There is so much myth surrounding the life and times of David Crockett that hardly anyone knows the truth about the man. We know he was born in 1786 and gave up his life for Texas Independence on 6 March 1836. He was 49-years old when he died — in those days, 49-years was a long time to live. One of the stories about Crockett surrounds his political career. He served in the Tennessee General Assembly between 1821-1823 and served as a member of the U. S. House of Representatives from 1827-1831 and 1833-1835. When Crockett decided that he was done with politics, he allegedly told someone, “You can go to hell; I’m going to Texas.” And he did.
Crockett went to Texas for the same reasons as other folks back then. There was an adventurer in Crockett, the same as there was a sense of adventure in most people who migrated west. The difference was that as a member of the US House, Crockett was fully aware of what was going on between the Texians and Mexico’s centrist government. Most of the pioneers had no clue at all. Crockett entered Texas with both eyes wide open. He knew what he was getting himself into — and he believed that the Texas fight was one worth having. Was he also looking to enrich himself in land? Of course, he was. There were no “commies” back then seeking to hold hands and sing kumbaya. Taking a piece of scrub land and molding it into a profitable enterprise wasn’t for the faint of heart.
What we also know to be a fact is that Texians, Texans, and Americans have never gotten along well with Mexicans. There are no similarities between the two cultures, and while there are plenty of good arguments from both sides of any issue confronting Texians, Texans, and Americans, there was never any “earned trust” between these people. This uneasy relationship continues to this very day; and today, as in 1915 (or at any other time in our history with Mexico), the association was often deadly.
There was always a good reason for revolution in Mexico. The reasons are as valid today as they were in 1824, 1836, and in 1910. Arguably, no one associated with government in Mexico ever developed compassion for their citizens. Ever. Mexican politicians who became the inheritors of Spanish America were always completely focused on enriching themselves; building a vibrant nation and society was never a priority, and still isn’t. As the descendants of Spanish Peninsulares and creoles, today’s politicians remain welded to an unwieldy class structure that makes one group of people forever better than the one just below their own. One would think that after 500 years of this “caste” system, the people would throw it off and demand better from their government. But — no.
What caused the Mexican Revolution of 1910 was the increasing unpopularity of El Presidenté Jose de la Cruz Porfirio Diaz Mori. He was known simply as Porfirio Diaz. He’d served as President of Mexico for 31 years. He served in office for so long because he observed the golden rule: whoever owns the gold, makes the rules. Plus, it seems that Mexico’s founding fathers never quite got around to solving the question of presidential succession.
Not only did Mexico have a revolution in 1910, one that lasted for ten long, bloody years, Mexico also experienced a series of armed insurrections. It was a time when every thug with a bandolier called himself general, and every army general commanding a platoon was a self-perpetuating thug. The groups in armed conflict, and the men involved in these lawless shootouts, when listed altogether, remind one of the greater Chicago telephone directory.
In 1910, one might have imagined that things could not have ever gotten worse in Mexico. They would have been wrong. The situation in Mexico between 1910-1920 was so bad that no rational person could have imagined what was next on the agenda. Casualty estimates range from 1.7 million to 2.7 million people killed (military and civilian). Of innocent bystanders alone, somewhere between 700,000 and 1.1 million. Within four years, conditions were such inside Mexico that American politicians began to view them as presenting a clear and present danger to the peace and stability of the United States. It was serious enough to justify two (2) separate US interventions: the invasion of Vera Cruz (1914) and the twelve-month-long Poncho Villa Expedition (1916-17). In addition to the two US expeditions, there was another confrontation — which occurred after thousands of Mexicans invaded Texas to escape the violence in Mexico (see also, Sedition in Texas and The Bandit War). It did not help to improve relations with Mexico when it was learned that Germany was making an attempt to coopt Mexico into attacking the US southern border.
Send in the Marines
When President Woodrow Wilson decided to commit American blood to the defense of Paris, France in 1917, it was necessary to mobilize the U. S. Armed Forces. At the very moment when Wilson made his fateful decision, there were only two (2) military services even partially ready for combat: The United States Navy and the U. S. Marine Corps. The Navy and Marines were “most ready” because they had already demonstrated their capabilities in the Spanish-American War. The Army, meanwhile, were still organized almost exclusively for fighting hostile Indians in the western states. Mobilization in 1917 was a herculean task — and it speaks well for the American people that they were able to pull it off in such a short period of time.
One of the units activated in 1917 was my first (home) regiment, the Eighth Marines. Of course, a number of regiments were brought online in 1917, not only for use in Europe, but also in areas far away from the European battle zone. In total, fourteen regiments of Marines were activated by the middle part of 1918. Most of these never served in the European conflict but were deployed either in the Caribbean or remained in readiness inside the United States. The 8th Marine Regiment was one of these stateside infantry units.
At the time, Marine Corps regiments lacked the structure of subordinate battalions. There was only a regimental headquarters element, and independent numbered companies. The 8th Marines included its headquarters, 103rd, 104th, 105th, 106th, 107th, 108th, 109th, 110th, 111th, and 112th rifle companies totaling 1,000 officers and men under the command of Major Ellis B. Miller. In 1917, owing to the “different kind of war” unfolding for the United States in Europe, the Marine Corps recognized the wisdom of adopting the U. S. Army’s battalion structure. If the Marines were going to fight a sustained land engagement, particularly alongside Army units, they would have to adopt an organizational structure that was identical to that of the Army. The structure, for the regiments dispatched to Europe, included three subordinate battalions, each with a headquarters company, and four rifle companies — an increase in strength to 3,000 men. Since the 8th Marines was not earmarked for service in Europe, the standard pre-war organization was retained.
The regiment’s first orders from HQMC was to prepare for deployment — to Texas. The contingency plan was to send the 8th Marines into Mexico if needed in the defense of the United States’ southern border — particularly in light of the fact that there was no improvement in Mexican/American relations after Pershing’s pursuit of Pancho Villa, and the growing concern among American citizens living along the border for their safety — particularly in light of Germany’s attempt to involve Mexico against the United States. Should it become necessary, the 8th Marines would make an amphibious assault at Tampico and seize the oilfields there.
After arriving at Fort Crockett, the 8th Marines resumed its normal duties, which included field training, weapons training, and amphibious operations. In August 1918, a newly organized 9th Marine Regiment under the Third Marine Brigade joined the 8th Marines at Fort Crockett. These units had been stationed in Cuba to safeguard sugar mills from insurrectionists and saboteurs working with German agents. It was in this way that the 8th Marine Regiment became a subordinate command, along with the 9th Marines, of the 3rd Marine Brigade.
This presence of a large force of U. S. Marines in Texas — not too far distant from the Mexican border, continued through 1919. There was never any attempt to hide the purpose of these Marines and Mexican officials were fully aware of the United States’ willingness to intervene in Mexico’s internal affairs. Accordingly, a steady supply of oil from Tampico continued to flow to the United States and its allies. This duty assignment was the 8th Marines most important contribution to the First World War. After eighteen months in Texas, HQMC directed that the 8th Marines move to Philadelphia. There, on 25 April 1919, the regiment was deactivated.
 Fort Crockett, constructed in 1903, was named in honor of frontiersman and member of the U. S. House of Representatives, David Crockett. Fort Crockett was a facility of the U. S. Army Coastal Artillery Corps at Galveston, Texas. During World War I, Fort Crockett served as a training base and pre-deployment training facility.
When Marines landed on Guadalcanal, they came ashore without opposition. A small Japanese construction force assigned to complete the airfield at Lunga Point wisely withdrew as soon as they realized there were Marines in the area. Guadalcanal did eventually turn into a combat cesspool, but not during the initial landing.
Marines landing on Tulagi, however, faced off against a determined enemy. This enemy would eventually let go, of course, but only over their dead body—and the U. S. Marines were plenty capable of accommodating them.
On 7 August 1942, the Japanese, in their insufferable arrogance, continued to imagine that it could maintain their presence in the central Pacific region, even after their two attempts to extend their homeland defensive perimeter were thwarted in the Battle of Coral Sea (May 1942) and at Midway (June 1942). These two back-to-back victories gave the Allied forces the opportunity to seize the offensive elsewhere in the Pacific. Allied planners decided to make this move against the British Solomon Islands: Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Gavutu-Tanambogo.
As part of their campaign that resulted in the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) sent naval infantry to occupy Tulagi and nearby islands in the southern Solomons. The Third Kure Special Naval Landing Force occupied Tulagi on 3 May 1942 [Note 1]. These troops almost immediately began to construct a seaplane base, ship refueling facility, and communications station on Tulagi and Gavutu/Tanambogo and the Florida Islands.
Aware of these activities, Allied planners became even more concerned when they observed Japanese efforts to construct an airfield near Lunga Point. Admiral Ernest J. King, serving as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, devised a plan to deny the use of the Solomon Islands. Otherwise, the Japanese would be positioned to threaten supply routes between the United States and Australia. King’s long-term objective was to seize or neutralize the Japanese base of operations at Rabaul. The Solomon campaign would also enable the Americans to support Allied efforts in New Guinea and open the way to re-take the Philippine Islands.
Admiral Chester A. Nimitz, Commander, United States Pacific, established the South Pacific theater of operations, placing Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley in command to direct the Allied effort in the Solomon Islands. Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, U. S. Marine Corps, moved his 1st Marine Division from the United States to New Zealand for pre-combat training. Additional Allied units (land, naval, and air forces) established bases in Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia. Vandegrift’s established his forward headquarters at Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides. The Solomon campaign would become known as Operation Watchtower.
Initially, Watchtower excluded Guadalcanal—until Allied intelligence noted the airfield construction at Lunga Point. Nimitz then decided to incorporate Guadalcanal. The expeditionary force involved 75 warships and troop transports (both American and Australian), which assembled near Fiji on 26 July 1942. There was only time for one rehearsal landing.
Major General Vandegrift commanded 16,000 Allied (mostly U. S. Marines) and he intended to lead the majority of these ashore on Guadalcanal on 7 August. Vandegrift assigned a second offensive operation to his deputy commander, Brigadier General William H. Rupertus [Note 2]. Rupertus would command the assault on Tulagi with 3,000 Marines.
Bad weather in the southern Solomon Islands allowed the Americans to approach Guadalcanal undetected early on the morning of 7 August. The amphibious ready group split into two groups, one earmarked for Guadalcanal, and the other for Tulagi, Gavutu-Tanambogo-Florida. Aircraft from USS Wasp attacked the Japanese installation on Tulagi in advance of the landing, destroying 15 seaplanes. The cruiser USS San Juan and destroyers USS Monsoon and Buchanan conducted pre-landing bombardments. To provide supporting fire for the main landing, the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines (1/2) made an unopposed landing on Florida Island at 07:40—guided to their objective areas by Australian coast watchers.
The Battle for Tulagi
Tulagi Island is roughly two miles long and about a half-mile wide. It’s location is south of Florida Island, 22 miles across Sealark Channel from Guadalcanal. A ridge rising 300 feet above sea level marks the northwest-southeast axis. Two-thirds of the way down from its northwest tip, the Ridgeline is broken by a ravine, and then rises again toward a triangle of hills. The farthest southeast hill is designated Hill 208, and the farthest northeast hill is designated Hill 281. Three thousand yards east of Tulagi are the islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo. Gavutu Harbor on the Northeast end of the island, and Purvis Bay, southeast of Gavutu, forms an ideal deep-water anchorage.
At 0800, two battalions of Marines made an unopposed landing on the western shore of Tulagi, about midway between the two ends of the oblong shaped island [Note 3]. Thick beds of coral prevented landing craft from reaching the shoreline, so the Marines went over the side of their landing craft and waded ashore—a distance of about 110 yards.
The Marine landing surprised Tulagi’s Japanese defenders and it took them some time to organize their defenses. The overall Japanese commander of the Tulagi contingent was Captain Shigetoshi Miyazaki of the Yokohama Air Group. Miyazaki radioed his commander in Rabaul, IJN Captain Sadayoshi Yamada, informing him that Tulagi was under attack, that he was in the process of destroying signals, and his intention to resist the Americans to the last man.
2/5 secured the Northwest end of Tulagi without opposition and then joined Edson’s Raiders in their advance toward the southeastern end of the island. Japanese resistance was stiff, but isolated. Around noon, Captain Suzuki, commanding the 3rd Kure Force, repositioned his men on Hill 281 and a nearby ravine at the Southeast end of the island. Japanese defensive positions included dozens of tunneled caves dug into the hill’s limestone cliffs. Each of these contained machine-gun positions protected by layers of sandbags. The Marines reached the primary line of resistance (MLR) near dusk and dug in for the night.
Japanese naval infantry attacked the Marine perimeter five times during the night. Their tactics included ferocious frontal attacks and small unit attempts at infiltration. The Marines met teach assault by fire and close combat. Although taking a few casualties, the Marine line held through the night; the Japanese gave up far more dead or wounded. Twenty-two year old Private First Class (PFC) Edward H. Ahrens, from Dayton, Kentucky, assigned to the 1st Raiders, single-handedly engaged the enemy in hand-to-hand combat, killing thirteen Japanese before he too was killed [Note 4].
At daybreak on 8 August, six Japanese infiltrators shot and killed three Marines before they were eliminated. Later that morning, 2/2 landed to reinforce the landing force; 2/5, surrounded Hill 281 and the ravine. Pounding the enemy with mortar fire, the Marines launched a coordinated attack with satchel charges and well-aimed small arms fire. Each assault on Japanese held caves and machine-gun positions was expensive. Japanese naval infantry fought from foxholes, slit trenches, pillboxes, and caves. Machine-gunners fired their weapons until killed; when one gunner fell, another would take his place and this process continued until everyone in that position was dead.
Stiff Japanese resistance continued until late afternoon, although the Marines found a few stragglers over the next several days, engaged them, and killed them. In total, only three Japanese soldiers surrendered on Tulagi. Forty Japanese escaped by swimming to Florida Island. Over the next several months, Marines tracked down these escapees and killed them.
The Battle for Gavutu-Tanambogo
Gavutu and Tanambogo were islets, so-called because they were little more than exposed mounds of coral rising out of the sea. The Japanese constructed a seaplane base on Gavutu. The highest point on Gavutu was Hill 148; on Tanambogo, Hill 121—hills the IJN defended with concrete bunkers and a series of well-fortified caves.
Separating the two islets was a causeway extending some 1,600 feet. Nearly six hundred troops occupied these islets, including a number of Japanese and Korean civilians assigned to the 14th Construction Unit. The two islets were mutually supportive; each was in machine gun range of the other.
Marine commanders mistakenly estimated an enemy force of around two-hundred men. Following a naval bombardment, which damaged the seaplane base, Marines of the 1st Parachute Battalion stormed ashore at Gavutu at noon on 7 August 1942. Because naval gunfire had damaged the seaplane ramp, the Marines had to disembark their landing craft in an exposed position. Japanese defensive fire began ripping up the Marines, wounding or killing one in every ten of the battalion’s 397 troops. The landing force scrambled to get out of the killing zone.
Captain George Stallings, the battalion operations officer, ran forward to direct the forward movement of two Browning machine guns and a mortar section. He directed these weapons against Japanese positions to suppress their murderous fires. Dive bombers arrived to help suppress the Japanese, with some success. After about two hours of intense combat, the Marines reached and began climbing Hill 148. From the top, they began working their way down the other side, clearing Japanese positions with satchel charges, grenades, and hand-to-hand combat. Other Marines at the top of Hill 148 began delivering automatic weapons fire against the Japanese on Tanambogo’s Hill 121.
The battalion commander radioed General Rupertus for reinforcements before assaulting Tanambogo. Rupertus detached a company from 1/2 on Florida Island to assist in the assault, ignoring the advice of his operations officer that one company would not be sufficient. Rupertus reasoned that since most of the Japanese on Tanambogo were aircrew, aircraft maintenance, and construction personnel with no combat training., one company would do. Again, the Marine hierarchy under-estimated Japanese strength and fighting spirit. The rifle company was sent to Tanambogo shortly after dark on 7 August. The Marines came ashore while illuminated by the fires created by earlier naval bombardments. Five of the landing craft received heavy automatic weapons fire as they approached the shore, which killed or wounded several navy boat crewmen. Realizing that his position was untenable, the company commander quickly transferred his dead and wounded to the remaining boats to be taken back to the landing ship. He then led twelve Marines in a sprint across the causeway to cover on Gavutu.
During the night, heavy thunderstorms dropped torrential rains on the islets. Under this cover, the Japanese launched several assaults against the Marine perimeter. General Vandegrift, monitoring the operation from Guadalcanal, ordered 3/2 to prepare for landing on Tanambogo the next morning. The battalion began moving ashore at 10:00 on 8 August. Initially, the landing received air support from carrier-based attack aircraft, but General Vandegrift called it off after two aircraft accidentally dropped their bombs on Marine positions — killing four Marines. USS San Juan directed accurate naval gunfire on Tanambogo lasting for about thirty minutes. Marines from Gavutu provided covering fire while 3/2 went ashore, which enabled the battalion to complete its landing phase by 12:00.
