Vietnam — A Complicated War

Lunar New Year is the first new moon of a lunar calendar whose months are organized according to moon cycles.  Numerous cultures celebrate the event in various ways on a diverse range of dates.  The more well-known of these include New Year’s Day (or week) of the Chinese calendar, the Tibetan calendar of East Asia, the Buddhist and Hindu calendars of Southeast and South Asia, the Islamic calendar, and the Jewish calendar that originated in the Middle East.

In Vietnam, the Lunar New Year is known as Tết.  It has Sino-Vietnamese origins, celebrating the arrival of spring according to the Vietnamese calendar, which usually falls in late January or early February.

In 1965, Tết began on 10 February; it celebrated the year of the snake.

Before Tết in 1965, South Vietnamese insurgents, known as the Viet Cong (VC), began a new phase of their war against the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) by shifting from their classic hit-and-run tactics to mass assaults against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).  Their first salvo was devastating to the RVN because no one expected it and because its result produced heavy casualties to both ARVN and Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) forces at Binh Gia (forty miles east of Saigon, RVN’s capital city).[1]  When mechanized and armored units attempted to reinforce the beleaguered ARVN forces at Binh Gia, the VC destroyed them.  This VC victory over ARVN military units created considerable political instability within the RVN government.

Warning Order

On January 21, 1965, Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch, U. S. Marine Corps, was assigned as the Assistant Division Commander, 3rd Marine Division (3rdMarDiv).  The following day, he was directed to assume command of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (9thMEB).  The MEB was a task-organized Marine Air-Ground task force formed around the 9th Marine Regiment (9th Marines) of the 3rdMarDiv.  The ground combat element included two battalion landing teams (BLTs).  The air combat element had two 1st Marine Aircraft Wing helicopter squadrons.  Both BLTs and air squadrons formed the Special Landing Force (SLF) of the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) of the U. S. Seventh Fleet.

On January 22, 1965, General Karch was preparing for an amphibious landing in South Vietnam when the national command authority put a hold on the introduction of US combat forces to South Vietnam.  President Johnson was still “thinking” on February 7 when VC forces attacked the US installation at Pleiku in the central highlands.  This assault ended with the deaths of nine American soldiers, the injury of 128 military and civilian personnel, and the destruction of 129 US military aircraft.  The following day, the Marine Corps 1st Light Anti-aircraft Missile Battalion (1stLAAMBn) arrived at Da Nang, South Vietnam, with the mission of protecting the joint US-VNAF airfield in the event of an attack by the North Vietnamese air forces.[2]  Advanced elements of the battalion began arriving on February 8.

Meanwhile, as senior American military leaders and diplomats were “re-thinking” their commitment to South Vietnam (and consulting with South Vietnamese officials), the VC geared up for another assault, which materialized on February 11 at Qui Non.

The Commander of US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), requested a 3-battalion Marine Expeditionary Brigade to provide a ground defense of the joint RVN/US air base at Da Nang.  President Lyndon B. Johnson approved MACV’s request on March 2, 1965.  BLT 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines (1//3) was almost immediately flown to Da Nang from Okinawa.  Additional elements of the 9thMEB began moving ashore on March 8.

The Special Landing Force (SLF) included BLTs 1/9 and 3/9 — both were serving at sea off South Vietnam’s coast under the overall authority of the Commander, U. S. Seventh Fleet.  The brigade’s air combat element was increased to include Marine Aircraft Group 16, which, while operating out of Da Nang Air Base, conducted support operations and combat air patrols for two months.

The birth of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) occurred on May 7, 1965, when President Johnson approved the deployment of the 3rdMarDiv and 1stMAW to Da Nang.[3]  The first general to command III MEF was Major General William R. Collins, who concurrently served as Commanding General, 3rdMarDiv.  General Collins also served as Naval Component Commander, Vietnam.  With General Collins’s arrival in Vietnam, the 9thMEB was deactivated, and General Karch resumed his duty as Assistant Division Commander.  The 9th Marine Regiment folded back into the 3rdMarDiv.[4]

On background, the 3rdMarDiv was dispatched to the Far East in 1953 to support the 1st Marine Division (1stMarDiv), which was then engaged in the defense of South Korea (the Korean War), taking up station on the Island of Okinawa — where it remained until early 1965.

