Category: Korea

Second Battle of the Naktong Bulge

Background

When North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) forces invaded the Republic of South Korea (ROK), they did so with superiority in both manpower and equipment.  The NKPA benefitted from the training, arms, and equipment provided by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).  North Korea’s President Kim Il-sung took his orders directly from Joseph Stalin.

The NKPA’s mission was to aggressively pursue United Nations forces and the fledgling ground forces of the Republic of South Korea, attacking them frontally and from the flanks until they had surrounded and destroyed all resistance.[1]  The strategy worked well enough in the first three months of their invasion; between 25 June and late August 1950, the NKPA continually attacked, mauled, and demoralized ROC and UN forces, pushing them ever southward to what became the Pusan Perimeter.  As numerically inferior ROC and UN forces withdrew southward in an often disorderly manner, they left behind their dead, their wounded, and their “missing in action.”  They also abandoned critical wartime equipment, which the NKPA later used against the Allied forces.

When the NKPA approached the Pusan Perimeter, however, their frontal attacks were only marginally successful; envelopment operations were even less so.  It was from within the Pusan Perimeter that UN forces, primarily the United States Army with only token participation by UN and NATO allies, began the process of reorganization, reinforcement, and resupply.[2]

See also: First Battle of the Naktong Bulge.

Following the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge, Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, commanding the U.S. Eighth Army, assigned the defense of the Naktong Line to the inexperienced Second U.S. Infantry Division (2 ID).[3]  His decision made 2 ID the main target of several enemy infantry divisions.  The NKPA intended to split 2 ID, thus rendering it incapable of massed resistance.  The NKPA’s success enabled the communists to penetrate Yongsan.

A Second Battle Evolves

The 5th Marine’s earlier assault upon the NKPA 4th Infantry Division at the cloverleaf rendered that division ineffective as a combat force.  Similarly, US Army units pushed the NKPA 6th Infantry Division back across the Naktong River.  In the Taegu region of South Korea in late August, three U.S. divisions repulsed five enemy infantry/armored divisions.  The main battles in this engagement included the Battle of Masan, the Battle of Chindong-ni, the Battle of Komam-ni, the Battle of the Mountain, and the Battle of the Bowling Alley, which rendered the NKPA 13th Infantry Division ineffective.  On South Korea’s east coast, ROK infantry divisions pushed back three additional NKPA divisions at Pohang-dong.  [Pictured: Captain Francis Ike Fenton, Jr., Commanding Officer, Company B 1/5 August 1950 (titled: The face of war).][4]

Reeling from the American assault, the enemy commander decided to reinitiate offensive operations.  Still, in light of the U.S. Navy’s lethal naval gunfire support to ground forces, they avoided future flanking movements.  Instead, the NKPA opted for a series of frontal assaults to breach the U.S. perimeter.  The communists reasoned that it was their only hope of achieving victory.

Supplied with intelligence from the USSR, the NKPA was well aware that MacArthur’s U.N. command was building up its forces within the Pusan Perimeter.  The defeat of these new units was critical to the NKPA’s overall success in pushing the Americans into the Sea of Japan.  Moreover, to achieve a final victory, the NKPA would have to surround Taegu and destroy all UN/US forces defending it.  Cutting the main supply route (MSR) into Taegu would be critical to achieving that objective.

The NKPA plan called for a five-pronged assault.  In the center, the 9th, 4th, 2nd, and 10th NKPA divisions would overwhelm 2 ID at the Naktong Bulge and seize Miryang and Yongsan.  The attack would commence on September 1, 1950.

On September 1, the 35th Regiment (25 ID) engaged the enemy in the Battle of the Nam River, north of Masan.  On the 35th’s right was the 9th Regiment (part of 2 ID).  The 9th occupied a front extending over 18,000 meters (11.2 miles), which included a portion of the Naktong Bulge.  Each regiment’s rifle company had a defensive front of 910 to 1,220 meters, but in reality, these units only held the key hills and observation points.  The area assigned to the 9th Regiment was unrealistic, far exceeding its defense capability.  The regiment had been observing enemy activity to their front for several days.  The regimental operations officer assumed that the NKPA was reinforcing their defensive positions.  One indication of likely lethal action was when civilian laborers supporting the NKPA fled the front lines.

The NKPA 9th Infantry Division intended to outflank and destroy the US army at the Naktong Bulge by capturing Miryang and Samnang-jin.  This action would cut off 2 ID’s MSR and escape route between Taegu and Pusan.  The NKPA also planned to attack 24 ID, an organization the North Koreans knew was exhausted after several weeks of fighting.  Unknown to the North Koreans, the American 2 ID replaced 24 ID on the line.  On the night of August 31, elements of the NKPA 9th began crossing the Naktong River.

The soldiers of 2 ID were fresh — but most of the men were inexperienced and without a clue about what would happen when the enemy attacked.  The NKPA overran the young troopers amid green flares and shrill whistles and pushed many of them to the 25 ID line.   

Another call for the Fire Brigade

“The Pusan perimeter is like a weakened dike; the Army intends to use us to plug the holes as they open.  We’re a brigade —a fire brigade.  It will be costly fighting against a numerically superior enemy.  Marines have never lost a battle; this brigade will not be the first to establish such a precedent.  Prepare to move.”  — Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, USMC.

By September 1, less than thirty days from the beginning of their fight, the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade (1stMarBde) was down to around 4,300 men; in less than 30 days, the Marines had taken 500 casualties.  Word had come down to the Brigade Commander, Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, that the Marines would come off the line.  They were needed elsewhere.  No one in the ranks knew where, exactly, and no one asked, but it would have to be better than the Pusan Perimeter.  Craig knew what was coming — as did General Douglas A. MacArthur and Major General Oliver P. Smith, USMC.  However, preparations for moving the Marines came to a halt early in the morning of September 1, 1950.

The following day, the 1st and 2nd Regiments of the NKPA (9th Infantry Division) stood a few miles short of Yongsan.  Facing them were the shattered remains of Easy Company, 2nd Battalion, US 9th.  There were no other UN/US troops to defend Yongsan.  The 2 ID commander, Major General Lawrence B. Keiser, had formed ad hoc units from his support troops to shore up Easy Company.  Still, it would not be enough to withstand a further assault by the enemy division.

In Tokyo, Major General Doyle O. Hickey, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, United Nations Far East Command, wanted to know when General Walker intended to release the Marines for further assignment.  In his answer, General Walker described the situation: “The 2nd ID has been shattered, and the ground between what remained of it, and the 25 ID line, is in grave peril.”  Walker said he did not think he could save the 2nd ID without the Marines.  MacArthur approved Walker’s further use of the 1stMarBde, and they soon became attached to General Keiser’s command.[5]

 Subsequently, Walker ordered Keiser to destroy enemy units east of the Naktong River and restore the 2 ID main line of resistance (MLR).  Walker informed Keiser and Craig that he would release the Marines as soon as Keiser accomplished that mission.  Following a council of war between the Eighth Army, 2 ID, and 1stMarBde on September 2, a decision was taken to mount a counterattack the next morning.  The 5th Marines would commence its attack to the west at 08:00 on September 3, astride the Yongsan-Naktong Road.  Army units would attack northwest from a position above the Marines and attempt to tie in with the 23rd Regiment.  On the Marines’ left, what remained of the 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion, 1/9th, and the 72nd Tank Battalion would attack south to reestablish contact with 25 ID.

Marines were scheduled to relieve George and Fox companies 2/9th and 2nd Combat Engineers at 0300 and 0430 on September 3.  The second battalion, 5th Marines (2/5) under Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise, assembled north of Yongsan.  Lieutenant Colonel George R. Newton’s 1/5 assembled south of Yongsan.  Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett’s 3/5 provided area security southwest of Yongsan, covering the enemy’s likely avenues of approach.  Fighting began during the night of September 2-3, with Marines gaining high ground to serve as their line of departure.  With the help of Marine tank fire, G 2/5 overcame heavy NKPA resistance, but the fight delayed a coordinated advance of the two line battalions.  The Marines “jumped off” at 0855 toward the NKPA high ground, one-half mile distant.

A coordinated assault by aircraft, artillery, and pissed-off Marine infantry caused NKPA forces in front of them to break off and withdraw.  Machine gun fire from 1/5 caught the NKPA reinforcements in the open and slaughtered them in the hundreds.  By noon, 1/5 possessed Hill 91.

North of the road, 2/5 had a more difficult time in their advance.  Heavy NKPA fire halted the Marines short of Hill 116, 2 miles west of Yongsan.  Owing to the Koreans’ stubborn resistance, the battle raged through most of the night, and D 1/5 found itself isolated in the cut between Hill 91 and Hill 116.  West of Yongsan, Marine tanks knocked out four T-34 tanks; a fifth tank was abandoned when the communist crew decided to seek employment elsewhere.  During the fight, 2/5 gave up 34 dead and 77 wounded.

Just before midnight on September 3, the CO 5th Marines (Colonel Murray) ordered Taplett to lead his 3/5 through Roise’s 2/5 and prepare for a resumption of the attack the following day.  That night, heavy rain brought an end to a perfectly crappy day for the Marines.  3/5 held up just short of 2/5’s rear.  By dawn, the sky was clear, and 2/5 continued its advance — at first, against little opposition.

At 0800, 2/5 resumed its advance north of the road and seized Hill 116.  During the night, under cover of dense rain, the NKPA 9th Division withdrew.  South of the road, 1/5 occupied what appeared to have been the enemy Division’s command post.  The Marines found abandoned tents and equipment, including two fully functional T-34 tanks.  Advancing Marines, supported by tanks, found enemy dead strewn all about.  By nightfall, the Marines had advanced another 5 kilometers.

On September 5, 1950, Murray called for preparatory artillery fire before the Marine’s third day in the assault.  The heavy rain soaked the Marines and placed them in the right frame of mind for intense combat.  The ground was soggy and slippery.  While slogging forward toward Obong-ni Ridge, the 9th Regiment moved into the cloverleaf where the battle had raged in the previous month.  At midmorning, after the Marines spotted the enemy digging in on the high ground ahead, they took positions between two hills.  At around 1430, 300 enemy infantry suddenly appeared from concealed positions inside the village of Tugok and fanatically charged the Marines of B 1/5.  Able Company, supporting Army artillery, and 81mm mortars repelled the attack, but not before Baker Company suffered 25 casualties. Pictured right, Navy Corpsmen aid wounded Marines.

As the NKPA began its assault on Company B, two T-34 tanks surprised and knocked out two of the Marine’s leading M-26 (Pershing) tanks.  Because the two wounded tanks blocked their field of fire, four other Marine tanks withdrew to better firing positions.  Tank assault teams from Company B took the T-34s under fire, destroying both, along with an enemy armored personnel carrier.

September 5 was a tough day for US forces.  Army units suffered 105 killed, 430 wounded, and 587 missing in action (1,119 total casualties.  Marine casualties were 35 dead and 91 wounded (126 total).  The Allied offensive of September 3-5 was one of the bloodiest battles of the Korean War.  It was a time when the enemy’s 4th and 9th Infantry Divisions ceased to exist as combat units.

Against his will, Lieutenant General Walker released the Marines late at night on September 4th; they began pulling out for Pusan just a little after midnight.  General MacArthur replaced the 5th Marine Regiment with two Army regiments: the 17th and 65th Infantry Regiments.  General Walker did not think two Army regiments were a suitable replacement for one understrength Marine regiment, but he had no further say in the matter.

The First Marine Brigade traveled to Japan and was absorbed into the 1st Marine Division.  In ten days, the men of the 5th Marine Regiment and Marine Aircraft Group 33 would participate in one of the world’s most spectacular and difficult amphibious landings.  They called it INCHON.

Sources:

  1. Alexander, B.  Korea: The First War We Lost.  Hippocrene Books, 2003.
  2. Blair, C., Jr.  The Forgotten War.  Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
  3. Fehrenbach, T. R.  This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness.  New York: Macmillan Co., 1963.
  4. Gugeler, R. A.  Combat Actions in Korea.  Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2005.
  5. Halberstam, D.  The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War.  New York, Hyperion Books, 2007.
  6. Malkasian, C.  The Korean War.  Osprey Publishing, 2001.
  7. Simmons, E. H.  The United States Marines: A History.  Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
  8. Tucker, S. C., ed.  Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History.  Santa Barbara: Checkmark Books, 2002.
  9. Varhola, M. J.  Fire and Ice: The Korean War, 1950-1953.  Mason City: Da Capo Press, 2000.

Endnotes:

[1] The United Nations Command (also UNC) is the multinational military force that supported the Republic of Korea during and after the Korean War (which, technically, is still underway).  As Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) and Commander of the United Nations Command, Douglas MacArthur commanded all Allied forces during the Korean War.

[2] U.S. logistical power provided the wherewithal for the beleaguered Army units to resist overwhelming North Korean forces and begin planning a counter-offensive.

[3] Walker (1889-1950) graduated from the USMA in 1907 and served in the First and Second World Wars and the early months of the Korean War.  While commanding the 8th US Army, Walker was killed in a jeep accident. 

[4] Captain (later Colonel Fenton) (1922-1998) was the son of Brigadier General Francis I. Fenton, Sr.  During the Battle of Okinawa, F. I. Fenton, Sr., served as the 1st Marine Division combat engineer.  It was during this battle that he learned that his youngest son, PFC Michael Fenton, serving as a scout sniper with Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, had been killed near Sugar Loaf Hill.

[5] This was the second time in Marine Corps history that Marines served with the U.S.  Second Infantry Division—the first time within the 4th Marine Brigade in World War I.

First Battle of the Naktong Bulge

Background

Late in 1945, President Harry S. Truman appointed Dean Gooderham Acheson (1893-1971) to serve as Undersecretary of State, a position Acheson retained through three successive cabinet secretaries of state.  In this role, Acheson was conciliatory toward the Soviet Union, a position he kept even through Joseph Stalin’s attempts to seize Eastern Europe and Southwest Asia.  It was only late in the game that Acheson “changed his thinking” and became more than an observer of the Cold War; he became its architect.

Due to the frequent absences of the Secretary of State, Undersecretary Dean Acheson often served as “Acting Secretary,” and this placed him in constant contact with the President.  Eventually, Acheson and Truman formed a close relationship, and Acheson became the author of President Truman’s containment policy (Truman Doctrine).  Undersecretary Acheson also directed the formulation of the US economic aid program to Europe, also known as the Marshall Plan.  Acheson and Truman both believed that the best way to curb the Soviet Union’s aggressive policies was to restore economic prosperity to Western Europe and encourage interstate cooperation.

Acheson became Secretary of State in 1949.  He refined the Truman Doctrine and became the primary designer of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  That summer, the press and political opposition began asking questions about Mao Zedong’s success in the Chinese Civil War.  Acheson prepared a 1,054-page report titled United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 — also known as the China White Paper.  Acheson argued that US intervention in China (1945-1947) was doomed to failure.  Whatever Acheson hoped to achieve in writing this voluminous document failed.  The American press blamed the Truman administration for the spread of communism in China — and they were probably right.

On January 12, 1950, Mr. Acheson appeared before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., to deliver a speech about the Cold War in East Asia.  In his speech, he carefully defined the so-called American Defense Perimeter as a warning to China and the Soviet Union that the United States was committed to its containment policy.  Acheson said that the defense perimeter in the Pacific extended as a line running through Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines.  He neglected to mention the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China (Taiwan), which signaled to the Chinese and Soviets that the United States would not guarantee the security of either.  In the minds of many, the United States had betrayed the Koreans and Taiwanese.  In a little over six months, in the early morning hours of 25 June 1950, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) launched a full-scale invasion of South Korea.  They were backed, trained, supplied, and advised by the Soviet Union.

The timing of the North Korean attack could not have been better.  In June 1950, Truman’s Defense policies had almost completely dismantled the United States military.  Truman’s demobilization of the armed forces substantially reduced the number of combat-experienced soldiers assigned to forward units.  The Army’s forward-most combat unit was the US 24th Infantry Division (24 ID), stationed in Japan as part of the post-war occupation force.  Truman’s cuts had reduced the 24 ID to about fifty percent of its wartime strength.

The Commanding General of the 24 ID was Major General William F. Dean.  Most of the men assigned to this division were poorly trained conscripts.  Their combat equipment was obsolete, poorly maintained, and barely operable.  In the entire infantry division, General Dean had one combat-ready battalion.

The 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment (1/21), under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith, consisted of two reinforced rifle companies and an artillery battery (540 men).[1]  Designated Task Force Smith, the Army promptly dispatched 2/21 to Taejon, South Korea.  From Taejon, Smith was to proceed to Osan to confront North Korea’s 75,000-man invasion force.  Smith’s mission was to block advancing North Korean forces until the rest of 24 ID could be organized and dispatched to South Korea.[2]

General Dean’s orders to Smith were, “When you get to Pusan, head for Taejon.  Block the main road as far north as possible.  Establish contact with [Brigadier] General [John H.] Church.[3]  If you can’t find him, go to Taejon and beyond if you can.  Sorry, I can’t give you more information — that’s all I’ve got.”

As Smith’s task force began moving north to Osan, Major General Dean flew into the Taejon airfield to take charge of the 24 ID’s advance element; the US 34th Infantry Regiment soon followed to reinforce Task Force Smith.  Dean determined to hold the NKPA advance at Osan.  He assigned Brigadier General George B. Barth, the Division’s artillery commander, to assume overall command of Task Force Smith.

At Task Force Smith’s point of contact with the enemy on July 3, Smith’s six 105mm howitzers unleashed a barrage upon the enemy’s lead T-34 tanks.  Since none of his artillery munitions were powerful enough to stop the Russian-built tanks, Smith’s effort had no effect on the advancing NKPA.  It was only when Smith’s howitzers fired High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) rounds at point-blank range that they had any impact on the Russian tanks.  Still, it wasn’t enough to stop the advance of an NKPA infantry regiment following behind the tanks, and Smith’s position was quickly overrun.  When 1/21’s untrained troops ran out of ammunition, an orderly withdrawal soon turned into a massive foot race to the rear.

Smith did accomplish his mission, however.  He delayed the NKPA advance for about two hours.  The reinforced battalion of 540 men suffered 60 dead, 21 wounded, 82 captured (32 of whom died in captivity),[4], and around 150 temporarily displaced stragglers during the route.

After the defeat of Task Force Smith, MajGen Dean ordered the US 34th to implement delaying tactics south of Osan, but it too suffered a defeat at Pyongtaek.  Upset by the regiment’s poor performance, General Dean fired the regimental commander, Colonel J. B. Loveless, and replaced him with a friend of Dean’s, Colonel Robert R. Martin.  Dean ordered Martin to stop the NKPA at Chonan.  The following day, Dean and General Walker visited Chonan to inspect the regiment and observe the battle’s outcome.  They found Colonel Martin dead, the regiment defeated, and its survivors in disarray.  Dean ordered the remnants of the regiment to withdraw to the Kum River and directed the two remaining battalions of the 21st Regiment to conduct a delaying action.

On 12 July, MajGen Dean ordered his three regiments (19th, 34th, and 21st) to cross the Kum River, destroy all bridges behind them, and establish a defensive line around Taejon.  The 19th Regiment had 2,276 men; the 34th had around 2,020; after suffering 1,433 casualties, the 21st Regiment could field 1,100 men.  Dean had an additional 2,007 men in his artillery units.  Between 13-16 July, the 24 ID suffered an additional 650 casualties as two NKPA infantry divisions pushed the Americans out of Taejon city, block by block.

On 20 July, Major General Dean ordered the 34th Regiment to withdraw while he remained behind to help evacuate wounded men.  Dean took command of the rear element of the withdrawal, which enemy forces ambushed.  Dean, having been separated from his command, was ultimately taken prisoner.  General Church assumed command of the division.

Naktong

The Naktong River curves westward opposite the town of Yongsan in a wide semicircular loop.  For most of this loop, the river’s width is around 400 meters, and its depth averages six feet.  Military troops can wade across rivers, but it is a grueling task given bottom silt and currents.  A depth of six feet is too deep for fording vehicles.

