The Soul of a Regiment

By Talbot Mundy

First published in Adventure magazine, February 1912


Talbot Mundy, perhaps the most incredible adventure writer of the 20th century, wrote “The Soul Of A Regiment” at the beginning of his career.  Voted the greatest story ever published in “Adventure,” this story cemented Mundy’s reputation.[1]

I


So long as its colors remain, and there is one man left to carry them, a regiment can never die; they can recruit it again around that one man, and the regiment will continue on its road to future glory with the same old traditions behind it and the same atmosphere surrounding it that made brave men of its forbears.       So, although the colors are not exactly the soul of a regiment, they are the concrete embodiment of it and are even more sacred than the person of a reigning sovereign.

The First Egyptian Foot had colors — and has them still, thanks to Billy Grogram; so the First Egyptian Foot is still a regiment.  It was the first of all the regiments raised in Egypt, and the colors were lovely crimson things on a brand new polished pole, cased in the regulation jacket of black waterproof and housed with all pomp and ceremony in the mess-room at the barracks.  There were people who said it was bad policy to present colors to a native regiment; that they were nothing more than a symbol of a decadent and waning monarchism in any case, and that the respect which would be due them might lead dangerously near to fetish-worship.  As a matter of cold fact, though, the raw recruits of the regiment failed utterly to understand them, and it was part of Billy Grogram’s business to instill in them a wholesome respect for the sacred symbol of regimental honor.

He was Sergeant-Instructor William Stanford Grogram, V.C., D.S.M., to give him his full name and title, late a sergeant-major of the True and Tried, time expired, and retired from service on a pension.  His pension would have been enough for him to live on, for he was unmarried, his habits were exemplary, and his wants were few; but an elder brother had been a ne’er-do- well, and Grogram, who was the type that will die rather than let any one of his depend on charity, left the army with a sister-in-law and a small tribe of children dependent on him.  Work, of course, was the only thing left for it, and he applied promptly for the only kind of work that he knew how to do.

The British are always making new regiments out of native material in some part of the world; they come cheaper than white troops, and, with a sprinkling of white troops among them, they do wonderfully good service in time of war — thanks to the sergeant instructors.  The officers get the credit for It, but it is the ex-noncommissioned officers of the Line who do the work, as Grogram was destined to discover. They sent him out to Instruct the First Egyptian Foot, and it turned out to be the toughest proposition that anyone lonely, determined, homesick, fighting man ever ran up against.

He was not looking for a life of idleness and ease, so the discomfort of his new quarters did not trouble him overmuch, though they would have disgusted another man at the very beginning.  They gave him a little, white-washed, mud-walled hut with two bare rooms in it and a lovely view on three sides of aching desert sand; on the fourth, a blind wall.

It was as hot inside as a baker’s oven, but It had the one great advantage of being easily kept clean, and Grogram, whose fetish was cleanliness, bore that in mind and forbore to grumble at the absence of a sergeant’s mess and the various creature comforts that his position had entitled him to for years.

What did disgust him, though, was the unfairness of saddling the task that lay in front of him on the shoulders of one lone man; his officers made it quite clear that they had no intention of helping him in the least; from the Colonel downward they were ashamed of the regiment, and they expected Grogram to work it into something like shape before they even began to take an interest in it.  The Colonel went even further than that; he appeared at Orderly Room every morning and once a week attended a parade out on the desert where nobody could see the awful evolutions of his raw command, but he actually threw cold water on Grogram’s efforts at enthusiasm.

“You can’t make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear,” he told him a few mornings after Grogram joined, “or well-drilled soldiers out of Gyppies.  Heaven only knows what the Home Government means by trying to raise a regiment out here; at the very best, we’ll only be teaching the enemy to fight us! But you’ll find they won’t learn.  However, until the Government finds out what a ghastly mistake’s being made, there’s nothing for it but to obey orders and drill Gyppies.  Go ahead, Grogram; I give you a free hand.  Try anything you like on them, but don’t ask me to believe there’ll be any result from it.  Candidly, I don’t.”

But Grogram happened to be a different type of man from his new Colonel.  After a conversation such as that, he could have let things go hang had he chosen to, drawing his pay, doing his six hours’ work a day along the line of least resistance, and blaming the inevitable consequences on the Colonel.  But to him, a duty was something to be done; an impossibility was something to set his clean-shaven, stubborn jaw at and to overcome; and a regiment was a regiment to be kneaded, pummeled, damned, coaxed, and drilled till it began to look as the true and tried used to look in the days when he was sergeant-major.  So he twisted his little brown mustache and drew himself up to the full height of his five feet eight inches, spread his well-knit shoulders, straightened his ramrod of a back, and got busy on the job while his Colonel and the other officers did the social rounds in Cairo and cursed their luck.

The material that Grogram had to work with were fellaheen — good, honest coal-black negroes, giants in stature, the embodiment of good-humored incompetence, children of the soil weaned on raw-hide whips under the blight of Turkish misrule and Arab cruelty.[2]  They had no idea that they were even men till Grogram taught them, and he had to learn Arabic first before he could teach them even that.

They began by fearing him, as their ancestors had feared every new breed of task-master for centuries; gradually, they learned to look for instant and amazing justice at his hands, and from then on, they respected him.  He caned them instead of getting them fined by the Colonel or punished with pack drill for failing things they did not understand; they were thoroughly accustomed to the lash, and his light swagger cane laid on their huge shoulders was a joke that served merely to point his arguments and fix his lessons in their memories; they would not have understood the Colonel’s wrath had he known that the men of his regiment were being beaten by a non-commissioned officer.

They began to love him when he harked back to the days when he was a recruit himself and remembered the steps of a double shuffle that he had learned in the barrack room; when he danced a buck and wing dance for them, they recognized him as a man and a brother, and from that time on, instead of giving him all the trouble they could and laughing at his lectures when his back was turned, they genuinely tried to please him.

So he studied out more steps and danced his way into their hearts, growing daily stricter on parade, daily more exacting of pipe-clay and punctuality, and slowly, but surely as the march of time, molding them into something like a regiment.

Even he could not teach them to shoot, though he sweated over them on the dazzling range until the sun dried every drop of sweat out of him.  And for a long time, he could not even teach them how to march; they would keep step for a hundred yards or so and then lapse into the listless shrinking stride that was the birthright of centuries.

He pestered the Colonel for a band of sorts until the Colonel told him angrily to go to blazes; then, he wrote home and purchased six fifes with his own money, bought a native drum in the bazaar, and started a band on his own account.

Had he been able to read music himself, he would have been no better off because, of course, the fellaheen he had to teach could not have read it either, though possibly he might have slightly increased the number of tunes in their repertoire.

As it was, he knew only two tunes himself: “The Campbells Are Coming” and the National Anthem.

 He picked the six most intelligent men he could find and whistled those two tunes to them until his lips were dry, his cheeks ached, and his very soul revolted at the sound of them.  But the six men picked them up, and, of course, any negro in the world can beat a drum.  One golden morning before the sun had heated the desert air, the regiment marched past in really good formation, all in step and tramping to the tune of “God Save the Queen.”

The Colonel nearly had a fit, but the regiment tramped on, and the band played them back to barracks with a swing and a rhythm that was new not only to the First Egyptian Foot; it was new to Egypt!  The tune was half a tone flat, maybe, and the drum was a sheepskin business bought in the bazaar, but a new regiment marched behind it.  And behind the regiment — two paces right flank, as the regulations specify — marched a sergeant-instructor with a new light in his eyes — the gray eyes that had looked out so wearily from beneath the shaggy eyebrows and that shone now with the pride of a deed well done.

Of course, the Colonel was still scornful.  But Billy Grogram, who had handled men when the Colonel was cutting his teeth at Sandhurst and who knew men from the bottom up, knew that the mob of unambitious countrymen, who had grinned at him in uncomfortable silence when he first arrived, was beginning to forget its mobdom.  He, who spent his hard-earned leisure talking to them and answering their childish questions in hard-won Arabic, knew that they were slowly grasping the theory of the thing — that a soul was forming in the regiment — an indefinable, unexplainable but obvious change, perhaps not unlike the change from infancy to manhood.

And Billy Grogram, who above all was a man of clean ideals, began to feel content.  He still described them in his letters home as “blooming mummies made of Nile mud, roasted black for their sins, and good for nothing but the ash-heap.”  He still damned them on parade, whipped them when the Colonel wasn’t looking, and worked at them until he was much too tired to sleep, but he began to love them.  And to a big, black, grinning man of them, they loved him.  To encourage that wondrous band of his, he set them to playing their two tunes on guest nights outside the officers’ mess, and the officers endured it until the Colonel returned from furlough.  He sent for Grogram and offered to pay him back all he had spent on instruments, provided the band should keep away in the future.

Grogram refused the money and took the hint, inventing weird and hitherto unheard-of reasons why it should be unrighteous for the band to play outside the mess and preaching respect for officers in spite of it.  Like all great men, he knew when he had made a mistake and how to minimize it.

His hardest task was teaching the Gyppies what their colors meant. The men were Mohammedans; they believed in Allah; they had been taught from the time when they were old enough to speak that idols and the outward symbols of religion are the signs of heresy, and Grogram’s lectures, delivered in stammering and uncertain Arabic, seemed to them like the ground-plan of a new religion.  But Grogram stuck to it.  He made opportunities for saluting the colors — took them down each morning and uncased them, and treated them with an ostentatious respect that would have been laughed at among his own people.

When his day’s work was done and he was too tired to dance for them, he would tell them long tales, done into halting Arabic, of how regiments had died rallying around their colors, of a brand new paradise, invented by himself and suitable to all religions, where soldiers went who honored their colors as they ought to do; of the honor that befell a man who died fighting for them, and of the tenfold honor of the man whose privilege it was to carry them into action.  And in the end, although they did not understand him, they respected the colors because he told them to.


II

WHEN England hovered on the brink of indecision and sent her greatest general to hold Khartoum with only a handful of native troops to help him, the First Egyptian Foot refused to leave their gaudy crimson behind them.  They marched with colors flying down to the steamer that was to take them on the first long stage of their journey up the Nile, and there were six fifes and a drum in front of them that told whoever cared to listen that “The Campbells are coming — hurrah! hurrah!”

They marched with the measured tramp of a real regiment; they carried their chins high; their tarbooshes were cocked at a knowing angle, and they swung from the hips like grown men.[3]  At the head of the regiment rode a Colonel whom the regiment scarcely knew, and beside it marched a dozen officers in a like predicament; but behind it, his sword strapped to his side and his little swagger-cane tucked under his left arm-pit, Inconspicuous, smiling and content, marched Sergeant-Instructor Grogram, whom the regiment knew and loved, and who had made and knew the regiment.

The whole civilized world knows — and England knows to her enduring shame — what befell General Gordon and his handful of men when they reached Khartoum.  Gordon surely guessed what was in store for him even before he started, his subordinates may have done so, and the native soldiers knew.  But Sergeant-Instructor Grogram neither knew nor cared.

He looked no further than his duty, which was to nurse the big black babies of his regiment and to keep them good tempered, grinning and efficient; he did that as no other living man could have done it and kept on doing it until the bitter end.

And his task can have been no sinecure.  The Mahdi — the ruthless terror of the Upper Nile who ruled by systematized and savage cruelty and lived by plunder — was as much a bogy to peaceful Egypt as Napoleon used to be in Europe and with far more reason.[4]  Mothers frightened their children into prompt obedience by mentioning his name, and the coal-black natives of the Nile-mouth country are never more than grown-up children.

It must have been as easy to take that regiment to Khartoum as to take a horse into a burning building, but when they reached there not a man was missing; they marched in with colors flying and their six-fife band playing, and behind them — two paces right flank rear — marched Billy Grogram, his little swagger-cane under his left arm-pit, neat, respectful and very wide awake.  For a little while, Cairo kept in touch with them, and then communication ceased.  Nobody ever learned all the details of the tragedy that followed; a curtain was drawn — of mystery and silence such as has always veiled the heart of darkest Africa.

Lord Wolseley took his expedition up the Nile, whipped the Dervishes at El Teb and Tel-el-Kebir, and reached Khartoum to learn of Gordon’s death but not the details of it.  Then he came back again, and the Mahdi followed him, closing up the route behind him, wiping all trace of civilization off the map and placing what he imagined was an insuperable barrier between him and the British — a thousand miles of plundered, ravished, depopulated wilderness.

So a clerk in a musty office drew a line below the record of the First Egyptian Foot; widows were duly notified; a pension or two was granted; and the regiment that Billy Grogram had worked so hard to build was relegated to the past like Billy Grogram.

Rumors had come back along with Wolseley’s men that Grogram had gone down fighting with his regiment; there was a story that the band had been taken alive and turned over to the Mahdi’s private service, and one prisoner, taken near Khartoum, swore that he had seen Grogram speared as he lay wounded before the Residency.  There was a battalion of the True and Tried with Wolseley, and the men used methods that may have been not strictly ethical in seeking tidings of their old sergeant-major, but even they could get no further details; he had gone down fighting with his regiment, and that was all about him.

Then, men forgot him.  The long, steady preparation soon began for the new campaign that was to wipe the Mahdi off the map, restore peace to Upper Egypt, regain Khartoum, and incidentally avenge Gordon. Regiments were slowly drafted out from home as barracks could be built for them; new regiments of native troops were raised and drilled by ex-sergeants of the Line who never heard of Grogram; new men took charge; and the Sirdar superintended everything and laid his reputation brick by brick, of bricks which he made himself, and men were too busy under him to think of anything except the work in hand.[5]

But rumors kept coming in, as they always do in Egypt, filtering in from nowhere over the illimitable desert, borne by stray camel drivers, carried by Dervish spies, tossed from tongue to tongue through the fish market, and carried up back stairs to Clubs and Department Offices.  There were tales of a drummer and three men who played the fife and a wonderful mad feringhee who danced as no man surely ever danced before.  The tales varied, but there were always four musicians and a feringhee.[6]

When one Dervish spy was caught and questioned, he swore by the beard of the prophet that he had seen the men himself.  He was told promptly that he was a liar; how came it that a feringhee — a pork-fed, infidel Englishman — should be allowed to live anywhere the Mahdi’s long arm reached?

“Whom God hath touched—” the Dervish quoted, and men remembered that madness is the surest passport throughout the whole of Northern Africa.  But nobody connected Grogram with the feringhee who danced.

But another man was captured who told a similar tale, and then a Greek trader turned Mohammedan to save his skin, who had made good his escape from the Mahdi’s camp. He swore to have seen this man as he put in one evening at a Nile bank village in a native dhow.  He was dressed in an ancient khaki tunic and a loin-cloth; he was bare-legged, shoeless, and his hair was long over his shoulders and plastered thick with mud.  No, he did not look in the least like a British soldier, though he danced as soldiers sometimes did beside the campfires.

Three natives who were with him played fifes while the feringhee danced, and one man beat a drum.     Yes, the tunes were English tunes, though very badly played; he had heard them before and recognized them.  No, he could not hum them; he knew no music.  Why had he not spoken to the man who danced?  He had not dared.  The man appeared to be a prisoner, and so were the natives with him; the man had danced that evening until he could dance no longer, and then the Dervishes had beaten him with a kurbash for encouragement: the musicians had tried to interfere, and they had all been beaten and left lying there for dead.[7] He was not certain, but he was almost certain they were dead before he came away.

Then, more than three years after Gordon died, there came another rumor, this time from closer at hand — somewhere in the neutral desert zone that lay between the Dervish outpost and the part of Lower Egypt that England held.  This time, the dancer was reported to be dying, but the musicians were still with him.  They got the name of the dancer this time; it was reported to be Goglam, and though that was not at all a bad native guess for Grogram, nobody apparently noted the coincidence.

Men were too busy with their work; the rumor was only one of a thousand that filtered across the desert every month, and nobody remembered the non-commissioned officer who had left for Khartoum with the First Egyptian Foot; they could have recalled the names of all the officers almost without an effort, but not Grogram’s.

III


And with the proficiency, of course, came competition — matches between regiments for the regimental cup and, finally, the biggest event of the Cairo season, the match between the Civil Service and the Army of Occupation, or, as it was more usually termed, “The Army vs. The Rest.”  That was the one society event that the Sirdar made a point of presiding over in person.

EGYPT was busy with the hum of building — empire-building under a man who knew his job.  Almost the only game the Sirdar countenanced was polo, and that was only because it kept officers and civilians fit.  He gave them all the polo, though, that they wanted, and the men grew keen on it, spent money on it, and, needless to say, grew extraordinarily proficient.

He attended it in mufti always but sat in the seat of honor, just outside the touch-line, halfway down the field, and behind him, held back by ropes, clustered the whole of Cairene society, on foot, on horseback and in dog carts, buggies, gigs and every kind of carriage imaginable. Opposite and at either end, the garrison lined up — all the British and native troops rammed in together, and the native population crowded in between them and wherever they could find standing-room.

It was the one event of the year for which all Egypt, Christian and Mohammedan, took a holiday.  Regimental bands were there to play before the game and between the chukkers, and nothing was left undone that could in any way tend to make the event spectacular.

Two games had been played since the cup had been first presented by the Khedive, and honors lay even — one match for the Army and one for the Civil Service.[8]  So on the third anniversary feeling ran fairly high.  It ran higher still when half time was called and honors still lay even at one goal all; to judge by the excitement of the crowd, a stranger might have guessed that polo was the most important thing in Egypt.  The players rode off the pavilion for the half-time interval, and the infantry band that came out onto the field was hard put to drown the noise of conversation, laughter, and argument. At that minute, there was surely nothing in the world to talk about but polo.

But suddenly, the band stopped playing, as suddenly as though the music were a concrete thing and had been severed with an ax.  The Sirdar turned his head suddenly and gazed at one corner of the field, and the noise of talking ceased — not so suddenly as the music had done, for not everybody could see what was happening at first — but dying down gradually and fading away to nothing as the amazing thing came into view.

It was a detachment of five men — a drummer, three fifes, and one other man who marched behind them — though he scarcely resembled a man.  He marched, though, like a British soldier.

He was ragged — they all were — dirty and unkempt.  He seemed very nearly starved, for his bare legs were thinner than a mummy’s; round his loins was a native loincloth, and his hair was plastered down with mud like a religious fanatic’s.  His only other garment was a tattered khaki tunic that might once have been a soldier’s, and he wore no shoes or sandals of any kind.

He marched, though, with a straight back and his chin up, and anybody who was half observant might have noticed that he was marching two paces right flank rear; it is probable, though, that in the general amazement, nobody did notice it.