By the end of 1965, the entire 3rdMarDiv had relocated to Vietnam (including its command element, three infantry regiments, and all supporting combat and service support elements).  By March 1966, communist insurgents and regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units had learned there was a new sheriff in town.  What this meant in terms of combat was that (a) communist forces should think twice before shooting at US Marines, and (b) if they ever felt the need for a thorough ass-whipping, they could get one from the 3rd Marine Division.

Culturally, the Vietnamese have always allowed their sense of self-worth to interfere with basic common sense.  Accordingly, the 3rdMarDiv and its 24,000 cranky Marines parried several communist thrusts into the RVN’s northernmost provinces (designated as the I Corps Tactical Zone (also, I CTZ).  COMUSMACV directed the 3rdMarDiv to assume responsibility for the defense of I CTZ.[5]

By 1966, the 3rdMarDiv was the largest (ever) combat division in the Marine Corps.  It controlled five infantry regiments, one artillery regiment, all of its usual supporting elements, U. S. Army artillery units, Navy logistical support units (including Seabees), and two regiments of ARVN.  While the division was significantly reinforced, I Corps was an unbelievably large area to defend.  Quang Tri Province alone extended 1,800 miles in diameter.  Beyond its size, Quang Tri Province was marked by rugged terrain and impenetrable forests and bordered two hostile nations: Laos and North Vietnam.  U.S. Marines called it “Indian country.”[6]

In defending this terrain, the Marines operated under heavily restrictive rules of engagement imposed upon them by MACV.  Theater command didn’t want the Marines shooting “friendlies,” so U. S. Forces had first to encounter hostile fire before they could respond.  The problem was that a hefty percentage of the friendlies in Quang Tri Province were part-time hostiles — but it wouldn’t do to shoot innocents if you were also trying to pacify them.

It was a complicated war.

The importance of terrain is that it dictates the tactical employment of troops.  Given the size of the province and its thick canopied terrain (and other limiting factors), the 3rdMarDiv assigned its regiments to critical locations — each regimental commander with a unique tactical area of responsibility (TAOR).  High elevations frequently separated marine combat regiments, which affected the ability of the units to coordinate offensive and defensive operations and line-of-sight communications.  The thick canopy of dense jungles and severe weather patterns restricted ground and air operations.

The need for highway infrastructure restricted the rapid and unfettered movement of men and materials within Quang Tri Province.  There was one main north-south highway (Route 1).  It connected Marine operating bases at Dong Ha and Quang Tri City in the North to Phu Bai and Da Nang in the South.  The Cua Viet River in Quang Tri Province provided the 3rdMarDiv with its primary logistics artery.  The Cua Viet ran from its mouth into Dong Ha, where the river was as wide as a mountain pathway.

A second highway (Route 9) linked Dong Ha with Khe Sanh.  Eastward from Khe Sanh, 3rdMarDiv units established a series of outposts that offered a defense of Route 9 and the Cam Lo River Valley, which extends from Dong Ha to the coastal plain.  The critical outposts were Ca Lu (10 miles east of Khe Sanh), the Rockpile (a 700-foot outcrop 8 miles north), Camp Carroll (10 miles eastward), and Leatherneck Square (a quadrilateral region outlined by Cam Lo, Con Thien, Gio Linh, and Dong Ha).

The 3rdMarDiv’s defensive mission frustrated most senior commanders because (a) Marine Corps doctrine holds that the only reason for a defensive posture is to prepare for the next attack.  Static defense is not how the Marine Corps wins battles, and (b) even though the Marines defeated the enemy whenever they appeared, it was a costly strategy that the Marines could not sustain.  Static warfare imposed unacceptable casualties, and there was nothing to show for it.  The North Vietnamese were happy to fight a war of attrition, but no one wearing a Marine Corps uniform could understand Westmoreland’s willingness to pursue the same game plan.  Within the first year of Vietnam service, Marines suffered 5,000 casualties.

In 1967, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, serving as the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, warned senior commanders in Vietnam that for the Marines to succeed, they must be allowed to wage war on their terms, not as part of a static defense scheme that subjected them to the will and dictates of the enemy.[7]  Marines, he argued, could be trusted to set their own rules of engagement consistent with their areas of responsibility.

The NVA had already demonstrated that it was willing to lose large numbers of men in exchange for a fewer number of ours — but over a sustained period, our losses would work against the interests of the American people.  North Vietnam wanted to drag the war out for as long as possible.  Marine commanders wanted to put an end to it.  Washington politicians (also known as America’s weak Willies), however, did not want a confrontation with North Vietnam’s primary ally, China.

