The Quế Sơn Valley, located in Quảng Nam Province, is bounded by mountain ranges north, south, and west. It extends some 24 miles from east to west from Route 1 to Hiệp Đức. The Ly Ly River and Routes 534 and 535 traverses most of the valley’s length. In 1965/1966, the valley supported a Vietnamese population of around 60,000 farmers and salt miners. Whoever held Quế Sơn Valley owned the keys to the struggle for the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ).
The struggle for the Quế Sơn Valley began in December 1965 (Operation Harvest Moon) and February 1966 (Operation Double Eagle II). Brigadier General William A. Stiles, USMC, reported to the 1st Marine Division in late April to assume the duties of Assistant Division Commander, 1stMarDiv. Shortly after his arrival, the Division Commander directed Stiles to assume command of Task Force X-Ray. His mission was to plan for and direct a reconnaissance-in-force in the region of Đỗ Xá, South Vietnam.[1]
In June, the Commanding General III Marine Amphibious Force and Commanding General 1stMarDiv received intelligence information compiled by the U.S. Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (USMACV) indicating that a suspected enemy base of operations was operating some thirty miles southwest of Chu Lai, near the western border of I CTZ. MACV placed the headquarters of the enemy’s Military Region v in the area of Đỗ Xá. They had been asking for Marine Corps intervention for several months. Army intelligence had wanted Marines to mount an operation throughout the Valley for several months.
After a few unavoidable delays, Stiles and his staff completed their plan of action but almost immediately became aware of the presence of an entire enemy combat division within the Quế Sơn Valley. The 620th NVA Division operated with three full-strength infantry regiments (3rd, 21st, and 1st VC) in the area straddling the Quang Tin/Quang Nam provinces northwest of Chu Lai. Stiles’ reconnaissance operation, designated Operation KANSAS, was placed on hold until the Marines could address a significant enemy presence close to Chu Lai.
But on June 13, 1966, the III MAF Commander directed the 1stMarDiv to commence an extensive reconnaissance campaign between Tam Kỳ and Hiệp Đức. Stiles was ordered to plan for a joint combat operation with the 2nd ARVN Division. The plan called for the aerial insertion of six Marine reconnaissance teams from the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion and an additional 1st Force Reconnaissance Company team into selected landing zones (LZs) to determine the extent of NVA penetrations.
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J. Sullivan (1920 – 1995), the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (1stRecon) commander, would exercise control over all reconnaissance missions. On schedule, a thirteen-man team was airlifted to Nui Loc Son, a small mountain in the center of the Quế Sơn Valley (seven miles northeast of Hiệp Đức. Another eighteen-man team landed on the Nui Vu hill mass that dominates the terrain ten miles west of Tam Kỳ.
These initial landings would be followed up the next morning by two teams to the higher ground south of the valley, two teams to the northwest of the valley, and one in the south of Hiệp Đức. The last team would parachute onto Hill 555, east of the Tranh River. These Marines experienced a single injury as one of the team twisted his ankle upon contact with Terra Firma.
As the operation evolved, the 1st Force Recon Company parachutists were the first to be extracted. After landing, these Marines followed procedure by burying their parachutes and then moved away to establish observation posts. At around 1400 hours, the Marines observed an estimated forty enemy soldiers undergoing tactical training. Four hours later, a woodcutter team appeared with a sentry dog. The animal alerted on the buried parachutes, and a short time later, an enemy combat patrol appeared to be searching for the Marines. The Recon Team Leader, 1stLt Jerome T. Paull, requested that his men be extracted. These Marines were airlifted back to Chu Lai.
The 18-man team inserted on Nui Vu was led by Staff Sergeant Jimmie E. Howard, USMC. After their insertion on June 13, Howard found the hill an excellent observation platform, and for the next two days, Howard’s team reported extensive enemy activities. This team, supported by an ARVN 105mm Howitzer Battery (located seven miles south of Nui Vu), was able to call in artillery missions on “targets of opportunity.”
Staff Sergeant Howard, a seasoned combat veteran, exercised care to only call artillery missions when an American aircraft spotter or helicopter was in the region, but the enemy was aware of the presence of these Marines and was determined to neutralize the threat.
On the 14th, the NVA began organizing a force to attack the post. On the night of June 15, a U.S. Army Special Forces Team leading a South Vietnamese irregular defense group (popular forces) radioed a warning to General Stiles’ command post (C.P.) — a company-sized unit of between 200 and 250 NVA soldiers closing in on the Marine reconnaissance unit on Hill 448. Word was passed down to the platoon leader, Staff Sergeant Jimmie L. Howard, USMC, through his parent unit, Company C, 1st Recon Battalion, 1st Marine Division.
Later that night, between 2130 and 2330, Lance Corporal Ricardo C. Binns, USMC, detected the sound of troops marshaling for an assault and fired the first shots from his M-14 Rifle. The NVA quickly closed in, surrounding the Marine perimeter. The enemy closed in because they had learned through practical experience that the closer they were to the Marines, the less likely they would become targets of USMC Close Air Support (CAS). Unlike the Air Force, Marine pilots routinely flew CAS missions at tree top level (give or take five inches).
After Corporal Binns opened fire, outpost Marines withdrew from their listening posts to reposition themselves within the rocky knoll. Automatic weapons fire from a DShK machine gun (shown right) and 60mm mortar fire kept the Marines from maneuvering away from their hilltop positions. After their initial fire, the NVA tossed hand grenades into the Marine positions, followed by a short-lived frontal assault. The Marine’s well-aimed rifle fire repelled the enemy’s assault, causing the communists to fall back. After reorganizing, the NVA assaulted the Marines again and again — each time being pushed back by the Marine’s murderous fire.
Near midnight, Staff Sergeant Howard radioed his company commander, Captain Tim Geraghty, to ask for an extraction and close air support. These requests were delayed at the III MAF Direct Air Support Center (DASC).[2] The violence of the enemy attack convinced Howard that his team was being overrun, so he again called for assistance. Colonel Sullivan radioed Howard to reassure him that help was on the way.
At around 0200, a Marine C-47 (DC-3) arrived on station and began dropping flares to light up the area and prepare for the arrival of fixed-wing and rotor gunships. Jet aircraft screamed in and dropped their bombs and napalm within 100 meters of the Marine perimeter. Helicopter gunships from VMO-6 strafed to within twenty meters of the Marine perimeter.
At 0300, enemy ground fire drove off a flight of MAG-36 helicopters that were trying to extract Howard’s Marines. When that attempt failed, Colonel Sullivan informed Howard that he should not expect reinforcements until dawn and urged him to hold on as best he could.
By then, the fight devolved into small, scattered, individual fights between Marine defenders and probing enemies. The NVA, wary of U.S. aircraft, decided against organizing another mass assault but continued to fire at the Marines throughout the night. Enemy snipers had placed themselves close to and above the Marine’s defenses.
Staff Sergeant Howard’s Marines were running out of ammunition; their situation was critical. Howard ordered his men to fire only well-aimed single shots at the enemy. The Marines complied with their team leaders’ instructions but also began throwing rocks at suspected enemy positions, hoping the enemy would think that the Marines were lobbing in grenades. By 0400, every Marine in Howard’s team had been wounded; six Marines lay dead. Staff Sergeant Howard was struck in the back by a ricochet, which temporarily paralyzed his legs. Unable to stand, Howard pulled himself from one fighting hole to the next, encouraging his men and directing their fire.
At dawn on June 16, UH-34s, with Huey gunship cover, successfully landed Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (C/1/5) at the base of Nui Vu. The helicopter piloted by Major William J. Goodsell, the Commanding Officer of VMO-6, was shot down. While Goodsell was successfully evacuated, he later died from his wounds.
Charlie Company encountered enemy resistance as it moved to relieve Howard’s team. When Charlie Company’s lead element reached Howard’s position, he shouted a warning to “get down” because enemy snipers were helping themselves to any Marine that appeared in their rear sight aperture. The company commander, First Lieutenant Marshal “Buck” Darling, later reported that when he arrived at Howard’s position, every Marine still alive had armed themselves with enemy AK-47s taken from dead communists lying within the Marine perimeter.
Everyone associated with the defensive operation assumed that Howard and his men had held off an NVA rifle company. Military intelligence later clarified that Howard’s 18 Marines had held off a battalion of NVA regulars from the 3rd NVA Regiment. The enemy continued to battle the Marines for the hill until around noon and then disengaged. When the enemy pulled out, they left behind 42 dead. Charlie Company lost two KIA and two WIA.
Meanwhile, General Stiles’ completed plan of action involved eight battalions (four Marine and four ARVN) with air and artillery support. The initial assault force included two battalions from the 5th Marines and two Vietnamese Army battalions. Stiles and his Vietnamese counterpart would control the action from Tam Kỳ. Anticipating the need for massive firepower, Stiles prepositioned artillery units from Da Nang and Chu Lai into forward firing positions on Hill 29, west of the railroad line seven miles north of Tam Kỳ.
