraft in defense, while the three destroyers, led by USS John V. Johnston, launched a torpedo attack that sank one ship and sent the Japanese strike force into disarray.

Japanese aircraft from a base at Luzon launched a kamikaze attack on the retreating American task force, sinking one escort carrier and damaging three others.  When aircraft assigned to Taffy Two joined the battle, the increasing severity of the air attack further convinced Kurita that he was engaging the Third Fleet’s surface carriers.  Satisfied with sinking what he believed were multiple carriers and worried the bulk of the Third Fleet was approaching, Kurita withdrew his fleet north, failing to carry out his orders to attack the landing forces at Leyte Gulf.

Taffy 3 sustained heavy losses, losing two escort carriers, two destroyers, a destroyer escort, and numerous aircraft.  Over 1,000 Americans died, comparable to the combined losses of American men and ships at the Coral Sea and Midway.  Three Japanese cruisers were sunk by air attack, and three others were damaged.  The Japanese had over 2,700 casualties.  Taffy 3 was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.

Commander Ernest E. Evans, USN, served as the captain of the USS Johnston, serving in command since the ship’s commissioning on October 27, 1943.  Upon assuming command, Evans told his crew, “This is going to be a fighting ship, and I intend to take her in harm’s way.  Anyone who doesn’t want to go along had better get off right now.”

When the Japanese fleet was first sighted, Commander Evans did not hesitate.  After laying a smoke screen to help hide the escort carriers from enemy gunfire, he ordered his helm hard to port, and he led his destroyer out of the task unit’s circular antiaircraft disposition in favor of charging the enemy alone to make a torpedo attack.  Some claim that Evans told his crew over the ship’s intercom: “A large Japanese fleet has been contacted.  They are fifteen miles away and headed in our direction. They are believed to have four battleships, eight cruisers, and a number of destroyers.  This will be a fight against overwhelming odds from which survival cannot be expected.  We will do what damage we can.”

Charging in against the Japanese along with USS Johnston was USS Samuel B. Roberts.  Roberts’ captain was Lieutenant Commander Robert W. Copeland (1910 – 1973) (later promoted to Rear Admiral).

The fate of Johnston‘s captain was never conclusively established and remains the subject of debate among survivors of the ship’s crew.  Some say that Evans was hit by Japanese naval shellfire; others claim he was last seen boarding a damaged motor whaleboat.  What is known is that Commander Evans was seriously injured during the battle and lived long enough to order his crew to abandon ship.  He was not among the rescued crew.

Copeland was a recipient of the Navy Cross Medal.  Commander Evans was a posthumous recipient of the nation’s highest award: The Medal of Honor.

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, after the Battle of Samar, wrote, “The success of Taffy 3 was nothing short of special dispensation from the Lord Almighty.”  Historians have cited the Battle of Samar as one of the greatest last stands in U.S. Naval History.

Sources:

  1. Copeland, R. W.  The Spirit of Sammy B.  Ocala, Florida 2007.
  2. Cutler, T.  The Battle of Leyte Gulf, 23-26 October 1944.  Naval Institute Press, 2001.
  3. Friedman, N.  U.S. Destroyers: An illustrated Design History.  Naval Institute Press, 2005.
  4. Hornfischer, J.D.  The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailor.  Bantam Books, 2004.
  5. Thomas, E.  Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign, 1941 – 1945.  Simon & Schuster, 2006.

Endnotes:

[1] The letter V is a designation for heavier than air (fixed wing) aircraft.  In Latin and Italian, the word “to fly” is volare; in French, it is volplaner.  Volplane means to soar or glide.  Lighter than air aircraft were designated by the letter Z (Zepplin).

[2] The word frigate has evolved from the 17th and 18th centuries.  It was given to any full-rigged ship built for speed and maneuverability, but today, its usage has little consistency.  Today’s U.S. frigates take on a guided missile role, anti-submarine operations, air defense, and littoral combatant ships.  The designation may also apply to destroyers and destroyer escorts — it all depends on who’s doing the talking. 

[3] The Royal Navy rated their Hunt class ships as true destroyers.

[4] Both Cochrane and Mills were promoted to Rear Admiral.

Turning Point — Midway, Part II

Continued from Last Week

Admiral Nagumo kept half his airstrike group in reserve: four squadrons of dive and torpedo bombers.  At 0715, Nagumo ordered his reserve aircraft rearmed with bombs for land targets.  Within thirty minutes of these rearming efforts, a Japanese scout plane notified the fleet that he had sighted a sizable American force to the east of the IJN fleet’s position.  He failed to describe the force, however.  Nagumo reversed his order to rearm his reserve aircraft with land bombs.  He demanded better intelligence from the scout plane.  Another thirty minutes elapsed before the scout radioed the presence of a single American carrier force.  The scout did not see the second carrier.

A confused Admiral Nagumo was unsure how to proceed.  Subordinates advised that he strike Midway immediately with the forces available to him.  Still, his ability to launch a strike against the spotted American carrier was hampered by the fact that he had to recover inbound aircraft from the first assault.  They’d have to ditch at sea if Nagumo didn’t recover his aircraft.

The few aircraft on the Japanese flight decks at the time of the attack were either defensive fighters or, in the case of Sōryū, fighters earmarked to augment fleet CAP operations.  No matter Nagumo’s decision, it would probably be wrong.

Japanese carrier doctrine preferred launching fully constituted strikes rather than piecemeal attacks.  Nagumo’s reaction was doctrinaire without confirmation of whether the American force included carriers (not received until 0820).  In addition, the arrival of another land-based American air strike at 0753 gave weight to the need to attack the island again.  Ultimately, Nagumo decided to wait for his first strike force to land, then launch the reserve, which would be adequately armed with torpedoes.

Ultimately, Nagumo’s decision made no difference because Admiral Jack Fletcher’s carriers began launching their planes at 0700.  Enterprise and Hornet completed their launch by 0755.  Yorktown did not finish launching their birds until 0908, so the aircraft that would deliver the crushing blow were already enroute to Nagumo’s fleet.  Even if Nagumo had not strictly followed carrier operations procedures, he could not have prevented the launch of American assault aircraft.

The American Assault

Admiral Fletcher’s flag was aboard the U.S.S. Yorktown.  He benefitted from PBY sighting reports from the early morning hours and ordered Admiral Spruance to launch against the Japanese as soon as it was practical.  Yorktown was held in reserve in the event additional Japanese carriers were discovered.

Admiral Spruance reckoned that an air strike could succeed even though the range to target was extreme.  After judging the likelihood of success, Spruance turned the aircraft launch over to the Chief of Staff, Captain Miles Browning, U.S.N.  The American carriers had to launch their plane into the wind.  This meant the carriers had to steam into the wind — taking the American ships away from the Japanese positions.  Browning understood that as soon as all attack aircraft were in the air, the carriers would have to turn about and steam toward the Japanese to recover their planes after the attack.  These factors prompted Browning to begin his launch at 0700.  Yorktown began her launch at 0800.

Admiral Spruance ordered his aircraft to proceed immediately and directly to their targets.  Fuel was critical; he did not want to waste fuel trying to form up for a mass assault.  Neutralizing enemy carriers was crucial to the success of the battle.

The Japanese launched 108 attack aircraft in seven minutes; it took Enterprise and Hornet more than an hour to launch 117.  Admiral Spruance judged that the need to hit the enemy quickly outweighed the preferred practice of organizing aircraft by type and speed, so the squadrons launched piecemeal and proceeded to the attack in varying air groups.  Spruance was thinking outside the box because keeping the Japanese busy fending off an American assault would prevent them from seizing the initiative.  It was also a gamble that the Americans would find Nagumo vulnerable.

U.S. Navy aircraft had a difficult time locating the enemy.  Commander Stanhope Ring followed an erroneous heading of 265 degrees rather than the correct heading of 240 degrees.  His flight missed the Japanese carriers completely.  Lieutenant Commander John Waldron, commanding Torpedo Squadron 8 (VT-8), realized that Stanhope was pursuing an incorrect heading and broke off, turning to the correct heading.  Ten F4Fs from Hornet ran out of fuel and had to ditch.

Waldron’s VT-8 began its attack at 0920.  VF-6 from Enterprise followed at 0940.  VF-6’s fighter escorts lost contact with, ran low on fuel, and turned back toward the carrier.  Without fighter escort, all fifteen aircraft of VT-8 were shot down.  Ensign George H. Gay, Jr., was the only survivor of VT-8.

VT-6 lost nine of its 14 Devastators.  Ten aircraft (of 12) from VT-3 were shot down before hitting enemy targets.  Part of the problem was malfunctioning torpedoes, which produced a scandal in the United States.  The Battle of Midway was the last time TBD Devastators were used in combat.[1]  At this stage in the war, Japanese Zeros were among the most advanced fighters in the world — far superior to American torpedo bombers and Grumman F4F Wildcats.

American torpedo attacks achieved three important results despite their failure to score any hits.  First, they kept the Japanese carriers off balance and could not prepare and launch their counterstrike.  Second, the poor control of the Japanese combat air patrol (CAP) meant they were out of position for subsequent attacks.  Third, many of the Zeros ran low on ammunition and fuel.  The appearance of a third torpedo plane attack from the southeast by VT-3 from Yorktown at 1000 hours very quickly drew the majority of Japanese CAP to the southeast quadrant of the Imperial fleet.  More disciplined aircrews and greater numbers of aircraft might have been effective.

By chance, when the Japanese sighted VT-3, three squadrons of SBDs from Enterprise and Yorktown approached from the southwest and northeast.  A squadron from Yorktown flew immediately behind VT-3 but elected to attack from a different course.  VB-6 and VS-6 (from Enterprise) were running low on fuel because of their time to find the enemy.

Lieutenant Commander C. Wade McClusky, serving as the air group commander aboard Enterprise, led the scout bombers and was credited with making a critical tactical decision that led to the sinking of the INJ fleet carriers Kaga and Akagi.  Within minutes of McClusky’s attack, three of the four Japanese aircraft carriers were ablaze.  However, the actual sinking of the carriers was accomplished by Japanese escort ships; the Japanese did not want the carriers to fall into American hands.

Counterattack

Japan’s sole surviving aircraft carrier, Hiryū, wasted little time counterattacking.  The ship’s first wave included 18 D3As and six fighter escorts.  They followed the withdrawing American aircraft and attacked the first carrier they encountered, Yorktown, hitting her with three bombs.  The strike blew a hole in Yorktown’s deck and snuffed out all but one of her boilers.  Admiral Fletcher moved his flag to the heavy cruiser U.S.S. Astoria.

Damage control parties could temporarily patch the flight deck and restore power to several boilers within an hour.  Yorktown achieved a speed of 19 knots (22 m.p.h.), enabling her to resume air operations.  Lost in the attack were thirteen Japanese dive bombers and three fighter escorts.  Two damaged fighters turned back after attacking American SBD’s returning to Enterprise.

About an hour later, a second wave from Hiryū’s, consisting of ten B5Ns and six escorting A6Ms, arrived over Yorktown; the crew’s repair efforts had been so effective that the Japanese pilots assumed the carrier to be a different, undamaged ship.  Yorktown was crippled with an additional two torpedoes.  She lost all power and developed a twenty-three-degree list to port.  During their attack, the Japanese lost five torpedo bombers and two fighters.  News of these two air strikes, with the mistaken conclusion that the attacks had destroyed two American carriers, improved Japanese morale.  The few surviving aircraft aboard Hiryū and improved confidence convinced some Japanese crewmen that they could scrape together enough aircraft for another airstrike against what they thought was the only remaining American carrier.

