Background
The United States began providing material support to French Indochina starting after the end of World War II. After the defeat of French colonial forces at Điện Biên Phủ (1954), the United States shifted its waste of taxpayer money to the South Vietnam regime headed by Vietnam’s former Prime Minister, Ngô Đình Diệm — who declared himself President of the Republic of South Vietnam. The Vietnam War effectively began with the North Vietnamese-backed Viet Cong insurgency in 1959 – 1960.[1]
The US became even more involved as the military and political situation deteriorated in South Vietnam. Since President Diem refused to comply with American demands, President John F. Kennedy gave his nod to a CIA assassination of President Diem on 2 November 1963. President Kennedy would follow Diem in twenty days.
Following the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in August 1964, the U.S. Pacific Command, under Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, ordered the activation of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (9thMEB). The 3rd Marine Division’s Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General Raymond G. Davis, was directed to assume command of the Brigade, which included the 9th Marine Regiment (Headquarters), three battalion landing teams (BLTs), and an aviation contingent. When deployed at sea, the BLTs fell under the command authority of the Commander, United States Seventh Fleet, Amphibious Ready Group, serving at the Fleet’s Special Landing Force (US 7thFlt ARG/SLF).
When the Gulf of Tonkin crisis faded, one BLT was returned to its home base on Okinawa, another sent to the Philippines to occupy what was called the SLF Camp, and the third BLT remained afloat as part of the 7th Fleet. Brigadier General Davis remained at Subic Bay in the Philippines “in case” hostilities re-erupted.
Meanwhile, the situation in South Vietnam became critical when VC forces defeated the ARVN at Binh Gia in January 1965. It was a communist challenge to the South Vietnamese government and its American ally. Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch assumed command of the 9th Expeditionary Brigade on 22 January. General Karch directed amphibious training exercises involving the first and third battalions (1/9 and 3/9). On 7 February, the VC assaulted the US base at Pleiku, killing 9 Americans, wounding 128 others, and damaging or destroying 25 American aircraft. By presidential decree, Marines were ordered to Da Nang by the end of February to protect the base from enemy (VC) incursions.
Land the Marines
After a delay because of a snag in negotiations with the South Vietnamese government, Karch led his Brigade ashore on 8 March. Soon after landing, 2/9 joined 1/9 and 3/9 at Da Nang. The delay in negotiations involved the naming of the Brigade. Vietnamese officials objected to the use of the word “expeditionary.”[2] Consequently, the Brigade was re-designated 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade.
Once General Karch moved his flag ashore in Vietnam, he came under the direct authority of the Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), US Army General William Westmoreland.
Two months later, American Marines and units of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) secured the area surrounding Chu Lai to establish an airfield/base support area capable of supporting high-performance aircraft.
Based on the anticipated escalation of hostilities in Vietnam, the U.S. Pacific Command reactivated the III Amphibious Corps (from World War II), designating it as the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF). The Commanding General III MAF was Major General William R. Collins. A month later, Headquarters Marine Corps replaced Collins with Major General Lewis W. Walt, who commanded the MAF and the 3rd Marine Division. Westmoreland ordered III MAF/3rdMarDiv to assume command authority over all US military activities in the northernmost province of South Vietnam, also known as the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ).
General Westmoreland ordered Major General Walt to undertake offensive operations in conjunction with the South Vietnamese military as a matter of priority. Walt demurred, reminding Westmoreland that Marine Corps activities in Vietnam were restricted by a letter of instruction (dated 6 May 1965). Specifically, the U.S. Marines could only assist the ARVN or Vietnamese Marine Corps if they were “heavily engaged with a VC force.”
General Westmoreland told Walt to “rewrite the LOI” to specify the authority Walt thought he needed to get the job done — and he (Westmoreland) would grant that authority. On 6 August, General Walt received official permission to take the offensive against the Viet Cong forces. A week later, the 7th Marine Regiment arrived in Vietnam. Walt intended to employ that regiment against the 1st Viet Cong Regiment — the enemy unit responsible for destroying the hamlet of Ba Gia, twenty miles south of Chu Lai.