24 ID occupied an area 16 miles long adjacent to the Naktong River.  The division’s perimeter consisted of lightly defended observation posts on the surrounding high ground.  The killing ground between the river and eastward hills was suitable for pre-registered artillery and mortar fire.  Still, the understrength division was too widely dispersed to allow for interlocking fields of small arms and automatic weapons fire.  The 34th Regiment occupied the southern half, west of Yongsan, and the 21st Regiment occupied the northern half, west of Changyong.  General Church placed the 19th Regiment in reserve.  On August 5, 1950, the division’s total strength was 14,540.

During the night of August 5-6, an 800-man KPA force crossed the river undetected near Yongsan.  Another force attempted to cross the river further north, but the Americans detected them,  pummeled them, and forced them back.  North Koreans engaged 3/34 at around 0200, forcing the battalion to abandon its command post and establish secondary positions.  The attack threatened to split 24 ID.

1/34 was dispatched to reclaim the lost ground but was ambushed enroute.  The Korean force penetrated three miles east of the Naktong, halfway to Yongsan.  Several units of the 34th began a retreat northward into the lines of the 21st, but General Church ordered them to turn around.  The 19th launched a counter-attack along the 34th Regiment’s northern flank, trapping three hundred North Korean soldiers in a nearby village, killing most of them.  While the 19th and elements of the 34th managed to push enemy forces back, the NKPA stubbornly held onto their bridgehead.  During the night of August 6-7, the North Koreans made several attempts to cross the river.  South Korean (ROK) forces repulsed one attempt, but the NKPA succeeded in another.

24 ID continued counter-attacking on August 7, but their gains were slow, hampered by a determined enemy, extremely high temperatures, and a shortage of drinking water.  The NKPA pressed to regain territory adjacent to Oblong-ni, to them, critical terrain that sat astride the main road in the Naktong bulge.  Late that afternoon, the US 9th Regiment reinforced 24 ID.  The 9th Regiment was a fresh, well-equipped regiment, but its men needed combat experience.  Nevertheless, a vigorous attack enabled the American Army to reclaim part of Cloverleaf Hill before being held off by a well-entrenched enemy.

The battle continued to rage on August 7-8 as the NKPA attempted to send two additional battalions across the river.  The 21st Regiment repulsed this enemy.  Undeterred, however, the NKPA relocated their battalions south, where they successfully crossed the river at the bridgehead.  By mid-morning on August 8, a full enemy regiment was poised to assault the American positions.  North Korean gains were expensive to both sides, but neither side was able to achieve a decisive advantage over the other.

Meanwhile, the NKPA had constructed an underwater bridge of sandbags, logs, and rocks to move trucks, heavy artillery, additional infantry, and tanks across the river.  On August 10, the North Koreans had two fully resupplied regiments across the Naktong and occupied fortified positions.

General Church assembled a large force under Colonel John G. Hill, Commanding the 9th Regiment.  Dubbed Task Force Hill, Colonel Hill commanded elements of the 9th, 19th, 21st, and 34th regiments, with supporting artillery.  Hill’s mission was to drive the NKPA from the east river bank on August 11.  While Hill organized his assault force, the NKPA 4th Division moved southward, outflanking Task Force Hill. 

General Walker realized that the upcoming fight would be desperate.  To strengthen the 24th Infantry Division, General Walker ordered the recently arrived 2nd and 24th Infantry Divisions to tie in with Church’s beleaguered division.  Meanwhile, General Church began forming provisional infantry units from his supply and maintenance units.  On August 13, the 23rd and 27th Regiments were able to push NKPA troops out of Yongsan.  Early in the morning of August 14, Colonel Hill launched an assault against the North Korean cloverleaf defenses.  A series of attacks and counterattacks continued for most of the day, and both sides took many casualties.

Hill’s force could not penetrate the NKPA defenses.  The number of officers killed threatened the effectiveness of the assault units, and there were significant disruptions to unit communications.  By the end of the next day, the fight had become one of attrition.  Frustrated, General Walker turned to the United States Marines.

How Battles Are Won

Truman’s inept post-World War II demobilization of the Armed Forces affected the smaller Marine Corps in greater proportion than any of the other services, mainly because Truman detested the idea of maintaining a Marine Corps and had no tolerance for doing so.  A Marine Corps wasn’t necessary, he argued.  The United States already had the Army.  Nor did Truman or his Defense Secretary, Louis Johnson, think America needed a Navy; they had the Air Force.  Secretary Johnson informed the Chief of Naval Operations that the Navy was obsolete.  That argument fell apart early in the morning of June 25, 1950.

On 25 June 1950, the 1st Marine Division was in cadre status; the division had one under-strength infantry regiment (the 5th Marines) and a substantially reduced number of supporting units.  Instead of three battalions, the 5th Marine Regiment had only two.  Each battalion had two rifle companies (rather than three), a reduced weapons company, and half of what was needed for a fully supportive headquarters and service company.  The regiment’s combat equipment was left over from the Second World War.

If there was a miracle surrounding the early part of the Korean War, it was that the Marines at Camp Pendleton could form a combat brigade and set sail for Korea within forty days.  To achieve this miracle, the Marines undertook two massive efforts between 25 June and 3 August: (1) Form, equip, and transport a lethal 4,700-man combat brigade across the Pacific Ocean to Pusan, South Korea, and (2) the Marines reactivated, staffed, trained, and reequipped the 1st Marine Division for service in Korea.  To achieve these goals, the Marine Corps reduced its support establishment by two-thirds, activated the Marine Corps Reserve, and shifted seven thousand Marines from East Coast units to Camp Pendleton, California.

The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (1stMarBde) was activated on July 7 and sailed within a week for Pusan, arriving on August 3.  Brigadier General Edward A. Craig commanded the brigade, which consisted of the under-strength 5th Marine Regiment and Provisional Marine Aircraft Group-33.[5]  Upon arrival in Korea, General Craig reported to the CG 8th US Army, LtGen Walker.

The 1stMarBde went into action on the day of its arrival in Korea.  Walker assigned the Marines to reinforce the 25 ID and the Army’s 5th Regimental Combat Team (5RCT) under Major General William B. Kean, US Army.  In total, Kean commanded roughly 20,000 men.  The Brigade’s first mission was to attack enemy forces in the area of Masan, seize Chinju, and mount a push toward the Nam and Kum rivers.  Designated Task Force Kean, 25 ID, began its offensive on 7 August.

General Craig’s Marines surged forward to Pansong, rapidly inflicting nearly 400 casualties on the NKPA 6th Division and overrunning its headquarters.  Army units, however, were stalled by fierce enemy resistance.[6]  Task Force (TF) Kean trudged toward Chindong-ni, but the fragmented force produced a confused battle zone where American units were too often isolated and necessitated resupply by air.  Not long after Kean initiated his offensive, the NKPA began one of their own.

Marine Aircraft Group 33 provided air support to TF Kean by delivering air strikes on enemy positions.  On August 10, Marine pilots destroyed the NKPA 83rd Motorized Regiment, allowing Craig’s Marines to make a fast advance toward Chindong-ni — only to be halted by General Kean and redeployed to another sector of what became a fragmented battlefield.  Four days passed, and Kean still failed to achieve his two primary objectives: divert NKPA forces from the north and prevent them from reaching the Chinju Pass.

Meanwhile, General Walker became frustrated with the lack of progress of 24 ID against the NKPA 4th Division, which had pushed elements of the 34th Regiment from their several positions and, in the process, captured much of its organic combat equipment — including artillery.  The North Koreans were poised to split the US defensive line and cut off the American’s main supply route (MSR).  Despite repeated efforts to dislodge the NKPA from their well-fortified positions, 24 ID suffered one devastating setback after another.  Mounting Army casualties prompted Walker to redirect Craig’s Marines into the cloverleaf.[7]

Colonel Raymond L. Murray, Commanding Officer of the 5th Marines, launched his assault on 17 August.[8]  Initially, NKPA resistance was tenacious, but these communists were no longer facing untested US soldiers.  A large percentage of the officers and NCOs serving in the 5th Marines were combat veterans of the Pacific War.  By August 17, the Marines had been fighting for 14 days and were pretty well pissed off.  As Marines have always done, they followed their gutsy leaders into the bowels of hell.  Employing well-coordinated combined arms, Murray’s Marines forced the NKPA out of their fortifications and overwhelmed them, one hill at a time.

How bad was it for the NKPA 4th Division?  General George S. Patton, were he still alive, might have felt sorry for the North Koreans.  By the time one understrength Marine regiment was finished with the 4th NKPA Infantry Division, it had no more than 300 troops left alive in each of its regiments — not all of whom were interested in sticking around for the finale.  Murray’s Marines had killed 1,200 communists; another 2-3,000 North Koreans (the smarter ones) had thrown down their weapons and deserted.  The 5th Marines gave up 67 dead and 278 wounded to achieve this victory.  Co-located Army units suffered 1,800 losses (one-third of those were killed in action).

But the battle for the Pusan Perimeter was far from over.

Meanwhile, General Douglas A. MacArthur had a plan in the works, and the U. S. Navy/Marine Corps team would play a key role in its execution.  They were the only American forces who could have pulled it off.

Sources:

  1. Alexander, B.  Korea: The First War We Lost.  Hippocrene Books, 2003.
  2. Blair, C., Jr.  The Forgotten War.  Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
  3. Fehrenbach, T. R.  This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness.  New York: Macmillan Co., 1963.
  4. Gugeler, R. A.  Combat Actions in Korea.  Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2005.
  5. Halberstam, D.  The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War.  New York, Hyperion Books, 2007.
  6. Malkasian, C.  The Korean War.  Osprey Publishing, 2001.
  7. Simmons, E. H.  The United States Marines: A History.  Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
  8. Tucker, S. C., ed.  Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History.  Santa Barbara: Checkmark Books, 2002.
  9. Varhola, M. J.  Fire and Ice: The Korean War, 1950-1953.  Mason City: Da Capo Press, 2000.

Endnotes:

[1] A normal infantry battalion consists of a command element, headquarters staff, organic logistics support, and reinforcements as necessary for assigned missions.  Subordinate units include an H&S Company, three rifle companies, and a weapons company. 

[2] Most of Smith’s men were inexperienced teenagers without adequate training.  Only a third of the battalion’s officers and around sixteen percent of Smith’s NCOs had previous combat experience.

[3] On 27 June, General MacArthur detached Brigadier General John H. Church from his assignment as Assistant Division Commander, 24th ID, and sent him to Korea to establish an Advance HQ and liaison with the Republic of (South) Korea Army (ROK).  Upon the Church’s recommendation, MacArthur ordered Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker to deploy the 24th ID to Korea.

[4] Several of the dead soldiers had been executed by North Korean forces, their bodies later found in shallow graves with their hands bound behind them and shot through the back of the head.

[5] See also: Edward A. Craig — Marine!

[6] To reiterate a previous point, most of the Army’s combat units were manned with young, insufficiently trained soldiers, led by barely competent junior officers and NCOs — all of which can be attributed to Truman’s policy of gutting the US Armed Forces.  Truman’s policy in this regard was criminally malfeasant.  The evidence for this statement would only grow more convincing over the next six months.

[7] See also: Locating the Enemy and Advance to Kosong.

[8] Raymond L. Murray (1913-2004) was a Marine’s Marine.  In his thirty-three years of Marine Corps service, he was awarded two Navy Cross medals, one Distinguished Service Cross, four (4) Silver Star medals, two Legions of Merit, and the Purple Heart medal.  I was honored to have met General Murray several times; he was an exceptional leader.

Vietnam — A Complicated War

Lunar New Year is the first new moon of a lunar calendar whose months are organized according to moon cycles.  Numerous cultures celebrate the event in various ways on a diverse range of dates.  The more well-known of these include New Year’s Day (or week) of the Chinese calendar, the Tibetan calendar of East Asia, the Buddhist and Hindu calendars of Southeast and South Asia, the Islamic calendar, and the Jewish calendar that originated in the Middle East.

In Vietnam, the Lunar New Year is known as Tết.  It has Sino-Vietnamese origins, celebrating the arrival of spring according to the Vietnamese calendar, which usually falls in late January or early February.

In 1965, Tết began on 10 February; it celebrated the year of the snake.

Before Tết in 1965, South Vietnamese insurgents, known as the Viet Cong (VC), began a new phase of their war against the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) by shifting from their classic hit-and-run tactics to mass assaults against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).  Their first salvo was devastating to the RVN because no one expected it and because its result produced heavy casualties to both ARVN and Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) forces at Binh Gia (forty miles east of Saigon, RVN’s capital city).[1]  When mechanized and armored units attempted to reinforce the beleaguered ARVN forces at Binh Gia, the VC destroyed them.  This VC victory over ARVN military units created considerable political instability within the RVN government.

Warning Order

On January 21, 1965, Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch, U. S. Marine Corps, was assigned as the Assistant Division Commander, 3rd Marine Division (3rdMarDiv).  The following day, he was directed to assume command of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (9thMEB).  The MEB was a task-organized Marine Air-Ground task force formed around the 9th Marine Regiment (9th Marines) of the 3rdMarDiv.  The ground combat element included two battalion landing teams (BLTs).  The air combat element had two 1st Marine Aircraft Wing helicopter squadrons.  Both BLTs and air squadrons formed the Special Landing Force (SLF) of the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) of the U. S. Seventh Fleet.

On January 22, 1965, General Karch was preparing for an amphibious landing in South Vietnam when the national command authority put a hold on the introduction of US combat forces to South Vietnam.  President Johnson was still “thinking” on February 7 when VC forces attacked the US installation at Pleiku in the central highlands.  This assault ended with the deaths of nine American soldiers, the injury of 128 military and civilian personnel, and the destruction of 129 US military aircraft.  The following day, the Marine Corps 1st Light Anti-aircraft Missile Battalion (1stLAAMBn) arrived at Da Nang, South Vietnam, with the mission of protecting the joint US-VNAF airfield in the event of an attack by the North Vietnamese air forces.[2]  Advanced elements of the battalion began arriving on February 8.

Meanwhile, as senior American military leaders and diplomats were “re-thinking” their commitment to South Vietnam (and consulting with South Vietnamese officials), the VC geared up for another assault, which materialized on February 11 at Qui Non.

The Commander of US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), requested a 3-battalion Marine Expeditionary Brigade to provide a ground defense of the joint RVN/US air base at Da Nang.  President Lyndon B. Johnson approved MACV’s request on March 2, 1965.  BLT 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines (1//3) was almost immediately flown to Da Nang from Okinawa.  Additional elements of the 9thMEB began moving ashore on March 8.

The Special Landing Force (SLF) included BLTs 1/9 and 3/9 — both were serving at sea off South Vietnam’s coast under the overall authority of the Commander, U. S. Seventh Fleet.  The brigade’s air combat element was increased to include Marine Aircraft Group 16, which, while operating out of Da Nang Air Base, conducted support operations and combat air patrols for two months.

The birth of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) occurred on May 7, 1965, when President Johnson approved the deployment of the 3rdMarDiv and 1stMAW to Da Nang.[3]  The first general to command III MEF was Major General William R. Collins, who concurrently served as Commanding General, 3rdMarDiv.  General Collins also served as Naval Component Commander, Vietnam.  With General Collins’s arrival in Vietnam, the 9thMEB was deactivated, and General Karch resumed his duty as Assistant Division Commander.  The 9th Marine Regiment folded back into the 3rdMarDiv.[4]

On background, the 3rdMarDiv was dispatched to the Far East in 1953 to support the 1st Marine Division (1stMarDiv), which was then engaged in the defense of South Korea (the Korean War), taking up station on the Island of Okinawa — where it remained until early 1965.

By the end of 1965, the entire 3rdMarDiv had relocated to Vietnam (including its command element, three infantry regiments, and all supporting combat and service support elements).  By March 1966, communist insurgents and regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units had learned there was a new sheriff in town.  What this meant in terms of combat was that (a) communist forces should think twice before shooting at US Marines, and (b) if they ever felt the need for a thorough ass-whipping, they could get one from the 3rd Marine Division.

Culturally, the Vietnamese have always allowed their sense of self-worth to interfere with basic common sense.  Accordingly, the 3rdMarDiv and its 24,000 cranky Marines parried several communist thrusts into the RVN’s northernmost provinces (designated as the I Corps Tactical Zone (also, I CTZ).  COMUSMACV directed the 3rdMarDiv to assume responsibility for the defense of I CTZ.[5]

By 1966, the 3rdMarDiv was the largest (ever) combat division in the Marine Corps.  It controlled five infantry regiments, one artillery regiment, all of its usual supporting elements, U. S. Army artillery units, Navy logistical support units (including Seabees), and two regiments of ARVN.  While the division was significantly reinforced, I Corps was an unbelievably large area to defend.  Quang Tri Province alone extended 1,800 miles in diameter.  Beyond its size, Quang Tri Province was marked by rugged terrain and impenetrable forests and bordered two hostile nations: Laos and North Vietnam.  U.S. Marines called it “Indian country.”[6]

In defending this terrain, the Marines operated under heavily restrictive rules of engagement imposed upon them by MACV.  Theater command didn’t want the Marines shooting “friendlies,” so U. S. Forces had first to encounter hostile fire before they could respond.  The problem was that a hefty percentage of the friendlies in Quang Tri Province were part-time hostiles — but it wouldn’t do to shoot innocents if you were also trying to pacify them.

It was a complicated war.

The importance of terrain is that it dictates the tactical employment of troops.  Given the size of the province and its thick canopied terrain (and other limiting factors), the 3rdMarDiv assigned its regiments to critical locations — each regimental commander with a unique tactical area of responsibility (TAOR).  High elevations frequently separated marine combat regiments, which affected the ability of the units to coordinate offensive and defensive operations and line-of-sight communications.  The thick canopy of dense jungles and severe weather patterns restricted ground and air operations.

The need for highway infrastructure restricted the rapid and unfettered movement of men and materials within Quang Tri Province.  There was one main north-south highway (Route 1).  It connected Marine operating bases at Dong Ha and Quang Tri City in the North to Phu Bai and Da Nang in the South.  The Cua Viet River in Quang Tri Province provided the 3rdMarDiv with its primary logistics artery.  The Cua Viet ran from its mouth into Dong Ha, where the river was as wide as a mountain pathway.

A second highway (Route 9) linked Dong Ha with Khe Sanh.  Eastward from Khe Sanh, 3rdMarDiv units established a series of outposts that offered a defense of Route 9 and the Cam Lo River Valley, which extends from Dong Ha to the coastal plain.  The critical outposts were Ca Lu (10 miles east of Khe Sanh), the Rockpile (a 700-foot outcrop 8 miles north), Camp Carroll (10 miles eastward), and Leatherneck Square (a quadrilateral region outlined by Cam Lo, Con Thien, Gio Linh, and Dong Ha).

The 3rdMarDiv’s defensive mission frustrated most senior commanders because (a) Marine Corps doctrine holds that the only reason for a defensive posture is to prepare for the next attack.  Static defense is not how the Marine Corps wins battles, and (b) even though the Marines defeated the enemy whenever they appeared, it was a costly strategy that the Marines could not sustain.  Static warfare imposed unacceptable casualties, and there was nothing to show for it.  The North Vietnamese were happy to fight a war of attrition, but no one wearing a Marine Corps uniform could understand Westmoreland’s willingness to pursue the same game plan.  Within the first year of Vietnam service, Marines suffered 5,000 casualties.

In 1967, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, serving as the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, warned senior commanders in Vietnam that for the Marines to succeed, they must be allowed to wage war on their terms, not as part of a static defense scheme that subjected them to the will and dictates of the enemy.[7]  Marines, he argued, could be trusted to set their own rules of engagement consistent with their areas of responsibility.

The NVA had already demonstrated that it was willing to lose large numbers of men in exchange for a fewer number of ours — but over a sustained period, our losses would work against the interests of the American people.  North Vietnam wanted to drag the war out for as long as possible.  Marine commanders wanted to put an end to it.  Washington politicians (also known as America’s weak Willies), however, did not want a confrontation with North Vietnam’s primary ally, China.