The Americans fight back

Late in the afternoon, a scout plane from Yorktown located Hiryū, prompting Enterprise to launch a final strike of 24 dive bombers (including 6 SBDs from VS-6, 4 SBDs from VB-6, and 14 orphaned SBDs from Yorktown’s VB-3.  Despite more than a dozen Japanese fighters flying CAP above Hiryū, four (possibly five) bombs hit the Japanese carrier, leaving her ablaze and unable to launch or recover aircraft.  Another strike was launched from Hornet — late due to miscommunications, concentrated on the remaining escort ships but failed to score any hits.

After futile attempts at controlling the blaze, Japanese crew members abandoned Hiryū while the remainder of the fleet continued sailing northeast to intercept the American carriers.  Despite a scuttling attempt by a Japanese destroyer that hit her with a torpedo and then departed quickly, Hiryū stayed afloat for several more hours, being discovered early the following day by an aircraft from the escort carrier Hōshō and prompting hopes she could be saved, or at least towed back to Japan — but soon after being spotted, Hiryū sank.  Rear-Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi and ship’s captain Tomeo Kaku decided to go down with their ship.

At sundown, the Americans and the Japanese planned to continue the fight.  Admiral Fletcher ceded command to Ray Spruance, believing he could not further command his fleet.  For his part, Admiral Spruance knew that the United States had won a great victory, but he was unsure of what Japanese forces remained in the area.  What he was sure of was that he would defend Midway Island and the U.S. carrier fleet.

To aid his still-airborne aviators, Spruance, pilots who had launched at an extreme range, continued to close with Nagumo — at night with decks lit to aid in navigation.  Finally, fearing a possible night encounter with Japanese surface forces and believing Yamamoto would persist in his attack, Spruance withdrew to the east and turned west towards the enemy’s last known position at midnight.

Spruance was right: Yamamoto did intend to continue the engagement.  He sent his remaining surface forces searching eastward for the American carriers.  He also dispatched a cruiser raiding force to bombard Midway Atoll.  Spruance was also fortunate he decided to withdraw eastward because had he come into contact with Yamamoto’s heavy ships (including the massive battleship Yamato), given Japan’s superiority in night-attack tactics, historians think Spruance would have been overwhelmed, and his carriers lost.

Despite extensive searches for the Japanese on 5 June, Spruance failed to regain contact with Yamamoto — but at 0215 on 6 June, Commander John Murphy, commanding U.S.S. Tambor (SS-198), was lying 90 nautical miles west of Midway Atoll and made the second of the submarine service’s two major contributions to the Battle of Midway.  Lieutenant Commander Edward Spruance (Admiral Spruance’s son) served under Commander Murphy.  Sighting several ships, neither Murphy nor Spruance could identify them.

Both officers were uncertain of whether they were friend or foe.  Neither was willing to approach any closer to verify their heading or type.  Murphy sent a spot report to the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific (COMSUBPAC), forwarded to Nimitz, who sent it to Admiral Spruance.  Admiral Spruance, a former submarine commander, was furious at the report’s vagueness.  It forced Spruance to anticipate that the four large ships were part of a large invasion force.  In reality, the ships were those sent by Yamamoto to shell Midway.

Meanwhile, the Japanese sighted Tambor and initiated maneuvers designed to evade an enemy attack.  While chasing down Tambor, the heavy cruisers Mogami and Mikuma collided, inflicting heavy damage to Mogami’s bow.  Mikuma reduced speed to around twelve knots to stay with Mogami.  It was only at early dawn at 0412 that Commander Murphy could tell that the ships were Japanese.  Murphy decided to approach for a torpedo attack, but the effort was unsuccessful.  Noting the approach to two additional Japanese ships, Murphy dived and played no further role in the battle.  As soon as Tambor returned to port, Admiral Spruance relieved Murphy of his command, citing his confusing contact report, inability to score a hit on two damaged cruisers, and lack of command presence.  To be fair, though, only one submarine of twelve assigned to the battle area successfully torpedoed an enemy ship.

Over the following two days, the Americans launched several strikes against Japanese stragglers.  Air strikes eventually sank Mikuma, but Mogami returned to Japan for repairs.  Captain Richard E. Fleming, U.S. Marine Corps, participated in the sinking of Mikuma.  He was killed while executing a glide bomb run.  Fleming was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

The battle ended with more than 3,000 Japanese deaths, the loss of four aircraft carriers and a heavy cruiser, one heavy cruiser and four destroyers damaged, and 248 destroyed aircraft.  Thirty-seven Japanese sailors were pulled out of the sea.  American losses include one carrier, one destroyer, 150 destroyed aircraft, and 307 killed in action – including Major General Clarence L. Tinker, Commander, Seventh Army Air Force.

Aftermath

Historians refer to the Battle of Midway as the turning point in the Pacific War.  It was a major U.S. victory, something to celebrate in war, but had it gone the other way, the Pacific War would have lasted much longer.

The Japanese continued attempting to seize more territory, but the United States moved from naval parity with the Japanese to superiority.  Midway gave the Americans the initiative, paving the way for landings at Guadalcanal and the protected effort of the Solomon Islands campaign.  But the war was far from over.

Sources:

  1. Evans, D., and others.  Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy (1887 – 1941).  Naval Institute Press, 1997.
  2. Fuchida, M., and others.  Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan – the Japanese Navy’s story.  Naval Institute Press, 1955.
  3. Hanson, V. D.  Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power.  Doubleday, 2001.

Endnotes:

[1] Japanese Zero’s flying CAP slaughtered all unescorted slow-moving TBD aircraft.  A few TBDs managed to get within a few ship-lengths range of their targets before dropping their torpedoes — close enough to be able to strafe the enemy ships and force the Japanese carriers to make sharp evasive maneuvers — but all of their torpedoes either missed or failed to explode.

Turning Point — Midway, Part I

Introduction

Six months after the Imperial Japanese Navy attack at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and one month following the Battle of the Coral Sea, another naval battle loomed.  It would become known as the Battle of Midway Island.

The first phase of Japan’s strategy in the Pacific was to expand its outposts, which it did by seizing the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies (modern-day Indonesia).  Indonesia was particularly interesting to Japan because of its oil resources, which the Japanese desperately needed.  One month after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese began formulating their second phase.  Significant disagreements between the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Navy (IJN) delayed a unified plan until April 1942.  The IJN won the debate, if that’s what it was, but only because Admiral Yamamoto threatened to resign should the Emperor decide on the Army’s plan.

Admiral Yamamoto’s central goal was to eliminate the United States’ carrier fleet, which he regarded as the main threat to the overall Pacific campaign.  It was only luck that Yamamoto missed the carrier fleet at Pearl Harbor. 

The Doolittle Raid, launched from the carrier task force of Vice Admiral Halsey on 18 April 1942, only served to heighten Admiral Yamamoto’s concerns about the capabilities of American aircraft carriers.  The raid wasn’t materially significant, but it psychologically shocked Japan’s mistaken notion of invincibility to a foreign attack on the home islands.  Then, several small hit-and-run operations by American carriers in the South Pacific were added to the Doolittle raid.  In 1942, the IJN had a numerical superiority over the American navy in terms of ships, aircraft, and battle-tested pilots — but the Americans had demonstrated that they were still a threat to Japan’s Pacific goals and the Japanese home islands.

Admiral Yamamoto observed that the U.S. Pacific Fleet hesitated to participate in a large-scale sea battle.  Of course, he was correct; the United States had three fleet carriers operating in the Pacific.  Yamamoto decided that a second attack at Pearl Harbor might draw the Americans into a confrontation where Japan’s numerical advantage would shatter the Pacific Fleet.  Since Pearl Harbor, however, the Americans had significantly increased their land-based air capability in Hawaii, and Admiral Yamamoto knew that a second assault might prove entirely too risky.  Instead, Yamamoto selected as his primary target a minuscule atoll at the extreme northwest end of the Hawaiian Island chain 1,300 miles from Oahu.  Midway, he reasoned, was outside the effective range of land-based U.S. aircraft stationed on the main islands.  The only purpose for the attack was to lure the Americans out to fight in an environment where the Japanese believed they stood a good chance of victory.

Why Midway?

The United States had three interests in Midway Island: First, the island was critical for maintaining the Pacific submarine fleet.  Second, Midway was essential to the operation of the U.S. Seaplane Fleet.  Third, Midway was a staging point for bomber missions at Wake Island.

Admiral Yamamoto’s plan for Midway was far too complex.  It required careful coordination of several battle groups over several hundred miles of open sea.  He based his plan on faulty intelligence.  Yamamoto assumed that the U.S.S. Hornet and Enterprise (Task Force 16) were the only American carriers in the Pacific.  A month earlier, during the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese sank the U.S.S. Lexington and believed they had also sunk the U.S.S. Yorktown.  Yorktown was severely damaged but not lost.  Emergency repairs at Pearl Harbor had restored the ship to active service.  Yorktown would play an important role in the discovery of IJN ships.

Yamamoto also misjudged the morale of the US Navy, which he believed was a debilitating factor following Japanese victories of the previous several months.

Yamamoto’s plan called for deception.  To this end, he dispersed his forces to conceal their full extent from the Americans.  To this end, Yamamoto’s battleship fleet (and supporting cruisers) trailed several hundred miles behind the Carrier force.  Yamamoto intended that these assets would charge forward to destroy whatever elements the U.S. Navy had to engage him.  This was a typical naval strategy in 1942.

Admiral Yamamoto did not know that the U.S. Navy had broken Japan’s naval code.  The Americans knew what Yamamoto was going to do.  The American Navy knew Admiral Yamamoto’s supporting fleet would not be properly positioned to support his carrier force.  More than this, the US Navy knew that Yamamoto’s trailing force could not keep pace with his carrier fleet.  This also meant that Japanese scouting planes could not be effectively employed.

Meanwhile, the IJN pledged its support to the IJA’s plan for an invasion of the Aleutian Islands, which necessitated siphoning off naval assets to support the landing forces of the IJA.  Operations in the Aleutians were not so much diversionary as a simultaneous attack on U.S. assets based in Alaska.  It was not a well-coordinated operation, however.  The Aleutian campaign began one full day ahead of the assault on Midway.

The IJN delivered a devastating blow to the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.  Newly appointed to command the Pacific Ocean Area, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz’s priority was to marshal all his available assets to respond to Japanese aggression.  His resources were meager: Vice Admiral William Halsey’s two-carrier task force and Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher’s carrier force, which included the U.S.S. Yorktown.

The Americans Regroup

Because Admiral Halsey suffered from severe dermatitis, Navy medical officials hospitalized him at the Pearl Harbor Naval Hospital.  Nimitz replaced him with Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance, a battleship commander.  Yorktown, severely damaged in the Battle of the Coral Sea, was quickly restored to battle-ready condition.  It was an arduous task, as her flight deck had to be repaired, internal structures cut out, removed, and replaced.  These tasks were accomplished within 72 hours — after which Yorktown returned to sea with many more repairs performed while underway.

Yorktown’s partially depleted air group was rebuilt or replaced using whatever planes and pilots could be found, including transfers from U.S.S. Saratoga[1].  Many new pilots were not long out of flight school and, therefore, without combat experience.

By 4 June 1942, the U.S. Navy assembled four squadrons of Consolidated Model 28 Catalina (PBY) aircraft (totaling 31) at Midway.  The mission of the Catalina was long-range reconnaissance.  Also located at Midway were six new Grumman Avengers (TBF) transferred ashore from the U.S.S. Hornet.  Marine aircraft squadrons added 19 Douglas Dauntless (SBD), 7 Wildcat F4F-3, 17 Vought Vindicators (SB2U), and 21 Brewster Buffalo (F2A) aircraft.  The Army Air Corps contributed 17 Flying Fortresses (B-17) and 4 Martin Marauders (B-26) (equipped with torpedoes).  In total, the U.S. had 126 aircraft.