The 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (3/1) accompanied artillery units from Da Nang and provided security for the artillery positions on Hill 29 and Thang Binh. Artillery support units included HQ Battery 4/11 (command and control), Kilo Battery 4/12 (6 155mm Howitzers at Hill 29), and Provisional Yankee Battery 4/12 (2 155mm Howitzers) at Thang Binh.
On the morning of June 17, the South Vietnamese military high command notified the Marines that the two Vietnamese infantry battalions would not participate in the Marine Corps operation. Accordingly, Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt (III MAF) delayed Operation Kansas again — and then modified General Stiles’ plan of action.[3] Rather than a multi-battalion heliborne operation in the Quế Sơn Valley, Walt elected to continue the reconnaissance in force. Note: Walt’s decision placed fewer than 1,800 Marines against an entire NVA infantry division.
The Fifth Marines (5thMar) remained at Chu Lai, ready to support the Recon Marines on-call. Stiles continued in command of the operation. He repositioned some of his assets to provide better coverage for the recon teams. On June 18, Kilo 4/11 (4 155mm guns) joined the other artillery units on Hill 29, and an additional provisional battery from the 12th Marines deployed to a new firing position 6,000 meters from Thang Binh. Kilo 4/12 joined the new provisional battery the next day. On June 19, CH-46 aircraft lifted two 105mm howitzers from Chu Lai to the Tien Phuoc Special Forces Camp, some 30 miles distant. Operational control of 3/1 was transferred to the 5th Marines.
With these support units repositioned, Colonel Sullivan shifted his CP to Tien Phuoc. For the next ten days, the reconnaissance battalion (reinforced) continued to conduct extensive patrolling operations throughout the Quế Sơn Valley. Twenty-five recon teams were involved in this operation.
Operation Kansas, which officially began on June 17, ended on June 22nd when General Stiles relocated his command post. Marine infantry participation, with the exception of the relief of Staff Sergeant Howard’s platoon, was confined to a one-company exploitation of a B-52 Arc Light strike on June 21, some 3,500 meters east of Hiệp Đức.[4] Despite Operation Kansas’s official end on June 22, Marines remained in the area for six additional days.
Four of Howard’s Marines were awarded the Navy Cross: Corporal Binns, Hospital Man Second Class Billee Don Holmes, Corporal Jerrald Thompson, and Lance Corporal John Adams. Thompson and Adams, killed in action, were awarded posthumous medals. Silver Star Medals were awarded to the remaining thirteen Marines, four posthumously, along with two Marines from Charlie Company, also posthumously.
Staff Sergeant Howard received a meritorious combat promotion to Gunnery Sergeant and was later awarded the Medal of Honor—our nation’s highest combat award. Howard was eventually promoted to First Sergeant, retired from the Marine Corps in 1977, and became a high school football coach. He passed away in 1993, aged 64.
Notes:
[1] Stiles graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Class of 1939, and was an officer with extensive combat experience.
[2] The DASC is the principal USMC aviation command and control system and the air control agency responsible for directing air operations directly supporting ground forces. It functions in a decentralized mode of operations but is directly supervised by the Marine Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) or Navy Tactical Air Control Center (NTACC). The parent unit of DASCs is the Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS) of the Marine Air Control Group (MACG).
[3] Lew Walt (1913 – 1989) served in World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam. During his military service, he was awarded two Navy Cross medals, two Navy Distinguished Service medals, the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit (with Combat V), the Bronze Star (with Combat V), and two Purple Heart medals. Following his promotion to four-star general and service as the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Walt retired in 1971. General Walt passed away on March 26, 1989.
[4] Following the Arc Light strike, Echo Company 2/5 surveyed the strike area and found no evidence of a large body of enemy forces.
Back at Phu Bai, Lieutenant Colonel Ernest C. Cheatham reviewed Marine Corps urban combat doctrine, which recommended staying off the streets and moving forward by blasting through walls and buildings. Accordingly, he continued to gather the necessary equipment he would need to accomplish his mission, including M20 Rocket Launchers, M40 106mm Recoilless Rifles (mounted on flatbed vehicles called “mules”), C-4 explosives, flamethrowers, tear gas, and gas masks.
Cheatham received this equipment early in the afternoon of February 3. After a council of war, Cheatham deployed his battalion to recapture the southern section of Huế. Many Marines serving under Task Force X-Ray had no previous combat experience in urban warfare/close-quarters combat. Because of the cultural and religious significance of Huế City, Allied forces were ordered not to bomb or shell the city. In any case, seasonal monsoons prevented allied forces from employing air support. However, as the intensity of the battle increased, the “no bombing” restriction was lifted.
The NVA’s tactics were to remain as close to the Marines as possible, which enemy planners imagined would negate the effective use of artillery and close air support. The NVA maintained a forward fighting line directly opposite the Marine’s positions, with a secondary line only two blocks to the rear. Snipers and machine guns intensely defended each building within the battle zone.
The enemy also prepared spider holes (fox holes) in gardens and streets to create crossed fires between all buildings and streets. If the Marines penetrated the forward line, the NVA would withdraw to the secondary line, and the business would begin anew. At dusk, the NVA and VC would attempt to reinfiltrate their former positions.
On the night of February 3, the NVA commander, seeing the buildup of Marines at Huế University, thinned out his frontline forces, leaving just a platoon to defend the Treasury building and adjacent Post Office. Then, on the morning of February 4, when the Marines launched their attack on the Treasury building, murderous enemy crossfires penned the Marines down for hours.
The only way to break out of their stalemate was to blow a hole into the side of buildings and clear it, room by room. These actions were costly to the Marines performing such missions, but they were also costly to the overall operation because the process was time-consuming. Under cover of tear gas and the residue of overwhelming M48 and M40 fires, Marines were able to cross city streets to employ plastique explosives and rocket launchers.
Slowly but steadily, Marines pushed into the Treasury building, post office, and the Jeanne d’Arc High School, killing the enemy in massive numbers. Marines also suffered the fate of combat. Company A 1/1 lost half of his men (wounded and killed) in a single day’s fighting. In addition to locating the enemy and destroying them, Marines also rescued and protected Vietnamese civilians trapped by the NVA and VC assault. That evening, VC sappers succeeded in blowing up the An Cuu bridge, cutting the road link to Phu Bai.
Following the capture of the Treasury, Cheatham continued his methodical advance to the west, leading with tear gas, M48s, and Ontos—followed by Mules and Marine grunts. As NVA-VC’s manpower and ammunition were depleted, resistance lessened. The enemy no longer tenaciously defended each building; they relied more on sniper fire, mortars, and rockets.
On February 5, Marines recaptured the Huế Central Hospital complex, rescuing Lieutenant Colonel Pham Van Khoa (the Mayor of Huế and Thua Thien Province chief), hiding in the grounds. The next day, Marines attacked the Provincial Headquarters, which served as the command post of the NVA 4th Regiment. While the Marines were seizing the surrounding walls, the area between the wall and buildings was covered by fire from every enemy-held window and spider-hole inside the grounds.
Marines sent an Ontos forward to blast an entry into the building, but the enemy disabled it with a B-40 rocket. Next, the Marines sent a Mule forward to blow a hole in the building, which allowed the Marines to advance under cover of tear gas. Once they entered the building, Marines fought room by room to clear out the enemy — but many of the NVA slipped away. After securing the building, Marines cleared the spider-holes, giving no quarter to their occupants.
To celebrate their victory, Marines raised an American flag, but they were ordered to lower it because Vietnamese law prohibited the flying of any foreign flag unless the flag of the Republic of Vietnam accompanied it.
After resting his men at the Provincial Headquarters, Cheatham advanced west toward the Phu Cam Canal. He swung south and east to clear the area with the canal to his right. On February 7, the NVA twice ambushed a 25-vehicle supply convoy on Route 547 from Phu Bai to the 11th Marines firebase Rocket Crusher. The 11th Marines provided artillery support to Allied forces fighting in and around Huế.
Enemy ambuscades killed twenty Marines and wounded thirty-nine. NVA sappers finally succeeded in destroying the Trường Tiền bridge, which restricted all movement between the old and new cities. NVA forces in the new town, worn down by more than a week of constant combat and effectively cut off from their comrades on the other side of the river, began to abandon the city slowly. The 815th and 2nd Sapper Battalions moved to the southern side of the Phu Cam Canal, joining the 818th Battalion. The 804th Battalion and the 1st Sapper Battalion remained south of the canal near the An Cuu Bridge. At the same time, the 810th Battalion began preparing to sneak west across the Perfume River by raft and boat to Gia Hoi Island.
Colonel Gravel’s 1/1 had been engaged in clearing operations to the east and south of the MACV compound. On February 10, they captured the soccer stadium, giving the Marines a second (and much safer) helicopter landing zone. Combat engineers built a pontoon bridge across the Phu Cam Canal, restoring the road access that had been lost when the An Cuu Bridge was blown up.
