I don’t do book or movie reviews because I’m not qualified. Occasionally, however, I do offer summaries, not so much of the book or film, but of events that I find interesting, touching, or otherwise significant. One of these is the story of U. S. Air Force Staff Sergeant William H. Pitsenbarger (1944-1966). It truly is an extraordinary story and I enthusiastically recommend the 2019 film The Last Full Measure.
Pitsenbarger grew up in a small town just outside Dayton, Ohio. While still in high school, Bill Pitsenbarger contacted a local Army recruiter about enlisting with an option for Special Forces (Green Beret) training. When he spoke to his parents about his interests, they refused to give their permission. Upon graduation from high school, Bill Pitsenbarger joined the Air Force on the delayed entry program.
At the completion of basic training at San Antonio, Texas, Pitsenbarger volunteered for pararescue training. In 1963, this included Army parachute school, survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training, and air crash rescue and firefighting. Bill Pitsenbarger’s first assignment after his initial training was Hamilton AFB, California. While assigned to Hamilton AFB, Pitsenbarger performed a period of temporary additional duty in the Republic of Vietnam. At the conclusion of this temporary assignment, Pitsenbarger volunteered to return to Vietnam for a regular tour of duty where he reported for duty with Detachment 6, 38th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron at Bien Hoa Air Base just outside Saigon (now, Ho Chi Minh City). Detachment 6 included five aircrews that flew three Kaman HH-43F “Huskie” Helicopters commanded by Major Maurice Kessler, USAF.
The 2nd Battalion, 16th US Infantry arrived at Vung Tau, South Vietnam, on 10 October 1965 attached to the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (The Big Red One). Initially, 2/16 encamped at Ben Cat, north of Saigon. The division wasted no time getting this newly arrived brigade adapted to the combat environment. Operations Bushmaster and Bloodhound involved aggressive patrolling adjacent to Highway 13 and the Michelin Rubber Plantation, followed by Operation Mastiff (February 1966) and Abilene (March-April 1966).
Operation Abilene was a search and destroy mission targeting the 274th and 275th Viet Cong Regiments of the 5th Division. Abilene employed two brigades of the US 1st Infantry Division with the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment and 161st Battery, Royal New Zealand Artillery assigned in support. Initially, the Viet Cong avoided battle and contact with the communists was sporadic.
Major General William e. DePuy, as commander of the Big Red One, devised a plan to lure the VC into attacking his force. He assigned Company C, 2/16 to act as the bait. Once the VC attacked Company C, DePuy planned to rush in additional rifle companies to surround and destroy the Viet Cong force. At the time, the strength of Company C was 134 soldiers; it was only marginally effective as a US rifle company.
On 11 April 1966, as Charlie Company moved through the Courtenay Rubber Plantation, its understrength platoons encountered sporadic fire from communist snipers who attempted to kill the Americans one at a time. This intermittent fire allowed VC forces to maneuver around the outnumbered Americans. By 1400, it became apparent that VC officers were systematically directing their men to encircle the Americans. The communists had taken DePuy’s bait, but through “piss poor” planning, thick jungle prevented the 2nd Battalion’s other companies from surrounding the VC or reinforcing Charlie Company. Worse, friendly artillery fire further decimated the few men now surrounded by a superior enemy force.
Desperate fighting continued through the night; the soldiers of Charlie Company threw everything they had at the Viet Cong, including tear gas grenades. While established in a tight perimeter with mutually supporting crew-served weapons fire, the enemy was still able to breach the company’s lines —in the process of exfiltration, slitting the throats of soldiers wounded and awaiting medical evacuation. After five hours of brutal combat, what remained of Company C formed a tight perimeter protected only by supporting artillery, delivered at the rate of five rounds per minute.
It was in this setting that the Joint Rescue Center dispatched two HH-43 Huskie helicopters to extract wounded soldiers of C/2/16INF near Cam My, 35 miles east of Saigon. Upon reaching the extraction site, the helicopter crew lowered Senior Airman Bill Pitsenbarger, USAF to the ground to prepare wounded soldiers for evacuation. It was then that Pitsenbarger learned that the company medic was one of the wounded, that his wounds were enough to warrant aeromedical evacuation, and that he needed to remain on the ground to provide medical support to the men of Charlie Company. Pitsenbarger continued to provide life-saving treatment to the wounded and load them aboard returning helicopters.
The Air Force crew wanted Pitsenbarger back aboard the aircraft, but he elected to remain with the beleaguered company. Enemy small-arms fire struck one of the helicopters and its engine began to lose power. Pitsenbarger waived the helicopter off and continued administering to the wounded soldiers. The intensity of the enemy fire precluded further evacuations. For the next several hours, Pitsenbarger tended the wounded, hacking splints out of jungle vines, building improvised stretchers out of saplings, and when the infantry troops began running out of ammunition, Pitsenbarger gathered it from the dead and distributed it to those remaining alive.
With the arrival of darkness, Bill Pitsenbarger borrowed a rifle from a fallen soldier and joined with members of Charlie Company in forming a night perimeter. During the night, enemy fire took the life of Bill Pitsenbarger. The next morning, reinforcements arrived at the battle site to discover the young Airman’s body on the perimeter, his rifle in one hand, his medical kit in the other.
While serving in Vietnam, Senior Airman Bill Pitsenbarger completed 250 pararescue missions. His selfless courage under fire at Xa Cam My prompted his command to recommend him for the Medal of Honor. Instead, the Air Force posthumously awarded Pitsenbarger the Air Force Cross (AFC). Not everyone agreed with this decision. For the next 34 years, Air Force squadron mates and surviving members of Charlie Company worked tirelessly to have his AFC upgraded to the Medal of Honor. They accomplished their mission on 8 December 2000 when the Secretary of the Air Force presented his surviving and still-grieving parents with their son’s much deserved Medal of Honor and a posthumous promotion to Staff Sergeant (E-5).
Medal of Honor Citation:
Airman First Class Pitsenbarger distinguished himself by extreme valor on April 11, 1966 near Cam My, Republic of Vietnam, while assigned as a Pararescue Crew Member, Detachment 6, 38th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron. On that date, Airman Pitsenbarger was aboard a rescue helicopter responding to a call for evacuation of casualties incurred in an on-going firefight between elements of the United States Army’s 1st Infantry Division and a sizable enemy force approximately 35 miles east of Saigon. With complete disregard for personal safety, Airman Pitsenbarger volunteered to ride a hoist more than one hundred feet through the jungle, to the ground. On the ground, he organized and coordinated rescue efforts, cared for the wounded, prepared casualties for evacuation, and insured that the recovery operation continued in a smooth and orderly fashion. Through his personal efforts, the evacuation of the wounded was greatly expedited. As each of the nine casualties evacuated that day were recovered, Pitsenbarger refused evacuation in order to get one more wounded soldier to safety. After several pick-ups, one of the two rescue helicopters involved in the evacuation was struck by heavy enemy ground fire and was forced to leave the scene for an emergency landing. Airman Pitsenbarger stayed behind, on the ground, to perform medical duties. Shortly thereafter, the area came under sniper and mortar fire. During a subsequent attempt to evacuate the site, American forces came under heavy assault by a large Viet Cong force. When the enemy launched the assault, the evacuation was called off and Airman Pitsenbarger took up arms with the besieged infantrymen. He courageously resisted the enemy, braving intense gunfire to gather and distribute vital ammunition to American defenders. As the battle raged on, he repeatedly exposed himself to enemy fire to care for the wounded, pull them out of the line of fire, and return fire whenever he could, during which time, he was wounded three times. Despite his wounds, he valiantly fought on, simultaneously treating as many wounded as possible. In the vicious fighting which followed, the American forces suffered 80 percent casualties as their perimeter was breached, and airman Pitsenbarger was finally fatally wounded. Airman Pitsenbarger exposed himself to almost certain death by staying on the ground and perished while saving the lives of wounded infantrymen. His bravery and determination exemplify the highest professional standards and traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Air Force.
Staff Sergeant Pitsenbarger’s combat awards include the Medal of Honor, Airman’s Medal, two Purple Heart medals, Air Medal, and the Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross.
 Pararescue training began in 1946 in the U. S. Army Air Corps. The mission of ARS was saving the lives of airmen downed as a result of disasters, accidents, crash landings at locations beyond their assigned air base. The far-flung nature of Army/Air Force operations created a demand for a larger pararescue service, which was separate and distinct from local base rescue units. Pararescue teams include a physician, and four medics additionally trained in field medicine, rescue operations, parachute training, and basic infantry tactics. The Vietnam war was a pivotal conflict for USAF PRTs; the demand for qualified pararescue men was high and the program significantly expanded. The use of helicopters enlarged areas of operations and demanded a shift in tactics. The USAF created “rescue packages,” some of which involved forward air controllers, escort helicopters and A-1 “Sandys,” airborne rescue coordination flights and heavy helicopters commonly referred to as Jolly Green Giant (HH-3 and HH-53).
 A highly decorated infantry officer with service in World War II, the Korean War on detached duty with the Central Intelligence Agency, as an attaché in Hungary, Chief of Staff Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and from March 1966, as Commanding General, 1st US Infantry Division.
 Although the Air Force upgraded Pitsenbarger’s Air Force Cross to the Medal of Honor, he was the first USAF enlisted man ever to receive the Air Force Cross. In total, only four USAF enlisted men have received the Medal of Honor.
Born in Herefordshire, England in 1885, William E. Fairbairn illegally joined the British Royal Marines in 1901. He was only fifteen years old. He so much wanted to join the Marines that he somehow convinced his recruiter to falsify his paperwork. Upon completion of his initial training, Fairbairn was immediately sent to Korea where he got his first taste of close combat. Along with getting battle-tested in war, Fairbairn realized that his very life could depend upon his ability to defend himself with bayonet or fighting knife. He began studying martial arts disciplines that originated in Korea. It was the beginning of his effort to become a master of combat.
In 1907, the British Legation Guard seconded Fairbairn to the International Police Force in Shanghai; it was the toughest assignment a police officer could get. As a junior officer, he was assigned to one of the cities red-light districts. It was also the most dangerous part of the most dangerous city in the entire world.
Shanghai’s inner-city warlords controlled the gangs of outlaws; they, in turn, ran large areas within the city. These were seriously dangerous men who would brook no competition from either gangsters or police officers. The gangs ran everything illegal, from deviant behavior and opium to the kidnapping and ransom of the children of wealthy parents, to cold-blooded murder.
Not long after arriving in Shanghai, Officer Fairbairn was patrolling in the brothel district when he encountered a gang of criminals who threatened his life. They threatened the wrong man. Fairbairn attacked these gangsters, but he was quickly overwhelmed by their numbers and he received a life-threatening beating. When he woke up in the hospital days later, Fairbairn noticed a plaque near his bed advertising the services of one Professor Okada, a master of jujitsu and bone setting. Through many hours of off duty study, William Fairbairn earned a black belt in both jujitsu and judo.
Fairbairn (pictured left) served 30 years with the Shanghai police. In this time, he was involved in over 600 encounters with armed and unarmed assailants. His innate courage, determination, and acquired skillset in hand-to-hand combat always took him through to safety. On one particular evening, Fairbairn entered into another dangerous situation with a Japanese officer and fellow expert in the martial arts.
At this time, extreme hostility existed between China and Japan. As Fairbairn approached and greeted the Japanese officer, he noticed that there were around 150 Chinese men and women sitting bound on a nearby Japanese naval vessel. When Fairbairn inquired what was in the offing, the Japanese officer informed him that the Chinese persons were going to be executed. Fairbairn insisted that the Japanese officer release the Chinese at once and he would take them into custody. The Japanese officer refused.
Calmly, with a measured voice, Fairbairn warned the Japanese officer, paraphrasing: Do what you have to do, but one day we’ll meet again, and I’ll make sure you pay for this wrongdoing. The Japanese officer released all prisoners to Fairbairn.
Over many years, Fairbairn acquired practical knowledge in the field of law enforcement, self-defense, and close combat. He decided to incorporate his experiences into a new practical street defense system. He called it Defendu. He borrowed from various martial arts and included his own “down and dirty” non-telegraphic strikes that were easy to apply and highly practical and effective in real-world situations. Defendu also included various kicks, mainly designed to damage an attacker’s legs and knees.
In addition to his hand-to-hand combat skills, Fairbairn also developed new police weapons and equipment (bullet-proof vests, batons), firearms training courses, and specialized training for police anti-riot forces.
In 1939, the British Secret Service recruited Fairbairn and commissioned him as an army officer. Shortly after, with his demonstrated skills, colleagues and superiors alike began referring to Fairbairn as “Dangerous Dan.” He, along with fellow close-combat instructor Eric Sykes, received commissions as second lieutenants on 15 July 1940. Fairbairn and Sykes trained British, American, and Canadian commando units, including American ranger forces, in such areas as close-combat, combat shooting with the pistol, and knife fighting techniques. Lieutenant Fairbairn was quite plain in his instruction: dispense immediately with any idea of gentlemanly rules of fighting. His admonition was, “Get tough, get down in the gutter, win at all costs. There is no fair play. There is only one rule—kill or be killed.”
There are those today who never heard of William Fairbairn or Eric Sykes, but they may have heard of their most erstwhile invention: The Fairbairn fighting knife, also called commando knife … a stiletto-type dagger used by the British Special Forces in World War II. Given all his combat-related innovations, some have suggested that William Fairbairn might have been the inspiration for Ian Flemings’ Q Branch in the James Bond novels and films.
Significantly, Fairbairn also influenced training in the U. S. Marine Corps. Anthony J. D. Biddle, Sr., (1874-1948) (shown right) was a millionaire, the son of Edward Biddle II, the grandson of Anthony Drexel, and the great-grandson of Nicholas Biddle —bankers and industrialists all. His wealth enabled him to pursue the theater, writing, and Christianity on a full-time basis. A. J. D. Biddle was the basis of the book and play titled My Philadelphia Father, and the film The Happiest Millionaire. As a United States Marine, Biddle trained men in the art of hand-to-hand combat in both World War I and World War II. He was a fellow of the American Geographical Society and founded a movement called Athletic Christianity. In 1955, Sports Illustrated magazine called him boxing’s greatest amateur and a major factor in the re-establishment of boxing as a legal act and an estimable sport.
Colonel Biddle, as an expert in close-quarters fighting, wrote a book entitled Do or Die: A supplementary manual on individual combat. It instructed Marines and members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on combat methods with open hand fighting, knife fighting, and bayonet fighting. Within the book Do or Die, Biddle wrote in the Imprimatur, “Now come the very latest developments in the art of Defendu, originated by the celebrated Major W. E. Fairbairn, Assistant Commissioner of the Shanghai Municipal Police, and of jujitsu as shown by Lieutenant Colonel Samuel G. Taxis, U. S. Marine Corps, formerly stationed in Shanghai, who was an instructor in these arts. Following a series of conferences with Colonel Taxis, several of his particularly noteworthy assaults are described in Part III of this manual. Major Fairbairn is the author of the book, Get Tough.
Despite his lethal capabilities, Dangerous Dan was a well-mannered gentleman who never drank alcohol, never used profanity, and never boasted of his ability or accomplishments. William Ewart Fairbairn passed away on 20 June 1960, aged 75, in Sussex, England.
Biddle, A.J. D. Do or Die. Washington: The Leatherneck Association, Inc., 1937
Fairbairn, W. E. Get Tough. New York: Appleton-Century Company, 1942
Fairbairn, W. E. Shanghai: North China Daily News and Herald, 1926
Fairbairn, W. E., and Eric A. Sykes. Shooting to Live. London: Oliver & Boyd, 1942.
Lewis, D. The Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare: How Churchill’s Secret Warriors Set Europe Ablaze and Gave Birth to Modern Black Ops. Kindle edition online.
Somewhere between the first and fifth of August 1943, three young lieutenants, naval aviators all, swooped down upon a somewhat large rattlesnake resting in the area adjacent to the Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina, captured it, and took it with them to their newly commissioned squadron ready room. The well-fed snake measured about seven feet in length. Few people understand why lieutenants do anything. Observing the antics of a lieutenant, most people roll their eyes and think to themselves, “But for the grace of God …”
In this case, however, the lieutenants were on a mission. It was to find a nickname for their recently commissioned aircraft squadron. With all squadron pilots assembled, it was unanimously agreed that Marine Fighting Squadron 323 (VMF-323) would be henceforth known as the Death Rattlers. Its patch and nickname continue to exist today, as of this writing, for 77-years. In 1943, VMF-323 was assigned to Marine Aircraft Group (MAG)-32, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW). The squadron’s first commanding officer was Major George C. Axtell, Jr.
VMF-323 began combat training almost immediately after its activation. This squadron, as well as others being formulated, were desperately needed in the Pacific. In September 1943, VMF-323 was transferred to one of the Air Station’s outlying fields, a Marine Corps Auxiliary Air Facility at Oak Grove. Its first aircraft was the Vought F4U-1 Corsair. In 1943, VMF-323 was one of eight Marine Corps Corsair squadrons.