General Krulak identified three options along the DMZ: (1) Withdraw the Marines further south, out of range of NVA artillery (which, while tactically sound, offered a propaganda victory to the NVA), (2) Invade North Vietnam (tactically and logistically challenging, and politically impossible), or (3) Reinforce the 3rdMarDiv, and intensify air and artillery bombardments of North Vietnam.  It was up to General Westmoreland to decide — the ball was in his court.

General Westmoreland had to agree with Krulak’s assessments, even to the extent of putting together a planning group to consider the feasibility of an amphibious landing north of the DMZ. However, this wasn’t how President Lyndon B. Johnson wanted to fight the war.  Westmoreland’s only political option was reinforcing the 3rdMarDiv with an Army brigade.  Doing so allowed the CG 3rdMarDiv to realign his force within the I CTZ.  Increased air, artillery, and naval gunfire support imposed significant losses on NVA forces north of the DMZ. It prompted the North Vietnamese command structure to rethink its long-term strategy.  Within a short time, while bureaucrats in Washington toyed with U. S. warfare doctrine, the NVA was preparing for a bloody confrontation.

McNamara’s Fiasco

Robert S. McNamara began serving as Secretary of Defense during the Kennedy administration in 1961; after John Kennedy’s assassination, President Lyndon B. Johnson retained him in that capacity.  Known as one of the “Whiz Kids,” McNamara was instrumental in reshaping Ford Motor Company to increase its American automobile industry market share.  He was also the genius behind Ford’s failed Edsel model.

In December 1965, McNamara met with former Kennedy-era National Security Council staff member Carl Kaysen.[8]  It was from Kaysen that McNamara developed his idea for an electric barrier to limit infiltration from North Vietnam.  The so-called McNamara line became a metaphor for Bob McNamara’s arbitrary, personal, and aggressive management style that tended to by-pass proven Defense protocols, ignored or rebuffed DoD experts, and preferred relying on technology rather than superbly trained members of the Armed Forces.[9]  In essence, senior military leaders either conformed to McNamara’s dictates, or they quite suddenly retired from active military service.

McNamara’s preference for untested technology led him to implement programs without full coordination among defense experts.  The only danger to this in peacetime is an extraordinary squandering of taxpayer resources.  In combat, lives are lost, and soldiers are critically or permanently injured.  Nevertheless, McNamara rejected every criticism of his policies and programs.[10]

Before 1965, the Department of Defense experimented with various schemes for defensive lines along South Vietnam’s northern border, at the DMZ and its border with Laos.  Defense experts rejected many of Kaysen’s ideas for two reasons.  First, to implement them, the United States would have to increase the number of its static positions, and second, because it would encourage the NVA to establish safe areas deeper inside Laos.[11]  Kaysen’s (later, McNamara’s) electronic wall would limit NVA infiltration into South Vietnam.  From his meeting with Kaysen, McNamara ordered a feasibility study involving several science technologists.

McNamara’s panel provided their conclusions in March 1966.  He passed their proposals to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for comments.  The JCS was lukewarm on the idea.  Creating an electronic barrier, they argued, would still require a large number of troops and cost a large sum of money.  Moreover, the project would cause potentially insurmountable logistical challenges.  JCS members may have wondered if McNamara had heard of Hadrian’s Wall (122-138 AD).

Secretary McNamara then turned to a federally funded research study group (the JASON Group) for their assessment.  These individuals supported the notion of a barrier wall primarily because, in their opinion, President Johnson’s air campaign over North Vietnam was an utter failure.  The JASON Group thought it would be a good idea to create two barrier systems — the first along the southern edge of the DMZ and another along South Vietnam’s western border with Laos.  Electronic signals, they argued, could trigger air interdiction and remotely controlled minefields.  Moreover, they added, the system could be in place within a year.

McNamara sent the JASON Group’s proposal to the JCS for additional consideration.  Except for JCS Chairman General Earle Wheeler, every JCS member rejected the idea.  Wheeler nevertheless sent the recommendation to Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, Commander, U. S. Pacific, for his review.  Admiral Sharp concluded that the plan, at best, was impractical.  Amazingly, General Westmoreland agreed with Admiral Sharp.

Ignoring this advice, McNamara took his plan to President Johnson, recommending approval.  The price tag was around $2.5 billion ($23.7 billion in 2024).  McNamara’s scheme had several code names.  At first, it was named PRACTICE NINE; it later changed to ILLINOIS CITY and then to PROJECT DYE MARKER.  In early 1967, Marine Corps engineers began bulldozing a strip of land 500 meters wide from Gio Linh westward to Con Thien.

At the beginning of 1968, the western end of McNamara’s wall, from Khe Sanh through the Special Forces camp at Lang Vei, which was still under construction, was attacked by NVA forces.  The NVA overran Lang Vei and established a siege of Khe Sanh.  The Battle of Khe Sanh lasted 77 days.  General Creighton W. Abrams, Westmoreland’s newly arrived replacement, ordered Khe Sanh abandoned in July.  He also ordered the destruction of all infrastructure along Route 9 toward Laos, including all bridges and roads.  In October, all work relating to DYE MARKER ceased.  Instead, Abrams ordered McNamara’s wall converted into fortifications and support bases for his new strategy: mobile operations.  McNamara’s Wall quickly became known as McNamara’s Folly.  Significantly, the entire episode with McNamara’s line diverted Marine combat units from their traditional role of beating the enemy to a pulp.  Casualties mounted.

A Confusing Structure

During the summer and fall of 1966, the NVA initiated two major thrusts across the DMZ.  III MAF realigned around 10,000 Marines to meet these new threats.  In October, Major General Wood B. Kyle, Commanding General, 3rdMarDiv, assumed operational control of all U. S. Forces operating in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces.  He moved his command post from Da Nang to Phu Bai, north of the Hai Van Mountains, which separated the two northern provinces of I Corps from the three remaining southern provinces.  The main Marine force in Quang Tri Province consisted of seven (of 18 available) battalions.[12]

At the same time, the 1stMarDiv, under Major General Herman Nickerson, moved its CP from Chu Lai to Da Nang.  Nickerson left Brigadier General William A. Stiles in charge of Task Force X-Ray at Chu Lai.  X-Ray was a brigade-size force of four battalions between Quang Tri and Quang Ngai.  In addition to the two Marine battalions in Quang Ngai, Brigadier General Run Sang Kim of the South Korean Marine Corps commanded three ROK Marine battalions.[13]

To any average person, the organizational structure of Marine Corps combat units in Vietnam would be confusing and nonsensical, but the fluid nature of nonlinear warfare in Vietnam caused senior commanders to view individual battalions as their primary maneuver elements (rather than regiments, which traditionally controlled subordinate battalions).  Task organization took on new meaning when separate battalions from the 3rd Marine Regiment (for example) were operationally assigned to other command elements.  A battalion of the 7th Marines might be attached to the 4th Marines for a specific purpose or length of time (such as a combat operation).  Another contributing factor was the implementation of battalion rotations between Vietnam and Okinawa.  Whenever a battalion from the 3rd Marines was rotated out of Vietnam for rest and refit, another battalion would rotate in to take its place — one perhaps from the 9th Marines.

To further confuse the casual observer, the U. S. Seventh Fleet exercised authority over an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), which, after March 1966, included the 9th MAB as part of the Special Landing Force (SLF) (See also Note 2).  The SLF could be deployed as part of U. S. Seventh Fleet operations, operating independently from the forces under III MAF, or it could be employed to reinforce III MAF units if necessary.

Air support for Marines in the I CTZ was provided by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1stMAW), elements of which occupied airfields at Da Nang, Chu Lai, Phu Bai, Marble Mountain, and Ky Ha.  Fixed-wing units operated from Da Nang and Chu Lai; helicopter squadrons were distributed among all five.

Finally, ARVN units operated independently but in close coordination with III MAF.  The ARVN I Corps consisted of the 1st ARVN Division (Hue City), 2nd ARVN Division (Quang Ngai), the independent 51st Regiment (Quang Nam), a ranger group, and three battalions of Vietnamese Marines (temporarily attached) moved throughout I CTZ.  The total Vietnamese force included 34 battalions.  Regional and Popular (territorial reserve) forces augmented the ARVN I Corps.  The number of South Vietnamese forces assigned to I Corps was 77,000 combat troops.

The Bottom Line

From the beginning of the United States’ involvement in Vietnam in 1945, when U. S. politicians imagined that it would be prudent to assist post-World War II France in reclaiming its Indochinese colonies —even though the Vietnamese people had had enough of the Frenchman’s abuse, the thinking of highly placed American officials was deeply flawed.

The problem for President Harry S. Truman was that the individual who first proclaimed Vietnam’s independence from France, a man calling himself Ho Chi Minh, was a committed communist.  Truman concluded that supporting a brutal French colony was preferable to the creation of a  new communist (nationalist) state and ignored Ho Chi Minh.  It never entered Truman’s mind that a gently guiding capitalist hand might have moved Minh toward the center of his idealistically socialist goals.  Neither Truman nor anyone in his administration anticipated that if Ho Chi Minh could not obtain support for Vietnamese independence from the United States, he could get it from China … after the Chinese Revolution (1945-1949).  China threw its support behind Vietnam in July 1950 and began transforming North Vietnamese insurgents into a regular army.

French colonial forces battled the communists through 1954 before their overwhelming defeat at Dien Binh Phu.  It was time for the French to withdraw from Vietnam, but who would take France’s place?  Eisenhower, who replaced Truman, acknowledged the United States’ commitment to support a non-communist state in Vietnam but opposed any American ground effort except for the participation of military and civilian political advisors supporting the Republic of Vietnam.  President Kennedy expanded the role of military advisors but opposed direct military involvement.  It wasn’t until after President Lyndon B. Johnson concocted the story of a North Vietnamese attack on a U. S. destroyer that a surge in American air, ground, and naval involvement took shape.  By then, the United States had spent tens of billions of dollars supporting a corrupt and thoroughly inept political structure in South Vietnam.

Still, one must wonder how, after investing so many lives, so much money, time, and effort into “defending” South Vietnam, the United States could lose a war when it had so many advantages.  Nearly 3 million Americans served in Vietnam.  In addition to 1.4 million South Vietnamese forces, the United States was also assisted by South Korea (320,000), Australia (50,190), New Zealand (3,500), Laos (72.000), Cambodia (200,000), The Philippines (2,061), and Thailand (32,000).  Casualty rates were extraordinary: allied military forces experienced 392,365 dead and nearly 2 million wounded in action. Almost 4 million Vietnamese civilians were killed, 400,000 Cambodian civilians and 62,000 Laotian civilians lost their lives, as well.  There were so many troops, such utter defeat, and David Berger wanted to attack China with 28 battalions of U.S. Marines.  God help us!

There are several explanations for America’s failure, not the least of which was its failure to maintain the moral high ground from the beginning of World War II.  American politicians during this period were not our “best and brightest.”  They still aren’t.  Presidents responsible for that bloody war were near-sighted, closed-minded, immoral, vain, and malfeasant.  The American diplomatic corps was inept; high-ranking political appointees were incompetent — few to none ever having served in uniform — they decided they could run the war from inside the Beltway.  Over time, these know-nothings decided they knew more than our military professionals.  Among those military careerists, far too many put their promotions ahead of their sacred duty.

It was a complicated war, easily avoided if only the American voter had made better choices for their national leaders.  North Vietnam’s celebrated military leader, Võ Nguyên Giáp, later wrote that no one was more surprised than he when American politicians suddenly withdrew their armed forces from South Vietnam.  The US Military had won all the battles, North Vietnam could no longer sustain such huge battle losses, and it was only a matter of time before the United States and RVN could claim victory.  But, of course, the politicians in Congress knew best.  America’s defeat was political, not military.  Even now, wise voting is not one of America’s strong points.

Sources:

  1. Berman, L.  Lyndon Johnson’s War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam. New York: Norton & Company, 1989.
  2. Eisenhower, D. D.  Mandate for Change.  Doubleday, 1963.
  3. Fall, B. B.  The Two Viet Nams: A Political and Military Analysis.  New York: Praeger, 1967.
  4. Giap, V. N.  Military Art of People’s War: Selected Writings.  New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970.
  5. Karnow, S.  Vietnam: A History.  New York: Penguin Books, 1997 (second edition).
  6. Shulimson, J. And Charles M. Johnson.  U. S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965.  Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1978.
  7. Telfer, G. L. and Lane Rogers (et. al.)  U. S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967.  Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1984.

Endnotes:

[1] After the Vietnam War, the Communist victors renamed the city after their revolutionary leader, Ho Chi Minh.

[2] VNAF = South Vietnam Air Force

[3] US Marines are an expeditionary force.  The original designation of the task-organized force was III Marine Expeditionary Force. However, this designation was temporarily changed at the request of General Westmoreland to III Marine Amphibious Force (and for similar reasons, 9thMEB was redesignated 9thMAB).  Given their history of foreign expeditionary occupations (1887-1954), the word expeditionary offended Vietnamese sensitivities.

[4] 9thMAB reactivated on 1 March 1966 on Okinawa; its new mission was to serve as the Special Landing Force (SLF) of the U. S. Seventh Fleet.  In this capacity, 9thMAB exercised operational authority over Regimental Landing Team (RLT) 5 (formed around the 5th Marines (a 1stMarDiv regiment), BLT 2/5, and service support elements of the 1st Service Battalion.  Its air element was MAG-13.  In the spring of 1966, RLT-5 was relieved by RLT-26.  Throughout the war, the 9thMAB was instrumental in destroying VC regiments and elements of NVA infantry divisions operating in the Thua Thien Province as part of Operation Deckhouse.

[5] COMUSMACV was General William C. Westmoreland (1914-2005).  Westmoreland foolishly adopted the NVA’s strategy of a war of attrition.  He served as COMUSMACV from 1964-68 and then as U. S. Army Chief of Staff until his retirement in 1972.  In fairness to General Westmoreland, his failed strategy in Vietnam was imposed on him by Washington politicians and bureaucrats — he simply lacked the moral courage to do the right thing irrespective of any political consequences.  In my view, Westmoreland was under no obligation to obey presidential orders that he found unconscionable.  Since Westmoreland became President Johnson’s lackey, we can only infer that he intentionally placed his career ahead of the welfare of his men.

[6] Offensive and defensive combat operations are limited by weather and terrain.  These factors are more important than any other physical elements (equipment, communications, weapons, resupply).  See also U. S. Army Field Manual 100-5 (Operations).

[7] FMFPAC (1941-Present) is the world’s most significant maritime landing force.  The general officer commanding reports to the Commander, U. S. Pacific, and exercises command authority over all subordinate commands of the Navy/Marine Corps expeditionary units operating in the Pacific, from California to the Far East.  During the Vietnam War, CG FMFPac did not exercise operational control over Marines in Vietnam.  Still, he did have something to say about how the Marines were employed within COMUSMACV’s theater of operations.

[8] Kaysen was an academic policy advisory and international security specialist at MIT who co-chaired the Committee on International Security Studies at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.  What Kaysen knew about warfighting wouldn’t fill a thimble.  Why he had any credibility with Kennedy, Johnson, or McNamara is anyone’s guess.

[9] This same inane thinking destroyed the Central Intelligence Agency’s human intelligence capability, preferring to rely, instead, on satellite technology.  This, too, was a fiasco with long-term consequences.

[10] This is why presidential elections matter.  The President appoints his cabinet, unelected men who make momentous decisions impacting the welfare of the American people.  We should know who presidential candidates are considering for high level l cabinet posts before we elect them to the presidency.  Who in their right mind would have voted for John F. Kennedy knowing that he intended to appoint, as Secretary of Defense, the man who gave them Edsel?

[11] Pro-technology advocates believed that constructing such a wall would serve the long-term interests of South Vietnam after US forces had been withdrawn.  Such a belief was part of the fallacy U. S. Officials cultivated about the mission assigned to the American armed forces operating in Vietnam.  Everyone was told that the role of our military was to defend South Vietnam from the aggression of North Vietnam.  This fallacy may have morphed into the truth of our Vietnam experience — after the assassination of South Vietnam’s president, Ngo Dinh Diem — but it was always Diem’s long-term goal to unify Vietnam (conquer North Vietnam) under his leadership.  Diem’s goal, therefore, was almost identical to that of North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, albeit in reverse.  Every succeeding president of South Vietnam had but one goal: to enrich themselves at the American taxpayer’s expense.

[12] Between 2019 and 2023, while serving as Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Berger directed training and equipping 28 infantry battalions to confront the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Navy (PLAN).  First, land warfare is not the mission of the U.S. Marine Corps.  Berger must also not have been aware that 18 battalions were insufficient to defeat the much smaller North Vietnamese Army.  Dolt.

[13] the Republic of Korea (South Korea) contributed substantially to the Allied war effort during the Vietnam conflict.  The Korean Marine Corps Blue Dragon Brigade served with distinction in ICTZ, the Fierce Tiger Mechanized Infantry Division, ROK Army, served in Binh Dinh Province (7,652 officers, 107,340 enlisted men), and the ROK Army 9th Infantry Division, served in the Phu Yen, Tuy Hoa, and Khanh Hoa provinces (6,445 officers and 98,891 enlisted men.  I cannot speak to the performance of the Korean Army units, but the Korean Marines put the fear of God into NVA and VC troops in equal measure.  The Korean Marines didn’t play fair.    

Advance to Kosong

“The Pusan perimeter is like a weakened dike; the Army intends to use us to plug the holes as they open.  We’re a brigade —a fire brigade.  It will be costly fighting against a numerically superior enemy.  Marines have never lost a battle; this brigade will not be the first to establish such a precedent.  Prepare to move.” – BrigGen Edward A. Craig, August 3, 1950

There were many notable American participants during the Korean War (1950-53), some of them bona fide heroes.  But if all of them were not this, they at least performed their demanding duties heroically and with great distinction in the most troubling of times.  The reader will find many of their stories on these pages. 

The Korean War began on 25 June 1950 when nine North Korean infantry divisions and an armored brigade suddenly invaded the Republic of South Korea.  It marked the beginning of the first hot encounter of the so-called Cold War Era.  By the time the 1st Marine Brigade arrived in South Korea on 3 August 1950, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) was already a shamble.  The North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) had already pushed elements of the Eighth U.S. Army as far south as they could go and prepared to either destroy the American Army or force it into the Sea of Japan.

In 1950, the United States’ entire defense structure was at less than half its wartime strength, according to previously authorized tables of organization and equipment (also, T/O & E).  The U.S. Marines were no exception.  When the Marine Corps Commandant dispatched his “warning order” to the 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, California, the division was ineffective as a combat organization.  The division mainly existed on paper — a cadre staff of Marines available to accomplish the minimum work to keep them functioning at reduced manpower and equipment levels.

The senior officer at Camp Pendleton was Brigadier General Edward A. Craig.  Major General Graves B. Erskine, its previous commander, had already departed Camp Pendleton en route to his new duty assignment.  Erskine’s replacement was Major General Oliver P. Smith, who, at that moment, was en route to Camp Pendleton with his family.  The Korean Peninsula emergency would not wait for Smith’s arrival; the Commandant ordered Brigadier General Craig, as senior officer present, to form a provisional brigade for combat duty in Korea.

The brigade would consist of a ground combat element, an air combat element, and necessary combat support units.  The brigade would form around the Fifth Marine Regiment (which consisted of three understrength infantry battalions).  The air component would include three squadrons designated Provisional Marine Aircraft Group (MAG)-33.  Brigadier General Thomas H. Cushman commanded MAG-33 and served Craig as Deputy Commander.

The Commanding Officer, 5th Marines, was Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray (selected for promotion to Colonel).  Murray was a highly decorated combat veteran.  His battalion commanders were Lieutenant Colonel George R. Newton[1] (1/5), Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise[2] (2/5), and Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett[3] (3/5).

Upon arrival in Pusan, Korea, on 3 August 1950, Brigadier General Craig briefed his officers: “The situation is serious.  With the forces available, it is obvious that the [Pusan] perimeter cannot be held in strength.  Eighth Army has adopted the plan of holding thinly and counter-attacking enemy penetrations to keep them off-balance, to prevent them from launching a coordinated effort.”

