U. S. Marine Corps Defense Battalions
The Marine Corps mission, now a long tradition, is to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, or to repel the enemy’s assault by fire and close combat. No matter what occupational specialty assigned, every Marine is a trained rifleman. Up-close and personal is how Marines fight. As an organization, the Corps has two essential purposes: (1) making Marines, and (2) winning battles.
People who seek to join the Marine Corps are already psychologically unique because every potential recruit knows what the Marine Corps will expect from them from the very beginning of their enlistment process. Knowing this, however, is insufficient. Every enlisted recruit and every officer candidate must measure up to the Corps’ uncompromising high standards. They must demonstrate that they have what it takes to serve as a US Marine. They do this either at recruit training depots or at the officer candidate school — which is where they earn the title, MARINE.
Marines are naval infantry. Between 1775-1900, Marines primarily served in ship’s detachments, navy yards, and provisional forces for expeditionary service ashore. Between 1900-1940, Marines participated in irregular warfare and counter-insurgency operations in support of American foreign policy. Conventionally, Marines served with enviable distinction in the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and in the Middle Eastern Wars.
Organizationally, the Marine Corps is composed of its Headquarters element (Headquarters Marine Corps) (HQMC), its supporting establishments (Marine Corps Bases and Air Stations), and the Operating Forces. The Operating forces (presently) consist of three infantry divisions, three air wings, three logistical commands, and their reserve counterparts. The Marine Corps organizes its deployed forces as Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs), which range from battalion landing teams to reinforced infantry divisions. While war strategies are matters for senior (flag rank) officers, battlefield tactics frequently fall within the purview of Marine noncommissioned officers (NCOs).
The structure of the Marine Corps (1775-present) has been an evolutionary process. At its beginning, Congress authorized the recruitment of two Marines battalions and directed that their officers organize them for service aboard ships of war as riflemen. Historically, the size of the Marine Corps has expanded and contracted to meet the nation’s demands in times of peace and war. In the Revolutionary War period, for example, the size of shipboard detachments depended on the ship’s size to which assigned. The size of the Marine Corps depended on the missions assigned to it by Congress. Following the Revolutionary War, the new U.S. Congress determined that it could no longer afford to maintain a naval force, so both the Navy and Marine Corps disbanded between 1783-1798. The Navy and Marine Corps have continuously served the American people since 1798; their size in ships and manpower ceilings is always a matter for the Congress to decide.
Victory over Spain in 1898 was a pivotal event because it propelled a somewhat backwater United States onto the world stage and had a sudden and significant influence on the growth of the US Navy and Marine Corps. With victory over Spain came vast territorial acquisitions that included the Philippine Islands, Guam, Samoa, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. These were in addition to already existing US interests in Central America (Nicaragua and the Isthmus of Panama). Territorial acquisition meant that the United States would have to defend these faraway places, and the only service that could do that was the US Navy — challenges never imagined before 1898.
Realizing that the post-Civil War Navy was initially out of its depth in this new world order, the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) established the General Board of the Navy in 1900. The Board’s membership included the Navy’s most senior officers, men who were at the end of their careers upon whom he could rely on offering deliberate and objective analyses of world events and offering recommendations on a wide range of issues — from ship design to naval strategy and contingency planning and training. The General Board undertook the development of war plans for responding to anticipated threats against the US East Coast, the Antilles, and, eventually, the Panama Canal.
Initially, the General Board of the Navy viewed Great Britain as a “most likely” threat to American interests and sovereignty. With greater allied cooperation with the United Kingdom, however, the General Board turned its attention toward Imperial Germany, especially after Spain sold its Central Pacific territories to Imperial Germany and German military construction projects in the Pacific and coastal China. Japan’s victory over Imperial Russia in 1905 forced the US to consider conflict with the Japanese, as well.