As the five debouched upon the polo ground, four of them abreast and one behind, the four men raised their arms, the man behind issued a sharp command, the right-hand man thumped his drum, and a wail proceeded from the fifes.  They swung into a regimental quickstep now, and the wail grew louder, rising and falling fitfully and distinctly, keeping time with the drum.

Then, the tune grew recognizable.  The crowd listened now in awe-struck silence.  The five approaching figures were grotesque enough to raise a laugh, and the tune was more grotesque and more pitiable still. Still, there was something electric in the atmosphere that told of tragedy, and not even the natives made a sound as the five marched straight across the field to where the Sirdar sat beneath the Egyptian flag.

Louder and louder grew the tune as the fifes warmed up to it; louder thumped the drum.  It was flat, and notes were missing here and there.  False notes appeared at unexpected intervals, but the tune was unmistakable.  “The Campbells are coming! Hurrah! Hurrah!” wailed the three fifes, and the five men marched to it as no undrilled natives ever did.

“Halt!” ordered the man behind when the strange cortege had reached the Sirdar, and his “Halt!” rang out in good, clean military English.

“Front!” he ordered, and they “fronted” like a regiment.  “Right Dress!”  They were in line already, but they went through the formality of shuffling their feet. “Eyes Front!”  The five men faced the Sirdar, and no one breathed. “General salute — pre-sent arms!”

They had no arms. The band stood still at attention.  The fifth man the bare legs and plastered hair — whipped his right hand to his forehead in the regulation military salute — held it there for the regulation six seconds, swaying as he did so and tottering from the knees, then whipped it to his side again, and stood at rigid attention.  He seemed able to stand better that way, for his knees left off shaking.

“Who are you?” asked the Sirdar then.

“First Egyptian Foot, sir.”

The crowd behind was leaning forward, listening; those that had been near enough to hear that gasped. The Sirdar’s face changed suddenly to the look of cold indifference behind which a certain type of Englishman hides his emotion.

Then came the time-honored question, prompt as the ax of a guillotine — inevitable as Fate itself:

“Where are your colors?”

The fifth man — he who had issued the commands fumbled with his tunic.  The buttons were missing, and the front of it was fastened up with a string; his fingers seemed to have grown feeble; he plucked at it, but it would not come undone.

“Where are—”

The answer to that question should be like an echo, and nobody should need to ask it twice. But the string burst suddenly, and the first time of asking sufficed.  The ragged, unkempt, long-haired mummy undid his tunic and pulled it open.

“Here, sir!” he answered.

The colors, blood-soaked, torn — unrecognizable almost — were around his body!  As the ragged tunic fell apart, the colors fell with it; Grogram caught them and stood facing the Sirdar with them in his hand.  His bare chest was seared with half-healed wounds and crisscrossed with the marks of floggings, and his skin seemed to be drawn tight as a mummy’s across his ribs.  He was a living skeleton!

The Sirdar sprang to his feet and raised his hat, for the colors of a regiment are second, in holiness, to the Symbols of the Church.  The watching, listening crowd followed suit; there was a sudden rustling as a sea of hats and helmets rose and descended.  The band of four, who had stood in stolid silence while all this was happening, realized that the moment was auspicious to play their other tune.

They had only one other, and they had played “The Campbells are coming” across the polo field; so up went the fifes, “Bang!” went the drum, and “God Save Our Gracious Queen” wailed the three in concert, while strong men hid their faces and women sobbed.

Grogram whipped his hand up to the answering salute, faced the crowd in front of him for six palpitating seconds, and fell dead at the Sirdar’s feet.

And so they buried him; his shroud was the flag that had flown above the Sirdar at that ever-memorable match, and his soul went into the regiment.

They began recruiting it again the next day around the blood-soaked colors he had carried with him, and the First Egyptian Foot did famously at the Atbara and Omdurman.  They buried him in a hollow square formed by massed brigades, European and native regiments alternating, and saw him on his way with twenty-one parting volleys instead of the regulation five.  His tombstone is a monolith of rough-hewn granite, tucked away in a quiet corner of the European graveyard at Cairo — quiet and inconspicuous as Grogram always was — but the truth is graven on it in letters two inches deep:

HERE LIES A MAN.

Endnotes:

[1] Talbot Mundy (born William Lancaster Gribbon, 23 April 1879 – 5 August 1940) was an English writer of adventure fiction.  Based for most of his life in the United States, he also wrote under the pseudonym of Walter Galt.  Best known as the author of King of the Khyber Rifles and the Jimgrim series, much of his work was published in pulp magazines.

[2] Fellah, plural fellaheen (Arabic) — a peasant or cultivator of the soil among the Egyptians, Syrians, etc. Webster’s Dictionary, 1913 edition.

[3] Tarboosh, tarbush (Arabic) — a red cap worn by Turks and other Eastern nations, sometimes alone and sometimes swathed with linen or other stuff to make a turban. Webster’s Dictionary, 1913 edition.

[4] Mahdi — Muhammad Ahmad ibn as Sayyid Abd Allah (1844-1885) – otherwise known as The Mahdi or Mohammed Ahmed – was a Muslim religious leader, a fakir, in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.  He declared a jihad and raised an army after declaring himself the Mahdi in 1881 and led a successful war of liberation from the Ottoman-Egyptian military occupation. He died soon after his liberation of Khartoum, and the state he founded fell victim to colonial maneuverings that doomed it to reconquest in 1899.

[5] Sirdar (Hindi from Persian) — here, the title given to the British commander of the Egyptian army.  For other meanings of this term, see the articles in The Hobson-Jobson Dictionary. 

[6] Feringhee (Hindi from Farangistan, “Land of the Franks,” i.e., Europe) — a European.  Platt’s Dictionary of Urdu, Classical Hindi, and English.

[7] Kurbash (Arabic) — a whip or strap about a yard in length, made of the hide of the hippopotamus or rhinoceros.  It is an instrument of punishment and torture that was used in various Muslim countries.

[8] Khedive – Vicroy


Algiers Revisited

Some Background

The practice of state-supported piracy was a common practice in the 18th and 19th centuries.  One may recall that the fledgling United States went to war with Great Britain for a second time because the British navy accosted U.S.-flagged ships and impressed their crew to serve involuntarily aboard British ships of the line.  The U.S. government regarded this sort of behavior as a form of piracy.  If not that, then bullying.[1]  Additionally, European maritime states hired privateers to attack each other’s shipping.  The decision of Great Britain and France to pay tribute to the Barbary pirates encouraged the scallywags to increase their piracy — which benefitted England and France through less competition in the Mediterranean.  And, of course, the navies of England or France were not huckleberries a pirate vessel would want to challenge.

Before American independence, extortion along the North African coast was not an American problem.  The North American colonies were British Colonies, so the problem belonged solely to the Royal Navy and British Parliament.  After independence, however, American shipping enjoyed no protection from England or France.  After independence, our English cousins quickly informed the Barbary Pirates that they could avail themselves of American shipping at their leisure.  It didn’t take long; in 1785, Dey Mohammed of Algiers declared war on the United States and captured several U.S. commercial ships.  The financially troubled American Confederation could not pay exorbitant ransoms for the return of ships, crews, or cargo.  Nor could the Americans afford to raise a navy — or pay tribute.  So, the United States attempted to negotiate with Islamic pirates.

The Barbary Coast included several North African states.  Morocco, an independent kingdom, seized U.S. merchant vessels in 1784 after the Americans ignored its diplomatic overtures.  However, once the U.S. acknowledged Morocco’s strategic position, negotiations progressed smoothly and productively; by 1786, a trade agreement did exist between the U.S. and Morocco.  Conversely, Algiers assumed a belligerent, condescending tone in demanding tributes that the United States could not afford.  To circumvent Algiers, the U.S. Minister of France attempted to establish a coalition of weaker naval powers to defeat Algiers.  Our minister was unsuccessful in this; his name was Thomas Jefferson.  However, Portugal was also at war with Algiers.  Its navy was strong enough to block Algerian ships from sailing past the Straits of Gibraltar, so American merchantmen had safe passage for a time.

A brief Portuguese-Algerian peace again exposed American merchant ships to extortion in 1793.  The efforts of diplomats sent to North Africa in 1795 concluded treaties with Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli.  The treaties agreed to pay tribute to these states, and the treaty with Algiers resulted in the release of about 80 sailors.

It wasn’t until after the ratification of the US Constitution in 1789 that the federal government had the authority to levy taxes and raise and maintain an armed force.  When Algiers seized American ships in 1794, Congress authorized the construction of six ships for a re-instituted U. S. Navy.

In 1797, William Eaton (a former Army officer) was appointed Consul General of the United States.  President Adams sent him to Tunis to negotiate peace and trade agreements with Tunis’s governor (Bey).  Tunis was the closest neighbor to Tripoli and the place of exile of the former Pasha of Tripoli, Hamet Karamanli (the elder brother of the reigning Pasha, Yusuf Karamanli).

While in Tripoli, Easton devised a plan whereby the United States would support the restoration of the deposed Pasha.  This, Eaton argued, would garner respect for the United States throughout the Mohammedan world.  However, Eaton had no support for his plan in Philadelphia.  Meanwhile, the Bey continued to demand tributes, and Eaton refused to convey his demands to the U.S. government.  Accordingly, the Bey of Tunis ordered Eaton to leave his country.  Hamet Karamanli, in fear for his life, fled Tunis for Egypt.

In 1801, the Pasha of Tripoli sought to punish the United States for its failure to make timely payments of tribute; he demanded higher tributes and polished off these demands by declaring war on the United States.  Algiers followed suit.  This was the first Barbary War — fought between 1801 and 1805.

For additional background about the United States’ involvement in two Barbary Coast Wars, seeAt Tripoli, Part I and At Tripoli, Part II.

The Fire Reignites

There was a continuing campaign by various European navies and the American navy to suppress Berber piracy.  The specific aim of this expedition, however, was to free Christian slaves and to stop the practice of enslaving Europeans, holding them for ransom, and stealing and selling ship’s cargo.  To this end, the campaign was partially successful.  However, Islamic barbarity did not completely end until the French conquered Algeria (c. 1830) and, in the process, sent many Algerians to meet their heavenly father.  Shamefully, the French were thrown out of Algeria in 1962. 

Yet, despite having been severely chastised by the United States Navy on two occasions, the Ottoman rulers of North Africa refused to cease their uncivilized behavior — which led to further confrontations with the Royal Navy in 1816.

Following the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1815), the Royal Navy no longer needed assistance from the Barbary States to provide supplies for Gibraltar and their Mediterranean fleet.  This lack of dependency allowed the British to exert political pressure on the Barbary states to end their piracy and practice of enslaving European Christians.

In 1816, Admiral Edward Pellew, 1st Viscount Exmouth (Lord Exmouth), conducted a diplomatic mission to Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers, backed by a small squadron of ships of the line, to convince the North African Ottoman Deys to stop the practice and free their Christian slaves.[2]  The Deys of Tunis and Tripoli unequivocally agreed to comply, but the Dey of Algiers was recalcitrant and the negotiations tempestuous.

Lord Exmouth, believing he had negotiated a successful treaty to stop Christian slavery, returned to England.  Sadly, confused orders sent Algerian troops to massacre 200 Corsican, Sicilian, and Sardinian fishermen who had been placed under British protection just after the treaty was signed.  The act caused outrage in Britain; Lord Exmouth’s negotiations were seen as a diplomatic failure, and his government ordered him back to sea to complete the job correctly and punish the Algerians.  Pellew’s squadron consisted of ships of the line HMS Queen Charlotte, Impregnable, Albion, Minden, and Superb, HMS Leander (a 50-gun frigate), HMS Severn, Glasgow, Granicus, and Hebrus (regular frigates), and four bomb ships, HMS Beelzebub, Fury, Hecla, and Infernal.

HMS Queen Charlotte (100 guns) served as Lord Exmouth’s flagship, with Rear Admiral David Milne as second-in-command aboard HMS Impregnable (98 guns).  The squadron was considered by many to be inadequate for the mission.  Still, Exmouth had already unobtrusively surveyed the defenses of Algiers, was very familiar with the town, and was aware of a weakness in the defensive batteries’ fire field.  He believed that more large ships would have interfered with each other without being able to bring much more fire to bear.  In addition to his main fleet, Lord Exmouth commanded five sloops, eight boats armed with Congreve rockets, and some transports to carry the rescued slaves.  When the British arrived in Gibraltar, Dutch Vice Admiral Frederik van Capellen (commanding a squadron of frigates) offered to join the expedition.  Lord Exmouth accepted van Capellen’s offer and assigned him to cover the main force from Algerian flanking batteries.

Preparation

The day before Lord Exmouth’s assault, HMS Prometheus arrived at the station.  Admiral Pellew assigned the commanding officer, Captain W. B. Dashwood, to rescue the British Consul and his family.  The Algerians discovered the rescue attempt and arrested some of the party.

Pellew’s plan of attack was for the larger ships to approach in a column, sail into the zone where the majority of the Algerian guns could not be brought to bear, and then come to anchor and bombard the batteries and fortifications on the breakwater (mole) to destroy the Algerian defenses.  Simultaneously, HMS Leander was to anchor off the mouth of the harbor and bombard the shipping inside the mole.  To protect Leander from the shore battery, HMS Severn and Glasgow were to sail inshore and bombard the battery.  Troops would then storm ashore on the mole with sappers and the Corps of Royal Engineers.

Go Signal

Admiral Pellew, aboard Queen Charlotte,anchored approximately eight yards off the mole facing the Algerian guns.  Several other ships anchored out of their position, notably Admiral Milne aboard Impregnable, 400 yards from his assigned station.  This error reduced the effectiveness of these ships and exposed them to accurate enemy fire.  Some other ships sailed past Impregnable and anchored in positions closer to the plan.  The frigate Granicus and the sloop Heron closed the gap created by the misplaced Impregnable.

Before hostilities, Lord Exmouth and the Dey of Algiers agreed that neither would fire the first shot.  Why Exmouth would even converse with an enemy about this is beyond me.  But the Dey’s plan was to allow the British fleet to anchor, sortie from the harbor, and board the ships with an overwhelming force of men.  Poorly disciplined Algerians mistakenly fired a gun at around 1515 hours, prompting Pellew to order an immediate response.

The Algerian assault force attempted to board Queen Charlotte, but that was a mistake of epic proportions — British broadsides sank 28 boats — running the rest to shore.  After an hour, the British silenced the cannon on the mole, which allowed Lord Exmouth to turn his attention to the shipping in the harbor, destroying those ships by 1930 hours.  The British destroyed one unmanned Algerian frigate by boarding her and setting it on fire.  Mortars and rockets destroyed three additional frigates and five corvettes.

The battle produced flotsam adrift in the harbor, some of it on fire and drifting toward ships at anchor.  These conditions forced some of Exmouth’s ships to weigh anchor and relocate for safety.  As these ships maneuvered out of the way, Impregnable became isolated from the other ships and vulnerable to enemy attack.  It didn’t take the Algerian gunners long to target the ship and began raking the 98 fore to aft.  Impregnable took 268 hits, suffering injury to her hull and damage to the mainmast in fifteen places.  Algerians killed fifty crew members and wounded 164 others.  At around 2000 hours, Admiral Milne asked Pellew to send an explosion vessel against a lighthouse battery that was mauling his ship.  The British exploded the vessel but to little effect.

With Algerian batteries unable to maintain their rate of fire, Lord Exmouth ordered the squadron to weigh anchor and withdraw out of range, leaving Minden behind to offer suppressive fires to further Algerian fire.  Wind changes permitted Exmouth’s squadron to move out of range, and by 0130, all ships were re-anchored, and the ship’s officers were caring for their wounded crews.

British casualties exceeded 900 men.  The British/Dutch force had fired over 50,000 shots and used 118 tons of gunpowder and 960 mortars.  Algerian forces employed 308 guns and seven mortars.  A covert inspection of the city by British cease-fire negotiators revealed that the Deylik of Algiers was destroyed.  The bay was filled with the smoking hulks of what was left of the Algerian navy; floating dead bodies filled the harbor.

Aftermath of Battle (August 28, 1816)

At noon, Lord Exmouth sent a letter to the Dey:

Sir:

For your atrocities at Bona on defenseless Christians and your unbecoming disregard of the demands I made yesterday in the name of the Prince Regent of England, the fleet under my orders has given you a signal chastisement by the destruction of your navy storehouse and arsenal, with half your batteries.  As England does not war for the destruction of cities, I am unwilling to visit your personal cruelties upon the unoffending inhabitants of the country, and I therefore offer you the same terms of peace which I conveyed to you yesterday in my Sovereign’s name.  Without your acceptance of these terms, you can have no peace with England.

Admiral Pellew warned the Dey that the action would continue if he did not accept his terms.  Wisely, the Dey took Lord Exmouth’s terms, not realizing that Exmouth was bluffing.  His squadron was out of shot and gunpowder.  If the action were to continue, it would have to be after replenishment at Gibraltar. Upon the signing of the formal treaty on September 24, 1816, the Dey freed 1,083 enslaved Christians.  He would later free 3,000 more.

Endnotes:

[1] The Royal Navy was not without some justification for at-sea impressments.  Service in the Royal Navy was at all times a hard life, and more than a few English sailors deserted their ships and signed on as deck-hands aboard commercial vessels, where life was easier, as a means of earning their income.  It was bad enough that the Royal Navy began the practice of stopping ships at sea and apprehending deserters.

[2] Dey is a title given to commanders or (from 1710) governors of the Janissaries of Algiers and extended to other Ottoman officials by Western writers—also, Bey.


American Rangers

Introduction

Whenever a British-American colony faced hostile Indians or threats from a foreign military presence, colonial governors and legislatures raised provisional (temporary) regiments to defend colonial settlements. Interim organizations were full-time military units but served for specific emergencies or pre-specified periods.  Provisional troops differed from regular British army units in several ways:

  • The length of local military service for those serving in the ranks lasted for the campaign season’s duration; field officers usually served over many years.
  • The colonies recruited enlisted men through a quota system that might incorporate local militia.[1]
  • All officers received their appointments from colonial governors or legislatures.  Field officers were usually men of social or political importance, such as landowners and colonial legislature members;[2] junior officers were usually appointed because they had previously served as popular militia officers[3].
  • The recruitment standards were lower within the provincial regiments than in the militia.
  • Provincial recruitment included a demand for individuals experienced in logistical support, such as providing and transporting food, surgical supplies, and munitions.
  • The officers and ranks of provisional regiments received pay for their services, for infantry privates around one shilling, sixpence per month (in today’s currency, £8.53).