In January 1944, VMF-323 was transferred to El Centro, California and reassigned to Marine Base Defense Aircraft Group (MBDAG)-43. In California, squadron pilots worked to master instrument flying, gunnery, bomber escort, overland navigation, dogfighting, section flight tactics, field carrier landings, and strafing. Field carrier landing training was a prelude to actual carrier landing qualification training. When this training period was concluded, VMF-323 moved to Camp Pendleton, California. For Major Axtell, training new officers was a never-ending task since no sooner had he molded his pilots into skilled aviators, they would be transferred to another squadron and Axtell would have to begin the task of bringing along a newer pilot. Axtell, a qualified instrument pilot before taking command of the squadron, insisted that all of his pilots develop that skill set. Axtell believed that instrument flying would build self-confidence in his pilots and prepare them for future battles—which proved prescient.
VMF-323’s first casualty occurred on 17 March 1944 when Second Lieutenant Robert M. Bartlett, Jr., crashed his aircraft two miles south of the airbase while on a routine night familiarization flight. In April, VMF-323 took part in two large-scale joint service air interception exercises. On 25 May Second Lieutenant John A. Freshour and his passenger, Lieutenant Commander James J. Bunner, USN were killed when their Douglas SBD (Dauntless) crashed into a power line near Camp Pendleton’s airfield. That month, Axtell focused his pilots on the art and science of dive-bombing and forcing his pilots to avail themselves of an intelligence reading room and a classified material library. Major Axtell, young as he was, was a task-maker because in addition to learning, practicing, and becoming proficient in aviation skills, he also demanded that his pilots attend aircraft recognition classes and lectures on a host of technical topics —including the geography of Palau’s Islands, Philippines, the Sulu Archipelago, and other island areas these pilots could be assigned to. A third pilot was lost when Second Lieutenant Glen B. Smith crashed at sea on a routine training flight.
On 7 September 1944, 30 pilots, 3 ground officers, 90 enlisted men, 24 aircraft, and repair parts boarded the USS Breton (CVE-23) as the squadron’s advanced element. Its rear echelon of 20 officers, 167 enlisted men remained behind for further training. VMF-323 would be assigned to the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing. Ten days later, the squadron catapulted the squadron to its destination at Emirau. During takeoff, Second Lieutenant Gerald E. Baker crashed into the sea and was killed. Upon arrival at Emirau, Axtell reported to the Commanding General, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing for duty. For the next 30 days, VMF-323 conducted local flight training within a fifty-mile radius of the field. Training included gunnery, dive-bombing, and squadron tactics. On 24 October, Commander Task Group 59.6 ordered VMF-323 (Forward) to Espiritu Santo, a rear area supply base in the New Hebrides Islands. On the same day, the Commanding General, FMFPac (Air) placed VMF-323 under his administrative control.
By 31 October, VMF-323 (Fwd) was fully located at Espiritu Santo and busily involved in setting up the squadron for air operations. Between 9-28 November, the squadron participated in another round of familiarization flights, gun proficiency, bombing, and squadron tactics. On 29 November, the squadron’s rear echelon arrived and rejoined the squadron. MAG-33 attached the squadron on the same day. Ordnance experts from MAG-33 began installing airborne rocket launchers almost immediately, necessitating additional training by squadron pilots and ground crews. It was complicated; pilots needed to learn about glide angle, range, proper lead, rock effectiveness, safety, and the characteristics of various rockets. Added to the already busy training routine was close air support of ground troops. Unbeknownst to the squadron’s officers, they were being prepared for battle on the island of Okinawa. As the pilots were practicing air combat maneuvers, the enlisted men were spending more time on the rifle range: Every Marine is a Rifleman. Expected to develop proficiency with their sidearm, pilots went to the range, as well. Finally, the squadron’s ground defense crews practiced with anti-aircraft machine guns. There would be no gravel crunchers to provide security for VMF-323.
On 23 February, MAG-33 issued classified orders to the Commanding Officer, VMF-323: they would fly their 32 Corsairs to Okinawa in echelons. Combat operations began on 10 April from Kadena airfield. Weather conditions made Flying conditions poor. When the dawn combat air patrol (CAP) launched at 0515 hours on their first day, First Lieutenant James L. Brown failed to join the flight. Initially listed as missing in action, he was later declared killed in action. On the next day, the airfield came under attack, but there was no damage or casualties. The Death Rattlers’ first combat kill came that very morning, 11 April. First Lieutenant Vernon E. Ball was readying for takeoff when a Japanese bomb hit the runway in front of his aircraft. Ball calmly steered his aircraft around the bomb crater and took off. Once airborne, Ball observed fellow squadron mate Al Wells shoot down the Japanese bomber responsible for cratering the runway.
On the afternoon of 12 April, a fourteen aircraft CAP noted the approach of Japanese aircraft from the north. The Death Rattlers split into three divisions. Six aircraft were diverted northwest from Ie Shima, flight leader Major Arthur L. Turner with Second Lieutenant Obie Stover as his wingman. The second section was led by First Lieutenant Dellwyn L. Davis, with Second Lieutenant Robert J. Woods as his wingman. The third section was led by First Lieutenant Charlie Spangler, with Second Lieutenant Dewey Durnford as his wingman.
The Marines were flying at 15,000 feet, 71-miles northwest of Ie Shima when they spotted a multi-engine Japanese bomber about eight miles distant and at an altitude of around 11,000 feet. According to the Squadron’s official account:
Spangler and Durnford peeled off, followed by Davis and Woods. Spangler closed from five o’clock and opened fire at 800 feet. First, he knocked out the tail gunner and the top of the rudder, and then flamed the port engine. Durnford was closing from seven o’clock, whereupon the Betty turned on him, apparently trying to give the side blister gunner a shot. Durnford opened fire at 200 feet, directing his fire at the cockpit. Davis flamed the starboard engine from 100 feet and the Betty spiraled down in flames, exploding when it hit the water.
Meanwhile, a second six-plane element was directed to the Motobu Peninsula. Captain Felix S. Cecot was flight leader with Second Lieutenant Leon A. Reynolds as his wing. Captain Joe McPhail led the second section with Second Lieutenant Warren W. Bestwick. Second Lieutenant Glenn Thacker flew with Second Lieutenant Everett L. Yager. The enemy approached at about 18,000 feet. The Marines climbed to 23,000 to gain an overhead advantage. McPhail reported—
I spotted some F4Us chasing Zekes; I called out their position and rolled over. Bestwick was on my wing. On the way down, four Zekes appeared right under us at about 19,000 feet, flying almost abreast in two-plane sections. I started firing at the rear plane on the right, at about 400 yards, above and behind. My first burst was off, and the Zeke saw the tracers. He made a couple of small turns, and then I started getting hits. Pieces started coming off around the cockpit, and then he blew up. The other three scattered. I then pushed over and came home alone, being unable to find my wingman.
Berwick’s report stated …
Captain McPhail shot at the rear plane on the right. His Zeke crossed under the rest of their formation and exploded in flames. I picked the second plane of the first section and fired a long burst and saw it explode. By that time, the first plane of the second section had broken off to the right and down, so I continued my run and fired a 20-degree deflection shot from behind. This plane also exploded. While looking for Captain McPhail, I saw my first Zeke spiraling down smoking, but I didn’t see my second Zeke after firing on him.
Lieutenant Thacker had followed Bestwick on the original pass going after the fourth Zeke in the formation. He made an attack run on the Zeke and his guns knocked pieces from the fuselage, causing it to smoke. The Zeke, however, rolled, pulled up tightly, and escaped. Thacker claimed a probable kill as a result of his action.
At the same time, Captain Cecot dove from 23,000 feet to 5,000 to fire at a Jack. The Jack rolled, Cecot fired at his belly and saw it smoking. He was unable to observe further damage. He too claimed a probable kill.
The remaining section, composed of lieutenants John Ruhsam and Robert Wade, were returning to Kadena because Wade’s landing gear could not be retracted. Just south of Motobu, a Zeke dove out of the sun and made a pass at Wade’s plane. Wade lowered his flaps and made a tight run. The Zeke shot past, rolled, and dove to the deck. Wade followed him down and was almost in firing position when Ruhsam opened fire with a 30-degree deflection shot and the Zeke burst into flames and crashed.
During this flight, all squadron pilots involved encountered Japanese aircraft for the first time.
VMF-323 flew a variety of close air support and bombing missions over the next few days, the seventh and last mission of 22 April was a record-breaker. The last mission was an eight aircraft formation led by Major George C. Axtell, the squadron commander. The flight departed Kadena at 1500 hours and did not return until around 1915. During this flight, VMF-323 downed a record 24 (and three-quarters) enemy aircraft. The squadron’s records reflect that the action was fast and furious.
Major Jefferson D. Dorah, Jr., squadron executive officer, burned five planes and exploded a sixth, all within twenty minutes. Major George B. Axtell shot down five planes within fifteen minutes. Twenty-one-year-old Lieutenant Jeremiah J. O’Keefe also shot down five planes, one of which tried to ram him after it caught fire.
Flying combat aircraft is a dangerous vocation. This was true in 1945, it is more so now as our young men fly high-performance aircraft with exceptionally complicated technology. Every moment of a training or combat flight is a teaching moment. Bad things can happen to machines, and it is the human pilot that must respond to each “sudden” and sometimes catastrophic failure. In April 1945, VMF-323 pilots learned about fire discipline. Some used up their ammunition too quickly, wastefully, which at the moment the last round was fired, rendered that bird as combat ineffective. Other pilots dropped their external fuel tanks too soon, which threatened their ability to return safely to base. They learned from their mistakes, of course … or they died because of them.
VMFA-323 is the home squadron of my good (and long-time) friend Pablo, who occasionally comments here. Pablo has been an aviator for more than 50 years. That is … fifty years of accident-free flying. He is a certified instructor pilot, a certified glider pilot, and certified to teach glider flying. He is also a much-sought-after aviation safety instructor/lecturer. He will attest to the risks associated with aviation and most likely agree that these innate risks, when combined with high anxiety combat maneuvering, makes military flying the most challenging vocation anyone could ever ask for. It should not surprise anyone that there are aircraft mishaps, and that good young men and women die in them. Given the operational tempo of our military air wings, what is surprising is that there are not more mishaps.
As Brigadier General Chuck Yeager (USAF) once said, “There are old pilots, and there are bold pilots, but there are no old bold pilots.”
Chapin, J. C. Fire Brigade: U. S. Marines in the Pusan Perimeter. Washington: USMC Historical Center, 2000.
Pitzl, G. R. A History of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323. Washington: USMC Historical Center, 1987.
Sherrod, R. History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II. Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952.
 Lieutenant General George B. Axtell (1920-2011) was a World War II flying ace, recipient of the Navy Cross, and the youngest commanding officer of a Marine fighter squadron. General Axtell served through three wars and retired from active service in 1974. In addition to command of VMF-323, he also commanded VMF-452, VMF-312, Marine Carrier Air Group-16, Marine Air Control Group 1, Marine Aircraft Group 12, Force Logistics Command, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, and the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic. In addition to the Navy Cross, he was awarded the Navy Distinguished Service Medal, three awards of the Legion of Merit with combat valor device, two awards of the Distinguished Flying Cross, and seven awards of the Air Medal.
 The Corsair was developed by the Chance Vought Aircraft Company, designed and operated as a carrier-based aircraft and entered service in the Navy-Marine Corps in 1942. It quickly became one of the most capable fighter-bombers in the US arsenal and, according to Japanese pilots, the most formidable American fighter in World War II. The Corsair saw service in both World War II and the Korean War. It was retired from active service in 1953.
 Betty was the name Allied aviators gave to the Mitsubishi G4M twin-engine land-based bomber.
 Zeke was the name Allied aviators gave to the Mitsubishi A6M Zero.
 Jack was the name Allied aviators gave to the Mitsubishi J2M Raiden (lightning bolt), a Japanese Navy aircraft
People have admired chivalrous conduct for thousands of years, long before we invented a word for it. It does not confine itself to mounted warriors wearing armor and confronting a determined enemy. Chivalry was a code employed by a culture of warriors, which extends to the notion of good men skilled in warfare willing to place their lives and fortunes “on the line” in defense of innocents, in defense of the realm, in defense of religious beliefs. The code was already in writing by the time of Charlemagne and is chronicled in La Chanson de Roland, which tells of the Battle of Roncevaux Pass in 778 A.D. Historians have restored the code, which appears in summary form below:
To fear God and maintain His church (community)
To serve the liege lord in valor and faith
To protect the weak and defenseless
To give succor to widows and orphans
To refrain from the wanton giving of offense
To live by honor and for glory
To despise pecuniary reward
To fight for the welfare of all
To obey those placed in authority
To guard the honor of fellows
To eschew unfairness, meanness, and deceit
To keep faith
At all times, speak only truth
To persevere to the end in any enterprise once begun
To respect and honor women
Never refuse a challenge from an equal
Never turn one’s back upon a foe
Of these eighteen tenets, 12 relate to chivalrous behavior, as opposed to combat. For people like me, they remain relevant and elemental in the behavior of true ladies and gentlemen and closely align themselves with the New Testament’s I Corinthians, 13.
If I speak in the tongues of men or angels but do not have love, I am only a resounding gong or a clanging cymbal. If I have the gift of prophecy and can fathom all mysteries and all knowledge, and if I have a faith that can move mountains, but do not have love, I am nothing. If I give all that I possess to the poor and give over my body to hardship that I may boast, but do not have love, I gain nothing.
Love is patient; Love is kind. It does not envy, it does not boast, it is not proud. It does not dishonor others; It is not self-seeking, nor easily angered and keeps no record of wrongs. Love does not delight in evil but rejoices in the truth. It always protects, always trusts, always hopes, and always perseveres.
Love never fails. But where there are prophecies they will cease. Where there are tongues, they will be stilled. Where there is knowledge, this too will pass away. For we know in part, and we prophecy in part, but when completeness comes, what is in part disappears. When I was a child, I spoke as a child; I thought like a child. I reasoned like a child. But when I became a man, I put away the things of childhood. For now, we see only a reflection, as in a mirror, but we will see face to face. Now I know in part, then I shall know fully, even as I am fully known.
And now these three alone remain: faith, hope, and love. But the greatest of these is love.
During the early and late Middle Ages, the code of chivalry was incorporated into rites of knighthood, standards of behavior expected of those who served the interests of others, more than their own interests. They also included strict rules of etiquette and behavior. The codes were so exemplary that poets, lyricists, and writers incorporated them into their tales. Since most people were illiterate, wandering minstrels communicated these ideals throughout the land. In the post-Roman period of England (c. 500 A.D.) Arthurian myths strengthened notions of personal fortitude and courage in the face of adversity, of honor, honesty, valor, and loyalty.
I believe these two things: (1) King Arthur was not a myth; (2) No organization in the world today better emulates the chivalrous code than the United States Marine Corps. This is what I believe, but I do not exclude any other of western civilization’s stalwart military or public service organizations. I only intend my statement to emphasize the frequency of such laudatory qualities within the brotherhood of the US Marine Corps.
The stories from antiquity, mythical or otherwise, serve as teaching moments. There may not have been a greater general in all antiquity than Julius Caesar, but he was a flawed man (professionally and personally) whose mistakes were devastating to Rome and its people. King Arthur too was an illustrious leader, a man whose human frailty led to his demise and that of his Camelotian kingdom. Not too many years ago, the American people spoke of the Kennedy White House as Camelot, but revealed history tells us that Jack Kennedy and his lovely bride were troubled people whose personal behaviors destroyed them, their legacy, which deeply troubled their citizen-admirers’.
The bane of humankind is our moral frailty.
Historians have claimed that the Arthurian stories were legend or myth because there are no written records to validate them. Nor is there any physical evidence that he ever lived —until recently. British archeologists believe that they have uncovered the burial tomb of a man named Arthur that dates back in time to around 500 A. D. Perhaps King Arthur was a myth, but I doubt it. King Arthur is the warrior from antiquity that no one ever forgot. His existence may not be as well documented as that of Jesus of Nazareth, but the evidence that does exist is enough to convince me that such a man did exist —but more to the point, his is a story that can help us discover who we are, and how we might use the lessons of time to improve ourselves; how we might better serve our families, our communities, and our nation.
Many tales were written about King Arthur and his knights of the round table, most of which were romantic constructs that incorporated supernatural or mythical beings, which were clearly imaginative inventions. Three hundred years earlier, however, Nennius records Arthur as a historic figure in Historia Brittonum (The History of the Britons), an account unfettered by flights of fancy. The Britons, of course, were tribal Celts who occupied all of Britain before being pushed into Wales by the Romans, Angles, and Saxons. Arthur was one of the last Britons to make a successful stand against the Anglo-Saxon invasions, a conflict that continued through the rise and progeny of King Alfred the Great (847-99). If Nennius correctly records the events of the time, given that present-day England was divided by squabbling tribes in the post-Roman period, then Arthur would not have adorned himself in shining armor. He would wear the attire of a Celtic chieftain, which most likely incorporated the clothing and armor of late-Roman style. There would have been no great castles, but something more on the order of wooden stockades incorporated with then-existing Roman fortifications/settlements.
Historic facts about this period of Romano-British England are more fascinating than the fanciful tales because history is more plausible. Monk Nennius never told us where Arthur was born, but he did list his battles —notably his last battle at Badon, which occurred near Aquae Sulis (present-day Bath). The significance of the battle was that the Britons prevailed over the Anglo-Saxon horde, pushing them back to the British Saxon Shore. We know this from the Anglo-Saxon’s own records of the time, and from archaeological evidence. That the Britons had a powerful, unifying leader, seems undeniable.
