For well over seventy years, the United Nations Organization (UNO) has continuously involved itself in so-called peacekeeping/humanitarian operations — at best with mixed, but at worst with disastrous results. It is a complex conversation because, over those seventy years, the nature of armed conflict has changed dramatically, and the challenges peacekeepers face have evolved into highly complex if not impossible-to-accomplish missions. Warfare is always complicated, of course, but making matters worse is the utter incompetence of UNO officials and, in the case of the United States (in its past role in such operations), the unbelievable ineptitude of executives and members of both parties of the United States Congress.
In 2019, 14 separate UNO peacekeeping missions involved well over 100,000 soldiers, police, and senior UNO civilians. The cost of these operations in 2019 exceeded $7 billion. The United States paid out $2 billion as its “fair share” of keeping the peace.
To understand the “complexity” of UNO peacekeeping operations, it is first necessary to divide them into categories. The oldest of these are operations that attempt to resolve border disputes. A second category involves multi-dimensional operations, such as might include civil war. A third type, the most difficult, involves protection and stabilization missions — which are further complicated by cultural factors. I am writing now about the cultural influences of the people to whom the aid is directed and the UNO culture responsible for overseeing such missions (particularly when UNO surrogates incorporate globalist/socialist thinking into mission structure, which obfuscates matters even further).
Of the third type, in addition to the complexities mentioned, we must add peacekeeping operations in the face of violent extremism. Generally, UNO effectiveness is only possible when opposing interests invite the participation of the UNO, when the UNO remains strictly neutral in facilitating the conflict, and when the use of force is limited to self-defense of peacekeeping units. Operational disaster is the result of the UNO’s failure to adhere to these principles. Two examples stand out: The Congo in 1960 and Somalia in 1991-95. The reality of the fiasco in Somalia was that the UNO (and its surrogate, the U.S. government) quite miserably failed to realize (or acknowledge) that there was no peace to keep. It was a doomed-to-fail effort before it began, made worse along the way with poorly conceived shifts in mission.
In the case of Somalia, the UNO became involved as a response to inhumane conditions of starvation and forced migration. In both instances, millions were affected … with forced migration causing tribal conflicts with fifteen separate rebel groups. Rushing to take advantage of the situation was the Saudi-funded Al Qaeda organization which sought to damage the credibility of the UNO, the U.S. government, and the U.S. Armed Forces.
Unfortunately, the global situation is not improving. Neither the UNO nor the United States has learned valuable lessons from their past mistakes. Despite the impropriety of U.S. involvement in Somalia, the Department of State continues to spend billions of the taxpayer’s money “ … in developmental assistance [in Somalia] to support economic, political, and social sectors to achieve greater stability, establish a formal economy, obtain access to basic services, and attain representation through legitimate, credible governance.” The wording comes from the writers of the popular television series Madam Secretary. “The United States works closely with other donor partners and international organizations to support social services and the development of an effective and representative security sector, including military, police, and justice organizations while supporting ongoing African Union peacekeeping efforts.”
Whenever the UNO wants to divorce itself from costly peace-keeping/humanitarian assistance operations, it mismanages such efforts so horribly that it becomes only a matter of time before a progressive American president steps in to relieve the UN of it’s responsibility. Somalia is an excellent example. The price paid by the American people to maintain this irrational facade is the bloodshed of American servicemen, a lifetime of woe by the parents, wives, and children of slain soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, and adding the costs of war to the backs of American taxpayers.
Geographically, Somalia sits on the Horn of Africa at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Bordering states include Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. The people who live in these border regions number around 9 million; 98% are Somali tribesmen. About 45% of Somalia’s population is under 15 years of age. Seventy percent of the Somali people are nomads who travel at will with their clans and livestock through Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya. This migratory pattern generates land disputes between Somalis and their neighbors.
Civil war and massive starvation in Somalia prompted UN and Organization of African Unity (OAU) interventions in 1991 because half of the nation’s 10 million people were starving to death. Between January and March 1992, at least three-quarters of a million Somalis died from starvation; another 3 million fled the country as refugees. Nothing about this situation was unusual in East Africa in 1991.