In late 1901, the Navy General Board demanded that (then) Major General Commandant Charles Heywood develop a four-company infantry battalion for expeditionary and advanced base defense training. The Navy Board envisioned a Marine battalion that could rapidly deploy (ship to shore) in defense of American territories as part of the Asiatic Fleet and do so without awaiting the arrival of US Army units from the United States. The writings of Captain Dion Williams, (then assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence), emphasized the importance of the Navy’s ability to refuel its ships from Pacific coaling stations. Since it was incumbent upon the Navy to defend those advanced bases, the Navy turned to the Marine Corps for this purpose.
One achieves an understanding of warfare by reading history and then thinking about an event’s causes, its actors, what they did, why they did it, the mistakes they made, and the consequences of conflict. Learning how to prepare for war is a bit more complicated — often involving many years of trial and error. In 1907, a battalion under Major Eli K. Cole participated in a training exercise in Subic Bay, the Philippine Islands. It took his Marines ten weeks to set emplace 44 heavy shore battery guns. The lesson the Marine Corps learned from this exercise pointed to the wisdom of pre-staging men and material as “rapid response” elements of the naval expeditionary forces. Cole’s exercise prompted the Navy Board to recommend establishment of permanent advanced bases within the Navy’s defensive sphere.
In 1913, Major General Commandant William P. Biddle ordered a Marine Corps Advanced Base Force. He named it the 1st Advanced Force Brigade. Biddle further re-designated the Brigade’s two regiments as the Fixed Defense Regiment (under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Long) and the Mobile Defense Regiment (under Colonel George Barnett).
World events temporarily interfered with the Corps’ effort to improve the Advanced Base Force concept. In 1914, the President dispatched a Marine expeditionary force to Vera Cruz, Mexico. The Marines used this event to test and validate previously developed theories; these, in turn, providing essential lessons for ongoing developments in Marine Corps force structure.
During World War I, the 4th Marine Brigade operated as one of two brigades within the US Second Infantry Division. The 4th Marine Brigade consisted of the 5th Marine Regiment, 6th Marine Regiment, and the 6th Machine-gun Battalion. A fully deployed combat brigade was a significant increase in overall Marine Corps strength, but the American Expeditionary Force in Europe was not the only iron in the fire. HQMC formed an additional expeditionary brigade for service in the Caribbean and Central America during the so-called banana wars. In 1919-1920, post war reductions in funding forced the Marine Corps to disband several infantry regiments/separate battalions.
In 1921, Major General Commandant John A. Lejeune continued the work undertaken in previous decades — work that actually continues today. Each achievement, methodological or technological, becomes the foundation upon which new ideas emerge — and so it goes. In 1933, creating and perfecting the Advanced Base Force led to the creation of the Fleet Marine Forces (Atlantic and Pacific) — which became an integral part of the United States Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.
The primary mission of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) was the seizure and temporary defense of advanced bases, in concert with US fleet operations. In the 1920s and 1930s, the United States participated in a series of naval conferences designed to reduce the likelihood of war by limiting armaments (i.e., the size of national navies). It was, at best, a romantic assumption. The US Congress began thinking defensively, prompting a significant reduction in the size of the military services. Defense is not how the Marine Corps wins battles; senior Marine officers remained focused on offensive operations and defensive thinking had no appreciable impact on the readiness planning of the Fleet Marine Force.
The vast range of US territories and the requirement to defend them continued as a vital interest to the Navy and as a primary responsibility of the Marine Corps. A formal review of responsibilities assigned to the Army and Navy, designed to avoid duplication of effort, determined that the Army should confine itself to continental land operations. The Navy should focus its attention on the security of overseas territories and possessions.
By 1937, the Navy began to consider creating Marine Corps security detachments, particularly at vulnerable locations in the Pacific, in conjunction with Plan Orange. Initially, the Navy Board envisioned security detachments as battalion-sized organizations. In 1938, the Navy Board recommended the placement of defense battalions at Midway, Wake, and Johnston Islands —in sufficient strength and size to repel minor naval raids.