The first provincial forces organized in British North America occurred during King William’s War in the 1670s, consisting primarily of men from the Massachusetts Bay Colony.  During Queen Anne’s War, provincial regiments were raised from Massachusetts Bay, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, making up most British forces.  During King George’s War, most provincial regiments originated in Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.  In the Seven Years’ War, the British commander relegated local forces to non-combat roles supporting the regular British Army — primarily as pioneers and freight haulers.  Those men were essential to the operation of the regular army.

In 1670, around half of the men living in the British colonies were literate, but they weren’t the most effective fighting force despite their intellect.  There are reasons for this.  Whatever training provincial forces did receive, they obtained from British regular forces — usually from the salty old color sergeant who drilled the men in battlefield tactics.  This training might have been okay, except that British regular forces serving in North America were organized and trained for European-style engagements.  European battle organizations/formations were ill-suited for frontier warfare because Indians employed guerilla-style tactics; they made good use of camouflage and concealment before launching surprise attacks.  While the British grouped their ranks in orderly ranks and formations, an Indian attack was more on the order of a free-for-all.  What the colonies needed — and what they produced, were Ranger companies.  Rangers were frontiersmen and accomplished Indian fighters.[4]

Enter the Rangers

John Smith provides the earliest record of ranger operations in British America, dated around 1622.  “When I had ten men able to go abroad, our commonwealth was very strong.  With such a number, I ranged that unknown country 14 weeks.”  Smith tells us that many ranger units were small, around the same number of men as present-day infantry squads.  Note that army squads consist of ten men, including the squad leader and two fire teams of four men each.  Marine squads involve thirteen men, including the squad leader and three fire teams of four men each.   

Benjamin Church (b. 1639) was the grandson of Richard Warren, one of the original Mayflower passengers who landed at Plymouth.  In 1667, he married Alice Southworth in Duxbury, Massachusetts.  During King Philip’s War, Church was the principal military aide to Governor Josiah Winslow of the Plymouth Colony.[5]  Governor Winslow commissioned Church as a captain on 24 July 1675.  He commanded a mixed independent company of Indian allies and English settlers — the first company of which successfully raided the camps of hostile Indians in the upper regions of the Massachusetts colony.

Captain Church (realizing that European-style battle formations were ineffective against the Indians) began to imagine a different style of warfare on the frontier.  Many of his Indian recruits were Christians (called Praying Indians); from them, he learned the Indian skill set of tracking, stalking, blending in with one’s surroundings, ambushing, and raiding.

On 19 December 1675, colonial forces representing Massachusetts, Plymouth, and Connecticut (and their Indian allies) engaged and killed 300 Narragansett warriors.  The battle was significant because the survivors of the Narragansett tribe withdrew from the conflict and remained in hiding until after the war and also because Captain Church had started an American tradition.  One of the men serving under Church was the father of John Lovewell (1691-1725), whose ruthless warfighting skills made him the most famous ranger of the early colonial period.[6]

Another famous American ranger was John Gorham (1709-1751).  Gorham was the first “significant” British military presence in the Nova Scotia and Acadia frontier to remain in the region for a substantial period.  Gorham’s Rangers included two armed ships (the Anson and Warren — about 70 tons each) that performed regular patrols off the coast of Nova Scotia.  He was first commissioned as a captain in 1744, later promoted to lieutenant colonel in the 7th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment in 1745, and two years later received a commission as a captain in an independent company in the British Army.  Gorham’s father (1686-1746) also served as a colonel in the provincial forces during King George’s War.  Gorham was among the few American colonists to receive a regular British Army commission.[7]

Few people today have ever heard of Church, Lovewell, or Gorham — but nearly everyone has heard of Robert Rogers (1731-1795), if for no other reason than he played a conspicuous role in Alexander Rose’s book, Washington’s Spies: The Story of America’s First Spy Ring (2007) and the subsequent television series titled Turn: Washington’s Spies.

Robert Rogers was a British-American frontiersman who served in the British Army during the French and Indian War (1754-1763) and the American Revolution (1765-1783).[8]  Rogers raised and commanded Rogers’ Rangers with service in the New York colony’s Lake George and Lake Champlain regions.  These rangers frequently mounted winter raids against French towns and military emplacements.[9]  Despite the rangers’ ability to fight in inhospitable environments, the regular British Army looked upon these frontiersmen with disdain.  Today, the Queen’s York Rangers (Canada), U. S. Army Rangers, and the US 119th Field Artillery claim military lineage to Rogers’ Rangers.  Rogers’ Standing Orders appear in the U. S. Army Ranger Handbook.

According to some historians, Major Richard Rogers offered his services to General George Washington at the outset of the American Revolution.  Washington, fearing that Rogers was a British plant, refused the offer.  We then understand that a much-put-out Rogers joined forces with British loyalists, raised the Queen’s Rangers, and fought against the American rebels.  Rogers is credited with capturing the American spy Nathan Hale — which was no major achievement because Nathan Hale may have been America’s most incompetent spy.  In 1779, Rogers traveled to Nova Scotia, where he created the King’s Rangers Regiment, with service through the end of the revolution.

In January 1812, the US War Department authorized six companies of U. S. Rangers — a mounted infantry regiment charged with protecting the western frontier.  A year later, an additional ten companies were raised.  Official Army records in 1813 list twelve companies of Rangers.  The Army disbanded these companies in 1815.

During the Black Hawk War (1832), a battalion of mounted rangers (dragoons were an early version of the United States cavalry) recruited frontiersmen to serve for one year.[10]  The Army required each man to provide his own horses and weapons.  The battalion consisted of six companies of 100 men each.  The battalion commander was Major Henry Dodge.[11]

During the American Civil War, the Army fielded three ranging units: Loudoun’s Rangers, consisting primarily of Quaker and German soldiers; Blazer’s Scouts, who mainly confronted other irregular forces (such as the Bushwhackers), and for the Confederacy, John Mosby’s Rangers. 

Entering the Modern Era

Early in World War II, Major General Lucian Truscott proposed creating an Army commando unit modeled on the British Commandos.  Subsequently, five ranger battalions served in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Battalions, U. S. Rangers).  Another battalion (the 6th) was organized for service in the Pacific (PTO).  Additional battalions (numbered 7th through 10th) were organized on paper as part of the American disinformation campaign, also known as Operation Quicksilver.

Eighty percent of the 1st Ranger Battalion came from the US 34th Infantry Division; of those, following commando training at Carrickfergus, Northern Ireland, fifty men were selected to serve with British Commandos during the raid at Dieppe.  These men were the first US soldiers to serve in ground combat in the ETO.  The 1st, 3rd, and 4th Battalions fought in North Africa and Italy as Darby’s Rangers.  At the Battle of Cisterna on 29 January 1944, most of the men assigned to the 1st and 3rd battalions were either killed or captured, with the remaining rangers reassigned and absorbed into the First Special Service Force under Brigadier General Robert L. Frederick (also known as the Devil’s Brigade), a joint United States-Canadian ranger brigade.  A temporary ranger battalion was formed from the US 29th Infantry Division in December 1942, which served until November 1943.

During the invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944, Company D, Company E, and Company F of the 2nd Ranger Battalion landed at Pointe du Hoc — an assault force of 225 men.  Members of the 29th Ranger Battalion augmented the 2nd and 5th battalions.  Several landing craft capsized in the stormy waters, resulting in several men drowning during the initial assault.  A navigation error caused a one-hour delay in the operation and the loss of the element of surprise, resulting in an additional loss of 30 men.  The remaining 190 Rangers scaled the cliffs utilizing rope ladders.  At the top of Pointe du Hoc, only 90 men remained capable of carrying firearms.  Although the Germans had removed the heavy artillery pieces overlooking Pointe du Hoc, the battalion successfully seized the position and disabled a battery of 155mm artillery placed 1,000 yards behind the Atlantic Wall.

Company A, Company B, and Company C of the 2nd battalion landed with the 5th Rangers at Omaha Beach, completing their assigned mission despite suffering tremendous casualties during the assault.  Company A lost 96% of its men on Omaha Beach; only two men survived the landing unscathed.

Two separate Ranger units fought in the Pacific War: the 98th Field Artillery, activated on 16 December 1940, was re-designated the 6th Ranger Battalion on 20 September 1944.  This battalion led the invasion of the Philippines and executed the raid on the Cabanatuan Prisoner of War Camp.  At the end of the war, the battalion was deactivated while still serving in Japan on 30 December 1945.  In 1943, a nearly 3,000-man composite unit was formed around Frank Merrill —known as Merrill’s Marauders.  The training of these men followed the training scheme of Major General Orde Wingate, British Army, whose field of expertise and specialization involved deep penetration raids behind enemy lines.  Merrill’s Marauders were employed against the Japanese in the Burma Campaign.

Korea and Vietnam

The United States initiated general demobilization of the armed forces almost immediately following the surrender of Germany (7 May 1945) and Japan (2 Sep 1945).  As with all the other armed services under the post-war presidency of Harry S. Truman and Defense Secretary Louis A. Johnson, the Army was gutted and, therefore, unprepared for major combat on 25 June 1950.  The re-activation of a unique ranger unit was needed in the earliest days of the Korean War.  In mid-August 1950, the 8th Ranger Company was formed under the command of Second Lieutenant Ralph Puckett.[12]

The company was a light infantry force specializing in finding and engaging the enemy in fire and close combat.  The 8th Ranger Company became the model for all subsequent ranger units.  Rather than companies within light infantry battalions, U. S. Army rangers in Korea and Vietnam operated as companies attached to larger units as special mission forces.  Between mid-August 1950 and April 1951, the Army activated sixteen additional ranger companies, designated 1st through 15th Ranger Company.  To form these new units, the Army solicited volunteers from the 505th Airborne Regiment, the 80th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division.

In the Korean War, rangers patrolled, probed, scouted, and conducted raids and ambushes against Chinese and North Korean units.  In one nighttime raid, the 1st Ranger Company destroyed the headquarters element of the 12th North Korean Division.  In another, Lieutenant Puckett’s company became famous when they captured and held a strategic hill overlooking the Chongchon River — and held it against overwhelming enemy forces.  During this battle, Puckett was wounded several times by grenades and mortar fire.  Puckett’s injuries were so severe that he required hospitalization for over a year.

During the Vietnam War, the Army formed Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) companies to perform heavily armed reconnaissance teams to patrol inside enemy-controlled areas.  LRRP teams and companies were attached to every brigade/division.  Company E, 52nd Infantry (LRP)[13] pulled off one of the more daring missions in the Vietnam War on 19 April 1968 by seizing Signal Hill on Dong Re Lao Mountain in the A Shau Valley.

On 1 January 1969, the Army’s LRRP units were re-named Ranger Companies, 75th Infantry Regiment.  Fifteen companies were raised from LRRP units serving at locations around the globe.  The 75th Infantry Regiment’s lineage was linked to Merrill’s Marauders.  The independent companies were designated Alpha through Papa (excluding Juliet).[14]  In addition to scouting and reconnaissance patrols, the Ranger companies provided terrain assessment, security missions, recovery operations, interrogation of captured soldiers, enemy communications intercept, and disruption of enemy supply routes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.  Most Ranger team leaders and assistants graduated from the 5th Special Forces Group Recon School at Nha Trang.

Late Twentieth Century

In January 1974, the Army directed the formation of a Ranger battalion — the first such battalion since World War II.  The 1st Ranger Battalion was activated on 1 July 1974 at Fort Stewart, Georgia; the 2nd Ranger Battalion was activated on 1 October 1974.  In 1980, soldiers of the 1st Battalion participated in Operation Eagle Claw, the Iranian hostage rescue mission.  The mission was subsequently aborted due to numerous coordination and equipment failures, none of which were the fault of the assigned soldiers.  Of eight aircraft assigned to the mission, only five arrived at the pre-operation staging location — three experienced mechanical issues.  As available helicopters prepared to withdraw from staging, one of the aircraft crashed into a C-130, killing eight soldiers.

In October 1983, the 1st and 2nd Ranger Battalions participated in Operation Urgent Fury — the rescue of American medical students on the island of Grenada.  On 1 October 1984, the Army activated the 3rd Ranger Battalion at Fort Benning, GA.  In February 1986, the 75th Ranger Regiment was re-activated, incorporating the three ranger battalions.

Operation Just Cause

Relations between the United States and Panama had been deteriorating over several years.  In May 1989, after political opponents revealed that Panamanian President Manuel Noriega had stolen the election, Noriega officially canceled the election and retained power by force of arms, which was unpopular among the Panamanian people.  President George H. W. Bush called upon Noriega to honor the people’s will while directing the reinforcement of military installations of the U.S. Canal Zone. 

In October, Noriega survived an attempt by the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) to overthrow him.  Urged on by Noriega, the Panamanian general assembly passed a resolution on 15 December 1989, which declared war on the United States.  The next day, four US military personnel were stopped at a roadblock outside the PDF headquarters in Panama City.  Four officers (Marine Corps Captain Richard E. Haddad, Navy Lieutenant Michael J. Wilson, Army Captain Barry L. Rainwater, and Marine First Lieutenant Robert Paz) were en route to a downtown hotel for dinner.  Their privately owned vehicle was surrounded by a mob of citizens, accompanied by members of the PDF.  The PDF opened fire and mortally wounded Lieutenant Paz.  Hadded, who was driving, was also wounded.  Because a Navy officer and his wife witnessed the incident, the PDF arrested the couple.  While in custody, Panamanian troops assaulted the Naval officer’s wife.  It was then that President Bush ordered the invasion of Panama, citing the shooting incident and Panama’s declaration of war.

The entire Ranger regiment participated in Operation Just Cause in late December 1989 — their mission was the capture of two airfields and Noriega’s beach house.  In the process of completing that mission, they took over 1,000 Panamanian soldiers into custody.

War on Terror

Beginning in 1991, American Rangers (along with other US and coalition armed forces) began participating in what has become the Middle Eastern wars, a substantial commitment of American personnel and financial resources.  Since then, Rangers have deployed to Somalia (1993) and Kosovo (2000), and deployments to Iraq, Syria, Waziristan, and Afghanistan have been so frequent and so widely dispersed that each of the three battalions has added an additional light infantry company to help shoulder the regiment’s world-wide responsibilities.

Today, Army rangers operate within the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), a unified command that supervises the special operations components of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.  USSOCOM was created in the aftermath of the failed attempt to rescue diplomats from the US Embassy in Tehran.  The command’s activities involve clandestine operations involving direct action, reconnaissance/intelligence gathering, counter-terrorism, unconventional measures, psychological operations, civil affairs, and counter-narcotics.  Each armed force has its unique operations component, but each is structured to work together as a joint-force team.

USSOCOM comprises the Joint Special Operations Command, Special Operations Command — Joint Capabilities, the Army Special Operations Command, Marine Corps Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, and Air Force Special Operations Command.

The Army Special Operations Command includes 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment (Delta Force), 75th Ranger Regiment (the US Army’s premier light infantry organization), and Army Special Operations Aviation Command (Airborne).  There are also unique units, such as two psychological operations groups (airborne) and the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, who help sustain civilian populations who suffer the trauma of war and natural disasters.

No one ever said war was easy.

Sources:

  1. American Forces in Action (series), “Pointe du Hoc and the 2nd Ranger Battalion.”  U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1946.
  2. Black, R. W.  Ranger Dawn: The American Ranger from the Colonial Era to the Mexican War.  Penn: Stackpole Books, 2009.
  3. Burhans, R. D.  The First Special Service Force: A Canadian/American Wartime Alliance: The Devil’s Brigade.  Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947.
  4. Bahmanyar, M.  U. S. Army Ranger, 1983-2002.  Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003.
  5. Church, B., and Thomas Church.  The History of Philip’s War, Commonly Called The Great Indian War of 1675 and 1676.  S. G. Drake, ed.  J & B Williams, 1829 (online).
  6. Cuneo, J. R.  Robert Rogers of the Rangers.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1959
  7. Faragher, J. M.  A Great and Noble Scheme.  New York: Norton & Company, 2005.
  8. Grenier, J.  The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
  9. Harrison, G. A.  Cross Channel Attack.  U. S. Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations.  Washington, D. C.: U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1951.
  10. O’Donnell, P. K.  Dog Company: The Boys of Pointe Du Hoc: The Rangers Who Accomplished D-Day’s Toughest Mission and Led the Way Across Europe.  Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2012.
  11. Taylor, T. H., and R. J. Martin.  Ranger — Lead the Way. Turner Publishing, 1996.
  12. Werner, B.  First Special Service Force, 1942-44.  Osprey Publishing, 2006.
  13. Zaboly, G. S.  A True Ranger: The Life and Many Wars of Major Robert Rogers.  Garden City Park: Royal Blockhouse, 2004.

Endnotes:

[1] Militia (also called minutemen) consisted of local able-bodied men between the ages of 16 and 60 who, beginning in 1645, were drawn from local settlements and underwent rudimentary training to respond (within minutes) of an emergency.  Over time, service with the militia became the ‘moral obligation’ of the more prominent men within the community.  From within this upper class body of men, militia officers were elected by the men they would lead in conflict.

[2] George Washington, who started the Seven Years War, was commissioned by Robert Dinwiddie, Royal Governor of Virginia.  Washington, therefore, was a provincial officer vs. a militia officer.  

[3] Militia officers were generally “elected” by the men whom they led, hence the expression “popular” officers.

[4] By use of the term “accomplished Indian fighters,” I mean to suggest that if they were still alive, then they were survivors of one or more bloody confrontations with hostile Indians.

[5] Known variously as King Philip’s War, the First Indian War, Metacom’s War, and Pometacomet’s Rebellion, was a conflict between 1675-1678 between American Indians in the New England region and its colonists and their Indian allies.  King Philip was an Indian chief named Metacom who adopted the name Philip because of the friendly relations between his father and the New England colonists.  In this instance, relations deteriorated because in attempting to seize all firearms in possession of the Wampanoags, the colonists hanged three of the tribe.

[6] More than 100 years after his death, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Henry David Thoreau wrote stories about John Lovewell’s clash with the Abenaki Indians.  A description of Lovewell includes “scalp hunter,” which reflects the training Ranger’s received from their Indian allies.  There are several explanations for the removal of a dead enemy’s hair and all of them may be factually based — it is another small matter lost in time.  One theory is that in taking scalps, Indian warriors proved their valor in combat; another is that scalping denied the victim a special place in the afterlife.  Either way, the Indians taught American Rangers how to do it and why they should.  Suffice to say that Natty Bumppo was a figment of James Fenimore Cooper’s imagination, but John Lovewell was the real deal. 