The area of present-day Somalia was one of the first places Islamic conquerors stopped at the beginning of their murderous campaigns in 700 A.D. From that point on, East Africans have suffered one war after another, beginning around 900 A.D. Nothing improved in the lives of native people after Italian and British imperialists began warring with one another over possession of the Horn of Africa. Following World War II, the United Kingdom placed British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland under its protection.
In 1960, both trust territories united to form the Somali Republic, with Great Britain and Italy deciding the location of its borders. A formal government took shape under the auspices of the Somali National Assembly through a national referendum that excluded 70% of the Somali people. The fun began nine years later with a series of assassinations of government leaders and a military coup d’état. Between 1969-1991, the Somali government fell under the control of the so-called Supreme Revolutionary Council — under which Somalia became known as the Somali Democratic Republic. Culturally, the SDR was closely linked to the Arab world and joined the Arab League in 1974. Somali government leaders abandoned democracy in 1976 to establish a one-party scientific-socialist government based on Marxism and Islamism.
War broke out between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977. The issue of contention was the placement of Somalia’s western border. Initially, the Somalis gained an advantage over their enemy until the Soviet Union intervened with “advisors” and 20,000 Cuban mercenaries. The USSR’s involvement in East Africa prompted the Somali government to ask for American assistance. U.S. diplomats were over-joyed; they’d wanted a piece of East Africa since around 1960. Thanks to the American taxpayer (who hadn’t a clue about any of this), Somalia created the largest army on the African continent.
By the 1990s, mainly due to the end of the Cold War, East Africa no longer offered any strategic value to either the new Russian federation or the United States. Left to its own devices, Somalia began a steep spiral into authoritarianism. Through clever instigation, Ethiopia started rebel movements throughout Somalia, which led to civil war, food and fuel shortages, and a period of cripling inflation. Somali government leaders clamped down even more by establishing curfews and surveiling and harassing foreigners.
Libya assisted in overthrowing the Somali government and installing a loose confederation of tribalists to replace it. An international group consisting of Egyptians, Arabians, and Italians subsequently determined that Ali Mahdi Mohamed should serve as the President of Somalia. Unfortunately, Mohamed was only capable of controlling the capital city; tribal groups divided up the rest of the country.
Enter the United Nations
The time was right for the United Nations to stick its nose under the Somali tent. The United Nations Organization Somali Command (UNOSOM) attempted to arrange several “cease-fire” agreements — emphasis on attempted. A fifty-man detachment of UN Peacekeepers tried to stabilize the country enough to conduct humanitarian relief operations. Such a small detachment had no chance of success, so the UN increased its military footprint to around 500 troops.
However, rebel factions in Somalia ignored all previously agreed-to cease-fire agreements, and the fighting continued. According to its own guidelines, the UNO should have withdrawn all military and civilian aid workers from Somalia.
In August 1992, the UN Security Council discussed sending an additional 3,000 troops to Somalia. Discussing the proposition was as far as the proposal ever got. Conditions in Somalia worsened as tribal factions splintered into even smaller groups and then splintered again. As the fighting became nastier its effects grew worse. For example, rebel factions used UN forces for target practice, attacked ships laden with food stores, and cargo aircraft became targets of opportunity. If aid workers knew what was good for them, they hired bodyguards.
By November 1992, General Mohamed Farrah Aideed tired of the fun and games and ordered all UN forces (the so-called Unified Task Force (UNITAF) out of Somalia. There is probably a no better example of UN failure than this — and it was at this point that President George H. W. Bush demonstrated his brilliance as a national leader for the second time (appointing April Glaspie as Ambassador to Iraq was his first). Bush volunteered the U.S. military to lead a “multinational” force to secure humanitarian operations in Somalia.
The UN General Secretary became so giddy that he authorized the American-led force (designated Operation Restore Hope) to use all necessary means to ensure the protection of UNITAF relief efforts. Eventually, UNITAF involved personnel from 24 countries (but mainly from the United States). The plan was simple enough: the U.S. military protected civilian aid workers while UNOSOM continued its efforts to negotiate an end to the fighting and distribute food stores.