There were also equipment shortfalls on the Japanese side.  During the engagement in the Coral Sea, the Japanese lost the light carrier Shoho, and the seriously damaged fleet carrier Shokaku was returned to Japan for repairs.  The carrier Zuikaku escaped battle damage but lost half of her air group and remained dockside awaiting replacement aircraft and pilots.[2]  This was a problem for the Japanese because, in 1942, Japanese training doctrine required carriers and air groups to train and fight as a single unit.  The Americans didn’t have this problem because air groups were interchangeable.

The preceding circumstances meant that IJN Carrier Division 5, which included two of Japan’s advanced carriers, would not be available for the Midway engagement.  Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo, commanding the carrier fleet, was thus short one-third of fleet carriers.  Added to this, the Japanese carrier fleet was experiencing combat fatigue.  These sailors had been engaged in combat operations since the previous December.  Another deficiency in the carrier force: it could throw a pretty good punch, but it couldn’t take one.  The Japanese had problems with the carrier fire control systems, and there were too few air patrol aircraft to provide combat air patrol (CAP) (air cover) services to the fleet.  The Japanese also lacked radar capability, experienced radio communications problems with their air groups while aloft, and lacked sufficient command and control over CAP missions.

The Japanese had other problems, as well.  Because the Japanese deployed their carrier escorts as visual scouts at long range from the primary carrier force, they could not support the carrier fleet as close-in anti-aircraft escorts.  The escort ships lacked adequate training for the scouting mission and were insufficiently armed with anti-aircraft armaments.  Worse, perhaps, Japanese scouting was in disarray.

And because Japanese submarines were late getting into position, U.S. carriers arrived at their assembly point northeast of Midway (codenamed Point Luck) undetected.  The Japanese intended to refuel their reconnaissance seaplanes from submarines at French Frigate Shoals; however, U.S. warships were already on station when they arrived at the predesignated point.  As previously noted, the American Navy was reading Japanese operational messages.

From an operational standpoint, the Japanese were approaching a critical battle entirely blind.  The Japanese did notice an increase in communications activity, and this information was in Yamamoto’s hands before the battle, but he made no change in the battle plan.  Yamamoto reasoned that if he could detect increased message traffic, Nagumo could as well.

Battle Stations

At about 0900 on 3 June, a U.S. Navy PBY aircraft piloted by Ensign Jack Reid discovered a Japanese force about five-hundred nautical miles west-southwest of Midway.  He mistakenly reported this group as the main enemy force.  Alerted, nine B-17s departed Midway Island at 1230 for the first air attack.  Three hours later, the B-17s located the transport group 660 miles to the west.  These aircraft experienced heavy anti-aircraft fire, and in their haste, none of the bombs hit Japanese targets.[3]  The first damage to any Japanese vessel occurred the following morning when a PBY struck an oil tanker with an air-launched torpedo.  It was the only successful torpedo attack during the entire battle.

Admiral Nagumo launched his initial attack on Midway at 0430, 4 June.  The attacking force consisted of 36 Aichi (D3A) dive bombers and 36 Nakajima (B5N) torpedo bombers.  These were escorted by 36 Mitsubishi (A6M) (Zero) fighters.  Nagumo also launched eight search aircraft — but these were too few to scout the intended search areas adequately, and poor weather conditions hampered the search effort.  At about this same time, 11 PBYs were taking off from Midway to conduct their own search patterns.  At 0534, a PBY reported sighting two Japanese aircraft carriers; another spotted the inbound Japanese airstrike fifteen minutes later.

Radars at Midway picked up the incoming enemy and scrambled interceptors to meet the threat.  Unescorted bombers headed toward the Japanese carriers, their escorts remaining behind to defend Midway.  Japanese bombing commenced at 0620, inflicting heavy damage to the advanced base.  Marine aircraft were the first to engage the Japanese and suffered heavy casualties, losing two F4F-3s and thirteen F2As.  Most surviving aircraft were heavily damaged.  Only two aircraft remained “airworthy,” but Marine aircraft could destroy four B5Ns and one A6M.

American shore anti-aircraft fires were intense, successfully destroying three Japanese aircraft and damaging several more.  Of the 108 Japanese planes launched, Americans destroyed eleven, damaged fourteen, and inflicted some damage on twenty-nine.  Despite the overwhelming numbers of Japanese aircraft involved in the assault, aircraft operations from Midway Island continued.  Command pilots advised Admiral Nagumo that a second assault would be necessary if he intended to land troops by 7 June.

American bombers made several attacks on the Japanese carrier force.  The Japanese repelled these attacks with the loss of 3 fighters but inflicted heavy damage on 17 American aircraft.  It was during this assault that the Marines lost Major Lofton R. Henderson.[4]  The main airfield at Guadalcanal was later named Henderson Field in his honor.  Admiral Nagumo was determined to make another attack on Midway — a decision that went against Admiral Yamamoto’s order “to retain a reserve strike force armed for anti-ship operations.”

(Continued Next Week)

Sources:

  1. Evans, D., and others.  Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy (1887 – 1941).  Naval Institute Press, 1997.
  2. Fuchida, M., and others.  Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan – the Japanese Navy’s story.  Naval Institute Press, 1955.
  3. Hanson, V. D.  Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power.  Doubleday, 2001.

Endnotes:

[1] USS Saratoga was undergoing repairs in San Diego; despite every effort to ready her for the coming engagement, resupply and the assembly of sufficient carrier escorts hampered her ability to return to the central Pacific in time for the Midway engagement.

[2] One of Japan’s major deficiencies during the war was her inability to train and replace aircrew personnel.  Later in the war, Japan would waste these resources in the so-called Kamikaze air fleet.

[3] These were not scared pilots or morons.  The nerve-racking experience was that of flying a large, slow airplane at point-blank range directly into the muzzles of enemy deck guns.  Since the B-17s didn’t have enough forward firepower to keep those guns down, the army bombers became sitting ducks and “No Joy Commandos.”

[4] Henderson, born in Lorain, Ohio, graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1926.  His initial assignment was in China, where he served as a platoon commander.  The Marine Corps accepted him for flight training in 1928 at San Diego, California.  By 1942, Henderson was a major commanding VMSB-241.  He led the squadron into an attack against the Japanese carrier Hiryu.  Although his aircraft burst into flames during his attack, he continued his assault and perished in delivering his ordnance.  Henderson was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross Medal.

Captain Hulbert of the Old Breed

Hulbert 001Henry Lewis Hulbert (12 Jan 1867—4 Oct 1918) was one of those Marines of the “old breed” I enjoy reading about. He was the first born of a prosperous Kingston-Hull, Yorkshire, England family, and this enabled him to attend Felsted School in Essex and later, to enter the British Colonial Service. His first appointment was in Malaya, where he married Anne Rose Hewitt, but a subsequent scandal and divorce led him to leave Malaysia for the United States.

At the age of 31, Hulbert enlisted in the U. S. Marine Corps (1898) and completed boot camp at Mare Island, California. His initial line assignment placed him in the company of 200 fellow Marines in a joint British-American intervention expedition to Samoa. During the Second Samoan Civil War, then Private Hulbert distinguished himself in combat and was subsequently awarded the Medal of Honor due to his gallantry and intrepidity under fire.

Hulbert 002

By the time the United States entered World War I, Hulbert was serving at the highest enlisted rank.  Sergeant Major Hulbert served on the staff of Marine Corps Commandant, Major General George Barnett. Then, just prior to America’s entry into the war, Hulbert was appointed as the first Marine Corps Gunner (warrant officer) and was reassigned to the Fifth Regiment of United States Marines on 27 March 1917.  Hulbert was five months past his 50th birthday.  As the United States began to prepare for war, senior officers realized that the Corps was significantly short of company grade offers —those who ordinarily command platoons and companies.  As a consequence, the Marine Corps promoted Gunner Hulbert (and others) to the rank of second lieutenant (temporary).

During World War I, Lieutenant Hulbert participated in the Battle of Belleau Wood, and during this battle was recognized several times for courage under fire.  He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, and recommended for a battlefield commission to Captain.

At the Battle of Soissons, Hulbert distinguished himself further but was killed in action on 4 October 1918 at Mont Blanc Ridge.  He was posthumously promoted to the rank of captain, and awarded the Navy Cross, Purple Heart, and Croix de Guerre (France). A U. S. Navy destroyer (DD-342) was named in his honor and was commissioned from 1920 to 1945.

Operation Swift — 1967

Introduction

Quảng Tri province, Vietnam, is surrounded by Quảng Binh Province to the north, Thura Thiên Huế Province to the south, Savannakhet Province (in Laos) to the west, and the South Bien Dong Sea to the east.

Hills and the Annamite Mountains dominate the terrain of Quảng Tri.  The highlands, characterized by steep slopes, sharp crests, and narrow valleys, are covered mainly by a dense broadleaf evergreen forest.  Most peaks range from 1,200 meters (4,000 feet) to 2,100 meters (7,000 feet).  Some, however, extended to 8,000 feet.

The narrow coastal plains flanking the highlands on the east have rocky headlands and consist of belts of dunes.  In areas where the soil is suitable, farmers grow rice.  From the crests that mark the highlands drainage divide, streams flow east towards the East Sea (South China Sea) or west into Laos or Cambodia.  Those flowing eastward follow short courses through deep narrow valleys over rocky bottoms until they reach the coastal plains, where they slow down and disperse.  The westward-flowing streams follow longer traces, sometimes through deep canyons, which are subject to seasonal flooding.

The weather features a wide range of temperatures and rainfall, with hot and dry southwest winds during the Southwest Monsoon (May to September) and much cooler wet weather during the rainy season (November to mid-March).  Average temperatures throughout the year hover around 75°F, but the rainy season can bring temperatures as low as 40°F.

Some History

The history of Vietnam is one of conflict.  At one time, the lowlands of Quảng Tri and central Vietnam were populated by the Cham people (now Cambodians) — people culturally distinct from the Vietnamese who lived to the north along the Red River.  The Qin Dynasty of China conquered parts of present-day Central Vietnam at the end of the third century before the common era (B.C.E.) and administered through locals through a Chinese commandery for several centuries.  A rebellion by the Cham in the second century overthrew Chinese control and reestablished local authority.

In the 14th and 15th centuries, several Vietnamese armies defeated the Chams.  Ethnic Vietnamese gradually displaced or assimilated Chams who had not fled, and over time, a distinct Vietnamese cultural group evolved in the area.  The region was seized by the French in 1874 and, in 1887, became part of French Indochina, known as Annam.

Circumstances for War

Upon the political separation of Vietnam in 1954, Quảng Tri became the northernmost province of the State of Vietnam and, later, its successor — the Republic of Vietnam.  The line of separation between North and South Vietnam was designated a demilitarized zone (DMZ), with the southern-most portion in Quảng Tri and the northern-most portion in Quảng Binh, North Vietnam.

Beginning in 1964, the province became the forward edge of the Vietnamese battle area, particularly after 1966 when the Third Marine Division (3rdMarDiv) established firebases south of the DMZ.  In that year, elements of the North Vietnamese Army (N.V.A.) also began to occupy the northern region of South Vietnam and push deeper into the southern Republic.  North Vietnamese troops overran the provincial capital, Quảng Tri City, in 1967, which made the province a principal battleground in the Vietnam War.

Operation Swift

The Quế Sơn Valley is located along the border of the Quảng Nam and Quảng Tin provinces.  During the Vietnam War, it lay in the southern portion of the Republic of Vietnam’s (R.V.N.s) First Corps Tactical Zone (I C.T.Z.).  Quế Son was populated and rice rich — a key area for controlling South Vietnam’s five northern provinces.  In early 1967, two infantry regiments of the N.V.A. infiltrated the northern region.