Defense battalions were coastal artillery units armed with 5-inch guns (6), anti-aircraft guns (12), machine guns (48 .30 caliber) (48 .50 caliber), searchlights (6), and sound locators (6). The Battalion’s usual complement involved 28 officers and 482 enlisted men, but a battalion’s size depended on the specific size of the area the battalion was charged to defend. Once ashore, owing to the size of naval guns, the Battalion would become “immobile.” In effect, once defense battalions assumed their positions, there would be no retreat.
Initially, the Marine Corps envisioned four defense battalions; their importance (in relation to the Marine Corps as a whole) was significant. Of the Corps’ total strength (27,000 officers and enlisted men), 9,000 Marines would serve as part of the Fleet Marine Force, and 2,844 of those would serve in defense battalions.
Defense battalions began to form in late 1939. By 7 December 1941, there were seven active battalions: the 1st, 2nd, 6th, and 7th formed at Marine Corps Base, San Diego, California; the 3rd, 4th, and 5th formed at Parris Island, South Carolina. The 5th Defense Battalion was the first such battalion to deploy to a potentially hostile shore.
Under the command of Colonel Lloyd L. Leech, the 5th Defense Battalion deployed to Iceland in June 1941 as part of the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional). In addition to the 5th Defense Battalion, the Brigade included the 6th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 10th Marines, and various other supporting units to reinforce British forces charged with blocking any German attempt to seize Iceland. To facilitate training and instruction for the American Marines, the brigade commander assented to the 5th Defense Battalion’s incorporation into the British air defense system.
Over time, it became increasingly unlikely that Germany would seize Iceland. However, while the Pacific command urgently needed the 1st Brigade, its eventual reassignment was contingent upon the arrival in Iceland US Army units to replace the Marines. Before Pearl Harbor, statutory provisions precluded the assignment of non-volunteer troops to overseas locations. Army conscripts could not serve in Iceland until a state of war existed between the United States and its adversaries. The Brigade was finally relieved by Army units in March 1942.
Of the remaining defense battalions, all but one (2nd) deployed to the Pacific before Pearl Harbor. The 2nd Defense Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Raymond E. Knapp, joined the 2nd Marine Brigade in Samoa in January 1942. Already serving in Samoa was the 7th Defense Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Lester A. Dessez. The 7th Defense Battalion was the first FMF unit to operate in the South Pacific theater of operations.
The 3rd Defense Battalion formed in late 1939. After initial training, the Battalion embarked for Pearl Harbor in April 1940. In September, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific ordered elements of the Battalion to Midway Island. The entire Battalion reformed at Midway in February 1941. In September 1941, the 6th Defense Battalion replaced the 3rd Battalion at Midway, which then returned to Hawaii and participated in defense of Pearl Harbor. Also, in Hawaii on 7 December 1941, was the 1st Defense Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Bert A. Bone, and the 4th Defense Battalion, under Colonel Harold S. Fassett.
The preceding may seem like an orderly process, but it was far from that. Moving large numbers of Marines and their heavy (and expensive) equipment is never easy, rarely tidy, and always compounded by higher headquarters. For instance, in 1939, the 1st Defense Battalion formed by renaming the 2nd Battalion, 15th Marines, and then reorganizing it, re-equipping it, and re-positioning it to serve in its new role. In February 1941, the 1st Defense Battalion arrived at Pearl Harbor from San Diego. No sooner had the Battalion arrived when higher authority split it apart into subunits and redistributed them throughout the Central Pacific. FMF Pacific (also, FMFPac) dispatched Detachment A, 1st Defense Battalion to Palmyra Island (arriving 10 March). A month later, HQMC renamed the unit “Marine Detachment, 1st Marine Defense Battalion, Palmyra Island.” Additional subunits became Marine Detachments at Johnston (mid-July) and Wake (late-July). Thus, on 7 December 1941, the 1st Defense Battalion had subunits on three atolls with their headquarters element remaining at Pearl Harbor.