Land the Marines
Training and readiness have been the hallmark of the United States Marine Corps since the Revolutionary War. In the Marines, training and operational planning are continuous and concurrent. President Bush made his televised announcement on 4 December 1992; planning for Somali operations began on the morning of 5 December.
U.S. planners at the U.S. Central Command envisioned four operational phases. First, deploy troops to secure harbors and airfields. Second, establish and expand security zones throughout southern Somalia. Third, expand the security zone and secure land routes for humanitarian missions. Fourth, return Somali operations to the UN (presumably so that the UN could undo all of the U.S. military’s accomplishments).
Mission planners also struggled with their assessment of the enemy. As previously mentioned, the Somali “enemy” were splintered tribalists. The answers to such questions as “how well is he armed,” and “under what conditions can he best employ his power” were largely unknown because Marines could face a different enemy every day. But in addition to “enemy” capabilities, there was also the issue of rampant lawlessness. Under the best of circumstances, U.S. operations in Somalia were volatile in the extreme.
After extensive “special operations” training, Headquarters I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) designated the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines (2/9) as the lead battalion within the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (15thMEU), earmarked for humanitarian assistance operations in Somalia. These Marines would spearhead the mission ashore as part of the UN mandate. Fox Company “raiders” went in first to secure the seaport, the Recon detachment, followed by Golf Company, secured the Mogadishu airport.
15th MEU became an integral part of Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) Tripoli, including USS Tripoli, USS Juneau, and USS Rushmore. ARG Tripoli was on station off the coast of Somalia on 3 December. The initial landing commenced at 0540 with Marines and Navy Seals going ashore at Mogadishu, where the dolts from CNN had set up television cameras and bright lights to offer advantages to the enemy, should they care to resist the landing. With that one significant glitch in violation of operational security, the landing proceeded quickly and smoothly.
2/9 Marines proceeded to the U.S. Embassy compound, where they secured the chancery. Colonel Greg Newbold set up his command post (CP) at the airfield. Also, on that first day, the first coalition partner arrived and joined the Marine security plan: a company from the 2nd French Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment, which came by aircraft from Djibouti.
The Marine’s “overwhelming show of force” allowed them to seize, hold, and expand their control. They discovered in Mogadishu a modern-looking city reflecting the effects of two years of warfare: anarchy, terror, no electricity, running water, or sanitation. There were no police officers. Public buildings had been damaged, looted, and stood vacant. With closed schools, gangs of youths roamed the streets looking for things to pillage. Crowded refugee camps filled every parcel of open land. The only visible civic activities were those involving the burial of human remains.
Toward the end of the first day, a vehicle containing nine Somalis ran a roadside checkpoint manned by French Legionnaires. They opened fire at the fleeing automobile — killing two and wounding seven others. Afterward, Somali snipers added UN Peacekeepers to their list of potential targets. They weren’t hitting anyone, but the shooting was bothersome and worrisome.
On 10 December, Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, assumed command of Marine Forces (MARFOR), Somalia. MARFOR provided the basic structure around which the Unified Task Force evolved. Behind the Marines, the most prominent American force was the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division, eventually forming the centerpiece for Army Forces, Somalia (ARFOR). General Wilhelm’s command authority included the 15thMEU and French forces. Wilhelm focused his attention on securing ports of arrival and departure and the Embassy compound. When 1st Battalion, 7th Marines arrived, Wilhelm expanded his control over areas outside Mogadishu — notably into Bale Dogle. Wilhelm assigned that mission to BLT 2/9 (supported by HMM 164), which they accomplished within 48 hours.
The first U.S. Army unit into Somalia was Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry (deployed with 2/87), which flew into the Bale Dogle airfield. Upon arrival, Alpha Company relieved the Marines and assumed control of the airfield.
The first direct attacks on UNITAF members occurred in two separate incidents on 12 December. Three aircraft of HMM 164 received fire from unknown persons with damage to their rotors. Marines returned fire with 20mm guns and missiles, destroying two “technicals” and damaging one US-made armored personnel carrier.