So began the march of an under-strength brigade of Marines into the breach of combat once more.  The fighting was brutal; there would be no immediate replacements for casualties.  The Marines would fight with what they had.  Fortunately, General Craig commanded several extraordinary Marine officers, all seasoned combat officers, who exuded the warrior ethos and shared with their men the misery and depredations of hostile contact with a numerically superior enemy.

By 6 August 1950, the Marines had been fighting the enemy for three days.  While Colonel Roise’s 2/5 battled two enemies —the North Korean People’s Army and the South Korean heat— Colonel Taplett’s 3/5 calmly perched on Hills 255 and 99, observing enemy movement.  Captain Joseph C. Fegan and Lieutenant Robert D. Bohn were on the radio calling in artillery fire on enemy movements north of Chindong-ni[4].

Around mid-morning, Second Lieutenant Lawrence W. Hetrick’s 3rd Platoon, Company A (Engineers), completed laying landmines on the Haman Road about a half-mile above Chindong-ni.  Newton’s 1/5 reached the village during the afternoon of 7 August and relieved Company G’s two platoons on Hill 99.  Bohn led his company across the valley and deployed along the lower slopes of Hill 255.  Enemy snipers harassed Bohn’s Marines throughout the night of 7-8 August.  At dawn, Golf Company Marines discovered several enemy soldiers setting up firing positions less than 100 yards outside their defensive perimeter.  While the Marines promptly destroyed these enemy troops, they were astonished that the North Koreans had gotten so close without making a sound.

Shortly after daybreak on 8 August, Captain Fegan’s men calmly observed a formation of troops climbing Hill 255 from the direction of the Haman Road.  Fegan believed the troops were South Korean replacements and watched as they filed to the top of the hill beyond the plateau, forward of the Marine’s positions.

When this formation began setting up facing the Marines, Fegan and his Marines hunkered down.  Within a few minutes, the formation opened fire.  Their possession of the high ground above 3/5 opened the door for harassing fire and blockage of the Masan-Chindong-ni road, the U.S. force’s main supply route.  When the Army’s 2/24 advanced to relieve 2/5 and 3/5, NKPA fire drove them off the road.  Fegan might have mentioned the presence of these troops but failed to do so.

When Taplett became aware of these NKPA troops, he ordered Fegan’s company to remove them.  Captain Fegan maneuvered two platoons to execute Taplett’s order, but the terrain made their advance difficult.  When Lieutenant Williams’ platoon faltered in its climb, Fegan led his 3rd Platoon forward.  Eventually, the 3rd Platoon was able to work its way through the NKPA position, one fighting hole at a time; the North Korean soldiers resisted until death.  The fight cost the Marines of Company H six dead and 32 wounded.

During this action, Company G spotted another enemy formation bound for Hill 255 from Haman Road.  The enemy soldiers moved across the valley from the high ground north of Hill 99 and attempted to climb Hill 255 via the same route used earlier in the day.  Company G and supporting arms unleashed hellacious fire upon the NKPA formation, and what remained of their number scuttled back to their starting point.

Colonel Murray ordered Taplett to cease fire and dig in for the night.  As Captain Fegan’s Company H began preparing for night defense, artillery, and close air support pounded the saddle north of the company, which forced the NKPA to withdraw from Fegan’s immediate front.

During the night of August 8-9, Marine artillery and mortar fire dropped hot steel across the entire battalion front, which appeared to discourage nocturnal enemy activities.  At 0825, Marine artillery resumed its bombardment.  After the artillery fires, Marine aircraft worked the enemy over with napalm —its first such use in the Korean War.   Company H then launched an assault against negligible enemy resistance.

Colonel Murray’s plan for eliminating the enemy threat to the MSR called for a Marine advance along Hill 255.  North of this, U.S. Army units would clear the ridge, approaching from Masan.  At noon, Company H observed soldiers from the 24th Infantry moving southward; the long ridge was considered secure, but removing the enemy was costly.  In total, Captain Fegan lost 16 men killed in action, with 36 wounded.  There would be no replacements.

Overall, Task Force Kean’s[5] assaults on Chinju and Sachon did not succeed within its first 48 hours.  During this period, the only advance Kean made was on his TAOR’s[6] right flank by the 35th U.S. Infantry.  In General Craig’s capacity as provisional commander of all units along the Masan-Chinju axis, Craig directed Army operations within his sector.

On 8 August, Craig ordered the Army’s 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) to continue attacking Tosan so that the 5th Marines could proceed to Sachon.  Following preparatory artillery fires, the 5thRCT pushed forward with some gain near the line of departure, but enemy resistance increased near the village of Sin-gi.  Additionally, excessive military traffic and inadequate roadways hampered the Army’s progress.  Fighting on Hills 255 and 342 increased the fog of war over such large operating areas.

Colonel Murray ordered LtCol Newton’s 1/5 forward from Chindong-ni at 0600.  Newton’s mission was to attack along the south fork of the Tosan junction in preparation to seize a yet-determined regimental objective.  Heavy military traffic (intermingled with refugee flow) stalled Newton’s progress along the MSR.  Newton reported the situation to Murray, who told Newton to suspend his march.  Captain Tobin remounted Hill 99 for security, and the battalion went into a holding pattern. 

When word finally came to “move out,” 1/5 worked its way along the still-crowded roadway.  LtCol Newton walked ahead to the 1/5thRCT command post.  He learned that the enemy occupied low-lying areas, and the Army’s rifle companies occupied the high ground.  The Army battalion commander reported, “My companies are cut off.”  At 14:00, vehicle congestion again halted Newton’s advance; he was still more than a mile from his designated line of departure.

At this moment, a much-dispirited Army NCO arrived.  He was dripping with mud and water.  He informed Newton that he had just returned from Hill 308, where his company was heavily engaged with enemy forces.  He reported that enemy machine guns covered all approaches to adjacent rice paddies, which forced him to low-crawl the entire distance.

While Colonel Murray was en route to Chindong-ni, Major General Kean flagged him down and ordered Murray to provide a night relief of 1/5thRCT.  Kean said he would inform Craig of his order as soon as possible.   At this particular stage in the operation, the Marines began to question who controlled the area: General Keen or the enemy division commander.  Newton radioed Murray for clarification; his new order was to postpone jumping off until nightfall.

Newton withdrew his battalion to the outskirts of Sangnyong-ni and set up at the base of Hill 342.  At around 20:00, Newton received orders to relieve 1/5thRCT at midnight and secure the troublesome road junction.  Colonel Murray was tired of the Army’s dithering around; he wanted a final solution to the “who’s doing what” dilemma.  He ordered Newton to report to 1/5thRCT no later than 23:00.  According to the “plan,” an Army guide would lead Newton across a broad rice paddy to Hill 308.  Newton was in place by 22:00, only to find that the Army’s rifle companies were already bugging out.  Worse, there were no guides[7].

Newton’s battalion proceeded west, through Sin-gi, and halted on the MSR about a half-mile outside Tosan.  A narrow dike branched southward from the road, a well-trodden trail from Hill 308 to the MSR.  The footpath was evident because the steady stream of soldiers and 1/5 had no choice but to wait until the Army units had completed their hasty retreat.  At midnight, Newton and his Marines stood alone in a rice field reported crawling with communists.  A short time later, two South Korean civilians approached Newton and identified themselves as the Army’s “official guides.” The skeptical Marine led his battalion along the footpath toward Hill 308.

The pathway took Newton some 1,200 yards in complete darkness.  The march was time-consuming and nerve-racking.  The lead element of the battalion, moving in single file, reached the base of Hill 308 without incident.  The dawn of 9 August was breaking when the last Marine completed the crossing.  Soon after reporting his position, Newton received a radio order from Murray to continue his assault on Hill 308.  Captain John L. Tobin’s Company B took the point.  The climb involved 1,000 feet in elevation and 2,000 yards southward.  It wasn’t long before the sun began taking its toll on the struggling Marines.  While en route, Marines encountered harassing fire from enemy snipers.  By the end of the day, Hill 308 belonged to 1/5.

At 17:00 on 9 August, operational control of all Army and Marine Corps forces in Task Force Kean’s TAOR passed from Craig.  As 1/5 settled in atop Hill 308 and began searching for water sources, Murray radioed Newton. He ordered him to withdraw his unit to the road below and continue his movement to Paedun-ni.  It was an order Newton could not entirely obey because most of his Marines were suffering from heat exhaustion.  Murray was adamant, however, so Newton instructed Captain Tobin and Captain John R. Stevens (Company A) to rest their Marines while he led Captain Walter E. Godenius (H&S Company) and Major John R. Russel (Weapons Company) and a platoon of tanks in the battalion’s vanguard.

When Newton once more reached the base of Hill 308, he discovered that his Japanese maps (which is all he had) were as accurate as Army artillery.  There were no accurate maps in South Korea.  Map grids were incorrect, villages were misnamed and misplaced, and road systems were erroneously plotted.  Maps also lacked contour lines, meaning that elevation was impossible to determine.  Inaccurate maps presented a dangerous situation because ground artillery spotters would have to adjust fire.  The first round out could land on friendly positions, and there was simply no way around it.

Newton had only proceeded a few hundred yards down the MSR when his lead element held up.  There were land mines on the road.  1st Platoon, Company A (Engineers) responded.  The engineers discovered that the obstacles were American anti-tank mines spilled on the roadway from an Army cargo vehicle.  A short time later, Colonel Murray arrived by jeep and informed Newton that he was on the wrong road and traveling in the wrong direction.  It was late afternoon when the column had turned around and resumed the march.  Company A and B rejoined the main body at the top of a 400-foot pass.  Colonel Murray ordered Newton to halt in place and set up a defensive perimeter astride the pass.  At dusk, 1/5 was in position two miles south of the Tosan line of departure — that is, according to Newton’s Japanese maps.

The absence of enemy resistance along the MSR convinced General Craig that the enemy was unprepared to confront the Marines.  To exploit this advantage, he radioed Newton to execute a night attack and capture Paedun-ni before daylight on 10 August.  Since Kean had relieved the Brigade from further “mopping up” duties, 2/5 was once more available for offensive operations.  Roise trucked his Marines to an assembly area near the base of Hill 308, arriving at 21:00.  Within two hours, 2/5 began the march southward to participate in the seizure of Paedun-ni.  2/5 passed through 1/5 at around 01:00.  By this time, the Marines were weary and needed rest.  Luckily, they met no enemy resistance.

Roise’s advance element included three M-26 tanks.  Just outside Paedun-ni, one of the tanks fell through the concrete bridge and wedged between two abutments.  A second tank, attempting to negotiate a narrow bypass next to the bridge, threw a track.  The incident halted Roise’s column for two hours.

2/5 finally reached Paedun-ni at 08:00.  The town was empty of enemy troops.  By 0930, Roise’s reformed battalion was again marching toward Kosong.  Colonel Murray wanted to expedite the movement of Roise’s battalion, so he devised a plan to shuttle the Marines forward with the available vehicles.  It took some time to arrange the shuttle.  Craig arrived by helicopter around 11:00 and expressed his unhappiness with Murray’s progress.  He told them to “march at all speed,” but with an impassable bridge blocking the way of heavy vehicles, there was only so much Murray could do.  He did manage to get five 2½-ton trucks beyond the bridge.  The trucks and ten jeeps began ferrying the Marines forward with what they could carry; the rest continued on foot until more vehicles became available.

Roise’s orders were to seize Kosong and coordinate its defense with the town mayor.  This was probably what Roise was thinking about when lead vehicles began to climb through the Taedabok Pass, a defile about 1,000 yards in length.  Just beyond the defile, entering the village of Pugok, the road skirted the base of a large hill that overlooked the entire length of the pass.  Just abreast of Pugok, enemy machine guns opened up, raking Company D Marines.

The Marines scrambled out of the vehicles and took cover in roadside ditches.  An NKPA anti-tank gun opened up and hit one of the abandoned jeeps.  Captain Zimmer, commanding Company D, ordered his first platoon to seize the high ground on the right side of the road.  First Platoon Marines quickly set in and engaged enemy anti-tank guns.  The second platoon moved up and eradicated small groups of enemies at the entrance to the defile.  Zimmer directed mortar fire at the anti-tank gun, which silenced it but also expended all available 60 mm munitions.  Zimmer decided to hold his company in place until resupplied.  Two tanks arrived at 16:30 —their 90 mm guns driving out the enemy.

Once Taplett’s 3/5 arrived at Paedun-ni, Colonel Murray ordered him to prepare to pass through 2/5 and continue the advance.  3/5 began moving through 2/5 at the entrance to the Taedabok Pass.  Company G had just crossed the departure line and deployed to assault the hill at the bend in the road.  In consultation with Roise, Murray determined that the Marines didn’t know enough about the enemy’s position or strength.

To answer this question, 2/5’s operations officer, Major Morgan J. McNeely, offered to lead a patrol.  At 17:30, McNeely took a jeep with a radio operator and a fire team from Company D to conduct a reconnaissance.  From Taplett’s observation post on the high ground to the left of the road, he saw McNeely heading into danger.  Taplett radioed Captain Bohn to stop the jeep, but it was too late.  As McNeely and his men vanished around the bend in the road around a large hill, there was suddenly a loud clatter of machine guns and small arms fire.  The fate of McNeely’s patrol remained in doubt as Captain Bohn’s Company G moved into the attack.  First Lieutenant Jack Westerman’s platoon took the lead.  Captain Bohn dispatched Second Lieutenant Edward F. Duncan’s platoon to make a sweeping envelopment to the right, which outflanked the NKPA force and drove them from the high ground.

From the crest of the hill, Lieutenant Westerman observed the bullet-riddled jeep with McNeely and his men stretched out motionless on the ground beneath and behind the jeep.  At significant risk to his safety, Westerman made a dash to the jeep, recovered the mortally wounded McNeely, and carried him back to the protection of his platoon.  Westerman reported three of McNeely’s men KIA, with two additional men severely injured, who remained undercover.

When Company G resumed their assault, two additional enemy machine guns opened up.  Taplett dispatched Captain Fegan’s Company H along the left of the MSR.  Fegan seized the hill opposite Bohn’s position.  It was dusk before the Marines silenced the machine gun.  Murray ordered 3/5 to secure for the night set in a defensive perimeter of the two hills already occupied.  The two wounded men would have to wait for a corpsman until the following day.

Except for scattered rifle fire, the night passed quietly.  Taplett fragged his two rifle companies to continue their attack at first light … but before dawn on 11 August, a small force of NKPA troops charged Captain Bohn’s front.  A furious hand-to-hand clash erupted as the enemy charged toward Bohn’s centerline observation post.  Bohn directed the defense as the enemy tossed hand grenades into the company line.  Fragments of one enemy grenade pierced Bohn’s shoulder.  Staff Sergeant Charles F. Kurtz, Jr. called down mortar support while throwing grenades into the enemy’s midst and ducking submachine gun bursts.  The fight lasted 30 minutes, with Bohn’s Marines driving the enemy off the hill.  Despite his wound, Bohn remained with his company and prepared to continue the assault on Kosong.

At 08:00, Taplett’s 3/5 stepped off as the regiment’s advance element; Company G took the battalion front.  Second Lieutenant John D. Counselman’s third platoon assumed the point behind Corporal Raymond Giaquinto.  A mile into the March, Giaquinto called a halt.  The by-now highly pissed off, Giaquinto led his fire team forward at a dead run and captured an enemy machine-gun emplacement, killing five enemies before they could fire a single shot.  Giaquinto swept aside three additional enemy positions.  A series of envelopments brought Captain Bohn to the bridge north of Kosong at 10:00.  At that juncture, Captain Fegan’s company passed through Company G and pushed into town.

Captain Fegan cleared northern Kosong of light enemy resistance using one platoon and two tanks, wheeled right, and continued to Sachon.  Two additional platoons continued moving south and seized the high ground below Sunam-dong.  As Colonel Taplett set up his command post, General Craig arrived in a jeep to confer.  At that moment, enemy snipers opened up from positions around a schoolhouse.  Marines returned fire immediately, and the Koreans dived off life’s stage.   

Shortly after Captain Fegan entered Kosong, Captain Bohn turned his company southwest and assaulted Hill 88 to eliminate what turned out to be a somewhat stubborn group of NKPA soldiers.  Bohn called in for air and artillery support.  When delivered, the communists decided they’d had enough and made a hasty retreat.  General Craig called a halt to Taplett’s mission to secure Kosong; instead, he wanted an immediate attack on Sachon.  Taplett recalled Captain Bohn and organized his battalion for an attack on Sachon.

Moments, before Captain Fegan stepped off with Company H, Navy Corpsman William H. Anderson, raced his jeep ambulance to pick up casualties from Company G below Hill 88.  Passing through Fegan’s lead element, Anderson failed to make the turn southward and sped toward Sachon.  Two enemy anti-tank guns waiting west of Kosong blasted Anderson’s jeep, killing him and spilling two casualties out of the wrecked vehicle.  Captain Fegan led two tanks forward.  Technical Sergeant Johnnie C. Cottrell blasted the NKPA positions with rounds of 90 mm death—and Taplett’s 3/5 continued their drive for Sachon.

Sources:

  1. Appleman, R. E.  South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu.  Washington: Department of the Army, 1998.
  2. Catchpole, B.  The Korean War.  London: Robinson Publishing, 2001.
  3. Geer, A.  The New Breed: The Story of the U.S. Marines in Korea. New York: Harper & Bros., 1952.
  4. Hastings, M.  The Korean War.  New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988.
  5. Varhola, M. J.  Fire and Ice: The Korean War, 1950-1953.  Mason City: Da Capo Press, 2000.

Endnotes:

[1] There is not much information available about Colonel Newton.  In 1941, 1stLt Newton served at the U.S. Embassy, Peking, China, when the Japanese captured and interned him as a prisoner of war until 1945.  Newton’s combat decorations include the Silver Star medal and Legion of Merit in recognition of his courageous and meritorious service in the Korean War.  Colonel Newton retired from active service in 1962.

[2] Colonel Harold S. Roise (1916-1991) commanded the Marine Detachment, USS Maryland on 7 Dec 1941, the USS Alabama on station in the North Atlantic, and during the Battle for Okinawa in World War II.  Colonel Roise’s combat decorations include two (2) Navy Cross medals, the Silver Star medal, Legion of Merit, and Purple Heart.  Roise retired from active service in 1964.

[3] Colonel Robert D. Taplett (1918-2004) commanded the Marine Detachment, USS Salt Lake City on 7 Dec 1941.  The ship, undamaged, later participated in the Battle of the Coral Sea (1942) and Battle of the Aleutian Islands (1943).  Taplett’s combat decorations include the Navy Cross Medal, two (2) Silver Star medals, the Bronze Star medal, and Legion of Merit.  Taplett retired from active service in 1960.  Taplett authored a book entitled Dark Horse Six (2003) about his Korean War service.

[4] Both Fegan and Bohn attained flag rank; Fegan retired as a lieutenant general, and Bohn retired as a major general.

[5] The task force included elements of the 25th U.S. Infantry Division under Major General William B. Kean (minus one regiment and one artillery battalion), reinforced by the 5th Marine Regiment.  LtGen Walker (CG 8thArmy) intended a counter-offensive to deny the NKPA 6th Division from operating in Masan and Chinju.

[6] Tactical Area of Responsibility.

[7] Night reliefs are complex at best — and treacherous.  It is hard to know who is stumbling around in the dark.

Locating the Enemy

— and destroying him.

At the beginning of August 1950, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) had been in South Korea for thirty-six days.  Within that time, the 75,000-man invasion force had pushed the South Korean Army and a few American advisory units into Pusan, South Korea, a major port city on the southeast coast of South Korea.  The US Army had tried to halt the NKPA advance, but the effort failed, and the units, thrown in from their base in Japan, were soon destroyed.  The South Korean people were badly frightened, and — at least so far in the war — the United States and South Korean government had done nothing to give them confidence. 