American military headquarters in Vietnam, known as the Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (M.A.C.V.), recognized that the Quế Son Valley was strategically important.  In 1967, the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, assigned the 5th Marine Regiment (5th Marines) to support the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (A.R.V.N.) in Quế Son.

Operation Swift was an operation launched to rescue two Marine companies that N.V.A. infantry units had ambushed.  The operation kicked off on 4 September 1967.

During the spring and summer of 1967, Marines launched Operations Union and Union II, intending to sweep the N.V.A. from the southern rim of the Quế Son.  Several bitter and costly battles forced the communist 2nd Division to cede control of the area to the 5th Marines.  Two battalions of the 5th Marines continued to operate in the valley throughout the rest of the summer, but their patrolling lacked aggressiveness.  The N.V.A., focused on rebuilding their ravaged units, did not challenge the Marines in the Quế Son Valley.  Viet Cong (V.C.) units moved into the Quế Son as a reinforcing element to the N.V.A. 2nd Division.

In early August, the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division turned his attention to the Quế Sơn Valley following several other significant operations around Da Nang.  In an attempt to draw the N.V.A. into another destructive confrontation, Major General D. J. Robertson initiated Operation Cochise.  However, communist forces avoided contact with the three Marine battalions tasked with the operation, which ended on 28 August 1967.  The operation produced modest results.

The Marines then initiated sweep operations designed to shield local Vietnamese from communist intimidation during upcoming local elections.  Operation Swift began in the early morning hours of 4 September when a superior N.V.A. force attacked Delta Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (1/5) in a bivouac outside the village of Dong Son.

The Commanding Officer of 1/5 was Lieutenant Colonel Pete Hilgartner.  When radio communications announced that Delta Company was in the thick of it, he dispatched Bravo Company to aid and reinforce.  It was all Hilgartner had to send.  With two companies involved in intense combat, the regimental commander ordered Kilo Company and Mike Company from 3/5 to relieve the other two companies.  By the early afternoon, Kilo and Mike were ambushed and pinned down in separate enclaves.  Corporal Larry B. Nunez earned the Silver Star for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity while serving as a rifle squad leader during the fighting.  Lieutenant Vincent R. Capodanno, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Navy, and Sergeant Lawrence D. Peters would later receive the Medal of Honor.  Sergeant Thomas C. Panian received the Navy Cross.

Were it not for Marine Corps artillery and aviation close air support, the enemy’s overwhelming force would have overrun the Marine infantry units.  Marine A-6 Intruders silenced enemy anti-aircraft gun emplacements, which allowed even more allied aircraft C.A.S.  A fresh infantry company assaulted the enemy at dawn on 5 September, forcing the N.V.A. to withdraw.

With friendly units relieved of enemy pressure, Colonel Stan Davis, Commanding Officer of the 5th Marines, ordered 1/5 and 3/5 to pursue the withdrawing communists — the “official” commencement of Operation Swift.  After the second day, Marine losses included 54 killed and 104 wounded.

In the early afternoon of 6 September, two battalions of the V.C. 1st Regiment attacked Bravo Company (the lead company of 1/5).  Opposing two battalions, the Marine company was quickly isolated and in danger of being overrun.  They were able to hold their positions because of accurate artillery fire.  Sergeant Rodney M. Davis, Platoon Guide, 2nd Platoon, Bravo Company, intentionally absorbed the force of a communist grenade to protect the lives of other Marines during the fight.  Davis later received the Medal of Honor.  When the communists withdrew at around 1400 hours, they left behind 61 dead.

Within a few hours, 3/5 Marines were also heavily engaged.  India Company dispatched to capture an enemy emplacement on a nearby hill, became isolated and nearly overrun by the V.C. 1st Regiment’s 3rd Battalion.  Kilo Company fought through the V.C. and relieved India Company I, but the two line companies had too many casualties to relocate.  The two companies repulsed night assaults by the V.C. forces.  Mike Company fought through the V.C. and linked up with India and Kilo companies.

On 10 September, Hotel Company, 2/5 discovered an unoccupied bunker system; when another Marine platoon moved through the same village several hours later, they were hit by intense fire from the bunker now occupied by an N.V.A. force.  Mike 3/5 joined Hotel 2/5 to support the pinned-down platoon, and with air and artillery support, the Marines overran the enemy’s positions.[1]

Also, on 10 September, the A.R.V.N. 37th Ranger Battalion encountered an N.V.A. force north of the Operation Swift operational area.  In the early morning of 12 September, two N.V.A. companies assaulted India 3/5, which the Marines repulsed.  The next night, the communists counter-attacked the A.R.V.N. Rangers, prompting additional Vietnamese and Marine Corps unit reinforcements.

Operational Aftermath

Operation Swift ended on 15 September.  By this time, the N.V.A. had relinquished control of the southern half of the Quế Son Valley.  As Operation Swift concluded, U.S. Army units arrived in the I C.T.Z.’s southern regions, allowing the Marines to concentrate more significant effort within the Quế Son Valley.  In total casualties, the U.S. and Vietnamese forces lost 155 men killed (9 missing), while the M.A.C.V. estimated six-hundred enemy dead.

Sergeant Lawrence D. Peters, USMC

Larry Peters joined the 48th Rifle Company, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, in September 1963.  He completed recruit training with the 1st Recruit Training Battalion, Parris Island, South Carolina, in September 1964 and Infantry Training at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

Having been promoted to Corporal, Peters requested assignment to the Fleet Marine Forces.  He reported to Staging Battalion, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California, for pre-deployment training in March 1966.

In May, Peters joined Delta Company, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines in Vietnam, serving as a fireteam leader, squad leader, and the Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (N.C.O.I.C.) of a Combined Action Platoon.  In September 1966, the Marine Corps promoted Peters to Sergeant and assigned him to temporary duty with Headquarters Company, 7th Engineer Battalion.  In July 1967, Peters was assigned as a rifle squad leader with Company M, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (M/3/5).

MEDAL OF HONOR CITATION

            The President of the United States, in the name of the Congress, takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

SERGEANT LAWRENCE D. PETERS

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

For service as set forth in the following:

CITATION:

            For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a squad leader with Company M, Third Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam, on 4 September 1967.  During OPERATION SWIFT, in the province of Quảng Tin, the Marines of the second platoon of Company M were struck by intense mortar, machine gun, and small arms fire from an entrenched enemy force.  As the company rallied its forces, Sergeant Peters maneuvered his squad in an assault on an enemy-defended knoll.  Disregarding his own safety, as enemy rounds hit all about him, he stood in the open, pointing out enemy positions until he was painfully wounded in the leg.  Disregarding his wound, he moved forward and continued to lead his men.  As enemy fire increased in accuracy and volume, his squad lost its momentum and was temporarily pinned down.  Exposing himself to devastating enemy fire, he consolidated his position to render more effective fire.  While directing the base of fire, he was wounded a second time in the face and neck from an exploding mortar round.  As the enemy attempted to infiltrate the position of an adjacent platoon, Sergeant Peters stood erect in full view of the enemy, firing burst after burst, forcing them to disclose their camouflaged positions.  Sergeant Peters continued firing until he was critically wounded by a gunshot wound in his chest.  Although unable to walk or stand, Sergeant Peters steadfastly continued to direct his squad in spite of two additional wounds, persisted in his efforts to encourage and supervise his men until he lost consciousness and succumbed.  Inspired by his selfless actions, the squad regained fire superiority and once again carried the assault to the enemy.  By his outstanding valor, indomitable fighting spirit, and tenacious determination in the face of overwhelming odds, Sergeant Peters upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.  He gallantly gave his life for his country.

In addition to the Medal of Honor, Sergeant Peters was entitled to the Purple Heart Medal, Combat Action Ribbon, Presidential Unit Citation with a star reflecting the second award, the National Defense Service Medal, Vietnamese Service Medal, with three stars reflecting campaigns, the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with bronze palm, and the Vietnamese Campaign Medal.   

Sources:

  1. Telfer, G.  U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967.  Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1984.
  2. Villard, E.  The 1968 Tet Offensive Battles of Quảng Tri City and Hue.  U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair.

Notes:

[1] Several dead Marines were discovered holding their jammed M-16 rifles.  See also: Misfire: the tragic failure of the M-16 in Vietnam.  Bob Orkand and Lyman Duryea, Stackpole Books, 2019.  The M-16 often failed to eject spent cartridges, often jammed, making the rifle ineffective.  Men began to be killed in combat because they couldn’t return fire or because they had paused to clear and repair their weapons.

The First Battle

Background

The United States began providing material support to French Indochina starting after the end of World War II.  After the defeat of French colonial forces at Điện Biên Phủ (1954), the United States shifted its waste of taxpayer money to the South Vietnam regime headed by Vietnam’s former Prime Minister, Ngô Đình Diệm — who declared himself President of the Republic of South Vietnam.  The Vietnam War effectively began with the North Vietnamese-backed Viet Cong insurgency in 1959 – 1960.[1]

The US became even more involved as the military and political situation deteriorated in South Vietnam.  Since President Diem refused to comply with American demands, President John F. Kennedy gave his nod to a CIA assassination of President Diem on 2 November 1963.  President Kennedy would follow Diem in twenty days.

Following the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in August 1964, the U.S. Pacific Command, under Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, ordered the activation of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (9thMEB).  The 3rd Marine Division’s Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General Raymond G. Davis, was directed to assume command of the Brigade, which included the 9th Marine Regiment (Headquarters), three battalion landing teams (BLTs), and an aviation contingent.  When deployed at sea, the BLTs fell under the command authority of the Commander, United States Seventh Fleet, Amphibious Ready Group, serving at the Fleet’s Special Landing Force (US 7thFlt ARG/SLF).

When the Gulf of Tonkin crisis faded, one BLT was returned to its home base on Okinawa, another sent to the Philippines to occupy what was called the SLF Camp, and the third BLT remained afloat as part of the 7th Fleet.  Brigadier General Davis remained at Subic Bay in the Philippines “in case” hostilities re-erupted.

Meanwhile, the situation in South Vietnam became critical when VC forces defeated the ARVN at Binh Gia in January 1965.  It was a communist challenge to the South Vietnamese government and its American ally.  Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch assumed command of the 9th Expeditionary Brigade on 22 January.  General Karch directed amphibious training exercises involving the first and third battalions (1/9 and 3/9).  On 7 February, the VC assaulted the US base at Pleiku, killing 9 Americans, wounding 128 others, and damaging or destroying 25 American aircraft.  By presidential decree, Marines were ordered to Da Nang by the end of February to protect the base from enemy (VC) incursions.

Land the Marines

After a delay because of a snag in negotiations with the South Vietnamese government, Karch led his Brigade ashore on 8 March.  Soon after landing, 2/9 joined 1/9 and 3/9 at Da Nang.  The delay in negotiations involved the naming of the Brigade.  Vietnamese officials objected to the use of the word “expeditionary.”[2]  Consequently, the Brigade was re-designated 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade.

Once General Karch moved his flag ashore in Vietnam, he came under the direct authority of the Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), US Army General William Westmoreland.

Two months later, American Marines and units of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) secured the area surrounding Chu Lai to establish an airfield/base support area capable of supporting high-performance aircraft.

Based on the anticipated escalation of hostilities in Vietnam, the U.S. Pacific Command reactivated the III Amphibious Corps (from World War II), designating it as the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF).  The Commanding General III MAF was Major General William R. Collins.  A month later, Headquarters Marine Corps replaced Collins with Major General Lewis W. Walt, who commanded the MAF and the 3rd Marine Division.  Westmoreland ordered III MAF/3rdMarDiv to assume command authority over all US military activities in the northernmost province of South Vietnam, also known as the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ).