3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines began its assault at 16:15, supported by two Stuart light tanks. One of these tanks became stuck on a large tree stump and was isolated from its infantry support. Fifty Japanese airmen assaulted the tank and set it on fire, killing two crewmen and nearly beating the remaining two Marines to death before infantry fire killed most of the attackers [Note 5].
3/2 Marines began clearing operations by systematically destroying the Japanese cave network with satchel charges and hand grenades. During the night of 8 August, Japanese defenders initiated several assaults, which frequently involved hand-to-hand engagements. By noon on 9 August, all Japanese resistance on Tanambogo ended. During the battle for Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo, Marines killed 863 Japanese soldiers/airmen and took twenty prisoners (most of whom were civilian laborers). Marine and Navy losses were 122 killed in action, 200 wounded.
The U. S. Navy quickly turned the Tulagi anchorage into a naval base/refueling station. Japanese naval superiority in the “slot” forced Allied ships into the refuge of Tulagi during hours of darkness and ships encountering significant battle damage were usually anchored at Tulagi for repairs. Later in the war, Tulagi became an operating base for the Navy’s patrol-torpedo boats; Florida Island became an American seaplane base.
Once officials declared the islets “secure,” General Rupertus’ landing force joined the rest of the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal.
Alexander, J. H. Edson’s Raiders: The 1st Marine Raider Battalion in World War II. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000.
Christ, J. F. Battalion of the Damned: 1st Marine Paratroopers at Gavutu and Bloody Ridge, 1942. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007.
Hammel, E. Carrier Clash: The Invasion of Guadalcanal & The Battle of the Eastern Solomons, August 1942. St. Paul: Zenith Press, 1999.
Jersey, S. C. Hell’s Islands: The Untold Story of Guadalcanal. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008.
Miller, J. Guadalcanal: The First Offensive. Washington: Center of Military History, 1995.
 The Special Naval Landing Forces were not called “marines,” but their purpose was identical to those of their American opponents: to project naval power ashore.
 William H. Rupertus (1889-1945) was a highly decorated Marine Corps officer who participated in the Banana Wars, as a China Marine, and in World War II at Guadalcanal, New Britain, and the Marianas Island campaigns. A distinguished marksman and a member of the famed Marine Corps Rifle Team, Rupertus was the author of the now famous Rifleman’s Creed.
 Commanding officers were: 1st Raider Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson; 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (1/5), Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Rosecrans. Company B and Company D of the 1st Raiders were first ashore, followed by Company A and Company C. Japanese defenders did not make a serious attempt to oppose the landing; they instead withdrew into a network of caves and dugouts intending to inflict as many casualties on the Marines as possible. Edson soon realized that naval and aerial bombing had no effect on the Japanese defenses unless they were “direct hit.”
 Posthumously awarded the Navy Cross.
 Marines later discovered 42 Japanese bodies around the tank, one of whom was the Japanese executive officer of the Yokohama Air Group, Lieutenant Commander Saburo Katsuta, and several of his seaplane pilots. The overall commander at Tanambogo was Navy captain Miyazaki, who blew himself up inside his command post during the late afternoon of 8 August.
that the process does not become a monster. —Nietzsche
We cannot begin to demonstrate an understanding of history’s great tragedies until we appreciate and acknowledge the strengths and weaknesses of the men who shaped them. Occasionally, high officials’ statements and behaviors reveal who they were, how they reasoned, and how they arrived at decisions that affected tens of thousands of other human beings. Of course, people are complex animals, and we are all flawed in some ways. Knowing that people are flawed should give those of us living in democracies something to think about before choosing our national leaders.
As one example, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was a man who had no qualms about developing atomic weapons or approving chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, but he was consistently an anti-colonialist and sympathetic to popular independence/nationalist movements. Roosevelt’s compassion, coupled with his moralism, limited his interest in colonialism to work performed by missionaries in far distant places unknown to most Americans. It was Roosevelt’s anti-colonial sentiments that brought him to loggerheads with other leaders of the allied powers — notably Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle.
Mr. Roosevelt believed colonialism opened the door to secret diplomacy, which led to bloody conflicts. These deeply held beliefs created tensions between Roosevelt, Churchill, and de Gaulle. Both Churchill and de Gaulle intended to re-engage their pre-World War II colonial interests — including those in Southeast Asia and North Africa.
But Roosevelt, the pragmatist, also kept his focus on winning the war against Germany and Japan. To achieve that primary objective, he curbed his anti-colonial sentiments throughout most of the war — with some exceptions. Roosevelt, for example, did not hesitate to signal his belief that the people of Indochina (present-day Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) were much better off without French meddling in their internal affairs. After World War II, Roosevelt intended to “push” France toward an agreement placing its Southeast Asian colonies into an international trusteeship — a first step, Roosevelt believed — toward achieving Indochinese independence.
Unfortunately, Franklin D. Roosevelt died in office on 12 April 1945 — before the end of the Second World War. Whatever his intentions toward Southeast Asia, it was left unfulfilled. Upon Roosevelt’s death, Harry S. Truman ascended to the presidency, and Truman was an entirely different man. Truman did not share Roosevelt’s anti-colonialist sentiments; he was more concerned about maintaining good relations with the United Kingdom and France. As a result, America’s world war allies had little trouble retaining their colonial holdings once the war was over. When nationalist leader Ho Chi Minh announced Viet Nam’s independence in 1945, Truman ignored him — preferring instead to back De Gaulle.
In fact, Truman developed no distinct policy toward Indochina until around 1947 and only then because of the re-emergence of the Soviet Union and its totalitarian power over most of Eastern Europe and not until Winston Churchill forewarned of a clash between communism and capitalism — his now-famous Iron Curtain speech in 1946. Always “slow on the up-take,” or if not that, then his preoccupation with post-war US domestic policy, the Iron Curtain speech, and George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” nudged Truman’s attention toward the Soviet Union, Europe, and the domino theory of global communism.
The Truman Doctrine led US foreign policy toward two interrelated goals — the first being an ambitious (American taxpayer-funded) program designed to rebuild a massively destroyed Europe as a democratic, capitalist dominated, pro-US collection of nations and a global defense against Soviet-style communism. The first of these attentions went to Greece and Turkey but soon extended into East and Southeast Asia, as well. The connection between events in Europe and far-distant Indochina was the re-established colonial empires of Great Britain and France, precisely the clash between French colonialism and the Vietnamese nationalist Ho Chi Minh, which began in 1945.
In 1943, the outcome of the Pacific war was inevitable: Japan would lose. What remained uncertain was how many allied troops would perish if it became necessary to invade the Japanese home islands. Encouraged, perhaps, by Italy’s campaign against Abyssinia in 1939, the US Army contracted with the University of Illinois (Urbana/Champaign) and a botanist/bioethicist named Arthur Galston to study the effects of chemical compounds (notably, dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4-D) and trichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4,5-T)) on cereal grains (including rice) and broadleaf crops.
What Galston discovered was that certain chemicals could be used to defoliate vegetation. It was from this discovery that the question arose — how best to disperse such chemicals?
Since the beginning of powered flight, highly placed civilian and military officials have debated aeronautics’ utility in conflict. During the First World War, French, British, and American forces employed airpower to counter enemy aircraft, perform intelligence gathering functions, attack enemy observation balloons, and drop bombs on enemy troop and artillery concentrations. In the Second World War, the allied powers refrained from using chemical and biological weapons — perhaps out of fear that the enemy would reciprocate its use — and (mostly) confined its lethal air assault to enemy industrial and transportation centers. There were two exceptions, however. Fire-bombing destroyed Dresden, Germany, Tokyo, Japan — and the civilians who lived in those cities. It was a travesty surpassed only by the use of atomic weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in early August 1945 — the point being that aerial delivery of weapons or other means of mass destruction was not a new phenomenon among the world’s first nations.
In early 1945, the US Army tested various chemical mixtures at the Bushnell Army Airfield in Florida. These tests were so successful that the US began planning to use defoliants against Japan — should it become necessary to invade the home islands. The people working on the application of chemical warfare did not know about the Manhattan Project. Because of the use of two atomic bombs in Japan, the allied invasion of the home islands was unnecessary — and neither was the use of herbicides.
Nevertheless, Great Britain and the United States continued their evaluations of defoliants’ use in the years following World War II. The Americans tested well over 1,100 chemical compounds in various field tests, and the British conducted similar tests in India and Australia. The first western nation to deploy chemical defoliants in conflict was the United Kingdom during the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960).
By the mid-1950s, events unfolding in Southeast Asia were already leading the United States toward an unmitigated disaster in foreign policy and economic expenditures. In 1961, given the “success” of the use of defoliants on the Malaysian Peninsula, American and Vietnamese officials began to consider their service in Vietnam, as well.
Even before President Lyndon Johnson escalated the United States’ involvement in Vietnam, war planners realized that the region’s dense foliage would challenge those involved in ground and air campaigns. This factor led to Operation Ranch Hand — a U. S. Air Force effort between 1961-1971 to reduce jungle vegetation and deny food sources to North Vietnamese troops and Viet Cong insurgents by spraying the dense forests with an estimated 20-million gallons of various herbicides. The Air Force concoction, code-named Agent Orange, contained the deadly chemical dioxin, later proven to cause cancer, congenital disabilities, rashes, and severe psychological and neurological problems among those exposed to it and their offspring.
Elmo Russell “Bud” Zumwalt accepted an appointment to the US Naval Academy in 1939. Upon graduation, he was commissioned an Ensign on 10 June 1942. Upon selection to Rear Admiral (Lower Half), Zumwalt assumed overall command of Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Seven in 1965. As Rear Admiral (Upper Half), Zumwalt became Commander, US Naval Forces (Vietnam) and Chief, U. S. Naval Advisory Group within the USMACV. In 1968, he was promoted to Vice Admiral and served as the principal navy advisor to US Army General Creighton Abrams, serving as Commander, MACV.
Zumwalt’s command was part of the “brown water” navy, which in his advisory capacity, controlled the Navy’s swift boats that patrolled the coasts, harbors, and river systems of South Vietnam. Among his subordinate boat commanders was his son, Elmo Russell Zumwalt III (and John F. Kerry). The brown water navy also included Task Force 115 (Coastal Surveillance Force), Task Force 116 (River Patrol Force), and Task Force 117 (Joint Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force).
In 1968, the United States had been fully engaged in the Vietnam War for three years. No one wants to fight a never-ending war, not the people who have to fight in it, not the people back home who suffer the loss of loved ones, and not the politicians whose popularity and careers are diminished by unhappy citizens. American war planners wanted to turn the war over to Vietnamese military officials to decide their fate vis-à-vis the conflict with North Vietnam. This task of turning the war over to the Vietnamese government was called Vietnamization, first implemented by President Richard M. Nixon. Nixon, who previously served as Eisenhower’s vice president, wanted the United States out of the Vietnam conflict — but with honor.
To achieve Vietnamization, the “press was on” to move Vietnamese military forces as quickly as possible to the point where they could take over the war, allowing the United States to withdraw their forces. President Nixon didn’t want to hear any excuses about how or why USMACV could not achieve it.
Admiral Zumwalt related the story of how he attended a briefing with General Abrams in 1968 when the discussion emerged about how soon the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) might assume control of the air war over South Vietnam. A senior US Air Force officer opined that the VNAF might be ready as early as 1976. Abrahams threw a fit … Vietnamization was taking too long, and the Air Force didn’t seem to understand that MACV didn’t have eight more years to fool around with the project. When it was Zumwalt’s turn to speak, he laid out his plan for increasing the pace of Vietnamization among the riverine forces. This moment was when the Admiral made his fateful decision to increase defoliation along South Vietnam’s inland waterways. Zumwalt later said that he specifically checked with the Air Force about possible harmful effects of Agent Orange on US personnel; he said, “We were told there were none.”
But in 1988, Dr. James Clary, a USAF researcher associated with Operation Ranch Hand, wrote to Senator Tom Daschle, stating, “When we initiated the herbicide program in the 1960s, we were aware of the potential damage [to humans] due to dioxin contamination in the herbicide. However, because the material was to be used on the enemy, none of us was overly concerned. We never considered a scenario in which our own personnel would become contaminated with the herbicide.”
Admiral Zumwalt’s son was diagnosed with stage four non-Hodgkins lymphoma in 1983; in 1985, doctors also discovered stage three Hodgkins (another form of lymphoma). Elmo R. Zumwalt III died in 1988, 42-years old. His son, Elmo R. Zumwalt IV, suffers from congenital dysfunction that confuses his physical senses. In 1985, Admiral Zumwalt told the press, “I do not have any guilt feelings because I was convinced then, and I am convinced now, that the use of Agent Orange saved literally hundreds and maybe thousands of lives.”
The Admiral could not have been more wrong as to the effects of Agent Orange and “saving lives.” The consequences of using dioxin to defoliate Vietnam’s dense jungle ended up killing up to 40,000 American servicemen, causing untold sickness and suffering to their offspring and killing as many as four million Vietnamese civilians. Agent Orange killed his son — and the effect of this incomprehensible decision continues to manifest itself in 2021. Admiral Zumwalt passed away in 2000 from mesothelioma. He was 79 years old – he outlived his son by twelve years.
Associated Press (Online). “Elmo Zumwalt, Son of Admiral, Dies at Age 42.” 13 August 1988.
Clark, C. S. and Levy, A. Sprectre Orange.The Guardian.com. 2003.
Mach, J. T. Before Vietnam: Understanding the Initial Stages of US Involvement in Southeast Asia, 1945-1949. Centennial Library: Cedarville University, 2018.
Stellman, J. M. and Stellman, S. D., Christian, R., Weber, T., and Tomasallo, C. The Extent and Patterns of Usage of Agent Orange and other herbicides in Vietnam. School of Public Health, Columbia University, 2002.
Veterans and Agent Orange. National Academies, Institute of Medicine, Committee to Review Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans of Exposure to Herbicides, 2012.
Vietnam Express (online). Due Hoang, Hoang Phuong, Dien Luong. Out of Sight/Out of Mind: Vietnam’s Forgotten Agent Orange Victims, 2017.
Zumwalt, E. Jr., and Zumwalt, E. III. Agent Orange and the Anguish of an American Family. New York: New York Times Magazine, 1986.
 On 5 March 1946, then former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill condemned the Soviet Union’s policies in Europe, declaring that “… an iron curtain has descended across the [European] continent.” It was the opening volley of the Cold War.
 George F. Kennan (1904-2005) was one of the US’ foreign policy wise men. He was a historian and diplomat who advocated a containment policy toward the Soviet Union and helped Truman formulate the so-called Truman Doctrine.
 British forces entered Indochina in rather substantial numbers to accept the surrender of Imperial Japanese forces at the end of World War II. Free French forces re-entered Vietnam soon after and observing the growing discord between French legionnaires and Vietnamese nationalists, and with no desire to be caught between the two, the British forces soon withdrew. British colonial forces concentrated on their interests in Malaya (which also became a hotbed for communist inspired nationalism), Singapore, and Hong Kong.
 Raids conducted by my than 1,400 allied aircraft between 13-15 February 1945, resulting in 25,000 civilian deaths.
 Part of Operation Meeting House conducted on 9-10 March 1945 is the single most destructive bombing raid in human history. It destroyed 16 square miles of central Tokyo and killed about 100,000 people.
Most people associate the World War II Era Navy and Marine Corps with the Pacific War — which is certainly accurate; the U. S. Navy was unquestionably the dominant force in the Pacific. But the Allied powers could not have won the European war without superior naval power, as well. Victory at sea was a keystone for allied triumph over the Axis power in all World War II theaters.
Europe (Nordic, Western, Eastern fronts)
Mediterranean, Africa, Middle East
Victory at sea involved the formidable task of keeping sea lanes open for the movement of troop transports, combat equipment, raw materials, and food stores — in massive quantities earmarked for the United Kingdom, nearly isolated by hostile German forces.
Complicating the Navy’s Atlantic mission was the fact that theater area commanders had to compete for limited naval resources. There were only so many aircraft carriers, only so many landing craft, only so many carrier-based aircraft — only so many men. It was up to theater area commanders to find the best way of distributing these limited assets where they would do the most good. As one can imagine, the Navy’s mission to protect ships, men, and material over vast areas of the world’s major oceans was no small undertaking — and neither was denying access to them by the Axis powers.
Within 15 years from the end of World War I, Germany began rebuilding its military and naval forces. Between 1933 and 1939, without opposition and emboldened by European politicians who sought to avoid war at any cost, Germany seized and annexed Alsace-Loraine, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. When Adolph Hitler discovered that the “free world’s” only response to this aggression was appeasement, and in concert with the Soviet Union, he launched a lightning invasion of Poland. Allied powers responded to the invasion by declaring war on Germany, prompting Germany’s invasion of Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France — and then began its assault on the United Kingdom through aerial bombing and naval blockades. Once Germany believed that it had neutralized the United Kingdom, Hitler foolishly invaded the Soviet Union.