By early December, Marine defense battalions defended Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, and Wake. The global war plan, then in effect, renamed “Rainbow Five,” called for the development of air bases at all these sites. After 7 December, the United States had to concede Guam (and its small naval facility) to the Japanese owing to its position in the center of the Japanese-held Marianas Island group. The Navy’s intention behind creating these small forward bases was two-fold. Samoa would help protect communication routes in the Southwest Pacific; Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake were offered for the protection of Oahu installations. None of the forward bases provided much protection, however.
At Pearl Harbor
Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor started at 0755 on 7 December 1941. The assault lasted two hours. The defense battalions offered limited (and generally ineffective) opposition to Japanese forces. This generally poor performance was not the fault of the defense battalions, however. Japan’s attack was a surprise event well-timed for Sunday morning. Accordingly, all US responses were haphazard.
Before the Japanese attack, the United States was already preparing for hostilities — albeit with only limited intelligence information. Hawaii-based commanders heard nothing from Washington beyond cautionary advice. Reacting with caution, senior commanders ordered all munitions secured at widely dispersed locations. Motor vehicles were carefully stored in are motor pools, berthed ships and parked aircraft were lined up neatly for ease of monitoring security — in case Japanese agents attempted to sabotage American military equipment. When the Japanese attacked, air defense positions had no ammunition with which to shoot down enemy planes. Within a few moments of the attack, air and ground commanders ordered munitions, but there were no vehicles available to transport it. By the time ammunition did arrive, the Japanese attack was over.
Within six minutes of the beginning of the Japanese attack, Marines from the defense battalion had machine guns set up and engaged the enemy. These were the only weapons used in the defense of Pearl Harbor. It was a bit too little.
Within mere hours after Japan’s attack, Navy and Marine commanders took steps to reinforce outlying island garrisons, rushing substantial numbers of Marines to Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra. These Marines and their equipment came from the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Defense Battalions. Midway’s assets included 17 Scout/Bombers, ferried to the island commander via the aircraft carrier USS Lexington. Once the ship returned to Pearl Harbor, additional flights were direct over-ocean movements. The distance from Pearl Harbor to Midway was 1,137 miles.
The situation on Guam was bleak. Lieutenant Colonel William K. McNulty’s 122 Marines (and 15 additional Marines serving on detached duty with the Guamanian Police Force) were overwhelmed by Japanese forces.
Johnston Island, a spec of sand in the middle of the ocean, was too small and too close to the Hawaiian Islands to risk a land assault, but it was a tempting target. Major Francis B. Loomis, serving as the 1st Defense Battalion executive officer, was present at Johnston Island when the Japanese made their move against Pearl Harbor. As the senior officer present, Loomis assumed overall command of American military assets.
The first contact the Johnson Island Marines had with the Japanese occurred on 12 December when a submarine surfaced 8,000 yards off Sand Island and began firing green star clusters, which exploded high overhead. Marines returned fire with a 5-inch gun, and the submarine withdrew. Three days later, two Japanese ships opened fire and damaged several buildings and an oil storage facility. Again, the Marines answered with a 5-inch gun, and the enemy ships withdrew before suffering any damage. On the nights of 18, 21, and 22 December, enemy submarines returned to deliver harassing fire. By the end of the month, reinforcements arrived from Hawaii, adding another 5-inch battery, another 3-inch battery, and 16 more machine guns —but the Marines heard no more from the Japanese for the duration of the war.
Palmyra Island experienced a single Japanese attack on 24 December. A Japanese submarine surfaced 3,000 yards offshore and fired its deck guns at a dredge in the lagoon. The 5-inch battery drove the submarine away. Lieutenant Colonel Bone, commanding the 1st Defense Battalion, arrived with reinforcements at the end of December. The Palmyra garrison became 1st Defensive Battalion in March. Spreading Marines all over the Central Pacific had the effect of diminishing unit cohesiveness within the defense battalions. To solve this problem, local commands absorbed the various “detachments” into their organizations.