On February 11, Hotel Company 2/5 secured a bridge over the Phu Cam Canal and the city block on the other side of the canal. The next day, Fox Company swept the west bank of the canal, fighting through houses and the Huế Railway Station that had been sheltering NVA snipers. On February 13, Fox and Hotel companies crossed the bridge again to secure the entire area. As Marines advanced into the open countryside towards the Từ Đàm Pagoda, they located freshly dug NVA graves and then were hit by a barrage of mortar fire, forcing them to withdraw. Two-Five had inadvertently stumbled on the NVA’s field command post.
On February 13, General Creighton Abrams established his forward headquarters at Phu Bai, replacing General Cushman and assuming overall command of U.S. forces in CTZ I.
The Citadel
While the ARVN 1/3 and 2nd and 7th Airborne Battalions were busy clearing out the north and western parts of the Citadel, including the Chanh Tay Gate, the ARVN 4/2 moved south from Mang Ca toward the Imperial Palace. In those operations, South Vietnamese forces killed over 700 NVA-VC troops. On February 5, NVA-VC units managed to stall ARVN airborne units, prompting General Trưởng to replace them with his 4th battalion, 2nd Regiment (4/2). Meanwhile, the ARVN 4/3, operating south of the river, assaulted the Thuong Tu Gate near the eastern corner of the Citadel.
After seven successive attempts to breach the gate failed, 4/3 was ordered to reinforce the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 4th regiment. On 6 February, the ARVN 1/3 captured the An Hoa Gate and the northwest corner of the Citadel, and the 4th Battalion seized the southwest wall. That night, the NVA counterattacked with a battalion from the NVA 29th Regiment, scaling the southwest wall and pushing the 4th Battalion back to Tây Lộc.
On February 7, the ARVN 3rd Regiment, which had been futilely trying to break into the southeast corner of the Citadel, was moved by LCM-8s (Mike Boats) to Mang Ca to reinforce units inside the Citadel. The ARVN 2nd Troop, 7th Cavalry (equipped with fifteen M113s) arrived at Mang Ca from Quảng Trị to relieve the 3rd Troop. To avoid enemy ambushes, the 2nd Troop turned off Highway One a few miles north of the city, traveled east cross-country and swung around to the rear of Mang Ca through the Trai Gate.
Also, on 7 February, the North Vietnamese tried to bring their air support into the battle, sending four North Vietnamese Air Force (Il-14) transport aircraft from Hanoi. The Ilyushin IL-14 was a Soviet production of the Douglas DC-3. Two of the aircraft carrying explosives, antitank ammunition, and field telephone cables managed to find an opening in the cloud layer about six miles north of Huế. They dropped their cargo in a large lagoon for local forces to retrieve. One of the aircraft returned safely, but the other, flying through dense fog, crashed into a mountain, losing all on board.
Meanwhile, the other two Il−14s, modified to drop bombs, were ordered to bomb Mang Ca. However, neither aircraft could find the city in the fog, so they returned to their base with all their artillery. Five days later, they tried again, but bad weather prevented them from locating Mang Ca. The two aircraft radioed that they were scrubbing the mission and then headed to sea to jettison their bombs. A short time later, both aircraft disappeared while over water.
On February 10, two forward observers from the Marines’ 1st Field Artillery Group were flown into Tây Lộc to help coordinate artillery and naval gunfire to support the fighting inside the Citadel. However, General Ngô Quang Trưởng directed that the Marines should not target the Imperial Palace under any circumstances.
On February 11, The South Vietnamese Marines (Task Force Alfa) (the 1st and 5th Battalions) began to replace the Vietnamese Airborne units by helicopter, as Bravo Company 1/5 was airlifted to Mang Ca. Intense enemy fire precluded a full insertion, however. On February 13, Alpha and Charlie Companies 1/5, supported by five M-48s from the 1st Tank Battalion, were loaded into LCM-8s (Mike Boats) and ferried across to Mang Ca. Once there, the Marines moved south along the eastern wall of the Citadel while Bravo Company remained in reserve.
Unknown to the Marines, the ARVN Airborne withdrew from the area two days earlier when the Vietnamese Marines began arriving at Mang Ca. NVA defenders had used the opportunity of the delay to reoccupy several blocks of the Citadel and reinforce their defenses. Communist forces engaged Alpha Company, which almost immediately suffered 35 casualties. The CO of 1/5, Major Robert Thompson, ordered Bravo Company to relieve Alpha, and the advance continued slowly until NVA flanking fire halted it.
The next day, Marines resumed their attack, supported by Marine artillery, Naval gunfire, and Marine Corps close air support. Despite this, the Marines made little progress and had to withdraw. As soon as the Marines withdrew, the communists reoccupied those positions.
Delta Company arrived at the Citadel on the evening of February 14 after taking fire while crossing the Perfume River. On February 15, Delta Company led a renewed attack against the Dong Ba Gate, with Charlie Company defending its flank. After Bravo Company joined the assault, Marines secured the gate. The Marines suffered six deaths and fifty wounded, while the enemy sustained twenty deaths.
Also, on February 14, the South Vietnamese Marine Task Force joined the battle. The operational plan called for the VN Marines to move west from Tây Lộc and then turn south. However, they were soon halted by a strong NVA defense. After two days of fighting, the VN Marines had only advanced 400 meters. Meanwhile, the ARVN 3rd Regiment fought off an NVA counterattack in the northwest corner of the Citadel.
Despite their many setbacks, the communists appeared determined to prolong the battle. The 6th Battalion, 24th Regiment, 304th Division (originally located near Khe Sanh) reached the Citadel after following an intentionally convoluted route through Thon La Chu. The 7th Battalion, 90th Regiment, 324-B Divison was due to arrive within a few days — after a forced march from the DMZ.
On February 16, two companies from the 1st Battalion, U.S. 8th Cavalry Regiment, fought elements of the NVA 803rd Regiment, 324-B Division, about twelve miles northeast of Huế, killing 29 enemies before breaking contact the following day. Also, on February 16, 1/5 advanced 140 meters at the cost of seven Marines killed and 47 wounded. The Marines killed 63 of the enemy.
That same day, at a meeting at Phu Bai involving Generals Abrams, LaHue, Trưởng, and South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, Kỳ approved the use of all necessary force to clear the NVA-VC forces from the Citadel, regardless of any damages to historic structures.
On the night of February 16, a radio intercept indicated that a battalion-size NVA force was about to launch a counterattack over the west wall of the Citadel. Artillery and naval gunfire was called in, and a later radio intercept indicated that a senior NVA officer had been killed in the barrage. Another intercept stated that the battalion commander requested permission to withdraw from the city, but his request was denied, and he was ordered to stand and fight.
Vietnamese forces resumed their attacks on February 17, and the Hac Bao Company was moved to support 1/5’s right flank. Over the next three days, these forces slowly reduced the NVA’s defensive perimeter.
On February 18, 1/8th Cav was attacked by elements of the 803rd Regiment twelve miles northeast of Huế. This second engagement convinced the NVA commander that the regiment could not reach the Citadel.
By February 20, the 1/5 advance had stalled. After conferring with senior commanders, Major Thompson launched a night attack against three NVA strongpoints, blocking further movement. At dawn, the entire battalion would assault NVA positions. At 0300 on February 21, three ten-man teams from the 2nd Platoon of Alpha Company launched their assault, quickly capturing the sparsely defended position the NVA had withdrawn from during the night.
As the NVA sought to reoccupy those positions the following day, they were caught in the open by the assaulting Marines from 1/5. Thompson lost three Marines in the fight, but 16 NVA were killed. At that moment, the Marines were only 100 meters from the south wall of the Citadel. That evening, Bravo Company was replaced by Lima Company, 3/5.
Unknown to either the Americans or South Vietnamese, the NVA had begun a phased withdrawal from the Citadel, making their way southwest to return to their bases in the western hills. Lima 3/5 was tasked with clearing the area through the Thuong Tu Gate to the Trường Tiền Bridge. They completed their mission, meeting little enemy resistance.
But to the west, South Vietnamese forces continued to meet stubborn resistance. On February 22, after a barrage of 122mm rockets, the NVA counterattacked Vietnamese Marines, who unmercifully pushed them back with the support of the Hac Bao Company.
Little progress was made on February 23, prompting a very frustrated General Abrams to suggest that the Vietnamese Marines should be disbanded. That night, the NVA attempted another counterattack but was forced back (again) by intense artillery. The ARVN 3rd Regiment launched a night attack along the southern wall of the Citadel. At 0500 the following day, they raised the South Vietnamese flag over the Citadel and secured the south wall by mid-morning.
General Trưởng then ordered the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, and the Hac Bao Company to recapture the Imperial Palace, which was achieved against minimal resistance by late afternoon. The last pocket of NVA at the southwest corner of the Citadel was eliminated in an attack by the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalion in the early hours of February 25.
Mopping Up
On February 22, the ARVN 21st and 39th Ranger battalions boarded junks and traveled to Gia Hoi Island, where the communist provisional government had been headquartered since the offensive started. The Rangers swept the island as thousands of residents emerged from hiding and ran through their ranks to escape the battle. The most brutal fight of the day centered on a pagoda that contained an NVA battalion command post. The sweep continued through February 25. The three-day operation netted hundreds of VC cadre, many of whom were university students who, according to residents, had played a key role in rounding up government officials and intellectuals the NVA/VC targeted as threats to their new regime.