[7] The few officers who received a regular British Army commission included John Gorham, Joseph Gorham, Benoni Danks, and Richard Rogers. 

[8] The year 1764 is generally regarded as the beginning of the American Revolution (in philosophical discourse) because it was around that time when the British-American colonists began to question the right of the British Parliament to tax the colonies without the participation of colonial members of the Parliament or any colonial representation in the British Parliament.  From the viewpoint of British prime ministers, the series of taxes levied upon the colonists, beginning in 1765 (subsequently withdrawn in some cases) was necessary because (according to PM George Grenville), the whole of revenues of the American customs houses in 1764 amounted to only £2,000 annually, while the British government was paying between £7-8,000 annually to collect them.  Even in the opinion of Adam Smith, Parliament “… has never hitherto demanded of [the American colonies] anything which even approached to a just proportion to what was paid by their fellow subjects as home.”

[9] Significant because at that time, opposing military forces frequently went into winter camps during frigid weather.

[10] Mounted infantry are also frequently referred to as dragoons.

[11] Henry Dodge also served in the US House of Representatives, and as Governor of the Wisconsin Territory.  In earlier years, he was indicted as a co-conspirator of Aaron Burr but the charges against him were later dropped. 

[12] Ralph Puckett, Jr., (1926—) (USMA ’49) volunteered to command the newly activated ranger company soon after his arrival in Japan.  The company, a light infantry force, specialized in searching for enemy forces and engaging them in direct fire and close combat.

[13] Later redesignated Company H, Rangers.

[14] The U. S. Army has not had a Company J since 1816 because the letter J looks too much like the letter I.


Maintaining the Standard

One doesn’t have to be crazy to be a U.S. Marine — but it helps.

Third Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (also 3/5), was initially activated in 1917 to participate in World War I. Its initial complement included veterans of the Spanish-American War (1898), the Boxer Rebellion (1900 — 1901), and raw recruits who needed and deserved the firm hand of America’s finest noncommissioned officers.

Following the war to end all wars, 3/5 participated in the so-called Banana Wars and guarded the U.S. Mail. During World War II, 3/5 fought at Guadalcanal, New Guinea, Peleliu, and Okinawa. As one of the regiment’s three battalions, 3/5 participated as part of the 1st Marine Brigade — the fire brigade in the Pusan Perimeter, the landing at Inchon, and the battles of Seoul and Chosin Reservoir. The Battalion’s nickname came from its field radio call sign, chosen by its Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Taplett, U.S.M.C. (deceased): Darkhorse Six.

Between 1966 – 1971, Darkhorse fought with distinction in the Vietnam War, with battles at Chu Lai, Da Nang, Quang Nam, Que Son, An Hoa, and the Ross Combat Base. Nineteen years later, 3/5 deployed to the Middle East with the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade supporting Operation Desert Shield, and thirteen years after that, as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom and battles in Fallujah.

The battle-tested Third Battalion, Fifth Marines is entitled to display 77 decorations. It is a high standard shared by nearly every U.S. Marine Corps infantry organization. Winning battles is what Marines do.

Early on 25 March 2003, Darkhorse moved north on Highway One toward Ad Diwaniyah. The Battalion was mounted on a motorized convoy. Intelligence reports indicated the presence of an Iraqi enemy, but no one was quite sure where or how many. The Marines were on edge — as they should be. Weapons were locked and loaded. Marines scanned the area from front to rear and flank to flank.

The Marines were looking for a fight because that is the mission assigned to infantry battalions.   The Marines of 3/5 found their fight within a single instant as an overwhelming number of enemy mortars, rockets, and small arms fire descended upon them, transforming morning calm into morning chaos. Explosions and bullets were flying everywhere. Marine leaders began shouting commands because shouting was the only way anyone could hear them.

First Lieutenant Brian R. Chontosh commanded the Combined Anti-Armor Team (C.A.A.T.), Weapons Company, 3/5. The team’s mission was to provide protective fire to support the Battalion’s reinforcing tanks. When the enemy fire opened up, the tanks blocked the road ahead, potentially locking the C.A.A.T. into a dangerous kill zone. Chontosh occupied the first vehicle behind the tanks. He was accompanied by Lance Corporal Armand McCormick (driver), Lance Corporal Robert Kerman (rifleman), and Private First Class Thomas Franklin as the machine gunner. Franklin was a big man — which is how he became known to his friends as “Tank.”  Private First Class Ken Korte served as Chontosh’s radioman.

From Franklin’s position in the vehicle’s turret, he could see hundreds of enemy troops. There were so many enemies that it was impossible for Franklin not to hit them with his fifty-caliber weapon, which chewed up the bodies of Franklin’s targets. The chatter of the machine gun was constant. Except for the loudness of the explosion, a rocket-propelled grenade landed harmlessly thirty feet in front of Chontosh’s vehicle.

Corporal Scott Smith drove Chontosh’s second vehicle. The platoon corpsman was Hospital Man Third Class Michael Johnson, known simply as “Doc.”  Doc occupied the back seat, while Frank Quintero occupied the turret, manning a Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wireless-guided (TOW) missile launcher. An RPG ripped through the side of the second Humvee, but even though it failed to explode, the munition hit Quintero in the abdomen and smashed Doc in the head, throwing him outside the vehicle, killed instantly.

Chontosh’s vehicle was in the middle of the pandemonium. Smith’s radio call dominated the airwaves, “Johnson’s dead! Johnson’s dead!”  With tanks ahead of him, vehicles to the rear, and sand berms left and right, Chontosh concluded that he had but one move — the stuff one sees in typical Hollywood films. He ordered McCormick to turn right and drive straight into the center of the enemy’s attack formation. By the time the vehicle reached the sand berm, the Humvee was going as fast as it could. Witnesses claimed that the move was utterly insane, and all the while, Tank kept firing his .50 as enemy dead fell left and right. McCormick later testified that had it not been for Franklin’s exceptional delivery of lethal fire, they’d all be dead.

Closing in on the enemy, McCormick noticed a dip in the berm — a passageway into the jaws of death where they could attack the Iraqis from their rear. “Take it,” Chontosh ordered, killing two Iraqis thinking they would impede the attack. McCormick shot through the opening and crashed the Humvee into a dry irrigation ditch — one that was full of Iraqi fighters. Lieutenant Chontosh leaped from the vehicle shouting, “Let’s go!”  Chontosh was armed with his M-9 service pistol, so he grabbed McCormick’s M-16, jumped into the trench, and began killing Iraqis.

McCormick tossed up a resupply of ammo to Franklin, who was still firing; Korte assisted Tank in reloading the weapon, the muzzle of which was probably near to melting. With that task done, McCormick and Kerman joined their lieutenant in the trench. The sight of these Marines stunned the Iraqi fighters, and the sound of Franklin’s gun terrified them. Those who didn’t die took off running in the opposite direction. Chontosh, having emptied his service rifle and pistol of ammunition, grabbed a discarded enemy weapon and continued his assault. Rounds from an enemy weapon kicked up sand all around Franklin, but he kept firing from his exposed position.

At one point in the battle, Chontosh picked up two discarded AK-47s and accurately fired them at the enemy — one in each hand. When the ammunition had been expended, the lieutenant picked up a discarded RPG and fired it into the middle of a group of retreating enemies. When Chontosh’s audacious assault ended, he had cleared 200 yards of the enemy trench, killing more than twenty Iraqis and wounding another score of unlucky enemy soldiers.

When Lieutenant Chontosh and his Marines returned to the roadway, he noted two or more dozen enemy dead where the Battalion had fought them. More than one-hundred enemies died, with fifty more taken prisoner — all within fifteen minutes. Many of these men had run over the berm to escape Chontosh and his Marines, running into 3/5’s automatic weapons.

Later promoted to captain, Chontosh received the Navy Cross for his courageous actions on 25 March 2003. Lance corporals McCormick and Kerman received the Silver Star, and Franklin and Kore received Navy-Marine Corps Commendation medals. The ambush took the life of Doc Johnson, and Quintero survived his severe wounds. Had it not been for Chontosh’s incredibly audacious act, far more Marines would likely have been killed or injured. Captain Brian Chontosh subsequently earned two Bronze Star Medals (with a Combat V device). After his promotion to major, Chontosh retired from active duty in October 2013.

Mare Nostrum

Introduction

Senatus Populus Que Romanus

People who enjoy reading about ancient Rome are fascinated by the strength and capabilities of the Roman Legions.  Perhaps not so much of the brilliance of Rome’s generals, but the capacity of 5,000 to 6,000 men advancing 50 miles in a single day, establishing a well-defended bivouac, tearing it down the next morning, and then marching another 50 miles — is nothing short of extraordinary.[1]

Of all the things we know (or think we know) about the ancient world, there is one aspect of that history we know very little about — the Roman Navy.  Even considering eight hundred years of faithful service to Rome, modern historians know far more about Rome’s legions than they do its Navy.  It is a sad fact because Rome’s navy was the instrument through which the Republic (and later the Empire) transformed the Mediterranean Sea into Mare Nostrum (Our Sea) — and the loss of naval power contributed to the fall of Rome in 426 A.D.

We know very little about the Roman Navy’s early history because so few records of naval activities exist.  In any case, Rome was always a land-based society.  The Romans only occasionally went to sea, and until around 311 B.C.E., if any size of Roman fleet existed, hardly anyone took notice of it.  But 311 B.C.E. was when Rome ordered the construction of a fleet of twenty ships and appointed two magistrates to command it.

Before the Punic Wars (264 – 146 B.C.E.) Rome’s fleet (classis) was restricted to minor coastal operations mainly centered on defending commercial ships from raiding pirates.  We understand this from a chronological standpoint by realizing that Rome first had to conquer and consolidate its power on the Italian Peninsula before it could look outward.  This was an effort lasting roughly 500 years.

Nor should anyone think that creating a navy was a simple task.  An effective Navy must have a sufficient number of ships capable of imposing its will on an enemy fleet.  The captains of such vessels must be skilled pilots and employ strategies and surface warfare tactics that allow them to defeat their enemies.

A Short History

Mare Nostrum

As legions of land infantry sought to expand Rome’s influence on the land, a small naval force was trying to develop some degree of power at sea, but before the First Punic War, Rome’s fleet confined itself to coastal patrols to protect trade routes.  If Roman commanders decided they needed naval blockades, they called upon their Greek allies in Southern Italy for assistance.  That situation changed when Rome went to loggerheads with Carthage in 264 B.C.E.[2] 

The Punic Wars was a series of conflicts between Rome and Carthage lasting from 264 B.C.E. to 146 B.C.E.[3]   The first of these broke out in Sicily and lasted 23 years.  The conflict was primarily naval warfare conducted in the Mediterranean Sea surrounding the island of Sicily.  When war erupted, Carthage was the dominant power in the western Mediterranean, and insofar as the Carthaginians were concerned, Sicily was part of the Punic Empire.

Once they decided to dispute the Carthaginian claim over Sicily, the Roman Senate ordered a massive construction effort of 100 quinqueremes and 20 triremes.[4]  Quinqueremes were large galley ships with five rows of oarsmen; triremes were smaller ships hosting three rows of rowers.  Over more than two decades of fighting, both sides suffered tremendous human and material losses.  Ultimately, the Romans defeated Carthage in 241 B.C.E., even if the quest for supremacy remained undecided.  A 2nd Punic War was fought between 218 – 202 B.C.E., ending with another Roman victory.  In 146 B.C.E., Rome assaulted Carthage, slaughtered most of its inhabitants, and demolished the city and its fortifications.  Afterward, North Africa became a Roman province.

Rome’s new fleets fell under the direct command of elected magistrates, men elected for one year.  Because they were politicians with no expertise in naval warfare, the navy’s principal advisors and ship captains were Greek seamen.  The Greeks provided the Romans with a large amount of knowledge, but the Carthaginians, formerly known as Phoenicians, invented seafaring — and the Romans ranked inferior to the Carthaginians for many years.

Corvus

One maxim is that necessity is the mother of invention.  During the First Punic War, the Romans sought ways of compensating for their lack of seafaring skills with new naval warfare technologies.  One was a sea bridge (shown right) called a Corvus. Measuring roughly 4 feet by 36 feet, the device was (likely) placed in the prow of a galley where a pole and a system of pulleys permitted the raising and lowering of a bridge.  A heavy spike acted as an anchor on the enemy ship’s deck, allowing marines to cross over onto the enemy ship and engage them in direct combat.[5]  Rome’s first success with the Corvus occurred during the Battle of Mylae, which the Romans won.

Despite the Carthaginian advantage in experience, they only won one major sea battle at Drepana in 249 B.C.E.  By 120 B.C.E., Rome was the undisputed Mediterranean power and remained so for the next 546 years.  Rome’s navy helps to explain this success. 

Rome’s first sea battle outside Mare Nostrum occurred in 56 B.C.E., during the Gallic Wars.  When a maritime tribe of Veneti rebelled against Rome’s authority, it was up to Julius Caesar to respond to it.  Caesar, the great land general, was at a disadvantage because the Romans were unfamiliar with the coastline, struggled against tides and currents, and they had lost their surface warfare expertise.  Additionally, Veneti ships were made of sturdy oak, stood taller than Rome’s lighter galleys, and relied on sail for propulsion.  These factors gave the Veneti important advantages over the Romans.  Still, the Romans were clever engineers.  When the Veneti and Romans finally clashed in Quiberon Bay, the Roman Navy used hooks at the end of long poles and cut the halyards supporting the Veneti sails.  It didn’t end well for the Veneti after Roman marines boarded their ships.  In the following year, Caesar used his Roman galleys to invade Britain.

The Ships

Egyptian Ship

Ancient Rome can take no credit for inventing ships or surface warfare.  It has been going on for a long time.  Nearly 2,000 years before Italian tribalists began identifying as Roman, Egyptian ships patrolled the Nile River.  Because of a lack of suitable wood for shipbuilding, Egypt constructed its earliest vessels from woven papyrus reeds.  They were large enough to accommodate 30 rowers and two men on the rudder.  Scholars claim that Egyptian surface warfare is as old as Egypt itself.

Phoenician ship

Next came the Phoenicians, who, around 1,500 B.C.E., gave the Egyptians a seaborne thrashing.  Scholars tell us that the Phoenician culture developed from the ancient Canaanites (present-day Lebanese).  The Phoenicians dominated the Mediterranean Sea around 500 B.C.E., establishing settlements in Cyprus, Sardinia, Sicily, Malta, and Carthage.

Persian Warship

The Persian navy developed within its first empire between 525 – 330 B.C.E. We know it is pure speculation because there are no existing written records of the Persian Navy.  Scholars believe the Persian naval force came about because Cambyses wanted to use it to conquer Egypt, strengthen a Persian presence on the coast of Asia Minor, assert its authority over Samos, conquer Thrace, and war against Scythia.   In its time, the Persians developed 1,200 warships and three times that number in transport ships. 

Greek Warship

Greece was never a nation-state until long after the Roman period.  Before Rome, Greece consisted of independent city-states that were happy to fight with other Greeks when not warring with foreigners.  Of the strongest city-states, Athens had the most formidable navy, its ships no doubt influenced by the Phoenicians, and created out of necessity as a defense against Persia’s attempts at conquest.  The Persian wars were fought between 499 – 449 B.C.E.

The earliest Greek ship of war was known as a penteconter.  This ship emerged when there was no distinction between merchants and warships.  They were versatile, long-range vessels used for sea trade, piracy, and warfare and capable of transporting freight or troops.  A penteconter was rowed by fifty oarsmen, arranged in a row of twenty-five on each side of the ship.  A midship mast with sail could also propel the ship under favorable conditions.  The Penteconter design provided a long ship with sharp keels (thus referred to as “long boats”).  Typically, they lacked a full deck — or were unfenced ships.

The Greeks later copied and produced the Phoenician bireme, a ship with two rows of oarsmen on each side.  Later, a trireme design increased the number of oarsmen to three rows.  Triremes were first used against Corinth around 700 B.C.E.  What we know about these ships comes from archeological investigations.  Modern analysts claim that these ships “most likely” pushed the technological limits of the ancient world.  By “technology,” historians refer to what humankind knew or understood about human accommodation, propulsion, weight, waterline, the center of gravity, stability, strength, and feasibility.  Each of these was an interdependent variable — even if one became more important than another according to the ship’s purpose.

Shipbuilders would determine the size of a ship based on the number of men needed to crew it.  A trireme demanded a crew of 200 men, 170 of which were involved in its propulsion and steering mechanisms.  A demand for greater speed required high oar-gearing — the ratio between the outboard length of an oar and the inboard length, which made the trireme so effective at sea. 

Shipbuilding was a science and a delicate balance.  The original construction of a trireme was intended to maximize its performance.  Should a shipwright later modify the ship, its design would become compromised.  Designers attempted to optimize speed to the point where any less weight would result in losses to the ship’s integrity.  They placed the center of gravity at the lowest possible position — just above the waterline — which retained the ship’s resistance to waves and capsizing.

How good were these ancient shipbuilders?  The purpose of the area just below the center of gravity and the waterline (known as the hypozomata) was to allow the bending of the hull when faced with a 90-knot force.  The fact that these ancient thinkers could put such technology into practice is mind-bending.

Roman Quinquereme

Even so, the intricacy of triremes was such that they demanded a great deal of maintenance to stay afloat.  Ship’s lines, sails, rudders, oars, and masts required frequent replacement, and if left at sea too long, they would become waterlogged.  To extend the life of such ships, they were pulled out of the water at night (whenever possible).  Even though constructed with light wood, drawing the ship out of the water took 140 men.  Properly taken care of, the vessel might last 25 years.

Construction of a trireme took 6,000 man-days.  That’s 40 men, 150 days per ship.  Archeologists believe the vessel measured 120 feet in length and 18 feet wide.  The height of the ship sitting in the harbor was almost 7 feet.  When under power, the ship was capable of 6 knots as leisurely effort.  At average cruise speed, the ship could travel 50 – 60 miles in a day.  The Roman quinquereme was much larger.

In classical antiquity, the primary purpose of these galleys was to ram an enemy ship — to cause the enemy ship to sink or become disabled.  They called this  ram rostra, giving the name Navis Rostrata for “warship.”  Ship ramming took skill, luck, and a ship capable of surviving the act of ramming another ship at 8 to 10 knots speed.

It is important to remember that Rome turned to the Greeks for their expertise in its early days of investigating naval warfare.

