Some Background
The practice of state-supported piracy was a common practice in the 18th and 19th centuries. One may recall that the fledgling United States went to war with Great Britain for a second time because the British navy accosted U.S.-flagged ships and impressed their crew to serve involuntarily aboard British ships of the line. The U.S. government regarded this sort of behavior as a form of piracy. If not that, then bullying.[1] Additionally, European maritime states hired privateers to attack each other’s shipping. The decision of Great Britain and France to pay tribute to the Barbary pirates encouraged the scallywags to increase their piracy — which benefitted England and France through less competition in the Mediterranean. And, of course, the navies of England or France were not huckleberries a pirate vessel would want to challenge.
Before American independence, extortion along the North African coast was not an American problem. The North American colonies were British Colonies, so the problem belonged solely to the Royal Navy and British Parliament. After independence, however, American shipping enjoyed no protection from England or France. After independence, our English cousins quickly informed the Barbary Pirates that they could avail themselves of American shipping at their leisure. It didn’t take long; in 1785, Dey Mohammed of Algiers declared war on the United States and captured several U.S. commercial ships. The financially troubled American Confederation could not pay exorbitant ransoms for the return of ships, crews, or cargo. Nor could the Americans afford to raise a navy — or pay tribute. So, the United States attempted to negotiate with Islamic pirates.
The Barbary Coast included several North African states. Morocco, an independent kingdom, seized U.S. merchant vessels in 1784 after the Americans ignored its diplomatic overtures. However, once the U.S. acknowledged Morocco’s strategic position, negotiations progressed smoothly and productively; by 1786, a trade agreement did exist between the U.S. and Morocco. Conversely, Algiers assumed a belligerent, condescending tone in demanding tributes that the United States could not afford. To circumvent Algiers, the U.S. Minister of France attempted to establish a coalition of weaker naval powers to defeat Algiers. Our minister was unsuccessful in this; his name was Thomas Jefferson. However, Portugal was also at war with Algiers. Its navy was strong enough to block Algerian ships from sailing past the Straits of Gibraltar, so American merchantmen had safe passage for a time.
A brief Portuguese-Algerian peace again exposed American merchant ships to extortion in 1793. The efforts of diplomats sent to North Africa in 1795 concluded treaties with Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. The treaties agreed to pay tribute to these states, and the treaty with Algiers resulted in the release of about 80 sailors.
It wasn’t until after the ratification of the US Constitution in 1789 that the federal government had the authority to levy taxes and raise and maintain an armed force. When Algiers seized American ships in 1794, Congress authorized the construction of six ships for a re-instituted U. S. Navy.
In 1797, William Eaton (a former Army officer) was appointed Consul General of the United States. President Adams sent him to Tunis to negotiate peace and trade agreements with Tunis’s governor (Bey). Tunis was the closest neighbor to Tripoli and the place of exile of the former Pasha of Tripoli, Hamet Karamanli (the elder brother of the reigning Pasha, Yusuf Karamanli).
While in Tripoli, Easton devised a plan whereby the United States would support the restoration of the deposed Pasha. This, Eaton argued, would garner respect for the United States throughout the Mohammedan world. However, Eaton had no support for his plan in Philadelphia. Meanwhile, the Bey continued to demand tributes, and Eaton refused to convey his demands to the U.S. government. Accordingly, the Bey of Tunis ordered Eaton to leave his country. Hamet Karamanli, in fear for his life, fled Tunis for Egypt.
In 1801, the Pasha of Tripoli sought to punish the United States for its failure to make timely payments of tribute; he demanded higher tributes and polished off these demands by declaring war on the United States. Algiers followed suit. This was the first Barbary War — fought between 1801 and 1805.
For additional background about the United States’ involvement in two Barbary Coast Wars, seeAt Tripoli, Part I and At Tripoli, Part II.