On February 23, a mechanized task force involving the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and Troop A, 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry swept along the northwestern wall toward the An Hoa Bridge, flushing out several NVA troops who had taken refuge in the thick grasses and weeds.
Meanwhile, a mile further to the northwest, the remainder of the 5/7th Cav resumed its advance toward Thon An. These troops fought their way into the NVA-occupied hamlet and found a honeycomb of tunnels and bunkers beneath its shattered remains. They spent the rest of the day searching the ruins for survivors. They also combed through the adjacent cemetery, where the 806th Battalion had ambushed the ARVN 7th Airborne Battalion on 31 January.
On February 24th, the 5/7th Cav rejoined its detached company and the armored cavalry platoon from the 3/5th Cavalry near the western corner of the Citadel. The combined force then swept toward the Bach Ho Railroad Bridge along the southwestern face of the Citadel, where a few NVA continued to hold out in a narrow band of trees.
While 1st Battalion, 1st Marines conducted clearing operations in southern Huế, 2/5 conducted security patrols south of the Phu Cam Canal. On February 24, 2/5 Marines launched an operation to the southwest of Huế to relieve the ARVN 101st Combat Engineers, which had been under siege by the NVA since the start of the battle.
As 2/5 approached the base at 0700, they were met by NVA mortar and machine-gun fire. Marine artillery pushed the enemy into a hasty withdrawal, and 2/5 entered the base at 0850. The base remained under fire from enemy positions in a Buddhist temple to the south and from a ridgeline to the west. At 0700 on February 25, Fox and Golf Companies 2/5 began their assault on the ridgeline. They were met by intense mortar fire. With support from Marine artillery, Marines secured part of the ridge, killing three communists.
The attack resumed the following morning. Hotel Company attacked a nearby hill, and after meeting stubborn resistance, the Marines pulled back so that air strikes could neutralize the enemy. Twenty enemy soldiers were killed, along with four Marines, from friendly fire. The Marines renewed their attack the following day, killing fourteen additional enemy.
On February 28, 1/5 and 2/5 Marines launched a combined operation to the east of Huế to try to cut off any NVA forces moving from Huế towards the coast. Only a few NVA were encountered and dealt with.
Operation Huế City officially concluded on March 2, 1968. ARVN losses included 452 killed and 2,123 wounded. American losses were 216 dead and 1,584 wounded. However, the numbers don’t add up. According to after-action reports, the NVA executed 4,856 captured civilians and ARVN personnel, but the official toll, as reported by the Vietnamese command authority, only 844 civilians were killed, with 1,900 (estimated) receiving combat injuries.
NVA/VC losses are also a matter of debate. North Vietnamese records indicate 2,400 killed and 3,000 wounded. General Abrams’ headquarters reported twice the number of enemies killed. What is not debated is that the imperial city was utterly destroyed, making over 100,000 people homeless and terrorized.
In 1967, North Vietnamese military officials realized that their war strategy in South Vietnam wasn’t working out quite the way they had hoped. It was time to try something else. The government of North Vietnam wanted a massive offensive, one that would reverse the course of the war. When defense minister and senior army commander General Vo Nguyen Giap[1]voiced opposition to such an offensive, believing that a significant reversal of the war would not be the likely result of such an undertaking, North Vietnamese officials stripped Giap of his position, gave him a pocket watch, and sent him into retirement.
The politburo then appointed General Nguyen Chi Thanh to direct the offensive. At the time, Thanh was commander of all Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam. When General Thanh unexpectedly died, senior politburo members scrambled to reinstate General Giap.
Earlier — in the Spring of 1966 — Giap wondered how far the United States would go in defending the regime of South Vietnam. To answer this question, he executed a series of attacks south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) with two objectives in mind. First, he wanted to draw US forces away from densely populated urban and lowland areas where the NVA would have an advantage. Second, Giap wished to know if the United States could be provoked into invading North Vietnam.
Both questions seem ludicrous since luring the military out of towns and cities was the last thing he should have wanted, and unless China was willing to rush to the aid of its pro-communist “little brothers,” tempting the US to invade North Vietnam was fool-hardy. In any case, General Giap began a massive buildup of military forces and placed them in the northern regions of South Vietnam. Their route of infiltration into South Vietnam was through Laos. General Giap completed his work at the end of 1967 — with six infantry divisions massed within the Quang Tri Province.
US Army General William C. Westmoreland, commander of the United States Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (COMUSMACV or MACV), led all US and allied forces in Vietnam. Westmoreland responded to Giap’s buildup by increasing US/allied forces in Quang Tri, realizing that if he wanted the enemy to dance, he would have to send his men into the dance hall.
What Westmoreland could not do, however, was invade either North Vietnam or Laos[2]. Realizing this, Giap gained confidence in creating more significant battles inside South Vietnam. But even this wasn’t working out as Giap imagined. Westmoreland was not the same kind of man as French General Henri Navarre, whom Giap had defeated in 1954. For one thing, Westmoreland was far more tenacious, and meeting the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) away from populated areas would allow Westmoreland to make greater use of his air and artillery assets.
In phases, Giap increased North Vietnam’s military footprint in the northern provinces of South Vietnam. One example of this was the NVA’s siege of the Khe Sanh combat base. President Lyndon Johnson was concerned that the NVA was attempting another coup de guerre, such as at Dien Bien Phu, where Navarre was thoroughly defeated. Johnson ordered Khe Sanh held at all costs. With everyone’s eyes now focused on those events, Giap launched a surprise offensive at the beginning of the Tet (Lunar New Year) celebration. He gave his attack order on January 31, 1968. It was a massive assault involving 84,000 NVA and Viet Cong (VC) soldiers executing simultaneous attacks on 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of the six autonomous cities (including Saigon and Huế), 64 of 242 district capitals, and 50 hamlets.
Giap chose to violate the Tet cease-fire accord because he knew that many South Vietnamese soldiers would be granted leave to celebrate the holiday with their families. It was an intelligent move that gave Giap a series of early successes. VC forces even managed to breach the US Embassy enclosure in Saigon. Within days, however, the offensive faltered as US/ARVN forces turned back the communist onslaught. Heavy fighting continued in Kontum, Can Tho, Ben Tre, and Saigon … but the largest occurred in the City of Huế[3]. The Battle of Huế was the longest and the bloodiest battle of the Tet Offensive.
In 1968, Huế was the third-largest city in South Vietnam; its population was around 140,000, and about a third of those living inside the Citadel, north of the Hương River, which flows through the city.[4] Huế also sat astride Highway One, a major north-south main supply route about 50 miles south of the DMZ. Huế was the former imperial capital of Vietnam. Up to this point, Huế had only occasionally experienced the ravages of war—mortar fire, saboteurs, and acts of terrorism, but a large enemy force had never before appeared at the city’s gates. But, as a practical matter, given the city’s cultural and intellectual importance to the Vietnamese people (and its status as the capital of Thua Thien Province), hostile actions were only a matter of time.
The people who lived in Huế enjoyed a tradition of civic independence dating back several hundred years. The city’s religious monks viewed the war with disdain, but it is also true that few religious leaders felt any attachment to the government in Saigon. They wanted national reconciliation — a coalition where everyone could get along.
Ancient tradition held that Huế had sprung to life as a lotus flower blossoming from a mud puddle. It is a fascinating myth. The city is situated on a bend of the Perfume (Hương) River just five miles southwest of the South China Sea. The river divided Huế into two sections. On the north bank stood the Citadel, a fortress encompassing nearly four square miles (modeled after China’s Forbidden City). The Citadel was shaped like a diamond, its four corners pointing to the cardinal directions of the compass. Stone walls encircled the Imperial City, and just beyond those, a wide moat filled with water. The walls stood 8 meters high and several meters thick.
On the southeastern wall, the Perfume River ran a parallel course, which offered additional protection from that quarter. There were ten gates; four of these (along the southeastern side) were made of carved stone. The remaining walls each had two less elaborate gates. A winding shallow canal ran through the Citadel, from southwest to northeast. Two culverts connected the inner-city canal with those on the outside.
A newer section of the city lay south of the Perfume River. It was the center for residential and business communities, including government offices (and a US Consulate), a university, provincial headquarters, a prison, a hospital, a treasury, and the forward headquarters element of MACV sited within a separate compound. Referred to as “New City,” it was half the size of the old town. It was also called The Triangle because of its irregular shape between the Phu Cam Canal in the south, a stream called Phat Lac on the east, and in the north by the Perfume River. A pair of bridges linked the modern city to the Citadel: the Nguyen Hương Bridge (part of Highway 1) at the eastern corner of the Citadel, and fifteen hundred meters to the southwest was the Bach Ho Railroad Bridge. Another bridge, called the An Cuu Bridge, was a modest arch on Highway 1 that conveyed traffic across the Phu Cam Canal.