Every day, thousands of refugees streamed into Pusan, seeking the protection of United Nations forces.  They brought with them what they knew, what they had seen with their own eyes, and what they had heard from others about the resounding defeat of American and South Korean military units.  They knew about the soldiers who had run away from the NKPA, who had dropped their weapons and surrendered, only to be shot down in cold blood.  The fear among the people was palpable.  According to one eye-witness in Pusan, one could almost smell the fear in the people — a peculiar odor that seemed to worsen with each passing day.

But then, a remarkable and easily observable transition took place.  On the evening of 2 August, ships began to arrive from the United States carrying a brigade of United States Marines and all their equipment.  On the morning of 3 August, the American Marines started unloading their combat equipment.  The Marines soon formed on the pier.  Close to 5,000 men dressed in field uniforms with field transport packs on their backs.  They held their weapons at rest along their right side.

A color guard stood in front of the formation; two riflemen stood guard over the United States Flag and the Marine Corps battle standard.  If any of the young Marines standing in formation behind the color guard were fearful, it wasn’t reflected in their demeanor or facial expressions.  South Korean observers noted this, and “the word” quickly spread throughout the city.

The average age of these young Marines was 19 ½ years.  They came from the same land as the other youngsters, who had been fighting in South Korea since early July — and thoroughly defeated by a numerically superior, well-trained, well-armed, and determined enemy.  The poorly trained, poorly led, unresolved, and highly fearful soldier was easily defeated.  In some cases, they threw their weapons away and surrendered.  Korean refugees reported seeing the bodies of dozens of young men lying alongside the dusty roads, their hands tied behind them and murdered in cold blood.  But these young Marines seemed different, somehow.  They exuded confidence.  They did not arrive in South Korea to die but to locate their enemy.

As the Marines were in the process of assembling on the pier, the Commanding General, 1st (Provisional) Marine Brigade, Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, U. S. Marine Corps, met with his senior staff, which included the Commanding Officer, 5th Marine Regiment, and the Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group -33.  He finalized his order with a strict warning:

“The Pusan perimeter is like a weakened dike; the Army intends to use us to plug the holes as they open.  We’re a brigade —a fire brigade.  It will be costly fighting against a numerically superior enemy.  Marines have never lost a battle; this brigade will not be the first to establish such a precedent.  Prepare to move.”

Within an hour, U.S. Marines marched smartly toward a small town named Chang-won.  Chang-won was a dedicated assembly point for elements of the Eighth US Army’s Reserve.

Before the arrival of the Marine Brigade, General Walton Walker, commanding the Eighth US Army, prepared a plan for the United States’ first counteroffensive in the Korean War.  Walker’s idea was to use reserve elements to initiate a thrust toward Chinju through Masan, which was in the hands of the NKPA 6th Infantry Division.  In this way, Walker would force the NKPA to divert some of its forces to confront the reserve while he continued building up his main force.  Once achieving this objective, Walker intended to initiate an even more significant push to the Kum River.  Still, his main thrust would depend upon the arrival in Korea of the US 2nd Infantry Division.

Walker believed his greatest threat was the NKPA 6th Infantry Division, a well-disciplined, supremely confident combat unit with a history of defeating American forces ever since the NKPA invasion of South Korea.  The enemy division was centered in the town of Chinju.  What Walker didn’t know was that the 6th NKPA Division was also preparing for offensive operations.  The NKPA intended to strike the southwestern corner of the Pusan perimeter and capture the town of Masan, 35 miles from Pusan.

Walker’s attack force would form around the US 25th Infantry Division (25 ID), known as Task Force (TF) Kean — after the 25th’s commanding general, William B. Kean.  The division’s regiments included the 27th Infantry Regiment (27 INF), 35th Infantry Regiment (35 INF) 5th Regimental Combat Team (and subordinate units) (5 RCT)[1] and the 1st Marine Brigade (1stMarBde).  Altogether, TF Kean would consist of about 20,000 troops.

Walker’s plan called for TF Kean to kick off operations in the area of Masan, South Korea, with his objectives including the seizure of Chinju from the NKPA 6th Infantry Division.  This would be followed by a larger push to the Kum River by mid-August.  A secondary objective was to divert NKPA units from the Naktong to areas south of Masan.

TF Kean initiated its assault on 7 August.  At the Notch, a northern pass into the city and site of a previous battle, the 35 INF encountered stiff resistance but ultimately defeated 850 NKPA forces.  Kean’s force overran the NKPA 6th Division’s command post, but the Korean division was well trained and nearly fanatical in its own defense.  Remarkably, the NKPA initiated an offensive of their own at about the same time and the two attacking forces clashed.  As the American attack slowed and then stalled, Kean radioed General Craig and gave him operational command of the forward-most units.  General Craig and Colonel Raymond L. Murray, Commanding the 5th Marine Regiment, were relentless in taking the battle to the NKPA despite war-stopping weather.  Relying on Marine Aircraft to dislodge the enemy and air resupply to sustain the offensive, heavy fighting continued for three days.  By 9 August, TF Kean was poised to take Chinju.

On 10 August, Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett[2], Commanding the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5), knocked on the enemy’s door at Kosong.  With radio in hand, he contacted the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines (1/11) and requested a fire mission.  The artillery Marines responded by delivering a lethal salvo of 105mm howitzer fire.  Inside the village, an NKPA motorized regiment panicked and made a mad dash for safety.  The enemy probably acted rationally, but it was a huge mistake.  Overhead, combat aircraft from VMF-323[3] were searching for targets of opportunity.

Looking down from his cockpit flight leader Major Arnold A. Lund witnessed around a hundred vehicles of the NKPA 83rd Motorcycle Regiment (including jeeps and troop-carrying trucks), dashing off down the road leading out of Kosong.  Lund’s Corsairs screamed downward from cruising altitude to strafe the entire length of the column.  The effect of the Marine air attack was akin to the proverbial Chinese Fire Drill.  Korean vehicles zigzagged and crashed into one another and ran off the road into a ditch to get out of the way of Marine Corps aircraft.  The NKPA’s Soviet­-made jeeps and motorcycles were sitting ducks for F4U aircraft, which worked their targets with rocket or 20-mm fire.  After the Marine aircraft had set about 40 vehicles on fire, another flight from VMF-323 arrived, and they were, in turn, followed by USAF F-51s, which put the icing on the cake and the NKPA lost an entire regiment.

The Marine aviators didn’t walk away unscathed.  Two of the lead Corsairs were badly damaged in the initial attack and had to make emergency landings.  Lieutenant Doyle Cole ditched into the bay at the very­-moment General Craig was making a tour of the battle area in a helicopter.  Craig operated the hoist that pulled Doyle out of the water to safety.  Captain Vivian Moses was not as fortunate.  While putting his aircraft down in enemy territory, he was thrown unconscious from the cockpit and drowned in a rice paddy moments before a rescue bird reached his position.  He was the first Marine aviator from MAG-33 killed in the Korean War.[4]

After securing the village of Kosong, 3/5 resumed its attack toward Sachon and soon came upon the scene of chaos left by the F4U’s.  Some of these vehicles were undamaged but wisely abandoned by the NKPA.  Taplett’s Marines were suitably impressed by the motorcycles and sidecars; they noted that the sleek black Russian jeeps were nearly identical to American jeeps.  Curious Marines found the jeeps to contain Ford engines — provided to the Russians under Franklin D. Roosevelt’s lend-lease program of World War II.[5]

The air assault at Kosong was a dramatic example of the capabilities of the Marine Air-Ground Team.  MAG-33 aircraft were constantly in the sky above Marine ground units.  Marine Corps pilots, trained as infantry officers, were relentlessly aware of the ground game; MAG-33 made its aircraft available to the grunts on short notice.  Rendering close air support (CAS) isn’t simple, but it is effective in killing and demoralizing an enemy.  With VMF-214 and VMF-323 based on separate aircraft carriers, combat aircraft could arrive on station with more fuel and ordnance than Air Force missions flying in from Japan.  Overall control of tactical air operations in Korea fell under the Fifth Air Force, of course, but Marine tactical air operations were integrated with a priority support for Marine ground forces.  Other United Nations forces also benefitted from Marine air, but at a lower priority.

Within the Brigade, Tactical Air Control Parties were placed within each battalion, with a regimental TACP exercising overall coordination.  Each TACP consisted of an officer and six enlisted men.  They were equipped with radio-jeeps, portable radios, and other equipment.  General Craig’s headquarters had an air section that planned and advised the brigade commander in matters of tactical use of aircraft.

Company H, 3/5 (also, “How Company”) (letter designated companies used a phonetic alphabet to ensure easily understood radio communications[6]) led the attack into Sachon; M-26 (Pershing) tanks led the way as reconnaissance by fire.  At around 18:00 hours, after Taplett’s column had covered several miles, a lone enemy machine gun in a valley on the left of the battalion’s front wounded three Marines, temporarily holding up the battalion’s advance.  By the time Marine tanks had silenced the enemy machine gun, it was growing dark.  Taplett decided to halt his advance.  He set his battalion in on two hills north of the road.  The Marines prepared their defensive perimeter and settled in for the night.  All the Marines could talk about was the Marine air attack on the NKPA motorized regiment and what a waste of good motorcycles it was.

Offshore and paralleling Taplett’s advance was a Landing Ship Tank (LST) manned by a team from Major William L. Batchelor’s Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion.[7]  Batchelor’s Marines set up supply stations along the Main Supply Route (MSR) in order to keep the ground-pounders supplied with food stores, ammunition, and medical supplies.  The LST also served the Marines as a makeshift hospital ship manned by Company C, 1st Medical Battalion.  For the first time in Marine Corps history helicopters were used in evacuating wounded Marines to the field medical facilities.

As Taplett settled his battalion into a night defense, NKPA forces were in disarray.   For the first time since the North Korean invasion began, an American counterattack not only stopped the enemy’s advance, but it also sent them into a full retreat.  On the morning of 12 August, Taplett’s Marines were but a day’s march from Sachon.  The Army’s 5th Regimental Combat Team (5th RCT) moved in the same direction north along the Chinju route where, although enemy opposition had been light, the RCT’s advance was slow due to several factors, which included streams of refugees constricting primitive roadways.[8]

General Craig anticipated stiffening enemy resistance and passed his concerns along to the senior officers of the Brigade.  Events proved General Craig correct.  Colonel Raymond L. Murray, Commanding Officer of the 5th Marines, was an outstanding combat commander who understood that by demanding aggressive behavior from his battalion commanders and placing unrelenting pressure on the enemy, he would reduce the number of his regiment’s casualties.  Within the next 48 hours, the brigade would carry out one of the most astonishing operations in the history of the Marine Corps: simultaneous battalion assaults, in opposite directions, on two fronts, twenty-five miles apart.

But there was no hint of these developments at 06:30 on 12 August 1950 when LtCol George R. Newton’s 1/5 passed through LtCol Taplett’s 3/5 with the continuing mission to seizing Sachon.  The countryside was quiet when 1/5 stepped off.  Too quiet.  Veteran NCOs grumbled to themselves; the enemy was up to something — but what?

The Brigade Recon Company took the battalion point under Captain Kenneth J. Houghton.  Captain John L. Tobin’s Company B followed Houghton.  Two M-24[9] tanks were placed in line between the 1st and 2nd platoons of Company B.  Three more tanks followed Company B.  There was no hint of an enemy presence.  The unnatural calm lasted nearly five hours as Newton’s Marines advanced eleven miles.  At noon, Sachon was only four miles further down the road.

Captain Houghton and his Marines rounded a bend in the road leading into the thatched-hut village of Changchon and immediately spotted two enemy soldiers scrambling for cover in the distance.  When several Marines opened fire, a well-concealed enemy responded with a massive amount of automatic weapons fire from both sides of the road.

The NKPA’s apparent plan was to wait until the entire Marine column had entered their killing zone, but Marine rifle fire spooked enemy machine gunners into a premature response.  Captain Tobin quickly dispatched his first platoon to reinforce Houghton.  First Lieutenant Hugh C. Schryver led his men forward along the roadside ditches at the cost of three casualties but successfully reinforced Houghton’s small reconnaissance detachment.  Tobin then deployed his second platoon under First Lieutenant David L. Taylor to move up behind the three tanks.  The tanks were unable to maneuver off the road because of the possibility that they would become bogged down in adjacent rice paddies, but as mobile fortresses, they provided some protection to the grunts and added firepower to the forward element.

NKPA fire from the hill on the right pinned down the balance of Tobin’s third platoon and the headquarters section.  LtCol Newton requested that the battalion air controller, First Lieutenant James W. Smith, call for an air strike to suppress or neutralize the enemy ambush.  Mortar and artillery crews began setting up their weapons in hastily selected positions, but Newton wasn’t looking for a protracted fight; he needed overwhelming fire, and he needed it sooner rather than later.  Marine Air was the only external supporting arm available.  After the Corsairs attacked Hill 250, Tobin ordered Second Lieutenant David R. Cowling to lead his third platoon into an attack on the hill.  Newton ordered Company A to dispatch a rifle platoon and a machine gun section to seize Hill 301 (on the right side of the roadway).

As Cowling’s platoon began its movement across an open rice paddy, enemy automatic weapons laid down a murderous crossfire forcing Cowling and his men to withdraw.  Tank and mortar fire had scant effect on the enemy guns.  Cowling lost one Marine killed, and four others seriously wounded.

Company A’s platoon occupied Hill 301 without encountering NKPA resistance.  Smith advised Newton that the overhead aircraft had five minutes remaining on station.  Newton requested that the aircraft engage targets of opportunity along the road to Changchon, which resulted in a repetition of the Kosong turkey shoot, albeit on a smaller scale.  The aviators destroyed a convoy of enemy reinforcements rushing forward to engage Newton’s battalion.

While Lieutenant Cowling withdrew to the base of Hill 301, Newton ordered Captain John R. Stevens, Commanding Able Company, to secure the high ground on the right side of the road with the rest of his men.  Hill 250 was the center of NKPA resistance.  Mortar crews delivered 115 rounds on the enemy’s suspected positions.  Following a second air strike, enemy guns fell silent.  Tobin’s remaining two platoons supported Houghton’s force on the left.  Artillery augmented Marine rifle fire, and one enemy position after another was systematically targeted and eliminated.  Colonel Newton called for three additional air strikes, which allowed Tobin’s 1st and 2nd platoons to cross the road and attack the enemy’s positions.

When Lieutenant Taylor spotted an enemy formation approaching the crest of Hill 202 from the reverse slope, he dispatched Technical Sergeant F. J. Lischeski with a squad of Marines to welcome them to the party.  Lischeski ordered his Marines to hold fire until the enemy was within 75 feet.  The enemy unit was eliminated.  Of the 39 men in the NKPA ambush detachment, 38 died instantly; the remaining survivor died from his wounds a short time later.

With darkness approaching, Tobin ordered his company into a night defense.  Colonel Newton suspected that an NKPA force remained behind to provide security for what remained of the withdrawing 6th NKPA Infantry Division and remnants of the 83rd Motorized Regiment.  At the end of the day, Newton had lost three Marines killed and 13 wounded.  Newton orchestrated the evacuation of his casualties by road, protected by tanks.  Newton’s response to the NKPA ambush was an excellent demonstration of a Marine infantry battalion’s lethality.

Mission Redirect

While Newton engaged the enemy at Changchon, Brigadier General Craig received another hot potato.  General Kean ordered Craig to provide a reinforced infantry battalion back to Chindong-ni.  Kean reported that the situation was critical; NKPA forces had penetrated and overran three batteries of artillery.  Kean expected the Marines to move immediately because the MSR was in grave danger of being cut.  A Marine counterattack was needed “now.”  General Kean advised Craig, “The assault into Sachon is no longer a priority.”

At nightfall, Newton expected to lead his weary battalion into Sachon early the following day.  However, at midnight on 12 August, Colonel Murray[10] radioed Newton and ordered him to prepare to move by truck at 0630 to a new sector.

Endnotes:

[1] The 5RCT was a heavily reinforced regiment consisting of the US 5th Infantry Regiment, 555th Field Artillery Battalion, 72nd Engineer Company, 5th Tank Company, a heavy mortar company, 5th Medical Company, and the 5th Aviation Section. 

[2] Bob Taplett (1918-2004) served with distinction as a Marine officer for twenty years, serving in World War II and the Korean War.  He was awarded the Navy Cross and two awards of the Silver Star medal in recognition of his courage under fire.  Retiring in 1960, Taplett authored an autobiography titled Darkhorse Six, published in 2003.

[3] See also: Death Rattlers.

[4] On the previous day, Moses had been shot down and rescued behind enemy lines.  Despite this harrowing experience, Moses volunteered to fly the mission on 11 August.

[5] It is bad enough to have to face a determined enemy but having to confront them with weapons made in the United States adds insult to injury.

[6] For example, in 1950, the phonetic alphabet for A, B, C, D, and E was Able, Baker, Charlie, Dog, and Easy.  To standardize the phonetic alphabet among Allied radiophone spellings, again for clarity and consistency, the phonetic alphabet was later changed to Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, and Echo.  How Company later became Hotel Company.

[7] A Marine shore party battalion were mostly task organized units, the size and makeup of which depended on their assigned mission.  Battalion strengths ranged from 273 Marines and 8 Navy medical personnel to 567 Marines and 19 corpsmen.  The battalion’s table of organization called for an H&S Company and three letter designated companies.  The letter companies were cargo handlers moving necessary supplies from sea to shore or from air terminal to the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

[8] Civilian refugees are “war stoppers” for several reasons.  Not only do American commanders avoid civilian casualties whenever possible, according to the law of land warfare, but large groups of refugees interrupt the flow of military traffic and enemy infiltrators use these groups to get behind American lines to sabotage and disrupt main supply routes (MSRs).

[9] The M-24 Chaffee light tank fielded a 75mm gun and a .50 caliber Browning machine gun.  The 75mm gun was insufficient in knocking out the Russian made T-34 medium tank.

[10] Major General Raymond L. Murray (1913-2004) was a highly decorated officer who earned two Navy Cross medals, one during World War II and one during the Korean War.  During World War II, he participated in the battles for Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Saipan.  In Korea, he served in the Pusan Perimeter, Inchon, the Second Battle of Seoul, and the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir.  He was also awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, four Silver Star medals, the Legion of Merit, and the Purple Heart Medal.  General Murray retired from the Marine Corps in 1968.  I met General Murray on several occasions.  He was always cordial, and once we met, he never forgot your name or when he had last spoken to you.  Semper Fi, General.

Fighting Withdrawal, Korea 1950

Webb D. Sawyer (1918 – 1995), a son of the State of Ohio, graduated from the University of Toledo and received his Marine Corps commission in 1941.  During World War II, he served in the 24th Marines and participated in the battles of Kwajalein, Saipan, and Tinian as the Third Battalion’s operations officer.  When the battalion executive officer was wounded in action, Captain Sawyer assumed that role.  He received the Bronze Star Medal for valor during the Battle of Saipan.  Upon promotion to major, he assumed the duties as Regimental Operations Officer during the Battle of Iwo Jima.

When the Korean War broke out, Major Sawyer assumed command of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division.  In that capacity, he took part in the landing at Inchon and the Battle of Seoul in September 1950.

On the night of 3 November, during the regiment’s advance into North Korea from Wonsan, enemy forces fiercely assaulted Sawyer’s battalion, but under his leadership and direction, the men resisted and then defeated their attackers.  Two weeks later, sub-zero temperatures arrived in the area of the Chosin Reservoir — accompanied by thirteen Chinese infantry divisions (compromising the Ninth Chinese Army) — all in time for the celebration of Thanksgiving, 1950.  The Chinese would receive a warm welcome from the 1st Marine Division and what remained alive of the U.S. Army’s Task Force Faith.  Thus began a fighting withdrawal lasting eleven days over the most inhospitable terrain in North Korea.  The American’s withdrawal cost the Chinese ten of their infantry divisions.

On 6 December 1950, Sawyer’s Battalion encountered a heavily reinforced Chinese roadblock position.  Sawyer led the battalion in its assault, defeated the roadblock, and continued directing close combat for the next twenty-two hours.  Despite a painful wound to his foot from enemy shrapnel, Sawyer continued fighting his rapidly depleting battalion.

