The entry to the Playboy Club was not what you might suspect. No sophisticated foyer with muted music and a warm greeting by a Bunny that an aerospace engineer would reject due to her high drag profile. Our entry had curious names, like the Bicycle Seat, the Heart, the Parrot’s Beak, or the Light Bulb. Through those doorways, we entered the Ho Chi Minh Trail area in Laos, adjacent to the North-South Vietnamese demilitarized zone.
The names referred to geographical landmarks easily made out from the air, shaped like the title they carried. We flew the TA-4 aircraft; our mission was high speed, low-level visual reconnaissance. In short, we were after intelligence concerning troop movements, truck parks, supply areas, guns—anything to help take the guesswork out of the command estimate of enemy capabilities.
We weren’t always called Playboys. In 1966, we used the call sign Condole and did mostly support work: calling in close air support, adjusting artillery, and coordinating naval gunfire. Some referred to us as “Fast FAC,” or fast moving forward air controllers. We used a trusty old two-seater called the TF-9J Cougar, which proved slow and ill designed for mission requirements. The most frequent gripe was the radio: we had to wire an infantry backpack PRC-25 radio to the glare shield in the back seat, remove the flight helmet, and talk over a hand-held mike.
In 1969, the tandem seat TA-4 Skyhawk replaced the Cougar, and with it came the call sign “Playboy.”
We were a rag tag outfit, much like Pappy Boyington’s Black Sheep in World War II. We became an integral part of the Marine Air Group’s Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron (H&MS), which performed the important job of intermediate maintenance for the fighter and attack squadrons within the Group. In that respect, it was NOT rag tag. When it came to flying, the aircrews came from everywhere. Usually they were shuffling paper in a staff section somewhere within the Air Wing. The nucleus was, of course, a handful of pilots assigned to H&MS.
The men who joined the Da Nang Playboy Club were volunteers, and carefully screened by the skipper. The crews were selected based on reputation, experience (one previous combat tour), and demonstrated professionalism. Initially composed of only pilots, four Naval Flight Officers (NFOs) were accepted during 1970. Three of the four were FAA rated pilots, and two of the three were eventually able to use their flying skills during the course of the program. Toward the end of the mission, the process of selecting pilots and aircrew was highly discriminating.
Our working area on the trail covered about 2,700 square miles, and we flew between one hundred and 1,500 feet above ground level as fast as that little bucket of bolts would go. It took quite a few flights before pilots and aircrew developed their 400-knot eyeball, but we did engage our targets, and we did collect valuable intelligence. The key to our mission effectiveness was “trail experience.” Aircrew eventually developed the capability of determining whether a group of bushes had moved from one day to the next, or if a clump of vegetation hadn’t been there the day before. Moving bushes usually received a bomb, or two.
And, we learned to respect the enemy. Under constant surveillance and attack, he moved people, supplies, and constructed vast road networks with only basic equipment. And he did this in a systematic and successful way against the most highly industrialized and technologically sophisticated nation in the world. From that experience came the frustrating question, “How can they do that when we’re working so hard to oppose them?” The answer is both simple and complex; it forms the basis of our question of involvement in the first place.
We considered ourselves an unusual group, yet looking back we were only a cross section from any town in the United States. We had a Baptist preacher, and a hard-drinking, cigar chewing poker player. Some of these men became legends in their own time, now forgotten except among their comrades.
In the 19 months of the Playboy operations, we lost only one aircraft. Rick Lewis won the Silver Star by helping his back-seater during a rescue effort, and calling in air strikes against enemy gun emplacements. Don Schwaby, in another incident, had just entered the operations area when a small arms round hit the nose of his aircraft, went through the instrument panel, and continued into his oxygen mask. The slug came to rest between his lips, against his teeth, and never even broke the skin. Not many guys catch bullets that way.