Roman Navy High Command

During Rome’s Republic, command of a naval fleet was given to a serving magistrate or pro-magistrate — men of consular or praetorian rank. 

Note: Rome thrived for well over 1,300 years.  As Rome Proper developed, it underwent three systems of government.  The first was a kingdom.  In this arrangement, the king served as the executive magistrate.  The king’s power was absolute.  He was the supreme ruler, high priest, chief lawgiver and judge, and sole army commander.

When the king died, his power reverted to the Roman Senate, a body of around 100 men who served by virtue of their wealth and influence in the Roman city-state.  The senate ruled Rome until electing a new king.  When that occurred, the senate relinquished its sovereign power back to the king.

A succession of kings became abusive and much resented by the people.  When the people overthrew the monarchy and adopted a republic, the constitutional balance of power shifted from the sole executive to the Roman Senate.

During the republican stage, the number of senators increased from around 100 to between 300 – 500 lifetime appointments.  After establishing a republic, the Senate assigned executive power to two elected consuls.  The consuls shared state power as chief executives for one year.  During the imperial period, power shifted from appointed consuls to a single executive, the emperor (who served for life).  Note: The Roman Senate continued until 603 A.D. — 177 years after the “fall of the Roman Empire.”

It was during the republican period when Rome abandoned permanent political assignments (except the Senate) and began the practice of limiting high-ranking appointments to one year.  But there was a problem … the Romans soon discovered that appointments made for periods of only one year denied the state practical advantages of experience and the flexibility needed to ensure the availability of knowledgeable men to perform important functions.  So, without making any changes to the limitations imposed by one-year appointments, the Romans decided to temporarily extend certain officials’ authority  (imperium) for as long as needed.  Pro-magistrates, therefore, were former consuls or praetors with extended authority.  They were also called pro-consuls and pro-praetors.

In the Punic Wars, one consul commanded the fleet; the other controlled the army.[6]  These men were politicians and, therefore, incompetent to command or direct fleet or squadron operations.  The actual command was instead entrusted to experienced legates and senior tribunes.

In ancient times, navies and trading fleets did not have the logistical capabilities of modern ships — which means that if they needed stores, repairs, or re-equip, they would have to go ashore to see to those needs.  Nor was a Roman Navy headquarters element directing the fleet’s missions.  Roman navies operated as extensions of the Roman Legions.

Ship’s Crew

Roman Marine 2nd Century B.C.

The helmsman, an experienced seaman, headed the ship’s deck and command element.  Experienced sailors were always upper-deck hands, as were lookouts on the bow, boatswain, quartermaster, shipwright, piper, and two rowing assistants.  Whether rowers or helmsmen, ancient sailors needed physical stamina.  Previous battle experience was a “given.”  These men were probably in their late 30s or early 40s.  Ten additional hands cared for and deployed the ship’s sails and masts.

Contrary to Hollywood depictions, the rowers of ancient navies were free men of society’s lower classes.  Enslaved people may have been employed, but if they were, it was only out of necessity rather than standard practice.  These men were the greyhounds of the fleet, so they were likely young and powerful. 

We believe Roman marines served aboard ships during the Punic Wars — but there is a shortage of specific information about these men that allows much insight into their duties, training, rank classifications, or uniforms.  We think the naval infantry component of a Roman galley numbered between ten and fifteen men experienced in boarding enemy ships, closing with them, and engaging in combat with their enemies.  Such men had to be fearless in the performance of their duties.

I think marines (naval infantry) joined the fleet during the 1st Punic War when the Roman Navy understood they could not defeat the Carthaginians by ship-ramming alone.  It would be necessary for marines to help defeat enemy crews, and when Roman leaders found that even spear throwers and archers had limitations, they came up with the idea for a Corvus.  Then, with that innovation, the Romans began defeating enemy ships.  It may have been a marine who came up with the concept of the Corvus — and it may have been then that the Roman marine proved his worth to naval battles.

Roman Marine, 3rd Century A.D.

A Roman soldier served for 25 years; it was probably no different for sailors and marines.  Like the army, the Roman Navy trained its men to perform necessary tasks.  Sailors learned their tasks; Marines learned theirs.  It is also possible that marines/sailors cross-trained — that marines learned how to perform certain naval tasks, and sailors learned how to perform marine tasks.  When quinqueremes and triremes were alongside each other, marines would deploy to kill enemy crew with their spears or bows and arrows or board the enemy ship with drawn swords.  Surface warfare was a dangerous game.  The boarder could be killed, of course — and probably many were.  But if too many marines boarded the enemy ship, the galley might capsize.  No doubt, many did.  We think a marine in the 3rd century A.D. may have looked like the caricature shown at right.

Endnotes:

[1] If these men were able to advance 50 miles in a 12 hour period (daylight hours), they sustained a pace exceeding 4 miles per hour.  Impressive. 

[2] Modern-day Tunis.

[3] The word Punic refers to the language spoken by ancient Carthaginians, who evolved from Phoenician culture.  There were three Punic wars.

[4] Scholars claim that the Romans captured a Carthaginian quinquereme and used it as a blueprint for its own ships.

[5] Few warfare technologies are “perfect,” and neither was the Corvus.  The downside of this device was that if not properly secured, or if it became unsecured during rough seas, it could cause a galley to capsize. 

[6] In subsequent wars, praetor’s assumed command of a fleet.  A praetor was the title of either a military commander or an elected magistrate.   


Gurkha

Introduction

The Gurkha (also Gorkhas) are soldiers native to the Indian sub-continent residing in Nepal and some areas of Northeast India.  As a combatant, they are a tremendous force.  They are small in stature, but the reader will not discover a body of men possessing more tenacity and esprit de corps or less regard for their safety.  It is such that these small men appear as giants on the battlefield — or, if not that, their ferocity is enough to cause the blood of their enemies to run cold, drop their weapons, and run like hell.  The Gurkha signal to attack has caused heart attacks in twenty-year-old men.

Most military historians rate Gurkhas among the finest combat soldiers in the world.  They believe that the only way to defeat a Gurkha combat is by killing every man in his unit and then shooting them again just to make sure.

Some Background

John Watts and George White were two very enterprising Englishmen who, sometime between 1598-1600, came up with the idea of forming a joint-stock company that would focus on trade with India.  The company came into being on 31st December 1600 as the East India Company (EIC) — but over many years had several names.  Eventually, people began calling it the John Company.  In 1712, Dr. John Arbuthnot created a satirical character named John Bull, which became a national personification of the United Kingdom, generally, and England in particular.

But in 1600, no one imagined that EIC would acquire vast tracts of the Indian subcontinent.  By 1740, the English competed with the French and Spanish for supremacy inside the Indian Ocean area.  The competition was keen — there was no prize for second place.  To gain (and retain) trade advantages, EIC relied heavily on the British Army to pacify the Indian population and the Royal Navy to protect trade routes and valuable cargoes.

Since it was economically impractical to permanently assign English regiments to India, EIC created its own army — one composed of native riflemen led by British officers and NCOs. EIC used this army to subdue uncooperative Indian states and principalities and to protect its economic interests. By 1800, the East India Company employed over 200,000 native soldiers, making it twice as large as the British Army.

In the early years, company management was both efficient and economical — but over time, incompetence, mismanagement, and other circumstances far beyond the company’s control (such as widespread famine in India) led the nearly bankrupt company to request financial aid from the British Parliament.  After much debate, the government reasoned that such a commitment would benefit the nation’s long-term interests and approved EIC’s request — but not without having something to say about the company’s management.  Parliamentary regulation and oversight of EIC began in 1773.  In 1784, Parliament seized control of all Indian political policies through The India Act.

The John Company ceased to exist in 1858 when the Parliament forced it to cede all of its territories and holdings in India to the British Crown, which included massive parts of the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, and mid-Eastern Gulf colonies.  Before incorporation, however, the EIC managed to recruit Nepalese to serve the company as part of its private army.  They became known as Gurkhas.  It was a relationship that began after the Anglo-Nepalese War (1814-1816).

The Gurkha War

The Malla Dynasty was the ruling dynasty of the Kathmandu Valley (1201 – 1779) and one of the most sophisticated urban civilizations in the Himalayan foothills and a key destination in the India-Tibet trade route. 

In 1766, when the Gurkha King invaded Kathmandu (which at the time belonged to the Malla Confederacy), the Malla appealed to the EIC for help and armaments.  The company responded by sending an ill-equipped, poorly trained force of 2,500 men under a very young Captain, George Kinloch.  By any measure, the expedition was an unmitigated disaster.  Out of his depth as a military commander, Captain Kinloch had the additional misfortune of a malaria pandemic in the ranks.  The Gurkhas quickly overpowered Kinloch’s demoralized troops, and since dead men did not need British-manufactured firearms, the Gurkhas collected the weapons and put them to good use against their other enemies.

Gurkha aggression toward Tibet over long-standing trade eventually involved Imperial Chinese troops between 1789-1792.  It was then that the Gurkha (by then calling themselves Nepalese), in recognizing a common interest in territorial expansion, appealed to the British Governor-General for his assistance against the Chinese.  Governor-General Lord Warren Hastings had no desire to engage Imperial China, but he was never averse to exploiting regional commercial opportunities.[1]  Moreover, the company was at the center of a cash-flow problem — an issue that Hastings could resolve by selling rare wools to English markets.  Tibet was the only place on earth where Kashmir existed, and the only way to obtain it was through the mountain passes in Nepal — and this was only possible through the strategy of “political safety,” or territorial control and military pacification.

The Anglo-Gurkha War (1812-1816) involved two separate British military campaigns with seven major engagements and an extraordinary expenditure of money.  Despite Nepal’s initial interest in involving the British in their dispute with China, which was not forthcoming, certain elements of the Gurkha hierarchy distrusted the British (with good reason), particularly after the British gained control of a neighboring principality.  This event prompted the Nepalese to annex buffer territories of their own, which they were fully prepared to defend.  In preparing for war with the British, the Nepalese suffered no illusions about the stakes of such a confrontation.  One tribal chieftain advised his Nepalese lord, “They will not rest without establishing their own power and will unite with the hill rajas, whom we have dispossessed.  We have hitherto hunted deer; if we engage in this war, we must prepare to fight tigers.”

The Anglo-Gurkha war ended with the Treaty of Sugauli in 1816.  It required Nepal to relinquish all buffer territories west and east of its formal border and accept a permanent British representative in Kathmandu.  Initially, the Nepalese objected to the treaty until General David Ochterlony offered the Nepalese a deal they could not refuse, which was that they could either agree to the treaty or Ochterlony would destroy them.[2]  It was thus that Nepal became a British-protected state.

Incorporating the Gurkhas

General Ochterlony and political agent William Fraser (1784-1835) were the first to recognize the potential of Gurkha soldiers in British service.  During the war, Ochterlony employed Gurkha defectors as irregular forces.  He and Fraser were impressed with these fighters and had no qualms about their devotion to the British cause.  Fraser proposed that Ochterlony form the Gurkhas into a battalion under a British officer and key noncommissioned officers.  This battalion later became the 1st King George’s Own Gurkha Rifles.  About 5,000 Nepalese men entered British service after 1815, most of whom were Himalayans from three ethnic groups: Kumaonis, Garhwalis, and Gorkhalis — all of which quickly assimilated into a unique Gurkha identity.

Over time, the Gurkhas became the backbone of the British Army, forming ten regiments of two battalions each.  The British called them the Brigade of Gurkhas or, more simply, The Gurkha Rifles.  Between 1857-1918, the British employed Gurkha units to address conflicts in Burma, Afghanistan, the Indian frontiers, Malta, Cyprus, Malaya, China, and Tibet — with the Gurkhas serving with great distinction in each of them.

Eventually, the British raised twenty Gurkha battalions and formed them into ten regiments.  During the First World War, the number of Gurkha battalions increased to 33, totaling approximately 100,000 men.  Of these, 20,000 were either killed or wounded.  More than 2,000 Gurkhas received combat decorations for their exceptional courage and gallantry.[3]  So steady were these men that they were among the first to arrive during the disastrous Gallipoli campaign — and they were the last to withdraw.

The Gurkha fought in the Third Afghan War (1919) and numerous campaigns in the Northwest regions, notably in Waziristan. At the end of the world war, the British returned its Gurkha regiments to India, keeping them away from the internal strife of urban areas and placing them instead on the Indian frontier, where fiercely independent tribesmen were a constant source of unrest. The mission of the Gurkha along the frontier was more on the order of a constabulary: keeping the peace by confronting lawlessness among the Pathan tribes.

In 1939, there were ten Gurkha regiments (twenty pre-war battalions).  After the evacuation of Dunkirk in 1940, the Nepalese government offered to increase the number of Gurkha battalions to 35.  Eventually, that number rose to 43 battalions, adding two battalions to each regiment and a fifth battalion to the 1st, 2nd, and 9th Gurkha Rifles (also, 1 GR, 2 GR, and 9 GR).  To accomplish this expansion, Gurkha training battalions increased to five.  The Nepalese raised two additional battalions for peace-keeping duty in India.  In total, a quarter-million Nepalese men served in 40 Gurkha battalions, 8 Nepalese Army battalions, as well as in parachute, training, garrison, and logistical units against German/Italian forces in Syria, North Africa, Italy, and Greece, and Japanese forces in Burma, northeast India, and Singapore.  Of all Imperial combat forces, Gurkhas earned 2,734 medals for bravery at the cost of 32,000 casualties in all theaters.

The pattern of Gurkha military ranks followed those of the Indian Army.  Three levels included privates, noncommissioned officers, and commissioned officers.  Commissioned officers within the Gurkha regiments held Viceroy’s commissions (while British officers held King’s or Queen’s commissions).  Thus, any Gurkha holding a Viceroy’s commission (VCO) was subordinate to any British officer, regardless of rank.[4]  After Indian Independence in 1947, Gurkha officers reassigned to the British Army received King’s or Queen’s Gurkha Commissions (also known as KGO or QGO).  The Crown abolished KGO/QGO in 2007.  One notable difference between Gurkha officers and British officers is that no Gurkha can achieve a direct commission; Gurkha officers may only receive commissions through the enlisted ranks — they are all “mustangs.”

Today, Gurkhas serve in two separate armies: British and Indian.  There is one Gurkha Regiment in the British Army and 12 battalions (6 regiments) in the Indian Army.

Ferocity in Combat

The Indian Rebellion of 1857

The problem of rebellion began as early as 1772 when Lord Hastings started to recruit for the British East India Company.[5]  Because many Bengalis opposed the BEIC in combat, Hastings avoided them during his recruitment efforts.  He instead recruited higher castes, such as the Rajput and Bhumihar, from outlying regions.[6]  Ostensibly, the Madras and Bombay armies’ recruits were caste-neutral, but high-cast men were avoided below the surface. These caste-centered recruiting limitations continued through 1855.

The domination of higher castes in the Bengal army was one of the problems that led to the rebellion.  For example, to avoid being polluted by the unclean lower caste, high-caste soldiers in the Bengal army dined separately — a situation that works against the concept of military teamwork.  Hindu culture consumed the Bengal army, and higher-caste men were accorded privileges not extended to those of the lower-caste Bengali or the other company armies.  For example, the company exempted Bengal soldiers from any service that took them beyond marching distance from their homes.  The exemption excused Bengali soldiers from overseas service.

The final spark of discontent within the armies involved the ammunition used in the Enfield 1853 rifle/musket.  The weapons fired mini-balls, and because the bore was smaller in diameter (tighter) than earlier muskets, pre-greased paper cartridges were needed to facilitate ramming the ball down the bore.  In loading the weapon, sepoys (Indian soldiers serving in the British Army) had to bite the cartridge open to release the powder.  Rumors began circulating that the grease on these cartridges came from beef.  Biting into beef grease would be offensive to devout Hindus, and if the lubricant came from pork lard, another rumor, biting into the cartridge would offend Muslims.[7]  Added to these rumors was the claim that British/Company officers intended to convert Hindus and Muslims to Christianity.  To quell the first rumor, Colonel Richard Birch ordered the manufacture of greaseless cartridges; the sepoys could grease the cartridges themselves using whatever substance they preferred.  Colonel Birch’s common sense solution only caused many simple-minded soldiers to conclude that the rumors were true.

Unhappiness among civilians was more complicated.  Three groups of rebels were feudal nobility, rural landlords, and peasants.  The nobility was unhappy because they had lost titles and domains under company regulations that denied adopted children as legal heirs.  Landlords had lost their lands to peasant farmers due to company land reforms.  At the outset of the rebellion, landlords quickly re-occupied lost lands — without much complaint from the peasants, who oddly enough also joined the rebellion.  There was also the issue of forced indebtedness.  When peasant landowners could not pay their taxes, they borrowed money from loan sharks at high-interest rates.  Peasants lost their land to these money lenders when they could not repay borrowed money.

In the spring and summer of 1857, Indian soldiers refused to obey the orders of company officers, and native officers declined to arrest or discipline them.  Initially, it was more a matter of silent contempt than open mutiny.  However, when all but five 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry soldiers refused to accept cartridges, their British commander, Lieutenant Colonel George Carmichael-Smyth, ordered courts-martial.  Most of these men received sentences of ten years imprisonment with hard labor.  Before marching the convicted men to jail, Smythe ordered them publicly stripped of their uniforms and shackled.

The opening of the rebellion occurred the next morning when rebels attacked and ransacked officers’ quarters.  Several British officers were killed, along with four civilian men, eight women, and eight children.  Crowds in the bazaar rebelled by attacking off-duty soldiers, beating to death fifty Indian civilians who served British officers, and attacked the post-jail, releasing the recently court-martialed soldiers.  News of this uprising fostered other rebellions across India at Delhi, Agra, Kanpur, and Lucknow.

Not everyone opposed the British East India Company, and neither were the Gurkhas alone in suppressing the mutiny.  Sikh princes supported the British, along with the princes of Hyderabad, Mysore, Travancore, Kashmir, and Rajputana.[8]  But the mutiny was unexpected and spread rapidly.  When the British began to deploy Gurkha forces, rebels panicked — as well as they should have.

The Gurkhas could not understand such disloyalty, and it angered them.  The last thing any reasonable person wants is an angry Gurkha standing before him.  The Gurkhas were unrelentingly ruthless toward the rebellious.  In one instance, a single Gurkha soldier chased down a dozen or more Wahhabi extremists; when the Gurkha was done with them, the Muslims lay dismantled in the gutter.