Following the First World War, the United Kingdom decided to place all of its military aircraft under the Royal Air Force, completely neglecting its naval arm vis-à-vis sea-launched aircraft. As a result of this poor thinking, the United Kingdom lost its maritime superiority.
In the years leading up to World War II, Royal Navy Aviation competed with the RAF for scant resources. The decision taken by Britain’s war policy board was that strategic bombing must occupy a higher priority than seaborne attack aircraft — and did so even after the United States proved that long-range bomber aircraft were only marginally effective against moving ships at sea. The use of B-24 Liberator aircraft against Japanese ships of war during the Guadalcanal campaign in 1942-43 reinforced the American’s earlier conclusion.
In 1939, the Royal Navy had a substantial base structure at both ends of the Mediterranean, at Alexandria, Egypt, Gibraltar, and Malta. The French Navy had naval bases at Toulon and Mers-el-Kébir and deluded themselves into believing that the Mediterranean was “their sea.”
In September 1939, when the UK declared war against Germany, there were only seven aircraft carriers in the British fleet. These were capital ships highly vulnerable to German submarines, battleships, and land-based aircraft. Because the British had no carriers in the First World War, there was no battle-tested procedure for protecting aircraft carriers.
Substantial loses during the UK’s initial carrier operations underscored weaknesses of command decisions and employment doctrine. HMS Courageous was lost in the second week of the war, sunk by the German submarine U-29. HMS Ark Royal might have been lost in the following week were it not for defective torpedoes fired by U-39. From these two incidents, the British Admiralty decided that carriers were too vulnerable for use as a submarine screening force. In early June 1940, HMS Glorious was lost to German battleships off the coast of Norway [Note 1].
At the beginning of 1942, the U. S. Atlantic Fleet operated Carrier Division Three, which included the fleet attack carriers (CVA) USS Ranger, USS Hornet, and USS Wasp, and the escort carrier (CVE) USS Long Island. Over the course of the war, American and British carriers became increasingly effective in a number of operational assignments — from providing air cover during amphibious operations to patrolling in search of enemy ships.
Unlike the Pacific war, where naval and ground commanders planned and implemented combat strategies and operations, European heads of government were the decision-makers in the Atlantic war. Both Winston Churchill and Adolph Hitler directly involved themselves in the details of operational planning; in contrast, Franklin Roosevelt left the details of fighting to his military commanders.
The Battle of the Atlantic
The Battle of the Atlantic was a contest of strategies between the Allied and Axis powers. Both sides attempted to deny use of oceanic shipping. British and American navies sought to blockade German shipments of raw materials from Norway; the Germans attempted to block American shipments of food and vital supplies to the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.
Germany relied principally on its submarines, merchant raiders, battle cruisers, and land-based aircraft to destroy American shipping — of those, submarines were by far the most effective [Note 2]. Allied use of aircraft carriers contributed significantly to the ultimate success of the Battle of the Atlantic — used not only to protect convoys, but to locate and destroy German submarines, as well. This success was the direct result of the Allied capture and deciphering German code machines.
In September 1939, Germany had fifty-seven submarines; twenty-two were suitable for combat operations in the Atlantic and only eight or nine could operate “on station” because of the time it took to return to their base for fuel, refit, and replenishment. By March 1940, this small submarine force accounted for the sinking of 222 Allied ships — including two aircraft carriers, a cruiser, and two destroyers. Germany’s application of underwater naval assault was “unrestricted,” evidenced by Germany’s sinking of the civilian passenger ship Athenia.
On land, it took Germany only six weeks to conquer France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (10May-24 June 1940). With the fall of France, Germany was able to establish a submarine base along the French coast, which brought their U-boats 1,000 miles closer to Allied convoy routes.
Within the space of two years, the production of German U-boats was sufficient to allow Germany’s Grand Admiral Erich Raeder and Admiral Karl Dönitz to begin employing submarines in groups (from eight to twenty) (the wolf pack). In April 1941, German submarines destroyed half the convoy ships transiting from Halifax to Liverpool. The action was significant enough to cause President Roosevelt to order the transfer of USS Yorktown, three battleships, and six destroyers from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet. In September 1941, Roosevelt transferred 50 American destroyers to the Royal Navy [Note 3]. It was at this time that the United States Navy began escorting Britain-bound convoys as far as Iceland. Despite these efforts, by the time the United States entered the war, German U-boats had destroyed 1,200 cargo ships.
American Attitudes, 1939-41
The American people well-remembered the terrible loss of life during World War I and they wanted nothing whatever to do with another European War. Franklin Roosevelt campaigned for reelection with the promise of neutrality [Note 4]. When war broke out in Europe in 1939, Roosevelt declared American neutrality — but he also established a “neutral zone” in the Atlantic within which the United States would protect shipping. The Navy assigned USS Ranger to patrol this “neutral” zone.
Even before 1939, Roosevelt’s opposition party in Congress watched developing world events and the president with growing concerns. Members of Congress were well aware that Roosevelt was itching to involve himself in the European war, so in the 1930s, the congress passed a series of neutrality acts (1935, 1936, 1937, and 1939) that reflected the mood of the American people. Americans had become isolationist and non-interventionist. Whether these were carefully thought-out restrictions may not matter today, but the Acts made no distinction between victim or aggressor.
As Congress pushed back against Roosevelt’s apparent desire to engage in the emerging world war, Mr. Roosevelt crafted clever ways around congressional restrictions. The so-called Lend-Lease program was enacted in early March 1941; it permitted President Roosevelt to provide Great Britain, Free France, the Republic of China, and Soviet Union with food, oil, and war materials [Note 5]. Congress earmarked more than $50-billion for this purpose (about 17% of the USA’s total war expenditure) (in modern dollars, around $600-billion), most of which went to the United Kingdom. Under this agreement, nations receiving war materials could use them until returned to the United States (or were destroyed). Very little war material was returned to US control [Note 6]. The net-effect of Lend-Lease was that it removed any pretense of neutrality by the United States.
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, President Roosevelt asked Congress for a declaration of war against the Empire of Japan. On 11 December, Germany and Italy declared war against the United States. Mr. Roosevelt had his war.
Carriers and Their Functions
Large areas of the Atlantic were beyond the range of land-based aircraft in Canada, Iceland, and Great Britain. The UK, with insufficient fleet resources, initiated programs to enhance convoy protection. In 1940-41, Britain converted three ocean-going vessels, a seaplane tender, and an auxiliary cruiser [Note 7] to help extend the protective range of land-based aircraft. They called these vessels Fight Catapult Ships (FACs), Catapult Aircraft Merchant Ships (CAMs), and Merchant Aircraft Carriers (MACs). Germany sank three of these ships in 1941 — the same year the British converted thirty-five additional merchant ships into catapult ships.
In January 1941, the United Kingdom began converting captured German merchant ships to escort carriers (CVEs). While CVEs were slow and lightly armored, they did provide platforms for dispatching and retrieving land-based aircraft. Britain’s first CVE was christened HMS Audacity. The ship carried six operational aircraft with room for an additional eight, but because there was no hanger deck or elevator, aircraft were maintained on the flight desk.
In April 1941, the United States began converting merchant hulls to CVEs. The first American CVE was christened USS Long Island. A second American CVE was transferred to the UK, who christened her HMS Archer. Archer was capable of operating 15 aircraft. The Americans constructed five additional CVEs, (transferring four to the Royal Navy): HMS Avenger, HMS Biter, HMS Dasher, HMS Tracker, and the USS Charger.
Lessons learned from USS Long Island led to substantial improvements to forty-four successive CVEs. The new constructs were capable of carrying between 19-24 aircraft. Thirty-three of these went to the United Kingdom. Additional CVEs were constructed from tanker hulls, which were longer and faster than the merchant hull ships.
Aircraft carriers operating in both oceans had similar functions. They supported amphibious landings, raided enemy ports, searched for enemy submarines, escorted merchant convoys, transported aircraft, troops, vital supplies, and served as training platforms for carrier-rated pilots.
The Turning Point
In the spring of 1943, German submarines assaulted 133 Allied ships, a major decline from previous periods. The Battle for the Atlantic had taken an abrupt turn. On 21 April, Germany sent 51 U-boats to attack a 42-ship convoy transiting from Liverpool to Halifax. Designated Convoy ONS-5, the shipments were protected by nine naval escorts. U-boats sunk thirteen ships; escort vessels and Catalina flying boats sunk seven U-boats and badly damaged seven more. In total, for that month, Allied forces destroyed 43 German submarines. For the next six months, beginning in May 1943, the Allies dispatched 64 North Atlantic convoys with 3,546 ships to Great Britain. Not a single ship was sunk en route.
Faced with such massive losses, Grand Admiral Dönitz ordered his submarines into the Central Atlantic, South Atlantic, and Indian Oceans. These were the areas used by the United States to transport men and materiel to the Mediterranean to support operations in Sicily and the India-Burma campaign. To counter Dönitz’ strategy, the U. S. Navy authorized anti-submarine groups, which included destroyers and CVEs, to operate apart from convoys. Between June – December 1943, Allied hunter-killer groups [Note 8] destroyed 31 German U-boats, including ten of the so-called resupply submarines. Admiral Dönitz’ strategy in the Central and South Atlantic fared no better than his North Atlantic scheme.
Hunter-killer battle groups were a team effort. CVEs used the F4F Wildcat fighter to look for submarines, and when spotted (either by air or radar), dispatched TBF Avengers with bombs, depth charges, and torpedoes. Allied destroyers and destroyer escorts served to screen the CVE hunter-killer groups [Note 9].
By the end of 1944, the Allied powers dominated the Atlantic. Dönitz moved his submarine force around, but the US & UK were reading the admiral’s mail. He ordered 58 U-boats to counter Allied landings at Normandy. German U-boats sank four Allied ships at the cost of 13 U-boats. After Normandy, Dönitz withdrew his submarines to Norwegian waters, which drew the Allies’ attention to the German battleship Tirpitz (a sister ship to Bismarck), which lay at anchor in Norway. Tirpitz did very little during World War II, but the ship did offer a potential threat to Allied navies. In early 1944, the Allies’ focus on Tirpitz deceived the German high command into believing that an Allied invasion of Norway was imminent. Once Tirpitz was sunk in November 1944, the Royal Navy felt comfortable sending the carriers HMS Formidable and HMS Indefatigable to the far east to join the British Pacific Fleet.
At the beginning of 1945, HMS Implacable was the only Allied fleet carrier in the Atlantic, supported by 12 British and 10 American CVEs. All other fleet carriers were sent to the Pacific Theater to finish the war with Japan even as the war with Germany continued. Thirty German U-boats attacked a 26-ship convoy in February 1945, supported by German Torpedo-Bombers, but aircraft from CVEs Campania and Nairana drove the U-boats away with no loss of merchantmen. Convoys bound for Russia continued through May 1945 [Note 10].
Marines in the Atlantic
We seldom read or hear about Marines who served in the Atlantic War. This is very likely because fewer than six-thousand Marines participated in Atlantic, North African, and European campaigns during World War II. Of course, before the war, US Marines served at various U. S. Embassies.
In 1941, about four-thousand Marines of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade served in Iceland through February 1942. But given the expertise of U. S. Marines in amphibious warfare, the Navy Department assigned several senior Marine officers to serve as planners/advisors for invasions of North Africa, Sicily, and Normandy. For example, Colonel Harold D. Campbell [Note 11], an aviator, was responsible for planning air support for the 6,000 man raid on Dieppe [Note 12]. Marines were also responsible for training four U. S. Army combat divisions in preparation for their amphibious assault of North Africa. In North Africa, Marines from ship’s detachments executed two raids in advance of the main invasion: one operation involved seizure of the old Spanish Fort at the Port of Oran; a second raid secured the airfield at Safi, Morocco. Both operations took place on 10 November 1942, the Marine Corps’ 167th birthday.
Fifty-one Marines served with the U. S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), participating in behind the lines operations in Albania, Austria, Corsica, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Rumania, Sardinia, and Yugoslavia from 1941 to 1945. See also: Marines and Operation Torch, Behind the Lines, and Every Climb and Place.
At sea, Marines assigned to detachments aboard battleships and heavy cruisers served as naval gun crews during the North African, Sicily, and Normandy invasions [Note 13]. Reminiscent of the olden days of sailing ships, Navy ship commanders sent their Marine sharpshooters aloft to explode German mines during Operation Overlord (the invasion of Normandy) [Note 14]. On 29 August 1944, Marines from USS Augusta and USS Philadelphia participated in the Allied acceptance of the surrender of Marseilles and 700 German defenders.
When General Eisenhower assumed the mantle of Supreme Allied Commander, his staff consisted of 489 officers. Of these, 215 were American officers, including Colonel Robert O. Bare, who served on the staff of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey, Allied Naval Commander. Bare worked on the plan for the Normandy invasion. While serving with the British Assault Force, Bare was awarded the Bronze Star Medal. At the completion of his tour in Europe, Bare participated in the Palau and Okinawa campaigns. During the Korean War, Bare served as Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Division.
Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk served Eisenhower as Commander, Western Naval Task Force. Assigned to Kirk’s staff was Marine Colonel Richard H. Jeschke [Note 15]. Jeschke served Kirk as an assistant planning officer in the operations staff. Of the total 1.5 million Americans serving in Europe, 124,000 were naval personnel. Fifteen-thousand of those served on combat ships, 87,000 assigned to landing craft, 22,000 assigned to various naval stations in the UK, and Marine Security Forces, United Kingdom. On 6 June 1944, Rear Admiral Don P. Moon (Commander, Force Uniform), frustrated with delays in landing operations, dispatched Colonel Kerr ashore to “get things moving.” Kerr diverted troops scheduled to land at Green Beach to Red Beach, which expedited the operation. Colonel Kerr credited the low casualty rates during the landing to the accuracy and rate of fire of naval artillery.
The landing at Omaha Beach was a different story. German defenses inflicted 2,000 casualties on a landing force of 34,000 men. Rear Admiral John L. Hall dispatched Colonel Jeschke and First Lieutenant Weldon James ashore at Omaha Beach to observe and report back to him the effectiveness of naval gunfire support from USS Texas.
Colonel John H. Magruder II, USMC served as the naval liaison officer to Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s 21st Army Group. Many Marine officers were assigned to various posts because of their fluency in foreign languages. Magruder was fluent in Dutch. Major Francis M. Rogers served as an interpreter for General Edouard de Larminent, Commander, II French Corps. Rogers was fluent in both French and Portuguese.
Allen, H. C. Britain and the United States. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1955.
Dawson, R. H. The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959.
DeChant, J. A. Marine Corps Aviation Operations in Africa and Europe. Washington: Marine Corps Gazette, 1946.
Donovan, J. A. Outpost in the North Atlantic. Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1992.
Edwards, H. W. A Different War: Marines in Europe and North Africa. Washington: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1994.
Eisenhower Foundation. D-Day: The Normandy Invasion in Retrospect. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1971.
Morrison, S. E. The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963.
Menges, C. A. History of U. S. Marine Corps Counter-intelligence. Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1991.
Roskill, S. The Navy at War, 1939-1945. Chatham, Kent, Great Britain: Mackays of Chatham, 1960.
 Glorious was ordered to help evacuate aircraft during the UK’s withdrawal from Norway. The ship left the main body of the fleet when discovered by the German battleships. German 11-inch guns literally ripped Glorious apart. Alone, without aircraft aloft, and only 4-inch protective guns, Glorious had no chance of survival in a hostile sea. Captain Guy D’Oyly-Hughes, commanding Glorious, was a former submarine skipper. He decided to set out alone so that he could, once at sea, court-martial Wing Commander J. B. Heath, RN, and Lieutenant Commander Evelyn Slessor, RN, who had refused to obey an order to attack shore targets. Heath admitted his refusal, but argued that his mission was ill-defined and his aircraft unsuited to the task.
 German submarines accounted for 70% of world-wide allied shipping losses.
 The agreement was also known as the Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement.
 In a joint statement issued on 14 August 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill announced their joint goals for the world following World War II. Later dubbed The Atlantic Charter, it established an outline of objectives that included dismantling the British Empire, the formation of NATO, and a general agreement on tariffs and trade. An American-British alliance was formed in 1939 with Roosevelt and Churchill secretly meeting eleven times. The Atlantic Charter made clear Roosevelt’s support of Great Britain, but in order to achieve the charter’s objectives, the United States would have to become a participant in the war. This could not happen, politically, unless there was first of all a cataclysmic event that propelled the United States into the war. From 1939 forward, Roosevelt did everything he could to cause the Japanese to attack the United States —which they did on 7 December 1941.
 Canada had a similar program they referred to as “Mutual Aid.”