Was there such a place as Camelot? Yes-and no. Colchester, England is the site of the earliest Roman settlement, although evidence suggests that the settlement existed before the arrival of Romans in 55 B.C. It was then called Camulodunon, which also appears on coins minted by the chieftain Tasciovanus between 20-10 B.C. It would be easy to make this association, but Colchester is far removed from Aquae Sulis and there is yet another possibility.
In the Bodleian Library at Oxford University, there is a 7th-century work titled The Song of Llywarch the Old. It contains one of the oldest references to King Arthur, composed of a series of poems attributed to a poet named Llywarch, who praises the exploits of a chieftain named Cynddylan, who died fighting the Anglo Saxons in 658 A.D. Cynddylan, according to Llywarch, was the direct descendant of Arthur, which implies that Arthur once ruled the kingdom that Cynddylan ruled. It was the kingdom of present-day Powys, Wales, which at the time covered the area described above, in the south and west-central England and east-central Wales. The Anglo-Saxons eventually defeated the Britons, pushing them into the Welsh mountains where a modern-day county still retains the old kingdom’s name. The Romans called this area Viroconium.
When Rome abandoned Britain in 410 A.D., most of their settlements were abandoned and Britain fell into the so-called Dark Ages. Romans and their mixed-blood descendants, however, continued to occupy Viroconium. It had been the fourth largest town in Romano-Britain after Londonium(London), Lindum Colonia (Lincoln), and Eboracum (York). While the Anglo-Saxons quickly overran the largest cities (above), Viroconium was far distant from the invasive Germans and remained free and evolved into the Briton’s most important city in the early Dark Ages. These ruins still exist with archeological evidence that the town went through a process of reconstruction around 500 A.D. We know the town today as Wroxeter, which is 25 miles northwest of Worcester, my lovely bride’s hometown. Ancient manuscripts tell us that Arthur ruled over the Briton’s most important city —which would have been Viroconium.
Still, Arthur is not a Welsh name. The ruler of Viroconium around the time of Arthur was named Owain Ddantgwyn (pronounced Owen Thant-gwyn), which sounds nothing like Arthur. During the early Middle Ages, British warriors were given honorary titles of real or mythological animals thought to represent their prowess in battle. One of these was the Welsh word “Arth,” meaning Bear. In Viroconium around 500 A.D., its ruler Owain Ddantgwyn was known as the Bear, hence, Arth. Scholars today connect the Welsh word for bear with the Latin word for bear, Ursus, which then became, in later years, Arthur, a king, and a person who actually did exist.
The tales of King Arthur are entertaining, but the history of the real warrior is more fascinating. Our admiration for such a fellow continues because, among other things, he helped create the code of honor that serves as our guide for achieving and maintaining nobility.
Knights in the sense of the Middle Ages never existed in the United States, of course —Americans eschewed the notion of kings or of men born into families of nobles. Instead, we Americans believe that every person can obtain nobility by acting nobly. The Knight’s Code of Honor that I borrowed (above) is a nifty tool for helping us achieve nobility —as a guide for the way we live our lives.
As for knights —we do have them, but we call them by another name. Their standards are high, their tolerance for failure is low, they do remarkably brave things almost on a daily basis while never seeking recognition. They are guardians of the weak, they succor the suffering, and live according to a unique code of honor. These knights demand fairness, serve justice, always persevere, and they keep the faith. In fact, it is their motto: Semper Fidelis. We call these modern-day knights United States Marines.
“Greater love hath no man than this: that a man lay down his life for a friend.”
Remarkably, much about the US Marines is modeled on the warrior that no one forgot. Personally, given who I am, I hope no one ever does forget.
Anderson, G. King Arthur in Antiquity. London: Roufledge (2004)
Phillips, G. The Lost Tomb of King Arthur. Rochester: Bear & Company, 2016
Dumville, D. N. Sub-Roman Britain: History and legend. 1977
 Our observation that chivalrous codes did exist does not suggest that every individual who took such oaths always observed them. Every person has strengths as well as weaknesses; some of us have destructive character flaws. In ancient society, and today, there are plenty of scurrilous fellows who took oaths for only one purpose, to advance themselves, and then violated them on a more-or-less on-going basis.
 Read: The Lost Tomb of King Arthur, by Graham Phillips, Rochester: Bear & Company, 2016.
 Nennius was a Welsh monk of the 9th century. Nennius, who lived in Brecknockshire, present-day Powys, was a student of the bishop Elfodd of Bangor, who convinced ecclesiastics of his day to accept the Continental dating of Easter. Much of Nennius’ effort was based on earlier works, notably De Excidio et Conquestu Britanniae, which was written by Gildas between 500-579 A. D.
 Popular writers suggest that Arthur Pendragon was descended from a Welsh and Romano-British line, which given the history of Rome’s presence in Britain, and the areas in which they settled (Aquae Sulis (Somerset)-West Mercia (Wroxeter/Worcestershire)), the suggestion is credible.
Shortly after the inauguration of President George Washington in 1789, Congress created the United States Department of War (also, War Department) as a cabinet-level position to administer the field army and Naval Affairs under the president’s constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States and the United States Secretary of War. The first Secretary of War was retired army general Henry Knox. With the possible exception of President James Madison “lending a hand” alongside U. S. Marines at the Battle of Bladensburg in 1814, George Washington is the only Commander-in-Chief to lead a field army in 1794 during the so-called Whiskey Rebellion.
President John Adams considered the possibility of reorganizing a “new army” under the nominal command of retired President Washington to deal with the increase of maritime incidents between the United States and the French Republic in 1798. Adams considered this possibility owing to his concern about the possibility of a land invasion by the French and his perceived need of consolidating the Armed Forces under an experienced “commander in chief.” A land invasion would come, but not from France.
Also, in 1798, Congress established the United States Department of the Navy, initiated on the recommendation of James McHenry to provide organizational structure to the emerging United States Navy and Marine Corps (after 1834), and when directed by the President or Congress during time of war, the United States Coast Guard (although each service remained separate and distinct with unique missions and expertise). Until 1949, the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy served as members of the presidential cabinet.
Following World War II, particularly as a consequence of evolving military technology and the complex nature of war, Congress believed that the War and Navy departments would be better managed under a central authority. James Forrestal, who served as the 48th Secretary of the Navy, became the first United States Secretary of Defense. A restructuring of the US military took the following form under the National Security Act of 1947.
Merged the Department of the Navy and Department of War into the National Military Establishment (NME). The Department of War was renamed the Department of the Army. A Secretary of Defense would head the NME.
Created the Department of the Air Force, which moved the Army Air Corps into the United States Air Force.
Protected the U. S. Marine Corps as a separate service under the Department of the Navy.
The secretaries of military departments remained nominal cabinet posts, but this arrangement was determined deficient given the creation of the office of the Secretary of Defense.
While the National Security Act of 1947 did recognize the U. S. Marine Corps as a separate naval service, it did not clearly define the service’s status within the Navy Department. Under this new arrangement, the Commandant did have access to the Secretary of the Navy, but many operational matters involving the Marine Corps continued to fall under the purview of the Chief of Naval Operations. As an example, the U. S. Navy funded Marine Corps aviation, determining types of aircraft made available to the Marine Corps as well as matters pertaining to air station operations. Accordingly, the Marine Corps, as an organization, remained vulnerable to the dictates of others in terms of its composition, funding, and operations limiting the role of the Commandant in deciding such matters.
Within three months of assuming the office of Commandant on 1 January 1948, General Clifton B. Cates was forced to confront a difficult political situation. In March, Defense Secretary Forrestal convened a meeting of the military secretaries and service chiefs in Key West, Florida to discuss and resolve their respective roles and missions within the National Military Establishment. Since General Cates was not invited to the meeting, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Louis E. Denfield, undertook the representation of the Marine Corps as part of the Navy. The problem was that the Marine Corps has never been part of the U. S. Navy.
Part of the Key West conference involved a discussion concerning likely future conflicts, with everyone agreeing that America’s next war would involve the Soviet Union in Europe. Should this happen, given President Truman’s mandate to cut Defense spending, then the Army and Air Force would require substantial defense allocations for reinforcements. In order to fund this potential threat, the meeting concluded that the Marine Corps must receive less money. Besides, argued the Army and Air Force, there would be no need for an amphibious force in a European war. The Key West meeting concluded with an agreement that the Marine Corps would be limited to four infantry divisions, that the JCS would deny Marine Corps leadership any tactical command above the corps levels, and a prohibition of the Marine Corps from creating a second land army.
When General Cates learned of this meeting, he protested making such decisions without his participation claiming that it violated the intent of the National Security Act of 1947 and impaired the ability of the Marine Corps to fulfill its amphibious warfare mission. General Cates protestations fell on deaf ears.
Louis A. Johnson replaced James Forrestal as Secretary of Defense in March 1949. Johnson shared Truman’s commitment to drastic reductions in defense spending in favor of domestic programs. Both Truman and Johnson made the erroneous assumption that America’s monopoly on atomic weapons would act as a sufficient deterrence against Communist aggression. Neither of these men, therefore, believed that a military force-in-readiness was a necessary function of the Department of Defense.
Given the relative autonomy of the service secretaries and military chiefs under the National Security Act, and as a means of thwarting independent lobbying by either the Navy or the Air Force, President Truman pursued two courses of action. (1) Truman sought (and obtained) an amendment to the National Security Act that made the Department of Defense a single executive department, which incorporated as subordinates, each of the service secretaries. The amendment also created the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subordinating its members to the chairman, the first of these being General Omar Bradley. (2) Both President Truman and Johnson demanded that the service secretaries and senior military leaders “get in line” with the President’s defense cuts.
The intimidation apparently worked because General Omar Bradley changed his tune once he was nominated to become Chairman of the JCS. In 1948 he moaned, “The Army of 1948 could not fight its way out of a paper bag.” In the next year, both he and Army Chief of Staff General Collins testified before Congress that Truman cuts made the services more effective.
At about the same time, in a meeting with the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Richard L. Conolly, Johnson told him, “Admiral, the Navy is on its way out. There is no reason for having a Navy and Marine Corps. General Bradley tells me amphibious operations are a thing of the past. We’ll never have any more amphibious operations. That does away with the Marine Corps. And the Air Force can do anything the Navy can do, so that does away with the Navy.”
Truman hated the Marine Corps with intense passion, which might afford psychologists years of interesting study. He did not think the nation needed a corps of Marines when there was already a land army. In implementing Truman’s budget cuts, Secretary Johnson intended that the Marine Corps be disestablished and incorporated into the U. S. Army. Toward this goal, Johnson initiated steps to move Marine Corps aviation into the U. S. Air Force. He was soon reminded that such a move would be illegal without congressional approval.
Neither Truman nor Johnson ever accepted the fact that the Marine Corps, as a combat force, provided unique strategic and tactical strengths to the national defense structure. What the law would not allow Secretary Johnson or President Truman to do, they attempted to accomplish through financial starvation. Under the chairmanship of Omar Bradley, the JCS was bitingly hostile to the Marine Corps.
The Marine Corps, however, was not the lone ranger. Less than a month after assuming office, Secretary Johnson canceled construction of the USS United States, a then state-of-the-art aircraft carrier. Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan resigned his office, and a number of Navy admirals joined him, effective on 24 May 1949. The incident is remembered as the Revolt of the Admirals.
The revolt of admirals prompted the House Armed Services Committee to convene hearings during October 1949. A number of active duty and retired admirals appeared before the committee and gave their testimony, including Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Denfield. They had little good to say about Louis Johnson or newly appointed Navy Secretary Francis Matthews. General Cates also gave testimony, giving his unqualified support to the Navy. Along with this, he protested the fact that he had not been consulted in matters pertaining to the Marine Corps and the impact of these decisions on the national defense. Said Cates, “… the power of the budget, the power of coordination, and the power of strategic direction of the armed forces have been used as devices to destroy the operating forces of the Marine Corps.” The House committee also called General Bradley, who, in arguing in favor of disestablishment of the Navy and Marine Corps rejected the notion that the United States would ever again have a use for amphibious operations.
Replacing Admiral Denfield as CNO was Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, who immediately repudiated General Vandergrift’s agreement with Secretary Sullivan. He instead approached the Secretary of Defense and requested “a free hand” in matters pertaining to the Marine Corps. Johnson granted Sherman’s request. At the beginning of 1950, after two years of forced budgetary cuts, Sherman slated the Marine Corps for additional cuts. The Marine Corps would be reduced to 24,000 officers and men, a reduction from eleven infantry battalions to six, from twenty-three aviation squadrons to twelve. Additionally, Secretary Johnson ordered the curtailment of appropriations for equipment, ammunition, supplies, and people and excluded Marine Corps units from various tactical training. Admiral Sherman assigned the bulk of amphibious ships to support Army training, leaving the Marines with little to do.
War did return to the United States, of course. When it did, it proved General Omar Bradley and the other joint chiefs were completely wrong in their predictions. Worse, it demonstrated how unprepared the United States was for its next martial challenges.
Support for the Marines
Although Representative Carl Vinson (D-GA) proposed a bill that gave full JCS membership to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the measure failed but generated much attention in the American press, particularly in the Hearst news organization. Public support was already growing for the Navy-Marine Corps when the war clouds once more gathered in the Far East.
Among Truman’s staunchest congressional foes was Representative Gordon L. McDonough (R-CA). McDonough wrote a letter to President Truman noting how the Marine Corps has always rushed to the nation’s defense. With this in mind, the congressman urged the president to include the Commandant as a full member of the JCS. The president’s response to McDonough tells us far more about Truman than is possible in an entire essay. Truman wrote, “For your information, the Marine Corps is the Navy’s police force, and as long as I am President, that is what it will remain.” Apparently, Truman failed to consider that he was writing to someone who might use the president’s blistering comments against him later on. Truman continued, “They [Marines] have a propaganda machine almost the equal of Stalin’s. When the Marine Corps goes into the Army it works with and for the Army and that’s the way it should be … The Chief of Naval Operations is the chief of staff of the Navy of which the Marines are a part.”
McDonough inserted Truman’s response into the Congressional Record, and it wasn’t long before the press picked it up and printed it. Press reporting created a firestorm in the United States. Conservative politicians of both parties and journalists excoriated Truman for his remarks. The White House was overwhelmed by mail from the public, many who lost loved ones during World War II, expressing their indignation of Truman’s remarks. Presidential aides scrambled to construct a letter of apology, which Truman personally handed to General Cates at the White House. He then released a copy to the press. Afterward, when Truman fired Louis Johnson after only 18 months as Defense Secretary, the matter moved to the back burner.
The nation responds
Immediately following World War II, the Eighth US Army was assigned to occupation duty in Japan. Initially, there was much work to be done: disarming former Japanese soldiers, maintaining order, dealing with local populations, guarding installations, and prosecuting war criminals. According to the Eighth Army Blue Book, “On 31 December 1945, Sixth Army was relieved of occupation duties and Eighth Army assumed an expanded role in the occupation, which encompassed the formidable tasks of disarmament, demilitarization, and democratization. The missions were flawlessly executed at the operational level by Eighth Army …”
The statement may be undeniably true, but as the Japanese people settled comfortably into their new reality, demands placed on soldiers and their officers lessoned. What the Blue Book’s history section omits, a dangerous precedent for future soldiers, was that this major combat command became lethargic, pleasure-seeking, and in the face of severe budgetary restraints imposed on it by the Truman administration, reached an unbelievable level of incompetence and ineptitude.
In the early hours of 25 June 1950, the (North) Korean People’s Army, numbering 53,000 front line and supporting forces followed a massive artillery bombardment into South Korea. There were only a handful of Army advisors in South Korea at the time. Those who wanted to continue living made a beeline toward the southern peninsula.
In Japan, there was a single battalion in the 21st Regiment of the 24th Infantry Division capable of “mounting out” to interdict the overwhelming KPA army. The battalion, composed of mostly untrained teenagers capable of little more than standing guard duty in Japan, never stood a chance.
The Marines Respond
At the time of the North Korean invasion, senior officers of the U. S. Marine Corps knew that they would be called upon to address this new crisis. Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, in Hawaii, flew to Tokyo to confer with General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), in Tokyo. At the conclusion of their meeting, MacArthur sent a dispatch to the JCS in Washington requesting the immediate assignment of a Marine regimental combat team to his command.
In Washington, General Bradley delayed his response for a full five days. By the time the JCS did respond, the North Korean Army had already mauled the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division at the Battle of Osan, rendering it combat ineffective. Closer to the truth, 1/21 was combat ineffective even before it arrived on the Korean Peninsula. For these young men, the land of the morning calm had become a bloody nightmare.
In late June 1950, Marine Corps manpower equaled around 74,000 men. The total number of Marines assigned to the Fleet Marine Forces was 28,000, around 11,000 of these were assigned to FMFPac. Neither the 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton nor its east coast counterpart, the 2nd Marine Division, could raise more than a regimental landing team (RLT) of combat-ready troops, with supporting air. To fully man a combat division, it would be necessary to transfer Marines to Camp Pendleton from posts and stations, recruiting staffs, supply depots, schools, depots, districts, and even Marine headquarters.