General Krulak identified three options along the DMZ: (1) Withdraw the Marines further south, out of range of NVA artillery (which, while tactically sound, offered a propaganda victory to the NVA), (2) Invade North Vietnam (tactically and logistically challenging, and politically impossible), or (3) Reinforce the 3rdMarDiv, and intensify air and artillery bombardments of North Vietnam.  It was up to General Westmoreland to decide — the ball was in his court.

General Westmoreland had to agree with Krulak’s assessments, even to the extent of putting together a planning group to consider the feasibility of an amphibious landing north of the DMZ. However, this wasn’t how President Lyndon B. Johnson wanted to fight the war.  Westmoreland’s only political option was reinforcing the 3rdMarDiv with an Army brigade.  Doing so allowed the CG 3rdMarDiv to realign his force within the I CTZ.  Increased air, artillery, and naval gunfire support imposed significant losses on NVA forces north of the DMZ. It prompted the North Vietnamese command structure to rethink its long-term strategy.  Within a short time, while bureaucrats in Washington toyed with U. S. warfare doctrine, the NVA was preparing for a bloody confrontation.

McNamara’s Fiasco

Robert S. McNamara began serving as Secretary of Defense during the Kennedy administration in 1961; after John Kennedy’s assassination, President Lyndon B. Johnson retained him in that capacity.  Known as one of the “Whiz Kids,” McNamara was instrumental in reshaping Ford Motor Company to increase its American automobile industry market share.  He was also the genius behind Ford’s failed Edsel model.

In December 1965, McNamara met with former Kennedy-era National Security Council staff member Carl Kaysen.[8]  It was from Kaysen that McNamara developed his idea for an electric barrier to limit infiltration from North Vietnam.  The so-called McNamara line became a metaphor for Bob McNamara’s arbitrary, personal, and aggressive management style that tended to by-pass proven Defense protocols, ignored or rebuffed DoD experts, and preferred relying on technology rather than superbly trained members of the Armed Forces.[9]  In essence, senior military leaders either conformed to McNamara’s dictates, or they quite suddenly retired from active military service.

McNamara’s preference for untested technology led him to implement programs without full coordination among defense experts.  The only danger to this in peacetime is an extraordinary squandering of taxpayer resources.  In combat, lives are lost, and soldiers are critically or permanently injured.  Nevertheless, McNamara rejected every criticism of his policies and programs.[10]

Before 1965, the Department of Defense experimented with various schemes for defensive lines along South Vietnam’s northern border, at the DMZ and its border with Laos.  Defense experts rejected many of Kaysen’s ideas for two reasons.  First, to implement them, the United States would have to increase the number of its static positions, and second, because it would encourage the NVA to establish safe areas deeper inside Laos.[11]  Kaysen’s (later, McNamara’s) electronic wall would limit NVA infiltration into South Vietnam.  From his meeting with Kaysen, McNamara ordered a feasibility study involving several science technologists.

McNamara’s panel provided their conclusions in March 1966.  He passed their proposals to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for comments.  The JCS was lukewarm on the idea.  Creating an electronic barrier, they argued, would still require a large number of troops and cost a large sum of money.  Moreover, the project would cause potentially insurmountable logistical challenges.  JCS members may have wondered if McNamara had heard of Hadrian’s Wall (122-138 AD).

Secretary McNamara then turned to a federally funded research study group (the JASON Group) for their assessment.  These individuals supported the notion of a barrier wall primarily because, in their opinion, President Johnson’s air campaign over North Vietnam was an utter failure.  The JASON Group thought it would be a good idea to create two barrier systems — the first along the southern edge of the DMZ and another along South Vietnam’s western border with Laos.  Electronic signals, they argued, could trigger air interdiction and remotely controlled minefields.  Moreover, they added, the system could be in place within a year.

McNamara sent the JASON Group’s proposal to the JCS for additional consideration.  Except for JCS Chairman General Earle Wheeler, every JCS member rejected the idea.  Wheeler nevertheless sent the recommendation to Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, Commander, U. S. Pacific, for his review.  Admiral Sharp concluded that the plan, at best, was impractical.  Amazingly, General Westmoreland agreed with Admiral Sharp.

Ignoring this advice, McNamara took his plan to President Johnson, recommending approval.  The price tag was around $2.5 billion ($23.7 billion in 2024).  McNamara’s scheme had several code names.  At first, it was named PRACTICE NINE; it later changed to ILLINOIS CITY and then to PROJECT DYE MARKER.  In early 1967, Marine Corps engineers began bulldozing a strip of land 500 meters wide from Gio Linh westward to Con Thien.