 The Lend-Lease arrangement with China (suggested in 1940) involved a plan for 500 modern aircraft and enough war materials to supply thirty divisions of ground troops. With the Chinese civil war “on hold” until the defeat of China’s common enemy (Japan), Roosevelt dealt independently with both sides through General Joseph Stilwell. Neither Chiang Kai-shek nor Mao Zedong ever intended to return Lend-Lease equipment to the United States; rather, both sides intended to use these armaments on each other after war with Japan was settled. As it turned out, American Marines died from weapons and ammunition manufactured in the United States when turned against them by Mao’s communist forces in 1945.
 OBVs were merchant ships pressed into service by the Royal Navy and converted into auxiliary carriers.
 The hunter-killer groups included US CVEs Card, Bogue, Core, Block Island, Santee, and HMS Tracker and Biter. USS Block Island was the only American CVE sunk in the Atlantic War.
 At a time when the Washington Naval Arms Limitation Treaty (1922) limited the construction of large battleships, the United States began building replacement ships for obsolete World War II destroyers. The Navy produced 175 Fletcher-Class destroyers (DD), designed as torpedo attack ships with a secondary mission of anti-submarine warfare and screening for capital ships. Destroyer Escorts (DE) were a smaller variant ship with specialized armaments capable of a smaller turning radius. Both ships were referred to as “tin cans” because they were lightly armored. They relied more on their speed for self-defense. During World War II, the U. S. Navy lost 97 destroyers and 15 destroyer-escorts.
 Convoys to Russia during the war involved 740 ships in 40 convoys, which provided 5,000 tanks and more than 7,000 aircraft. German U-boats destroyed 97 of these merchantmen and 18 escorting warships. Germany lost three destroyers and 38 U-boats.
 Harold Denny Campbell (1895-1955) served in both the First and Second World War. On 6 December 1941, Colonel Campbell assumed command of Marine Aircraft Group 11 at Quantico, Virginia. In May 1942, he was personally selected by Lord Mountbatten to serve as a Marine Aviation advisor to the British Combined Staff. After promotion to Brigadier General in 1943, Campbell assumed command of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing in Samoa and in 1944 commanded the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing in the Peleliu campaign.
 The raid was conducted by British and Canadian commandos. Tagged as Operation Jubilee, the purpose of the amphibious raid to test the feasibility of lightening raids for intelligence gathering and boosting the morale of “folks back home.” It was a much-needed learning experience because aerial and naval support was inadequate, the tanks were too heavy for a “lightening raid” and the Allies under-estimated the strength of German defenses. Within ten hours of the landing, the German army killed, wounded, or captured 3,623 British/Canadian commandos. The British also lost 33 landing craft and a destroyer. Operation Jubilee became a textbook lesson on what not to do in an amphibious operation.
 U. S. Navy battleships usually included a detachment of two-hundred Marines; battle cruisers usually had a detachment of around 80 Marines.
 I am trying to imagine a Marine sharpshooter 200 feet in the air on a pitching ship, shooting German anti-ship mines with any degree of accuracy. Damn.
 Colonel (later, Brigadier General) Jeschke (1894-1957) served with distinction in both the Atlantic and Pacific campaigns: on Guadalcanal, and during the invasions of Sicily and Normandy.
What most Americans know about the British Army in North America is this: they were the most powerful Army in the world, partnered with the most powerful navy in the world, and that the American colonists in rebellion never stood a chance. This, of course, is only true in the context of a refined, well trained army sent to confront farmers, shopkeepers, barmen, and boat builders who were drafted into the colonial militia.
In 1754, the British Army had about 4,000 regulars serving in the North America [Note 1]. To understand what this means, in terms of manpower strength, the average size of an infantry regiment was between 700-800 men. Given these numbers, then there were five regiments assigned to the colonies, each consisting of ten companies, the entirety being a brigade. The brigade commander may have formed battalions of five companies each. It is likely that British Army units were placed where they were most needed; given the size in area of the thirteen colonies, they were hardly an effective fighting force. The soldiers in residence had been long neglected by the home government; they had become complacent in their duties and posed no threat to anyone, much less the French or their Indian surrogates.
Regimental Colonels were honorary positions of well-placed gentlemen. The colonel’s frequent absences from the regiment made the lieutenant colonel the officer commanding, and he was assisted by a major. Aiding the officer commanding was a small staff of five men (excluding personal batmen). If the lieutenant colonel and major were absent from the regiment, then the senior captain stepped in as officer commanding. In such conditions, with captains commanding the regiment, then it fell upon the lieutenants to command the companies.
The British infantry company was composed of 3 officers, 2-4 musicians, 6 noncommissioned officers, and 56 privates. Sickness, desertion, and battle losses meant that British companies/battalions/regiments/brigades seldom — if ever — went into combat at full strength.
Young men of the eighteenth century often joined the British Army for economic reasons. The onset of the Industrial Revolution and land closure brought enormous social changes in Great Britain. Common laborers, textile workers, and displaced artisans joined the army to escape poverty. The British private received eight pence per day before taxes — about £1.00 per month. It was’t much, but it was better than the soldier could make “back home” as a laborer — £1.00 being somewhere in the neighborhood of $25.00/month in 2021 currency.
Where the British Soldiers Came From
The common soldier enlisted in the British Army under widely varied circumstances. The unemployed textile worker may have sought out the recruiter and accepted the King’s shilling for his service “at the pleasure of the King.” In other words, this recruit may have been recruited for life. But the British Army also hired mercenaries; men who fought for money, and only when the money was right. Most recruitments in the British Isles came from poverty stricken sections of the larger cities. Each regiment recruited for itself and regimental colonels would often lead recruiting parties into towns and villages. Some people were, with the permission of the Crown and local courts, pressed into service. They were vagrants, homeless people, drunkards, and some were prisoners who thought it would be a better life in the Army than eating rat meat in a dark, dank prison in the midlands.
British military officers purchased their commissions (and sold them). The purchase price of a military officer’s commission was high enough that it precluded men of moderate means from becoming British officers, or ascending higher in rank. Most officers up to the rank of major were of the middle class. Only sons of nobility could afford high command; they had to be well-born, and as such, they served concurrently as politicians and general officers.
The Braddock Expedition
On 20 February 1755, Major General Edward Braddock arrived in the colonies with two regiments and assumed command of all British land forces as Commander-in-Chief of the British North American Army. He met with several of the colonial governors in Alexandria on 14 April. They persuaded him to undertake vigorous actions against the French, who had instigated native populations against British settlements. With colonial militia reinforcing British regulars, Braddock planned his punitive expedition against the French around the following: a militia officer from Massachusetts would lead an attack against Fort Niagara; General Sir William Johnson from New York would lead an assault against the French at Crown Point; Colonel Monckton would lead an attack on the Bay of Fundy, and Braddock would himself march an expedition against Fort Duquesne (Pittsburg) on the Ohio River.
The main thrust of the British attack was Fort Duquesne. General Braddock commanded the 44th and 48th Regiments of Foot (1,350 men), an additional force of 500 regular and colonial militia, field artillery, and other support troops, for a total of around 2,100 men [Note 2]. A twenty-three year old lieutenant colonel of militia accompanied Braddock — a surveyor, who knew the landscape, and a man capable of serving as Braddock’s aide-de-camp. His name was George Washington. Major General Braddock fell mortally wounded at the Battle of Monongahela on 9 July 1755, carried from the field by Colonel Washington and Colonel Meriwether. Although Washington had no official position within the chain of command, he nevertheless brought order to the regiments and commanded a rearguard for the evacuation of the British expedition from the field. Of Braddock’s regular force, 456 were killed, 422 wounded. Of his officers numbering 86, 26 were killed, 37 were wounded. There were 50 women in the Braddock expedition, all but four were killed. Subsequent defeats along the frontier prompted London to expand the British Army in North America. It was easier said than done.
The average Englishman had little interest in serving in the British Army; it was a challenging lifestyle at the best of times. Between 1755-57, only 4,500 Englishmen enlisted for service in the colonies. At the same time, 7,500 British colonists enlisted in the British Army of North America. After Grat Britain formerly declared war against France in 1756, recruiting efforts on the Homefront were more successful. Some 11,000 regulars were sent from Britain to America in 1757. Simultaneously, the flow of colonial recruits diminished to a mere trickle of what it had been.
In early 1758, the British government appointed General James Abercromby to serve as Commander-in-Chief in North America. Abercromby brought reform and improvement in an army that grew to twenty-three battalions (about 8,000 men). That year marked the turning point of the war and the British Army reclaimed its prestige. After the Treaty of Paris of 1763, the regular British Army serving in North America was raised to 10,000 men. Americans living on the frontier welcomed these men; the British regular represented colonial security. On the other hand, while Americans enjoyed the peace of mind and safety provided by the British Army, no one wanted to pay for them in the form of taxes. This made no sense to any thinking person, but it is difficult to argue that most American colonists in 1770 were skilled in that regard.
The American Revolution
In terms of the sentiments of American colonists, there were only two sorts where the British soldier was concerned: those who loved them, and those who hated them. There was no middle group. The rabble-rousers in Boston fell into the latter category and sought to create confrontations with the symbol of British authority at every opportunity [Note 3]. By 1775, the British North American soldier was a highly proficient, extremely professional soldier — one could not look upon the colonial militiamen with anything but contempt. British soldiers didn’t run away from a fight.
The colonist’s fuss about paying their “fair share” of taxes to support the British Army in the colonies brought disdain from the British regular. He didn’t respect the colonist, and he didn’t respect the leaders of the emerging American government or its militia. A few years earlier, no one wanted to serve as a British regular officer more than George Washington, but the British establishment responded to his every effort with scorn. After 1770, colonial farmers, shopkeepers, and militia came to realize that despite all they did for England, the British would always regard them as second-class citizens.
France’s entry into the colonial revolution on the side of the Americans changed Great Britain’s strategic calculus. The British were no longer masters of the sea along America’s sea coast. While the British Army was widely distributed from Canada to Florida and the West Indies, the French could deliver fresh troops to any place along the East Coast at a time of their own choosing — unchallenged by either the British Army or the Royal Navy. Because the West Indies was more valuable to the British than the rebellious colonies, a large number of British Army and Royal Navy resources were diverted to protect British interest there.
The government in London soon realized that the colonies in New England were probably beyond saving. British loyalists living in New England were few in number. The southern colonies, on the other hand, had large populations of loyalists; there was hope that these colonies might be saved, and so the British Army and Royal Navy turned its attention to the Carolinas and West Florida. Britain’s effort toward saving the southern colonies was the match that lit the kindling in the southern colonies; capturing Charleston added logs to the fire.
General Cornwallis surrendered to General George Washington at Yorktown (Oct 1781). One key feature in the southern campaign was the number of British Loyalists who fought the British fight. The Battle of King’s Mountain in 1780 was an exclusively American engagement. The outcome of King’s Mountain prompted the Loyalists to reconsider; after all, there was never a guarantee that the British would win the war — and if they didn’t, then what would happen to the loyalists? Loyalists would have been suicidal to throw their lot behind the British if there was any chance at all that the patriots would end up as the victors — which, of course, they were.
British regular soldiers continued to fight well and the colonial militia always maintained their fear of British regular formations. The problem was that the British Army was getting smaller with each battle. Cornwallis did not have a regular pipeline for troop replacements, which meant that each British victory came at a high price. The British soldier was poorly fed, poorly cared for, and quite often poorly led … but they steadfastly performed courageously in battle after battle — at the beginning of the conflict and at the end of it.
The Age of Sail
It was never easy to support the British Army 3,000 miles away on the North American continent. To feed these soldiers a daily ration, the British government contracted with food producing companies who transported the rations in bulk across the Atlantic. By the time they arrived and found their way into the Red Coat’s mess kit, the rations were inedible. Biscuits were full of weevils, the bread was moldy, the butter rancid, the flour spoiled, insects infested peas, and then came the maggoty beef. It is no surprise to learn that the British soldier was seriously malnourished and toothless by the time he reached 30 years of age. Senior officers did register complaints, but they fell on deaf ears.
Adding to the difficult task of crushing rebellion was the corruption of British bureaucrats, contractors, ship’s captains, and commissary officers in the supply chain. Corruption didn’t begin with the British war ministry, and it certainly didn’t end there. One may wonder how well the family of Lyndon Baines Johnson profited from the Vietnam War.
Thirty Years Later
Many historians will argue that the American Revolution ended in 1783 with the Treaty of Paris of that year. I disagree. Oh, there may have been a treaty with Great Britain, but the behavior of the officers commanding British Army forces in North America never changed toward the Americans, nor — for that matter — did the behavior of the Royal Navy toward American flagged ships. Among more than a few senior British Army and Navy officers, an American Revolution “re-do” was a worthwhile undertaking. Officers commanding British forts in Canada never once stopped instigating Indian attacks against American western settlements or westward migrations — even to the extent of paying Indians for American scalps.
Renewed conflict with Great Britain in 1812 favored the Americans because, at the time, the British were up to their nickers in a fight with Napoleon Bonaparte. Because the priority for army forces was given to Europe, the British manned their North American forts with cadre staffs. Sadly, by 1812, America no longer had a George Washington to lead them. They had to rely on much older revolutionary era generals who, truth be known, weren’t all that good as generals when they were much younger.
While it was true that the early conflict favored the Americans, we should recall that America was once more at war with a powerful nation — and one that had one hand tied behind its back. It would have been advantageous to the Americans to win its War of 1812 early on — but no. Incompetent generals and one disaster after another denied the Americans a clear victory, even while confronting a much-diminished British army. It may have been too much for the Americans to covet Canada.
In 1814, Napoleon was soundly defeated, and when this occurred, the British were then able to turn their full attention to the United States. In that year, the British mauled the American army at Bladensburg, Maryland (See also: At Bladensburg, 1814), burned the city of Washington, and reasserted the Royal Navy’s control over the Eastern Seaboard (See also: Joshua Barney). It wasn’t until after the Treaty of Ghent, which officially ended the War of 1812, that General Jackson destroyed the British Army in New Orleans — (See also: At Chalmette, 1815) an American victory at last, but it was a superficial victory. The Americans did kill a lot of British soldiers — but to no good purpose.
Anderson, F. The War that Made America: New York: Penguin Books, 2005.
Brumwell, S. Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Curtis, E. E. The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution. New York: AMS Press, 1969.
Ellis, J. J. His Excellency, George Washington. New York: Knopf, 2004.
Fortescue, J. W. A History of the British Army (Thirteen volumes). New York: AMS Press, 1976.
Schenawolf, H. British Army Command and Structure in the American Revolution; Grenadier & Light Infantry Battalions. Revolutionary War Journal Online.
 North America included the thirteen British Colonies and after 1763, Canada.
 General Braddock’s overwhelming defeat was partly due to his lack of understanding about French activities and their shenanigans with native tribes. He also didn’t understand the Indians and had no interest in recruiting them for service with the British Army, which may have been a product of his aristocratic arrogance. Several additional issues plagued the operation from the beginning, including the difficulty in procuring the necessary supplies that would sustain his force while in the field. One the expedition began, he found the roadway was too narrow and in constant need of widening to move artillery and cargo wagons, it was rutted and painfully slow. His frustration in the lack of speed caused him to split his force. With 1,300 men in his “flying column,” he crossed the Monongahela River on 9 July, ten miles away from Fort Duquesne … but it was difficult terrain. The collision of both British and French/Indian forces surprised both groups. Braddock’s advance guard was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage. The Indians immediately assumed their usual practice of independent action; most of the French fled back to the Fort. Gage’s line of soldiers, wearing red coats, were difficult for the Indians to miss. As the soldiers began taking casualties, somewhat shaken by the war whoops of the Indians, Gage’s line became a shamble. Several of the British, in their confusion, fired on other British formations. Thereafter, the battle became a rout. Though Braddock exhibited personal courage and tenacity, the advantage went to the Indians, who were able to fire at the red coats from behind trees. It was the first time in North America where a British force was destroyed by an inferior number of enemy.
 In a manner similar to the way the modern-day BLMOs seek confrontations with police officers and random members of white society.
The first American ship to carry the name Essex was a 36-gun frigate [Note 1] constructed by Mr. Enos Briggs of Salem, Massachusetts, a design of Mr. William Hackett, and named in honor of Essex County, Massachusetts [Note 2]. United States Ship Essex was launched on 30 September 1799, presented to the United States Navy in December, and accepted for service on behalf of the Navy by Captain Edward Preble, USN, the ship’s first Commanding Officer. In January 1800, USS Essex departed Newport, Rhode Island in company with USS Congress; their mission was to serve as escorts for a convoy of merchant ships. The United States was then engaged in the Quasi-War with France [Note 3]; Essex and Congress were ordered to protect these merchant vessels from assault and confiscation by the French Navy. After only a few days at sea, a storm de-masted Congress and she was forced to return to the American coast. Essex continued on alone. USS Essex was the first US Navy ship to cross the equator and the first American man-of-war to make a double voyage around the Cape of Good Hope (March, August 1800).