During the continued withdrawal, Sawyer’s battalion was ordered to provide flanking security on Hill 1304 for the Division’s main body.  Note: Marines providing flanking security along the surrounding hills of the main supply route (MSR) were constantly climbing or descending mountainous terrain, engaging the enemy wherever found.  Hill 1304 indicated that the top of that hill measured 1,304 meters above sea level.

At one point, Sawyer noted an enemy rifle company attempting to outflank one of his companies.  Again, Sawyer led the attack and routed the enemy from his position, inflicting heavy losses.  After seizing the hill, he led his battalion four miles down the steep incline.  Webb Sawyer was awarded three Silver Star medals during the Chosin Reservoir Campaign.  In total, Sawyer earned the Navy Cross, Silver Star (3), Legion of Merit (2), Bronze Star with “V”, and the Purple Heart Medal.  After service in the Vietnam War, Sawyer retired from active duty.  By then, he was serving as a Brigadier General.

One of Sawyer’s men was Private First Class Hector A. Cafferata, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.  PFC Cafferata was born in New York City in 1929; his father was a Peruvian migrant.  In high school, Hector played football, moving to the semi-professional league in 1943.  Following Cafferata’s enlistment in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve in 1948, the  Marines assigned him to the 21st Infantry Battalion (Reserve) for service and training at Dover, New Jersey.  In September 1950, Cafferata was ordered to active duty and pre-deployment training at Camp Pendleton, California.  He embarked for Korea in October and, upon arrival, was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines.

PFC Cafferata distinguished himself in combat during the Chosin Reservoir campaign.  After all the men in his fireteam had been killed, Cafferata single-handedly held off the advanced element of a Chinese infantry regiment and personally annihilated two enemy rifle platoons.  He and PFC Kenneth Benson were the only two Marines able to resist the enemy’s assault.  After a fragmentation grenade temporarily blinded him, PFC Benson assumed responsibility for reloading Cafferata’s M-1 Rifle.  Hector, a crack shot, fought the enemy without either his coat or boots — neither of which he could locate in the early morning darkness.  Cafferata’s battle lasted well over five hours.

According to Hector’s testimony, “For the rest of the night, I was batting hand grenades away with my entrenching tool while firing my rifle at them.  I must have whacked a dozen grenades that night with my e-tool.”  When a grenade landed in the shallow entrenchment occupied by wounded Marines, he grabbed the grenade and lobbed it toward the enemy, thereby saving the lives of many Marines but also receiving several painful wounds.  He was finally wounded and disabled by an enemy sniper, but by then, he was rescued by reinforcing Marines.

The Marines airlifted PFC Cafferata to Japan, and he returned to the United States in December 1950.  On 1 September 1951, PFC Cafferata was ordered to the retired list.  On 24 November 1952, President Harry S. Truman awarded PFC Cafferata the Medal of Honor.  His citation reads as follows:

PRIVATE HECTOR A. CAFFERATA Jr.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE

For service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Rifleman with Company F, Second Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea on 28 November 1950.  When all the other members of his fire team became casualties, creating a gap in the lines, during the initial phase of a vicious attack launched by a fanatical enemy of regimental strength against his company’s hill position, Private CAFFERATA waged a lone battle with grenades and rifle fire as the attack gained momentum and the enemy threatened penetration through the gap and endangered the integrity of the entire defensive perimeter. Making a target of himself under the devastating fire from automatic weapons, rifles, grenades, and mortars, he maneuvered up and down the line.  He delivered accurate and effective fire against the onrushing force, killing fifteen, wounding many more, and forcing the others to withdraw so that reinforcements could move up and consolidate the position.  Again fighting desperately against a renewed onslaught later that same morning when a hostile grenade landed in a shallow entrenchment occupied by wounded Marines, Private CAFFERATA rushed into the gully under heavy fire, seized the deadly missile in his right hand, and hurled it free of his comrades before it detonated, severing part of one finger, and seriously wounding him in the right hand and arm.  Courageously ignoring the intense pain, he staunchly fought on until he was struck by a sniper’s bullet and forced to submit to evacuation for medical treatment. Stouthearted and indomitable, Private CAFFERATA, by his fortitude, great personal valor, and dauntless perseverance in the face of almost certain death, saved the lives of several of his fellow Marines and contributed essentially to the success achieved by his company in maintaining its defensive position against tremendous odds. His extraordinary heroism throughout was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

/S/ HARRY S. TRUMAN

In addition to his Medal of Honor, PFC Cafferata was awarded the Purple Heart Medal, Combat Action Ribbon, Presidential Unit Citation, National Defense Service Medal, Korean Service Medal, Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, and the United Nations Korean Service Medal.  Note: The U.S. Presidential Unit Citation is equivalent to the Silver Star Medal (awarded to every man in the unit cited).

After his wartime service, Hector worked as a salesman, a game warden, and a tavern owner in Alpha, New Jersey.  Upon learning that fellow Marine PFC Kenneth Benson (1932-2012) had not received any recognition for his part in the battle, Cafferata petitioned the Marine Corps to have Benson similarly recognized with the Medal of Honor.  As a result of Cafferata’s efforts, PFC Benson was awarded the Silver Star Medal in 2000. Hector retired to Florida, where he passed away on 12 April 2016.  He was survived by his wife, four children, six grandchildren, three great-grandchildren, and his brother. 

American Rangers

Introduction

Whenever a British-American colony faced hostile Indians or threats from a foreign military presence, colonial governors and legislatures raised provisional (temporary) regiments to defend colonial settlements. Interim organizations were full-time military units but served for specific emergencies or pre-specified periods.  Provisional troops differed from regular British army units in several ways:

  • The length of local military service for those serving in the ranks lasted for the campaign season’s duration; field officers usually served over many years.
  • The colonies recruited enlisted men through a quota system that might incorporate local militia.[1]
  • All officers received their appointments from colonial governors or legislatures.  Field officers were usually men of social or political importance, such as landowners and colonial legislature members;[2] junior officers were usually appointed because they had previously served as popular militia officers[3].
  • The recruitment standards were lower within the provincial regiments than in the militia.
  • Provincial recruitment included a demand for individuals experienced in logistical support, such as providing and transporting food, surgical supplies, and munitions.
  • The officers and ranks of provisional regiments received pay for their services, for infantry privates around one shilling, sixpence per month (in today’s currency, £8.53).

The first provincial forces organized in British North America occurred during King William’s War in the 1670s, consisting primarily of men from the Massachusetts Bay Colony.  During Queen Anne’s War, provincial regiments were raised from Massachusetts Bay, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, making up most British forces.  During King George’s War, most provincial regiments originated in Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.  In the Seven Years’ War, the British commander relegated local forces to non-combat roles supporting the regular British Army — primarily as pioneers and freight haulers.  Those men were essential to the operation of the regular army.

In 1670, around half of the men living in the British colonies were literate, but they weren’t the most effective fighting force despite their intellect.  There are reasons for this.  Whatever training provincial forces did receive, they obtained from British regular forces — usually from the salty old color sergeant who drilled the men in battlefield tactics.  This training might have been okay, except that British regular forces serving in North America were organized and trained for European-style engagements.  European battle organizations/formations were ill-suited for frontier warfare because Indians employed guerilla-style tactics; they made good use of camouflage and concealment before launching surprise attacks.  While the British grouped their ranks in orderly ranks and formations, an Indian attack was more on the order of a free-for-all.  What the colonies needed — and what they produced, were Ranger companies.  Rangers were frontiersmen and accomplished Indian fighters.[4]

Enter the Rangers

John Smith provides the earliest record of ranger operations in British America, dated around 1622.  “When I had ten men able to go abroad, our commonwealth was very strong.  With such a number, I ranged that unknown country 14 weeks.”  Smith tells us that many ranger units were small, around the same number of men as present-day infantry squads.  Note that army squads consist of ten men, including the squad leader and two fire teams of four men each.  Marine squads involve thirteen men, including the squad leader and three fire teams of four men each.   

Benjamin Church (b. 1639) was the grandson of Richard Warren, one of the original Mayflower passengers who landed at Plymouth.  In 1667, he married Alice Southworth in Duxbury, Massachusetts.  During King Philip’s War, Church was the principal military aide to Governor Josiah Winslow of the Plymouth Colony.[5]  Governor Winslow commissioned Church as a captain on 24 July 1675.  He commanded a mixed independent company of Indian allies and English settlers — the first company of which successfully raided the camps of hostile Indians in the upper regions of the Massachusetts colony.

Captain Church (realizing that European-style battle formations were ineffective against the Indians) began to imagine a different style of warfare on the frontier.  Many of his Indian recruits were Christians (called Praying Indians); from them, he learned the Indian skill set of tracking, stalking, blending in with one’s surroundings, ambushing, and raiding.

On 19 December 1675, colonial forces representing Massachusetts, Plymouth, and Connecticut (and their Indian allies) engaged and killed 300 Narragansett warriors.  The battle was significant because the survivors of the Narragansett tribe withdrew from the conflict and remained in hiding until after the war and also because Captain Church had started an American tradition.  One of the men serving under Church was the father of John Lovewell (1691-1725), whose ruthless warfighting skills made him the most famous ranger of the early colonial period.[6]

Another famous American ranger was John Gorham (1709-1751).  Gorham was the first “significant” British military presence in the Nova Scotia and Acadia frontier to remain in the region for a substantial period.  Gorham’s Rangers included two armed ships (the Anson and Warren — about 70 tons each) that performed regular patrols off the coast of Nova Scotia.  He was first commissioned as a captain in 1744, later promoted to lieutenant colonel in the 7th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment in 1745, and two years later received a commission as a captain in an independent company in the British Army.  Gorham’s father (1686-1746) also served as a colonel in the provincial forces during King George’s War.  Gorham was among the few American colonists to receive a regular British Army commission.[7]

Few people today have ever heard of Church, Lovewell, or Gorham — but nearly everyone has heard of Robert Rogers (1731-1795), if for no other reason than he played a conspicuous role in Alexander Rose’s book, Washington’s Spies: The Story of America’s First Spy Ring (2007) and the subsequent television series titled Turn: Washington’s Spies.

Robert Rogers was a British-American frontiersman who served in the British Army during the French and Indian War (1754-1763) and the American Revolution (1765-1783).[8]  Rogers raised and commanded Rogers’ Rangers with service in the New York colony’s Lake George and Lake Champlain regions.  These rangers frequently mounted winter raids against French towns and military emplacements.[9]  Despite the rangers’ ability to fight in inhospitable environments, the regular British Army looked upon these frontiersmen with disdain.  Today, the Queen’s York Rangers (Canada), U. S. Army Rangers, and the US 119th Field Artillery claim military lineage to Rogers’ Rangers.  Rogers’ Standing Orders appear in the U. S. Army Ranger Handbook.

According to some historians, Major Richard Rogers offered his services to General George Washington at the outset of the American Revolution.  Washington, fearing that Rogers was a British plant, refused the offer.  We then understand that a much-put-out Rogers joined forces with British loyalists, raised the Queen’s Rangers, and fought against the American rebels.  Rogers is credited with capturing the American spy Nathan Hale — which was no major achievement because Nathan Hale may have been America’s most incompetent spy.  In 1779, Rogers traveled to Nova Scotia, where he created the King’s Rangers Regiment, with service through the end of the revolution.

In January 1812, the US War Department authorized six companies of U. S. Rangers — a mounted infantry regiment charged with protecting the western frontier.  A year later, an additional ten companies were raised.  Official Army records in 1813 list twelve companies of Rangers.  The Army disbanded these companies in 1815.

During the Black Hawk War (1832), a battalion of mounted rangers (dragoons were an early version of the United States cavalry) recruited frontiersmen to serve for one year.[10]  The Army required each man to provide his own horses and weapons.  The battalion consisted of six companies of 100 men each.  The battalion commander was Major Henry Dodge.[11]

During the American Civil War, the Army fielded three ranging units: Loudoun’s Rangers, consisting primarily of Quaker and German soldiers; Blazer’s Scouts, who mainly confronted other irregular forces (such as the Bushwhackers), and for the Confederacy, John Mosby’s Rangers. 

Entering the Modern Era

Early in World War II, Major General Lucian Truscott proposed creating an Army commando unit modeled on the British Commandos.  Subsequently, five ranger battalions served in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Battalions, U. S. Rangers).  Another battalion (the 6th) was organized for service in the Pacific (PTO).  Additional battalions (numbered 7th through 10th) were organized on paper as part of the American disinformation campaign, also known as Operation Quicksilver.

Eighty percent of the 1st Ranger Battalion came from the US 34th Infantry Division; of those, following commando training at Carrickfergus, Northern Ireland, fifty men were selected to serve with British Commandos during the raid at Dieppe.  These men were the first US soldiers to serve in ground combat in the ETO.  The 1st, 3rd, and 4th Battalions fought in North Africa and Italy as Darby’s Rangers.  At the Battle of Cisterna on 29 January 1944, most of the men assigned to the 1st and 3rd battalions were either killed or captured, with the remaining rangers reassigned and absorbed into the First Special Service Force under Brigadier General Robert L. Frederick (also known as the Devil’s Brigade), a joint United States-Canadian ranger brigade.  A temporary ranger battalion was formed from the US 29th Infantry Division in December 1942, which served until November 1943.

During the invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944, Company D, Company E, and Company F of the 2nd Ranger Battalion landed at Pointe du Hoc — an assault force of 225 men.  Members of the 29th Ranger Battalion augmented the 2nd and 5th battalions.  Several landing craft capsized in the stormy waters, resulting in several men drowning during the initial assault.  A navigation error caused a one-hour delay in the operation and the loss of the element of surprise, resulting in an additional loss of 30 men.  The remaining 190 Rangers scaled the cliffs utilizing rope ladders.  At the top of Pointe du Hoc, only 90 men remained capable of carrying firearms.  Although the Germans had removed the heavy artillery pieces overlooking Pointe du Hoc, the battalion successfully seized the position and disabled a battery of 155mm artillery placed 1,000 yards behind the Atlantic Wall.

Company A, Company B, and Company C of the 2nd battalion landed with the 5th Rangers at Omaha Beach, completing their assigned mission despite suffering tremendous casualties during the assault.  Company A lost 96% of its men on Omaha Beach; only two men survived the landing unscathed.

Two separate Ranger units fought in the Pacific War: the 98th Field Artillery, activated on 16 December 1940, was re-designated the 6th Ranger Battalion on 20 September 1944.  This battalion led the invasion of the Philippines and executed the raid on the Cabanatuan Prisoner of War Camp.  At the end of the war, the battalion was deactivated while still serving in Japan on 30 December 1945.  In 1943, a nearly 3,000-man composite unit was formed around Frank Merrill —known as Merrill’s Marauders.  The training of these men followed the training scheme of Major General Orde Wingate, British Army, whose field of expertise and specialization involved deep penetration raids behind enemy lines.  Merrill’s Marauders were employed against the Japanese in the Burma Campaign.

Korea and Vietnam

The United States initiated general demobilization of the armed forces almost immediately following the surrender of Germany (7 May 1945) and Japan (2 Sep 1945).  As with all the other armed services under the post-war presidency of Harry S. Truman and Defense Secretary Louis A. Johnson, the Army was gutted and, therefore, unprepared for major combat on 25 June 1950.  The re-activation of a unique ranger unit was needed in the earliest days of the Korean War.  In mid-August 1950, the 8th Ranger Company was formed under the command of Second Lieutenant Ralph Puckett.[12]

The company was a light infantry force specializing in finding and engaging the enemy in fire and close combat.  The 8th Ranger Company became the model for all subsequent ranger units.  Rather than companies within light infantry battalions, U. S. Army rangers in Korea and Vietnam operated as companies attached to larger units as special mission forces.  Between mid-August 1950 and April 1951, the Army activated sixteen additional ranger companies, designated 1st through 15th Ranger Company.  To form these new units, the Army solicited volunteers from the 505th Airborne Regiment, the 80th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division.

In the Korean War, rangers patrolled, probed, scouted, and conducted raids and ambushes against Chinese and North Korean units.  In one nighttime raid, the 1st Ranger Company destroyed the headquarters element of the 12th North Korean Division.  In another, Lieutenant Puckett’s company became famous when they captured and held a strategic hill overlooking the Chongchon River — and held it against overwhelming enemy forces.  During this battle, Puckett was wounded several times by grenades and mortar fire.  Puckett’s injuries were so severe that he required hospitalization for over a year.

During the Vietnam War, the Army formed Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) companies to perform heavily armed reconnaissance teams to patrol inside enemy-controlled areas.  LRRP teams and companies were attached to every brigade/division.  Company E, 52nd Infantry (LRP)[13] pulled off one of the more daring missions in the Vietnam War on 19 April 1968 by seizing Signal Hill on Dong Re Lao Mountain in the A Shau Valley.

On 1 January 1969, the Army’s LRRP units were re-named Ranger Companies, 75th Infantry Regiment.  Fifteen companies were raised from LRRP units serving at locations around the globe.  The 75th Infantry Regiment’s lineage was linked to Merrill’s Marauders.  The independent companies were designated Alpha through Papa (excluding Juliet).[14]  In addition to scouting and reconnaissance patrols, the Ranger companies provided terrain assessment, security missions, recovery operations, interrogation of captured soldiers, enemy communications intercept, and disruption of enemy supply routes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.  Most Ranger team leaders and assistants graduated from the 5th Special Forces Group Recon School at Nha Trang.

Late Twentieth Century

In January 1974, the Army directed the formation of a Ranger battalion — the first such battalion since World War II.  The 1st Ranger Battalion was activated on 1 July 1974 at Fort Stewart, Georgia; the 2nd Ranger Battalion was activated on 1 October 1974.  In 1980, soldiers of the 1st Battalion participated in Operation Eagle Claw, the Iranian hostage rescue mission.  The mission was subsequently aborted due to numerous coordination and equipment failures, none of which were the fault of the assigned soldiers.  Of eight aircraft assigned to the mission, only five arrived at the pre-operation staging location — three experienced mechanical issues.  As available helicopters prepared to withdraw from staging, one of the aircraft crashed into a C-130, killing eight soldiers.

In October 1983, the 1st and 2nd Ranger Battalions participated in Operation Urgent Fury — the rescue of American medical students on the island of Grenada.  On 1 October 1984, the Army activated the 3rd Ranger Battalion at Fort Benning, GA.  In February 1986, the 75th Ranger Regiment was re-activated, incorporating the three ranger battalions.

Operation Just Cause

Relations between the United States and Panama had been deteriorating over several years.  In May 1989, after political opponents revealed that Panamanian President Manuel Noriega had stolen the election, Noriega officially canceled the election and retained power by force of arms, which was unpopular among the Panamanian people.  President George H. W. Bush called upon Noriega to honor the people’s will while directing the reinforcement of military installations of the U.S. Canal Zone. 

In October, Noriega survived an attempt by the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) to overthrow him.  Urged on by Noriega, the Panamanian general assembly passed a resolution on 15 December 1989, which declared war on the United States.  The next day, four US military personnel were stopped at a roadblock outside the PDF headquarters in Panama City.  Four officers (Marine Corps Captain Richard E. Haddad, Navy Lieutenant Michael J. Wilson, Army Captain Barry L. Rainwater, and Marine First Lieutenant Robert Paz) were en route to a downtown hotel for dinner.  Their privately owned vehicle was surrounded by a mob of citizens, accompanied by members of the PDF.  The PDF opened fire and mortally wounded Lieutenant Paz.  Hadded, who was driving, was also wounded.  Because a Navy officer and his wife witnessed the incident, the PDF arrested the couple.  While in custody, Panamanian troops assaulted the Naval officer’s wife.  It was then that President Bush ordered the invasion of Panama, citing the shooting incident and Panama’s declaration of war.

The entire Ranger regiment participated in Operation Just Cause in late December 1989 — their mission was the capture of two airfields and Noriega’s beach house.  In the process of completing that mission, they took over 1,000 Panamanian soldiers into custody.