At the beginning of 1968, the western end of McNamara’s wall, from Khe Sanh through the Special Forces camp at Lang Vei, which was still under construction, was attacked by NVA forces.  The NVA overran Lang Vei and established a siege of Khe Sanh.  The Battle of Khe Sanh lasted 77 days.  General Creighton W. Abrams, Westmoreland’s newly arrived replacement, ordered Khe Sanh abandoned in July.  He also ordered the destruction of all infrastructure along Route 9 toward Laos, including all bridges and roads.  In October, all work relating to DYE MARKER ceased.  Instead, Abrams ordered McNamara’s wall converted into fortifications and support bases for his new strategy: mobile operations.  McNamara’s Wall quickly became known as McNamara’s Folly.  Significantly, the entire episode with McNamara’s line diverted Marine combat units from their traditional role of beating the enemy to a pulp.  Casualties mounted.

A Confusing Structure

During the summer and fall of 1966, the NVA initiated two major thrusts across the DMZ.  III MAF realigned around 10,000 Marines to meet these new threats.  In October, Major General Wood B. Kyle, Commanding General, 3rdMarDiv, assumed operational control of all U. S. Forces operating in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces.  He moved his command post from Da Nang to Phu Bai, north of the Hai Van Mountains, which separated the two northern provinces of I Corps from the three remaining southern provinces.  The main Marine force in Quang Tri Province consisted of seven (of 18 available) battalions.[12]

At the same time, the 1stMarDiv, under Major General Herman Nickerson, moved its CP from Chu Lai to Da Nang.  Nickerson left Brigadier General William A. Stiles in charge of Task Force X-Ray at Chu Lai.  X-Ray was a brigade-size force of four battalions between Quang Tri and Quang Ngai.  In addition to the two Marine battalions in Quang Ngai, Brigadier General Run Sang Kim of the South Korean Marine Corps commanded three ROK Marine battalions.[13]

To any average person, the organizational structure of Marine Corps combat units in Vietnam would be confusing and nonsensical, but the fluid nature of nonlinear warfare in Vietnam caused senior commanders to view individual battalions as their primary maneuver elements (rather than regiments, which traditionally controlled subordinate battalions).  Task organization took on new meaning when separate battalions from the 3rd Marine Regiment (for example) were operationally assigned to other command elements.  A battalion of the 7^th Marines might be attached to the 4^th Marines for a specific purpose or length of time (such as a combat operation).  Another contributing factor was the implementation of battalion rotations between Vietnam and Okinawa.  Whenever a battalion from the 3^rd Marines was rotated out of Vietnam for rest and refit, another battalion would rotate in to take its place — one perhaps from the 9^th Marines.

To further confuse the casual observer, the U. S. Seventh Fleet exercised authority over an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), which, after March 1966, included the 9^th MAB as part of the Special Landing Force (SLF) (See also Note 2).  The SLF could be deployed as part of U. S. Seventh Fleet operations, operating independently from the forces under III MAF, or it could be employed to reinforce III MAF units if necessary.

Air support for Marines in the I CTZ was provided by the 1^st Marine Aircraft Wing (1stMAW), elements of which occupied airfields at Da Nang, Chu Lai, Phu Bai, Marble Mountain, and Ky Ha.  Fixed-wing units operated from Da Nang and Chu Lai; helicopter squadrons were distributed among all five.

Finally, ARVN units operated independently but in close coordination with III MAF.  The ARVN I Corps consisted of the 1st ARVN Division (Hue City), 2nd ARVN Division (Quang Ngai), the independent 51st Regiment (Quang Nam), a ranger group, and three battalions of Vietnamese Marines (temporarily attached) moved throughout I CTZ.  The total Vietnamese force included 34 battalions.  Regional and Popular (territorial reserve) forces augmented the ARVN I Corps.  The number of South Vietnamese forces assigned to I Corps was 77,000 combat troops.

The Bottom Line

From the beginning of the United States’ involvement in Vietnam in 1945, when U. S. politicians imagined that it would be prudent to assist post-World War II France in reclaiming its Indochinese colonies —even though the Vietnamese people had had enough of the Frenchman’s abuse, the thinking of highly placed American officials was deeply flawed.