But the Gurkhas did not escape the 18-month-long insurrection unscathed.  They suffered terrible casualties.  The difference was, and what set them apart, is that no Gurkha, no matter how badly wounded, would leave his post.  Not even when offered safe conduct for medical attention would they leave the side of their battling comrades.  All other “loyal” units paled in comparison to the Gurkhas.  No one had the “jolly recklessness” of the Gurkha private.

The rebels of Lucknow paled when they learned that the Gurkhas would oppose them.  The fighting lasted for several months, but even from the first day, the rebels knew they were dead men walking.  Again — as always — the Gurkha was both relentless and unmerciful.

The Malayan Emergency

Gurkha battalions operated continuously throughout the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960).  During this time, the Gurkha soldier proved again, as he had done in Burma, that the Gurkhas are superb jungle fighters.  The Gurkhas were among 40,000 regular British Commonwealth troops participating in the Malayan Emergency.  250,000 Malayan Home Guard troops augmented these men.

The Malayan Emergency was part of the post-World War II nationalist movements.  These were conflicts initiated by communist insurgents against pre-war colonial powers.  The initiating event in June 1948 was the murder of three Europeans during a communist assault on rubber plantations and the colonial government’s subsequent declaration of an emergency.

As in French Indochina, many of Malaya’s fighters were previously engaged as anti-Japanese nationalists, men trained and supplied by the British government during World War II.  Most communist rebels were ethnic Malayan or Chinese poorly treated by British colonial administrators over several decades.  The insurgents, when organized, began a series of assaults against British colonial police, military installations, tin mines, rubber plantations, and terrorist acts upon small, isolated villages.  At such time as the British had had enough of the murder and mayhem created by communist rebels, they sent in commonwealth forces, including the Gurkhas, to end it.

Organized as the 48th Gurkha Brigade (later, the 17th Gurkha Division), the British sent fighters from all four (then) existing Gurkha regiments (2nd, 6th, 7th, and 10th) and expanded (modernized) Gurkha fighting units by creating such combat support forces as engineers, signals, and transportation regiments. 

The Gurkha’s arrival in Malaya was a seminal event because it marked the beginning of the end of the communist insurgency there.  Unlike the US military in their later engagement in Vietnam, Gurkhas did not waste valuable time or effort trying to win the hearts and minds of the Malayan people.  They weren’t there for that … they were there to locate communists and kill them.  It was a mission-centered enterprise.  If there were going to be a contest for the hearts and minds of civilians, it would have to be won by the government’s civil administration.  Throughout their involvement in Malaya, the Gurkhas had few interactions with the civilian population.  At no time were Gurkhas deployed to protect villages.  They were after the “killer gangs” who behaved less as nationalist patriots than the armed thugs of jungle warlords.[9]

For the Gurkhas, jungle time was slow time.  Long-range patrols typically lasted two or three weeks (a few exceeded 100 days).  Soldiers carried a pack weighing around 90 pounds; it was all he needed for the duration of the patrol.  The Gurkhas dumped these heavy packs in a cache, mounting patrols in light order to sneak and peek.  The basic patrol unit often consisted of three men but sometimes involved as many as twelve.  The largest reconnaissance in force involved company-sized teams.

There was never any micro-management from a higher authority.  Unit commanders simply told their patrol leaders to “get on with it,” which gave these seasoned fighters maximum leeway in deciding how to proceed.  One of the favored Gurkha tactics was the ambuscade; some of these lasted from ten days to two weeks.  Such operations demand an unparalleled degree of self-discipline because an ambush is only successful when there are no unnecessary movements to reveal the ambusher’s position.  In truth, most ambushes yielded nothing at all.  Gurkhas killed most insurgents through chance encounters while patrolling.

Gurkhas relentlessly pursued their enemy for as long as it took until they rounded up or killed the communists.  Psychologically, such tenacity and commitment destroyed the communist’s self-confidence.  He could run, but he could not hide from the Gurkha combat patrol.  This was part of the strategy adopted by the British forces … keep the communists on the run.  Some of these forays lasted for twenty or more days, the limiting factor being the amount of ammunition carried by each soldier (sixty rounds).

What the Gurkhas accomplished in twelve years was extraordinary within the context of the overall strategy.  There was only limited use of artillery, and although the British employed light observation aircraft to support ground movements, there were no overwhelming air bombardment campaigns.  What fighting the Gurkha did, they did with their standard issue firearm, kukri knives, and their fighting spirit.  At the end of the day, Gurkha units didn’t need B-52s, artillery, or tanks.  They were in Malaya for one essential purpose: locate the enemy and kill him — and the way to do that most effectively was to terrorize the terrorists.  This is how the Gurkha won the Malayan Emergency.

Conclusion

Presently, the Gurkha contingent of the British Army includes the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd battalions of the Royal Gurkha Rifles, the King’s Gurkha Signals (five squadrons), King’s Gurkha Engineers (two squadrons), the 10th King’s Own Gurkha Logistics Regiment, the Band of the Brigade of Gurkhas, the Gurkha Company, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, a company at the Infantry Battle School, and one company at the Land Warfare Center.

In 1945, Rifleman Lachhiman Gurung was stationed in a trench with only two other men when over 200 Japanese soldiers opened fire. Gurung’s comrades were severely wounded in the opening fusillade.  As hand grenades fell on the Gurkhas, Gurung tried to throw each one back one after another.  He was successful with the first two, but the third exploded in his right hand. His fingers were blown off, and his face, body, and right arm and leg were severely wounded.  As the Japanese stormed the trench, Gurung used his left hand to wield his rifle, defeating 31 enemies and preventing the Japanese from advancing. Gurung survived his wounds and was awarded the Victoria Cross.

In 1949, the British selected former Gurkha soldiers for service in the Gurkha Contingent of the Singapore Police Force, which replaced the Sikh unit that existed before Japan’s occupation of Singapore.  These police are well-trained and highly disciplined.  They mainly perform as riot police and as an emergency reaction force.  In Brunei, a Gurkha Reserve Unit serves as a special guard and elite shock force of around 500 men.

In 2008, Taliban insurgents ambushed a squad of Gurkhas, hitting Private Yubraj Rai.  Captain Gajendera Angdembe and Riflemen Dhan Gurung and Manju Gurung carried Rai across 325 yards of open ground under heavy fire.  The Gurkha leave no soldier behind – ever.  In 2010, Acting Sergeant Dipprasad Pun single-handedly fought off thirty Taliban soldiers.  It took him an hour, but all the enemy lay dead in the end.  Pun received the Conspicuous Gallantry Cross.

The highest and most prestigious decoration in the British honors system is the Victoria Cross.  The qualification for this decoration is exceptionally valorous conduct “in the presence of the enemy,” with posthumous awards authorized when appropriate.  At one time, all member states of the British Empire participated in the British honors system, but since the beginning of the British Commonwealth of Nations, many such countries have devised their own honors system.  The Australians, for example, created The Victoria Cross for Australia —which looks similar to the British Victoria Cross.

So far, British authorities have awarded 1,358 Victoria Crosses to 1,355 men.  The greatest number of Victoria Crosses awarded for valorous conduct on a single day was 24 for individual actions on 16 November 1857 at Lucknow and Narnoul.  The most medals awarded in a single conflict was 658 during World War I.  There are five living holders of the VC: one RAF (World War II), three British Army (Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation, Iraq War, and Afghanistan War), and one Australian Army (Vietnam War).  Of the total awarded, 26 went to men serving with Gurkha regiments, 13 of whom were native Nepalese enlisted men.  Britain’s second highest award “for acts of the greatest heroism or the most conspicuous courage in circumstances of extreme danger, not in the presence of the enemy” is the George Cross.  Gurkha enlisted men have earned two such medals.

Sources:

  1. Barber, N.  War of the Running Dogs.  London: Collins Press, 1971.
  2. Barthorp, M.  Afghan Wars, and the North-West Frontier, 1839-1947.  Cassell Publishing, 2002.
  3. Chauhan, S. V.  The Way of Sacrifice: The Rajput.  University of Toronto, 1996.
  4. Cross, J. P. and Buddhiman Gurung.  Gurkhas at War: Eyewitness Accounts from World War II to Iraq.  Greenhill Books, 2002.
  5. Masters, J.  Bugles and a Tiger: Autobiography of the life and times of a British officer serving with the Gurkha Regiment in India in the run-up to World War II.  Handley, 1956.
  6. Parker, J.  The Gurkhas: The Inside Story of the World’s Most Feared Soldiers.  Headline Books, 2005.
  7. Thompson, R.  Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam.  London, Praeger Publishing, 1966.

Endnotes:

[1] Warren Hastings (1732-1818) served as governor of Bengal, head of the Supreme Council of Bengal, and along with Robert Clive, was responsible for the foundation of the British Empire in India.  Hastings achieved this by siding with one ethnic group against another and then conquering both — which eventually expanded British influence over the entire subcontinent.

[2] Major General Sir David Ochterlony (1758-1825) was a Massachusetts-born EIC officer who eventually served as Ambassador in Residence in Delhi, India.

[3] The number of combat decorations issued to Gurkhas is significant because traditionally, the British military is niggardly in awarding them. 

[4] A VCO lieutenant colonel was subordinate to a KCO second lieutenant. 

[5] The company recruited on behalf of three separate “presidential armies”: Bombay, Madras, and Bengal.

[6] A social stratification characterized by heredity, occupation, ritual status, and customary social interactions and exclusions based on such cultural notions as purity and pollution.  Although not confined to India, most people think of India when they think of caste systems.  Dating back 3,000 years, the caste system divides Hindus into four main categories, and this is determined by what they were in their past life.  These beliefs persist to the present day because they are deeply rooted in the Hindu religion. 

[7] More recently, it was claimed that American PsyOps programs floated rumors among Muslims that American soldiers dipped their small-arms ammunition in pork fat before loading their magazines — thus guaranteeing that the shot Muslim would go to hell.

[8] Sikhism is a hybrid between Hindu and Islamic belief systems.

[9] Malayan communists based their strategy on the fanciful assumption that communist victory in China would in some way presage Mao Zedong’s liberation of the much-maligned Chinese ethnics in Southeast Asia.  When the communists understood that a communist China gobbling up huge chunks of Southeast Asia was little more than madcap fantasy, the morale of Malayan killer gangs and jungle fighters collapsed.  This stands in stark contrast to the Vietnam War, where the communists were ethnic Vietnamese whose singular purpose was the reunification of the nation under a communist flag.


No Peace to Keep — Part II

Somalia, 1992-95

The Ongoing Threat

Somalia remained a dangerous place because of the randomness of armed assaults.  Marines and soldiers on patrol could never be sure when they might walk into a factional firefight or run into a gang of thugs.  On 12 January 1993, a security patrol was making a routine sweep along the southwest corner of the Mogadishu airfield.  At 2140, the patrol walked into an ambush and engaged in a firefight with several Somalis.

PFC Domingo Arroyo, a member of the security patrol, was mortally wounded.  Arroyo’s military occupational specialty was “field wireman,” primarily assigned to Headquarters Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines (artillery).  His participation in the security patrol was in keeping with this Marine Corps tradition: Every Marine is a Rifleman.  PFC Arroyo was the first Marine killed in Somalia.

General Wilhelm realized that to carry out his security mission, Mogadishu would have to be stabilized.  He wanted an aggressive plan to develop intelligence sources to enable Marines to become better prepared for their dangerous duties.  The result was a four-phase plan within which each phase would turn simultaneously, like the wheels in a timepiece.

The phases were (a) collect information about the human population (clans, where they lived, location of gang leaders, etc.), (b) Increased foot patrols and checkpoints, increase the visibility of the troops, (c) direct action as required, and (d) evaluation, assessment, and formulating an updated plan for ongoing actions.

The units involved in this new process, organized within the MARFOR Mogadishu Task Force under Colonel Jack W. Klimp, were 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines, 3rd Amphibious Assault Battalion, 3rd Light Armored Infantry Battalion, Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines.

The task force numbered 2,000 Marines with its CP at the sports stadium in the northern section of the city — where most of the factional conflicts took place.  Its main activity was patrolling, which enabled Marines to gather intelligence and demonstrate their constant presence.  Patrolling reduced violence and reassured citizens of the Marine’s benign intent.  Patrols also raided arms merchants within the outdoor markets and confiscated firearms whenever encountered.[1]

Shift in Mission

In January 1993, Bill Clinton assumed the presidency.  What Mr. Clinton understood about military operations would fit entirely on a post-it note.  Worse, all Clinton had available to advise him was Defense Secretary Les Aspin, Chairman of the JCS, General John Shalikashvili, and Commander, Central Command, General Joseph P. Hoar.

In early March 1993, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted to the UN Security Council his plan for returning Somali operations to the United Nations.  He acknowledged that the US-led peacekeeping/humanitarian missions were successful.  However, there was still no national government, police, or national army, and tribal factions continued to threaten the stability of the Horn of Africa.  To that end, the Secretary-General authorized UNOSOM II to establish a more secure environment throughout Somalia to achieve national reconciliation and a democratic state.

At a National Reconciliation Conference in Somalia, all fifteen Somali factions agreed to restore peace and democracy.  However, within a month, General Aideed’s faction had another think and decided not to cooperate with UNOSOM.  Aideed began broadcasting anti-UN propaganda over Radio Mogadishu, which prompted the Commander, UNOSOM II, Lieutenant General Cervik Bir, to shut down the radio station.

Meanwhile, UNOSOM’s principal staffers were all Somalis with no direct benefit in the success of the UN mission.  This explains how the UNOSOM organization became saturated with factional spies.  Aideed, for example, knew what UNOSOM was planning almost before General Bir.  After Aideed’s forces assaulted a Pakistani peacekeeping force, killing 24 and wounding 57 (also wounding 1 Italian and 3 American soldiers), the UN ordered the arrest and prosecution of General Aideed.

The search for Aideed began in earnest on 12 June.  Despite a house-to-house search for Aideed, he was never located.  On 12 July (Bloody Monday), US forces assaulted a house believed to contain Aideed.  Killed in the attack were several tribal leaders who, post mortem, were said to have been discussing peace arrangements with other factions — but that isn’t the information US forces had before the attack.  They believed Aideed was present at that “meeting of elders.”  Whatever the truth, the International Red Cross stated that 54 Somalis died in the attack, with an additional 161 wounded.  Aideed was not among the casualties.[2]

On 8 August, Aideed’s forces detonated a remote-controlled bomb against a US military vehicle, killing all four of its occupants.  Two weeks later, another bomb killed or injured seven more soldiers.  President Bill Clinton responded by ordering a Special Forces Task Force, including 400 Army Rangers, to deal with Aideed.  The Special Forces unit arrived in Somalia on 22 August 1993.  A month later, forces under Aideed shot down a Black Hawk Helicopter in the New Port area of Mogadishu.  All three crewmen died in the explosion/crash.

The Battle of Mogadishu

Also referred to as Operation Gothic Serpent, the battle began as a military quest by the U.S.-led peacekeeping and humanitarian coalition to capture Mohamed Farrah Aideed.[3]  General Aideed’s assault against coalition forces was part of a larger scheme by Saudi Arabia-funded Al-Qaeda to discredit the American armed forces and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East/Africa.

As part of the operation, led by the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), coalition troops were deployed to arrest two of Aideed’s lieutenants.  It quickly evolved into the Battle of Mogadishu (22 August-13 October 1993) and resulted in an unmitigated disaster for coalition troops and a strategic victory for Al Qaeda and the Somali National Alliance.  It was one of the most devastating battle losses in U.S. history.  By using the phrase “battle losses,” I do not refer simply to the 19 American, 25 Pakistani, or 1 Malaysian soldier killed; I refer to the fact that President Bill Clinton’s weak leadership, his lack of resolve, and the imposition of overly-restrictive rules of engagement allowed barely armed Somalis to hand the U.S. military a resounding defeat.

On 3 October, the joint-task force commander dispatched 160 combat troops, twelve vehicles, and 19 aircraft to make the arrest.  Aideed’s lieutenants were soon taken into custody and, along with an injured soldier, loaded into vehicles for transportation back to the mission command post.  However, armed militiamen surrounded by women and children converged on the target area from throughout the city.  Gunfire erupted, resulting in one Somali and one coalition death.  The radio report “stunned” the operational commander because “they expected no casualties.”[4]

In the violence that followed, Somali insurgents shot down two Black Hawk Helicopters, killing crew members and rescuers.  Somalis also quickly surrounded the reaction force dispatched to the scene.  A bloody battle ensued as coalition troops became overwhelmed by civilian men, women, and teenagers closing to within a few feet to give a fight.  In addition to the twenty coalition troops killed in action, 82 others received combat wounds/injuries.  Of the Somalis, coalition troops killed an estimated 1,000 and wounded 3,000.  These “estimates” remain questionable, however.

The Aftermath

Under the auspices of a UNO Peacekeeping/Humanitarian effort, the United States entered Somalia in December 1992 to stop the imminent starvation of millions of people.  For a time, these substantial efforts succeeded in feeding the hungry, but neither the UNO nor its surrogate, the United States, managed to broker peace among warring factions.

It was a poorly organized, ineffectually managed nation-building operation.  American officials, demonstrating either their incompetence or naivete, expected gratitude for their humanitarian efforts.  That did not happen because U.S. officials were blind to the reality of Saudi Arabia’s behind-the-scenes Wahhabist activities.  Nation-building did not work in South Vietnam; it did not work (again) in Somalia — and yet, the United States still had not learned any valuable lessons from this by the time of the Iraqi War in 2003.

In the long-term, UNO and United States diplomatic and military efforts failed to achieve its mission: peace and security in Somalia and starvation relief for its 10 million people.  It wasn’t even a good try.  It was a case of diplomatic and military ineptitude combined with numerous Somali factions trying to out-jockey one another for supreme control.  The Somali people proved themselves their own worst enemy.  Still, America gave up 42 of its young men.  Despite its superiority in armaments and technology, it allowed stone-age people to divert them from a worthwhile mission and force them to capitulate.

American military power allowed the United States access to conditions that might have led to conditions for peace amid famine and bloodshed, but the various factions were not yet exhausted from fighting, and they were themselves unwilling to stop the carnage. Ignoring the befuddled actions of UNO/American operational managers (who acted more like senior civilian officials and lieutenants than they did senior civilian officials and general officers), the troops did their best under the worst possible conditions. Simply stated, there was no peace in Somalia to keep. We must learn that the best soldiers in the world can only deliver up a foundation for peace — they cannot create peace itself.