General MacArthur had requested an RLT, he would get a Marine brigade, the advance element of the 1st Marine Division that had been ordered to embark. The officer assigned to lead the Brigade was the senior officer present at Camp Pendleton, Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, an experienced combat leader with 33 years of active duty service.
The ground combat element of the Brigade would form around the 5th Marine Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray. Murray was already selected for promotion to colonel. Marines reporting for duty at Camp Pendleton were rushed to the 5th Marines where they would flesh out Murray’s understrength battalions. 1st Battalion 11th Marines (artillery) would serve in general support of the brigade with additional detachments (company strength) in communications, motor transportation, field medical, support, engineer, ordnance, tanks, and special weapons.
At the Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California, Marine Aircraft Group 33 was being formed around Brigadier General Thomas H. Cushman. Cushman would serve as Craig’s deputy and command the brigade’s air element, consisting of a headquarters squadron, service squadron, VMF 214, VMF 323, VMF(N) 513(-), and Tactical Squadron-2 (detachment).
In total, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade arrived in Korea with 6,534 Marines —its equipment, brought out of mothballs dating back to World War II: trucks, jeeps, amphibian tractors, all reconditioned and tested for service.
Major General Frank E. Lowe, U. S. Army (Retired) was dispatched to Korea as the personal envoy of President Truman. His task was to observe the conduct of the conflict and report his findings directly to the President. General Lowe advised President Truman that the Army, its senior leadership and combat doctrine were dangerously lacking. Of the 1st Marine Division, General Lowe reported, “The First Marine Division is the most efficient and courageous combat unit I have ever seen or heard of.” General Lowe recommended that the Marine Corps have a permanent establishment of three divisions and three air wings.
Whether General Lowe’s report influenced Truman is unknown. What is known is that the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of the Navy, and Chief of Naval Operations continued to oppose recognition of the Marine Corps as a viable service and its leader as someone entitled to become a member of the JCS. Still, public and congressional support for the Marine Corps increased steadily. The issue of the Douglas-Mansfield bills was deferred until the 1952 legislative session. Before then, however, Admiral Sherman died suddenly in July 1951, and General Lemuel C. Shepherd succeeded Cates as Commandant of the Marine Corps.
As a result, the 1952 legislative session worked in the Marine Corps’ favor. The Marine Corps was approved for a peacetime force of three infantry divisions, three air wings, and a manpower ceiling of 400,000 men. The Commandant was granted access to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with voting rights on matters pertaining to the Marine Corps, as determined by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and on 20 June 1952, President Truman signed into law the Douglas-Mansfield Act. Some pundits claim that politically, Truman did not dare veto the bill —others argue that Truman finally realized the value of the Marine Corps as our nation’s premier combat force.
Catchpole, L. G. The Korean War. London: Robinson Publishing, 2001
Davis, V. The Post-Imperial Presidency. New Brunswick: Transaction Press, 1980
Fehrenbach, T. R. This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History. Washington: Potomac Books, 2001
Krulak, V. H. First to Fight: An Inside View of the U. S. Marine Corps. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999.
Montross, L. and Nicholas A. Canzona. S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953 (Volume 1): The Pusan Perimeter. Historical Branch, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C., 1954.
The United States Naval Proceedings Magazine, Volume 33, Number 3: A Propaganda Machine Like Stalin’s, Alan Rems, June 2019
 A supporter of the United States Constitution, Representative from Maryland, and third Secretary of War. He was also a noted surgeon with many successes during the Revolutionary War. Fort McHenry, outside Baltimore, is named in his honor.
 Forrestal had served in the Navy Department as Under Secretary since 1940 and appointed as Secretary of the Navy in 1944. Forrestal served as Secretary of Defense from 18 September 1947 until 28 March 1949 when President Harry S. Truman asked for his resignation and replaced him Louis A. Johnson. Forrestal’s wartime service had taken its toll and he was personally shattered when fired by Truman, with whom he had little patience. He took his own life on 22 May 1949 while undergoing treatment for severe depression.
 During World War II, Chief of Naval Operations Ernest J. King was well-known as a micro-manager. He treated the Commandant of the Marine Corps as another one of his bureau chiefs and denied the Commandant access to the Secretary of the Navy. This restriction changed when Admiral Nimitz became CNO, but the relationship was a gentleman’s agreement between Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan, Admiral Nimitz, and Marine Commandant Alexander A. Vandergrift. The National Security Act of 1947, however, did not clarify the status of the Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy.
 During World War II, the Marine Corps fielded six infantry divisions.
 Nearly every newly created U. S. Air Force general was a proponent of the use of strategic bombing and atomic warfare as the United States’ principal defense strategy. Standing in opposition to this ludicrous mindset was nearly every active duty and retired Navy admiral.
 The JCS evolved from a relatively inefficient joint board of senior Army and Navy officers who seldom agreed in matters of operational planning or execution. The Joint Board performed as presidential advisors but had no authority to initiate programs or policies. Following World War I, the Joint Board was renamed the Joint Planning Committee with the authority to initiate recommendations but had no authority to implement them.
 General Bradley detested the Marine Corps almost as much as President Truman and Secretary Johnson.
 Because of Truman and Johnson’s defense cuts, the United States had no combat-ready units in June 1950.
 Replacing Sullivan was Francis P. Matthews, a former director of the USO who admitted to having no expertise that would qualify him for service as a Navy Secretary beyond his contempt for the Marine Corps.
 President Truman demanded Denfield’s resignation and took action to demote the other admirals.
The War of 1812 between Great Britain and the United States evolved from several factors: (1) British impressment of American sailors, (2) The Americans accepted for citizenship British deserters, (3) British frigates blockaded US harbors in their search for British deserters, (4) British supported native Americans and urged them to commit hostile actions toward American settlers, (5) American interests in expansion into the Northwest Territory, and (6) America’s internal politics, with one faction demanding a stronger central government and closer ties to Great Britain, with the opposing party demanding a smaller central government, preservation of slavery and states’ rights, westward expansion, and a stronger break with the British.
Hostility with Great Britain, which at the time had the world’s strongest navy and land army, did not favor the United States. With few exceptions, senior American army officers —holdovers from the Revolutionary War— were elderly, full of themselves, tired, and incompetent. The combination of these factors led to American defeats at Detroit, Queenston Heights, and Upper Canada. Whether the United States succeeded or failed in this latest confabulation, the American people did not want another war with Great Britain; they were war-weary, which made James Madison a very unpopular president.
On the Continent, the United Kingdom was heavily committed to fighting Napoleon Bonaparte and could not immediately spare its army or the Royal Navy to confront the United States. These circumstances led the British to develop a conservative strategy in North America: defend British territory on land, employ naval blockades of American harbors, and harass US naval shipping at sea.
Following the death of Major General Robert Ross, who commanded the British North American Army, killed in action near Baltimore, Maryland, the British war office appointed Major General Edward Pakenham to succeed him. In August 1814, the United Kingdom and the United States initiated diplomatic negotiations to end the war. British Secretary of War Henry Bathurst issued Pakenham secret orders commanding him to continue prosecuting the war, even if he heard rumors of a peace treaty being signed because Bathurst feared that the United States Senate would refuse to ratify such a treaty. Bathurst did not want Pakenham to endanger his troops or miss an opportunity to gain advantages over the American Army.
In December 1814, the British navy stationed sixty (60) ships in the Gulf of Mexico, east of the entrance to Lake Pontchartrain, under the command of Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane. Aboard these ships were 14,450 soldiers. An American flotilla of gunboats under the command of Lieutenant Thomas ap Catesby-Jones, blocked their access to the lakes. British forces under Captain Nicholas Lockyer attacked Jones with 1,200 British sailors and Marines in 42 longboats. Each longboat was armed with a small cannonade. In this engagement, known as the Battle of Lake Borgne, Lockyer captured Jones’ vessels. Lockyer lost 17 of his men killed in action, with 77 wounded. Jones lost 6 Americans KIA, 35 wounded, 86 captured. Among the wounded were both Jones and Lockyer.
While Lockyer engaged Jones, General John Keane, commanding a force of three-thousand British soldiers, established a garrison on Pea Island (now, Pearl Island), which was about 30 miles east of New Orleans. On 23 December, Keane led a vanguard force of 1,800 soldiers to the east bank of the Mississippi River, 9 miles south of New Orleans. Unknown to General Keane at that time, New Orleans was undefended. Keane bivouacked his force at the Lacoste Plantation pending the arrival of reinforcements in preparation for an assault on New Orleans. When British officers commandeered the home of Gabriel Villeré, Villeré escaped through a window and warned General Andrew Jackson of the approaching British Army and informed Jackson of Keane’s position.
That very evening, Jackson led an assault force of 2,000 men to engage General Keane. After achieving surprise and disrupting the British camp, Jackson withdrew his force back to the Rodriguez Canal, 5 miles north of Keane’s encampment. General Jackson’s foray cost him 24 men killed in action (KIA) and 115 wounded in action (WIA). General Keane reported 46 of his men KIA, 167 WIA, and 64 missing in action (MIA). General Pakenham’s force arrived in the field on Christmas day. After conferring with Keane, Pakenham ordered a reconnaissance-in-force to test the Jackson defense.
Between 24 December and 8 January, General Jackson ordered his “rag-tag” army to construct, expand, or improve existing defensive positions. Jackson’s command of 4,732 men included 968 US Army regulars, 164 sailors and Marines under the command of Major Daniel Carmick, 1,060 Louisiana militia and volunteers, 1,352 Tennessee militia, 986 Kentucky militia, 150 Mississippi militia, 52 Choctaw warriors, and a volunteer force operating under the pirate Jean Lafitte.
When completed, Jackson’s defensive line was substantial. There were three lines of static defenses organized north of the Rodriguez Canal, which was fifteen feet wide and around eight feet deep. The breastwork, which included felled timber and soil, protected riflemen from enemy musket fire. Behind the defenses, Jackson constructed earthworks for his artillery. In addition to eight batteries of artillery, Jackson had at his disposal naval guns aboard the USS Carolina, the steamboat Enterprise, and the grounded USS Louisiana. Carmick’s force of sailors and Marines manned the western redoubt and helped coordinate naval gunfire from the vessels already named.
Soon after Pakenham’s main force on 1 January 1815, British artillery initiated a barrage of Jackson’s defenses. The exchange of artillery lasted over three hours and ceased only when Pakenham had expended all available munitions. Several of Jackson’s guns were silenced, which necessitated a realignment of artillery. During the barrage, Major Daniel Carmick fell wounded from fragmentation striking his forehead. Command of the naval forced passed to First Lieutenant Francois de Bellevue, USMC.
Initially, General Pakenham intended to launch an assault on Jackson’s position after first softening the American position with artillery fire. Whether it was a matter of Pakenham not realizing that he was short of artillery munitions, or that his fire plan was deficient, or some other reason, Pakenham canceled the attack. General Pakenham did not realize how close he had come to defeating Jackson. Several of Jackson’s militia had abandoned their positions during the British barrage and were not likely to return. Instead, Pakenham delayed his offensive until the entire force of 8,000 infantry was assembled ashore.
Pakenham’s force included eight battalions of Highlanders, the 14th Light Dragoons, elements of the 95th Rifle Brigade, and the 1st and 5th India Regiments. Several hundred blacks, recruited from West Indies colonies reinforced the British order of battle and a force of undetermined size of native Americans under the war chief Kinache.
The British assault began on the morning of 8 January 1815. Pakenham ordered a two-prong attack. Colonel William Thornton was to cross the Mississippi from the west back during the night with a force of 780 men, move up-river, and storm the naval battery under Commodore Daniel Patterson. Then, with captured American artillery, Thornton would turn those guns on the American line. General Keane would lead his force along the river and position them shy of Jackson’s defensive line for a frontal assault. General Samuel Gibbs (Pakenham’s deputy) would lead his column along the swamp, approaching the American on Jackson’s left flank. Major General John Lambert would hold his brigade in reserve.
No military operation plan survives its first objective, and this was the case with Colonel Thornton, who was delayed twelve hours when a dam constructed on one of the canals failed, forcing his men to drag their boats through muddy ground.
Notwithstanding Thornton’s delay, Pakenham ordered his assault to begin before dawn. Heavy fog and the pitch-black of the early morning hour wrapped his men as in a cloak, denying them a clear vision of what lay ahead. As the fog lifted, Pakenham’s forward line encountered withering American fire. Colonel Thomas Mullins, commanding the 44th East Essex Regiment, had forgotten the ladders and fascine he needed to cross the Rodriguez Canal and scale the American breastwork. When Mullins and most of his officers were killed, along with General Gibbs, the men became confused and floundered.
With his right-center struggling, General Pakenham ordered General Keane to detach his 93rd Highlanders and move across the open field and reinforce the British right flank. During this movement, Keane fell wounded. On Pakenham’s left flank, Colonel Rennie’s force managed to attack and overrun an American redoubt next to the river but was unable to hold the position or advance into the American line.
Jackson sent the 7th Infantry to recapture the redoubt. After 30 minutes of intense combat, Colonel Rennie and most of his men lie dead. On Pakenham’s right, British infantry threw themselves on the ground or into the canal to avoid American musket fire and grapeshot. A handful of men made it to the top of the parapet, but they were soon killed or captured. The 95th Rifles had managed to advance ahead of the main assault and were concealed in a ditch below the parapet, but without additional support, they were unable to advance further.
Jackson’s Americans repulsed the two-pronged British attack.
While directing his troops on the field, grapeshot from US artillery shattered General Pakenham’s left knee and killed his horse. As he was helped to his feet by his senior aide-de-camp, Major Duncan MacDougall, Pakenham was wounded a second time in his right arm. Then, having mounted MacDougall’s horse, another salvo of grapeshot ripped through his spine and he fell to the ground mortally wounded. With his second in command already dead (Gibbs), Major Wilkinson reformed the 21st Regiment and initiated a third assault. Wilkinson was shot as he achieved the top of the parapet; the Americans, impressed with his courage under fire, carried him to safety behind the rampart. The 93rd Highlanders, having no further orders, were caught in the open and were slaughtered by American artillery. General Lambert, commanding the reserve brigade, assumed command of the British force. Lambert led his reserve brigade onto the field. Observing that the attack had failed, he ordered a withdrawal with the rifles of his brigade providing covering fire for the retreating army.
The British had but one success during the Battle of New Orleans: it was the delayed attack on the west bank of the river where Thornton’s brigade and detachments of Royal Navy and Marines attacked and overwhelmed the American line. In this assault, Thornton was wounded, but his success had no effect on the outcome of the battle. General Lambert directed Colonel Alexander Dickson, his chief of artillery, to assess the British position. Dickson reported that no fewer than 2,000 additional men would be required to hold what they had. On this advice, Lambert ordered a general withdrawal from the field. In the American camp, Jackson believed that his defense strategy had failed and was preparing to withdraw when he received word that the British had already begun their withdrawal.
The battle was brief but costly. Pakenham’s force suffered 285 killed, 1,265 wounded and gave up 484 prisoners —all within 25 minutes. The Americans lost 13 killed and 30 wounded. Admiral Cochrane continued his naval bombardment of Fort St. Philip for another ten days but finally withdrew on 18 January. In the Duke of Wellington’s final analysis, the failure of this campaign was the result of Admiral Cochrane’s shortcomings as Commander-in-Chief of British Forces and the failure of Colonel Mullins to carry the ladders and fascines onto the field. There is little doubt that Colonel Mullins’ error cost Pakenham his victory at New Orleans.
After the battle, General Andrew Jackson commended the navy and Marines for their gallant conduct. On Jackson’s recommendation, the Congress resolved on 22 February 1822, that “Congress entertain a high sense of the valor and good conduct of Major Daniel Carmick, of the officers, noncommissioned officers, and Marines under his command, in the defense of [New Orleans] on the late memorable occasion.”
US Marine Corps Major Daniel Carmick, wounded during Pakenham’s artillery barrage, died from his wound on 6 November 1816. At the time of his service in New Orleans, Carmick was the second-ranking officer in the Marine Corps. Lieutenant de Bellevue, later promoted to captain, resigned his commission on 9 March 1824.
One of the saddest footnotes to any battle exists in the aftermath of the Battle of New Orleans. The fight actually occurred after a peace accord had been signed by British and American officials on 24 December 1814 —days before American and British forces confronted one another on 8 January 1815. Word of the peace was not received in the United States until 11 February 1815. In the final analysis, however, given Henry Bathurst’s secret directive to Pakenham, that is, to “continue the war even if he should hear rumors of a peace treaty”, the Battle of New Orleans would in all likelihood have taken place as it did even if word of the peace had reached American shores in time to avoid the conflict. The Bathurst directive reminds us that great danger to our forces exists whenever civilian officials interject themselves into the prerogatives of a field commander.