The problem for President Harry S. Truman was that the individual who first proclaimed Vietnam’s independence from France, a man calling himself Ho Chi Minh, was a committed communist.  Truman concluded that supporting a brutal French colony was preferable to the creation of a  new communist (nationalist) state and ignored Ho Chi Minh.  It never entered Truman’s mind that a gently guiding capitalist hand might have moved Minh toward the center of his idealistically socialist goals.  Neither Truman nor anyone in his administration anticipated that if Ho Chi Minh could not obtain support for Vietnamese independence from the United States, he could get it from China … after the Chinese Revolution (1945-1949).  China threw its support behind Vietnam in July 1950 and began transforming North Vietnamese insurgents into a regular army.

French colonial forces battled the communists through 1954 before their overwhelming defeat at Dien Binh Phu.  It was time for the French to withdraw from Vietnam, but who would take France’s place?  Eisenhower, who replaced Truman, acknowledged the United States’ commitment to support a non-communist state in Vietnam but opposed any American ground effort except for the participation of military and civilian political advisors supporting the Republic of Vietnam.  President Kennedy expanded the role of military advisors but opposed direct military involvement.  It wasn’t until after President Lyndon B. Johnson concocted the story of a North Vietnamese attack on a U. S. destroyer that a surge in American air, ground, and naval involvement took shape.  By then, the United States had spent tens of billions of dollars supporting a corrupt and thoroughly inept political structure in South Vietnam.

Still, one must wonder how, after investing so many lives, so much money, time, and effort into “defending” South Vietnam, the United States could lose a war when it had so many advantages.  Nearly 3 million Americans served in Vietnam.  In addition to 1.4 million South Vietnamese forces, the United States was also assisted by South Korea (320,000), Australia (50,190), New Zealand (3,500), Laos (72.000), Cambodia (200,000), The Philippines (2,061), and Thailand (32,000).  Casualty rates were extraordinary: allied military forces experienced 392,365 dead and nearly 2 million wounded in action. Almost 4 million Vietnamese civilians were killed, 400,000 Cambodian civilians and 62,000 Laotian civilians lost their lives, as well.  There were so many troops, such utter defeat, and David Berger wanted to attack China with 28 battalions of U.S. Marines.  God help us!

There are several explanations for America’s failure, not the least of which was its failure to maintain the moral high ground from the beginning of World War II.  American politicians during this period were not our “best and brightest.”  They still aren’t.  Presidents responsible for that bloody war were near-sighted, closed-minded, immoral, vain, and malfeasant.  The American diplomatic corps was inept; high-ranking political appointees were incompetent — few to none ever having served in uniform — they decided they could run the war from inside the Beltway.  Over time, these know-nothings decided they knew more than our military professionals.  Among those military careerists, far too many put their promotions ahead of their sacred duty.

It was a complicated war, easily avoided if only the American voter had made better choices for their national leaders.  North Vietnam’s celebrated military leader, Võ Nguyên Giáp, later wrote that no one was more surprised than he when American politicians suddenly withdrew their armed forces from South Vietnam.  The US Military had won all the battles, North Vietnam could no longer sustain such huge battle losses, and it was only a matter of time before the United States and RVN could claim victory.  But, of course, the politicians in Congress knew best.  America’s defeat was political, not military.  Even now, wise voting is not one of America’s strong points.

Sources:

1. Berman, L.  Lyndon Johnson’s War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam. New York: Norton & Company, 1989.
2. Eisenhower, D. D.  Mandate for Change.  Doubleday, 1963.
3. Fall, B. B.  The Two Viet Nams: A Political and Military Analysis.  New York: Praeger, 1967.
4. Giap, V. N.  Military Art of People’s War: Selected Writings.  New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970.
5. Karnow, S.  Vietnam: A History.  New York: Penguin Books, 1997 (second edition).
6. Shulimson, J. And Charles M. Johnson.  U. S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965.  Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1978.
7. Telfer, G. L. and Lane Rogers (et. al.)  U. S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967.  Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1984.

Endnotes:

[1] After the Vietnam War, the Communist victors renamed the city after their revolutionary leader, Ho Chi Minh.

[2] VNAF = South Vietnam Air Force

[3] US Marines are an expeditionary force.  The original designation of the task-organized force was III Marine Expeditionary Force. However, this designation was temporarily changed at the request of General Westmoreland to III Marine Amphibious Force (and for similar reasons, 9thMEB was redesignated 9thMAB).  Given their history of foreign expeditionary occupations (1887-1954), the word expeditionary offended Vietnamese sensitivities.