By mid-December world attention was focused on events unfolding at Wake Island. The unfolding battle electrified everyone. On 7 December 1941, the Wake Island detachment totaled barely 400 officers and men, including 9 officers and 200 enlisted men who had only joined the detachment in the previous month. The detachment commander was Major James P. S. Devereux. The Island’s air support squadron included 12 F4F-3 Wildcats of Major Paul A. Putnam’s VMF-211 detachment, which arrived on 4 December. Putnam reported to Devereux, who reported to the Island Commander, Commander Winfield S. Cunningham, USN.
There were no optimists among the Marines of Wake Island. Devereux’s detachment was understrength; one battery of 3-inch guns was completely unmanned. Two other batteries could field only three of four guns (each), and Echo Battery had no height-finding equipment. Ground and anti-air crew-served weapons were only half manned. The detachment had no radar and no sound-locator equipment. By the time Wake Marines learned of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, VMF-211’s dawn patrol was already aloft. Putnam dispersed his remaining aircraft, and the detachment’s Marines manned their posts.
Shortly before noon on 8 December (Wake Island was in a different date-time-zone from Hawaii), 36 Japanese bombers attacked Wake Island, their bomb load mostly hitting the airstrip where seven of the eight parked Wildcats were destroyed, exploding aviation gas storage tanks, and killing 23 of the 55 enlisted aviation ground crewmen. The bombers returned each day for the next six days, always at the same time of day. Each day, the Japanese inflicted more damage and took more lives. At 0300 on 11 December, a Japanese assault force appeared offshore. Warships moved in after dawn to begin raking fire prelude to troop landings. By 0615, the Marines had severely damaged the cruiser Yubari and sunk the destroyer Havate. Additionally, Marines damaged a light cruiser, two destroyers, and a troop transport. The Japanese withdrew to Kwajalein Island.
In the following week, Marines lost an additional three aircraft to Japanese bombers, half their trucks, and engineering equipment, most of their diesel fuel and dynamite, and the motor pool, warehouse, machine shop, and the blacksmith shop was wholly destroyed. The Japanese destroyed the last two Wildcats on 22 December during aerial combat. By this time, the Marines at Wake Island were running a pool on their expected shelf-life.
At dawn on 23 December, another Japanese assault force appeared offshore. One-thousand Imperial Japanese Army and 500 Imperial Japanese Navy prepared to land on Wake Island. Marines engaged the first wave of Japanese at 0245, but none of the 5-inch guns were able to take destroyers/transports under fire. The 3-inch guns inflicted some damage, but not enough to hinder the landing. Lacking any infantry support, overwhelming Japanese forces pushed the Marines back to secondary defensive positions. Gun crews, in defending themselves, had to forsake the big guns. By 0500, the Marines realized that the dance was about over. At dawn, enemy carrier-based fighters and bombers arrived overhead. Devereux advised Cunningham that he could no longer maintain organized resistance. With Cunningham’s concurrence, Devereux surrendered his force to the Japanese landing force commander.
The story of Wilkes Island unfolded differently, however. At Wilkes, the battle raged so fiercely that at daybreak, Captain Wesley Mc. Platt not only destroyed the Japanese landing party after the initial Japanese assault, but he also reorganized his men and ordered a ruthless counterattack, killing every Japanese soldier he could find, one after another. Captain Platt was out of contact with Devereux and did not know of the surrender until around 1330 when Platt saw Devereux approaching a Japanese officer. Platt was not a happy camper, but he obeyed Major Devereux’s order to relinquish his arms to the Japanese.
Admiral Yamamoto’s plan for seizing Midway Island was typically complex. He also based his assumptions on faulty intelligence. He believed that only two aircraft carriers were available to the Pacific Fleet after the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942. After the repair of USS Yorktown, the Navy had three carriers: Enterprise, Hornet, and Yorktown. He also misread the morale of the US Armed Forces and the general American population. Admiral Yamamoto was a crafty fellow, but he did not know that the Americans had broken the naval code. The key for the Americans was learning that the Japanese designation of Midway Island was JN-25.