Turning up the heat
After the attack on Ba Gia, US intelligence agencies located the 1st VC Regiment in the mountains west of the hamlet, reports indicated that the regiment was once more on the march and a threat to US and ARVN military units at Chu Lai. Acting on this intelligence, the 4th Marine Regiment conducted a one-battalion operation with the ARVN 51st Infantry Regiment (1st ARVN Division) along the Trà Bồng River. The name of this operation was Thunderbolt. It was a two-day search and destroy mission.
US and ARVN units found little evidence of a significant VC presence and encountered only scattered resistance. Eight days later, Allied intelligence confirmed the location of the 1st VC Regiment. On 15 August, a deserter from the regiment surrendered to the ARVN. During this soldier’s interrogation at the I Corps headquarters of ARVN General Nguyễn Chánh Thi, he revealed that the regiment established its base of operations in the Van Tuong village complex on the South Vietnamese sea coast, twelve miles south of Chu Lai. The source said that the communist regiment was planning to attack Chu Lai.
Additionally, the source revealed that the regiment consisted of two of its three battalions (the 60th and 80th) with reinforcing units. In all, the regiment hosted 1,500 fighters. General Thi believed the prisoner was speaking the truth and relayed this information to Major General Walt. At about the same time, Walt’s headquarters (Intel Section) separately corroborated this information. Convinced that the airfield was in danger of an attack, Walt consulted with his senior advisors (Karch, Colonel McClanahan (CO 4th Marines), and Colonel Peatross (CO 7th Marines) and decided on a spoiling attack in the Van Tuong region.
Starlite[3]
Within a two-day period, Walt’s operational staff coordinated with subordinate regiments to design a plan of attack. The operational concept dictated a two-battalion assault. One battalion would make an amphibious landing, and another would make a vertical insertion (helicopter assault) further inland. The two operational battalions would be under the control of Colonel Peatross. The assault units included Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. Fisher’s 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines (2/4), and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Muir’s 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines (3/3).
General Walt wanted a third (floating) battalion in reserve. He requested assistance from the 7th Fleet, who granted permission to employ the SLF battalion, then located at Subic Bay. Given the distance between South Vietnam and the Philippines, Walt scheduled the operation for 18 August 1965.
Because the Vietnamese military was infamous for leaking classified information to the enemy, Walt’s headquarters never communicated details of the operation to the ARVN Joint General Staff in Saigon until after the operation had begun. Only General Thi and the ARVN 2nd Infantry Division commander, General Hoàng Xuân Lãm, knew about the action — but only because it was essential to keep ARVN troops out of the operational area.
Colonel Peatross directed aerial surveillance of the area, including amphibious landing sites and the intended helicopter landing zones (LZs). Three LZs were designated four miles east of Route 1 and one mile inland from the coast. From those landing sites, the Marines would move northeast to the South China Sea — destroying any communists they found in the way. The purpose of the amphibious landing group was to serve as a blocking force to prevent the enemy from escaping to the south.
Third Battalion, 3rd Marines (3/3) was to make an amphibious landing at 0630 on 18 August with India and Kilo Companies abreast. Mike Company would move overland from Chu Lai to a ridgeline blocking position in the northern portion of the operational area, 4 miles northwest. Lima Company was detailed as the battalion reserve.
Soon after H-Hour (the time of the scheduled amphibious landing), UH-34 (helicopters) from HMM-261 and HMM-361 began shuttling elements of 2/4 into the three LZs.[4] The two battalions would join forces when Hotel Company 2/4 (LZ Blue) linked up with India Company 3/3 outside An Cuong, roughly 3/4 of a mile inland from Green Beach. From there, the Marines would sweep to the sea through Van Tuong. Artillery located at Chu Lai would support the operation, along with two US Navy destroyers, USS Orleck and USS Prichett, and the cruiser, USS Galveston. Fixed-wing aircraft from Marine Aircraft Group 11 (MAG-11) and MAG-12 would provide close air support.