[4] 9thMAB reactivated on 1 March 1966 on Okinawa; its new mission was to serve as the Special Landing Force (SLF) of the U. S. Seventh Fleet.  In this capacity, 9thMAB exercised operational authority over Regimental Landing Team (RLT) 5 (formed around the 5th Marines (a 1stMarDiv regiment), BLT 2/5, and service support elements of the 1st Service Battalion.  Its air element was MAG-13.  In the spring of 1966, RLT-5 was relieved by RLT-26.  Throughout the war, the 9thMAB was instrumental in destroying VC regiments and elements of NVA infantry divisions operating in the Thua Thien Province as part of Operation Deckhouse.

[5] COMUSMACV was General William C. Westmoreland (1914-2005).  Westmoreland foolishly adopted the NVA’s strategy of a war of attrition.  He served as COMUSMACV from 1964-68 and then as U. S. Army Chief of Staff until his retirement in 1972.  In fairness to General Westmoreland, his failed strategy in Vietnam was imposed on him by Washington politicians and bureaucrats — he simply lacked the moral courage to do the right thing irrespective of any political consequences.  In my view, Westmoreland was under no obligation to obey presidential orders that he found unconscionable.  Since Westmoreland became President Johnson’s lackey, we can only infer that he intentionally placed his career ahead of the welfare of his men.

[6] Offensive and defensive combat operations are limited by weather and terrain.  These factors are more important than any other physical elements (equipment, communications, weapons, resupply).  See also U. S. Army Field Manual 100-5 (Operations).

[7] FMFPAC (1941-Present) is the world’s most significant maritime landing force.  The general officer commanding reports to the Commander, U. S. Pacific, and exercises command authority over all subordinate commands of the Navy/Marine Corps expeditionary units operating in the Pacific, from California to the Far East.  During the Vietnam War, CG FMFPac did not exercise operational control over Marines in Vietnam.  Still, he did have something to say about how the Marines were employed within COMUSMACV’s theater of operations.

[8] Kaysen was an academic policy advisory and international security specialist at MIT who co-chaired the Committee on International Security Studies at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.  What Kaysen knew about warfighting wouldn’t fill a thimble.  Why he had any credibility with Kennedy, Johnson, or McNamara is anyone’s guess.

[9] This same inane thinking destroyed the Central Intelligence Agency’s human intelligence capability, preferring to rely, instead, on satellite technology.  This, too, was a fiasco with long-term consequences.

[10] This is why presidential elections matter.  The President appoints his cabinet, unelected men who make momentous decisions impacting the welfare of the American people.  We should know who presidential candidates are considering for high level l cabinet posts before we elect them to the presidency.  Who in their right mind would have voted for John F. Kennedy knowing that he intended to appoint, as Secretary of Defense, the man who gave them Edsel?

[11] Pro-technology advocates believed that constructing such a wall would serve the long-term interests of South Vietnam after US forces had been withdrawn.  Such a belief was part of the fallacy U. S. Officials cultivated about the mission assigned to the American armed forces operating in Vietnam.  Everyone was told that the role of our military was to defend South Vietnam from the aggression of North Vietnam.  This fallacy may have morphed into the truth of our Vietnam experience — after the assassination of South Vietnam’s president, Ngo Dinh Diem — but it was always Diem’s long-term goal to unify Vietnam (conquer North Vietnam) under his leadership.  Diem’s goal, therefore, was almost identical to that of North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, albeit in reverse.  Every succeeding president of South Vietnam had but one goal: to enrich themselves at the American taxpayer’s expense.

[12] Between 2019 and 2023, while serving as Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Berger directed training and equipping 28 infantry battalions to confront the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Navy (PLAN).  First, land warfare is not the mission of the U.S. Marine Corps.  Berger must also not have been aware that 18 battalions were insufficient to defeat the much smaller North Vietnamese Army.  Dolt.

[13] the Republic of Korea (South Korea) contributed substantially to the Allied war effort during the Vietnam conflict.  The Korean Marine Corps Blue Dragon Brigade served with distinction in ICTZ, the Fierce Tiger Mechanized Infantry Division, ROK Army, served in Binh Dinh Province (7,652 officers, 107,340 enlisted men), and the ROK Army 9th Infantry Division, served in the Phu Yen, Tuy Hoa, and Khanh Hoa provinces (6,445 officers and 98,891 enlisted men.  I cannot speak to the performance of the Korean Army units, but the Korean Marines put the fear of God into NVA and VC troops in equal measure.  The Korean Marines didn’t play fair.    

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