Borneman, W. H. 1812: The War that Forged a Nation. New York: HarperCollins, 2004
Chapman, R. The Battle of New Orleans: “But for a Piece of Wood.” Pelican Publishing, 2013
Drez, R. J. The War of 1812, Conflict and Deception: The British Attempt to Seize New Orleans and Nullify the Louisiana Purchase. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014
Patterson, B. R. The Generals, Andrew Jackson, Sir Edward Pakenham, and the road to New Orleans: New York: New York University Press, 2008
 Sir Edward Michael Pakenham (1778-1815) was the son of the Baron Longford and the brother in law of the Duke of Wellington. Pakenham was an experienced military officer, with service as a dragoon in the Rebellion of 1798, in Nova Scotia, Barbados, and Saint Croix. In 1803, he led an attack at Saint Lucia, where he was wounded, and in 1807 fought in the Danish Campaign at the Battle of Copenhagen in 1807. He was wounded for a second time at Martinique.
 Cochrane, who was then servicing as a vice admiral, commanded the North America and Jamaica Stations. Under Cochrane, Ross successfully burned the city of Washington and laid down the massive barrage at Fort McHenry, Baltimore, from which the Star-Spangled Banner was penned by Francis Scott Key. Despite criticism of the Duke of Wellington directed at Cochrane, he was advanced to full admiral in 1819. He passed away in Paris, France on 26 January 1832.
 Catesby-Jones (1790-1858) was appointed a navy midshipman in 1805 but lacking in education the Navy suggested he return home and study geography, navigation, and surveying as a measure to improve his future chances for an active naval assignment. When the navy mobilized gunboats following the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair, Catesby-Jones was assigned to gunboat 10, commencing active service in August 1807. After distinguishing himself at the Battle of Lake Borgne in 1814, Jones continued his service as a navy officer, reaching the rank of commodore. He passed away while serving on active duty in California.
 Attached to Jones were 35 Marines, three of which were killed and two wounded.
 The number of killed and wounded in this action may be accurate but given the placement of Keane’s encampment at the Villeré Plantation, the numbers reported as MIA seems questionable. It is more likely that some of these MIAs deserted Keane.
 A rough bundle of brushwood or other materials used for strengthening an earthen structure or making a pathway across uneven or saturated terrain.
 484 British riflemen had pretended to be dead; when the British force withdrew, these men stood up and surrendered to the Americans.
Shortly after the Geneva Convention of 1954, CIA director Allen Dulles sent Colonel Edward Lansdale to initiate a series of clandestine operations against North Vietnam. Lansdale initiated several operations, code named Nautilus, which included South Vietnam manned commando raids and the insertion of CIA recruited spies. In 1963, the CIA and US Department of Defense jointly agreed that these covert operations should transfer to the DoD. In January 1964, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam-Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG) assumed responsibility for all covert operations in Vietnam.
Once MAC-SOG took control of covert operations in North Vietnam, the Pentagon issued Operation Plan (OPLAN) 34-63, which entailed a continuation of commando raids and the expansion of electronic surveillance through US Navy ships and patrol boats based out of Da Nang. OPLAN 34-A expanded covert operations with more ambitious missions to offshore assaults on coastal installations. When US intelligence officers realized that some of their raiders had been turned by the North Vietnamese, US covert operations shifted more toward psychological operations, which involved spreading anti-Communist propaganda and deception. The effectiveness of these clandestine measures remains questionable, but there was no doubt that both the USSR and China were actively supplying the Viet Cong (VC) with weapons and munitions, or that North Vietnam was funneling men and material into South Vietnam through Laos.
With US Navy ships collecting intelligence off the coast of North Vietnam, it was only a matter of time before the North Vietnamese challenged these encroachments, which were mostly converted minesweepers. Occasionally, but always between midnight and 0300, North Vietnamese gunboats would approach these ships at high speed and then peel off and return to their island base of operations at a location above the 30th parallel. North Vietnamese gunboats were threatening, but they never actually attacked the unarmed minesweepers. Because the minesweepers were defenseless, the Navy decided to replace them with destroyers to continue electronic surveillance. These were referred to as desoto patrols. By sending out patrol boats to challenge US navy ships (which were always conducted beyond the internationally recognized 3-mile limit), US intelligence officers were able to collect useful information about North Vietnamese (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) (DRV) military and naval capabilities. In time, the DRV replaced their gunboats with larger vessels and torpedo equipped frigates.
When President John F. Kennedy was assassinated on 22 November 1963, the American presidency passed to Lyndon B. Johnson. Johnson retained most of Kennedy’s cabinet and advisors —men who had helped craft and manage the Kennedy administration’s policies toward Southeast Asia. Prior to his vice presidency, Johnson had been a long-serving member of the US Senate and the House of Representatives from Texas —but despite those bona fides, Johnson was uncertain about his own foreign policy credentials and this forced him to rely on Kennedy’s cabinet … men such as Robert S. McNamara, Dean Rusk, and McGeorge Bundy.
President Kennedy (like his predecessor Dwight D. Eisenhower), was reluctant to involve the United States in another Asian war. Neither of these men were hesitant to offer military assistance, in terms of advisors and material support, but neither could see how direct involvement would benefit either South Vietnam or US interests in Indochina. Kennedy had, with some success, negotiated recognition of the Kingdom of Laos as a neutral state, but this agreement was almost immediately ignored by the DRV, who had previously used Laos to infiltrate men and material into South Vietnam —and continued to do so. In signing the accord, Kennedy was naïve. Neither did the President of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem (or the US Ambassador to South Vietnam), believe that the Geneva Accord was a good idea. Diem believed that the United States was more concerned about its own interests in Southeast Asia than it was about the security of South Vietnam —and of course, he was right.
Diem had long resented America’s heavy hand in its internal affairs. For all of his short comings (at least, according to western standards), Diem was an intelligent man who was confronted by a plethora of domestic issues, not the least of which were well-entrenched urban gangsters, rural warlords, Buddhist activists opposing a Catholic head of state, and a determined Communist insurgency. American diplomats did not seem to appreciate either Diem’s stress level or the fact that he was culturally Vietnamese. His attitudes toward curtailing dissent were not so far removed from those of his North Vietnamese counterpart, Ho Chi Minh. Diem was harsh in his suppression of dissidents and Kennedy, believing that Diem’s punitive policies were counterproductive to stabilizing South Vietnam’s (RVN) government, pushed back. President Diem deeply resented this interference. The US and RVN were at an impasse —and something had to give.
On 1-2 November 1963, President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother (and chief advisor) Ngo Dinh Nhu were assassinated, an operation ostensibly planned and carried out by Diem’s senior military officers. Almost no one believed that these incompetent generals could have pulled off such an intricate operation without the help of the American CIA. If South Vietnam was unstable under Diem, his assassination made things worse. Ho Chi Minh, while stymied by the American-backed event, couldn’t have been more pleased.
Prelude to War
President Johnson soon learned that earlier assurances by McNamara and Bundy that the RVN was making progress against the communist insurgency were ill-founded. Secretary of State Dean Rusk warned Johnson that in fact, South Vietnam was in a deep spiral. McNamara and senior DoD officials rejected Rusk’s arguments, but as it turned out, Rusk was right and South Vietnam was in dire straits. Viet Cong attacks, performed at will, were increasing in frequency and lethality.
In late January 1964, South Vietnamese General Nguyen Khanh overthrew the ruling junta of Duong Van Minh (also known as Big Minh). It was the second coup d’état in three months. Amazingly, Johnson, who was not pleased with RVN’s progress in countering the communist insurgency, found encouragement in the coup and sought to bolster the Khanh regime. In March 1964, Johnson sent McNamara to undertake a fact-finding mission in South Vietnam. His report pointed to an easily discernible deterioration of popular morale and an acceleration of communist insurgencies. McNamara advised Johnson to send more US military and economic support.
By this time, President Johnson was convinced that South Vietnam was about to fall into the hands of the communists. He was determined not to become the first US president to lose the fight against communist aggression. The emerging war in Vietnam became Johnson’s primary focus. Ultimately, Johnson decided on a series of increasingly aggressive political strategies.
But 1964 was an election year in the United States. When US Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge resigned his post and announced that he was running for the presidency, Johnson replaced him with retired US Army General Maxwell Taylor, formerly the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On Taylor’s recommendation, Johnson also replaced General Paul D. Harkins as head of the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV), with General William C. Westmoreland. In making these changes, Johnson’s signal seemed clear enough: he was leaning toward a military solution to the conflict in Vietnam, rather than a diplomatic resolution.
President Johnson was also challenged for the presidency by Senator Barry Goldwater from Arizona. Johnson was many things (a decent human being not being one of them), but he was a master politician. With two very substantial challengers, Johnson increased his popularity by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (passed into law on 2 July), but he also understood this alone would not be enough to take America to another Asian war. Johnson would require the support of Congress to increase US involvement in South Vietnam. In order to achieve congressional support, Johnson would need to demonstrate that North Vietnam was a bona fide threat to the peace and security of the Southeast Asian Mainland.
On 1 August 1964, South Vietnamese commandos raided a North Vietnamese radio transmitter located on an offshore island. The very next morning, 2 August, the destroyer USS Maddox (DD 731) while cruising in international waters 28 miles off the coast of North Vietnam, engaged three North Vietnamese Navy (NVN) P-4 Motor Torpedo Boats of Torpedo Squadron 135. The Commander, Destroyer Division, 7th Fleet, Captain John J. Herrick, was aboard Maddox and exercised command authority over the Desoto mission. Herrick ordered Commander Herbert Ogier, the ship’s captain, to have gun crews fire on the torpedo boats if they came within 10,000 yards of Maddox. When the boats encroached upon the Maddox, Ogier ordered three rounds to warn off the NVN craft.
The NVN commanders were brothers, Van Bot, commanding T-333, Van Tu, commanding T-336, and Van Gian commanding T-339. The attack commenced in numerical order with T-333 spearheading the attack. The maximum effective range of their torpedoes was 1,000 yards (9/10ths of a mile). Maddox’ gun range was 18,000 yards. T-333 pressed home its assault astern Maddox with the two additional boats in trace. Then, T-333 attempted to run abeam of Maddox for a side shot. T-336 and T-339 fired first, but Maddox’ five-inch gun fire threatened the torpedo boats. Both fired their torpedoes prematurely, all four missing their target. T-333 fired its torpedoes, also without effect, but then fired at Maddox with its 14.5-mm (.57 caliber) deck gun. The American destroyer received a single hit. Altering course, crewmen observed torpedoes passing Maddox on her starboard side.
Within short order, four F-8 Crusaders from USS Ticonderoga (CV-14) arrived overhead and promptly attacked the NVN torpedo boats, forcing them to withdraw. Several NVN crewmen were wounded, four were killed, and all three boats were seriously damaged. There were no US casualties. One of the four aircraft sustained damage to its left wing, but all birds returned to Ticonderoga.
On 3 August, USS Turner Joy (DD-951) was ordered to accompany USS Maddox for another Desoto mission. On 4 August, Turner Joy’s radar picked up a number of blips believed to be approaching small, high-speed surface craft, but at an extreme range. As a precaution, the two destroyers called upon Ticonderoga to furnish air support. After nightfall, radar signatures suggested the convergence of patrol boats from the west and south. Turner Joy reported that she sighted one or two torpedo wakes, ramped up her speed and began evasion maneuvers. Turner Joy then began firing in the direction of the unidentified surface vessels. Over the next two and a half hours, Turner Joy fired 220 five-inch shells; aircraft from Ticonderoga likewise fired on “suspected” torpedo boats.
This second attack on 4 August never actually happened, but together with the incident on 2 August, President Johnson claimed “unprovoked attacks” upon the sovereignty of the United States. On 5 August, Johnson ordered bombing raids on North Vietnamese military targets. Referred to in history as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, Johnson asked for and received Congressional approval to escalate US involvement in the Vietnam War.
In North Vietnam, General Vo Nguyen Giap made a disturbing accusation. Lyndon Johnson, he said, constructed the Desoto patrols in order to provoke North Vietnam into a response, so that Johnson could use such a response as an excuse for escalating the conflict in South Vietnam. Giap’s allegation is probably true. According to Ray McGovern, a retired CIA analyst (1963-90), the CIA, “not to mention President Lyndon Johnson, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy all knew full well that the evidence of an armed attack on 4 August 1964, the so-called ‘second’ Tonkin Gulf incident, was highly dubious. During the summer of 1964, President Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff seemed keen on widening the war in Vietnam. They stepped up sabotage and hit and run attacks on the coast of North Vietnam.”
James Bamford, author of the book Body of Secrets, who spent three years in the US Navy as an intelligence analyst, agrees with McGovern. The primary purpose of the Maddox “was to act as a seagoing provocateur —to poke its sharp gray bow and the American flag as close to the belly of North Vietnam as possible, in effect shoving its five-inch cannons up the nose of the communist navy. The Maddox’ mission was made even more provocative by being present at times that coincided with commando raids, creating the impression that Maddox was directing those missions.” Accordingly, the DRV had every reason to believe that USS Maddox was involved in the commando raids.
Here’s what we know …
In the early afternoon of 4 August (Washington time), Captain John Herrick reported to the Commander in Chief, Pacific that “freak weather effects” on Turner Joy’s radar had made North Vietnamese attacks questionable. He was clear in his statement: “No North Vietnamese patrol boats had actually been sighted.” Herrick urged a full reevaluation of these events before any further action was taken. It was too late. President Johnson had already made his televised announcement.
Secretary McNamara later testified that he had read Herrick’s message after his return to the Pentagon in the afternoon of 4 August, but that he did not immediately contact the president to tell him that the premise of his justification for retaliatory air strikes was at that time, highly questionable. Scholars now argue that had Johnson received accurate information, had he been informed of the Herrick message, he “might have demanded more complete information before proceeding with broadening the war.” Personally, given what I know of Lyndon Johnson, I doubt it.
Johnson was up for reelection. He informed congress that the USS Maddox was not involved in providing intelligence for raids into North Vietnam. He stated clearly that North Vietnamese attacks were “unprovoked.” This was a lie and he knew at the time that it was a lie. As a result of this testimony, the US Congress passed a Joint Resolution granting Johnson authority to conduct military operations in Southeast Asia without the benefit of a declaration of war. Johnson was empowered to “take all necessary steps, including the use of armed forces, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.”
Lyndon Johnson’s election as President of the United States in his own right allowed the administration to move forward with a more aggressive policy in Southeast Asia. Mere days before the election, Communist guerrillas attacked the US air base at Bien Hoa killing four Americans, wounding scores, and destroying twenty-five aircraft. Johnson decided (politically) not to respond to this attack so close to a national election, but on election day, he created an interagency task force to review US-Vietnam policy. Chairing this task force was William Bundy (a former CIA analyst), the brother of McGeorge Bundy (serving as chief of the State Department’s Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs).
At the time of the election of 1964, owing to the political instability of South Vietnam, the US Military Assistance Command (USMACV) under General William Westmoreland, had grown to more than 20,000 men. Of the over 800 Marines in Vietnam, most were assigned to the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ) (Also, I Corps), which consisted of the five northern-most provinces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Sixty USMC advisors were assigned to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in I Corps. Aviators assigned to Shufly at Da Nang were reinforced by a Marine rifle company for airfield security. Additional Marines were assigned to the US Embassy in Saigon and the MACV staff.
In Washington, the government examined the possibility of sending US combat troops to RVN for the defense of critical US installations. General Maxwell Taylor, serving as US Ambassador to the RVN, warned the administration against over-emphasizing static security and recommended that aggressive ARVN field operations was the best strategy for stabilizing the country. Taylor was right in his assessment.
The possible employment of US forces was of special concern to the Marine Corps. In 1964, the most combat-ready Marines in the Far East were those of the 3rd Marine Division, located on Okinawa, and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing at Iwakuni, Japan. Both commands, under III Marine Amphibious Force, were task organized to support various contingency plans for Southeast Asia.
Following the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the US Pacific Command activated the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (9thMAB)under the command of the 3rdMarDiv Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General Raymond G. Davis. The ground combat element included the 9th Marine Regiment (9th Marines) and three battalion landing teams (BLTs) and a Provisional Marine Air Group (ProvMAG) consisting of fixed wing and helicopter squadrons. For the first several months, 9thMAB was a pre-positioned (mostly on paper) organization with a small headquarters at Subic Bay, Philippines. Brigadier General John P. Coursey relieved General Davis in October.
On 22 January 1965, Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch assumed command of the 9thMAB, which now consisted of two BLTs (1st Battalion, 9th Marines (1/9) and 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines (3/9)), both of which had been serving afloat with the Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force since the beginning of the year. At this time, the Marine brigade was the US combat force most readily available for deployment to RVN.
Meanwhile, in Washington, President Johnson’s working group gave him three options: (1) Continue with the current approach (funding and limited military support); (2) Escalate the war and strike North Vietnam; (3) Pursue a strategy of graduated response. After weeks of discussions, Johnson endorsed the third option and directed the task force to “flesh out” its implementation.
The Bundy Plan envisioned a series of measures of gradually increasing intensity. (1) An escalation of military involvement and the presence of US military personnel would bolster national morale. (2) Attack Viet Cong forces operating in South Vietnam. (3) Pressure Hanoi into ending its support of the Communist insurgency. The first phase of this plan was Operation Barrel Roll.
Johnson’s task force reflected his management style. He would have none of Kennedy’s lengthy debates with policy staffers. By tasking subordinates to develop broad planning initiatives, on an interagency basis, and frequently at levels far below that of senior white house officials, Johnson only considered recommendations that had already gained consensus before bringing them to his top aides. President Johnson would only make key decisions in the presence of a limited number of his closest advisors. Almost more than anything else, Johnson feared “leaks to the press.”