General Westmoreland ordered Major General Walt to undertake offensive operations in conjunction with the South Vietnamese military as a matter of priority.  Walt demurred, reminding Westmoreland that Marine Corps activities in Vietnam were restricted by a letter of instruction (dated 6 May 1965).  Specifically, the U.S. Marines could only assist the ARVN or Vietnamese Marine Corps if they were “heavily engaged with a VC force.”

General Westmoreland told Walt to “rewrite the LOI” to specify the authority Walt thought he needed to get the job done — and he (Westmoreland) would grant that authority.  On 6 August, General Walt received official permission to take the offensive against the Viet Cong forces.  A week later, the 7th Marine Regiment arrived in Vietnam.  Walt intended to employ that regiment against the 1st Viet Cong Regiment — the enemy unit responsible for destroying the hamlet of Ba Gia, twenty miles south of Chu Lai.

Turning up the heat

After the attack on Ba Gia, US intelligence agencies located the 1st VC Regiment in the mountains west of the hamlet, reports indicated that the regiment was once more on the march and a threat to US and ARVN military units at Chu Lai.  Acting on this intelligence, the 4th Marine Regiment conducted a one-battalion operation with the ARVN 51st Infantry Regiment (1st ARVN Division) along the Trà Bồng River.  The name of this operation was Thunderbolt.  It was a two-day search and destroy mission.

US and ARVN units found little evidence of a significant VC presence and encountered only scattered resistance.  Eight days later, Allied intelligence confirmed the location of the 1st VC Regiment.  On 15 August, a deserter from the regiment surrendered to the ARVN.  During this soldier’s interrogation at the I Corps headquarters of ARVN General Nguyễn Chánh Thi, he revealed that the regiment established its base of operations in the Van Tuong village complex on the South Vietnamese sea coast, twelve miles south of Chu Lai.  The source said that the communist regiment was planning to attack Chu Lai.

Additionally, the source revealed that the regiment consisted of two of its three battalions (the 60th and 80th) with reinforcing units.  In all, the regiment hosted 1,500 fighters.  General Thi believed the prisoner was speaking the truth and relayed this information to Major General Walt.  At about the same time, Walt’s headquarters (Intel Section) separately corroborated this information.  Convinced that the airfield was in danger of an attack, Walt consulted with his senior advisors (Karch, Colonel McClanahan (CO 4th Marines), and Colonel Peatross (CO 7th Marines) and decided on a spoiling attack in the Van Tuong region.

Starlite[3]

Within a two-day period, Walt’s operational staff coordinated with subordinate regiments to design a plan of attack.  The operational concept dictated a two-battalion assault.  One battalion would make an amphibious landing, and another would make a vertical insertion (helicopter assault) further inland.  The two operational battalions would be under the control of Colonel Peatross.  The assault units included Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. Fisher’s 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines (2/4), and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Muir’s 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines (3/3).

General Walt wanted a third (floating) battalion in reserve.  He requested assistance from the 7th Fleet, who granted permission to employ the SLF battalion, then located at Subic Bay.  Given the distance between South Vietnam and the Philippines, Walt scheduled the operation for 18 August 1965.

Because the Vietnamese military was infamous for leaking classified information to the enemy, Walt’s headquarters never communicated details of the operation to the ARVN Joint General Staff in Saigon until after the operation had begun.  Only General Thi and the ARVN 2nd Infantry Division commander, General Hoàng Xuân Lãm, knew about the action — but only because it was essential to keep ARVN troops out of the operational area.

Colonel Peatross directed aerial surveillance of the area, including amphibious landing sites and the intended helicopter landing zones (LZs).  Three LZs were designated four miles east of Route 1 and one mile inland from the coast.  From those landing sites, the Marines would move northeast to the South China Sea — destroying any communists they found in the way.  The purpose of the amphibious landing group was to serve as a blocking force to prevent the enemy from escaping to the south.

Third Battalion, 3rd Marines (3/3) was to make an amphibious landing at 0630 on 18 August with India and Kilo Companies abreast.  Mike Company would move overland from Chu Lai to a ridgeline blocking position in the northern portion of the operational area, 4 miles northwest.  Lima Company was detailed as the battalion reserve.   

Soon after H-Hour (the time of the scheduled amphibious landing), UH-34 (helicopters) from HMM-261 and HMM-361 began shuttling elements of 2/4 into the three LZs.[4]  The two battalions would join forces when Hotel Company 2/4 (LZ Blue) linked up with India Company 3/3 outside An Cuong, roughly 3/4 of a mile inland from Green Beach.  From there, the Marines would sweep to the sea through Van Tuong.  Artillery located at Chu Lai would support the operation, along with two US Navy destroyers, USS Orleck and USS Prichett, and the cruiser, USS Galveston.  Fixed-wing aircraft from Marine Aircraft Group 11 (MAG-11) and MAG-12 would provide close air support.

The Fight

At 1000 on 17 August, Marines from Mike Company 3/3 boarded amphibian tractors (LVTP-5s) at Chu Lai and moved along the coast to the Trun Phan Peninsula.  They then marched four miles south, where the company established its blocking position.  The company only encountered minor resistance (occasional snipers and booby traps).  Before dawn the following day, Company M was in place.  Since Marine security patrols were common in this area, there were no unusual activities for a communist observer to report.

At 1700 on 17 August, Colonel Peatross and the rest of 3/3 embarked on three ships of the ARG (Bayfield, Cabildo, and Vernon County).  Three Flame Tanks attached to the 7th Marines and a platoon of five M-48 tanks assigned to Colonel Fisher’s battalion boarded Landing Craft Mechanized (LCMs), which sailed independently toward the amphibious objective area. 

The task force first sailed east to deceive any VC observers in coastal water sampans.  Once they were over the horizon, however, the ships changed course to the southwest.  By 0500 on 18 August, all ships were at the amphibious objective area.  Galveston and Orleck provided naval artillery support to the landing.

At 0615 (15 minutes before H-Hour), Battery K 4th Battalion, 12th Marines (4/12) began to deliver preparatory fires in the areas surrounding the LZs.  Marine artillery augmented 20 Marine Corps A-4s and F-4s, which dropped 18 tons of bombs and napalm on the designated LZs.  Marines limited their preparation of the beach landing zone to air delivered 20mm cannon fire from MAG-12 to protect innocents in the village of An Cuong.

When the Marines stormed ashore, elements of Kilo Company received enemy sniper fire from its right flank.  When two platoons rushed the area, the VC wisely withdrew.  Kilo Company’s third platoon secured the northern half of An Cuong.  Golf Company landed at LZ Red at 0645; Fox Company and the battalion command element landed at LZ White, and Hotel Company arrived at LZ Blue 40 minutes later.

On the beach, LtCol Muir’s 3/3 was joined by Colonel Peatross’ command element at around 0730; at about the same time, tanks and Ontos rolled ashore from the LCMs.  Lima Company came ashore and established perimeter security around the Regimental Command Post and logistics sections.

Once ashore, Marines experienced light resistance from VC elements.  Company G searched two hamlets in the vicinity of LZ Red and then advanced northeast and linked up with Company M.  Company E encountered stiff enemy small-arms resistance at LZ White from positions on a ridgeline east-northeast of the landing zone, which included mortar and machine gun fire.  Echo Company Marines spotted around a hundred enemies in the open and called in artillery from 3/12.  After the barrage, ten or so remaining VC quickly withdrew from the field, and Echo Company pushed toward the ridgeline.

Along the coastline, Kilo Company advanced to a phase line a mile north of Green Beach.  At that location, a well-entrenched VC force blocked the Marine advance.  Muir ordered Lima Company to advance and, after coming online with Kilo Company, assaulted the enemy position.  With the aid of supporting arms, 3/3 seized the high ground.

The central action, however, occurred in the south near LZ Blue and the line between 3/3 and 2/4.  This area was roughly one square kilometer, bound by the hamlets of An Thoi (north), Nam Yen (south), and An Cuong (east).  It was a patchwork of rice paddies, streams, hedgerows, wooded and built-up areas.  Human footpaths lead off in all directions.  Two small knolls dominated the flat terrain — designated Hill 43 (a few hundred meters southwest of Nam Yen) and Hill 30 (400 meters north of An Cuong).  LZ Blue was located just south of Nam Yen, between Hill 43 and the hamlet.

The Hotel Company (2/4) LZ was almost on top of the enemy’s 60th Battalion.  VC allowed the first helicopters to touch down with little interference but opened fire as the other aircraft attempted to set down.  Three US Army UH-1B gunships from the 7th Airlift Platoon took the VC on Hill 43 under fire while Company H formed a defensive perimeter around the LZ.  The Commanding Officer of Company H was First Lieutenant Homer K. Jenkins.  He was initially unaware of the size of the enemy force and ordered a platoon to seize Hill 43 while the rest of his company secured Nam Yen.  Platoons attacking elements of a rifle battalion is not an even fight, so the attacks stalled under massive enemy defensive fires.

Realizing he was attacking a bee’s nest, Jenkins recalled his platoons and regrouped.  He called for air support against the VC hill position and within Nam Yen.  After these strikes, he again assaulted the hill with three platoons of somewhat irritated Marines.

The Viet Cong fought tenaciously, but the Marines (reinforced by close air support and tanks) were too strong.  After taking the hill, Jenkins took one prisoner and collected more than forty small arms weapons.

Lieutenant Jenkins’ call for air support caused a momentary halt to the advance of India Company, 3/3, at a streambed east of Nam Yen.  Bomb fragments slightly wounded two Marines.  After the air strike, India Company moved north along the stream for around 500 meters to a point opposite An Cuong.  India Company’s skipper was Captain Bruce D. Webb.  He requested permission to assault An Cuong, even though the hamlet was in 2/4’s TAOR.  After consulting with Peatross, Muir approved Webb’s request.

An Cuong was a well-fortified hamlet ideally suited to VC combat tactics.  The area surrounding the hamlet was heavily wooded with severely restricted fields of fire.  The only open spaces were the rice paddies — but even those were interspersed by hedgerows of hardwood and bamboo thickets.  An Cuong consisted of 25-30 huts, with fighting holes and camouflaged trench lines connected by interlocking tunnels.  As the company cleared the first few huts, a grenade exploded, killing Webb and wounding three other Marines.

No sooner had the grenade exploded than two enemy mortars fell on the advancing Marines, inflicting three more casualties.  With Webb’s death, First Lieutenant Richard M. Purnell assumed command and committed the company’s reserve platoon.  India Company’s aggressive assault enabled the Marines to gain the upper hand, and enemy resistance slackened as the Marines began securing the hamlet.

Making a hurried assessment of battle damage, Purnell counted fifty VC bodies.  With An Cuong in American hands, Purnell radioed for further instructions.  Colonel Muir ordered India Company to join with Kilo, which was still engaged at the phase line, a little more than a mile northeast of An Cuong.

Company H 2/4 remained near Nam Yen to eradicate enemy opposition; once accomplished, the company would link up with 3/3.  While India 3/3 maneuvered through An Cuong, Colonel Peatross committed one company of his reserve battalion to the fight.  India Company 3/7 (aboard USS Iwo Jima) was flown ashore by HMM-163 shortly after 0930.

As India 3/3 prepared to move from An Cuong, VC small arms fire, shot down a UH-1E gunship from VMO-2 northeast of the hamlet.  Lieutenant Purnell detailed two rifle squads and three tanks to remain behind to protect the downed helicopter.  As the company departed An Cuong, Purnell observed Hotel Company under Lieutenant Jenkins proceeding into an open rice paddy between Nam Yen and An Cuong.  Jenkins mistakenly assumed that Nam Yen was already pacified.  It wasn’t.