The Fight
At 1000 on 17 August, Marines from Mike Company 3/3 boarded amphibian tractors (LVTP-5s) at Chu Lai and moved along the coast to the Trun Phan Peninsula. They then marched four miles south, where the company established its blocking position. The company only encountered minor resistance (occasional snipers and booby traps). Before dawn the following day, Company M was in place. Since Marine security patrols were common in this area, there were no unusual activities for a communist observer to report.
At 1700 on 17 August, Colonel Peatross and the rest of 3/3 embarked on three ships of the ARG (Bayfield, Cabildo, and Vernon County). Three Flame Tanks attached to the 7th Marines and a platoon of five M-48 tanks assigned to Colonel Fisher’s battalion boarded Landing Craft Mechanized (LCMs), which sailed independently toward the amphibious objective area.
The task force first sailed east to deceive any VC observers in coastal water sampans. Once they were over the horizon, however, the ships changed course to the southwest. By 0500 on 18 August, all ships were at the amphibious objective area. Galveston and Orleck provided naval artillery support to the landing.
At 0615 (15 minutes before H-Hour), Battery K 4th Battalion, 12th Marines (4/12) began to deliver preparatory fires in the areas surrounding the LZs. Marine artillery augmented 20 Marine Corps A-4s and F-4s, which dropped 18 tons of bombs and napalm on the designated LZs. Marines limited their preparation of the beach landing zone to air delivered 20mm cannon fire from MAG-12 to protect innocents in the village of An Cuong.
When the Marines stormed ashore, elements of Kilo Company received enemy sniper fire from its right flank. When two platoons rushed the area, the VC wisely withdrew. Kilo Company’s third platoon secured the northern half of An Cuong. Golf Company landed at LZ Red at 0645; Fox Company and the battalion command element landed at LZ White, and Hotel Company arrived at LZ Blue 40 minutes later.
On the beach, LtCol Muir’s 3/3 was joined by Colonel Peatross’ command element at around 0730; at about the same time, tanks and Ontos rolled ashore from the LCMs. Lima Company came ashore and established perimeter security around the Regimental Command Post and logistics sections.
Once ashore, Marines experienced light resistance from VC elements. Company G searched two hamlets in the vicinity of LZ Red and then advanced northeast and linked up with Company M. Company E encountered stiff enemy small-arms resistance at LZ White from positions on a ridgeline east-northeast of the landing zone, which included mortar and machine gun fire. Echo Company Marines spotted around a hundred enemies in the open and called in artillery from 3/12. After the barrage, ten or so remaining VC quickly withdrew from the field, and Echo Company pushed toward the ridgeline.
Along the coastline, Kilo Company advanced to a phase line a mile north of Green Beach. At that location, a well-entrenched VC force blocked the Marine advance. Muir ordered Lima Company to advance and, after coming online with Kilo Company, assaulted the enemy position. With the aid of supporting arms, 3/3 seized the high ground.
The central action, however, occurred in the south near LZ Blue and the line between 3/3 and 2/4. This area was roughly one square kilometer, bound by the hamlets of An Thoi (north), Nam Yen (south), and An Cuong (east). It was a patchwork of rice paddies, streams, hedgerows, wooded and built-up areas. Human footpaths lead off in all directions. Two small knolls dominated the flat terrain — designated Hill 43 (a few hundred meters southwest of Nam Yen) and Hill 30 (400 meters north of An Cuong). LZ Blue was located just south of Nam Yen, between Hill 43 and the hamlet.
The Hotel Company (2/4) LZ was almost on top of the enemy’s 60th Battalion. VC allowed the first helicopters to touch down with little interference but opened fire as the other aircraft attempted to set down. Three US Army UH-1B gunships from the 7th Airlift Platoon took the VC on Hill 43 under fire while Company H formed a defensive perimeter around the LZ. The Commanding Officer of Company H was First Lieutenant Homer K. Jenkins. He was initially unaware of the size of the enemy force and ordered a platoon to seize Hill 43 while the rest of his company secured Nam Yen. Platoons attacking elements of a rifle battalion is not an even fight, so the attacks stalled under massive enemy defensive fires.