The problem, however, was that Johnson’s managerial style was frequently overwhelmed by events happening on the ground. No amount of tinkering would allow his administration to escape the reality of the Vietnam War: unabated political instability in South Vietnam and Communist successes in the field (being fought, of course, in South Vietnam rather than in North Vietnam). There were two problems with Johnson’s penchant for running the war from the white house: (1) With limited military experience, Lyndon Johnson was out of his depth, and (2) his meddling in the prosecution of the war seriously undercut the tactical prerogatives of his senior-most military officers.
The deterioration of South Vietnam’s political structure (and his apparent lack of confidence in his field commanders) led Johnson to take on an even larger role in handing the war. In February 1965, Johnson dispatched his national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy, to assess the need for an expanded bombing campaign, which William Bundy’s interagency task force had anticipated a few months earlier. At the time of Bundy’s visit, nine Americans were killed when VC elements raided Camp Holloway and Pleiku. This event provided the justification for expanding US military involvement —which of course, Bundy’s task force was already considering. Another VC assault at Qui Nhon resulted in the death of 23 Americans with another 21 wounded. Within days, Johnson approved a sustained bombing campaign of North Vietnam that would last for the rest of his presidency.
The attacks on Pleiku and Qui Nhon underscored the vulnerability of bases that US planes would be using in the bombing campaign. Accordingly, Johnson authorized the deployment of two Marine battalions to Da Nang in March 1965. It was a decision that caused Johnson great anxiety because he realized the likely impact of sending Marines into a combat environment and its impact in the minds of the American people.
Meanwhile, the bombing campaign did not appear affect Hanoi or the Vietcong in any significant way. By mid-March, Johnson was considering additional proposals for expanding the American combat presence in RVN. By 1 April, he decided to increase the Marine Corps footprint in RVN by two additional battalions and changed their mission from static defense of airfields to one of “active defense.” Realizing that four battalions of Marines would not be a sufficient force to stamp out the VC insurgency, he directed planners to expand the US military in Vietnam to 82,000 men.
According to a 2005 article in The New York Times, Robert J. Hanyok, a historian for the National Security Agency, after reviewing all available information, concluded that the NSA distorted intelligence reports passed to policy makers regarding the Gulf of Tonkin incident on 4 August 1964. Hanyok said that “NSA staff deliberately skewed evidence to make it appear as if the attack had occurred.” According to Hanyok, the incident began at the Phu Bai Combat Base where intelligence analysts mistakenly believed that the destroyers would soon be attacked. This concern would have been communicated back to the NSA, along with evidence supporting such a conclusion, but the fact was that the evidence did not support their conclusion. As the evening progressed, signals intelligence did not support a North Vietnam ambush, but NSA analysts were so convinced of an attack, they ignored 90% of the data that did not support their conclusion. This, too, was excluded from information provided to the President.
John Hanyok explained, “As much as anything else, it was an awareness that Johnson would brook no uncertainty that could undermine his position. Faced with this attitude, CIA analyst Ray Cline recalled, “We knew it was bum dope that we were getting from the 7th Fleet but we were told to only give facts with no elaboration on the nature of the evidence. Everyone knew how volatile Johnson was; he did not like to deal with uncertainties.” In other words, government bureaucrats wanted to avoid a presidential tantrum directed at them.
None of the foregoing supposes that war in Vietnam could have been avoided, particularly given the United States government’s previous twenty-years of involvement in Indochinese affairs. Truman’s concerns about a domino effect of global communism were justified by the behavior of Communist states before and after World War II. By the end of the Korean War, Americans were war weary. Eisenhower wisely determined that the American people, the US economy, could not sustain another foreign conflict in 1954. He also had hopes that limited engagement would provide the government of South Vietnam the time it needed to stabilize and solve its own problems. Both Truman and Eisenhower underestimated the lengths to which Ho Chi Minh was willing to go in unifying Vietnam under the Communist flag —but neither man really knew the Vietnamese, their history or their culture. John Kennedy’s idealism and naïveté worked against the long-term interests of the United States in Southeast Asia; his acquiescence in the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem made things worse.
Lyndon Johnson may be my least favorite character in history. He was a self-serving gangster, a liar, and lacked the kind of leadership the American people must have in time of war. Johnson’s war-time decisions traumatized the American people for a full generation —and I never actually touched upon the disaster that resulted from Johnson’s “great society” experiment with socialism. The American people are still paying for that.
Along with the good they might do, men elected to the presidency have to accept the bad as well. Presidents are mortal, after all. The men they select to advise them, in many cases, have much to do with their successes or failures. Truman’s confidence in Dean Acheson is one example, Kennedy’s and Johnson’s reliance on McNamara is another.
Richard Nixon was a deeply flawed man and did himself no honor in the matter of the Watergate Affair, but he did have an adequate measure of Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong. Today, we do not give Nixon enough credit for disentangling the United States from a war that could not be won. But we must also acknowledge that the American people themselves contributed to the evolving disaster of Vietnam. They, after all, voted in elections that chose such men as Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson; they in turn made bad choices in important cabinet positions.
The costs of the Vietnam War were high. 58,318 Americans died in the Vietnam War; 153,303 received combat wounds; 2,971 of those required hospitalization; 1,587 Americans remain listed as missing in action. 778 Americans were taken as prisoners of war, of those 116 died in captivity. This should lead a rational person to the conclusion that if the United States is going to involve itself in war, given its costs, then we damn sure need to win it. The American fighting man won every battle in Vietnam, but politicians in Washington handed the enemy a strategic victory. Surely the American voter can do better than this …
“Critical analysis,” said Clausewitz, “is the application of theoretical truths to actual events.” … theoretical truths of the principles of war to the actual events of the Vietnam War to produce an explanation for our failure there. If we are to profit by our mistakes, we must understand that it was a violation of these truths, not evil or wicked leaders, that was the cause of our undoing. As David Halberstam pointed out in The Best and the Brightest, one of the saddest aspects of the war is that it was waged by well-meaning and intelligent men doing what they thought best. The tendency to find devils, however, is still with us.” —Harry G. Summers, Colonel, Infantry, U. S. Army (Retired)
Beisner, R.L. Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War. New York: OUP USA, 2006
Beisner, R. L. Patterns of Peril: Dean Acheson Joins the Cold Warriors, 1945-46. Diplomatic History, Vol 20, 1996
Berman, L. Lyndon Johnson’s War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam. New York/London: Norton & Company, 1989
Courtois, S. and Nicolas Werth, Andrzej Paczkowski (et. al.). The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression. Harvard University Press, 1997.
Freedman, R. Vietnam: A History of the War. Holiday House, 2016.
Hastings, M. Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy, 1945-75. Canada: HarperCollins, 2018.
Karnow, S. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking/The Penguin Group, 1983
Lacouture, J. Ho Chi Minh: A Political Biography. Random House, 1968
McNamara, R. S. and Brian Van De Mark. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. Vintage Books, 1995.
Summers, Jr., H. G. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. Presidio/Random House, 1982
Whitlow, R. H. S. Marines in Vietnam: The Advisory & Combat Assistance Era, 1954-1964. History & Museums Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C., 1977
 MAC-SOG was a cover name for a multi-service unconventional warfare task force under the direct control of the Pentagon.
 The US OSS and CIA knew early on that Ho Chi Minh was a thoroughly nasty man who should be opposed by freedom-loving democracies at every turn. As outlined in The Black Book of Communism, Ho Chi Minh directed the Viet Minh in the conduct of a ruthless assassination campaign to remove all potential political opponents. The campaign began around 1944 (although some argue as early as 1941). Victims included Bui Quang Chieu, leader of the Constitutional Party and Ngo Dinh Khoi, brother of Diem, who headed the Party for Independence in North Vietnam. Again, with reference to The Black Book, Ho Chi Minh and his successors orchestrated the murder of more than 1 million people between 1941 and 1980.
 Commando type insertions involved Vietnamese personnel so that the US could deny involvement. Most were unsuccessful with the commandos frequently being captured and executed.
 If there is one man who is most culpable for America’s failed strategy in the Vietnam War, it is McNamara.
 Johnson wasn’t was interested in winning the fight as he was in not losing it.
 General Westmoreland was a proficient general, but two factors worked against him. First, he was political, which is the bane of most senior (three and four star) officers. Second, he didn’t have the courage to tell Johnson that he didn’t need the president’s help in running the war.
 Owing to President Kennedy’s assassination, American voters remained sympathetic toward Johnson. Lyndon Johnson won the 1964 election with 303 electoral votes to Richard Nixon’s 219.
 The P-4 was a 66-foot-long aluminum hulled boat armed with two torpedoes each mounted with a 550-pound TNT warhead. The P-4 was capable of exceeding 40 knots per hour.
 Rear Admiral James Stockdale, a veteran of World War II, a naval aviator and prisoner of war in North Vietnam, and a recipient of the Medal of Honor, testified that the second incident, reported on 4 August, never happened. Stockdale said, “I had the best seat in the house to watch that event, and our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets—there were no PT boats there. There was nothing but black water and American firepower.”
 One should ask, What would be the US response to foreign attacks upon coastal military installations inside the territory of the United States?
 U. S. Army General Earle Wheeler served as Chairman of the JCS from 3 July 1964 to 2 July 1970. From 1961-64, he served as Chief of Staff of the United States Army. Wheeler was regarded by some senior officers as a “yes man,” and exactly what President Johnson was looking for in a JCS chairman —General Curtis LeMay being one of them.
 The designation “Amphibious” in task organizations was later changed to “Expeditionary.” In 1965, the usage was 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade.
 The BLT is the basic Marine unit in an amphibious or vertical assault. It is a task organized infantry battalion reinforced with necessary combat support and combat service support elements (artillery, motor transport, tanks, amphibian tractors, engineers, communications, shore party, reconnaissance, and medical teams).
 A veteran of several amphibious campaigns in World War II.
 Which makes it apparent that no one in the Johnson Administration knew anything about Vietnam, its history, its people, or their culture. It is equally apparent that few senior military officers were equipped to fight the war in Vietnam, that most accepted the erroneous notion that the United States could defeat North Vietnam through an air campaign, and no one understood the value of defeating an enemy on his own territory.
 A USAF and Naval Air campaign designed to disrupt North Vietnam’s logistical corridor, known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail from 1964 to 1973.
 While serving in the US House of Representatives, Johnson received a direct commission to lieutenant commander in the US Navy Reserve. He was called to active duty after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and initially assigned to inspect shipyard facilities in Texas and on the West Coast. Johnson, a trusted ally of Franklin Roosevelt, was later send by Roosevelt to obtain information of conditions in the Southwest Pacific Area. While serving as an observer aboard a B-26 during a schedule air strike on New Guinea, the aircraft developed mechanical problems and was returned to its base of operations. According to Johnson, however, his aircraft received battle damage and was forced back to base before reaching its objective. Flight records reflect that the aircraft never came under enemy fire. Nevertheless, General MacArthur awarded Johnson the silver star medal for “gallantry in action.” He was the only member of the flight crew to receive an award. Returning to Washington, Johnson gave MacArthur’s command a good report.
 Named in honor of Warrant Officer Charles E. Holloway, the first Army aviator assigned to the 81st Transportation Company killed in action.
Early in US history, American military leaders relied on French and German advisors to help prepare the Continental Army for the American Revolution. Since then, select members of the US Army have served as military advisors for more than a hundred years, beginning in the early 1900s. During and after World War II, US military advisors have trained and advised the armed forces of Cambodia, Laos, Nationalist China, South Korea, South Vietnam, Taiwan, Thailand, and more recently, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Whenever one thinks about US military advisors, they may envision someone wearing a green beret, and they’d be right. The green beret is the headgear of the US Army Special Forces. The basic mission assigned to the Green Berets is to train and lead unconventional or clandestine guerilla forces, but this mission has been expanded to include the training of conventional forces.
Between the 1940s and 1970s, US military advisors were assigned to Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs). More recently, advisors are referred to as Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) or Military Transition Teams (MTTs). ETTs and MTTs are composed primarily of US Marines, Army Special Forces, Navy Seals, and members of the Army national guard serving in the combat arms. Members of the Air Force, Navy, and Army Reserve serve as advisors in matters and functions of combat service support.
Marines, by the way, have been “military advisors” for a very long time. After the turn of the twentieth century, US Marines were dispatched to the so-called banana republics to protect American interests and restore order out of the chaos caused by rebels and/or bandits (although they were often one and the same). The process of restoring order frequently caused Marines to establish or reform constabularies, train constables, lead them, and monitor their development. This was an advisory as well as a counterinsurgency role. Marine Corps officers and NCOs were frequently assigned away from their regular units to serve in the Haitian gendarmerie, Dominican constabulary, and Nicaraguan national guard.
Background and overview
During the Vietnam War, US civilian and military advisors supported the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in its endeavor to pacify urban and rural areas. The concept of pacification evolved from counterinsurgency doctrine in the 1950s, which included a wide array of civil and military programs: martial training and readiness, economic development, land reform, and democratization. None of these efforts could succeed without security forces (and their military advisors) to protect the people by seeking out and destroying communist terrorists. In the RVN, there were three essential objectives of US/RVN counterinsurgency/pacification: (1) Prevent North Vietnam from conquering South Vietnam; (2) Countering the communist insurgency, and (3) preparing the South Vietnamese to survive on their own merits (Vietnamization programs). Military and civilian advisors were key to each of these objectives, but none of these were easy to achieve for a wide range of reasons. Among these difficulties were a lack of coordination between various US efforts, confusion about what pacification was trying to accomplish, an absolutely corrupt Vietnamese government, and a highly dysfunctional military high command. This is a summary of a rather voluminous history.
First —the Marines
When the French colonial army departed Indochina, they left behind a fledgling military force, which included a small riverine navy, and an assortment of army commandos who served as naval infantry. Together, they constituted the river assault units, which some scholars claim was the only true French contribution to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). In replacing the French, the United States established a robust effort to aid the RVN against the communist bloc-supported People’s Republic of Vietnam (PRV).
In 1954, the Vietnamese Joint-General Staff re-designated these army commando units as Marine Infantry of the Navy of the Republic of Vietnam (NRVN). Organized into two landing battalions, they were again renamed in 1956 as the Vietnamese Marine Corps of the Navy (VMC). Four years later, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) (North Vietnam) and the RVN were locked into a deadly conflict that became known as the Second Indochina War, which lasted from 1960-1975. This war employed the full spectrum of armed violence, from individual terrorist acts and assassination and small unit guerilla actions to extensive land, air, and sea engagements.
There was no shortage of “the enemy.” There was the National Liberation Front (NLF) (also, Vietnamese Communists referred to as VC) and regulars of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) (also called People’s Army of Vietnam, PAVN). The NLF mostly consisted of North Vietnamese communist agents, sent into the RVN between 1954-1956 to destabilize the government through insurgency. It was also a civil conflict that involved international actors: The Democratic People’s Republic of China (Communist China), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and the Kingdom of Laos among them.
In 1961, the VMC was assigned to South Vietnam’s national reserve, used almost exclusively against political dissidents and urban and rural warlords. In 1962, the JGS formed the VMC into a 5,000-man brigade. In 1960, 1963, and 1964, the VMC involved itself in several coup d’état.
Several steps were necessary to transform these ARVN-trained men into Marines, chief among them was the authority to do so by the JGS. Next, it was necessary to establish a boot camp unique to the Vietnamese Marines Corps. Marines were given their own distinctive emblem that set them apart from the other branches of the South Vietnamese military. Additionally, officers and enlisted men with promise were sent to Quantico, Virginia for advanced training. By 1965, the VMC consisted of more than 6,500 men. The brigade was organized into a headquarters element, two task force headquarters, five infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and several smaller units of engineers, transportation, military police, field medical, and reconnaissance. Marine headquarters was located in Saigon; its commandant also served as the brigade commander and answered to the JGS. No longer attached to the Vietnamese Navy, VMC units were based at somewhat austere encampments at Song Than, Thu Duc, and Vung Tau.
Another VMC battalion was formed in 1966, but the Marines still lacked field armor, aircraft, and logistics support. Within two years a VMC infantry division was formed from two brigades. Two years after that, the VMC had three brigades (9 infantry battalions and 3 artillery battalions). By the time American forces were withdrawn in 1975, the VMC had organized four brigades. These were, in every sense, combat Marines. During the Easter Offensive of 1972, Vietnamese Marines lost 2,455 killed in action (KIA) and another 7,840 wounded in action (WIA).
Second —VMC Advisors
The first U. S. Marine Corps advisory section was established in 1955. It consisted of a lieutenant colonel and two captains as senior advisors and assistants attached to the Navy Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (MAAGV). In 1961, the advisory effort was expanded to include battalion level infantry and artillery advisors, then consisting of eight officers and sixteen enlisted men.
In May 1964, the Marine advisory unit was transferred to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and became the Marine Advisory Unit (MAU), Naval Advisory Group, MACV. An increase in manning was approved for 20 officers and 11 enlisted men. In January 1965, the strength of the MAU was 25 officers, 2 enlisted Marines, and a Navy Corpsman. The Senior Marine was now a colonel, in keeping with the rank of the VMC Commandant.