Lieutenant Colonel Harold D. Shannon ordered his 6th Defense Battalion to “general quarters” as soon as he learned of the Japanese attack at Wake Island. It was a sensibly prudent order, but its effect was that it kept his Marines on edge for an extended period. No action developed that day, but shortly after dark, the Japanese destroyers Akebono and Ushio arrived offshore. Their mission was to harass the Island’s defenders and determine the placement of Marine shore batteries. Two Japanese rounds hit the Island’s power plant and disrupted the communications center. As the two ships set up for their second run into the beach, Shannon ordered his Marines to engage enemy targets at will. Battery A’s 5-inch guns remained silent due to the break down in communications, but Battery B and Battery D opened up with their 5-inch naval artillery and 3-inch anti-aircraft guns. The .50 caliber machine-guns fired once the destroyers were within range. The Japanese ships withdrew shortly afterward.
Reinforcements and resupply soon arrived from Hawaii. Among the heavy weapons were 7-inch guns removed from World War I ships that had been in storage for many years. Midway Island was well-armed and adequately manned to repel an enemy assault; the American defenders responded to several Japanese probing raids early in 1942. Aviation assets at Midway included both Navy and Marine Corps combat aircraft. The Navy had four PBY squadrons (31 Patrol planes), and six Grumman TBF Avengers from VT-8. Marine Corps aircraft included Scout/Bomber squadron VMSB-231 (17 SB2U-3 Vindicators), and the remainder of VMF-221 (arriving at Midway from USS Saratoga with 14 F2A-3 Brewster Buffaloes). Following the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Pacific Fleet quickly replaced lost aircrews with additional Navy and Marine Corps air squadrons.
In May 1942, FMFPac reinforced the 6th Defense Battalion with three additional 3-inch batteries, a 37-mm anti-aircraft battery, a 20-mm anti-aircraft battery, and two rifle companies from the 2nd Raider Battalion with five light tanks in direct support. FMFPac ordered all Marine aircraft at Midway consolidated under Marine Aircraft Group (MAG)-22. The MAG received 16 SMD-2 Dauntless Diver Bombers and seven Grumman Wildcat fighters.
As the Battle of Midway Island began on 4 June 1942, it became apparent that the defense of the atoll was of secondary importance to the air engagements at sea, but Midway was the bait that had drawn Yamamoto’s task forces within range of US carrier aircraft. The Marines ashore were, however, ready for any eventuality. PBYs from Midway first spotted Japanese naval units at 0900 on 3 June. Army B-17s launched that afternoon to bomb the Japanese fleet, but none of the bombs hit their targets. At 0545 on 4 June, Navy PBYs fixed an approaching air assault position consisting of over 100 Japanese torpedo, dive bombers, and escort fighters (numbers estimated). US aircraft were in the air within ten minutes to intercept them. Japanese Zeros easily destroyed Marine buffaloes, but not without losing several bombers and fighters of their own. The survivors arrived over Midway at around 0630. The Japanese attacked lasted thirty minutes. Marine anti-air defenses claimed ten kills and seemed anti-climactic, but Japan’s air assault was what the Navy fleet commander wanted. As these planes returned to their carriers, US aircraft followed them.
The Battle of Midway’s significance was that it signaled the end of the United States’ defensive war and the beginning of America’s offensive. In these early days of a long war, the Defense Battalions’ Marines had played their role and contributed to the war effort. With the arrival of additional Marines, most of whom had enlisted after the attack on Pearl Harbor, many found their way into the Defense Battalions. By the end of 1942, the Marine Corps had 14 defense battalions. Two years later, there were twenty such battalions.