Despite Huế’s importance, fewer than a thousand soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) were on duty. Security for Huế was assigned to the First Infantry Division (ARVN) under the command of Brigadier General Ngo Quant Truong. The 1st ARVN was headquartered within the fortified Mang Ca compound in the northeast corner of the Citadel.
Over half of Truong’s men were on leave for the holiday when the Giap commenced his offensive at Huế. His subordinate commands’ location was spread along Highway 1 from north Huế to the DMZ. The closest unit of any size to the division CP was the 3rd ARVN Regiment. The regiment’s three battalions were located five miles northwest of Huế. The only combat unit inside the city was a 36-man platoon belonging to an elite unit called the Black Panthers, a field reconnaissance and rapid reaction company. Internal security for Huế was the responsibility of the National Police.[5]
The nearest US combat base was Phu Bai, six miles south on Highway 1. Phu Bai was a major U. S. Marine Corps command post and support facility that included the forward headquarters element of the 1st Marine Division (designated Task Force X-Ray). The Commanding General of Task Force X-Ray[6] was Brigadier General Foster C. LaHue, who also served as the Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Marine Division. Also situated at Phu Bai were the headquarters elements of the 1st Marine Regiment (Stanley S. Hughes, Commanding) and the 5th Marine Regiment (Robert D. Bohn, Commanding). There were also three battalions of Marines: 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (1/1) (Lt. Col. Marcus J. Gravel, Commanding), 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (1/5) (LtCol Robert P. Whalen, Commanding), and 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (2/5) (LtCol Ernest C. Cheatham, Jr., Commanding).
In addition to the Marines, several US Army commands were present, including two brigades of the 1st Air Cavalry Division (AIR CAV), which included the 7th and 12th Cavalry Regiments (dispersed over a wide area, from Phu Bai in the south to Quang Tri in the north), and the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division at Camp Evans, between Huế and Quang Tri. Operational control of the 1st Brigade was assigned to the 1st Air Cav.
NVA forces included 8,000 well-trained and equipped soldiers. The majority of these were NVA regulars. The NVA was reinforced by six VC main force battalions (between 300 and 600 men each). The field commander of these forces was General Tran Van Quang. The NVA plan called for a division-sized assault on the Imperial City, with other units serving as a blocking force to stop or frustrate the efforts of any allied reinforcing units. True to form, the communists knew all they needed about their civilian and military objectives within the city. VC cadres had also prepared a list of “tyrants” who were to be located and terminated — nearly all of these South Vietnamese civilian and military officials. Added to the lists were US civilians, clergy, educators, and other foreigners. The communists also knew all they needed to know about the weather.
The NVA plan (termed the General Offensive/General Uprising) was designed to incorporate both conventional and guerilla operations intending to destroy any vestige of the South Vietnam government and its Western allies, and if not that, then discredit the enemy and cause a popular uprising among the people. If everything worked according to plan, the Western allies would be forced to withdraw their forces from Vietnam.
A few senior NVA planners thought a popular uprising was highly unlikely; a few more expected that ARVN and US forces would drive the NVA out of the city within a few days —but, of course, such defeatist notions were best left unsaid. Meanwhile, the young, idealistic, gullible soldiers believed the propaganda and went into combat, convinced of a great victory. When these same young men departed their training camps, they had no intention of returning. Many wouldn’t.
The Fight Begins
In January 1968, everyone sensed that something was off-kilter. Tet was approaching. The people were uneasy. The cancellation of the Tet Truce and enemy attacks at Da Nang and elsewhere in southern I Corps dampened the normally festive spirit at Tet.[7] The first indication of trouble came shortly after midnight during the night of January 30-31 — a five-pronged assault on all five provincial capitals in II Corps and the city of Da Nang in I Corps. VC attacks began with mortar and rocket fire, followed by large-scale ground assaults by NVA regulars. However, these were not well-coordinated attacks, and by dawn on January 31, most communists had been driven back from their objectives.
These initial attacks turned out to have been launched prematurely, but while US forces and ARVN units were placed on operational alert, there was no immediate sense of urgency. ARVN commands sent our orders, which canceled all leaves for the Tet holiday, but most of these arrived too late, and besides that, General Truong did not believe the NVA had the intent or capability of attacking Huế City. Allied intelligence kept tabs on two NVA regiments in Thua Thien Province, but there was little evidence of enemy activity in and around Huế City. When Truong positioned his reduced force around the city, he intended to defend the urban areas outside the Citadel.
General Truong was not necessarily wrong in his conclusions —he was only misinformed. According to US intelligence, the 6th NVA Regiment (with 804th Battalion) was reported operational 15 miles west of Huế. The 806th Battalion was positioned outside Phong Dien, 22 miles northeast of Huế. The 802nd Battalion was placed 12 miles south of Huế. Analysts also placed the 4th NVA Regiment between Phu Bai and Da Nang. Unknown to anyone, both regiments were en route to Huế. The 6th NVA Regiment’s primary objectives were the Mang Ca headquarters compound, the Tay Loc Airfield, and the Imperial Palace. The 4th NVA Regiment was assigned to attack New City, including the Provincial headquarters, the prison, and the MACV (forward) headquarters compound. NVA planners assigned 200 specific targets between these two regiments, including radio stations, police stations, government officials, recruiting centers, and the Imperial Museum. Viet Cong main force battalions were specifically targeting individuals — those sympathetic to the South Vietnam regime.
On January 30, enemy shock troops and sappers entered the city disguised as simple peasants, their uniforms and weapons concealed in baggage or under their street clothes. VC and NVA regulars mingled with the Tet holiday crowds. Many of these covert agents dressed in ARVN uniforms and then took up pre-designated positions to await the signal to attack. The 6th NVA Regiment was only a few miles from the city’s western edge. About 1900, the Regiment stopped for an evening meal, and regimental officers inspected their troops. The regiment resumed its march one hour later in three columns, each with an objective within the Citadel.
At 2200 hours, Lieutenant Nguyen Van Tan, Commanding Officer of the 1st ARVN Division Reconnaissance Company, was leading a 30-man surveillance mission when a Regional Force Company east of his position reported it was under attack.[8] Remaining concealed, Tan observed two enemy battalions filter past his position toward Huế City. Tan radioed this information back to the 1st ARVN. These were likely the 800th and 802nd Battalions, 6th NVA Regiment. Despite Tan’s report, the communist troops continued toward Huế unmolested.
The NVA country-wide general offensive began at 0300; the only ARVN force inside Huế was the Black Panther Company, responsible for guarding the Tai Loc Airstrip (northwestern corner of the Citadel). By then, large numbers of VC guerillas had already infiltrated the city. In the early morning hours, the enemy took up positions in the town and awaited the arrival of NVA and VC assault troops.
At 0340, the NVA launched a rocket and mortar barrage from the mountains west of the city and followed this up with a three-pronged assault. A small sapper team dressed in ARVN uniforms killed guards and opened the western gate to the Citadel. The lead elements of the assault thus penetrated the city; the 6th NVA Regiment led the attack. As communist fighters poured into Huế, the 800th and 802nd Battalions rapidly overran most of the Citadel. General Truong and his staff held off the attackers at the ARVN compound, and the Black Panther Company held its ground at the eastern end of the airfield. Truong later withdrew the Black Panther company from the airfield to reinforce the ARVN compound. Except for this area, the NVA held the entire citadel, including the Imperial Palace.
The situation was similar across the Perfume River in southern Huế. The sound of explosions awakened allied advisors in the MACV compound. Grabbing any weapon they could get their hands on, advisors were able to repulse the ground assault, which lacked a coordinated effort. When the initial assault faltered, the 804th Battalion, 4th NVA Regiment, encircled the compound and began their siege. Two VC main force battalions seized the Thua Thien Provincial headquarters, the police station, and several other government buildings south of the river. The NVA 810th Battalion took up blocking positions on the city’s southern edge. By dawn on January 31, the North Vietnamese flag was flying over the Citadel, communist troops patrolled the streets, and political officers had begun their purge of South Vietnamese officials and American civilians.
The U. S. Marines
While the NVA were launching their attacks at Huế, the Marine Base at Phu Bai began receiving enemy rockets and mortars targeting the airstrip and Marine and ARVN infantry units. General LaHue started receiving reports of enemy strikes along Highway 1 between the Hai Van Pass and the City of Huế. Altogether, the NVA launched assaults against 18 targets. Intelligence was jumbled; no one was sure what was happening or where. LaHue knew that the 1st ARVN and MACV compounds had been hit, and because of the attack against the Navy’s LCU facility, all river traffic had ceased.
Meanwhile, General Truong realized that, at best, he had a tenuous hold on his headquarters. He ordered the 3rd Regiment (reinforced by two ARVN airborne battalions and a troop of armored cavalry) to fight into the Citadel from the northeast. The regiment finally arrived in the late afternoon, but only after intense fighting and a costly fight in terms of soldiers killed and wounded. Pleas for reinforcements at the MACV compound went unanswered because none of the senior commanders knew the extent of the enemy’s strength or their success in entering Huế.
Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam (Commander, ARVN Forces I CTZ) and Lieutenant General Robert Cushman (CG III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF)) began ordering subordinate commands to prevent enemy reinforcements from reaching the city. The NVA had the same idea—to prevent Western allies from entering the city. The NVA 806th and 810th blocked positions in southern Huế and along Highway 1.
Having received no reliable intelligence, General LaHue surmised that the attacks might have been a diversionary strike. General LaHue, who was only newly assigned to the Phu Bai area, was still unfamiliar with this tactical region (also, TAOR), let alone the fast-developing situation in Huế City.[9] This wasn’t the only problem for the Marines. Task Force X-Ray was created to help manage a major shift in the locations of the various combat elements of the First Marine Division and Third Marine Division, necessitated by MACV’s realignment of forces in I Corps.[10]
Colonel Bohn arrived at Phu Bai with General LaHue on 13th January. 1/1 under Colonel Gravel began making its move from Quang Tri at about the same time. His subordinate units, Charlie Company and Delta Company, reached Phu Bai on January 26, while Bravo Company and Headquarters Company arrived three days later. Alpha Company, Captain Gordon D. Batcheller, Commanding, arrived piecemeal. Two of his platoon commanders failed to arrive with their platoons, and a third platoon commander was attending leadership school in Da Nang.[11]
On January 30th, the First Marine Regiment (1st Marines) replaced the 5th Marines in operational responsibility for the Phu Bai TAOR. Colonel Hughes formally took operational control of the 1st Battalion (consisting of Company B, C, and D). In effect, Hughes commanded a paper regiment with barely a single battalion of Marines.
1/1 had already relieved 2/5, providing security on various bridges along Highway 1 and other key positions. When Company A finally arrived at Phu Bai on January 30, it was designated battalion reserve (also Bald Eagle Reaction Force). 2/5 moved into the Phu Loc sector and assumed responsibility for the area south of the Truoi River and east of the Cao Dai Peninsula. 1/5 retained responsibility for the balance of the Phu Loc region, extending to the Hai Van Pass.
At around 1730 hours on January 30, a Marine Recon unit (code name Pearl Chest) made lethal contact with what was believed to be an NVA company moving north toward Huế, resulting in around 15 enemy killed in action (KIA). After the unit fell back, it regrouped and encircled the Marines. Poor weather prevented Allied air support; the Recon Marines called for relief. LtCol Robert P. Whalen, commanding 1/5, sent his Bravo Company to relieve the Recon team. The NVA attacked Bravo Company as it approached the location of the embattled Recon Marines. Company B proceeded slowly with known enemies in the area and no understanding of how many. Whalen requested Bohn to send additional reinforcements from 2/5 so as not to diminish his battalion’s ability to defend the town of Phu Loc.
Colonel Bohn tasked Cheatham to send in a reinforcing company. Cheatham assigned this mission to Fox Company 2/5 (Captain Michael P. Downs, Commanding). NVA units ambushed Fox Company as it moved into 1/5’s sector. This action occurred at around 2300 hours, with Marines suffering one KIA and three wounded in action (WIA). After this contact, the NVA faded into the night. Fox Company secured an LZ to evacuate the injured and then returned to the 2/5 perimeter.
Realizing that his force was thin — and that his meager force could not sustain a significant engagement, Colonel Hughes ordered the Recon team to break out and return to Phu Bai. Whalen also directed Bravo Company to return to base. Colonel Bohn was puzzled about the purpose of these engagements.
As NVA units assaulted Huế City, they also attacked the Marines at Phu Bai with rockets and mortars, targeting the airstrip, known Marine positions around the airfield, and nearby Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) and local Popular Forces/Regional Forces (PF/RF) units.[12] An NVA company-sized unit attacked the South Vietnamese bridge security detachment along with CAP Hotel-Eight. LtCol Cheatham ordered Hotel Company 2/5 (Captain G. Ronald Christmas, Commanding) to relieve the embattled CAP unit. Marines from Hotel Company caught the NVA in the act of withdrawing from the CAP enclave and took it under fire. Seeing an opportunity to trap the NVA unit, Cheatham reinforced Hotel Company with his command group and Fox Company, which had just returned from its Phu Loc operation.
With his other companies in a blocking position, Cheatham hoped to catch the enemy against the Truoi River. However, after initiating the engagement with the NVA unit, events inside Huế City interrupted his plans. At around 1030 on January 31, Golf Company 2/5 was ordered to assume Task Force X-Ray reserve. The company detached from 2/5 and headed back to Phu Bai. Later that day, 2/5 also lost operational control of Fox Company, which allowed the NVA units to complete their withdrawal. Hotel and Echo Companies established night defensive positions.
While 2/5 engaged NVA along the Truoi River and Phu Loc, 1/1 began to move into Huế City. Task Force X-Ray had received reports of enemy strikes all along Highway 1 between Hai Van Pass and Huế. Eighteen separate attacks had occurred against everything from bridges to CAP units. With Alpha Company 1/1/ as Phu Bai reserve, Colonel Hughes directed Gravel to stage Alpha Company for any contingency. At 0630 on January 31, Hughes ordered Alpha Company to reinforce the Truoi River Bridge. All that the company commander knew was that he was to strengthen ARVN forces south of Phu Bai.
What occurred over the next several hours is best described as a “cluster fuck.” Alpha Company was convoyed to liaison with ARVN units. There were no ARVN units. The company commander encountered a few Marines from a nearby CAP unit and was told that Beau coupé VC were moving toward Huế. Gravel then ordered Batcheller to reverse course and reinforce an Army unit north of Huế. General LaHue rescinded that order, and Alpha Company was then ordered to assist a CAP unit south of Phu Bai. Thirty minutes later, Task Force X-Ray directed Alpha Company to proceed to the Navy LCU ramp to investigate reports of an enemy assault. In effect, the Marines of Alpha Company were being ground down by false starts.
Up to this point, the battle of Huế had been a South Vietnamese problem. General LaHue had little worthwhile information, and Alpha Company continued north toward Huế. The convoy met up with four tanks from the 3rd Tank Battalion. Batcheller invited the tanks to join him, and they accepted. Alpha Company, now reinforced with M-48 tanks, moved toward the MACV compound.
As Alpha Company approached the southern suburbs, the Marines came under increased sniper fire. At one village, the Marines were forced to dismount their vehicles and conduct clearing operations before proceeding further. The convoy no sooner crossed the An Cuu Bridge, which spanned the Phu Cam Canal into the city, when they were caught in a murderous crossfire from enemy automatic weapons and rockets. NVA were on both sides of the road. The lead tank commander was killed. Alpha Company pushed forward —albeit cautiously. Batcheller maintained “sporadic” communications with Gravel at Phu Bai. For the most part, the only thing Batcheller heard on the artillery and air nets were the voices of frantic Vietnamese. When Alpha Company reached the causeway, they once more came under sniper fire. Batcheller was seriously wounded. Gunnery Sergeant J. L. Canley assumed command of the company.[13]
Colonel Hughes requested permission from LaHue to reinforce Alpha Company. The only available reinforcing units were Headquarters & Service Company (H&SCo), 1/1, and Golf Company, 2/5. Colonel Gravel’s battalion was strung out from Phu Bai to Quang Tri (a distance of 46 miles). For whatever reason, Gravel had never met his Golf Company Commander, Captain Charles L. Meadows. Worse, Captain Meadows had no idea what was happening or what his upcoming mission would entail. All Meadows understood was that Golf Company would help escort the Commanding General to the 1st ARVN Division and back to Phu Bai.
Gravel’s hodge-podge column reached Alpha Company in the early afternoon. Gravel assumed control of the tanks but sent the trucks loaded with WIAs back to Phu Bai (including Captain Batcheller). With tanks taking point, Alpha Company, H&S Company, and Golf Company —in that order— raced toward the MACV compound. They arrived at about 1500 hours. By this time, the enemy had pulled back. Gravel met with the US Army senior advisor at the MACV compound, Colonel George O. Adkisson. Gravel was trying to understand the enemy situation, but this conversation may have ended with Gravel having even less understanding than when the discussion had begun.
Gravel ordered Alpha Company to establish a defensive perimeter at the MACV compound. With armor reinforcements from the Marines and 7th ARVN, Gavel took Golf Company in tow and attempted to cross the main bridge over the Perfume River. Marine armor was too heavy for the bridge, so Gravel left them on the south bank of the river. Available Vietnamese M-24 tank crews refused to go across the bridge.[14] Gravel directed two platoons to cross the bridge, but they were saturated with enemy fire when they reached the other side. Realizing he was outgunned, Gravel withdrew his Golf Company and returned to the MACV compound. One-third of Company G’s Marines were killed or wounded in this engagement.
The Americans still had scant information about the situation in Huế at 2000 hours. If General LaHue was confused, he knew far more about the situation than did Westmoreland. According to Westmoreland’s message to the JCS Chairman, three NVA companies were inside the Citadel, and a battalion of Marines had been sent in to clear them out.