The mission assigned to the US Marines was ever-evolving. Its principal effort remained at providing tactical advice and assistance, but the staff and logistical advisors played an important role as well. In the 14 months between January 1968 and March 1969, the MAU was expanded to 49 officers/10 enlisted men. In addition to a small administrative section, there were also advisors for principal staff officers, communications, and medical advisory elements. Field advisors now existed at the brigade and battalion levels.
A drawdown of manpower began in 1972 because it was believed, at the time, that the VMC battalions no longer needed advisors. The Easter Offensive of 1972 changed that thinking, however. The advisory unit fully deployed its advisors to support the VMC division in the field. Additional support was rendered by the 1st Air-Naval Gunfire Company (1stANGLICO), 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron of the U. S. Air Force, and the Army’s 14th Company, 1st Signal Brigade. This team effort resulted in a victory for the VMC at Quang Tri City.
Subsequently, US Marine advisors performed as liaison officers to VMC battalions on an as-needed basis to coordinate supporting arms (artillery and air support). By the time the US Marines were withdrawn from RVN, the VMC infantry division was self-sufficient.
Third—the other Marine Advisors
In 1935, US Marines began putting together a doctrinal publication they titled simply Small Wars Manual, published in 1940 as NAVMC 2890/Fleet Marine Force Publication 12-15. The Marine Corps is well known for its professional reading program, and so, when the Marine Corps was deployed to the RVN, they brought with them the knowledge acquired during pacification programs in Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. During these earlier operations, the Marines would first pacify the region of operations by locating and killing bandits and revolutionaries. They would then establish and implement programs to administer local areas and train citizens to take over all such responsibilities.
The first undertaking of the Combined Action Program (CAP) originated in the summer of 1965. LtCol William W. Taylor, commanding 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, had an assigned tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) that included six villages and an airfield within an area of ten square miles. 3/4 was over-extended. It was more “area” than the battalion could control. From this situation came the suggestion from the Battalion Executive Officer, Major Zimmerman, that the Marines incorporate local militias into the battalion’s operations. The idea was passed up the chain of command to LtGen Lewis Walt (Commanding III MAF), and LtGen Victor H. Krulak (Commanding FMFPac), both of whom had fought in the banana wars, who recognized the potential long-term value of such a plan. Both Walt and Krulak agreed to the proposal.
Four rifle squads were integrated with local popular forces (PFs); assigned Marines were volunteers, each of whom were screened to determine their suitability for independent duty, and then assigned to local villages. The rifle squad, when combined with PFs, would be able to protect the village from low-level VC threats. It was a workable plan because the poorly trained PFs could learn from the Marines, and the Marines would gain information and understanding about the local population and surrounding terrain. When the Marines weren’t training PFs, they engaged in local self-help programs and distributed CARE packages, tools, and hygienic supplies. The squad’s Navy Corpsman became the village “Doc.” The arrangement produced a win-win situation.
The CAP went through expected developmental problems, of course. Not every Marine commander supported the program; giving up trained combatants to engage with local populations. The loss of personnel was painful to the battalions who were tasked to provide them. The program became “official” in the summer of 1967; a local (inadequate 10 day) school was established near Da Nang. CAP was one of the US Marine Corps’ signature contributions to the Vietnam War. By 1969, the CAP involved 102 platoons, 19 companies, and 4 (supervisory) Combined Action Groups. By the end of 1970, CAP units operated throughout the five provinces of I Corps. See also: Combined Action Platoon (CAP) Vietnam (in six parts) by LtCol William C. Curtis, USMC (Retired).
Fourth —Everyone Else
As previously stated, the advisory effort in RVN involved far more than tactical advice and training. There were also civilian advisors, for the most part working under a structure known as CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support). CORDS was a unique hybrid civil-military structure directly under COMUSMACV. General Westmoreland’s deputy for CORDS was a civilian by the name of Robert W. Komer. Each Corps Tactical Zone commander, a Lieutenant General, was assigned a deputy for CORDS. Below the Corps were provinces. In Vietnam, a province might equate to a US State, below the province, districts (similar to counties), and below districts were villages. A province chief was likely a senior ARVN officer (colonel), assisted by both a US military advisor and a civilian CORDS advisor. A similar arrangement existed within districts, headed by lieutenant colonels or majors, with advisors. District chiefs took on the responsibility of coordinating and supervising the combined action platoons.
Civilian advisors at the corps, province, and district levels coordinated among the various agencies working to pacify the RVN. These included the activities of the United States Agency for International Development and the Central Intelligence Agency. Because these functions were in many cases overlapping, close coordination was necessary between military and civilian advisors.
Given all this effort, most of it stellar by any measure, then why did the Republic of Vietnam fall to the communists of North Vietnam? Earlier, I identified three essential objectives of counterinsurgency and pacification. I also listed four hindrances to achieving the objectives. What follows is my opinion, most likely useful to no one, except that it might provide a learning moment about our present military ventures, or even those in the future.
The United States overcame the challenge of interagency unity of effort. The pacification/counterinsurgency/advisory efforts mostly overcame the confusion concerning a rather vague notion of winning the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people. But the United States failed to address the pervasive government corruption, and the US was unable to sort out the dysfunctional chain of command. These last two alone were enough to derail every US effort to help the RVN to save itself. The United States was unable to prevent a North Vietnamese invasion or its conquest of the RVN. Part of this is explained by the fact that Republican President Richard M. Nixon made promises to the South Vietnamese that Democrats in Congress refused to honor. Some might, therefore, argue that the fall of Saigon came as a result of insufficient American aid. Let’s take a look at that …
The United States was either on the periphery or deeply involved in two Indochina wars. In the second war, the American people gave up over 58,000 dead. More than 153,000 were wounded. Some of our boys are still listed as missing in action. North Vietnam gave up 1.1 million killed in action; South Vietnam lost 250,000 combatants. Both countries lost more than two million civilians (each). Vietnam is the most heavily bombed country in the world’s long history. More than 6.1 million tons of bombs were dropped compared to 2.1 million tons in World War II. US planes dropped more than 20 million gallons of herbicides to defoliate Vietnam’s dense jungle; 5 million acres of forested land was destroyed and a half-million acres of farmland.
The Vietnam War cost the American people $168 billion. In today’s money, that’s about $1 trillion. US military operations cost $111 billion; another $29 billion provided non-military aid to the South Vietnamese. These costs continue. Compensation and benefits for Vietnam Veterans and their families continue to cost $22 billion annually. Since 1970, post-war benefits paid to veterans and their families amount to $270 billion.
Following the Korean War, the United States entered into a period of economic recession. In 1964, Congress passed a tax cut. The next year, war costs along with President Johnson’s war on poverty created what is now referred to as the “Great Inflation.” The top marginal tax rate in that year fell from 91% to 70% which boosted economic growth sufficiently to reduce the level of US deficit spending. Also, in 1965, Johnson signed Medicare into law, which helped create a heavier reliance on hospital care —resulting in substantial increases in healthcare costs.
The Vietnam War also accelerated the mechanization of the US agricultural industry. In 1970, a quarter of the US population lived on farms or in rural communities. Of those, 2.2 million men were called to the Vietnam Era service. Farms compensated for this decrease in labor by purchasing larger machines and concentrating on fewer crops. In the next year, the controversy over the conscription of 18-year old men who could not vote led to two additional changes in America: a voting age lowered to 18 years, and the beginning of an all-volunteer military force.
Finally, as a result of the Vietnam War, Americans began to distrust the federal government. Americans learned that President Johnson lied about the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which was the underlying reason in 1965 for sending in Marines and the commencement of a massive bombing campaign over North Vietnam. Americans also learned that the government conducted unauthorized wiretaps on Americans, and it has only gotten worse with NSA data mining, secret FISA courts, and fake news and dossiers.
Most Americans work hard for their living. Most of us simply want to care for our families, improve our lot in life, and in terms of our obligations to America, we want to do the right thing. We expect (and should expect) no less of our governments (federal, state, or local). Our federal government’s decisions, particularly in matters of sending our young men to war, must be moral decisions. Lying about the need for war is not moral behavior, or of surveilling our citizens, or collecting electronic metadata, or wasting taxes in areas of the world that do not warrant our generosity. It all comes down to one thing: voting responsibly —because the people we choose to lead us have the power to send our youngsters into harm’s way. We do need warriors in America; we do not need to waste them.
Klyman, R. A. The Combined Action Platoons: The U. S. Marine’s Other War in Vietnam. Praeger, 1986.
Melson, C. D., and W. J. Renfrow. Marine Advisors with the Vietnamese Marine Corps. Quantico: History Division, Marine Corps University, 2009
Sheehan, N. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1988
Stoli, R.H. S. Marine Corps Civic Action Efforts in Vietnam, March 1965-66. Washington: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1968
West, B. The Village. New York: Pocket Books, 1972
 Military advising may come somewhat naturally to Marines since it has always been the senior’s responsibility to teach, train, advise, monitor, and correct the junior. It is a cycle repeated now for going on 245 years.
 It remains popular among academics to criticize the so-called Banana Wars and the Marines who were sent into these Central and South American countries. Criticism of US foreign policy may very well be warranted, but it now seems necessary to remind people that US Marines do not formulate American policy, they implement it. Moreover, were it not for these banana wars, Marine officers and senior enlisted men would not have been as prepared for World War II, during which time they distinguished themselves by their knowledge, experience, courage, and calmness during times of utter chaos.
Corps Expéditionnaire Français en Extrême-Orient
 A clasp on the Vietnamese Campaign Medal reflects these dates.
 This information is part of the official record, but some Marines were “volunteered.”
 Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, an international humanitarian agency.
 Some of these civilians were former or retired military personnel or employees of the CIA.
 Dubbed “Blowtorch Bob” by US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge because of his brusque management style. Under Komer, the Phoenix Program intended to identify and destroy VC operatives through counterterrorism, infiltration, assassination, capture, and often torture. Komer, later replaced by William Colby (later, Director of the CIA), was said to have been responsible for 26,000 deaths and neutralization of over 81,000 VC. Claims have been made that the Phoenix Program scraped up innocent civilians along with the VC, and whether or not this is true, the program was successful in suppressing VC political and insurgency activity.
 One of these advisors was John P. Vann, a retired Army officer. In 1967, Vann was asked by Walt Rostow, one of President Johnson’s advocates for more troops, whether America would be over the worst of the war within six months. Vann replied, “Oh hell no, Mr. Rostow. I’m a born optimist. I think we can hold out longer than that.” For more on John Paul Vann, see also A Bright Shining Lie by Neil Sheehan.
 I returned to Vietnam in 2012. Eight years ago, corruption was alive and well, and the political structure was as bad as it always was. It has probably been this way for the past two-thousand years and gives us no hope for Vietnam as a future regional ally.
 2.5 million US servicemen were exposed to Agent Orange, increasing veteran’s probability of cancer, diabetes, heart disease, and birth defects.
 The rate at which tax is incurred on an additional dollar of income. In the United States, the federal marginal tax rate for an individual will increase as income rises. It is also referred to as a progressive tax scheme. Democrats have never seen a tax they don’t adore.
No one foresaw any geo-political problems from the small backward and completely landlocked Kingdom of Laos in 1945. It was a land inhabited for the most part by hill tribes who were generally peaceful and quite happy with their lifestyle. But there developed a rivalry between somewhat obscure princes that evolved into a serious international crisis and ultimately, an East vs. West military confrontation. A minor feud, generally meaningless to the rest of the world, was altered by North Vietnam’s policy of extending its control over the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and its use of Laos as a steppingstone to achieve undetected infiltration into South Vietnam. Behind the scenes was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) who had begun supplying military aid to the Pathet Lao —the army of the leftist Prince Souphanauvong. To counter these Communist-inspired activities, the United States had extended its military assistance effort to the anti-Communist Prince Boun Oum. As this minor struggle continued (from around mid-1950), Prince Souvanna Phouma, who had previously proclaimed neutrality, sided with the Pathet Lao. It was thus that the tiny Kingdom of Laos became a pawn on the chessboard of international politics.
US military assistance in Laos did very little to slow the escalation of Pathet Lao activities. In early 1960, the Pathet Lao joined forces with the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) to seize control of the eastern portion of the country’s long, southward panhandle. In 1961, aided again by NVA, the Pathet Lao opened an offensive on the Plain of Jars in central Laos. Boun Oum’s forces proved unable to contain this Communist push into the Laotian central region. By March 1961, the situation had become critical enough for President John F. Kennedy to alert the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), Admiral Harry D. Felt, for a possible military deployment to Laos.
Admiral Felt selected Major General Donald M. Weller, then serving as Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division, to additionally serve as Commander, Task Force 116. Weller’s command primarily consisted of US Marine ground and air forces, augmented by selected (mission essential) units of the US Army and US Air Force. As Weller organized his task force, President Kennedy successfully arranged a cease-fire in Laos. The crisis cooled further when fourteen governments agreed to reconvene the Geneva Conference to consider neutralization of the Laotian kingdom. Kennedy called off the alert and General Weller’s task force was deactivated.
Negotiations in Geneva proved to be long and tedious and the ceasefire was at best tenuous; sporadic fire fights continued to erupt in various areas, usually localized, but over time growing in their frequency. In the opening weeks of 1962, widespread heavy fighting broke out again, precipitating a more intense crisis. US observers agreed that by May 1962 the situation reached a critical point. Pathet Lao and NVA forces routed a major element of anti-Communist Laotian forces at Nam Tha, a town located along the Mekong River in northwestern Laos. As a result, General Phoumi Nosavanled his army in a general withdrawal into northern Thailand. In doing so, Phoumi risked widening the conflict into Thailand.
Afterward in control of the east bank of the Mekong, the Pathet Lao were poised for a drive into Thailand, which at the time was a member in good standing of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Additionally, General Phoumi’s defeat threatened the US negotiating position at the on-going Geneva accords. Accordingly, Kennedy ordered the re-activation of Task Force 116. This time Admiral Felt selected Marine Major General John Condon to serve as its commander. A Marine battalion landing team (BLT) joined the US 7th Fleet amphibious ready group as its special landing force. Combat elements of TF 116 promptly sailed into the Gulf of Siam. The US demonstration had two purposes: (1) send an important signal to Pathet Lao and NVA forces that the United States would not countenance an invasion into Thailand, and (2) assure the government of Thailand that the United States was committed to its defense.
After President Kennedy authorized a deployment of US military forces to Thailand, US Army Lieutenant General John L. Richardson assumed command of TF 116 with orders to execute military operations in Laos. Richardson’s orders were clear: exercise his command in a way that left no doubt as to American intentions to defend Thailand. He would accomplish this by positioning his force in a manner that would allow them to respond to any armed Communist threat to Thailand. At the same time, General Harkins (COMUSMACV) was ordered to also assume command of USMACTHAI and to exercise supervisory authority over TF 116.
One element of TF-116 already in Thailand was 1st Brigade, US 27th Infantry Division. US war plans called for an additional Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The Brigade would consist of a regimental landing team (RLT) (three BLTs), an attack squadron, a helicopter squadron, and various other supporting units of varying size. Marine air assets would operate out of the air base at Udorn, Thailand, which also served as the country’s provisional capital some 350 miles northeast of Bangkok. Udorn hosted a 7,000-foot runway suitable for high performance aircraft and aviation support units. The first attack squadron to arrive in Thailand was VMA 332, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Harvey M. Patton, who’s 20 A-4 Skyhawks arrived at around noon on 18 May 1962.
Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Adams, commanding BLT 3/9 and Lieutenant Colonel Fred A. Steele, commanding HMM-261, both units forming a key element of the Special Landing Force, disembarked from ships of the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) at Bangkok. Aviation support detachments began arriving at Udorn from Okinawa. To coordinate all aviation units and responsibilities, a provisional Marine Air Group was formed under Colonel Ross S. Mickey. On 19 May, Brigadier General Ormond B. Simpson, commanding the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (3rdMEB) (formerly, Assistant Division Commander, 3rdMarDiv) arrived at Udorn. As the brigade commander, Simpson would command all USMC air and ground elements deployed to Thailand. Simpson additionally carried the designation Naval Component Commander, which gave him responsibility for all Navy and Marine forces operating under JTF-116.
Elsewhere, US forces increased with additional USAF tactical fighter bombers, refueler aircraft, and two air transport squadrons. The US 27th Infantry was reinforced by Hawaii-based units and a logistics support command was activated near Bangkok. Major General Weller joined the staff of JTF-116 as LtGen Richardson’s chief of staff.
With the numbers of American forces sharply increasing, General Simpson implemented a civic action program with the people of Thailand. Civil action programs were performed by Marines when they were not involved in field or weapons training programs. Officers introduced local citizens to the English language while Marine engineers and Navy Seabees helped to repair buildings. Navy medical and dental personnel attended to physical ailments and injuries.
In Laos, Communist forces cautiously observed an ever-enlarging US military footprint in Thailand. The Pathet Lao and NVA halted their advance toward the Thai border.
JTF-116 headquarters was set up at Korat. General Weller established a rear-element in Bangkok and concentrated on coordinating the activities of the JTF with the Joint US Military Assistance/Advisory Group (JUSMAAG), Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACThai), and the US representatives of SEATO. At this time, Colonel Croizat, formerly the first Marine Corps advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, served as senior US military representative to the SEATO planning staff in Bangkok. Weller and Croizat were familiar with the JTF structure, its capabilities, and its functions.