Sources:

  1. Allard, K.  Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned.  National Defense University Press, 1995.
  2. Bowden, M.  Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern Warfare.  Atlantic Monthly Press,1999.
  3. Mroczkowski, D. P.  Restoring Hope: In Somalia with the Unified Task Force, 1992-1993.  HQMC History Division, 2005.
  4. Sangvic, R. N.  The Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of Failure.  Army Command and General Staff School, 1998.
  5. Wright, L.  The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11.  Knopf Publishing, 2006

Endnotes:

[1] The arms merchants weren’t “gun dealers.”  Arms merchants sold RPGs, assault rifles, machine guns, mortars, missiles, tank rounds, and weapons from nearly every manufacturer in the world.  In the first raid, Marines confiscated 1,500 assorted weapons.  Of course, the market raids merely drove the markets underground, but the word was out, and it made the city a safer place for everyone.

[2] Four western journalists (Dan Eldon, Hos Maina, Hansi Kraus, and Anthony Macharia) rushed to cover the story.  An angry Somali mob turned on these journalists and killed them — so the day wasn’t a total loss. 

[3] “General” Mohamed Farrah Aideed was killed by another Somali faction on 5 August 1996.  His son, Hussein Mohamed Farrah (Aideed) is a naturalized US citizen and a former U. S. Marine (1987-1995).  Corporal Farrah subsequently served as Deputy Prime Minister of Somalia.  He now lives in Eritrea.

[4] It is inconceivable to me that any military commander would send 160 troops, 19 aircraft, and 12 vehicles on a mission and not anticipate the possibility of casualties … particularly in light of the incident on 8 September when a large Somali force attacked coalition troops at a roadblock location.  Two additional assaults occurred on 16 and 21 September.  Crumbs.


No Peace to Keep — Part I

Somalia, 1992-95

Introduction

For well over seventy years, the United Nations Organization (UNO) has continuously involved itself in so-called peacekeeping/humanitarian operations — at best with mixed, but at worst with disastrous results.  It is a complex conversation because, over those seventy years, the nature of armed conflict has changed dramatically, and the challenges peacekeepers face have evolved into highly complex if not impossible-to-accomplish missions.  Warfare is always complicated, of course, but making matters worse is the utter incompetence of UNO officials and, in the case of the United States (in its past role in such operations), the unbelievable ineptitude of executives and members of both parties of the United States Congress.

In 2019, 14 separate UNO peacekeeping missions involved well over 100,000 soldiers, police, and senior UNO civilians.  The cost of these operations in 2019 exceeded $7 billion.  The United States paid out $2 billion as its “fair share” of keeping the peace.

To understand the “complexity” of UNO peacekeeping operations, it is first necessary to divide them into categories.  The oldest of these are operations that attempt to resolve border disputes.  A second category involves multi-dimensional operations, such as might include civil war.  A third type, the most difficult, involves protection and stabilization missions — which are further complicated by cultural factors.  I am writing now about the cultural influences of the people to whom the aid is directed and the UNO culture responsible for overseeing such missions (particularly when UNO surrogates incorporate globalist/socialist thinking into mission structure, which obfuscates matters even further).

Of the third type, in addition to the complexities mentioned, we must add peacekeeping operations in the face of violent extremism.  Generally, UNO effectiveness is only possible when opposing interests invite the participation of the UNO, when the UNO remains strictly neutral in facilitating the conflict, and when the use of force is limited to self-defense of peacekeeping units. Operational disaster is the result of the UNO’s failure to adhere to these principles.  Two examples stand out: The Congo in 1960 and Somalia in 1991-95.  The reality of the fiasco in Somalia was that the UNO (and its surrogate, the U.S. government) quite miserably failed to realize (or acknowledge) that there was no peace to keep.  It was a doomed-to-fail effort before it began, made worse along the way with poorly conceived shifts in mission.

In the case of Somalia, the UNO became involved as a response to inhumane conditions of starvation and forced migration.  In both instances, millions were affected … with forced migration causing tribal conflicts with fifteen separate rebel groups. Rushing to take advantage of the situation was the Saudi-funded Al Qaeda organization which sought to damage the credibility of the UNO, the U.S. government, and the U.S. Armed Forces.

Unfortunately, the global situation is not improving.  Neither the UNO nor the United States has learned valuable lessons from their past mistakes.  Despite the impropriety of U.S. involvement in Somalia, the Department of State continues to spend billions of the taxpayer’s money “ … in developmental assistance [in Somalia] to support economic, political, and social sectors to achieve greater stability, establish a formal economy, obtain access to basic services, and attain representation through legitimate, credible governance.” The wording comes from the writers of the popular television series Madam Secretary.  “The United States works closely with other donor partners and international organizations to support social services and the development of an effective and representative security sector, including military, police, and justice organizations while supporting ongoing African Union peacekeeping efforts.”

Whenever the UNO wants to divorce itself from costly peace-keeping/humanitarian assistance operations, it mismanages such efforts so horribly that it becomes only a matter of time before a progressive American president steps in to relieve the UN of it’s responsibility.  Somalia is an excellent example.  The price paid by the American people to maintain this irrational facade is the bloodshed of American servicemen, a lifetime of woe by the parents, wives, and children of slain soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, and adding the costs of war to the backs of American taxpayers.

Some History

Geographically, Somalia sits on the Horn of Africa at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.  Bordering states include Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya.  The people who live in these border regions number around 9 million; 98% are Somali tribesmen.  About 45% of Somalia’s population is under 15 years of age.  Seventy percent of the Somali people are nomads who travel at will with their clans and livestock through Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya.  This migratory pattern generates land disputes between Somalis and their neighbors.

Civil war and massive starvation in Somalia prompted UN and Organization of African Unity (OAU) interventions in 1991 because half of the nation’s 10 million people were starving to death.  Between January and March 1992, at least three-quarters of a million Somalis died from starvation; another 3 million fled the country as refugees.  Nothing about this situation was unusual in East Africa in 1991.

The area of present-day Somalia was one of the first places Islamic conquerors stopped at the beginning of their murderous campaigns in 700 A.D.  From that point on, East Africans have suffered one war after another, beginning around 900 A.D.  Nothing improved in the lives of native people after Italian and British imperialists began warring with one another over possession of the Horn of Africa.  Following World War II, the United Kingdom placed British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland under its protection.

In 1960, both trust territories united to form the Somali Republic, with Great Britain and Italy deciding the location of its borders.  A formal government took shape under the auspices of the Somali National Assembly through a national referendum that excluded 70% of the Somali people.  The fun began nine years later with a series of assassinations of government leaders and a military coup d’état.  Between 1969-1991, the Somali government fell under the control of the so-called Supreme Revolutionary Council — under which Somalia became known as the Somali Democratic Republic.  Culturally, the SDR was closely linked to the Arab world and joined the Arab League in 1974.  Somali government leaders abandoned democracy in 1976 to establish a one-party scientific-socialist government based on Marxism and Islamism.

War broke out between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977.  The issue of contention was the placement of Somalia’s western border.  Initially, the Somalis gained an advantage over their enemy until the Soviet Union intervened with “advisors” and 20,000 Cuban mercenaries. The USSR’s involvement in East Africa prompted the Somali government to ask for American assistance. U.S. diplomats were over-joyed; they’d wanted a piece of East Africa since around 1960.  Thanks to the American taxpayer (who hadn’t a clue about any of this), Somalia created the largest army on the African continent.[1] 

By the 1990s, mainly due to the end of the Cold War, East Africa no longer offered any strategic value to either the new Russian federation or the United States.  Left to its own devices, Somalia began a steep spiral into authoritarianism.  Through clever instigation, Ethiopia started rebel movements throughout Somalia, which led to civil war, food and fuel shortages, and a period of cripling inflation.  Somali government leaders clamped down even more by establishing curfews and surveiling and harassing foreigners.

Libya assisted in overthrowing the Somali government and installing a loose confederation of tribalists to replace it.  An international group consisting of Egyptians, Arabians, and Italians subsequently determined that Ali Mahdi Mohamed should serve as the President of Somalia.  Unfortunately, Mohamed was only capable of controlling the capital city; tribal groups divided up the rest of the country.

Enter the United Nations

The time was right for the United Nations to stick its nose under the Somali tent.  The United Nations Organization Somali Command (UNOSOM) attempted to arrange several “cease-fire” agreements — emphasis on attempted. A fifty-man detachment of UN Peacekeepers tried to stabilize the country enough to conduct humanitarian relief operations. Such a small detachment had no chance of success, so the UN increased its military footprint to around 500 troops.

However, rebel factions in Somalia ignored all previously agreed-to cease-fire agreements, and the fighting continued.  According to its own guidelines, the UNO should have withdrawn all military and civilian aid workers from Somalia. 

In August 1992, the UN Security Council discussed sending an additional 3,000 troops to Somalia.  Discussing the proposition was as far as the proposal ever got.  Conditions in Somalia worsened as tribal factions splintered into even smaller groups and then splintered again.  As the fighting became nastier its effects grew worse. For example, rebel factions used UN forces for target practice, attacked ships laden with food stores, and cargo aircraft became targets of opportunity.  If aid workers knew what was good for them, they hired bodyguards.

By November 1992, General Mohamed Farrah Aideed tired of the fun and games and ordered all UN forces (the so-called Unified Task Force (UNITAF) out of Somalia.  There is probably a no better example of UN failure than this — and it was at this point that President George H. W. Bush demonstrated his brilliance as a national leader for the second time (appointing April Glaspie as Ambassador to Iraq was his first).  Bush volunteered the U.S. military to lead a “multinational” force to secure humanitarian operations in Somalia.

The UN General Secretary became so giddy that he authorized the American-led force (designated Operation Restore Hope) to use all necessary means to ensure the protection of UNITAF relief efforts.  Eventually, UNITAF involved personnel from 24 countries (but mainly from the United States).  The plan was simple enough: the U.S. military protected civilian aid workers while UNOSOM continued its efforts to negotiate an end to the fighting and distribute food stores.[2]

Land the Marines

Training and readiness have been the hallmark of the United States Marine Corps since the Revolutionary War.  In the Marines, training and operational planning are continuous and concurrent.  President Bush made his televised announcement on 4 December 1992; planning for Somali operations began on the morning of 5 December.

U.S. planners at the U.S. Central Command envisioned four operational phases.  First, deploy troops to secure harbors and airfields.  Second, establish and expand security zones throughout southern Somalia.  Third, expand the security zone and secure land routes for humanitarian missions.  Fourth, return Somali operations to the UN (presumably so that the UN could undo all of the U.S. military’s accomplishments).[3]

Mission planners also struggled with their assessment of the enemy.  As previously mentioned, the Somali “enemy” were splintered tribalists.  The answers to such questions as “how well is he armed,” and “under what conditions can he best employ his power” were largely unknown because Marines could face a different enemy every day.  But in addition to “enemy” capabilities, there was also the issue of rampant lawlessness.  Under the best of circumstances, U.S. operations in Somalia were volatile in the extreme. 

After extensive “special operations” training, Headquarters I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) designated the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines (2/9) as the lead battalion within the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (15thMEU), earmarked for humanitarian assistance operations in Somalia.[4]  These Marines would spearhead the mission ashore as part of the UN mandate.[5]   Fox Company “raiders” went in first to secure the seaport, the Recon detachment, followed by Golf Company, secured the Mogadishu airport.

15th MEU became an integral part of Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) Tripoli, including USS Tripoli, USS Juneau, and USS Rushmore.  ARG Tripoli was on station off the coast of Somalia on 3 December.  The initial landing commenced at 0540 with Marines and Navy Seals going ashore at Mogadishu, where the dolts from CNN had set up television cameras and bright lights to offer advantages to the enemy, should they care to resist the landing.  With that one significant glitch in violation of operational security, the landing proceeded quickly and smoothly.

2/9 Marines proceeded to the U.S. Embassy compound, where they secured the chancery.  Colonel Greg Newbold set up his command post (CP) at the airfield.  Also, on that first day, the first coalition partner arrived and joined the Marine security plan: a company from the 2nd French Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment, which came by aircraft from Djibouti.

The Marine’s “overwhelming show of force” allowed them to seize, hold, and expand their control.  They discovered in Mogadishu a modern-looking city reflecting the effects of two years of warfare: anarchy, terror, no electricity, running water, or sanitation.  There were no police officers.  Public buildings had been damaged, looted, and stood vacant.  With closed schools, gangs of youths roamed the streets looking for things to pillage.  Crowded refugee camps filled every parcel of open land.  The only visible civic activities were those involving the burial of human remains.

Toward the end of the first day, a vehicle containing nine Somalis ran a roadside checkpoint manned by French Legionnaires. They opened fire at the fleeing automobile — killing two and wounding seven others.  Afterward, Somali snipers added UN Peacekeepers to their list of potential targets.  They weren’t hitting anyone, but the shooting was bothersome and worrisome.

On 10 December, Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, assumed command of Marine Forces (MARFOR), Somalia.  MARFOR provided the basic structure around which the Unified Task Force evolved.  Behind the Marines, the most prominent American force was the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division, eventually forming the centerpiece for Army Forces, Somalia (ARFOR).  General Wilhelm’s command authority included the 15thMEU and French forces.  Wilhelm focused his attention on securing ports of arrival and departure and the Embassy compound.  When 1st Battalion, 7th Marines arrived, Wilhelm expanded his control over areas outside Mogadishu — notably into Bale Dogle.  Wilhelm assigned that mission to BLT 2/9 (supported by HMM 164), which they accomplished within 48 hours.

The first U.S. Army unit into Somalia was Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry (deployed with 2/87), which flew into the Bale Dogle airfield.  Upon arrival, Alpha Company relieved the Marines and assumed control of the airfield.

The first direct attacks on UNITAF members occurred in two separate incidents on 12 December.  Three aircraft of HMM 164 received fire from unknown persons with damage to their rotors.  Marines returned fire with 20mm guns and missiles, destroying two “technicals” and damaging one US-made armored personnel carrier.[6]

On 6 January 1993, unknown persons fired on a convoy moving through Mogadishu from two authorized weapons storage facilities belonging to General Aideed’s faction.  The unified commander, Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston USMC, decided to take decisive action, or the danger to coalition forces would only increase.  He tasked General Wilhelm to develop a plan of action.  He wanted it simple and dramatic.

Mohamed Aideed

During the night of 6-7 January, Kilo Company 3/9 and Charlie Company 1/7 surrounded the two weapons sites.  LAVs from the 3rd LAI Battalion screened the area.  Snipers took positions in the high ground surrounding Aideed’s turf.  A two-company reserve force formed at the Embassy compound.  PsyOps personnel from the U.S. Army’s 9th Psychological Operations Battalion augmented each rifle company.  At 0553 on 7 January, PsyOps broadcasters began to issue warnings to the Somalis that they were surrounded, instructing them that they would not be harmed if they surrendered.

At that moment, helicopters assumed a hovering position around the ammunition sites.  Somalis in storage site No. 8 surrendered.  The men in site No. 2 decided to go out in a blaze of glory.  Helicopter crew chiefs reported that one tank inside the compound was turning over, and two Somalis had operated a heavy anti-aircraft machine gun.  Guns were cleared for snipers to take out the two machine gunners.  Within mere seconds, two machine gunners discovered the path to Allah, and then for good measure, the sniper rendered their machine gun inoperable.

The engagement that followed was loud, sharp, and somewhat short.  Initially, the Somalis opened up with a heavy volume of machine guns, recoilless rifles, and small arms.  At 0615, helicopters were cleared to engage targets inside the compound.  They fired for 30 minutes.  At 0647, U.S. tanks entered the compound, followed by Kilo Company Marines, who systematically cleared storage site No. 2.  Helicopters continued to receive periodic sniper fire.

General Wilhelm ordered Marines to confiscate all firearms. It turned into a long day as Marines inventoried 4 M47 Tanks, nine howitzers, 13 APCs, three anti-aircraft guns, 11 mortars, and one recoilless rifle.  In addition to losing several tons of weapons and munitions, General Aideed lost his self-esteem.

Despite this demonstration, coalition forces continued to receive sniper fire from “who knows where.”  Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni opined that sniping was simply the Somali way of testing the resolve of U.S. personnel — emphasis on “opinion.”[7]

Continued next week

Sources:

  1. Allard, K.  Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned.  National Defense University Press, 1995.
  2. Bowden, M.  Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern Warfare.  Atlantic Monthly Press,1999.
  3. Mroczkowski, D. P.  Restoring Hope: In Somalia with the Unified Task Force, 1992-1993.  HQMC History Division, 2005.
  4. Sangvic, R. N.  The Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of Failure.  Army Command and General Staff School, 1998.
  5. Wright, L.  The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11.  Knopf Publishing, 2006

Endnotes:

[1] This wasn’t the first time the U.S. government spent its treasure propping up a Communist-Islamic dictatorship.

[2] One of UNOSOMs grand ideas was to pay out over $130 million to purchase guns from Somali rebels.  It was a great deal for the Somalis, who never seemed to run out of guns to sell. 

[3] When CENTCOM planners asked the UN to identify “implied tasks” that would help planners assess mission fulfilment, no one in the UN had a clue.  In other words, no one in the UN had any idea how to measure operational successes.

[4] Commanding Officer, Colonel Gregory S. Newbold.

[5] Actually, some forces were already in place before the Marines arrived.  Teams from special operations command provided some security at several airfields, providing security for air combat control teams.  Charlie Company, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) provided sniper support to the U.S. Special Envoy while in Mogadishu. 

[6] “Technical” (also, Non-Standard Tactical Vehicle) (NSTV) is the term used to describe ordinary and four-wheel-drive pickup trucks converted to carry heavy weapons.  The term “technical” originated in Somalia. 

[7] Anthony Zinni was one of those “political generals” who ingratiated himself with Democratic Party elites.  He retired from active service in 2000.  In 2004, Diana B. Henriques of the New York Times identified Zinni as one of a cabal of “retired military people” recruited to deceive active duty military personnel and veterans into investing in the corporations they were paid to represent.  Specifically, First Commercial Financial Planning, Inc., tried to deflect the charge, but a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation confirmed the allegation that First Commercial Financial Planning used “retired flag rank officers” to perpetrate fraud against military veterans.


The Perdicaris Incident

Introduction

Admiral Mahan

Few Americans stand out as much as Alfred Thayer Mahan as one of the foremost thinkers on naval warfare and maritime strategy.  Some even say that Mahan was THE leading thinker on sea power and the conduct of war at sea.  Admiral Mahan was respected as a scholar in his own time, served as President of the American Historical Association, and is remembered as the author of The Influence of Sea Power Upon History.  Mahan’s studies examine the role of navies in determining the outcome of wars fought by the great European powers during the period between the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries and remain valuable for their insight into sea power and strategy.