The Fire Reignites
There was a continuing campaign by various European navies and the American navy to suppress Berber piracy. The specific aim of this expedition, however, was to free Christian slaves and to stop the practice of enslaving Europeans, holding them for ransom, and stealing and selling ship’s cargo. To this end, the campaign was partially successful. However, Islamic barbarity did not completely end until the French conquered Algeria (c. 1830) and, in the process, sent many Algerians to meet their heavenly father. Shamefully, the French were thrown out of Algeria in 1962.
Yet, despite having been severely chastised by the United States Navy on two occasions, the Ottoman rulers of North Africa refused to cease their uncivilized behavior — which led to further confrontations with the Royal Navy in 1816.
Following the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1815), the Royal Navy no longer needed assistance from the Barbary States to provide supplies for Gibraltar and their Mediterranean fleet. This lack of dependency allowed the British to exert political pressure on the Barbary states to end their piracy and practice of enslaving European Christians.
In 1816, Admiral Edward Pellew, 1st Viscount Exmouth (Lord Exmouth), conducted a diplomatic mission to Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers, backed by a small squadron of ships of the line, to convince the North African Ottoman Deys to stop the practice and free their Christian slaves.[2] The Deys of Tunis and Tripoli unequivocally agreed to comply, but the Dey of Algiers was recalcitrant and the negotiations tempestuous.
Lord Exmouth, believing he had negotiated a successful treaty to stop Christian slavery, returned to England. Sadly, confused orders sent Algerian troops to massacre 200 Corsican, Sicilian, and Sardinian fishermen who had been placed under British protection just after the treaty was signed. The act caused outrage in Britain; Lord Exmouth’s negotiations were seen as a diplomatic failure, and his government ordered him back to sea to complete the job correctly and punish the Algerians. Pellew’s squadron consisted of ships of the line HMS Queen Charlotte, Impregnable, Albion, Minden, and Superb, HMS Leander (a 50-gun frigate), HMS Severn, Glasgow, Granicus, and Hebrus (regular frigates), and four bomb ships, HMS Beelzebub, Fury, Hecla, and Infernal.
HMS Queen Charlotte (100 guns) served as Lord Exmouth’s flagship, with Rear Admiral David Milne as second-in-command aboard HMS Impregnable (98 guns). The squadron was considered by many to be inadequate for the mission. Still, Exmouth had already unobtrusively surveyed the defenses of Algiers, was very familiar with the town, and was aware of a weakness in the defensive batteries’ fire field. He believed that more large ships would have interfered with each other without being able to bring much more fire to bear. In addition to his main fleet, Lord Exmouth commanded five sloops, eight boats armed with Congreve rockets, and some transports to carry the rescued slaves. When the British arrived in Gibraltar, Dutch Vice Admiral Frederik van Capellen (commanding a squadron of frigates) offered to join the expedition. Lord Exmouth accepted van Capellen’s offer and assigned him to cover the main force from Algerian flanking batteries.
Preparation
The day before Lord Exmouth’s assault, HMS Prometheus arrived at the station. Admiral Pellew assigned the commanding officer, Captain W. B. Dashwood, to rescue the British Consul and his family. The Algerians discovered the rescue attempt and arrested some of the party.
Pellew’s plan of attack was for the larger ships to approach in a column, sail into the zone where the majority of the Algerian guns could not be brought to bear, and then come to anchor and bombard the batteries and fortifications on the breakwater (mole) to destroy the Algerian defenses. Simultaneously, HMS Leander was to anchor off the mouth of the harbor and bombard the shipping inside the mole. To protect Leander from the shore battery, HMS Severn and Glasgow were to sail inshore and bombard the battery. Troops would then storm ashore on the mole with sappers and the Corps of Royal Engineers.
Go Signal
Admiral Pellew, aboard Queen Charlotte,anchored approximately eight yards off the mole facing the Algerian guns. Several other ships anchored out of their position, notably Admiral Milne aboard Impregnable, 400 yards from his assigned station. This error reduced the effectiveness of these ships and exposed them to accurate enemy fire. Some other ships sailed past Impregnable and anchored in positions closer to the plan. The frigate Granicus and the sloop Heron closed the gap created by the misplaced Impregnable.