From position within Nam Yen and Hill 30, VC opened fire with small arms and machine gun fire, catching Hotel Company’s rear guard in a crossfire.  At about the same time, mortars began falling on Hotel Company’s lead platoons.  Jenkins and his Marines were taking fire from all directions.  Tanks and Ontos were having trouble getting through the muck of the rice paddies.  Once Jenkins formed his armor into a tight circle, he began deploying his infantry.  One squad moved northwest of Nam Yen and killed nine communists operating mortars, but intense concentrations of small arms fire forced them back.

At around 1400, Lieutenant Jenkins realized that his position was untenable.  He called for supporting arms and withdrew his company to LZ Blue.  Marine artillery destroyed whatever aesthetic value existed in Nam Yen, and F-4 and A-4 aircraft blasted Hill 30.  As the Marines withdrew, incoming medevac helicopters forced the lead platoon to alter its course.

As the platoon maneuvered toward the company’s flank, VC forces took the Marines under fire.  At this juncture, the beleaguered platoon unexpectedly linked up with Purnell’s helicopter security detail which had started to move toward its parent company after the downed helicopter had been repaired and flown out.  A VC unit quickly engaged the small force, but the two Marine units fought to An Cuong together.  Meanwhile, Jenkins and his other two platoons fought a delaying action and withdrew to LZ Blue, arriving at around 16:30.  Colonel Fisher directed Jenkins to establish a defensive perimeter and await reinforcements.

The promised reinforcements never arrived because those Marines had been diverted earlier to aid an ambushed supply column some 400 meters west of An Cuong.  Just before noon, Muir had ordered his executive officer, Major Andrew G. Comer, to dispatch an LVT to resupply India 3/3, which was only around 300 yards in front of the battalion command post.  Although thoroughly briefed on their route of march, the supply train became lost between Nam Yen and An Thoi.  It was at that time when the VC opened fire with recoilless rifles.

The vehicles backed off the road and turned their weapons to face the VC.  Using all their weapons, the troops held off the closing VC infantry.  The Marine’s rear vehicle was a flame tank.  As the Marines aimed their weapon, an enemy mortar rendered it inoperable.

The battle raged, and the Marines were in danger of being overrun by VC infantry.  One track driver, however, panicked under fire and kept his mic button depressed while pleading for reinforcements.  He effectively cut off the command element’s ability to ascertain exactly what was happening.  This went on for more than an hour.  Muir finally ordered Comer to lead a rescue mission to prevent the VC from separating 3/3 and 2/4.

Major Comer planned to employ a rapidly moving tank, LVTP-5, and an Ontos, speed through An Cuong, and blast enemy positions into submission.  Before completing his briefing, however, the out-of-action flame tank returned to the 3/3 CP.  The tank commander, a staff sergeant, reported that he had just come through An Cuong without incident, and he volunteered to lead the rescue mission to the stalled column. 

Comer’s force moved out at around 1300 hours.  Just after cresting Hill 30, enemy recoilless rifle fire stopped the M-48 Tank, causing the following vehicles to jam up.  The enemy used this opportunity to deliver devastating mortar fire on the rescue group.  Within mere moments, enemy fire killed five Marines and wounded another 17.  Marine infantry quickly dismounted the LVTP-5’s and the accompanying Ontos maneuvered to provide frontal fire and protect the flanks while artillery and air support assaulted the enemy’s positions.  VC fire diminished almost immediately, and India 3/3 resumed its advance toward An Cuong, leaving a squad to help guard casualties until they could be aero-medically evacuated.    

India Company entered An Cuong against little resistance, but Major Comer’s command group ‘bravo’ was caught by intense fire from a wooded area on their right flank and was forced to take what cover they could in the open rice paddies.  At the same time, the Marines came upon the two reinforced squads from India Company left behind to guard the downed Huey and the platoon from Hotel Company.  The two India Company squads fought to Hill 30, where they were evacuated.  The platoon from Hotel Company remained in the rice paddy.

As the intensity of the battle increased, Peatross ordered a halt to the advance of the units from LZs Red and White along the coast to prevent the regiment from being over-extended.  Lima Company 3/7 arrived at 1730 and was placed under the operational control of Lieutenant Colonel Muir.  He sent the company to reinforce India 3/3 in its search for the missing supply column.

With two tanks in support, Lima Company moved out.  While advancing through the open rice paddies of An Cuong, the Marines came under heavy fire, taking four killed in action and 14 wounded.  Being Marines, however, Lima Company persevered until the VC broke contact at nightfall.  Peatross later reasoned that adding a third Marine company and supporting arms forced the 60th Battalion to break contact.  That evening, Galveston and Orleck illuminated Nam Yen and An Cuong.    

The Marines persevered, and the VC broke contact as night fell.  Adding a third Marine company to the area and the weight of supporting arms forced the VC 60th Battalion to break contact.  Anticipating night attacks, Marines requested continuous illumination over Nam Yen and An Cuong from the Galveston and Orleck.

Colonel Peatross informed General Walt that, in his opinion, the VC intended to defend selected positions rather than massing available forces.  Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Muir decided that it was too risky to continue searching for the missing supply column that night, especially after having learned that the column, although immobilized, was no longer in danger.  Muir ordered Lima Company to move to the phase line and join up with Kilo and Lima 3/3.  Muir also ordered India to return to the command post.  With fourteen dead and 53 wounded, their fight was over.

During the night of 18 August, Colonel Peatross brought the rest of the BLT 3/7 (SLF) ashore.  India 3/7 arrived at the regimental CP at around 1800.  The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Bodley, arrived soon after.  Just after midnight, Mike 3/7 landed across Green Beach from the USS Talladega.  With the arrival of his third rifle battalion, Peatross completed his plan for the next day.

Peatross intended that Muir’s 3/3 would attack northeast from the phase line, while Fisher’s 2/4 drove eastward to the sea, there joining up with 3/3

At 0730, Colonel Muir’s 3/3 (with Kilo and Lima companies abreast and Lima 3/7 in reserve) attacked northeast from the phase line.  Colonel Fisher’s 2/4 (with Echo and Golf companies) drove eastward to the sea, joining Hotel 3/3.  Hotel and India companies and Major Comer’s group would withdraw to the regimental command post.  The remainder of 3/7 would fill the gap, with India and Mike companies extracting the ambushed supply column and moving toward An Thoi to establish a blocking position to prevent the VC from escaping to the south.  Mike Company 3/3 would block any VC escape further north.

19 August 1965

Marines from 3/7 moved into its zone of action (which included the area of the fiercest fighting of the day before), finding that the VC had melted away.  At 0900, India and Mike Companies departed the regimental CP and moved through An Cuong but met no VC resistance.  By 1500, the missing supply column had been extracted, and a blocking position was in place by An Thoi.  Although much of the VC presence had disappeared, there were still pockets of stiff opposition when they launched their combined assaults earlier in the morning. 

As always in Vietnam, flat terrain proved difficult.  Rice paddies (ringed by dikes and hedgerows) hindered control, observation, and maneuverability.  The VC were holed up in bunkers, trenches, and caves scattered throughout the area.  As Marines swept through the area, VC snipers fired on them from their rear.  Marines had to dig out the VC or blow up tunnels.  By 1030, Echo and Kilo companies linked up, and the two battalions continued their advance to the sea.  By nightfall, 2/4 had completed its sweep to the Phuoc Thuan Peninsula, and organized enemy resistance ceased.

Aftermath

Although the regiment completed the cordon phase, General Walt directed that the operation continue for another five days so Allied forces could systematically search the entire area.  Walt believed that some Viet Cong remained behind in underground hiding places.  As BLT 2/4 and 3/3 returned to Chu Lai on the 20th of the month, BLT 1/7 joined 3/7 and elements of the 2nd ARVN Division to continue the search.

Between 18 – 24 August, U.S. Marines located and destroyed 614 enemy soldiers, captured nine prisoners, held, and interrogated 42 suspected communists, and collected 109 assorted weapons.  Marine losses included 45 killed and 203 wounded.

Significant awards during the operation included:

Medal of Honor — Corporal Robert E. O’Malley (3/3), Lance Corporal Joe C. Paul (2/4).

Navy Cross — Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Muir

Silver Star — First Lieutenant Richard M. Purnell

Operation Starlite was the United States’ first major battle in Vietnam.  COMUSMACV touted the battle as a victory for the United States, but the VC also claimed victory, insisting that they had inflicted 900 American casualties, destroyed 22 tanks, and downed 13 helicopters.  The Marines in Vietnam didn’t have 22 tanks — ever.

Not everyone in the United States agreed with General Westmoreland’s assessment.  President Johnson was both embarrassed and upset with the Marines for having lost a resupply detachment at a critical moment in the battle.[5]  Working for the Associated Press, Peter Arnett made sure that everyone in the United States who could read found out about it.  Headquarters Marine Corps denied the story.

One important takeaway, however, was that the battle forced the Marines to realize that a daily allotment of water of two gallons/per man/per day was inadequate in the sweltering heat of Vietnam.

Notes:

[1] The Viet Cong (VC) was the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam — an armed communist organization operating in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.  The NLF fought under the direction of the communist government of North Vietnam.

[2] South Vietnamese leadership objected to the term “expeditionary” because that was how the French identified their colonial forces after 1945.  By 1965, the Vietnamese had had their fill of French cuisine. 

[3] Initially, the operation was to be called Satellite, but a power outage caused a clerk, using only candlelight, to type Starlite instead.

[4] HMM = Marine Medium Helicopter

[5] This is because President Johnson never heard a shot fired in anger in his entire life.

Military Medals — British and American Traditions

The Cousins

It has only been since the seventeenth century that acts of bravery, merit, or service during war gained recognition of participation or individual acts of courage.  Before then, the ordinary British soldier was usually rewarded with a state pension.  In any case, during the English Civil War, the public’s opinion of soldiers was quite low and remained so for many years.  Usually, only the most desperate fellows volunteered for military service — and in some cases, joining the army was an alternative to going to jail.

After the Napoleonic Wars (1799 – 1815), public opinion improved due to the well-publicized heroic actions of soldiers and their officers.  During this period, medals were only awarded to high-ranking officers and members of the aristocracy for services rendered to the Crown.

The first British Army Medal (B.A.M.) awarded to ordinary soldiers was the Waterloo Medal, issued between 1816 – 1817.  The B.A.M. was awarded to every soldier who could prove that they were present during the campaign against Napoleon in which the British Army, alongside their Dutch and German allies, suffered while performing feats of heroism.  The medal was unique for two reasons: (a) it was the first of its kind, and (b) each soldier or officer who received it had their name stamped into the medal.

Even though 39,000 medals were issued, the B.A.M. received mixed reactions among the senior officers and N.C.O.s who had not been present at Waterloo; they, instead, fought the War of 1812 in the United States/Canada and the Spanish Peninsula campaign.  In subsequent years, this particular controversy resulted in B.A.M. awards as a matter of routine whenever troops were sent to battle, no matter where in the world it was.

After gaining the approval of Queen Victoria and Parliament, the Ministry of Defense agreed to create a Military General Service Medal in 1847.  The process required the men to apply for the medal if they thought they thought themselves entitled to wear it. Not many men applied for the medal because not many men were literate enough to know what to do. The government only issued 26,000 medals. 

In the following decade, the government struck a dozen different medals: The Indian General Service Medal (1854), the Victoria Cross (after the Crimean War) — a gallantry medal awarded to men of any class or service for acts of heroism in the face of the enemy at risk of death.  There is no higher recognition for courage under fire in the United Kingdom than the V.C.