War on Terror

Beginning in 1991, American Rangers (along with other US and coalition armed forces) began participating in what has become the Middle Eastern wars, a substantial commitment of American personnel and financial resources.  Since then, Rangers have deployed to Somalia (1993) and Kosovo (2000), and deployments to Iraq, Syria, Waziristan, and Afghanistan have been so frequent and so widely dispersed that each of the three battalions has added an additional light infantry company to help shoulder the regiment’s world-wide responsibilities.

Today, Army rangers operate within the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), a unified command that supervises the special operations components of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.  USSOCOM was created in the aftermath of the failed attempt to rescue diplomats from the US Embassy in Tehran.  The command’s activities involve clandestine operations involving direct action, reconnaissance/intelligence gathering, counter-terrorism, unconventional measures, psychological operations, civil affairs, and counter-narcotics.  Each armed force has its unique operations component, but each is structured to work together as a joint-force team.

USSOCOM comprises the Joint Special Operations Command, Special Operations Command — Joint Capabilities, the Army Special Operations Command, Marine Corps Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, and Air Force Special Operations Command.

The Army Special Operations Command includes 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment (Delta Force), 75th Ranger Regiment (the US Army’s premier light infantry organization), and Army Special Operations Aviation Command (Airborne).  There are also unique units, such as two psychological operations groups (airborne) and the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, who help sustain civilian populations who suffer the trauma of war and natural disasters.

No one ever said war was easy.

Sources:

  1. American Forces in Action (series), “Pointe du Hoc and the 2nd Ranger Battalion.”  U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1946.
  2. Black, R. W.  Ranger Dawn: The American Ranger from the Colonial Era to the Mexican War.  Penn: Stackpole Books, 2009.
  3. Burhans, R. D.  The First Special Service Force: A Canadian/American Wartime Alliance: The Devil’s Brigade.  Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947.
  4. Bahmanyar, M.  U. S. Army Ranger, 1983-2002.  Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003.
  5. Church, B., and Thomas Church.  The History of Philip’s War, Commonly Called The Great Indian War of 1675 and 1676.  S. G. Drake, ed.  J & B Williams, 1829 (online).
  6. Cuneo, J. R.  Robert Rogers of the Rangers.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1959
  7. Faragher, J. M.  A Great and Noble Scheme.  New York: Norton & Company, 2005.
  8. Grenier, J.  The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
  9. Harrison, G. A.  Cross Channel Attack.  U. S. Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations.  Washington, D. C.: U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1951.
  10. O’Donnell, P. K.  Dog Company: The Boys of Pointe Du Hoc: The Rangers Who Accomplished D-Day’s Toughest Mission and Led the Way Across Europe.  Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2012.
  11. Taylor, T. H., and R. J. Martin.  Ranger — Lead the Way. Turner Publishing, 1996.
  12. Werner, B.  First Special Service Force, 1942-44.  Osprey Publishing, 2006.
  13. Zaboly, G. S.  A True Ranger: The Life and Many Wars of Major Robert Rogers.  Garden City Park: Royal Blockhouse, 2004.

Endnotes:

[1] Militia (also called minutemen) consisted of local able-bodied men between the ages of 16 and 60 who, beginning in 1645, were drawn from local settlements and underwent rudimentary training to respond (within minutes) of an emergency.  Over time, service with the militia became the ‘moral obligation’ of the more prominent men within the community.  From within this upper class body of men, militia officers were elected by the men they would lead in conflict.

[2] George Washington, who started the Seven Years War, was commissioned by Robert Dinwiddie, Royal Governor of Virginia.  Washington, therefore, was a provincial officer vs. a militia officer.  

[3] Militia officers were generally “elected” by the men whom they led, hence the expression “popular” officers.

[4] By use of the term “accomplished Indian fighters,” I mean to suggest that if they were still alive, then they were survivors of one or more bloody confrontations with hostile Indians.

[5] Known variously as King Philip’s War, the First Indian War, Metacom’s War, and Pometacomet’s Rebellion, was a conflict between 1675-1678 between American Indians in the New England region and its colonists and their Indian allies.  King Philip was an Indian chief named Metacom who adopted the name Philip because of the friendly relations between his father and the New England colonists.  In this instance, relations deteriorated because in attempting to seize all firearms in possession of the Wampanoags, the colonists hanged three of the tribe.

[6] More than 100 years after his death, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Henry David Thoreau wrote stories about John Lovewell’s clash with the Abenaki Indians.  A description of Lovewell includes “scalp hunter,” which reflects the training Ranger’s received from their Indian allies.  There are several explanations for the removal of a dead enemy’s hair and all of them may be factually based — it is another small matter lost in time.  One theory is that in taking scalps, Indian warriors proved their valor in combat; another is that scalping denied the victim a special place in the afterlife.  Either way, the Indians taught American Rangers how to do it and why they should.  Suffice to say that Natty Bumppo was a figment of James Fenimore Cooper’s imagination, but John Lovewell was the real deal. 

[7] The few officers who received a regular British Army commission included John Gorham, Joseph Gorham, Benoni Danks, and Richard Rogers. 

[8] The year 1764 is generally regarded as the beginning of the American Revolution (in philosophical discourse) because it was around that time when the British-American colonists began to question the right of the British Parliament to tax the colonies without the participation of colonial members of the Parliament or any colonial representation in the British Parliament.  From the viewpoint of British prime ministers, the series of taxes levied upon the colonists, beginning in 1765 (subsequently withdrawn in some cases) was necessary because (according to PM George Grenville), the whole of revenues of the American customs houses in 1764 amounted to only £2,000 annually, while the British government was paying between £7-8,000 annually to collect them.  Even in the opinion of Adam Smith, Parliament “… has never hitherto demanded of [the American colonies] anything which even approached to a just proportion to what was paid by their fellow subjects as home.”

[9] Significant because at that time, opposing military forces frequently went into winter camps during frigid weather.

[10] Mounted infantry are also frequently referred to as dragoons.

[11] Henry Dodge also served in the US House of Representatives, and as Governor of the Wisconsin Territory.  In earlier years, he was indicted as a co-conspirator of Aaron Burr but the charges against him were later dropped. 

[12] Ralph Puckett, Jr., (1926—) (USMA ’49) volunteered to command the newly activated ranger company soon after his arrival in Japan.  The company, a light infantry force, specialized in searching for enemy forces and engaging them in direct fire and close combat.

[13] Later redesignated Company H, Rangers.

[14] The U. S. Army has not had a Company J since 1816 because the letter J looks too much like the letter I.

248th Marine Corps Birthday

Gunfire and loud explosions cause most people to run in the opposite direction — for their safety.  Personal safety is not something Marines spend a lot of time thinking about.  They are more inclined to run toward the danger.  This has been going on now for 248 years — and they do it with a tight focus, unparalleled stamina, and a refusal to quit.  Congress approved the Medal of Honor in 1862.  Since then, 297 Marines have received this prestigious medal for acts of valor above and beyond the call of duty.

Marine Corps stories are inspirational; their valorous conduct is inspirational.  Part of it is that such stories inspire others to consider joining the Marines.

JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
(Philadelphia) Friday, November 10, 1775

Resolved, That two Battalions of marines be raised, consisting of one Colonel, two Lieutenant Colonels, two Majors, and other officers as usual in other regiments; and that they consist of an equal number of privates with other battalions; that particular care be taken, that no persons be appointed to office, or enlisted into said Battalions, but such as are good seamen, or so acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantage by sea when required; that they be enlisted and commissioned to serve for and during the present war between Great Britain and the colonies, unless dismissed by order of Congress: that they be distinguished by the names of the first and second battalions of American Marines, and that they be considered as part of the number which the continental Army before Boston is ordered to consist of.

Ordered, That a copy of the above be transmitted to the General.

This ancient document tells us that a Marine Corps existed before the United States of America.  The officer appointed to command these two battalions was Captain Sam Nicholas.  He quickly established a recruiting station at Tun Tavern in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  Nicholas was looking for a few good men.  That tradition continues today — the search for Americans with what it takes to fight and win our country’s battles.

Not long after Captain Nicholas began his recruiting effort, on 3-4 March 1776, five Marine companies conducted an amphibious raid at Nassau.  The American forces needed munitions and gunpowder, and the British had lots of it.  So, continental naval forces went to the Bahamas to seize British stores.  It wasn’t the most significant operation ever conducted by Marines, but it was a start.

After the American Revolution, Islamists in North Africa brought attention to themselves as pirates by attacking, seizing, capturing, and enslaving American sailors and holding them for ransom.  The situation was partly the fault of Congress for deciding to pay the cutthroats their ransom; it only inspired them to conduct more raids against American shipping.  Such behavior inspired President George Washington (who was never a fan of the Navy) to create the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps to safeguard American interests at sea and on foreign shores.

The Battle of Derna in 1805 was a defensive measure against the Barbary Pirates.  Marines were the first Americans to raise the United States Flag over a foreign nation.  Did the Islamists learn any important lessons from their encounter with U.S. Marines?  No, of course not.  We’re still fighting them today.

A little more than a hundred years later, Marines joined with their Army brothers in fighting the war to end all wars.  To dislodge the Germans from their positions within Belleau Wood in France, Marines launched a remarkable soul-shredding assault, which destroyed the enemy’s will to launch any counter-offensives.  The attack of the Marine Brigade, fighting as part of the US Second Infantry Division of the American Expeditionary Force, was so overwhelming that the Germans nicknamed them “Devil Dogs.” The name has stuck because of their relentless fighting spirit, and America’s Marines are still referred to as Devil Dogs today.

At the end of the Great War, the U.S. government rolled over and went back to sleep – but the Navy and Marine Corps remained wide awake and vigilant.  Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Pete Ellis predicted trouble with the Empire of Japan, urging the Navy and Marine Corps to begin preparations for another “great war.”

Between 1920 and 1940, the Navy-Marine Corps team put together deep-water and amphibious warfare doctrines that would guarantee victory to the Allied Powers in Atlantic, Mediterranean, Indian, and Pacific Ocean theaters of operations.  Part of this planning and preparation included innovative tactical strategies, including close air support for Marine ground forces.  Despite the success of such strategies and tactics, America’s land and air forces failed to comprehend the value of close air support until the Korean War (1950-53).

In September 1941, the U.S. Army Air Corps developed plans for war against Germany and Japan, basing the B-29 Superfortress in Egypt for operations against Germany.  Air Corps planning throughout 1942 and early 1943 continued to have the B-29 deployed initially against Germany, transferring to the Pacific only after the end of the war in Europe.

By the end of 1943, however, plans had changed, partly due to production delays, and the B-29 was soon earmarked for service in the Pacific Theater.  The Air Corps’ new plan was implemented by presidential order and dubbed Operation Matterhorn.  The United States would use B-29 aircraft to bomb Japan from forward air bases in Southern China and India, as needed.

American Air Corps and Chinese war planners selected the Chengdu region as suitable for B-29 home base operations.  The XX Bomber Command was initially intended to operate two combat wings of four air groups each, but these numbers were significantly reduced because of a lack of aircraft.

The scheme was costly because India and China had no overland connection.  All supplies required aerial transport over the Himalayan Mountains.  Such operations forced the Air Corps to lighten combat aircraft so that they could fly safely over the world’s highest mountain range.  The first flights took place in April 1944, the first bombing mission directed against Imperial Japanese forces in Bangkok on 5 June.  During this initial mission, the Air Corps lost five out of 77 aircraft due to non-combat issues.

The first bombing mission flown against the Japanese home islands occurred on 15 June – the first air assault on Japan since Doolittle.  Enemy ground anti-aircraft fire destroyed two B-29s; a third “disappeared” over the Himalayas.  Of the total bombing force, only one bomb hit an enemy target.  However, because the raid nearly exhausted the Allied fuel stocks at Chengdu, the Air Corps began to look for airfields closer to the Japanese Islands.  The distances between Chinese/Indian air bases and Japanese targets restricted the effectiveness of B-29 bombing missions.

The solution to the distance problem was to seize the Mariana Islands and use them for advanced air bases, bringing Japan’s northern cities within range of the B-29.  U.S. Marines assaulted Saipan on 15 June 1944, and Navy Seabees began the construction of an airfield even before the fighting ended on the island.  During the seizure of Japan, Marines suffered nearly 13,000 casualties, with between 3,000 and 3,200 killed in action.  Overall, American land forces suffered 16,500 casualties.  The Japanese began to shift its forces to a little-known island closer to home called Iwo Jima.  There were five airfields on Iwo Jima, and the United States wanted them for use by B-29 aircrews as an alternate emergency landing field.

The flag raising on Mount Suribachi on 23 February 1945 was a vital moment at the Battle of Iwo Jima.  After securing the island on 26 March 1945 (one of the bloodiest battles in Marine Corps history), the island’s airfields recovered 2,400 damaged B-29 bombers, saving the lives of 24,750 airmen.  The battle cost the Marines 26,000 casualties – 6,800 of those men killed.  The Iwo Jima flag raising is a permanent reminder of the fighting spirit of the U.S. Marines.  Iwo Jima – where Uncommon Valor was a Common Virtue.

In the summer of 1950, the American Eighth Army performed occupation duty in Japan.  Due to underfunding by the Truman administration, American military forces were understaffed, under-equipped, inadequately trained, and poorly led.  When the North Korean Army launched its attack on the Republic of South Korea on 25 June, elements of the U.S. Eighth Army were nearly pushed into the sea from its toehold in Pusan, South Korea.

United States Marines performed three miracles during the Korean War.  The first was the rapid deployment of the 1st Marine Brigade, dispatched to South Korea to help the Army defend the Pusan perimeter.  There was nothing “light” about this particular brigade.  Included, along with the 5th Marine Regiment, was Marine Aircraft Group 33 (MAG-33), and they, together, did massive damage to North Korean forces.

The second miracle was the Marine amphibious landing at Inchon – a mission General Omar Bradley said couldn’t be done.  General Bradley, it seems, never tired of being wrong.  According to historian and strategist Bernard Brodie, The amphibious landing of U.S. Marines in September 1950 at Inchon, on the west coast of Korea, was one of the most audacious and spectacularly successful amphibious landings in all naval history. 

The third miracle was the 1st Marine Division’s destruction of ten Chinese infantry divisions at the Battle of Chosin Reservoir.  Outnumbered 8 to 1 and cut off from logistical support, the 1st Marine Division battled the enemy in deep snow and minus forty-degree temperatures.  The Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, Major General Oliver P. Smith, USMC, when questioned about the withdrawal of Marines from the Chosin Reservoir, snapped Retreat hell!  We’re just attacking in another direction.

Not satisfied with Smith’s response to the question of withdrawing Marines, the press challenged Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, Commanding Officer of the 1st Marine Regiment, calmly responded: We’ve been looking for the enemy for several days now.  We’ve finally found him.  We’re surrounded.  That simplifies our problem of getting to these people and killing them.

U.S. Army Major General Frank E. Lowe, President Truman’s emissary in Korea, observed on 26 January 1951 that the safest place in Korea was right behind a platoon of Marines.  Lord, how they could fight.  The Reds told us they were afraid to tangle with the Marines and avoided them when possible.

In 1968, four U.S. Marines battalions joined South Vietnamese and U.S. Army units to engage in street fighting during the Battle of Hue in South Vietnam.  The fight, lasting 33 days, was an intense, unrelenting, block-by-block slug-fest that pushed back enemy defensive positions, eventually allowing American and Vietnamese forces to secure the city.  The Military Advisory Command, Vietnam, reported 5,113 enemy killed, 98 captured, and an estimated 3,000 wounded in action.

The legacy of American Marines continues.  According to one of our recent Commandants of the Marine Corps, what the Marine Corps does best is Make Marines and Win Battles.  This is accomplished through maximum focus on combat readiness and the resolve to win battles no matter what the odds.  During the Helmand Province Campaigns in 2009, (then) Brigadier General Lawrence D. Nicholson (now retired) led the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade’s 8,000 combat Marines into one of Afghanistan’s largest provinces.

BGen Nicholson orchestrated operations dubbed Khanjar, Eastern Resolve, and Cobra Anger from July 2009 into the fall season.  In February 2010, the 2nd MEB closed in on Marjah during Operation Mostarak.  Marine successes cleared the way for an Afghan government and Coalition presence in previously enemy-held areas.

American Marines also had to contend with vast poppy fields that helped finance the Taliban insurgency.  Nicholson maintained a dynamic vision for COIN operations with non-traditional maneuverings, such as interacting with local mullahs, employing female teams, and establishing the Joint Security Academy, a Marine Corps-led police training facility.

Senior Army officers and State Department officials considered some of General Nicholson’s methods unconventional and pressured him to “get in line” with official Afghan policies.  Nicholson, however, would not be bullied into adopting strategies or tactics that he knew were foolish, wasteful, or an unnecessary risk to his Marines.  He insisted on autonomy; his doctrinal reliance on MAGTF operations prompted his critics to label Helmand Province Marineistan.

These Marines, senior officials claimed, had gone rogue in Helmand Province; they wouldn’t do anything the Army wanted them to do.  Army officials didn’t understand.  U.S. Marines do not need the Army’s help or advice fighting bad guys – they’ve been doing it for 248 years.  As it turned out, the U.S. State Department or U.S. Army had no clue whatsoever about winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people.  Click on the link for additional information about Marineistan.

Today, the U.S. Marine Corps offers a reliable force in an uncertain world.  Institutionally, the Marines are the force of choice for the President, Secretary of Defense, and various combatant commanders.  Why?  Because Marines get the job done.

What Separates the Marines From the Other Branches?  First, readers must understand that each of America’s armed forces deserves the utmost respect for the mission they perform for their country.  But what makes the Marines unique is that they are a 9-11 force.  You call — Marines haul.  Marines aren’t a land army; they are one of the smallest military branches.  They are naval infantry.  They project naval power ashore with second-to-none expeditionary warfare capability.  They are armed and organized to get results anywhere in the world.

The Marine Corps is the only independent branch that serves as part of another branch.  In 1775, the Continental Congress established the Marines as a separate branch “for service with” the Navy.  In 1834, President Andrew Jackson wanted to make the Marines part of the Army.  However, the then-Marine Corps Commandant, Colonel Archibald Henderson, had proven the branch’s effectiveness on land and sea.  He persuaded Congress to place the Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy.  The Navy and Marine Corps have been a combat team ever since.

More often than not, U.S. Marines are first on the ground.  They are a quick reaction force with specialized units trained to respond to various crises wherever and wherever necessary.  Many Americans view the Marines as the tip of America’s spear.  Marine combat units are all expeditionary forces.

Another aspect of the Marines that makes them unique is that they guard United States Embassies — a responsibility exclusive to US Marines.  Currently, Marine Security Guards protect 174 Embassies and consulates in 146 countries.

Happy 248th Birthday, Marines!

The Outpost War — Korea, 1953

Background

In March 1952, U.S. Marines of the 1st Marine Division redeployed from east-central to western Korea, joining the United States First Corps (I Corps) in defense of the Main Line of Resistance (M.L.R.) — a section of which was code-named the Jamestown Line extending 35 miles east-to-west.  The Jamestown sector was located between People’s Volunteer Army (P.V.A.) line units to the north of the South Korean capital of Seoul.  Marine Corps aviation units assigned to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st M.A.W.) provided air support to their ground-combat brothers.

Marine battalions defending the so-called Nevada Cities Outposts included First Battalion, Fifth Marines (1/5), 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (2/1), and 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (3/1).  The Nevada Cities were a series of outposts code-named Vegas, Reno, and Carson.  According to Colonel Tony Caputa, the outposts were called Nevada Cities because it was a gamble that the Marines could them.  Joining the Marines on the Jamestown Line as part of the 1st Marine Division was the Provisional Regiment of the Republic of Korea Army (including a detachment of Korean Marines) and the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion.  The 1st Marine Division’s supporting units included artillery, tanks, and elements of the 1st M.A.W.

The Chinese were active and aggressive in patrolling, reconnaissance, and ambuscades throughout March.  Enemy forces included the 19th P.V.A. Division 65th Chinese People’s Army.  The 19th Division had three infantry regiments placed in forward positions.  The 120th Division of the 40th Army (under temporary control of the 46th Army) also had three forward regiments.