The Struggle —
On February 1, senior allied commanders agreed that the 1st ARVN Division would assume responsibility for the Citadel while Task Force X-Ray would clear the New City. General LaHue ordered Gravel to advance from the MACV compound to the Thua Thien provincial headquarters and the prison — a distance of about six city blocks. General LaHue briefed reporters, saying, “… very definitely, we control the city’s southside.”
In reality, the Marine footprint was too small to control anything. CG III MAF secured Westmoreland’s permission to send in the Cavalry. Major General John J. Tolson, commanding the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile), intended to insert his Third Brigade from Camp Evans into the sector west of Huế City. Two battalions would be airlifted into the northwest sector: 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, and 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry (and Brigade CP). Their mission was to close off the enemy’s supply line into Huế. Additionally, the 2nd Battalion, 101st Airborne, would cover security for Camp Evans, and the division’s First Brigade would continue operations in Quang Tri Province. At mid-afternoon on February 2, CAV 2/12 landed 10 miles northwest of Huế and began pushing toward the city.
But on February 2, the Marines were still struggling. There was some minor progress, but only after a 3-hour firefight. 1/1 finally reached the university, and the Army radio center was relieved. During the night, NVA managed to destroy the railroad bridge across the Perfume River. Commanding Hotel Company 2/5, Captain Ron Christmas crossed the An Cuu Bridge at around 1100. Hotel Company was reinforced with Army trucks equipped with Quad-50 machine guns and two ONTOS, each armed with six 106mm recoilless rifles, which devastated enemy positions wherever they were found.
Gravel launched a two-company assault toward his two objectives. The enemy stopped the attack as effectively as a brick wall, and the Marines withdrew to the MACV compound. It was then that General LaHue realized that he had underestimated the enemy’s strength. Shortly after noon, LaHue gave Colonel Hughes tactical control of Marine forces in the southern city. Hughes promised Gravel reinforcements and directed that he commence “sweep and clear operations: destroy the enemy, protect US nationals, and restore that portion of the city to US Control.”
On the afternoon of February 2, Hughes decided to move his command group from Phu Bai into Huế, where he could more directly control the battle. Accompanying Hughes in the convoy was Lt. Col. Ernest Cheatham, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, who, up until then, had been sitting frustrated in Phu Bai while three of his companies (F, G, and H) fought in Huế under Gravel’s command.[15]
Hughes quickly established his command post in the MACV compound. The forces at his disposal included Cheatham’s three companies from 2/5 and Gravel’s depleted battalion consisting of A Company, 1/1; a provisional company made up of one platoon of B Company, 1/1; and several dozen cooks and clerks who had been sent to the front to fight alongside the infantry.
Endnotes:
[1] General Giap defeated the Imperial French after eight years of brutal warfare following the end of World War II.
[2] The United States did deploy covert and special forces into Laos at a later time.
[4] The Hương River (also Hương Giang) crosses the city of Huế in the central province of Thừa Thiên-Huế. The translation for Hương is Perfume. It is called the Perfume River because, in autumn, flowers from upriver orchards fall into the river, giving it a perfume-like aroma. Of course, this phenomenon likely happened a thousand years ago because, in 1968, the river smelled more like an open sewer.
[5] The National Police were sometimes (derisively) referred to as white mice. They were un-professional, non-lethal, timid, and about a third of them were giving information to the enemy on a regular basis.
[6] Task Force X-Ray went operational on 13 January 1968.
[7] In 1962, South Vietnam was divided into four tactical zones: CTZs or numbered Corps. These included I CTZ (Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, and Quang Tin); II CTZ (Quang Ngai, Kontum, Pleiku, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Phu Bon); III CTZ (16 provinces); IV CTZ (13 provinces), and the Capital Zone (Saigon and Gia Dinh provinces).
[9] Equally valid for most subordinate commanders and units at Phu Bai.
[10] Operation Checkers was a shift in responsibility for guarding the western approaches to Huế City. To that end, the 1st and 5th Marine Regiments moved into Thua Thien Province from Da Nang. It was a massive shift of American military units, which also involved US Army units operating in I Corps. This shifting of major subordinate commands played right into General Giap’s hands.
[11] I will probably never understand why sending a recently commissioned officer to a leadership school in Vietnam was necessary.
[12] Thirteen-man rifle squads with medical support and reinforced by Vietnamese militia platoons assigned to provide area security within rural hamlets. See Also: Fix Bayonets on 02/05/2016 (series)
[13] Initially awarded the Navy Cross medal, the award was upgraded to the Medal of Honor in 2017.
[14] The M-24 Chafee light tank weighed 18 tons; the M-48 Patton tank weighed 40 tons. The Vietnamese tank crews were likely ordered not to attempt to cross the bridge.
[15] At this time, Ernie Cheatham was a 38-year-old veteran of two wars and 14 years removed from a professional football career. The Pittsburgh Steelers picked him in the 1951 draft. He put his NFL career on hold to fight in the Korean War, afterward suiting up as a defensive tackle with the Steelers for the 1954 season. But after being traded to the Baltimore Colts, Cheatham left professional football and rejoined the Marine Corps. Lieutenant General Ernest C. Cheatham retired from active service in 1988; he passed away on 14 June 2014.
Following 9/11, a bit of wreckage from the Twin Towers was buried at the American embassy in Kabul, with the inscription: “Never Again.” Now Again has come. On the 20th anniversary of 9/11, the Taliban flag will fly over the abandoned American embassy and al-Qaeda will be operating inside Afghanistan. Fifty years from now, Americans will stare in sad disbelief at the photo of an American Marine plucking a baby to safety over barbed wire at Kabul airport. What a shameful, wretched way to quit a war.
The root cause was extreme partisanship in Congress. By default, this bequeathed to the presidency the powers of a medieval king. The Afghanistan tragedy unfolded in four phases, culminating in the whimsy of one man consigning millions to misery.
Phase One. 2001–2007. After 9/11, America unleashed a swift aerial blitzkrieg that shattered the Taliban forces. Inside three months, al-Qaeda’s core unit was trapped inside the Tora Bora caves in the snowbound Speen Ghar mountains. A force of American Marines and multinational special forces commanded by Brigadier General James Mattis (later secretary of defense) was poised to cut off the mountain passes and systematically destroy al-Qaeda. Instead, General Tommy Franks, the overall commander, sent in the undisciplined troops of Afghan warlords, who allowed al-Qaeda to escape into Pakistan. Thus was lost the golden opportunity to win a fast, decisive war and leave.
Acting upon his Evangelical beliefs, President George W. Bush then made the fateful decision to change the mission from killing terrorists to creating a democratic nation comprising 40 million mostly illiterate tribesmen. Nation-building was a White House decision made without gaining true congressional commitment. Worse, there was no strategy specifying the time horizon, resources, and security measures. This off-handed smugness was expressed by Vice President Dick Cheney early in 2002 when he remarked, “The Taliban is out of business, permanently.”
On the assumption that there was no threat, a scant 5,000 Afghan soldiers were trained each year. But the fractured Taliban could not be tracked down and defeated in detail because their sponsor, Pakistan, was sheltering them. Pakistan was also providing the U.S.–NATO supply line into landlocked Afghanistan, thus limiting our leverage to object to the sanctuary extended to the Taliban.
In 2003, the Bush administration, concerned about the threat of Saddam’s presumed weapons of mass destruction, invaded Iraq. This sparked a bitter insurgency, provoked by Islamist terrorists, that required heavy U.S. military resources. Iraq stabilized in 2007, but by that time the Taliban had regrouped inside Pakistan and were attacking in eastern Afghanistan, where the dominant tribe was Pashtun, their own.
Phase Two. 2008–2013. For years, the Democratic leadership had been battering the Republicans about the Iraq War, claiming that it was unnecessary. By default, Afghanistan became the “right war” for the Democrats. Once elected, President Obama, who said that Afghanistan was the war we could not afford to lose, had no way out. With manifest reluctance, in 2010 he ordered a “surge” of 30,000 U.S. troops, bringing the total to 100,000 U.S. soldiers plus 30,000 allied soldiers. The goal was to implement a counterinsurgency strategy, yet Obama pledged to begin withdrawing troops in 2011, an impossibly short time frame.
The strategy aimed to clear villages of the Taliban, then leave Afghan soldiers — askaris — to hold them and to build infrastructure and governance linked to the Kabul central government. In a 2011 book titled “The Wrong War,” I described why this strategy could not succeed. In Vietnam, I had served in a combined-action platoon of 15 Marines and 40 local Vietnamese. It had taken 385 days of constant patrolling to bring security to one village of 5,000. In Afghanistan, there were 7,000 Pashtun villages to be cleared by fewer than a thousand U.S. platoons, an insurmountable mismatch. Counterinsurgency would have required dedicated troops inserted for years. President Obama offered a political gesture, not a credible strategy.