Realizing he was attacking a bee’s nest, Jenkins recalled his platoons and regrouped. He called for air support against the VC hill position and within Nam Yen. After these strikes, he again assaulted the hill with three platoons of somewhat irritated Marines.
The Viet Cong fought tenaciously, but the Marines (reinforced by close air support and tanks) were too strong. After taking the hill, Jenkins took one prisoner and collected more than forty small arms weapons.
Lieutenant Jenkins’ call for air support caused a momentary halt to the advance of India Company, 3/3, at a streambed east of Nam Yen. Bomb fragments slightly wounded two Marines. After the air strike, India Company moved north along the stream for around 500 meters to a point opposite An Cuong. India Company’s skipper was Captain Bruce D. Webb. He requested permission to assault An Cuong, even though the hamlet was in 2/4’s TAOR. After consulting with Peatross, Muir approved Webb’s request.
An Cuong was a well-fortified hamlet ideally suited to VC combat tactics. The area surrounding the hamlet was heavily wooded with severely restricted fields of fire. The only open spaces were the rice paddies — but even those were interspersed by hedgerows of hardwood and bamboo thickets. An Cuong consisted of 25-30 huts, with fighting holes and camouflaged trench lines connected by interlocking tunnels. As the company cleared the first few huts, a grenade exploded, killing Webb and wounding three other Marines.
No sooner had the grenade exploded than two enemy mortars fell on the advancing Marines, inflicting three more casualties. With Webb’s death, First Lieutenant Richard M. Purnell assumed command and committed the company’s reserve platoon. India Company’s aggressive assault enabled the Marines to gain the upper hand, and enemy resistance slackened as the Marines began securing the hamlet.
Making a hurried assessment of battle damage, Purnell counted fifty VC bodies. With An Cuong in American hands, Purnell radioed for further instructions. Colonel Muir ordered India Company to join with Kilo, which was still engaged at the phase line, a little more than a mile northeast of An Cuong.
Company H 2/4 remained near Nam Yen to eradicate enemy opposition; once accomplished, the company would link up with 3/3. While India 3/3 maneuvered through An Cuong, Colonel Peatross committed one company of his reserve battalion to the fight. India Company 3/7 (aboard USS Iwo Jima) was flown ashore by HMM-163 shortly after 0930.
As India 3/3 prepared to move from An Cuong, VC small arms fire, shot down a UH-1E gunship from VMO-2 northeast of the hamlet. Lieutenant Purnell detailed two rifle squads and three tanks to remain behind to protect the downed helicopter. As the company departed An Cuong, Purnell observed Hotel Company under Lieutenant Jenkins proceeding into an open rice paddy between Nam Yen and An Cuong. Jenkins mistakenly assumed that Nam Yen was already pacified. It wasn’t.
From position within Nam Yen and Hill 30, VC opened fire with small arms and machine gun fire, catching Hotel Company’s rear guard in a crossfire. At about the same time, mortars began falling on Hotel Company’s lead platoons. Jenkins and his Marines were taking fire from all directions. Tanks and Ontos were having trouble getting through the muck of the rice paddies. Once Jenkins formed his armor into a tight circle, he began deploying his infantry. One squad moved northwest of Nam Yen and killed nine communists operating mortars, but intense concentrations of small arms fire forced them back.
At around 1400, Lieutenant Jenkins realized that his position was untenable. He called for supporting arms and withdrew his company to LZ Blue. Marine artillery destroyed whatever aesthetic value existed in Nam Yen, and F-4 and A-4 aircraft blasted Hill 30. As the Marines withdrew, incoming medevac helicopters forced the lead platoon to alter its course.
As the platoon maneuvered toward the company’s flank, VC forces took the Marines under fire. At this juncture, the beleaguered platoon unexpectedly linked up with Purnell’s helicopter security detail which had started to move toward its parent company after the downed helicopter had been repaired and flown out. A VC unit quickly engaged the small force, but the two Marine units fought to An Cuong together. Meanwhile, Jenkins and his other two platoons fought a delaying action and withdrew to LZ Blue, arriving at around 16:30. Colonel Fisher directed Jenkins to establish a defensive perimeter and await reinforcements.