Portions of the Marine Corps contingency operation plan for Laos were later incorporated into operational planning for service in the Republic of Vietnam. One key provision of the plan was its emphasis on command relationships, an important aspect of Marine Corps and Air Force tactical support operations. In Laos, the CG 3rdMEB exercised operational control over all Marine tactical aircraft, an integral part of the air-ground team, which the Marines had nurtured since the mid-World War II period.
In Laos, training and acclimatization for combat operations began almost immediately at Udorn and Nong Ta Kai. While aviators became accustomed to working in the joint-tactical environment, ground pounders familiarized themselves with the terrain, working alongside Thai army units. Coordinated air-ground maneuvers publicized the presence of the Marines. Throughout this period of area familiarization, the Marines confined themselves to areas approved by the government of Thailand so as to minimize their contact or interference with local populations.
Once Pathet Lao and NVA commanders realized that the United States was seriously committed to Thailand, their offensive operations in northwest Laos came to a screeching halt. By late June 1962, US officials reported progress in negotiations in Geneva and Vientiane. President Kennedy, in a show of good faith, ordered major combat elements of JTF-116 to withdraw from Thailand. A month later, quarreling factions in Laos agreed to participate in a coalition government headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma and form a neutralist state. Within this protocol, agreed to and signed by the United States, Soviet Union, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Burma, Great Britain, France, Canada, India, China, Thailand, Poland, the Kingdom of Laos, and Cambodia, all foreign troops were prohibited from entering or operating within the borders of Laos. By 31 July 1962, all Marine Corps combat forces were withdrawn from Thailand/Laos, the 3rdMEB was deactivated, and the first deployment of the Marine Air-Ground task force to Southeast Asia came to an end.
The Laos Problem illustrated the value of the U. S. Marine Corps (a) as a force capable of supporting American foreign policy objectives on short notice, (b) its ability to partner with Navy, Army, Air Force units, and the militaries of foreign allies, (c) its ability to operate at will within remote areas, and (d) its ability to establish culture-sensitive civil action programs. The lessons learned by the Marines in Thailand/Laos would be taken off the shelf in another war in the not-too-distant future.
Diplomatically, Kennedy’s solution to the Laotian problem was a failure on many levels —not least of which were the convictions of both South Vietnam President Ngo Dinh Diem and U. S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Frederick Nolting, that a neutral Laos would only serve the interests of North Vietnam. Both Diem and Nolting knew that Prince Phouma was weak and untrustworthy. Diem’s solution was hardly realistic, however: he wanted to partition Laos into a pro-communist/pro-capitalist country. President Kennedy wanted a diplomatic solution to the Laotian problem —sooner rather than later— and that’s what he got. Despite the agreement on Laos, which North Vietnam almost immediately violated, Laos did become the primary infiltration route of North Vietnamese men and materials into the Republic of (South) Vietnam. Equally significant, perhaps, was the fact that Ho Chi Minh had taken an adequate measure of John F. Kennedy and the man who would succeed him: Lyndon B. Johnson.
(Next week: Marine Advisors in Vietnam)
Castle, T. At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U. S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975. Columbia University Press, 1993.
Conboy, K. J. War in Laos, 1954-1975. Squadron/Signal Publications, 1994.
Freedman, R. Vietnam: A History of the War. Holiday House, 2016.
Hastings, M. Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy, 1945-75. Canada: HarperCollins, 2018.
Hitchcock, W. The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World of the 1950s. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018
Karnow, S. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking/The Penguin Group, 1983
Sturkey, M.F. Bonnie-Sue: A Marine Corps Helicopter Squadron in Vietnam. South Carolina: Heritage Press International, 1996
Whitlow, R. H. S. Marines in Vietnam: The Advisory & Combat Assistance Era, 1954-1964. History & Museums Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C., 1977
 Admiral Felt (1902-92) was a naval aviator who led US carrier strikes during World War II. He served as CINCPAC from 1958-64. Felt, was an unremarkable graduate of the US Naval Academy. He spent five years at sea before applying for flight training. Felt went on to become one of the more accomplished Navy aviators in its entire history.
 Weller, an artillerist, became the Marine Corps’ foremost expert on naval gunfire support and authored several books on the topic. During World War II, Weller served under (then) Brigadier General Holland M. Smith, commanding the 1st Marine Brigade, as his artillery and naval gunfire support coordinator. Weller retired from active duty in 1963 while serving as Deputy Commander, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific.
 A battalion landing team is an infantry battalion reinforced by additional units sufficient to enable the team to accomplish its assigned mission. In this case, 3/9 was reinforced by an artillery battery, a tank platoon, an amphibious tractor platoon, a pioneer platoon, a motor transport platoon, an anti-tank platoon, and air and naval gunfire liaison teams.
 General Simpson (1915-1998) later commanded the 1stMarDiv during the Vietnam War.
 See also, final paragraph. Had the North Vietnamese adhered to their agreement, they would not have established the logistics corridor through the eastern length of Laos that became known as the Ho Chi Minh trail. Without it, the War in Vietnam might well have had a different outcome.
Đà Nẵng, Vietnam was first established in the year 192 AD as part of the ancient kingdom of Champa. The capital of Champa was a city named Indrapura (present-day Dong Duong, in Quang Nam Province). In the last half of the tenth century, the kings of Champa came into conflict with the Đại Việt, a people living near modern-day Hanoi. It was a conflict that lasted for over a hundred years and ended in territorial gains for the Dai Viet during the Ly Dynasty. The expansion of the Dai Viet continued for several centuries. By the end of the fifteenth century, Champa had all but ceased to exist.
The first European to appear at Da Nang was the Portuguese explorer António de Faria in 1535. Afterward, Portuguese ships regularly visited the city hoping to establish trade with its citizens. Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, French and Spanish traders and missionaries made landfall at Hoi An, south of Da Nang. The first known American to visit the city was John White on the brigFranklin of Salem, Massachusetts. American ships soon after made regular visits, but because the area was poor in resources, trade agreements with local officials simply wasn’t possible because the Emperor Minh Mang prohibited foreign vessels from making landfall at any location other than present-day port city of Haiphong.
French vessels bombarded Da Nang in 1847 and again in 1858 to punish the people for their abuse of Catholic missionaries. Under orders from Napoleon III, the French landed infantry as part of their Cochinchina Campaign. French gains in Vietnam were only temporary, however, as a large Vietnamese army forced a French retreat in 1860. By the end of 1862, however, French forces were able to capture and retain the southern stronghold of Saigon. Several southern provinces were ceded to the French by the Treaty of Saigon (1862). Over the next twenty years, the French were able to strengthen their hold on Vietnam, culminating in the establishment of the Union de l’Indochine Française in October 1887. Two years later, Da Nang became one of Indochina’s five most important cities (along with Hanoi, Saigon-Cholon, Haiphong, and Hué.
On 30 July 1962, Colonel Julius W. Ireland replaced Colonel Carey as the operation shufly task force commander. Ireland had served briefly in Vietnam in 1954 while commanding VMA-324 and delivered 25 F4U Corsair fighter-bombers to the French, who at the time were in desperate need of attack aircraft. Soon after Ireland’s arrival, additional personnel changes took place: Ralph R. Davis replaced Lieutenant Colonel William W. Eldridge as CO MABS-16 Sub-unit, and Lieutenant Colonel Alton W. McCully replaced Harry C. Dees as executive officer of the task unit.
HMM-163, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Rathbun replaced HMM-362, participating in its first combat mission on 1 August. HMM-163, known as the Ridge Runners, maintained a brisk operations schedule throughout the summer. HMM-163 suffered its first aircraft damage on 18 August.
The mission, which involved 14 helicopters led by Rathbun, arrived at a pre-arranged pickup point to rendezvous with an ARVN infantry unit. Upon their arrival, the Marines discovered that the ARVN unit was nowhere to be seen. One crewman reported seeing ARVN troops about a half mile away from the pickup point. Rathbun and his wingman then spotted white smoke at that approximate location and took off to investigate the area. While making a low pass, Rathbun’s bird was hit several times by small arms fire. The rudder control cable was severed, which punctured the main rotor transmission. Oil loss forced Rathbun to land on a nearby road. On site repairs enabled the Marines to return the aircraft to a more secure area.
What happened was that as Rathbun’s flight set down at the pre-arranged pickup point, ARVN forces commenced to engage a VC force of unknown strength about a half mile from the rendezvous point; a VNAF forward air controller (FAC) in an observation aircraft dropped smoke to mark the VC position for an air strike. Rather than dropping white smoke, the FAC should have dropped red. HMM-163 learned valuable lessons from this incident, including (a) the advisability of last-minute radio coordination with ground units before landing aircraft to support them, (b) that helicopters were not suitable for low level reconnaissance, and (c) pre-arranged smoke signals lend themselves to enemy deception. In Vietnam, there was no such thing as keeping secrets.
HMM-163 operations continued throughout August. Thinking outside the box, helicopter mechanics proposed modifying the H-34D by mounting M-60 machine guns inside the cargo hatch. A flexible machine gun mount made sure that the weapons would not obstruct the hatch during loading and unloading men and material. The addition of side-mounted automatic weapons allowed the crew chief to protect the helicopter during crucial landings and take offs. Of course, by regulation, door gunners were restricted from using their weapons until first fired upon and then only at clearly identified enemy targets. This rule of engagement (ROE) applied equally to US ground advisors.
In early September, General Harkins directed Colonel Ireland to begin planning for the relocation of his helicopter force, northward to Da Nang. The shift to I CTZ (also, I Corps) was part of a unit realignment; HMM-163 would switch places with the Army’s 93rd Helicopter Company. The movement took place in stages beginning on 4 September. But even after the squadron began the process of relocation, HMM-163 continued flying missions in support of the III CTZ commander. On 5 September, three helicopters were hit by enemy small arms fire. All aircraft returned safely to Soc Trang, but Corporal Billy S. Watson, a crew chief, became the first Marine wounded during the Vietnam War.
When the U. S. Marines arrived in Da Nang in September 1962, the city still retained many of the characteristics of an old French colonial city. The airfield was a French construct following World War II. It was modern and large enough to support VNAF, U. S. Air Force, Marines, and commercial aircraft —even though the field was literally surrounded by the city. Thus, Da Nang became the new base for operation shufly and in terms of its facilities, it was an improvement over Soc Trang. One of Colonel Ireland’s biggest worries was adequate security for his Marines and their aircraft. Initially, Ireland detailed a guard force from among the enlisted men of the flying squadron and MABS-16. Guard posts were set up around the flight line, maintenance hangar and communications center, but this arrangement was far from ideal. It necessitated that Marines with full time jobs take on the additional task of area security. Tired mechanics are lousy mechanics. Ireland requested the assignment of a permanent security force so that his operating force could concentrate on their assigned mission, but his request was not immediately approved.
At the time HMM-163 arrived in Da Nang, the I CTZ included South Vietnam’s five northern-most provinces, from the DMZ to Quang Ngai. All of these were coastal provinces, and with the exception of Quang Ngai, extended inland from the seacoast to the Laotian border, distances that ranged from 30 to 70 air miles. I Corps occupied the central portion of the region formerly known an Annam; it extended 225 miles south of the DMZ. The climate pattern of I Corps was almost the opposite of that experienced by Marines at Soc Trang. The dry season dominates the summer months, and monsoons govern the winter months. Monsoons are a weather phenomenon that influence large climate regions and reverses its direction seasonally. Generally, it is a strong wind from the southwest that brings heavy rainfall. In I Corps, monsoons bring heavy rains and dense fog, generally beginning around October and ending in March.
The terrain of I Corps ranges from a flat coastal plain to towering mountains, which protrude several miles west of the flat coastal plain. Most of the populated areas of I Corps are located along streams and rivers that empty into the Gulf of Tonkin. In 1962, two and a half million people lived in I Corps; their social patterns and economies were dictated by geography and climate and had existed for thousands of years.
Colonel Ireland’s aviators were tasked with supporting ARVN units in I Corps, which included the 1st and 2nd ARVN divisions. The 1st ARVN Division was stationed at Huế, the old Imperial City; the 2nd ARVN Division was headquartered at Da Nang. ARVN units operating in I Corps were occasionally augmented by the 25th ARVN Division from Kontum to achieve specific operational objectives.
Enemy forces within I Corps included four VC battalions, four separate infantry companies, and three district level (independent) platoons. Altogether, communist forces numbered around 5,000 men. Additionally, a not-so-veiled threat of an invasion across the DMZ from North Vietnam was always present. Across the Laotian border were the Ho Chi Minh trails from which men and material were funneled from the North into South Vietnam.
Nationally, the government’s military strategy was to pacify and control heavily populated areas, but in I Corps, dense forests and valleys demanded a more aggressive policy. This meant more airlift missions for HMM-163. The problem for Marine aviators was rough terrain and foul weather for at least half of the year.
Vietnamese ground commanders in I Corps, who had learned the value of helicopter support, lost no time requesting assistance from the Marines. HMM-163 flew its first mission from Da Nang on 18 September. Rough terrain and the fact that enemy units easily controlled all landing zones in I Corps prompted the Marines to again modify their tactics. For example, the Marines withheld landing operations until after VNAF bombers had softened likely enemy positions around landing zones. Marines additionally relied on coordinated pre-arranged artillery and air strikes to neutralize enemy troops in the area of operations.
Another issue facing the Marines was refueling their gas-guzzling H-34D’s. To solve this problem, HMM-163 lifted a 10,000-gallon fuel bladder into Quang Ngai, 65 miles south of Da Nang to serve as a permanent refueling point. Additional bladders were later positioned in Hué and Tam Ky.
On 19 September, the Marines helped evacuate a threatened government outpost from the mountains directly west of Da Nang, including an odd assortment of troops, their families, and personal belongings (livestock) to the relative safety of the coastal plain. This type of mission became routine for the Marines, which indicated a substantial increase in VC activity in I Corps, particularly after North Vietnam stepped up its support of VC units. While lifting elements of the 2nd ARVN Division, HMM-163 suffered its first battle damage near Tam Ky on 26 September. The Marines had become a favorite target of VC units. In one incident two ARVN soldiers were killed and Lance Corporal James I. Mansfield became the second Marine to receive combat wounds in Vietnam. Between 26 September and 4 October, five H-34’s received battle damage from enemy small arms fire.
On 6 October, five Marines and two sailors were killed when their Search and Air Rescue (SAR) helicopter crashed in the jungle fifteen miles west of Tam Ky. The crash resulted from a catastrophic mechanical failure. First Lieutenant William T. Sinnott, the pilot and only survivor, was successfully airlifted to medical facilities at Da Nang.
In airlifting ARVN troops, there was one aspect of such operations that became a source of irritation to the Marines. It was that ARVN troops were improperly prepared for airlift. Getting the ARVN troops loaded onto the aircraft more closely resembled a Chinese fire drill than an orderly military operation. The ensuing gaggle produced a waste of time and an increase of danger to the Marines and their birds. HMM-163 solved this problem by assigning a senior noncommissioned officer to act as loadmaster. Equipped with a radio, the loadmaster would arrive at the assembly area in advance of the main flight and supervise loading operations.
Monsoons arrived in I Corps in early November. Flight operations were restricted by heavy fog and low clouds in the mountain areas, forcing the Marines to concentrate their efforts along the coastal regions. Rathbun began sending his OE-1 to obtain current weather and climate conditions before allowing his aircraft to lift off. At best, it was a partial fix to the problem because monsoon rains moved quickly in from the South China Sea, and these heavy rains always disrupted flight operations.
Operation Shufly in I Corps was the beginnings of what would be come a long-time association of Marines with RVN’s rugged highlands. The officers and Marines of HMM-163 learned important lessons from their experiences and shared these with their brothers throughout the helicopter community. By the end of 1962, U. S. Marines had established an enviable record of service to the Republic of Vietnam and earned an exceptional reputation for their courage, innovation, and generosity toward their Vietnamese counterparts.
(Next week: The Laotian Problem)
Castle, T. At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U. S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975. Columbia University Press, 1993.
Conboy, K. J. War in Laos, 1954-1975. Squadron/Signal Publications, 1994.
Freedman, R. Vietnam: A History of the War. Holiday House, 2016.
Hastings, M. Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy, 1945-75. Canada: HarperCollins, 2018.
Hitchcock, W. The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World of the 1950s. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018
Karnow, S. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking/The Penguin Group, 1983
Sturkey, M.F. Bonnie-Sue: A Marine Corps Helicopter Squadron in Vietnam. South Carolina: Heritage Press International, 1996
Whitlow, R. H. S. Marines in Vietnam: The Advisory & Combat Assistance Era, 1954-1964. History & Museums Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C., 1977
 Its usage appears here in the written language of Vietnam. I will dispense with using this style further.
 A brig is a sailing vessel with two square-rigged masts.
 Saigon has had many names. As far as we know, its earliest name was Bai gaur in the 11th century. After falling to the Khmer, it was named Prey Nokor (forest city). Vietnamese moving south occupied the area and eventually displaced the Khmer and the city was named Gia Dinh, but later named Saigon (Cotton Stick) in the 18th century.
 So-named for their participation in rescue and relief operations after a typhoon had devastated the mountainous region of Hagman, Japan.