Admiral Mahan was also a student of international relations and attempted to apply the study of history toward an understanding of foreign policy and strategic problems of his day.  For a quarter of a century, he was a visible scholar and was sought by news outlets and public figures for his insight and advice.  Theodore Roosevelt was his friend, Franklin Roosevelt was a student, and Woodrow Wilson sought to silence him.  In President Wilson’s opinion, no good could come from military or naval officers who could think for themselves.

Mahan was, himself, a student of Thucydides — placing a high value on understanding the strategies pursued by the ancient Greeks, but he was dubious about the ability of states to promote cooperation by employing international law or the organization and political activity of peace societies because arbitration agreements among states, or the establishment of norms for conduct in the international arena were likely to work only so long as the issues at stake were limited in importance.  Once a great power’s vital interests were threatened, Mahan believed that international agreements to promote cooperation would give way to armed forces searching for security.  Mahan had no faith in the ramblings of liberal globalists who thought that agreements between nations would ensure peaceful relations — and as it turned out, Mahan was right.  In Mahan’s view, the best way to prevent war was for a country to be so well-armed that potential adversaries would be deterred from risking a conflict.

Paying very close attention to Mahan was a young politician with so much personal energy that he made others nervous.  It is fair to say that Theodore Roosevelt was an admirer of Admiral Mahan, but it would be a mistake to argue that Roosevelt owed Mahan for all his brilliant pragmatism.  Theodore Roosevelt was no shrinking violet in the study of history — and one wonders how much influence Roosevelt may have had on Mahan.  In 1879, while still an undergraduate at Harvard, Theodore Roosevelt began his study of the War of 1812, which became a prodigious effort.  In his research, what may have struck Roosevelt was that the American Navy had been unable to gain command of the sea despite its successes.  This revelation may have driven him toward a keen interest in what Mahan had to say about sea power.

A few years later, Vice President Theodore Roosevelt participated in the opening of the Minnesota State Fair in Minneapolis, where he was asked to deliver a speech.  He called it his “National Duties” speech.  Historians suspect that few people were paying much attention to Roosevelt when, toward the middle of his talk, he said, “Speak softly and carry a big stick — and you will go far.” Roosevelt borrowed this phrase from an African proverb. But in short order, Roosevelt began to address questions of international relations in the context of “big stick” foreign policy. Nine days later, Theodore Roosevelt would become President of the United States, and while assuring McKinley’s cabinet that he intended to continue their president’s policies, Roosevelt was an ardent imperialist who made the McKinley cabinet a nervous wreck.

Background

In 1826, a young man from Greece arrived in the United States for studies.  He was the son of an influential medical doctor and politician named Anthony Perdicaris. Anthony’s father, Licinius, was a physician to the Ottoman Sultan and later named a Count of the Republic of Venice for his services.  The Republic of Venice later beheaded Licinius for essentially the same reasons.

In 1822, during the Greek War of Independence, Ottoman forces attacked the city of Naousa and began killing all males and enslaving all Greek women and children.  Anthony gathered up his family and fled into the mountains.  Gregory was around twelve years old at the time.  Within a short time, Gregory had learned that his two brothers-in-law had been killed and that his mother and four sisters were taken captive and sold into slavery.  After his separation from his father, Gregory made his way to Jerusalem, where he met and befriended Pliny Fisk, an American missionary who helped arrange his passage to the United States.

Gregory was no slouch.  He learned English well enough to attend studies at Washington College (now Trinity) in Connecticut and graduate with a bachelor’s and master’s degree.  He later taught Greek and wrote several influential essays about the plight of the Greeks within the Ottoman domain.  In time, Gregory Perdicaris would become a naturalized American, and he would marry a young woman named Margaret Hanford, the granddaughter of William DeWitt, sister-in-law to Governor David Williams.  Hanford, although an orphan, came from a prominent South Carolina family.

Gregory returned to Greece in 1837 to serve as U.S. Ambassador.  When he returned to the United States in 1845, he resumed his life as an academic and a lecturer.  Politically associated with the Democratic Party, Gregory Perdicaris became an early investor in the Trenton Light Company and later served as one of its directors.  By 1852, he was also the Trenton Mutual Life Insurance Company president, with substantial investments in utility companies in Charleston, South Carolina.  In 1858, Gregory sent his son, Ion, to London, England, to study art.

Meanwhile, Margaret’s nephew, Henry McIver, began to demand that Ion be returned to South Carolina where he could participate in the Civil War.  Gregory had no intention of recalling his son from Europe.  On this basis, McIver sequestered the Perdicaris investments in South Carolina, which in 2020 value amounted to just over a million dollars.  In 1867, Gregory Perdicaris and several prominent Americans established a charitable fund for Greek refugees.  One of these investors was Theodore Roosevelt, Sr., father of the man who would become president.

Ion Hanford Perdicaris was born in Athens in 1840, grew up in Trenton, New Jersey, but fled to England at his father’s insistence to avoid participating in the American Civil War.  This prompted Henry McIver (a signer of the Ordinance of Succession) to confiscate the Perdicaris fortune, of which 1300 shares belonged to Ion.  To prevent the sequestration, Ion renounced his American citizenship (which was not permitted until 1868).  The issue of sequestration of the family’s wealth eventually made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1877.

Still a U.S. citizen, Ion traveled back and forth to London as a journalist for The Galaxy.  He was young, unattached, and somewhat of a playboy.  In 1870, he began attending supernatural rituals with Cromwell F. Varley (an electrical engineer) and his wife, Ellen.  Cromwell’s profession required a good bit of travel back and forth between the United States and the United Kingdom — and because he and Ellen had four children, it was not practical that his wife should accompany him on his trips.  During these business trips, Ion Perdicaris and Ellen Varley began having supernatural seances of their own.  When Cromwell discovered the infidelity, he promptly divorced Ellen.  Ion, striving either to do the right thing or avoid scandal, promptly married her (1873), and assumed responsibility for raising the children.

Ion H. Perdicaris

In the late 1870s, Ion Perdicaris purchased a substantial home and estate in Tangier, where he collected exotic animals, dabbled in the arts, and maintained ties to influential people in the United States.  Ion and Ellen moved (with her children — two boys and two girls) to Tangier in 1882.  Ellen Perdicaris (and her children) retained their British nationality.  In Tangier, Ion became active in the fight for the rights of the Moors, led several civic commissions, and, as a de facto spokesman for the foreign community, argued for recognition of Tangier as a free port city.  Ion retained business interests in England and the United States throughout this period with frequent visits to both countries.

In 1886, after Perdicaris strenuously objected to the treatment offered to a native Moroccan by the American Minister in Tangier, a man who Consul General Felix Matthews accused of rape, the Moroccan government arrested Perdicaris and fined him for interfering in a legal matter.  Subsequently, Perdicaris filed charges against Matthews, and the Consul was removed from his post and ordered back to the United States.

In May 1904, despite his reasonable efforts on behalf of the Moroccan people, Mulai Ahmed er Raisuni (also, Raissoulli) kidnapped and held for ransom Ion Perdicaris and his step-son, Cromwell Varley, Jr.  A Hollywood film about the abduction was released in 1975 titled The Wind and the Lion starring Sean Connery, Brian Keith, Candace Bergen, and Steve Kanaly.  The film, while entertaining, completely misrepresents what transpired during the so-called Perdicaris Affair.

The Raissoulli

 Ahmed al-Raissoulli was the leader of three Moroccan tribes near Tangier.  In 1903, the Moroccan government arrested and jailed five of Raisuli’s men, no doubt charging them with brigandry — because that’s what they were.  That same year, Raisuli learned about the Stone Affair, where Bulgarian revolutionaries kidnapped an American Missionary and held her for ransom.  A quick study, Raisuli promptly kidnapped a newspaper correspondent named Walter Harris and held him for ransom.  This worked out so well for Raisuli that he then targeted Ion Perdicaris, assuming that the wealthier American would net a larger ransom.

The Incident

Ion, his wife, and stepson Cromwell Varley, Jr., relocated from their townhome in Tangier to their summer estate, Aidonia, on 16 May 1904.  Late in the afternoon of 18 May, Raisuli and a band of ruffians abducted Perdicaris and his stepson from Aidonia.  The number of ruffians is unknown, but estimates range from nine to 150.  Raisuli’s men cut telephone wires and assaulted several of Ion’s servants, leaving Ellen unmolested at the house.  She later contacted authorities, including the U.S. and British Consul and Moroccan officials.

American Consul Samuel Gummeré notified the U.S. State Department: 

Mr. Perdicaris, the most prominent American citizen here, and his stepson Mr. Varley, a British subject, were carried off last night from their country house, three miles from Tangier, by a numerous band of natives headed by Raisuly. . I earnestly request that a man-of-war be sent at once. . . the situation most serious.

Raisuli carried Perdicaris by horseback through the Rif Mountains.  Raisuli demanded $55,000 (later $70,000), the removal of all government troops from the region, a promise to end all harassment of the Riffian people, and the removal and arrest of the Pasha of Tangier (then part of the Ottoman infrastructure) and several other government officials.  He also demanded that the United States and Great Britain “guarantee” these demands would be met.

When the State Department received Gummeré’s communiqué, the Secretary of State, John Hay, was out of town. When notified of the incident, President Theodore Roosevelt resolved that the United States would not pay the ransom.  The mantra that evolved was “Perdicaris Alive or Raisuli Dead.” Under-Secretary Francis Loomis dealt with the crisis by diverting seven of sixteen U.S. Navy ships from the Mediterranean to the port of Tangier. Admiral F. E. Chadwick was ordered to send a ship from the South Atlantic to Tangier.  Simultaneously, the British dispatched a Royal Navy vessel from Gibraltar.

Al-Raisuli

On 21 May, the Sultan’s representatives were sent to begin negotiations with the Raisuli.  Two days later, negotiations were in the tank.  On 29 May, Raisuli threatened to kill his prisoners if his demands were not met within the next two days.  Raisuli’s threats revealed internal tensions: the foreign minister of Morocco allied himself with Raisuli’s enemies.  The Sharif of Ouazzane was credited with progress in the negotiations.  The Sultan sent a messenger to Raisuli, but upon the messenger’s arrival, Raisuli had his throat cut.  (Pictured right, Ahmed al-Raissoulli).

The Navy Department ordered Admiral T. F. Jewell to send three additional ships on that same day.  The armored cruisers USS Brooklyn and USS Atlanta reached Tangier on 30 May, and Admiral Chadwick conferred with the Sultan’s representative.  Two additional gunboats arrived on the following day.  France assured the United States that they would do all they could to rescue the prisoners.  On 1 June, Raisuli increased his ransom demand to $70,000.00.

Admiral Jewell arrived with USS Olympia, USS Baltimore, and USS Cleveland a few hours later.  With ships at anchor, Jewell appointed Major John Twiggs Myers to overall command of the ship’s Marine Detachments.  Washington ordered Jewell to keep a leash on the Marines until he was specifically authorized to employ them against Raisuli.  Roosevelt did not want to risk the possibility of Raisuli executing his prisoners.  The only Marines sent ashore was a team of four (4) men carrying sidearms, ordered to protect the U.S. Consulate and Mrs. Perdicaris.  On 8 June, two additional Marines were dispatched to protect the Belgian legation.

The State Department intended that if Morocco did not meet the United States’ demands, American Marines would seize Morocco’s custom houses, which supplied much of the country’s revenue.  Secretary Hay wanted the Sultan to persuade Raisuli to release Perdicaris; if not, or if Perdicaris or his stepson was harmed, the Marines would enter the fray.

On 30 May, Secretary John Hay learned that there was a question about Perdicaris’ citizenship.  Hay was given to understand that Perdicaris was a Greek.  President Roosevelt’s resolve weakened, but he decided to stay the course and attempted to get Britain and France to join the U.S. in a combined military operation.  Neither country was interested because they worked with the Sultan behind the scenes, urging him to accept Raisuli’s terms.  Tensions rose substantially on 2 June when an Italian warship dropped anchor in Tangiers harbor.

The international aspects of the Perdicaris Affair increased on 6 June two when two Spanish warships dropped anchor in Tangier.  Spain’s concern was that the U.S. would attempt to force Tangier into giving the American Navy portage rights.  HMS Prince of Wales arrived two days later.

On 8 June, the Sultan granted Raisuli’s demands by appointing Herid el Barrada as the governor of Tangier.  The appointment angered tribesmen, who raided the home of an Englishman.  Negotiations dragged on as the Sultan removed his troops from Raisuli’s province on the following day.  Tribesmen were still not happy.  On 14 June, an attempt was made to kidnap the Italian Consul.  On 15 June, Raisuli increased his demands to control six (rather than two) Moroccan political districts.  Four days later, the Sultan accepted Raisuli’s demands, and 21 June was the date agreed for the release of Perdicaris and his stepson.

On 20 June, a hitch in negotiations occurred when a man named Zelai, governor of an inland tribe, refused to act as an intermediary.  The ransom money was deposited on 21 June.  On 22 June, Raisuli demanded that the Sultan place another district under his authority.  Although a settlement had already been reached, a cable from Samuel Gummeré accused the Sultan of holding up negotiations.  At the Republican National Convention, Secretary Hay stated, “We want Perdicaris alive, or Raisuli Dead.” There was no doubt that Roosevelt would get the Republican nomination, but Hay’s declaration electrified the convention.  Raisuli released Ion Perdicaris on 24 June.

Afterward, Perdicaris and his family moved to Turnbridge Wells, England  Raisuni used the money he gained from ransoming Perdicaris to build his palace, known as the “House of Tears.”

It was an interesting incident in history.  But the movie was better.

Film Clip: The Wind and the Lion

Handsome Jack of the Marines

Myers John Twiggs 001John Twiggs Myers (29 January 1871—17 April 1952) was the son of Colonel Abraham C. Myers, for whom Fort Myers, Florida is named, the grandson of Major General David E. Twiggs, and the great-grandson of General John Twiggs, a hero of the American Revolutionary War.  Born in Wiesbaden, Germany, Handsome Jack graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1892 and received an appointment as Assistant Engineer two years later. In March 1895, the Marine Corps offered Jack Myers a commission as a second lieutenant.

Despite the fact that few people know of John Twiggs Myers, Hollywood film producers have portrayed this colorful Marine officer in two popular films that were loosely based on his exploits as a “tall, roguishly handsome, global soldier of the sea.”  The first film was titled 55 Days at Peking, starring Charlton Heston in the role of Myers, a chap named Major Matt Lewis commanding American Marines during the Boxer Rebellion. In the second film, The Wind and the Lion, actor Steve Kanaly played the role of Captain Jerome.  In the actual event, Jerome was John Twiggs Myers.

After completing his studies at the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, and just prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the Marine Corps ordered Jack Myers to active duty.  As Commanding Officer of the Marine Detachment, USS Charleston, Myers participated in the capture of Guam from its Spanish garrison, and then later sailed to the Philippine Islands, where he was transferred to USS Baltimore.

During the Philippine-American War, Myers led several amphibious landings against Filipino insurgents, notably at the Battle of Olongapo and the Battle of Zapote River.  His courage under fire in both engagements earned him recognition as an exceptional officer.  The Marine Corps promoted Myers to captain toward the end of 1899.

In May 1900, Captain Myers accompanied the USS Newark to China.  Upon arrival, his navy commanding officer ordered Myers ashore to command a detachment of 48 Marines (including then Private Dan Daly) and 3 sailors.  Myers’ assignment in Peking was to protect the American Legation.  Because of his reputation for intrepidity under fire, the most vulnerable section of Legation’s defense, the so-called Tartar Wall, became Myers’s responsibility.

The Tartar Wall rose to a height of 45 feet with a bulwark of around forty feet in width that overlooked the foreign legation.  Should this edifice fall into Chinese hands, the entire foreign legation would be exposed to the Boxer’s long rifle fires. Each day, Chinese Boxers erected barricades, inching ever closer to the German position (on the eastern wall), and the American position (on the western approach).

Inexplicably, the Germans abandoned their position (and their American counterparts), leaving the Marines to defend the entire section.  At 2 a.m. on the night of 3 July 1900, Captain Myers, supported by 26 British Marines and 15 Russians, led an assault against the Chinese barricade, killing 20 Chinese and expelling the rest of them from the Tartar Wall.  During this engagement, Myers received a serious spear wound to his leg.  As a result of his tenacity under extremely dire conditions, the Marine Corps advanced Myers to the rank of Major and later awarded him the Brevet Medal (See notes), which in 1900 was the equivalent of the Medal of Honor for officers.  At that time, Marine officers were ineligible to receive the Medal of Honor.

Brevet Medal 001While recovering from his wounds, Myers served as Provost Marshal on American Samoa.  He was thereafter assigned to command the Marine Barracks at Bremerton, Washington.

In 1904, Myers commanded the Marine Detachment, USS Brooklyn, sent to Tangiers, Morocco to address the Perdicaris Incident.  Afterward, Major Myers completed the Naval War College, commanded the NCO School at Marine Barracks, Washington, D. C., and later commanded the Barracks for several months.  In August 1906, Major Meyers assumed command of the 1st Marine Regiment in the Philippines.  One year later, the Marine Corps ordered Myers to serve aboard USS West Virginia as Fleet Marine Officer of the Asiatic Fleet.  In 1911, Meyers completed the U. S. Army Field Officer’s School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and after graduating from the Army War College in 1912, Myers assumed command of a battalion with the Second Provisional Brigade at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  A year later he served in command of the Marine Barracks, Honolulu, Hawaii.

In 1916, then Lieutenant Colonel Meyers commanded the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines until assigned as Fleet Marine Officer, U.S. Atlantic Fleet where he served until August 1918.  He then assumed command of the Marine Barracks at Parris Island, South Carolina through November 1918.

In 1921, the Marine Corps appointed Colonel Myers to serve as Inspector General of the Department of the Pacific — serving in that position for three years.  In 1925, Myers assumed command of the 1st Marine Brigade in Haiti.  Following his service as Commanding General, Department of the Pacific in 1935, with 46 years of adventurous service, Major General Myers retired from active service.  In recognition of his distinguished service in 1942, the Marine Corps advanced Jack Myers to the grade of lieutenant general on the retired list.

John Twiggs Myers passed away at the age of 81 at his home in Coconut Grove, Florida on 17 April 1952. He was the last living recipient of the Brevet Medal.

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Notes

1. Myers was one of only 20 Marine Corps officers to receive this medal.