The promised reinforcements never arrived because those Marines had been diverted earlier to aid an ambushed supply column some 400 meters west of An Cuong. Just before noon, Muir had ordered his executive officer, Major Andrew G. Comer, to dispatch an LVT to resupply India 3/3, which was only around 300 yards in front of the battalion command post. Although thoroughly briefed on their route of march, the supply train became lost between Nam Yen and An Thoi. It was at that time when the VC opened fire with recoilless rifles.
The vehicles backed off the road and turned their weapons to face the VC. Using all their weapons, the troops held off the closing VC infantry. The Marine’s rear vehicle was a flame tank. As the Marines aimed their weapon, an enemy mortar rendered it inoperable.
The battle raged, and the Marines were in danger of being overrun by VC infantry. One track driver, however, panicked under fire and kept his mic button depressed while pleading for reinforcements. He effectively cut off the command element’s ability to ascertain exactly what was happening. This went on for more than an hour. Muir finally ordered Comer to lead a rescue mission to prevent the VC from separating 3/3 and 2/4.
Major Comer planned to employ a rapidly moving tank, LVTP-5, and an Ontos, speed through An Cuong, and blast enemy positions into submission. Before completing his briefing, however, the out-of-action flame tank returned to the 3/3 CP. The tank commander, a staff sergeant, reported that he had just come through An Cuong without incident, and he volunteered to lead the rescue mission to the stalled column.
Comer’s force moved out at around 1300 hours. Just after cresting Hill 30, enemy recoilless rifle fire stopped the M-48 Tank, causing the following vehicles to jam up. The enemy used this opportunity to deliver devastating mortar fire on the rescue group. Within mere moments, enemy fire killed five Marines and wounded another 17. Marine infantry quickly dismounted the LVTP-5’s and the accompanying Ontos maneuvered to provide frontal fire and protect the flanks while artillery and air support assaulted the enemy’s positions. VC fire diminished almost immediately, and India 3/3 resumed its advance toward An Cuong, leaving a squad to help guard casualties until they could be aero-medically evacuated.
India Company entered An Cuong against little resistance, but Major Comer’s command group ‘bravo’ was caught by intense fire from a wooded area on their right flank and was forced to take what cover they could in the open rice paddies. At the same time, the Marines came upon the two reinforced squads from India Company left behind to guard the downed Huey and the platoon from Hotel Company. The two India Company squads fought to Hill 30, where they were evacuated. The platoon from Hotel Company remained in the rice paddy.
As the intensity of the battle increased, Peatross ordered a halt to the advance of the units from LZs Red and White along the coast to prevent the regiment from being over-extended. Lima Company 3/7 arrived at 1730 and was placed under the operational control of Lieutenant Colonel Muir. He sent the company to reinforce India 3/3 in its search for the missing supply column.
With two tanks in support, Lima Company moved out. While advancing through the open rice paddies of An Cuong, the Marines came under heavy fire, taking four killed in action and 14 wounded. Being Marines, however, Lima Company persevered until the VC broke contact at nightfall. Peatross later reasoned that adding a third Marine company and supporting arms forced the 60th Battalion to break contact. That evening, Galveston and Orleck illuminated Nam Yen and An Cuong.
The Marines persevered, and the VC broke contact as night fell. Adding a third Marine company to the area and the weight of supporting arms forced the VC 60th Battalion to break contact. Anticipating night attacks, Marines requested continuous illumination over Nam Yen and An Cuong from the Galveston and Orleck.
Colonel Peatross informed General Walt that, in his opinion, the VC intended to defend selected positions rather than massing available forces. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Muir decided that it was too risky to continue searching for the missing supply column that night, especially after having learned that the column, although immobilized, was no longer in danger. Muir ordered Lima Company to move to the phase line and join up with Kilo and Lima 3/3. Muir also ordered India to return to the command post. With fourteen dead and 53 wounded, their fight was over.
During the night of 18 August, Colonel Peatross brought the rest of the BLT 3/7 (SLF) ashore. India 3/7 arrived at the regimental CP at around 1800. The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Bodley, arrived soon after. Just after midnight, Mike 3/7 landed across Green Beach from the USS Talladega. With the arrival of his third rifle battalion, Peatross completed his plan for the next day.