Before hostilities, Lord Exmouth and the Dey of Algiers agreed that neither would fire the first shot. Why Exmouth would even converse with an enemy about this is beyond me. But the Dey’s plan was to allow the British fleet to anchor, sortie from the harbor, and board the ships with an overwhelming force of men. Poorly disciplined Algerians mistakenly fired a gun at around 1515 hours, prompting Pellew to order an immediate response.
The Algerian assault force attempted to board Queen Charlotte, but that was a mistake of epic proportions — British broadsides sank 28 boats — running the rest to shore. After an hour, the British silenced the cannon on the mole, which allowed Lord Exmouth to turn his attention to the shipping in the harbor, destroying those ships by 1930 hours. The British destroyed one unmanned Algerian frigate by boarding her and setting it on fire. Mortars and rockets destroyed three additional frigates and five corvettes.
The battle produced flotsam adrift in the harbor, some of it on fire and drifting toward ships at anchor. These conditions forced some of Exmouth’s ships to weigh anchor and relocate for safety. As these ships maneuvered out of the way, Impregnable became isolated from the other ships and vulnerable to enemy attack. It didn’t take the Algerian gunners long to target the ship and began raking the 98 fore to aft. Impregnable took 268 hits, suffering injury to her hull and damage to the mainmast in fifteen places. Algerians killed fifty crew members and wounded 164 others. At around 2000 hours, Admiral Milne asked Pellew to send an explosion vessel against a lighthouse battery that was mauling his ship. The British exploded the vessel but to little effect.
With Algerian batteries unable to maintain their rate of fire, Lord Exmouth ordered the squadron to weigh anchor and withdraw out of range, leaving Minden behind to offer suppressive fires to further Algerian fire. Wind changes permitted Exmouth’s squadron to move out of range, and by 0130, all ships were re-anchored, and the ship’s officers were caring for their wounded crews.
British casualties exceeded 900 men. The British/Dutch force had fired over 50,000 shots and used 118 tons of gunpowder and 960 mortars. Algerian forces employed 308 guns and seven mortars. A covert inspection of the city by British cease-fire negotiators revealed that the Deylik of Algiers was destroyed. The bay was filled with the smoking hulks of what was left of the Algerian navy; floating dead bodies filled the harbor.
Aftermath of Battle (August 28, 1816)
At noon, Lord Exmouth sent a letter to the Dey:
Sir:
For your atrocities at Bona on defenseless Christians and your unbecoming disregard of the demands I made yesterday in the name of the Prince Regent of England, the fleet under my orders has given you a signal chastisement by the destruction of your navy storehouse and arsenal, with half your batteries. As England does not war for the destruction of cities, I am unwilling to visit your personal cruelties upon the unoffending inhabitants of the country, and I therefore offer you the same terms of peace which I conveyed to you yesterday in my Sovereign’s name. Without your acceptance of these terms, you can have no peace with England.
Admiral Pellew warned the Dey that the action would continue if he did not accept his terms. Wisely, the Dey took Lord Exmouth’s terms, not realizing that Exmouth was bluffing. His squadron was out of shot and gunpowder. If the action were to continue, it would have to be after replenishment at Gibraltar. Upon the signing of the formal treaty on September 24, 1816, the Dey freed 1,083 enslaved Christians. He would later free 3,000 more.
Endnotes:
[1] The Royal Navy was not without some justification for at-sea impressments. Service in the Royal Navy was at all times a hard life, and more than a few English sailors deserted their ships and signed on as deck-hands aboard commercial vessels, where life was easier, as a means of earning their income. It was bad enough that the Royal Navy began the practice of stopping ships at sea and apprehending deserters.
[2] Dey is a title given to commanders or (from 1710) governors of the Janissaries of Algiers and extended to other Ottoman officials by Western writers—also, Bey.
Fix Bayonets! 