An overview

In mid-March, the P.V.A. began a series of limited objective assaults against U.S. outposts.  The missions varied from squad to regimental-sized attacks against Outpost Reno and Vegas.  They were designed to deny the American’s observation into the P.V.A.’s rear areas.  A significant battle erupted on 26 March, lasting five days — referred to in history as the Battle of the Outposts.

The U.S. Army’s First Corps assigned the mission of denying a tactical advantage to Chinese Communist Forces (C.C.F.) to the 1st Marine Division.  The Tactical Area of Responsibility (T.A.O.R.) included defending a series of hills north of the Allied main line of resistance (M.L.R.).  Outpost Vegas was the highest in elevation of the so-called Nevada Cities Outposts, located some 1,300 yards north of the M.L.R.  Ranging north to south, Outpost Vegas included a 180-degree sweep toward the enemy held Hill 57 (to the right), U.S. Outpost Berlin, the M.L.R., and key Marine defensive highpoints on Hills 229 and 191 in the Marine sector, and the intervening terrain.

However, what the Marines could not see from Outpost Vegas, was Outpost Reno.  A rifle platoon (forty Marines and two Navy Corpsmen) manned each outpost.  A trench line surrounded the outpost.  The trench measured from 4 to 8 feet deep.  Beyond the trenches, two parallel lines of barbed wire lay linked with more parallel aprons of wire connecting the two.  Marines referred to this configuration as the Canadian System.

Outpost Reno (previously named Outpost Bruce) was the location of intense fighting on 5-6 September 1952 during the Battle of Bunker Hill.  During that fight, three Marines earned the Medal of Honor — two posthumously.

The Nevada outposts differed according to location, terrain, and enemy threat.  On the left, Carson guarded a barren hilltop where a cave provided living quarters for the Marines manning an oval perimeter protected by barbed wire, bunkers, and tunnel trenches with fighting holes.  Except for the slopes nearest the Jamestown Line (where a deeper entrenchment was dug), the main trench on Carson averaged 5 feet deep by 2 feet wide.  Most of the 28 fighting holes had excellent fields of fire, though overhead cover on some of them restricted observation and firing position.  During darkness, Marines manned two listening posts covering the likeliest avenues of a Chinese attack (from the Ungok hills to the west and Hill 67 to the north). 

The most vulnerable of the three outposts was Reno, in the center.  It was closest to enemy lines and occupied terrain that forced Marines into a perimeter vaguely resembling a wishbone — the open end facing north.  As at Carson, a cave served as living quarters for the Marines and might also serve as a final redoubt.  A tunnel provided access to the cave from the main trench, ranging from 5–7 feet deep.

Relying exclusively on fighting holes in the trenches, the Marines at Reno built no bunkers.  Their cave would be their last resort.  Reno has limited fields of fire in the direction of Chinese forces (Hill 67), which the Marines called Arrowhead Hill, but Carson (on the left) provided fire support in the battle area.  The approach that seemed to pose the greatest danger to Reno’s defenders followed a ridge extending southward from Hill 150.

As with the Marines defending the other two outposts, those at Reno were sustained by C-rations.  When the Marines finished their meals, they threw empty tin cans into the nearby gullies.  At night, clattering tin cans signaled the possibility of enemy activity at the base of the hill.[1]

To the south of Outpost Reno lay the Reno Block — an L-shaped trench with a small bunker at the end of the shorter leg and a machine gun position where the legs joined.  At night a reinforced squad was sent to man the blocking position, which also served as a listening post.  Reno Block, sited at the top of a hill, afforded excellent visibility for the Marines — which was also easily observed by the Chinese.  Marines manning Reno’s east–west trench could fire to support the blocking position, as could the garrison at Carson.

This brings us back to Outpost Vegas, the highest elevation of the three, which was located to the right of Reno and afforded the best view of the entire region.  Barbed wire and a well-constructed trench encircled the egg-shaped perimeter of Vegas.  There were three bunkers (two living cubicles and one warming bunker).  Despite its elevation, the fields of fire on Vegas were handicapped by irregularly sloped hills, which gave the enemy concealed firing positions.  The Marines at Outpost Vegas could not see Reno but had pre-registered their long-range weapons to support Reno Marines.

In the daylight, Marines on Outpost Vegas were targeted by Chinese snipers and harassing mortar and artillery fire, which forced the Marines to remain undercover for extended periods.  In late March, Allied intelligence anticipated no major enemy offensives.  The frigid winter turned into spring, and the melting snow turned the roads and pathways into muddy ruts, making resupply nearly impossible.  The newly deployed 1st Marine Regiment expected a comparatively quiet front in western Korea — it would be a welcome change to the fighting they experienced elsewhere.  In any case, the battle lines had remained (more or less) static for most of the war.

The P.V.A. had several reasons for their assault on 26 March.  One prevailing argument is that the Chinese and North Korean negotiators wanted to capture the Nevada outposts before the end of the war to gain leverage at the Panmunjom peace talks.  If the P.V.A. gained a victory at the Jamestown Line, they could threaten Seoul, embarrass, and pressure United Nations negotiators at the peace talks.  Marine Corps historical analysts agree.

Battle

The P.V.A. launched their assault on 26 March, hitting all Nevada outposts along with Dagmar, Esther, Bunker, and Hedy.  The assault came as a complete surprise to the United Nations forces.  When Marine headquarters issued its orders, they were simple and to the point: contact the enemy, take prisoners, and deny the ground to the enemy.

The attack began at 1900 with small arms and machine gun fire focused against 1/5.  This was followed by fifteen minutes of mortar and artillery fire on the regiment’s rear areas and supply routes.  Ten minutes later, thirty-five hundred Chinese troops from the 358th Regiment assaulted Carson, Reno, and Vegas.  One enemy infantry company attacked the Marine platoon atop Vegas.  Marine artillery responded with Variable Time (V.T.) proximity fuses targeting areas around the outposts and the enemy’s avenues of approach.[2]

When VT was fired at P.V.A. soldiers close to the Marine positions — as was often the case — the Marines would withdraw into previously dug caves on the opposite slope of the hills.  With that protection, the Marines waited until the overwhelming numbers of P.V.A. soldiers were pushed off the hill by the V.T. shells, and then the Marines would reemerge from the caves to man their prepared defensive positions. 

Overwhelming numbers of Chinese troops and enemy artillery fire forced the Marines on Vegas to abandon the outer ring of less easily defended trenches.  During the Chinese assault, Marine tanks and artillery began supporting an infantry raid intending to destroy the P.V.A. bunkers.  It was called Operation Clambake.  It was pure chance that the Marines started their raid just as the Chinese attacked along the same front.

Forty minutes into the attack, enemy artillery and mortar fire disrupted communications between Vegas and the 1/5 command post (C.P.).  Marine communicators and engineers repaired the landlines (telephone wire), which would only last until the next enemy barrage.  In another ten minutes, a hundred or so Chinese communist forces occupied the lower trenches of outpost Vegas taking cover from Marine Corps artillery — but the number of enemies overwhelmed the Marine platoon, causing them to withdraw from Vegas.

An hour later, the 1/5 commander directed that a rifle platoon be sent to reinforce the Vegas Marines, but before the backup could tie in with the withdrawing Marines, the enemy pinned them down with intense fire.  Three minutes before midnight, the battalion C.P. lost communications with the Marines at Outpost Vegas.  All of those Marines were either killed or captured.

After five hours of ferocious combat, the P.V.A. assault had been partially successful.  The enemy captured two outposts (Vegas and Reno), thwarting Marine efforts to reinforce the outposts.  The Marines still had possession of Carson.  Shortly after midnight, “FRED” Company 2/1 tried to recapture Vegas, but the lead platoon could only close with the enemy sufficiently to know that the P.V.A. controlled Outpost Vegas.  By 0300 on 27 March, reinforcing Marines retreated to the M.L.R.  Wounded Marines were either carried to the aid stations or, in extreme instances, evacuated by helicopter to hospital ships in Inchon Harbor.  On the other side, in the first eight hours of fighting, C.C.F. lost an estimated six-hundred men, four times the number of U.S. Marines.

Counterattack

The general commanding the 1st Marine Division was Major General Edwin A. Pollock.  Early on 27 March, he ordered observation planes to direct ground artillery fire at detectable P.V.A. artillery positions and enemy fortifications atop outposts Reno and Vegas.  Marines delivered more than sixty fire missions on the Chinese communists.  Additionally, two dozen Air Force and Marine Corps aircraft delivered ordnance on the enemy-held outposts.

Instead of attacking both Reno and Vegas outposts, General Pollock ordered concentrated air attacks on outpost Vegas.  “DAVID” Company, 2/1, was the first to assault Vegas, but those Marines never reached their objective.  When the company finally withdrew, only nine able-bodied men remained.  After ten hours of intense combat, “FRED” Company was still four hundred yards behind the advanced units approaching Outpost Vegas.  At the end of daylight, Marines held the lower slope of the hill, and the P.V.A. maintained the opposite lower slope.  There was no one left alive on the summit, inside the outpost.

The Third Day

On the morning of 28 March, General Pollock directed an aerial attack against Outpost Vegas.  1stMAW dumped an estimated 28 tons of ordnance on Vegas, enough to cause irredeemable harm to most of the enemy holding it.  After heavy fighting, Marines from “EASY” Company 2/1 gained control of outpost Vegas at around 1300 hours.  An hour and a half later, the outpost was back in U.S. hands.  Navy doctors set up a temporary field hospital on the slope of Vegas, where 200 wounded Marines received treatment.  Just after 2300 hours, the medical staff learned that a battalion-sized unit of P.V.A. was moving toward the hospital.  Armed with as many grenades as they could carry, wounded Marines threw the grenades down the slope to blunt the enemy’s maneuver.

The fourth and fifth days

For two days, Chinese communist forces continued to attack the Marines to retake Outpost Vegas.  Historians tell us that in these two days, the Chinese lost 4,000 men, an equivalent of two infantry regiments, killed or wounded in action.  On 30 March, Marine Artillery and air attacks devastated whatever remained of the People’s Volunteer Army, and given such tremendous losses in manpower, the Chinese accepted their defeat and withdrew.  The battle for Outpost Vegas was over.  A Turkish Brigade replaced the 1st Marine Division in May, which went into reserve after a week of heavy fighting. 

Marine casualties in March were 141 killed in action (K.I.A.), 29 died of wounds, 701 wounded and evacuated, 510 wounded and not evacuated, and 104 missing in action.  P.V.A. forces suffered 1,351 killed in action, 3,631 wounded, and four captured.  The U.S. Marines’ counterparts, the Korean Marines, had a minor presence during the battle for Outpost Vegas, but they suffered 26 killed in action, 97 wounded, and five missing in action.

The Battle for Outpost Vegas (and surrounding outposts) was among the bloodiest fighting in western Korea (1950 – 1953).  It was also unique because of a war horse named Reckless — a war horse.

Staff Sergeant Reckless, U.S.M.C.

Marines assigned to the 5th Marine regiment purchased the Mongolian horse from a Korean stable boy.  The popular story is that the stable boy needed money to buy an artificial leg for his sister and sold the animal to a Marine for $250.00.  They named the animal Reckless.  The horse was a chestnut-colored animal with a blaze and three white stockings.  Her date of birth and parentage are unconfirmed, but she was estimated to be around three or four years old.

Reckless was assigned to the Recoilless Rifle Platoon, Weapons Company, 5th Marines.  Note: The weapon used during the Korean War was the M20 75mm Recoilless Rifle.  This crew-served weapon (crew of two) included a gun tube and the M1917A1 tripod.  The weapon’s mass was 103 pounds, and its length was 82 inches (barrel length 65 inches).  Each 75mm round weighed from 20.5 to 22.6 pounds.  The shells were high explosive (HE), high explosive anti-tank (HEAT), and smoke rounds.  There were five guns in the Recoilless Rifle Platoon (two officers and 14 enlisted men).  Reckless meant the Marines would not have to haul these heavy weapons up and down Korea’s mountainous terrain.

Reckless quickly became part of the weapons company and was allowed to roam freely through camp, helping herself to Marine’s tents during cold nights and sharing their chow of green scrambled eggs and warm Black Label beer.

Reckless served in numerous combat actions, carrying supplies and ammunition and helping to evacuate casualties to field medical facilities.  Learning each supply route after only a few trips, Reckless could make the resupply runs on her own without the benefit of a wrangler (even during intense enemy fire). 

Reckless had been moving between the Nevada Cities when the P.V.A. attacked on 26 March 1953.  When artillery began to hit Outposts Vegas and the support network behind it on the M.L.R., the shocked animal ran unassisted to the nearest bunker, remaining until fitted for her next mission.

The next morning, on the 26th, as the 5th Marines recovered from the previous day’s assault, the Marines readied the horse for her duties as an ammunition carrier.  She was fitted with eight recoilless rifle projectiles (192 pounds of weight) and led by her wrangler to firing positions opposite the southern slopes of Outpost Vegas.  Even though she was twice wounded by enemy fire, she remained steadfast and calm while completing her ammunition resupply missions.  Reckless made 52 solo trips to resupply multiple front-line units during the battle. 

Reckless was the first (and only) horse to make an amphibious landing with her Marines. She received a “battlefield promotion” to corporal and sergeant in 1953 and 1954. After the war, the Marine Corps awarded her two Purple Heart Medals, the Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal, and two Presidential Unit Citations.  The Saturday Evening Post and Life Magazine featured the animal’s wartime exploits — where she was recognized as one of America’s 100 all-time animal heroes.

After the war, the Marines transported Reckless to the United States.  While quartered at Camp Pendleton, California, she made several “P.R.” appearances on television and participated in the Marine Corps Birthday Ball celebrations.  In 1959, Reckless was promoted to staff sergeant by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.  In her life, she birthed four foals.  Admirers of Reckless placed a bronze statue of the horse in the Kentucky Horse Park, Lexington.  Staff Sergeant Reckless passed away in May 1968.  She was buried at Camp Pendleton, California.

Notes:

[1] During the Vietnam War, Marines continued using C-Rats cans to alert against possible enemy movement — or rock apes, more than a few of which died from multiple gunshot wounds.

[2] A proximity fuse is an explosive device that detonates automatically when the distance to the target exceeds a predetermined value.  They were designed for such targets as planes, missiles, ships at sea, and animated ground forces.  They are five to ten times more lethal than other fuses. 

Improvise. Adapt. Overcome.

Among those interested in military history, particularly American military history, there are two prevailing opinions about American Marines.  The first is that Marines are quite good at amphibious warfare.  However, those with greater understanding realize that the Marines are more than amphibians; they are chameleons.  Marines aren’t just good at completing their traditional mission of projecting Naval power ashore; they are doubly good at fulfilling every mission.  What makes this even possible is the attitudes common among Marines: Improvise, Adapt, Overcome.

American Marines did not invent amphibious warfare; some form of it has been with us for at least 3,000 years.  Julius Caesar, the quintessential field commander, made amphibious landings and developed ship-borne artillery to support his landing forces.  From all this experience through three millennia, we know there are two kinds of amphibious operations: those that were highly successful and those that were a complete disaster.  Of the latter, no greater example exists than the spectacularly unsuccessful amphibious assault on Gallipoli, where of the 499,000 troops landed by Allied forces, half were killed, injured, or rendered incapacitated due to sickness and disease.

During the period between world wars, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps developed specialized amphibious warfare doctrine and equipment.  In the 1920s, two events propelled the Marine Corps to the forefront of amphibious inquiry.  The first was the introduction of the Marine Corps Schools (M.C.S.) at Quantico, Virginia.  The creation of Major General Commandant John A. Lejeune, M.C.S., provided an environment that encouraged enlightened thinking in matters of warfare.  Within this school, scholarly officers began asking “what if” questions about the future of war involving the United States.  The second event was the rise to prominence of Lieutenant Colonel Earl Hancock “Pete” Ellis, United States Marine Corps.

By this time, it was well known that Japan had seized several Pacific islands from the Germans during World War I.  Marine scholars began to suspect that Japan was starting to fortify these islands.  Lieutenant Colonel Ellis (Note 1) published a study in 1921 entitled Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia.  He predicted and outlined every move the Japanese would eventually follow in World War II and warned that the United States would face a fanatical enemy defending heavily fortified islands.  He also predicted the application of advanced warfare technology, such as aircraft carriers, torpedo planes, and long-range bombers.

From these inquiries, Navy and Marine Corps planners devised new troop organizations, new amphibious landing craft, a process for coordinating naval artillery and sea-borne air assault strategies, and logistical methodologies.  Navy planners scheduled exercises within the Caribbean area to test hypotheses, and it was from these lessons that a formal amphibious doctrine was eventually developed — including the seizure of objectives and the defense of advanced naval bases.

By 1927, the Marine Corps was officially tasked as an advanced base force.  On 7 December 1933, Secretary of the Navy Claude Swanson issued General Order 241, which transformed the Advanced Base Forces into the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF).  From that point on, the U. S. Marine Corps became America’s quick reaction force.  By 1934, Marine Corps tacticians had developed effective amphibious techniques, and in that year, the Marine Corps published the Tentative Landing Operations Manual.  It was tentative because the Navy and Marine Corps continued to test emerging ideas about amphibious operations.  They accomplished this through annual fleet landing exercises.  Much of this early information remains relevant to current operations.

It will suffice to say that these preparations proved invaluable in World War II when the Marines not only spearheaded many of the attacks against Japanese-held islands in the Pacific but also trained the U.S. Army divisions that also participated in the island-hopping campaign.  What the U.S. Army knew about amphibious operations in the planning and execution of Operation Torch (North Africa, 1942) they obtained from the doctrine developed by the Marine Corps in the two previous decades and overseen by Marine officers assigned to General Eisenhower’s staff.

Three months before war broke out on the Korean peninsula in 1950, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Omar N. Bradley famously said, “The world will never again see a large-scale amphibious landing (Note 2).” Three months after that, the Marine Corps made an amphibious landing at Inchon, Korea — the master strategy of U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur.

“The ability to furnish skilled forces to meet emergencies on short notice has long been a hallmark of the U. S. Marine Corps.  When the call to arms sounded for the Korean War in June 1950, the Corps was handicapped by the strictures of a peacetime economy.  Nevertheless, a composite brigade consisting of a regiment and an air group was made available within a week’s time.

“With a reputation built largely on amphibious warfare, Marines of the 1st Brigade were called upon the prove their versatility in sustained ground action.  On three separate occasions within the embattled Pusan Perimeter — south toward Sachon and twice along the Naktong River — these Marine units hurled the weight of their assault force at a determined enemy.  All three attacks were successful, and at no point did Marines give ground except as ordered.  The quality of their performance in the difficult days of the Pusan Perimeter fighting made them a valuable member of the United Nations team and earned new laurels for their Corps.” —Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., General, U. S. Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps (1952 – 1955)

What General Shepherd did not say, of course, was that by the time President Truman and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson finished destroying our defense structure, none of our military services were prepared for another conflict.  The magnitude of the task accomplished by the Marine Corps in the first ten weeks of the Korean War may be fairly judged from the fact that on 30 June 1950, the 1st Marine Division consisted of only 641 officers and 7,148 enlisted men.  The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had less than 500 officers and only 3,259 enlisted men.

On 2 August, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was pressed forward into the Pusan Perimeter with a scant 6,600 infantry and aviation officers and enlisted men.  The Brigade became known as the Fire Brigade; it was also a light brigade because every one of the regiment’s battalions and attachments was understrength.  This meant that the Marines going into combat would do so without an organic reinforcing reserve capability.  One may wonder how this was even possible.  The answer, of course, is that American Marines always get the job done —no matter what it takes.  They improvise.  They adapt.  They overcome.

Notes:

1.  Colonel Ellis (1880–1923) served as an intelligence officer whose work became the basis for the American campaign of a series of amphibious assaults that defeated the Japanese in World War II.  His prophetic study helped establish his reputation as one of the foremost naval theorists and strategists of his era, to include foreseeing a preemptory attack by Japan and island-hopping campaigns in the Central Pacific.  Colonel Ellis became the Marine Corps’ first spy whose mysterious death became enclosed in controversy.

2.  USMC Operations in Korea, 1950-1953 Volume I.