Peatross intended that Muir’s 3/3 would attack northeast from the phase line, while Fisher’s 2/4 drove eastward to the sea, there joining up with 3/3
At 0730, Colonel Muir’s 3/3 (with Kilo and Lima companies abreast and Lima 3/7 in reserve) attacked northeast from the phase line. Colonel Fisher’s 2/4 (with Echo and Golf companies) drove eastward to the sea, joining Hotel 3/3. Hotel and India companies and Major Comer’s group would withdraw to the regimental command post. The remainder of 3/7 would fill the gap, with India and Mike companies extracting the ambushed supply column and moving toward An Thoi to establish a blocking position to prevent the VC from escaping to the south. Mike Company 3/3 would block any VC escape further north.
19 August 1965
Marines from 3/7 moved into its zone of action (which included the area of the fiercest fighting of the day before), finding that the VC had melted away. At 0900, India and Mike Companies departed the regimental CP and moved through An Cuong but met no VC resistance. By 1500, the missing supply column had been extracted, and a blocking position was in place by An Thoi. Although much of the VC presence had disappeared, there were still pockets of stiff opposition when they launched their combined assaults earlier in the morning.
As always in Vietnam, flat terrain proved difficult. Rice paddies (ringed by dikes and hedgerows) hindered control, observation, and maneuverability. The VC were holed up in bunkers, trenches, and caves scattered throughout the area. As Marines swept through the area, VC snipers fired on them from their rear. Marines had to dig out the VC or blow up tunnels. By 1030, Echo and Kilo companies linked up, and the two battalions continued their advance to the sea. By nightfall, 2/4 had completed its sweep to the Phuoc Thuan Peninsula, and organized enemy resistance ceased.
Aftermath
Although the regiment completed the cordon phase, General Walt directed that the operation continue for another five days so Allied forces could systematically search the entire area. Walt believed that some Viet Cong remained behind in underground hiding places. As BLT 2/4 and 3/3 returned to Chu Lai on the 20th of the month, BLT 1/7 joined 3/7 and elements of the 2nd ARVN Division to continue the search.
Between 18 – 24 August, U.S. Marines located and destroyed 614 enemy soldiers, captured nine prisoners, held, and interrogated 42 suspected communists, and collected 109 assorted weapons. Marine losses included 45 killed and 203 wounded.
Significant awards during the operation included:
Medal of Honor — Corporal Robert E. O’Malley (3/3), Lance Corporal Joe C. Paul (2/4).
Navy Cross — Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Muir
Silver Star — First Lieutenant Richard M. Purnell
Operation Starlite was the United States’ first major battle in Vietnam. COMUSMACV touted the battle as a victory for the United States, but the VC also claimed victory, insisting that they had inflicted 900 American casualties, destroyed 22 tanks, and downed 13 helicopters. The Marines in Vietnam didn’t have 22 tanks — ever.
Not everyone in the United States agreed with General Westmoreland’s assessment. President Johnson was both embarrassed and upset with the Marines for having lost a resupply detachment at a critical moment in the battle.[5] Working for the Associated Press, Peter Arnett made sure that everyone in the United States who could read found out about it. Headquarters Marine Corps denied the story.
One important takeaway, however, was that the battle forced the Marines to realize that a daily allotment of water of two gallons/per man/per day was inadequate in the sweltering heat of Vietnam.
Notes:
[1] The Viet Cong (VC) was the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam — an armed communist organization operating in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The NLF fought under the direction of the communist government of North Vietnam.
[2] South Vietnamese leadership objected to the term “expeditionary” because that was how the French identified their colonial forces after 1945. By 1965, the Vietnamese had had their fill of French cuisine.
[3] Initially, the operation was to be called Satellite, but a power outage caused a clerk, using only candlelight, to type Starlite instead.
[4] HMM = Marine Medium Helicopter
[5] This is because President Johnson never heard a shot fired in anger in his entire life.
Fix Bayonets! 
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