Admiral James Stavridis was the supreme Allied commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization during the surge period. He recently wrote, “We trained the wrong kind of army for Afghanistan. . . . A decade ago, we debated all this at senior levels but kept coming back to a firmly held belief that we could succeed best by modeling what we knew and found comfortable: ducks like ducks, in the end.” According to the admiral, our top command knew they were creating “the wrong kind of army.” Yet they did so regardless.
My experience was different. In trips to Afghanistan over ten years, I embedded with dozens of U.S. platoons. When accompanying our grunts, the askaris did indeed fight. But ten years later, it remains a mystery to me why our generals refused to acknowledge what our grunts knew: namely, that the Afghan soldiers would not hold the villages once our troops left.
This wasn’t due to the structure of their army. The fault went deeper. The askaris lacked faith in the steadfastness of their own chain of command. Afghan president Hamid Karzai reigned erratically from 2004 through 2014, ranting against the American government while treating the Taliban with deference. His successor, Ashraf Ghani, a technocrat devoid of leadership skills, antagonized both his political partners and tribal chieftains. Neither man instituted promotion based upon merit or imbued confidence in the security forces. Familial and tribal patronage pervaded.
From the Kabul capital to province to district, from an Afghan general to a lieutenant, positions and rank depended upon paying bribes upward and extorting payments downward. We were caught on the horns of a dilemma caused by our political philosophy. Because we wanted to create a democracy, we chose not to impose slates of our preferred leaders. On the other hand, the askaris had no faith in the durability or tenacity of their own chain of command.
In contrast, the Taliban promoted upward from the subtribes in the different provinces. While decentralized, they were united in a blazing belief in their Islamist cause and encouraged by Pakistan. The Afghan army and district, provincial, and Kabul officials lacked a comparable spirit and vision of victory.
Phase Three. 2014–2020. From 2001 to 2013, one group of generals — many of them household names — held sway in the corridors of power, convinced they could succeed in counterinsurgency and nation-building. That effort, while laudable, failed.
But that did not mean that a Taliban victory was inevitable. Quite the opposite. A second group of generals came forward, beginning with General Joseph Dunford. The mission changed from counterinsurgency to supporting the Afghan army with intelligence, air assets, and trainers. President Obama lowered expectations about the end state, saying Afghanistan was “not going to be a source of terrorist attacks again.” U.S. troop strength dropped from 100,000 in 2011 to 16,000 in 2014. With the exception of Special Forces raids, we were not in ground combat, so there were few American casualties.
Battlefield tactics shifted to what the Afghan army could do: play defense and prevent the Taliban from consolidating. By 2018, U.S. troop strength was lower than 10,000. Nonetheless, General Scott Miller orchestrated an effective campaign to keep control of Afghanistan’s cities. Afghan soldiers, not Americans or allies, did the fighting and dying. The last U.S. combat death occurred in February of 2020.
Nevertheless, narcissistic President Trump, desperate to leave, promised the Taliban that America would depart by mid 2021. He cut the number of American troops in country to 2,500. With those few troops, General Miller nonetheless held the line. The U.S. military presence, albeit tiny, motivated the beleaguered Afghan soldiers. When the Taliban massed to hit the defenses of a city, the askaris defended their positions and the U.S. air pounced on targets. In addition, our presence provided a massive spy network and electronic listening post in central Asia, able to monitor Russia, China, Pakistan, and Iran. At a cost of no American lives and 5 percent of the defense budget, Afghanistan had reached a stalemate sustainable indefinitely at modest cost.
Phase Four. Bug-out in 2021. President Biden broke that stalemate in April of 2021, when he surprised our allies and delighted the Taliban by declaring that all U.S. troops would leave by 9/11, a singularly inappropriate date. As our military packed up, the miasma of abandonment settled into the Afghan psyche. In early July, our military sneaked away from Bagram Air Base in the middle of the night, which triggered a cascading collapse. Once Afghan units across the country grasped that they were being abandoned, they dissolved. What followed was a chaotic evacuation from the Kabul airport, with the Taliban triumphantly entering the city.
Asked why he had pulled out entirely, President Biden said, “What interest do we have in Afghanistan at this point, with al-Qaeda gone?” That stunning fabrication was a denial of reality: Al-Qaeda are commingled with the Taliban in Kabul. As the world watched, America had to rely upon Taliban forbearance to flee. President Biden had handed America a crushing defeat without precedent.
President Biden has claimed that the ongoing evacuation occurred because the Afghan army ran away instead of fighting. In truth, the Afghan soldiers did fight, suffering 60,000 killed in the war. Their talisman was the American military. No matter how tough the conditions, somehow an American voice crackled over the radio, followed by thunder from the air. Those few Americans were the steel rods in the concrete. When that steel was pulled out, the concrete crumbled. The spirit of the Afghan army was broken.
During the month following the abandonment of Bagram Air Base, the Pentagon remained passive. In contrast, a month before the abrupt fall of Saigon in 1975, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger was concerned about the North Vietnamese advances. As a former grunt in Vietnam, I was his special assistant during that turbulent time. He informed State and the White House that he was ordering an air evacuation; 50,000 Vietnamese were rescued before Saigon fell. In the case of Kabul, the Pentagon took no such preemptive action.
Worse, selecting which Afghans can fly to safety has been left to State Department bureaucrats, although State has an abysmal ten-year record, with 18,000 applicants stuck in the queue. Each day approximately 7,000 undocumented immigrants walk into America; about 2,000 Afghans are flown out daily from Kabul. In the midst of an epic foreign-policy catastrophe, the priorities of the Biden administration remain driven by domestic politics and constipated bureaucratic processes.
What comes after the botched evacuation finally ends?
A course correction inside the Pentagon is sorely needed. Our military reputation has been gravely diminished. The 1 percent of American youths who volunteer to serve are heavily influenced by their families. About 70 percent of service members have a relative who served before them. The Afghanistan War spanned an entire generation. What they took away from this defeat will be communicated from father to son, from aunt to niece.
To avoid alienating this small warrior class, the secretary of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs must put aside their obsession with alleged racism and diversity in the ranks. Former secretary of defense Mattis said that lethality must be the lodestone of our military. Sooner or later in the next six months, we will be challenged. Instead of again waiting passively for instructions, the Pentagon should recommend swift, decisive action.
President Biden’s image as a foreign-policy expert is indelibly tarnished. As vice president in 2011, he vigorously supported the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Iraq. Three years later, U.S. troops were rushed back in to prevent Iraq from falling to the radical Islamists. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote at the time, “he has been wrong on nearly every major foreign-policy and national-security issue over the past four decades.”
President Biden bragged that under his leadership, America was “back.” Instead, while denying that our allies were upset with his performance, he has destroyed his credibility. Perhaps there will be changes in his foreign-policy team, but President Biden himself will not be trusted by our allies as a reliable steward.
In his Farewell Address, Washington wrote, “The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge, natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism.”
As Washington warned, due to extreme partisanship, the American presidency has accumulated the powers of a king or a despot. In matters of war, over the past several decades one party in Congress or the other has gone along with whatever the president decided. This tilts power decisively in favor of the White House. Congress has abdicated from providing either oversight or a broad base of public support. The White House as an institution has become regal and aloof — the opposite of the intention of the Founding Fathers.
Afghanistan, from start to finish, was a White House war, subject to the whims and political instincts of our president. The result was an erraticism that drove out strategic consistency and perseverance. A confident President Bush invaded Afghanistan, blithely expanded the mission, and steered a haphazard course from 2001 through 2007. Presidents Obama and Trump were overtly cynical, surging (2010–2013) and reducing (2014–2020) forces while always seeking a way out divorced from any strategic goal. President Biden (2021) was a solipsistic pessimist who ignored the calamitous consequences and quit because that had been his emotional instinct for a decade.
Our Vietnam veterans were proud of their service. The same is true of our Afghanistan veterans. In both wars, they carried out their duty, correctly believing their cause was noble. After nation-building was designated a military mission, our troops both fought the Taliban enemy and improved life for millions of Afghans. With the Taliban now the victors, it hurts to lose the war, especially when the decision rested entirely with one man.
Who are we as a country? Who will fight for us the next time?
This article appears as “Who Will Trust Us the Next Time?” in the September 13, 2021, print edition of National Review.
Francis J. “Bing” West, Jr. (b. 1940) is an American author, Marine Corps combat veteran, and former Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) during the Reagan Administration.
West writes about the military, warfighting, and counterinsurgency. In the Vietnam War, he fought in major operations and conducted over a hundred combat patrols in 1966–1968. He wrote the Marine Corps training manual Small Unit Action in Vietnam, describing how to fight in close combat. As an analyst at the RAND Corporation, he wrote a half dozen detailed monographs about fighting against an insurgency. Later, as Assistant Secretary of Defense, he dealt with the insurgencies in El Salvador. From 2003 – 2008, he made sixteen extended trips to Iraq, going on patrols and writing three books and numerous articles about the war. From 2007 through 2011, he made numerous trips to embed with U.S. troops serving in Afghanistan.
Fix Bayonets! 