The second cruise of the Essex took her to the Mediterranean under the command of Captain William Bainbridge, serving in the squadron of Commodore Richard Dale [Note 4]. During this journey, Essex participated in the Barbary Wars through 1806. Upon return to the United States, Essex underwent refit until 1809 when she was re-commissioned as a patrol vessel along the East Coast of the United States.
The Jay Treaty of 1795, more formally The Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation Between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, was the framework of Alexander Hamilton, supported by George Washington, and brokered by John Jay. The Jay Treaty was intended to resolve certain deficiencies in the Treaty of Paris (1783) whose sole purpose was to avoid further confrontations with Great Britain. The goals of the Jay Treaty were mostly fulfilled (withdrawal of British Army forces in the Northwest Territory, cessation of US confiscation of property belonging to British loyalists, etc.) but several issues remained unresolved, such as Great Britain’s impressment of American sailors from ships and ports. From 1803, when Great Britain went to war with Napoleonic France, the British established a naval blockade to choke off trade with France. The United States disputed this blockade, proclaiming it illegal under internationally recognized laws of the sea. But to enforce the British blockade, and to make its point of naval supremacy, the British navy increased its impressment of American merchant sailors into the Royal Navy. This behavior, more than any other, inflamed the passions of the American people. In 1811, USS President closed with a Royal Navy sloop operating off the coast of North Carolina, challenged her, and then fired upon the smaller vessel. Eleven British sailors were killed. So now the passions of the British people were inflamed. As a result of this incident, the British became greatly annoyed and began arming North American Indians and encouraging them to attack American frontier settlements. The United States declared war against the United Kingdom on 18 June 1812. It became known as Mr. Madison’s War.
With the outbreak of war, David Porter [Note 5] was promoted to Captain on 2 July 1812 and assigned to command USS Essex. Sailing his ship to Bermuda, Porter engaged several British transports, taking one of these as a prize of war. On 13 August, Porter captured HMS Alert, the first British warship captured during the conflict. By the end of September, Essex had taken ten British merchantmen as prizes.
In February 1813, Porter sailed Essex into the South Atlantic where he sought to disrupt the British whaling fleet. His first action in the Pacific was the capture of the Peruvian vessel Nereyda. His purpose in seizing this vessel was that it held captive and impressed American whaling crewmen. Over the next year, Porter captured 13 British whalers; one of these was a French registry vessel, captured by the Royal Navy, sold to the owner of a British whaling fleet, and re-named Atlantic. In capturing these ships, Porter also took 380 British seamen as prisoners. In June, Porter offered parole to these captives, providing that they would not again take up arms against the United States. Porter renamed Atlantic as Essex Junior and appointed his executive officer, Lieutenant John Downes, to command her.
John Marshall Gamble (1791-1836) was only eight-years old when Essex went into service in 1799. Born in Brooklyn, New York, Gamble received his appointment to second lieutenant of Marines on 16 January 1809 when he was only 17 or 18-years old. At the outbreak of the War of 1812, Gamble commanded the Marine Detachment, USS Essex [Note 6]. Gamble was an accomplished Marine Corps officer but he is distinguished as the only Marine officer to command a United States Navy ship of war. Actually, Lieutenant Gamble commanded two ships, both British prizes pressed into United States service — seized and renamed USS Greenwich [Note 7] and USS Sir Andrew Hammond. Gamble also distinguished himself during a land action on an island called Nuku Hiva where Captain David Porter established the first US Navy Base in the Pacific Ocean.
Nuku Hiva is the largest of the Marquesas Islands (French Polynesia). Captain Porter arrived at Nuku Hiva at a time when island natives were at war with one another. Shortly after landing his shore party, Porter claimed the island on behalf of the United States and ordered the construction of a fortification and an adjacent village, which he named Fort Madison and Madisonville, respectively, after President James Madison. He also constructed a dock that was needed to facilitate repairs to his growing fleet of ships. For reasons known only to himself, Porter involved himself in the tribal conflict —possibly to curry favor with the majority of the warring natives.
Porter’s first expedition into the interior was led by Lieutenant Downes. He and forty others, with the assistance of several hundred native islanders called Te I’is, captured a redoubt held by as many as 4,000 Happah warriors. Afterwards, the Happah joined the Te I’is and Americans against another island group called Tai Pi. Captain Porter led a second expedition, which involved an amphibious assault against the Tai Pi shoreline. This second expedition, with Captain Porter in overall command, included 30 American sailors and Marines (with artillery), under Lieutenant Gamble, and 5,000 native warriors. From this point on, however, Captain Porter’s fate took an unfortunate turn.
On or about 13 July 1813, following a sharp naval engagement, Lieutenant Gamble, commanding USS Greenwich, captured the British armed whaler Seringapatam. [Note 8] The engagement was significant because, at the time, Seringapatam posed the most serious British threat to American whalers in the South Pacific. Subsequently, Captain Porter wrote to Lieutenant Gamble, stating, “Allow me to return to you my thanks for your handsome conduct in brining Seringapatam to action, which greatly facilitated her capture, while it prevented the possibility of her escape. Be assured sir, I shall make a suitable representation of these affairs to the honorable Secretary of the Navy.”
Captain Porter reported Gamble’s conduct to the Navy Department: “Captain Gamble at all times greatly distinguished himself by his activity in every enterprise engaged in by the force under my command, and in many critical encounters by the natives of Madison Island, rendered essential services, and at all times distinguished himself by his coolness and bravery. I therefore do, with pleasure, recommend him to the Department as an officer deserving of its patronage.”
During the sea battle between Greenwich and Seringapatam, which took place off the coast of Tumbes, Peru, damage to Seringapatam was not particularly significant, but did necessitate repairs to return the vessel to a state of sea worthiness. There were no human casualties on either side. Once the Americans repaired Seringapatam Captain Porter assigned Masters Mate James Terry of the USS Essex as prize master, and Seringapatam joined Porter’s squadron.
In September 1813, Porter returned Essex to Nuku Hiva (along with four prizes) for repairs. Around mid-December, Porter ordered Essex re-provisioned and readied for sea. With Essex Junior as an escort Porter began a patrol of the Peru Coast. Seringapatam, Hammond, and Greenwich remained at anchor under the guns of Fort Madison and Gamble assumed command of the garrison. Many of the crewmen of the captured ships were American; they and several British crewmen volunteered to serve under Porter. There were also six British prisoners of war who refused to serve the United States. Not long after Porter set sail, local natives became so troublesome that Gamble was forced to land a detachment of men to restore order. At this point, Gamble’s mission was to maintain order, guard the captive ships, guard prisoners of war, and do so with but a hand full of men.
Four months later, Lieutenant Gamble despaired of Porter’s fate [Note 9] and ordered repairs and rigging for sea of Seringapatam and Hammond. When signs of mutiny appeared among the men, Gamble ordered all arms and ammunition placed aboard Greenwich. Despite these precautions, mutineers freed the British prisoners of war and captured Seringapatam on 7 May, wounding Lieutenant Gamble in the scuffle. Mutineers placed Gamble in an open boat and Seringapatam sailed for Australia.
Gamble, returning to Hammond, set sail with a skeleton crew bound for the Caribbean Leeward Islands but was intercepted en route by the British sloop HMS Cherub. As it turned out, Gamble’s capture served the interests of the United States. At the time of his capture, Gamble was in possession of gifts intended for the King of the Leeward Islands. Captain Tucker of HMS Cherub seized these gifts as prizes of war. More than that, Tucker, having discovered several American ships in the Leeward Islands harbor, sent demands to the king to surrender these ships to him at once. When the king refused, Tucker landed a detachment of Royal Marines to enforce his demands.
Upon landing, the Royal Marines discovered that it was literally impossible to enforce their captain’s demands while surrounded by very angry Caribs [Note 10]. Captain Tucker wisely withdrew his force and sailed away. Meanwhile, when the king learned that his gifts had been confiscated by the Royal Navy, he was incensed and diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the Leeward Islands deteriorated.
At the conclusion of the War of 1812, Gamble returned to his duties as a Marine officer. He was promoted to captain on 18 June 1814, advanced to Brevet Major on 19 April 1815, and to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel on 3 March 1827.
John M. Gamble died on 11 September 1836 at the age of about 44-45 years. In terms of the family’s legacy, the destroyer USS Gamble (DD-123) and Port Gamble, Washington were named in honor of John Gamble and his brother, Peter, who served as a Navy lieutenant during the War of 1812. USS Gamble served as a destroyer in World War I and a minesweeper in World War II. Owing to the ship’s condition after two world wars, the Navy scuttled the ship in July 1945.
1.Daughan, G. C. The Shining Sea: David Porter and the Epic Voyage of the USS Essex During the War of 1812. Basic Books, 2013.
2.Captain David Porter, USS Essex, and the War of 1812 in the Pacific. U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command, 2014. Online.
3.Porter, D. D. Memoir of Commodore David Porter of the United States Navy. Albany: J. Munsell, 1875.
4.Toner, R. J. Gamble of the Marines: The Greatest U.S. Marine Corps Stories Ever Told. I. C. Martin, 2017.
5.Turnbull, A. D. Commodore David Porter, 1740-1843. New York and London: Century Press, 1929.
 A frigate in the days of sail was a warship that carried its principal batteries on one or two decks. It was smaller in size than a ship of the line (which is to say, smaller than the warships that were used in the line of battle), but full rigged on three masts, built for speed and maneuverability and used for patrolling and escort duty. They were rated ships having at least 28 guns. The frigate was the hardest-worked warship because even though smaller than a ship of the line, they were formidable opponents in war and had sufficient storage for six-months service at sea. A “heavy frigate” was a ship that carried larger guns (firing 18-24 pound shot) developed in Britain and France after 1778.
 Essex County, Massachusetts was created by the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony on 10 May 1643. Named after the county in England, Essex included the towns of Salem, Lynn, Wenham, Ipswich, Rowley, Newbury, Gloucester, and Andover. Essex County was the home of Elbridge Gerry, known for creating a legislative district in 1812 that gave rise to the word gerrymandering, which suggests that politicians in Massachusetts have been corrupt for at least the past 208 years.
 An undeclared war between the US and France from 1798 to 1800. John Adams was president. When the US refused to repay its debt for the Revolutionary War, American politicians argued that after the French overthrew their king, the nation to whom this debt was owed no longer existed; accordingly, said certain members of the US Congress, the debt was null and void. In response, France began seizing US flagged ships and auctioning them for payment.
 After 1794, the US Congress was unwilling to authorize more than four officer ranks in the Navy. These were Captain, Master Commandant, Lieutenant, and Midshipman. Commodore, therefore, was a title only, temporarily assigned to a U.S. Navy captain who, by virtue of seniority, exercised command over two or more U.S. naval vessels, and the rank Master Commandant was later changed to Commander.
 David Porter (1780-1843) was a self-assured naval officer who served on active duty with the U.S. Navy from 1790-1825, and as Commander-in-Chief of the Mexican Navy from 1826-1829. He later served as Chargé d’Affaires of the United States to the Ottoman Empire (1831-1840) and United States Minister to the Ottoman Empire (1840-1843). Porter was the adoptive father of David G. Farragut, the U.S. Navy’s first admiral.
 Gamble was promoted to Captain USMC in June 1814.
 Captain Porter later decided to burn Greenwich to keep the ship from being recaptured by the British South Atlantic squadron; it was a sensible decision because destroying the ship deprived the British of valuable whale oil, which at the time, was in high demand in England.
 Seringapatam was constructed in 1799 as a warship for Tippu Sultan, the ruler of Mysore. The British stormed his citadel at Seringapatam, and Sultan was killed. The British then sailed the ship to England where it was sold to British a whaling merchant. The ship made six voyages to the Southern Atlantic and Pacific until captured by Greenwich.
 Gamble’s concern was well-founded. On 28 March 1814, Royal Navy Captain James Hillyar forced Captain Porter’s surrender at the Battle of Valparaiso. HMS Phoebe and HMS Cherub disabled Essex to the point where he could no longer resist. Following the battle, Captain Hillyar provided care and comfort to Porter’s wounded crew, disarmed Essex Junior, and gave Porter his parole to return to the United States. Captain Hillyar sailed the Essex to England, where it was used as a transport ship, prison ship, and then ultimately sold at public auction for £1,230.
 The Caribs (now called Island Caribs) for whom the Caribbean was named, inhabited the Windward Islands of the Lesser Antilles. They were noted for their aggressive hostility and fiercely resisted European colonization. They identified themselves with the Kalina people, or mainland Carib of South America. They continue to exist within the Garifuna people, also known as black Caribs in the Lesser Antilles.
After the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on 7 December 1941 (an event that crippled the United States Pacific Fleet), Japan intended to seize a number of Pacific atolls for their own use. Doing so would increase their access to natural resources and locations suitable as advanced military and naval bases. Advanced Pacific Rim bases would extend the defensive perimeter of the Japanese home islands. In addition to their successful attack against the US Fleet, the Japanese also seized control of Hong Kong, the Philippine Islands, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, Wake Island, New Britain, and Guam.
The Battle of the Coral Sea (May 1942) and the Battle for Midway Island (June 1942) thwarted additional Japanese efforts to seize advance bases. Both battles were significant because (1) the Allied forces [Note 1] demonstrated to the world that the Empire of Japan was not invincible, and (2) the battles enabled the Allies to seize the initiative and launch a counter-offensive against the Japanese. The United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand chose the Solomon Islands as their place, and August 1942 as their time.
Allied intelligence learned that the Japanese Imperial Navy (JIN) occupied Tulagi in May 1942 and had established a seaplane base in the Solomons. They also discovered that the Japanese had embarked on the construction of an air base suitable for long-range bombers at Lunga Point on the island of Guadalcanal. If the Allies failed to interdict Japan’s efforts, Japanese air forces would be in a position to disrupt allied lines of communication between Australia/New Zealand, and the United States. Only one month earlier, in July, Australian reserve (territorial) battalions fought a stubborn action against Japanese advances in New Guinea. Although victorious, Australian reserves were seriously depleted. The arrival of the Second Imperial Force (Australia) in August (returning from the Mediterranean) allowed Australian forces to deny Japan’s seizure of Port Moresby, and Milne Bay. The Australian victory, with supporting American forces, was Japan’s first land defeat in World War II.
The author of the plan to attack the Solomon Islands was Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. The US Marines invaded Tulagi and Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 [Note 2], capturing the partially completed airfield at Lunga Point, although the airfield required additional work before the allied forces could use it.
Assembling Air Forces
The Americans renamed the field after Major Lofton R. Henderson, USMC [Note 3], who lost his life during the Battle of Midway while in command of VMSB-241. The first allied aircraft to land on Henderson Field was a patrol bomber (designation PBY) on 12 August. Eight days later, 31 Marine Corps Wildcat (F4F) fighters and Dauntless (SBD) dive bombers landed from the fast carrier USS Long Island. Following them on 22 August was a squadron of U. S. Army Air-Cobra (P-39). Additionally, B-17s began operations from Henderson Field (although the large bombers had an abysmal record against Japanese targets) [Note 4].
This ensemble of multi-service personnel and their dwindling collection of outdated, dilapidated, and inferior combat aircraft became known as the Cactus Air Force — “Cactus” being the Allied code name for Guadalcanal. Henderson Field barely qualified as an airfield. The Japanese designed it in an irregular shape, half of it sitting within a coconut grove, and its runway length was inadequate the wide range of for Allied aircraft. Even after combat engineers began their work to improve the field, it remained in such poor condition that it caused as many losses to aircraft as those lost in air combat. Rain, which was ever present on Guadalcanal, transformed the field into muddy swamp. Some of the allied aircraft were too heavy for the matting used for expeditionary airfields; takeoffs and landing also damaged the field. Despite these on-going problems, Henderson Field was essential to the U.S. effort of confronting the Japanese, distributing critical combat resupply, and evacuating wounded personnel. Henderson Field was also vital as an alternate airfield for Navy pilots whose carriers were too badly damaged to recover them.
In mid-August 1942, Guadalcanal was very likely one of the most dangerous places on earth. Allied naval forces were under constant threat of attack by Japanese air and naval forces. To safeguard carriers and their air groups from possible submarine or enemy carrier aircraft, once the amphibious force disembarked at Guadalcanal, the U. S. Navy withdrew its carriers, transports, and resupply ships from the Solomon Islands. This placed Allied ground forces at risk from Japanese naval artillery and air attack. The Allies needed aircraft—badly. Marine Fighter Squadron (VMF)-123 (flying F4Fs) began its operations at Henderson Field in mid-August. One squadron was insufficient to demand, however. The Allies needed more aircraft —sooner rather than later. Higher headquarters scheduled the arrival VMF-223 and VMTB-232 on Guadalcanal around 16 August. The pilots and aircraft arrived on 20 August, but because the demand for shipping exceeded available transport, ground crews became stranded in Hawaii; ground crews would not arrive on Guadalcanal until early September. The formula was simple —no ground crews, no operational aircraft.