The Victoria Cross is a simple design, the prototype of which was a product of the London jeweler Hancocks & Company.  Hancocks still make the V.C.  Legend tells us that the medal prototype and the first 111 crosses came from the bronze guns captured by the Russians in Crimea.  Since its creation, the Crown has issued 1,356 Victorian Cross Medals.

During the twentieth century, the British Army witnessed bloody action in both the First and Second World Wars.  Each conflict produced a unique series of campaign and service medals.  There was the 1914 – 1915 Star, the British War Medal, and Victory Medal for those fighting in the First World War.  The government awarded 2.3 million medals to frontline soldiers and support personnel, including Royal Navy and Canadian service members.

After World War II, the men serving in that conflict received a unique version of the general service medal, the 1939 – 1945 Star, worn alongside appropriate medals and campaign ribbons.  For example, those in the North African campaign received the African Star.  If they also served during the Italian Campaign or on D-Day, the appropriate specific awards to wear alongside it.  Commonwealth soldiers (Indian, Australian, Canadian, and South African) received proper recognition alongside their other entitlements.

The Americans

In the U.S. military, the history of personal decorations and awards is not part of the curriculum in basic training.  Military medals have had an important role in its history, but it is also rarely discussed.  Military personnel wear their decorations and awards with pride and reflect on them: they are symbols of a demanding job well done and trigger memories of good men, pulling together, and perhaps also lost forever —but they don’t brag about those medals.

Military personnel understand the difference between Decorations and Awards — most civilians do not.  Among civilians with no military service connection, there is no difference between decorations and awards, but they are two vastly different things.  A presented decoration recognizes specific acts of bravery or achievement.  An award or service medal confirms service in a particular role or geographical area (campaign) and citations issued by foreign governments and approved by the U.S. government.

Typically, a U.S. medal is struck with a design to commemorate an event.  It is a creative process involving various methods — including pressure stamping.  In the past, bronze, silver, and gold were used, but most U.S. military medals today are made of various alloys.  Modern medals are nothing like the medal invented by Antonio di Puccio Pisano in 1438.  This process remained exclusively in Italy until the 16th Century when it spread to other European nations.

In the American colonies, the oldest military decoration was the Fidelity Medallion, created by the Continental Congress in 1780 and presented to those who captured British Major John André — the officer who worked with Benedict Arnold to betray the colonies.

The Congress conferred the Fidelity Medallion on three soldiers who were members of the New York militia: Privates Isaac Van Wart, David Williams, and John Paulding.  The medal was never again awarded — and it is for this reason that the first United States (as opposed to Continental) medal awarded was the Badge of Military Merit, created in 1782.  In the new egalitarian America, it is also significant that the first medals awarded to American troops were awarded to enlisted men, not officers.[1]

On 7 August 1782, General George Washington designed the Badge of Military Merit.  It was a cloth or silk figure of a heart, recognizing meritorious or gallant conduct.  But it was General Washington who instigated the practice of awards of recognition, and only three men received this decoration: (a) Sergeant Elijah Churchill: 2nd Regiment, Light Dragoons.  He was awarded the badge for his part in two successful raids behind British lines in Nov. 1780 and in October of 1781.  (b) Sergeant William Brown: 5th Connecticut Regiment. Awarded the badge for leading an advance party — with only bayonets — penetrating the British lines at Yorktown, VA on 14 October 1781, and (c) Sergeant Daniel Bissell: 2nd Connecticut Regiment. Awarded the badge for masquerading as a British soldier from August 1781 to September 1782.[2]  Again, all three recipients were enlisted men — and the design was the forerunner of the modern Purple Heart Medal.

Between General Washington’s Merit Badge and the American Civil War, government officials issued certificates of merit and “brevet promotions” to recognize courageous conduct and meritorious service.  The first military decoration formally authorized by the United States government to symbolize valorous conduct was the Medal of Honor, approved for enlisted men of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.  President Lincoln signed the authorization on 21 December 1861.  In July 1862, Congress approved a Medal of Honor suitable for the U.S. Army (and Volunteer Army of the United States).

One should recall that the early American colonists migrated from England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. When they went to the New World, they took with them their long-held cultural values and traditions.  Among these was a general loathing for standing armies and the profession of arms.  See also: Citizen Soldier and the American Militia.  The reason for their profound contempt for the military was simple enough: British soldiers were instruments of government tyranny — a view reinforced throughout the American Revolutionary War.  This distrust of standing armies lasted from 1775 through 1941.

At the beginning of the American Civil War, the Union Army was comparatively small.  To build an armed force capable of defending the Union, it was necessary to augment it with federalized state militias.  Recruiting men to serve in the Civil War was no easier in 1861 than in 1776, and it became even more difficult once the knowledge of the horror of combat made its way into America’s living rooms.

Thus, the civil war gave the U.S. Congress two good reasons for instituting an American decoration for valor.  The first was the obvious: to honor American servicemen for their sacrifices.  The second reason was to incentivize enlisting in the Army — every romantic young man wants to become a hero.  The Navy was the first to adopt the Medal of Honor because it was the one service facing the gravest shortage of skilled crewmen.

Congress’s authorization for the Medal of Honor made certain stipulations.  Only acts of gallantry performed during the present conflict —the Civil War— would be recognized, and the Secretary of the Navy’s authorization was limited to two-hundred medals.

A new authorization signed in 1862 gave the Navy much more room for maneuver when it came to awarding the Medal of Honor and even authorized further rewards for committed, intrepid seamen. Now, a Sailor could earn a promotion by way of “extraordinary heroism” rather than wait until he aged into a higher rank, the usual practice. And now, unlike under the 1861 act, a Sailor could receive this promotion and a Medal of Honor for acts of heroism performed “in the line of his profession” and not necessarily in a combat situation. The first Medals of Honor struck resulted from this second act — of 1862.

The Purple Heart Medal

When Gen. John J. Pershing and the American Expeditionary Force arrived in Europe in 1917, the only existing American decoration was the Medal of Honor.  Pershing, his subordinate commanders, and the men of the rank and file soon became acutely aware that the British and French armies had a variety of military decorations and medals to recognize valorous service.

By the end of the First World War, the Army and Navy had developed additional medals to recognize exceptional heroism that does not meet the test of the Medal of Honor: The Navy Distinguished Service Medal, Navy Cross and Army Distinguished Service Medal, and Army Distinguished Service Cross.

These new medals (while giving much-deserved recognition to many servicemen) also required a high degree of combat heroism or meritorious service, and a few civilian and military leaders in Washington believed another decoration was needed — one that could be used to reward individuals of more junior rank for their valuable wartime services.

In the 1920s, the War Department studied the issue.  A few officers with knowledge of George Washington’s dormant Badge of Military Merit recommended that the merit medal be resurrected and renamed the Order of Military Merit.  Further, they suggested that the medal be awarded to any soldier in recognition of heroism not performed in actual combat or exceptionally meritorious service.

Ultimately, no action was taken on these proposals for another ten years — until General Douglas MacArthur assumed the office of Army Chief of Staff.  He revived interest in the merit medal by writing to Charles Moore, Chairman of the Commission of Fine Arts.  He informed Moore that the Army intended to revive General Washington’s old award on the bicentennial of his birth.

As a result, on 22 February 1932, the War Department published General Order No. 3 announcing that “the Purple Heart, established by General George Washington in 1782,” would be awarded to persons who, while serving in the Army of the United States, performs any singularly meritorious act of extraordinary fidelity or essential service.” Then, within a single parenthetical, the Army included this sentence: “A wound, which necessitates treatment by a medical officer, and which is received in action with an enemy of the United States, or as a result of an act of such enemy, may . . . be construed as resulting from a singularly meritorious act of essential service.”

This meant that the Purple Heart was an award for high-level service. But it also meant that an individual serving “in the Army” wounded in action could also receive the Purple Heart.  Not all wounds, however, qualified for the new decoration.  Rather, the wound had to be severe enough to necessitate medical treatment.

From 1932 until the outbreak of World War II, the Army awarded around 78,000 Purple Heart Medals to living veterans and active-duty soldiers who had either been wounded in action or had received General Pershing’s certificate for meritorious service during World War I.[3]

While the Army issued most Purple Heart Medals to men who had fought in France from 1917 to 1918, a small number of wounded soldiers from the Civil War, the Indian Wars, and the Spanish-American War applied for and received the Purple Heart.  However, there were no posthumous awards for this early edition of the Purple Heart Medal.  General MacArthur made it clear in 1938 the Purple Heart — like Washington’s Badge of Military Merit — was “not intended to commemorate the dead; it was to animate and inspire the living.”

After Imperial Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the deaths of thousands of soldiers in Hawaii and the Philippines, the War Department abandoned MacArthur’s “posthumous award” policy.  On April 28, 1942, the Army announced that the Purple Heart would be awarded to “members of the military services killed  (or who died of wounds) on or after December 7, 1941.”

This policy change only applied to those killed after the Japanese attack on Hawaii.  Posthumous awards of the Purple Heart for pre–World War II conflicts were still not permitted.  Five months later, the Army made another significant change in the award criteria for the Purple Heart: it restricted the award to combat wounds only.  

While MacArthur’s intent in reviving the Purple Heart in 1932 was that the new decoration would be for “any singularly meritorious act of extraordinary fidelity or essential service” (with combat wounds being a subset of such fidelity or service), the creation of the Legion of Merit in 1942 as a junior decoration for achievement or service meant that the Army did not need two medals to recognize the same thing.  As a result, the Purple Heart became a decoration for those wounded or killed in action.

One additional change in the evolution of the Purple Heart Medal was President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s decision on 3 December 1942 to allow the Secretary of the Navy to award the decoration to Sailors, Coast Guardsmen, and Marines.

The next significant change to the award criteria for the Purple Heart occurred during the presidency of John F. Kennedy.  When certain American service members in South Vietnam began being killed and wounded, they were deemed not eligible for the Purple Heart because they served in an advisory capacity (rather than as combatants).  Additionally, as a matter of law, the United States was not a formal participant in the ongoing war between the South Vietnamese, communist insurgents, and their North Vietnamese allies.  Thus, there was no “enemy” to satisfy the requirement of a wound or death received “in action against an enemy.”

President Kennedy signed an executive order on 25 April 1962 authorizing the Purple Heart Medal to any person killed or wounded “while serving with friendly foreign forces” or “as a result of action by a hostile foreign force.” By 1973, thousands more Americans had been awarded the Purple Heart.

Kennedy’s decision to expand the award criteria for the Purple Heart also meant that servicemen killed or wounded in lesser-known actions (such as the Israeli attack on the U.S.S. Liberty in 1967 and the North Korean seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo in 1968) could also receive the Purple Heart.

A successive change to the Purple Heart regulations occurred in February 1984 when President Ronald Reagan recognized the changing nature of war and signed an executive order announcing that the Purple Heart would recognize those killed or wounded as a result of an “international terrorist attack against the United States.” Reagan also decided that the Purple Heart should be awarded to individuals killed or wounded “outside the territory of the United States” while serving “as part of a peacekeeping mission.” President Reagan’s decision resulted in a small number of Americans receiving the Purple Heart who otherwise would have been denied the medal.

On 25 April 2011, the Department of Defense announced that the Purple Heart Medal could be awarded to any service member sustaining “mild traumatic brain injuries and concussive injuries” in combat.  This decision acknowledged that brain injuries caused by improvised explosive devices qualify as wounds, even though such damages may be invisible.  Awards for traumatic brain injury were retroactive to 11 September 2001, the day of Al Qaeda’s attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

On the issue of the severity of a brain injury, a serviceman or woman need not lose consciousness to qualify for the Purple Heart.  If a medical officer or health professional diagnoses concussive injury, and the “extent of the wound was such that it required treatment by a medical officer,” this is sufficient for the award of the Purple Heart.