On 6 January 1993, unknown persons fired on a convoy moving through Mogadishu from two authorized weapons storage facilities belonging to General Aideed’s faction. The unified commander, Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston USMC, decided to take decisive action, or the danger to coalition forces would only increase. He tasked General Wilhelm to develop a plan of action. He wanted it simple and dramatic.
During the night of 6-7 January, Kilo Company 3/9 and Charlie Company 1/7 surrounded the two weapons sites. LAVs from the 3rd LAI Battalion screened the area. Snipers took positions in the high ground surrounding Aideed’s turf. A two-company reserve force formed at the Embassy compound. PsyOps personnel from the U.S. Army’s 9th Psychological Operations Battalion augmented each rifle company. At 0553 on 7 January, PsyOps broadcasters began to issue warnings to the Somalis that they were surrounded, instructing them that they would not be harmed if they surrendered.
At that moment, helicopters assumed a hovering position around the ammunition sites. Somalis in storage site No. 8 surrendered. The men in site No. 2 decided to go out in a blaze of glory. Helicopter crew chiefs reported that one tank inside the compound was turning over, and two Somalis had operated a heavy anti-aircraft machine gun. Guns were cleared for snipers to take out the two machine gunners. Within mere seconds, two machine gunners discovered the path to Allah, and then for good measure, the sniper rendered their machine gun inoperable.
The engagement that followed was loud, sharp, and somewhat short. Initially, the Somalis opened up with a heavy volume of machine guns, recoilless rifles, and small arms. At 0615, helicopters were cleared to engage targets inside the compound. They fired for 30 minutes. At 0647, U.S. tanks entered the compound, followed by Kilo Company Marines, who systematically cleared storage site No. 2. Helicopters continued to receive periodic sniper fire.
General Wilhelm ordered Marines to confiscate all firearms. It turned into a long day as Marines inventoried 4 M47 Tanks, nine howitzers, 13 APCs, three anti-aircraft guns, 11 mortars, and one recoilless rifle. In addition to losing several tons of weapons and munitions, General Aideed lost his self-esteem.
Despite this demonstration, coalition forces continued to receive sniper fire from “who knows where.” Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni opined that sniping was simply the Somali way of testing the resolve of U.S. personnel — emphasis on “opinion.”
Continued next week
- Allard, K. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. National Defense University Press, 1995.
- Bowden, M. Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern Warfare. Atlantic Monthly Press,1999.
- Mroczkowski, D. P. Restoring Hope: In Somalia with the Unified Task Force, 1992-1993. HQMC History Division, 2005.
- Sangvic, R. N. The Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of Failure. Army Command and General Staff School, 1998.
- Wright, L. The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. Knopf Publishing, 2006
 This wasn’t the first time the U.S. government spent its treasure propping up a Communist-Islamic dictatorship.
 One of UNOSOMs grand ideas was to pay out over $130 million to purchase guns from Somali rebels. It was a great deal for the Somalis, who never seemed to run out of guns to sell.
 When CENTCOM planners asked the UN to identify “implied tasks” that would help planners assess mission fulfilment, no one in the UN had a clue. In other words, no one in the UN had any idea how to measure operational successes.
 Commanding Officer, Colonel Gregory S. Newbold.
 Actually, some forces were already in place before the Marines arrived. Teams from special operations command provided some security at several airfields, providing security for air combat control teams. Charlie Company, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) provided sniper support to the U.S. Special Envoy while in Mogadishu.
 “Technical” (also, Non-Standard Tactical Vehicle) (NSTV) is the term used to describe ordinary and four-wheel-drive pickup trucks converted to carry heavy weapons. The term “technical” originated in Somalia.
 Anthony Zinni was one of those “political generals” who ingratiated himself with Democratic Party elites. He retired from active service in 2000. In 2004, Diana B. Henriques of the New York Times identified Zinni as one of a cabal of “retired military people” recruited to deceive active duty military personnel and veterans into investing in the corporations they were paid to represent. Specifically, First Commercial Financial Planning, Inc., tried to deflect the charge, but a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation confirmed the allegation that First Commercial Financial Planning used “retired flag rank officers” to perpetrate fraud against military veterans.