The delay of ground crew at a critical period prompted Admiral John S. McCain, Sr. [Note 5] to order Major Charles H. “Fog” Hayes, serving as the Executive Officer, Marine Observation Squadron (VMO)-251 to proceed to Guadalcanal with 120 Seabees of the advance base force (operationally known as CUB-1) [Note 6] to assist the 1st Marine Division combat engineers in completing Henderson Field and then serve as ground crewmen for the Marine fighters and bombers presently en route. Ensign George W. Polk, USN [Note 7] commanded the Seabee detachment.
The men from CUB-1 embarked aboard ship and departed Espiritu Santo on the evening of 13 August, taking with them 400 55-gallon drums of aviation fuel, 32 55-gallon drums of lubricant, 282 bombs (100 to 500 pounds), belted ammunition, tools, and critically needed aviation spare parts. They arrived on Guadalcanal on 15 August and began assisting Marine engineers with their task of enlarging the airstrip. Despite daily assaults by Japanese aircraft, Marine engineers and Seabees completed the field on 19 August. CUB-1 technicians installed, tested, and operated an air-raid warning system in the Japanese-built field control tower.
VMF-223 with 19-aircraft and VMSB-232 with 12 planes arrived on 20 August; all aircraft arrived safely at Henderson Field and the pilots immediately began combat operations against Japanese aircraft over Guadalcanal. As immediately, the Sailors of CUB-1 began servicing these aircraft with the tools and equipment at their disposal. Aircraft refueling was by hand crank pumps when they were available but otherwise tipped over on the wings and funneled into the gasoline tanks. Loading bombs was particularly difficult because hoists were rare; bombs had to be raised by hand … 100-500-pound bombs. Belting ammunition was also accomplished by hand. The gunners on the dive bombers loaded their ammunition by the same laborious method.
CUB-1 personnel performed these tasks for twelve days before the arrival of Marine ground crews. As with all military personnel on Guadalcanal, CUB-1 crews suffered from malaria, dengue fever, fungus infections, sleepless nights, shortages of food, clothing, and supplies. Living conditions on Guadalcanal were some of the most difficult ever faced by Marines. Pilots and ground crews lived in mud-floored tents in a flooded coconut plantation called Mosquito Grove. Everyone on Guadalcanal was subjected to mortal danger. Japanese aircraft and artillery bombarded the airfield nearly every day. On the night of 13-14 October 1942, two Japanese battleships fired more than 700 heavy shells into Henderson Field. Ensign Polk’s men remained on the island until 15 February 1943.
For the first five days after the arrival of the Marine aviators, there was no “commander” of the air component; instead, the senior aviator reported directly to Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division. Technically, the Cactus Air Force was under the authority of Rear Admiral McCain, but as the local senior-most commander, Vandegrift and his operational staff exercised direct authority over all air assets, whether Army, Navy, or Marine.
Colonel William W. Wallace served temporarily as the first air group commander. On 3 September, Brigadier General Roy S. Geiger [Note 8] arrived to assume command as Commander, Aircraft, Guadalcanal (also, COMAIRCACTUS) and of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. By the time of Geiger’s arrival, air squadrons had already suffered significant losses. The pilots were sick, undernourished, and demoralized. Geiger changed that. By his personality, energy, and positive attitude, General Geiger raised the collective spirits of squadron survivors. The cost to Geiger, in the short-term, was that within a few months, the 57-year-old Geiger became seriously fatigued. Eventually, General Vandegrift relieved Geiger of his duties and replaced him with Geiger’s Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Louis E. Woods [Note 9], who was one of the Marine Corps’ outstanding aviators.
Ground Combat Interface
As previously mentioned, the Japanese started construction of the airfield at Lunga Point in May 1942. The landings of 11,000 Allied forces on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and the Florida Islands on 7-8 August 1942 was a complete surprise to the Japanese—and they weren’t too happy about it. As a response to the Allied landings, the Imperial General Headquarters ordered the Imperial Japanese Army’s (IJA) 17th Army (a corps-sized command under Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake), to retake Guadalcanal. His advance force began to arrive on Guadalcanal on 19 August. Allied planes operating from Henderson Field challenged Japan’s slow-moving transport ships, which had the effect of impeding Hyakutake’s efforts. On 21 August, General Hyakutake ordered a force of just under a thousand men to seize the airfield. Known as the Battle of Tenaru, Marines soundly defeated the IJA’s first attempt.
The IJA made a second attempt on 12-14 September, this time with a brigade-size force of 6,000 men. Known as the Battle of Edson’s Ridge, the Marines repelled that attack, as well. Convinced that the Japanese were not through with their attempts to reclaim Lunga Point, Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, commanding all Allied land forces in the Solomon Islands [Note 10], ordered the strengthening of defenses at Henderson Field. He additionally ordered his Marines to increase combat patrolling in the area between Lunga Point and the Matanikau River. IJA forces repulsed three different company-sized patrols operating near the Matanikau River between 23-27 September. Between 6-9 October, a battalion of Marines crossed the Matanikau and inflicted heavy losses on the IJA 4th Infantry Regiment, forcing a Japanese withdrawal [Note 11].
By 17 October, IJA forces on Guadalcanal numbered 17,000 troops, which included the 2nd Infantry Division (under Lieutenant General Masao Maruyama), one regiment of the 38th Infantry Division, and artillery and tank units. The IJN ordered heavy and light cruisers to support Hyakutake and conduct bombardments of Allied positions, including Henderson Field, warranted because the Cactus Air Force posed significant threats to Japanese transports ferrying replacements and supplies from Rabaul [Note 12]. On 13 October, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto dispatched a naval force under Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita to bombard Henderson Field. Kurita’s force included two battleships, one light cruiser, and nine destroyers. Beginning at 01:33, the Japanese Navy fired just under 1,000 rounds into the Lunga Point perimeter. The Japanese attack destroyed most of the aviation fuel, 48 of the Cactus Air Force’s 90 aircraft, and killed 41 men —of which were six CAF ground crewmen. As devastating as this attack was, Seabees restored the airfield to operating conditions within a few hours.
As Japanese infantry under Lieutenant General Maruyama began their march toward Lunga Point, aircraft of the 11th Air Fleet at Rabaul attacked Henderson Field with 11 G4M2 bombers and 28 A6M2 Zero fighters. The Cactus Air Force responded with 24 F4F Wildcats and 4 P-39s. A large and complex air battle ensured. Allied aviators could not determine how many losses they imposed on the Japanese, but on F4F received extensive battle damage with no loss of its pilot.
Just after nightfall on 23 October, two battalions of Japanese infantry (supported by tanks) attacked Marine positions behind a barrage of artillery. Marines quickly destroyed all nine tanks and responded with devastating artillery fire. Forty Marine howitzers fired 6,000 rounds into the attacking Japanese. The Japanese broke off their attack shortly after 01:00 hours. Partly in response to this attack, 2/7 (under LtCol Hanneken) redeployed to the Matanikau and assumed advanced defensive positions. LtCol Louis B. “Chesty” Puller’s 1/7 (with around 700 men) was the only battalion left to defend Henderson Field, a 2,500-yard perimeter on the southern face of Lunga Point. Puller’s outposts reported enemy movement at around 21:00 hours.
Heavy rain began falling an hour or so before, the torrential downpour inhibiting the advance of a Japanese infantry regiment. In the dark of night under a pouring rain, a Japanese battalion more or less stumbled into Puller’s defensive line at around 22:00. The Marines repulsed the Japanese advance, but the Japanese commander believed that his battalion had taken Lunga Point. At around 00:15, the IJA’s 11th Company of the 3rd Battalion assaulted the perimeter held by Marines from Alpha Company. Within thirty minutes, the Marines destroyed the 11th Company.
Further west, at around 01:15, the 9th Company charged into positions held by Charlie 1/7. Within around five minutes, a machine-gun section led by Sergeant John A. Basilone, killed nearly every member of the 9th Company. Ten minutes after that, Marine artillery had a murderous effect on the IJA regiment’s assembly area. Puller requested reinforcement at 03:30. The 3rd Battalion, 164th US Infantry rushed forward and quickly reinforced Puller’s perimeter. Just before dawn, the Japanese 3rd Battalion, 29th Infantry penetrated Allied artillery and assaulted the Marine position. 1/7 Marines killed most of these men, but about one-hundred Japanese broke through the American defense and created a bulging salient in the center of Puller’s line.
With daybreak on 24 October, the Japanese 2nd Battalion joined the assault, but the Marines soon defeated them, and they withdrew almost as quickly as they had appeared. Puller ordered his Marines to attack and eradicate the 100-or-so enemy soldiers within the salient, and to search and destroy any Japanese remaining alive forward of the battalion’s perimeter. Marines performing these tasks ended up killing around 400 additional enemy troops. But the battle was far from over. IJN platforms began to pummel the Marines just after midnight. A destroyer assault force chased away to US minesweepers, destroyed the US tugboat Seminole and an American Patrol Torpedo Boat. Just after 10:00, Marine shore batteries hit and damaged one Japanese destroyer. Cactus Air Force dive bombers attacked a second Japanese navy assault force which caused the sinking of a Japanese cruiser. While this was going on, 82 Japanese bombers and fighters from the 11th Air Fleet attacked Henderson Field in six separate waves throughout the day. The Cactus Air Force also attacked Japanese Aircraft, inflicting the loss of 11 fighters, 2 bombers, and one reconnaissance aircraft. The Allies lost two aircraft, but recovered the crews.
After completing mop-up operations, ground Marines began improving their defense works and redeploying troops to strengthen the line. In the West, Colonel Hanneken tied in with the 5th Marines; Puller’s Marines and the soldiers of 3/164 disentangled and repositioned themselves to form unit cohesive defenses. The 1st Marine Division reserve force, 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines (3/2) moved in behind 1/7 and 3/164. The IJA still had more to say to the Allied forces at Lunga Point.
General Maruyama regrouped his beleaguered forces, adding the 16th Infantry Regiment from his force reserve. At around 20:00 on 25 October and extending into the early morning hours of the 26th, the Japanese made numerous frontal assaults against the Marine/Army line (Puller/Colonel Hall). The Marines employed well-aimed small arms, automatic weapons, artillery, and canister fire from 37-mm guns directly into the attacking force with devastating effect. Marines completely wiped out the headquarters element of the 16th Infantry Regiment, including the regimental commander and four of the regiment’s battalion commanders. Another attack came at 03:00 on 26 October. Colonel Akinosuke Oka’s 124th Infantry Regiment hit the Matanikau defenses manned by LtCol Hanneken’s 2/7. Fox Company received the brunt of Oka’s attack. Machine-gun section leader Mitchell Paige destroyed many of his attackers, but the Japanese managed to kill all of the Marines except for Paige and an assistant gunner in their assault. By 05:00, Oka’s 3rd Battalion managed to push the remains of Fox Company out of their defensive positions. Major Odell M. Conoley, Hanneken’s executive officer, quickly organized a counter-attack, leading the survivors of Fox Company and elements of Golf and Charlie companies to retake the ridge line. Within an hour, the Japanese pushed the Japanese back, which ended Colonel Oka’s assault. 2/7’s casualties included 14 killed and 32 wounded. Oka’s losses exceeded 300 dead.
Six Marine aviators in the Cactus Air Force received the Medal of Honor: Major John L. Smith, USMC, CO VMF-223; Major Robert E. Galer, USMC, CO VMF-224; Captain Joseph J. Foss, USMC, XO VMF-121 (Former Governor of South Dakota); Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Bauer, USMC, CO VMF-212; First Lieutenant Jefferson J. DeBlanc, USMC, VMF-112; and First Lieutenant James E. Swett, USMC, VMF-221.
Medals of honor awarded other personnel included Major Kenneth D. Bailey, USMC (KIA), Sergeant John Basilone, USMC, Corporal Anthony Casamento, USMC, Platoon Sergeant Mitchell Paige, USMC [Note 13], Major Charles W. Davis, USA, Colonel Merritt A. Edson, USMC, Sergeant William G. Fournier, USA, Specialist Lewis Hall, USA (KIA), Signalman First Class Douglas A. Munro, USCG, (KIA), Rear Admiral Normal Scott, USN (KIA), and Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, USMC.
In all, 20 Marine Corps aviation squadrons served on Guadalcanal. Joining them, at various times, were ten U. S. Navy air squadrons (5 operating from USS Enterprise), two USAAF squadrons, and one Royal New Zealand air squadron.
1.Braun, S. M. The Struggle for Guadalcanal (American Battles and Campaigns). New York: Putnam, 1969.
2.Christ, J. F. Battalion of the Damned: The First Marine Paratroopers at Gavutu and Bloody Ridge, 1942. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007
3.De Chant, J. A. Devilbirds. New York: Harper Bros., 1947.
4.Mersky, P. B. U.S. Marine Corps Aviation—1912 to the Present. Nautical Publishing, 1983.
5.Paige, M. My Story, A Marine Named Mitch: The Autobiography of Mitchell Paige, Colonel, United States Marine Corps (Retired). Palo Alto: Bradford Adams & Company, 1975.
6.Sherrod, R. History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II. Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952.
7.Simmons, E. H. The United States Marines: A History (Fourth Edition). Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
The Allied forces in the Pacific during World War II were the US, UK, Australia, New Zealand, Soviet Union, and China. As a practical matter, given the requirements of global war at other locations in the world, and limitations of certain Allied countries to participate in the conflict, the US played the largest role in the Pacific War.
 The Guadalcanal campaign lasted through 9 February 1943.
 Initially identified by the Japanese as simply Code RXI, the incomplete airfield became the focus of one of the great battles of the Pacific war in World War II. Major Henderson (1903-1942) was a graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy (Class of 1926) and served in China, various Caribbean stations, and aboard the carriers Langley, Ranger, and Saratoga.
 B-17 aircraft were unsuitable for use against Japanese ships at sea. High altitude bombing of moving targets could hardly yield the results of Torpedo/Dive Bomber aircraft. Moreover, B-17 crews were young, inexperienced airmen who, while doing their level best, could not engage enemy ships with precision.
 At the time, Admiral McCain served as Commander, Aircraft South Pacific (1941-42). He was the grandfather of John S. McCain III, former Navy aviator POW and US Senator from Arizona.
 George W. Polk enlisted with the Naval Construction Battalion at the beginning of World War II. He also served as a “volunteer” dive bomber and reconnaissance pilot, receiving combat wounds and suffering from malaria, which required nearly a year of hospitalization. After the war, Polk joined CBS news as a journalist. Communist insurgents murdered him while he was covering the Greek Civil War in 1948.
 Roy Stanley Geiger (1885-1947) was a native of Florida who completed university and law school before enlisting in the US Marine Corps. While serving as a corporal in 1909, Geiger completed a series of professional examinations to obtain a commission to second lieutenant on 5 February 1909. After ten years of ground service, Geiger reported for aviation training in 1917 and subsequently became Naval Aviator #49 on 9 June. Geiger was variously described as curt, cold, ruthless, and determined. Geiger became the first Marine Corps general to command a United States Army during the Battle of Okinawa.
 Lieutenant General Woods later commanded the tactical air forces under the 10th U.S. Army during the Battle of Okinawa.
 The 7th Marine Regiment arrived on Guadalcanal on 18 September, adding an additional 4,157 men to Vandegrift’s ground combat element.
 Meanwhile, Major General Millard F. Harmon, Commander, U. S. Army Forces, South Pacific, convinced Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, Commander, Allied Forces, South Pacific, to reinforce the Marines immediately; one division of Marines, he argued, was insufficient to defend an island the size of Guadalcanal. Subsequently, the U. S. 164th Infantry Regiment (North Dakota Army National Guard) arrived on Guadalcanal on 13 October 1942.
 Allied naval forces intercepted one of these Japanese bombardment missions on the night of 11 October, resulting in a Japanese defeat at the Battle of Cape Esperance.
 Colonel Paige died on 15 November 2003, aged 85 years. He was the last surviving Medal of Honor recipient of the Guadalcanal campaign.
Captain George W. Sachtleben, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines
In January 1969, responsibility for combat operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ) (Also, I Corps), which included the five northern-most provinces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) rested with the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), who was then Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr. Cushman commanded 81,000 Marine and Army combat troops situated throughout the Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai.
(a) Major General Charles J. Quilter commanded 15,500 Marines of the First Marine Aircraft Wing (1stMAW), which included 500 fixed and rotary wing aircraft at Chu Lai, Da Nang, Phu Bai, and Quang Tri.
(b) Major General Ormond R. Simpson commanded the 1st Marine Division (1stMarDiv) just outside Da Nang, a force of 24,000 ground-combat Marines primarily assigned to Quang Nam Province.