One remaining issue is whether a Purple Heart is appropriate for someone with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (P.T.S.D.).  In 2008, after increasing numbers of men and women returning from service in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom were diagnosed as suffering from P.T.S.D., some commentators proposed awarding the Purple Heart for these psychological wounds.  After carefully studying the issue, the Defense Department concluded that having P.T.S.D. did not qualify a person for the Purple Heart because the disorder was not a “wound intentionally caused by the enemy — but rather a secondary effect caused by witnessing or experiencing a traumatic event.”

Endnotes:

[1] The Continental Congress did vote to award George Washington, Horatio Gates, and John Paul Jones with gold medallions in recognition of their efforts in defeating the British forces, but none of these were awarded until after the end of the Revolutionary War, in 1790.

[2] The information gathered by Sergeant Bissell helped the Continental Army prepare for an attack on the British in New York City.

[3] Printed certificates signed by Pershing that read “for exceptionally meritorious and conspicuous services.”

The Navy Cross

–And Posha

Introduction

Normally, a structure begins with a solid foundation, construed to mean “at ground level,” and works itself upward to its pinnacle.  The United States military awards system works just the opposite.  The current system begins at the pinnacle and works its way downward.  At the pinnacle of this system is the United States Medal of Honor.

The Medal of Honor is the nation’s highest military award for bravery, awarded by the President of the United States in the name of the United States Congress.  For this reason, the medal is often referred to as the Congressional Medal of Honor, but its official title is simply the Medal of Honor.  So far in its history, since its introduction in 1863, the Medal of Honor (also, MoH) has been awarded 3,512 times to 3,493 recipients.  Nineteen individuals have been double recipients of the award.  Since the award’s inception, the laws and regulations that apply to it have changed.  In some instances, the award has been rescinded.  Six rescinded awards have been reinstated.

On several occasions, legislation has been offered to waive certain restrictions — to encourage the President to award the Medal of Honor to particular individuals.  In the most general sense, this type of legislation is rarely enacted.  In limited number of cases, the medal has been awarded outside legal restrictions concerning time limits.  These cases are often based on technical errors, lost documents or eyewitness accounts, or other factors that justify reconsideration.  Such cases are an exception to the rule.

At the beginning

The tradition of recognizing American military men (later, women) dates to the American Revolution.  In the American colonies, the oldest military decoration was the Fidelity Medallion, created by the Continental Congress in 1780 and presented to the men responsible for capturing British Major John André — the officer who worked with Benedict Arnold to betray the colonies.

The recipients of the Fidelity Medallion were members of the New York militia: Privates Isaac Van Wart, David Williams, and John Paulding.  The medal was never again awarded — and it is for this reason that the first United States (as opposed to Continental) medal awarded was the Badge of Military Merit, created in 1782.  In the new egalitarian America, it is also significant that the first medals were awarded to enlisted men, not officers.[1]

On 7 August 1782, General George Washington designed the Badge of Military Merit.  It was a cloth or silk figure of a heart, recognizing meritorious or gallant conduct.  But credit for instigating the practice of awards recognition belongs to George Washington. Only three men received this hand-made decoration: (a) Sergeant Elijah Churchill: 2nd Regiment, Light Dragoons.  He was awarded the badge for his part in two successful raids behind British lines in Nov. 1780 and in October of 1781.  (b) Sergeant William Brown: 5th Connecticut Regiment. Awarded the badge for leading an advance party — with only bayonets — penetrating the British lines at Yorktown, VA on 14 October 1781, and (c) Sergeant Daniel Bissell: 2nd Connecticut Regiment. Awarded the badge for masquerading as a British soldier from August 1781 to September 1782.[2]  Again, all three recipients were enlisted men — and this design, by General Washington, became the forerunner of the modern Purple Heart Medal.

Between General Washington’s Merit Badge and the American Civil War, government officials issued certificates of merit and “brevet promotions” to recognize courageous conduct and meritorious military service.  Thus, the first military decoration formally authorized by the United States government to symbolize valorous conduct was the Medal of Honor, approved for enlisted men of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.  President Lincoln signed the authorization on 21 December 1861.  In July 1862, Congress approved a Medal of Honor suitable for the U.S. Army (and Volunteer Army of the United States).[3]

During the Civil War, more than 2,000 Medals of Honor were issued.  Allegations of fraud and shady politics in the award of the medal led to a review of all those issued to Army members prior to 1917.  A commission of five retired general officers determined that 911 of the medals had been improperly awarded.  Those awards included medals given to members of the 27th Maine Regiment for reenlisting during the Civil War, along with those presented to members of the Presidential Honor Guard at Lincoln’s funeral.  Also included was the only MoH awarded to a woman: Mary Walker, a union surgeon.[4]

Fifty-four years after the creation of the Medal of Honor (1861), at a time when the Medal of Honor was the only U.S. award for valor, officials of the Navy Department and War Department understood that servicemen were still behaving with extreme courage on the battlefield, but simply not to the level expected of the Medal of Honor.  For this reason, the Navy and Army developed additional decorations designed to recognize battlefield bravery of a lesser standard than that of the Medal of Honor.

In the Navy, officials ordered the creation of the Navy Distinguished Service Medal as second in line to the Medal of Honor and the Navy Cross Medal as third in line.  Army officials approved the Army Distinguished Service Medal and the Army Distinguished Service Cross.  In 1942, the precedence of these awards was reversed so that the Navy Cross and Army Distinguished Service Cross became the second highest awards, followed by the Distinguished Service medals as the third highest awards. 

Within the Navy Department, the Navy Cross was created to recognize valorous sailors and Marines whose performance would not qualify them for thenation’ss highest award.[5]    The Navy Cross, designed by James Earle Fraser, has been awarded 6,300 times.  Since 2001, the Navy Cross has been awarded 47 times — in two instances, the name of its recipient was classified secret.

The Navy Cross may be awarded to any member of the U.S. Armed Forces while serving with the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard (when serving under the Navy Department) who distinguish themselves by extraordinary heroism, not justifying an award of the Medal of Honor.  Such actions must take place under one of three sets of circumstances:

  1. In combat action, while engaged against an enemy of the United States; or,
  2. In combat action, while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force; or,
  3. In combat action while serving with friendly foreign forces, who are engaged in armed conflict in which the United States is not a belligerent party.

The act(s) of heroism must be performed in the presence of great danger or at great personal risk and must be performed in such a manner as to render the individual’s action(s) highly conspicuous among others of equal grade, rate, experience, or position of responsibility.  An accumulation of minor acts of heroism does not justify an award of the Navy Cross.

One of the recipients was a war dog handler —

William B. Soutra is a son of Worcester, Massachusetts.  When he joined the U.S. Marine Corps, he became the third generation of his family to serve as a Devil Dog.  William, who everyone calls Billy, did more than serve his country; he made history.

Soutra’s plan was simple enough.  He wanted to sign on the dotted line, enlist for a few years, do some growing up, and then return home with all kinds of stories to tell.  Once he was in the Corps, he wanted to do more than the average Marine (as if being a superhero isn’t enough excitement).  What Billy wanted to do is become a K-9 handler.

It was a tough program to get into, but Soutra managed it.  He initially worked with police dog breeds on basic patrol and scout work.  In 2006, the war was ramping up, and the Marines needed more dog handlers.  Following basic training, the Marine Corps selected Soutra to attend the specialized search dog (SSD) course, which at the time was a new frontier — its demand was the result of a new threat everyone was calling an Improvised Explosive Device (I.E.D.).  It was a competitive selection, and Soutra made the cut.

In February 2007, Soutra was posted to Security Battalion, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, CA.  His first dog post-graduation was a Belgian Malinois (also, Belgian Shepherd).  The team would deploy together in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  They performed combat patrols in Fallujah.  The dog, named Dina, was highly protective and intelligent.  She responded to hand signals from Soutra.  In 2008, Billy and Dina returned to Camp Pendleton.  Dina was seven years old; she was ready for retirement.

His next dog was a completely black male German Shepherd named Posha.  His reputation was aggressive and fearless; he didn’t play nice with the other animals.  Posha was an Alpha Male. During their deployment to Iraq in 2009, Soutra and Posha’s teamwork was so precise and seamless that, in a rare event, the Marines meritoriously promoted Soutra to Sergeant and, by extension, Posha to Staff Sergeant.

As the Marine Corps was in the process of developing three Military Working Dog platoons, there was an immediate need for Soutra and Posha, which in 2010 took the team to Company B, 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion supporting Operation Enduring Freedom.  While patrolling with Afghan Commandos in Helmand Province, Soutra’s unit became pinned down by a complex ambuscade initiated by an I.E.D. that mortally wounded Soutra’s element leader, a staff sergeant.  In the following actions, Sergeant Soutra distinguished himself, earning the nation’s second-highest decoration for heroism on the battlefield.

With the team leader incapacitated, Soutra immediately assumed command of the element and, with complete disregard for his own life, moved across the open terrain to each commando’s position, orienting them and directing their fires upon the enemy.

Under intense fire, Soutra fearlessly moved forward with the team Corpsman to reach the fallen element leader.  While the Corpsman rendered aid, Sergeant Soutra placed a tourniquet on a severely wounded commando nearby and pulled him to safety.  Repeatedly exposing himself to enemy fire, he again moved from position to position to orient and direct friendly fire and accurately relay enemy information to supporting aircraft overhead. Professionally and calmly, Soutra enabled coordinated a successful evacuation of the casualties, personally carrying one of the wounded men 75 meters to safety.

Nearly 70 minutes later, Sergeant Soutra rallied the platoon and maneuvered them safely out of the kill zone, with Posha remaining at his side throughout the actions.  It was Soutra’s decisive leadership, his exceptional courage in the face of heavy enemy fire, and his complete dedication to duty that earned him the Navy Cross.

Official military news releases use phrases such as — “moving exposed down the line,” and “rushed into the kill zone,” and “flurries of insurgent machine gun and mortar fire.”  But when Soutra speaks of this period, he mostly speaks of his combat partner. He’ll even tell you that Posha owns half of that Navy Cross.  According to Soutra, “Posha made me the Marine I am today.”

Sergeant Soutra cannot say enough good things about Posha.  “During all of the gunfire, as we moved into the firefight, he didn’t hesitate, he didn’t cower, he did everything exactly when and how I did it for two straight days.  If he had faltered or balked at any point, it could have been different.”  He added, “He always reacted the same way. He saved my life.”

While Posha made it through the second combat deployment, he later succumbed to cancer and was euthanized in 2011.  His loss was particularly difficult for Billy Soutra.  In 2012, Soutra said, “It’s been a year now, but it still hurts when I think about how he got cancer and had to be put down.”

Posha’s ashes rest in an urn at a place ofSoutra’st Soutra’s bedside.  If Soutra has his way, his German Shepherd hero, now buried in his heart, will one day be buried with him — so that they’ll always be together.

Semper Fi, Posha.

Endnotes:

[1] The Continental Congress did vote to award George Washington, Horatio Gates, and John Paul Jones with gold medallions in recognition for their efforts in defeating the British forces, but none of these were awarded until after the end of the Revolutionary War, in 1790.

[2] The information gathered by Sergeant Bissell helped the Continental Army prepare for an attack on the British in New York City.

[3] Navy and Marine Corps officers were not eligible to receive the Medal of Honor until 1915.

[4] Later restored.

[5] Many European nations had a well-established custom of decorating servicemen for various levels of courage in the face of the enemy.