Guadalcanal and beyond
The assault of Guadalcanal was the first American land offensive in the Pacific war. The 3rd Defense Battalion provided support to the 1st Marine Division’s landing. The landing force commander split the Battalion to support simultaneous operations at Guadalcanal and Tulagi. The Battalion’s machine-gun sections and 90-mm anti-aircraft guns went ashore in the first assault waves. Similarly, the 9th Defense Battalion supported the assault on the Munda Peninsula in July 1943. By this time, defense battalions employed 155-mm and 40-mm guns. On Vella Lavella, the 4th Defense Battalion’s 90-mm gun was the Japanese pilot’s worst nightmare. Both the 9th and 14th Defense Battalion went ashore with the landing forces at Guam in 1944. When Japanese aircraft were no longer capable of threatening Marine occupied terrain, senior officers decided that the battalions had served their purpose. HQMC disbanded most defense battalions after the war —but one (sort of) remains today. One Marine responsibility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is to defend the naval base. This mission is similar to that of the World War II-era defense battalion.
- Cole, E. K. Advanced Base Force Training. Philadelphia: 1915.
- Davis, H. C. Advanced Place Training. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1911.
- Jackson, R. H. History of the Advanced Base. Records of the General Board of the Navy, 1913.
- Jackson, R. H. The Naval Advanced Base. Records of the General Board of the Navy, 1915.
- McBride, W. M. Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.
- Millett, A. R. Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps. New York: The Free Press, 1991.
- Simmons, E. H. The United States Marines: A History. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1974.
 Incorporated as War Plan Red.
 Incorporated as War Plan Black.
 Incorporated as War Plan Orange.
 Eli Kelley Cole (1867-1929) graduated from the US Naval Academy in 1888, served as a naval officer for two years, and transferred to the US Marine Corps in 1890. In 1915, Cole, Williams, Earl H. Ellis, John H. Russell, and Robert H. Dunlap were the Marine Corps’ deepest thinkers. While commanding the 1st Provisional Brigade in Haiti, he received the Navy Cross Medal. He later commanded the US Army’s 41st Infantry Division during World War I, and served as the first Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. He passed away while still serving on active duty.
 The forebear of the 1st Marine Division.
 Designated 2nd Regiment, Advance Base Brigade on 18 February 1914 (today, 1st Marines).
 Designated 1st Regiment, Advance Base Brigade on 18 February 1914 (today, 2nd Marines).
 Fleet exercises were important rehearsals in the development of amphibious warfare and the establishment of advanced base defenses, including the art and science of loading/un-loading ships, transfer of equipment from ship to shore, employment of shore artillery, signal science, combat engineering, harbor construction/defense, and the employment of automatic weapons.
 See also, Wake Island (in three parts).
 Colonel Dessez’ also formed and trained the 1st Samoan Battalion (infantry) (territorial reserve).
 One of Putnam’s flight officers was Captain Frank C. Tharin, a graduate of the US Naval Academy (1934). While serving on Wake Island, Tharin distinguished himself through his courage and aeronautical skill against overwhelming Japanese air forces. He was a recipient of the Distinguished Flying Cross, Silver Star Medal, and two Air Medals. Tharin spend the war in a Japanese POW camp. I worked for LtGen Tharin in 1968 at a time when Tharin served as the Operations Deputy to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. General Tharin passed away in 1990.
 Wesley McCoy Platt survived the war as a POW. The United States subsequently awarded him the Silver Star Medal, Legion of Merit, and Purple Heart Medal. During the Korean War, Colonel Platt died of wounds while serving on the staff of Major General Oliver P. Smith, USMC, who commanded the 1st Marine Division at the Chosin Reservoir.
 Warfare is by its nature complex; overly complicated war plans simply increase the likelihood of failure at critical moments of the battle.
 First Lieutenant George H. Cannon, a communications officer, received severe wounds from Japanese guns but he refused evacuation until the communications center was once more up and running. Cannon died shortly afterwards. He received the Medal of Honor posthumously, the first Marine to receive the nation’s highest medal during World War II.
 The round of the 90-mm gun weighed 23 pounds. It had a maximum range of 39,500 feet.
4 thoughts on “The Road to War”
Excellent article! Hoping you and Kathy are well. And Cynthia wanted to know where are you two now? My best to you, Saint Michael!
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Thank you, Michael. Our best to you both.
Kawanio che Keeteru!
Thanks for the reminder, FJ.
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