(c) Major General Raymond G. Davis commanded the 3rd Marine Division (3rdMarDiv), 21,000 ground-combat Marines from Dong Ha, whose primary responsibility was Quang Tri Province.
(d) An additional 10,000 Marines provided combat logistics support to the MAW and two infantry divisions under Brigadier General James A. Feely, Jr., at Da Nang.
(e) An additional 1,900 Marines served in the Combined Action Program under Colonel Edward F. Danowitz — tasked with providing local area security to local villages and hamlets.
(f) In addition to these Marines, III MAF controlled combat operations involving a force of 50,000 U. S. Army troops involving elements of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Colonel James M. Gibson, Commanding, the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) under Major General Melvin Zais, both Army units serving under the US XXIV Corps, Lieutenant General Richard G. Stilwell, U. S. Army, based at Phu Bai.
(g) An additional 23,800 soldiers of Major General Charles M. Getty’s 23rd Infantry (Americal) Division operated in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces.
(h) General Cushman also exercised operational control over the United States Army Advisory Group (USAAG), who advised and assisted RVN military units operating in the I CTZ.
Enemy forces operating in RVN’s I CTZ included 123 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) battalions and 18 Viet Cong (irregular) (VC) battalions involving 90,000 troops. There were additionally around 23,500 guerrillas and 16,000 political and quasi-military cadres and another 30,000 North Vietnamese regulars operating in Laos but within striking distance of the I CTZ. These forces were controlled by five separate headquarters elements.
In January 1969, the communist forces were still reeling from their massive defeat during the Tet 68 campaign [Note 1]; it forced NVA and VC commands to reconsider their strategy for I CTZ. Rather than attempting to defeat the American and RVN forces through massive assault, they adopted the policy of prolonging the conflict through small unit hit and run tactics, sapper attacks, harassment, terrorism, and sabotage. Their focus became severing lines of communications, attacking rear area support bases, storage facilities, and defeating RVN’s pacification efforts. Driving these strategies and tactics was the differences in terrain from II CTZ to the northwestern areas of I CTZ. NVA regular units concentrated their forces in the uninhabited jungle-covered mountainous areas, close to border sanctuaries.
In the Marine Corps mindset, defense is a temporary tactic used to dig in for the night, or rest, regroup, and resupply their combat forces before continuing the attack. Locating the enemy, viciously attacking him, and destroying him is how wars are won. But this wasn’t the national policy of the United States. The mission in Vietnam was to defend South Vietnam — which gave up initiative to the enemy. Marine and Army commanders hated this with a passion, but those were their orders. But Major General Raymond G. Davis, commanding the 3rdMarDiv wasn’t about to sit around waiting for the enemy to attack him. Soon after assuming command of his division, he ordered his regimental commanders to go find the enemy, and kill him. General Cushman completely agreed with Davis’ thinking — as did Lieutenant General Herman Nickerson, Jr., when he replaced Cushman as CG III MAF on 26 March 1969.
General Davis’ idea of mobile operations depended on the helicopter, of course, but Ray Davis was no one trick pony. He also sought to exploit intelligence gathered by small sized reconnaissance patrols, which were continuously employed throughout the 3rdMarDiv TAOR, which supplemented electronic and other human intelligence sources. The recon patrols were called StingRay operations, who mission was to find, fix, and destroy the enemy with all available supporting arms. StingRay operations were augmented by even smaller “snoop and poop” patrols, known as Key Hole forays. Their mission was to “observe,” not engage.
On 9 April, Colonel Edward F. Danowitz [Note 2] relieved Colonel Robert H. Barrow as Commanding Officer, 9th Marines. Danowitz was determined to continue the aggressive operations planned and executed by Colonel Barrow under General Davis’ policy of finding the enemy and killing him.
Despite the success of the 9th Marines in Operation Dewey Canyon and the 3rd Marines in the Vietnam Salient, intelligence reports indicated that several regimental size enemy units were again infiltrating into the northern area of their Base Area 611, south of the salient, specifically elements of the 6th and 9th NVA regiments, the 675th Artillery Regiment, and various support elements. Air reconnaissance indicated as well that the NVA were repairing Route 922 and that significant numbers of enemy were returning to the A Shau Valley and eastward into Base Area 101, which was located astride the Quang Tri/Thua Thien political boundary.
To counter these enemy infiltrations, elements of the 3rdMarDiv and 101st Airborne were ordered to execute Operation Apache Snow in the northern A Shau Valley and southern Da Krong River Valley, cut the enemy supply and infiltration routes at the Laotian border, locate and destroy enemy forces, base camps, and supply caches. Operating under Lieutenant General Stilwell, XXIV commander, 1st Battalion and 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines (1/9 and 2/9) were assigned the task of occupying the southern Da Krong and blocking enemy escape routes into Laos along Route 922.
Movement to Contact
The 2/9 Commanding Officer was Lieutenant Colonel George C. Fox. Apache Snow began on 10 May when Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Culkin’s 1/9 leap-frogged over 2/9 and assaulted Fire Support Base Erskine, which overlooked the upper Da Krong and Route 922. For the Marines, the timing was perfect because the enemy units had yet to reconstitute infantry regiments following their defeat in Dewey Canyon. Culkin’s aggressive patrolling resulted in several skirmishes with enemy forces in transit, but each time the enemy refused the Marine’s invitation to dance. Fox’s 2/9, located 5 miles north, patrolled FSB Razor and LZ Dallas in an area north-northeast of Erskine. They too encountered numerous small sized enemy units, who were also quick to fade into the jungle.
While the Da Krong remained relatively quiet, the same could not be said for the A Shau Valley, where four US Army battalions and an ARVN battalion encountered a well-defended hut and bunker complex on Hill 937 and commenced operations to clear it of elements of the 9th and 29th NVA regiments. The battle lasted a week, concluding on 20 May 1969 with 500 enemy dead on the; Army casualties were 44 killed, 297 wounded. Soldiers from the 187th renamed this hill complex “Hamburger Hill.” Subsequently, surviving elements of the NVA regiments withdrew into Laos and avoided further contact with US and ARVN forces operating in the A Shau Valley.
The 3rdMarDiv continued to maneuver its battalions in western Quang Tri, which reduced the enemy’s threat. During June, the 9th Marines initiated two simultaneous operations, named Cameron Falls and Utah Mesa, which targeted the 304th NVA Division attempting to establish a presence south of Route 9. Evidence from reconnaissance missions indicated that elements of the NVA division had infiltrated into the lower Da Krong Valley, and were moving east and north along Route 616 and the river. A series of rocket attacks on combat base Vandegrift signaled the start of planned NVA pressure on allied positions by the 57th NVA Regiment. Colonel Danowitz’s Marines were assigned the mission of searching for and destroying enemy forces within an area bordered in the North by Song Quang Tri, in the South by the Da Krong River, on the East by FSB Shepherd, and on the West by FSB Henderson. This area was considered critical to the security of Vandegrift and the Ba Long Valley, which led to the population centers of Quang Tri and Dong Ha.
Cameron Falls began on 29 May. 2/9 moved unopposed toward FSB Whisman, which the battalion occupied; 3/9 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Oral R. Swigart, Jr., occupied FSB Shepherd. At Whisman, 2/9 Marines began to shore up their defensives with obstacles, fighting holes, claymore mines, and trip flares. At 0215 on 1 June, a small enemy force began probing 2/9’s defenses and ran up against a listening post manned by Golf Company. Two Marines were killed, but he FSB was alerted. Aggressive reaction by Golf 2/9 resulted in 19 enemy killed with two taken prisoner.
From information provided by the prisoners, Colonel Fox learned that the 57th NVA Regiment’s command post (CP) was located to the southwest of Whisman. The 2/9 commander issued a warning order to Fox and Golf companies to prepare for a sweep of the suspected location of the enemy CP; additional intelligence indicated that a large enemy force was moving northeast toward Hill 824. Danowitz redirected the attack toward Hill 824 with two companies from 2/9 in a sweep northeast along the Da Krong River, and two companies of 3/9 advancing east from FSB Shepherd. Swigart reported the terrain and vegetation exceedingly difficult — the twelve foot high elephant grass restricted air movement, making the advance exceedingly hot. As elements of 2/9 and 3/9 converged on Hill 824, both battalion commanders reported that the enemy force was deployed around the hill in considerable strength.
On 5 June, Hotel Company 2/9 encountered a well-fortified NVA battalion on the southern bank of the Da Krong. The initial engagement was a fight that lasted 12 hours. The best description of this fight comes from the Silver Star award citation issued to Captain George W. Sachtleben, of Chicago, Illinois:
The President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Silver Star to Captain George W. Sachtleben, United States Marine Corps, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action while serving as Commanding Officer, Company H, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Marine Division in connection with operations against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam.
On the afternoon of 5 June 1969, during operation Cameron Falls, two platoons of Company H advanced on a trail along the Da Krong River eight miles southwest of the Vandegrift Combat Base when they initiated contact with a company-sized North Vietnamese Army force occupying well camouflaged positions on a cliff overlooking the trail. Due to their location, the Marines were extremely vulnerable to the heavy volume of enemy rocket-propelled grenade, small arms, and automatic weapons fire, but continued to fight from a narrow ledge with their backs against the river.
Despite suffering serious wounds sustained during the initial moments of the fire-fight, Captain Sachtleben skillfully deployed his forces to counter the hostile attacks, directed the accurate delivery of supporting arms fire, and organized the movement of casualties to a relatively safe area.
Throughout the fight, he completely disregarded his own safety as he boldly moved about the hazardous area shouting instructions and encouragement to his men. After establishing an initial perimeter, he directed a limited assault which secured a toe-hold on a portion of one cliff looming over his position.
Throughout the night and the following morning, he directed both offensive and defensive actions which thwarted or repulsed repeated North Vietnamese Army attacks. Although aware that the enemy was reinforcing and faced by the fact that his company was running dangerously low on ammunition, that his key officers and noncommissioned officers were wounded, and that his men were nearing exhaustion, Captain Sachtleben fearlessly deployed his men, directed their fire, and fought with such tenacity that the North Vietnamese force broke contact late in the afternoon of the second day and retreated away from the Marines.
Captain Sachtleben’s’ dynamic leadership and valiant actions inspired all who observed him and were instrumental in his company accounting for 54 enemy killed as his company decisively defeated the North Vietnamese Army force. By his courage, bold initiative, and unwavering devotion to duty in the face of great personal danger, Captain Sachtleben upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.
A subsequent sweep of the area revealed a dozen more enemy remains, enemy bunkers, caves, and senior officer’s living quarters.
The United States Marine Corps paid tribute to Captain Sachtleben at Arlington National Cemetery, shown below:
Sergeant Stanley R. Richard, United States Marine Corps.
Smith, C. R. U. S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Standdown, 1969. Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1988.
 The number of enemy battalions went from around 94 in mid-1968 to around 23 in early 1969.
 Born in Chicago and raised in New Jersey, Edward Danowitz entered the Marine Corps in 1942 and served in World War II, Korea, the Dominican Republic, and in Vietnam. He retired in 1972. After his military service, he joined the faculty at Rollins College where he taught the Russian and Spanish languages. He passed away in 2013 at the age of 92 years.
You can place everything civilians know about the military into a thimble. It isn’t entirely their fault, of course. So, it comes as no surprise that civilians are likely to ask such questions as, What is the difference between a Green Beret and an Army Ranger? Or they might ask, Who’s the best, the Green Berets, Rangers, or Marines?
The answers to such deeply insightful questions will always depend upon who’s been asked. How would one expect a soldier or sailor to answer? A Marine, for example, might offer the questioner a contemptible stare and then just walk off without answering. Marines do have a sense of humor, but it has its limits. One of the best-ever answers originates with a former Green Beret sergeant major by the name of David Kirschbaum:
You tell the Marines to take a hill and they’ll frown, mutter, and bitch about it, but they’ll eventually salute, organize a platoon, and they’ll head straight for that hill. They’ll fight and kill whoever gets in their way of taking that hill, and even if there is only one PFC left in the bunch, he’ll seize that hill and organize himself for keeping it.
If you tell the Rangers to take a hill, they’ll salute and then go plan for a few days, write a lot of operation orders, develop patrol plans, argue about the scheme of maneuver, and finally decide who ought to be in charge. And then in the execution of taking that hill, they’ll find the absolutely worst terrain available for their route of march, which will preferably include swamps overrun with poisonous snakes and steep cliffs protected by predatory birds, and they’ll wait for the worst weather imaginable, but they’ll finally go through the swamps and climb the cliffs, and they won’t feel right unless they’ve lost half their force due to exhaustion or snake bite. But if there’s even one Ranger remaining, he’ll take the hill.
If you tell the Special Forces to take that hill, the first thing they’ll do is ask you why. So, you have to explain why. And then they’ll offer a disrespectful stare which is called silent contempt, and then they’ll just go away. In a few days, they might take that hill. Or they might take another hill that they liked better because the evidence was so blatantly obvious that their hill was the better choice that you can never argue with them about it. Or they might pull some sort of a deal and persuade the Marines to do it. Or, after a few days you might find them at the club completely ignoring the order to take the hill. And if challenged about their failure to take the hill, they’ll soon convince you that the order was a stupid idea and in not taking the hill, they very likely saved you from a court-martial —for which you are in their debt.”
Most people know the Special Forces soldier by his headgear: the Green Beret. They probably do not know that the US Army Special Forces traces its roots in unconventional warfare to the Alamo Scouts of the Sixth US Army in the Pacific during World War II, the Philippine Guerrillas [Note 1], the First Special Service Force [Note 2], and several operational groups within the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Note: the OSS was not a US Army command, but a large number of officers and enlisted men were assigned to the OSS and later used their experience in forming the US Army Special Forces. During the Korean War, men like Colonel Wendell Fertig and Lieutenant Colonel Russell W. Volckmann (former Philippine Scouts) used their wartime experiences to formulate the doctrine of unconventional warfare that became the foundation of the Special Forces.
In February 1950, the US government recognized a quasi-independent Vietnam within the French Union. The US was considering granting aid to the French forces opposing the communist insurgency of Ho Chi Minh. The US agreed to provide military and economic aid, and with this decision, American involvement in Indochina had begun.
In 1951, Major General Robert A. McClure selected Colonel Aaron Bank (formerly of the OSS) to serve as Operations Branch Chief of the Special Operations Division, Psychological Warfare Staff at Fort Brag, North Carolina. Within a year, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was formed under Colonel Bank at the Psychological Warfare School (later designated the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center). In 1953, the 10th SFG was split, with the 10th deploying to Germany, and the remaining men forming the 77th Special Force Group, which in May 1960 was re-designated as the 7th Special Forces Group.
On 7 May 1954, the French were overwhelmingly defeated by the Viet Minh (Communist supported Viet Nam Independence League) at Dien Bien Phu. Under the Geneva Armistice Agreement, Vietnam was divided into North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Between 1950-54, US officials had an opportunity to observe the struggle of France with the Vietnamese insurgency and become familiar with the political and military situation … but one has to wonder, what did these officials do with all that familiarization?
In July 1954, the US Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (USMAAGV) numbered 342 officers and men. Three months later, President Dwight D. Eisenhower promised direct aid to the provisional government of South Vietnam, which at the time was led by Premier Ngo Dinh Diem. Between 1954-56, Viet Minh cadres were busy forming action committees to spread communist propaganda and organize South Vietnamese citizens to oppose their own government [Note 3]. In 1955, both the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union announced that they would provide direct aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (also, DRV or North Vietnam). In August 1955, Premier Diem rejected for the third time Hanoi’s demand for a general election throughout both North Vietnam and South Vietnam to settle the matter of unification. In October 1955, Diem proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), which became the official government of South Vietnam.
On 24 June 1957, the 1st Special Forces Group was activated on Okinawa; within a year, a team from this unit trained fifty-eight soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) at a commando training center located at Nha Trang. These trainees would later become the nucleus for the first Vietnamese Special Forces units.
In 1959-60, communist insurgents (known as Vietnamese Communists (also, VC) grew in number and began terrorizing innocent civilians. Clashes between government forces and VC units increased from around 180 in January 1960 to nearly 550 in September. Thirty Special Forces instructors were sent from Fort Bragg to Vietnam in May to set up an ARVN training program.
On 21 September 1961, President John F. Kennedy announced a program to provide additional military and economic aid to the RVN. On that same day, the 5th Special Forces Group was activated at Fort Bragg. It was at this point in 1961 that President Kennedy took an interest in special forces operations and he became the patron of the Special Forces program within the Army.
Up until 1961, the RVN and US mission in Saigon focused their attention on developing regular ground forces, which for the most part had excluded ethnic and religious minority groups. Late in that year, the US initiated several programs that would broaden the counterinsurgency effort by developing paramilitary forces within these minority groups. The development of these groups became a primary mission of Special Forces teams in Vietnam. It was a difficult mission; one that required an understanding of Vietnamese culture, the culture of minority groups (i.e., Montagnards), and a great deal of patience.
In 1961, the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas undertook an examination of the responsibility of the US Army in the cold war and the so-called “wars of liberation” as practiced by communists around the world. One focus that evolved from this examination was doctrine needed to counter subversive insurgencies, particularly in RVN. When asked to identify units and numbers of forces needed and best prepared to deal with counterinsurgency operations, the Army selected as its vanguard unit the Special Forces, which at the time numbered around 2,000 troops.
Throughout the Vietnam War, the US Army Special Forces excelled in every aspect of unconventional warfare. As with the other American armed forces in Vietnam, however, the deck was stacked against them from the start [Note 4]. At the conclusion of the war, after Democrats in Congress reneged on America’s deal with Vietnam in the post Vietnamization phase, many veteran special forces soldiers left active service in disgust. We won all the battles, but the politicians back home handed a victory to the North Vietnamese from the jaws of their resounding defeat. The utter shame of American history was not the men who stepped up to serve during the Vietnam War, it was the Congress of the United States who not only turned its back on our South Vietnamese ally, but on the men and women who served in Vietnam as well.
The Green Berets do not refer to themselves as such. They either refer to themselves as “Special Forces” or SF. Sometimes they are known as “Sneaky Pete,” and “Snake Eaters.” They do know how to eat snakes, but I have it pretty good authority that it’s not a preferred or regular diet (although it’s probably better tasting than the current government faire of Meals Ready to Eat (MRE’s) (also, Meals rejected by Ethiopians).
The John Wayne film, The Green Berets, wasn’t really about the Special Forces soldier; it was more of a composite picture of soldiers one might find in the Special Forces. According to the retired special forces soldiers I know, the SFG of the 1960s is a far cry from the modern organization.
In the early days, the SF soldier was an individual we might call a natural woodsman. They were men to volunteered for duty with Special Forces because they preferred being in the boonies to being in garrison and having to take part in weekly parades, repetitious routines, and the chicken shit associated with regular army life. There was some formal training, of course, and it is true that these fellows had a knack for learning foreign languages, but most of the men received on-the-job training (OJT) in special forces operations teams. One former Green Beret described it as working hard when it was time to work and playing hard when it was time to play. Perhaps too much drinking and chasing skirts while on liberty, but these men were, indeed, the quiet professionals who never lost their focus on their mission.
The primary element of a Special Forces company is an operational detachment, commonly referred to as an A Team. It consists of 12 soldiers: 2 officers, and ten sergeants. All members of the A Team are Special Forces qualified and cross trained in different skills. The team is almost unlimited in its ability to operate in hostile or “denied” areas, able to infiltrate and exfiltrate by air, land, or sea. It can operate for indefinite periods of time in remote locations without any outside help or support—self-sustaining, independent teams who regularly train, advise, and assist US and allied forces and agencies and capable of performing a myriad of special operations. Every member of the A Team is lethal.
Besides the A Team commander (a captain), the second in command is a Chief Warrant Officer. The captain is responsible for ensuring and maintaining the operational readiness of the team; he may also command or advise an indigenous combat force up to battalion size units. His executive officer (second in command) serves as the tactical and technical expert. He is multi-lingual, supervises plans and operations, and is capable of recruiting, organizing, training, and supervising indigenous combat forces up to the battalion level.
The A Team Sergeant is a Master Sergeant, the senior enlisted man, responsible for overseeing all Team operations, supervising subordinate enlisted men, and the person who runs the show on a daily basis. Because of his interaction with the team enlisted men, he is sometimes referred to as the Den Daddy. He is capable of stepping up to second in command should the need arise, or assuming command should the team commander and XO become incapacitated.
The Operations Sergeant is a Sergeant First Class (E-7) who coordinates the team’s intelligence, including field interrogations. He is capable of training, advising, or leading indigenous combat forces up to a company size unit.
The team has two (2) weapons sergeants. One of these is usually a sergeant first class and he is assisted by a staff sergeant. These are the weapons experts who are capable of employing every small arm and crew served weapon in the world. They are responsible for training other team members in the use of a wide range of weapons. As tactical mission leaders, they are capable of employing conventional and unconventional tactics and techniques. They are responsible for the tactical security of the A Team.
The team has two (2) engineer sergeants. One of these is usually a sergeant first class, and he is assisted by a staff sergeant. These men are experts in demolitions. They are lethal with a capital L. They are the builders and destroyers of structures and serve as key players in civic action missions.
There are two (2) medical sergeants. One of these is usually a sergeant first class, and he is assisted by a staff sergeant. The SF medic employs the latest in field medical technology and limited surgical procedures, capable of managing any battlefield trauma injury, supervising preventative medicine, and as such is an integral part of civic action programs. Upon completion of the SF training, they are certified “paramedical” personnel, which includes advance trauma life support, limited surgery and dentistry, and even veterinarian procedures.
There are two (2) communications sergeants. One of these is usually a sergeant first class, and he is assisted by a staff sergeant. These are the Comm Guys, or sometimes referred to as “Sparks.” They are the lifeline of the team, able to establish and maintain sophisticated communications via FM, multi-channel, and satellite devices. Theirs is unquestionably the heaviest rucksack on the team.
In addition to their primary responsibilities, team members are often assigned other duties. The best scrounger very often acts as the supply sergeant. A scrounger is someone who can steal from other units without getting caught. One member with peculiar culinary skills might serve as the team cook.
In the 1960s, before the Special Forces were recognized as a branch of the army, they were regarded as “unassigned.” Another word for this was “bastard.” In joining the special forces, a solder became part of a bastard unit. The veteran soldiers preferred being bastards because it meant that they were generally ignored by the geniuses in Washington whose tactical skill set was operating a pencil sharpener. Today, the conventional army has taken over the special forces … which means that pencil pushers now dictate to the field soldier how he must go about his business. If you ask a veteran SF soldier, he’ll probably tell you that today’s SF is little different from the regular conventional army … but they do get to wear service insignia.
One of my favorites:
Staff Sergeant Schwartz had volunteered for the Special Forces. His request was approved contingent on successfully passing a psychological examination. On the date of his interview, Schwartz entered the medical officer’s office, removed his hat, and took a seat. The doctor, who had been reviewing Schwartz’s medical record, looked up and observed a frog sitting on Schwartz’s head. Having interviewed several Special Forces candidates that day, the doctor was unfazed. He asked Schwartz, “So, what’s your problem?” The frog answered, saying, “I don’t know, doc. It started off as a wart on my ass.”
 After the invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese in 1941, there were sixty American military and civilian commanders of forces throughout the Philippines who evaded capture or escaped Japanese imprisonment on the archipelago’s several islands. With the help and assistance of the Filipino people, the Philippine Scouts formed resistance groups, which were eventually recognized by the American military and eventually supported and supplied by the USN submarine service.
 The First Special Service Force, also known as the Devil’s Brigade, was an elite American-Canadian commando unit in World War II under the command of the Fifth US Army, organized in 1942 under Colonel Robert T. Frederick, who commanded the brigade until 1944.
 At this time, the average Vietnamese citizen was not overly patriotic. Occurrences outside of their immediate family, or outside their village of domicile, was of no great concern to them.
Twenty miles south of Da Nang, Vietnam, west of Highway 1, is a 36-square-mile area of flatland. Numerous waterways and man made canals criss cross this area and these are separated by thick tufts of five-foot high elephant grass. In 1968 it was an area ideal for concealing two battalions of enemy infantry, which at the time included the 1st Battalion, 36th Regiment of regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Viet Cong (VC) R-20 Battalion. The area was extremely dangerous to US and Republic of Vietnam (RVN) forces; firefights and ambuscades were frighteningly common. The Marines called this area Dodge City.
OPERATION MEADE RIVER was planned as part of the RVN’s Le Loi (Accelerated Pacification) Campaign [Note 1] — a series of operations designed to search for and destroy enemy forces. On the morning of 20 November 1968, seven Marine battalions moved overland and by helicopter to establish a cordon around Dodge City. While moving into initial staging areas, even before the sweeps began, Marines lost one KIA, suffered 25 WIA, and lost two helicopters. It was not a good omen. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (2/7) jumped off at midday. Their mission was to sweep from the western side of the cordon toward the rail lines. At around 1630, Company G (Golf 2/7) encountered an NVA bunker complex in an area the Marines nicknamed The Horseshoe. Enemy fire from these bunkers was intense and the Marines withdrew with six additional KIA.
On 21 November, Delta 1/1 and Lima 3/26 resumed the assault on The Horseshoe. Heavy enemy fire stalled the advance. The enemy had decided they weren’t leaving without a fight and the Marines were equally determined to give them one. The Marines resumed their assault on 22 November. Enemy machine gun fire devastated Echo 2/7 at close range as it began to cross a small stream; Marine losses were 7 KIA and 23 WIA. It took the company ten minutes to disengage. Concurrently, Delta 1/1 began its sweep from the North but they too were hit by intensive enemy fire with loses of 2 KIA and 17 wounded.
On 23 November, 3/26 moved from the Southwest toward the Horseshoe and joined up with 2/7. Hotel 2/7 overran several enemy positions and was able to recover the remains of six Marines lost on 20 November. Early on 24 November, Marines directed air and artillery against the Horseshoe; 2/7 reinforced by Kilo 3/26 renewed its attack. Again, strong enemy fire halted the Marine advance.
Before jumping off on 25 November, 2/7 directed artillery fire into suspected enemy positions before continuing the attack. There was no enemy resistance because the enemy had withdrawn during the night. Over the next four days, the Marines continued to exert pressure on the enemy within the cordon. It was grueling work for the Marines as they advanced through thick grass that concealed enemy defensive positions. Meanwhile, 3/5 initiated an assault along Route 4 which necessitated the destruction of several bunker complexes. As they approached a section called “The Hook,” the battalion encountered stiff enemy resistance. The battalion lost 2 KIA and 28 wounded before pulling back to allow for air and artillery fire.
3/5 reinitiated offensive operations on 2 December but made no progress. After additional air and artillery bombardments, 3/26 joined 3/5’s advance on 3 December and the Marines succeeded in penetrating the enemy’s intricate defensive positions during the next day. After air dropping napalm on the enemy’s defenses on 5 December, Marines overran the bunker complex and discovered the remains of 87 enemy dead.
On 6 December, Echo 2/26 encountered a stubborn NVA bunker complex just south of the La Tho River. Hotel 2/5 and Alpha 1/7 attacked the complex on the morning of 7 December but were quickly pinned down and suffered heavy casualties. As forward observers called in for additional air and artillery support, the grunts withdrew to set up night defensive positions. At around 1130 on 8 December, 3/26 supported by several armored personnel carriers from the ARVN 2nd Troop, 4th ARVN Cavalry aggressively attacked the complex finding 79 enemy dead from the previous day’s engagement. For a time, Hotel 2/5 was pinned down by a final line of bunkers spewing hot lead through the Marine’s line of advance, but the equally stubborn Marines used explosives to destroy the bunkers one at a time, which killed an additional 39 NVA/VC defenders.
The highly pissed-off Marines of Alpha 1/7 viciously assaulted a series of 12 bunkers killing 47 NVA. As the Marines pushed through the foliage to the bank of the river, they engaged another enemy unit attempting to escape into river killing an additional twenty NVA/VC. Alpha gave up six of their men KIA.
On the night of 8 December, Lima 3/26 engaged an NVA unit, killing fifteen enemy with the loss of 5 Marines. At sundown, India 3/26’s lead platoon found itself cut off from the rest of the company by intense enemy fire. Staff Sergeant Karl G. Taylor, serving as the Company Gunnery Sergeant, led a rescue team to recover and evacuate the platoon’s more seriously wounded Marines. After Taylor’s Marines had moved several wounded to safety, he returned with four volunteers to reach another group of wounded Marines who were laying exposed to enemy fire. Finding the position too strong, Taylor instructed his volunteers to move back to the company line, and then arming himself with a grenade launcher, charged across the rice paddy while firing 40-mm grenades into the enemy position. Although wounded several times, Taylor silenced the weapon.
Medal of Honor Citation Summary
While serving as Company Gunnery Sergeant on the night of 8 December 1968, Taylor was informed that the platoon commander of the lead platoon had been mortally wounded and that the platoon was pinned down by intense enemy machine gun fire. Staff Sergeant Taylor with another Marine in support, crawled forward to the beleaguered unit through a hail of hostile fire, shouted encouragement and instructions to the men, directing them to covered positions.
With his companion, Taylor repeatedly maneuvered across an open area to rescue those Marines who were too seriously wounded to move themselves. Upon learning that there were additional seriously wounded men lying in open area, exposed to the fire of an enemy machine gun position, Staff Sergeant Taylor led four Marines across the fire-swept terrain in an attempt to rescue the cut off Marines. When Taylor’s advance was halted by devastating enemy fire, Taylor directed his Marines to return to the company command post. He then took his grenade launcher and, in full view of the enemy, charged across the open rice paddy toward the enemy machine gun position, firing his weapon as he ran.
Although wounded several times, he succeeded in reaching the machine gun bunker and destroying it. By this time, Staff Sergeant Taylor was mortally wounded, but his actions saved the lives of the isolated Marines. By his indomitable courage, inspiring leadership, and selfless dedication, Staff Sergeant Karl G. Taylor upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.
Richard M. Nixon
President of the United States
Who was Staff Sergeant Karl Taylor?
He was born on 14 July 1939 in Laurel, Maryland. After leaving high school, Karl worked for a construction company as a scraper operator. On 15 January 1959, twenty-year old Karl and his brother Walter enlisted in the U. S. Marine Corps at the recruiting station in Baltimore. After recruit training at Parris Island, South Carolina, Karl completed combat training with the 1st Infantry Training Regiment at Camp Geiger [Note 2], North Carolina. Taylor’s first tour of duty was as a rifleman with the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. After promotion to corporal, which made him eligible for duty as a Marine Corps Drill Instructor, Karl applied for and was accepted to attend DI School at Parris Island. He served as a drill instructor until 1963.
In 1964, Taylor joined the 3rd Marine Division on Okinawa where he was assigned to Company G, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines. Taylor served his first combat tour when the division was sent to Vietnam in 1965. Upon rotation back to the United States, Taylor served as a sergeant-instructor at Company A, Officer’s Candidate School, Quantico, Virginia. He was promoted to staff sergeant on 1 September 1966.
In 1968, Taylor returned to Vietnam for his second combat tour of duty. He was assigned as the Company Gunnery Sergeant, Company I, 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines.
Taylor’s remains were returned to his family and he was interred at the Independence Cemetery, Washington County, Pennsylvania. In addition to receiving the nation’s highest award for conspicuous gallantry, Taylor’s family was awarded his Purple Heart medal. He was also entitled to wear the Combat Action Ribbon (two awards), the Presidential Unit Citation (two awards) [Note 3], and three awards of the Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal.
Operation Meade River Terminated
On the evening of 8 December, the enemy still retained a narrow strip of ground between 3/26 and the Song La Tho. Another push was ordered to eliminate these communists. Along with Marine Corps artillery, the USS New Jersey directed its sixteen-inch guns on these remaining positions throughout the night and into the morning. 3/26 launched its final assault at 1100 on 9 December. Despite the assault of overwhelming field and naval artillery during the night, remaining enemy forces tenaciously resisted the ground attack, but the Marines methodically and thoroughly eliminated the enemy wherever found.
Operation Meade River officially ended at 1800 on 9 December. The battle was a major event pitting determined Marines against equally resolved North Vietnamese and Viet Cong defenders. The operation ended with 1,023 enemy dead, 123 prisoners taken, and an additional 71 VC were captured when discovered hiding among local populations. Marines also destroyed 360 enemy bunkers and captured 120 tons of rice stores — but the cost was high. 108 Marines lost their lives with 510 wounded in action. ARVN casualties were 2 KIA and 37 WIA. Although initially vanquished, the persistent enemy soon began infiltrating snipers and before the end of December, Marines observed that communist forces were again preparing to launch assaults against Da Nang and Hoi An from Dodge City. By that time, the Marines had turned their attention to another problem area which they called “Arizona Territory.”
Hunt, R. Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds. Westview Press, 1995.
Shulimson, J. U. S. Marines in Vietnam, 1968: The Defining Year. Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C., 1997.
White, J. P. “Civil Affairs in Vietnam.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D. C.
 Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) was a pacification program created on 9 May 1967 that included military and civilian components of the US and RVN. The objective of CORDS was to gain support for the government of RVN from its rural populations influenced or controlled by insurgent communist forces (VC) and regular NVA. One of CORDS successes was the integration of civilian and military efforts to combat the communist insurgency.
 Named in honor of General Roy S. Geiger, USMC — one of the Corps’ first naval aviators and the only Marine to command a U. S. Army during World War II.
 Although a combat decoration awarded to every Marine in the unit cited, the Presidential Unit Citation is roughly equivalent to the Navy Cross Medal in precedence of other unit awards.