The only death that resulted from the program was a shock to the squadron. After operating for so long in such a high-threat environment, we all had taken several hits. But we all came back. After all, Rick Lewis was a walking example. Lieutenant Colonel George Ward, groomed to take command of the squadron in only a few weeks, was shot through the head while on a mission. The back-seater flew the plane back to the base. A squadron commander shapes the personality of his unit; we all felt his loss. Reacting to his loss, higher authority imposed an altitude restriction on the squadron —no lower than five grand. But that was too high to do the job, so back down into the grass we flew. Later, as I watched the evacuation of Saigon on television, I thought about George Ward.
The Playboy Program ended during September 1970. I returned to the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing at Cherry Point, North Carolina in December of that year. For a long time, I felt that I had been involved in the most exciting, professionally demanding, and personally challenging era of my life. And I was content in the knowledge that, as Patton suggested, if my son asked me what I did in Viet Nam, I would NOT have to tell him, I shoveled shit in Louisiana.
In the years that have passed, several Playboys have tried to hold a reunion. It has never been successful. In the past, our duty assignments spread us so far apart, and since then we have all retired from active service. I’m quite certain our after-action reports gather dust in an obscure file drawer somewhere… As a group, we paid some very special dues to our country, to our Corps, and ourselves. Yet, if my son asks me what is or has been especially exciting to me as a Marine, I’ll have to answer, “The job I did today, and the one I get to do tomorrow.”
As summarized in McNamara’s Folly, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara threw a costly wrench into the contest for control of the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ). His inane plan not only escalated the material costs of fighting the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), but it also dramatically increased the number of Marines, soldiers, and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops who were killed and wounded while building it.
Not a single Marine commander favored the so-called McNamara Line in I CTZ. Shaking his head in disgust, one Marine officer said, “With these bastards, you’d have to build the [wall] all the way to India and it would take the entire Marine Corps and half the Army to guard it — and even then, they’d probably burrow under it.” Even the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in his testimony before Congress, rigorously opposed the McNamara Line.
The Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) assigned overall operational responsibility for I CTZ to the Third Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF). In land area, I CTZ involved roughly 18,000 square miles. III MAF included the 1st Marine Division (1stMarDiv), 3rd Marine Division (3rdMarDiv), 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1stMAW), 3rd Force Logistics Command (3rdFLC), Provisional Corps, Vietnam, 1st Cavalry Division, 101st Airborne Division, Americal Division, Sub Unit 1, First Radio Battalion, 29th Civil Affairs Company, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion, and several ARVN and Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) commands.
The McNamara Line placed US Forces in I CTZ in a dangerous position because in order to construct the barrier, III MAF had to divert Marines away from their combat assignments to build it. With the 1stMarDiv operating near Chu Lai, in Quang Nam Province (65 miles south of Da Nang), responsibility for northern I Corps (abutting the demilitarized zone (DMZ)) fell to the 3rdMarDiv. Despite the fact that the 3rdMarDiv was the largest Marine division ever formed in the history of the Marine Corps, it still didn’t have the men it needed to defend northern I Corps.
The task of building the McNamara Line fell upon Navy and Marine Corps combat engineers; Marine infantrymen provided much of the manual labor, and 3rdMarDiv regiments and separate battalions had to provide protection to those who labored in its construction. Beside the already complicated matter of building the line, COMUSMACV wanted to project completed “yesterday.”
NVA commanders watched the construction activities with keen interest, no doubt asking themselves how the NVA could use the McNamara disruption to their advantage. At the beginning of July 1967, the NVA had 35,000 troops assembled just north of the DMZ. Their intention was to swarm across the Marine outpost at Con Thien, overwhelm US forces operating in Leatherneck Square, and invade en mass all of Quang Tri Province.
Con Thien (The Hill of Angels) was important to the Marines because the location was situated high enough in elevation to provide an excellent observation post over one of the primary NVA routes into South Vietnam. Moreover, anyone standing atop the 160-meter hill at Con Thien looking southeast could observe the entire forward logistics base at Dong Ha.
The NVA (supported by heavy artillery and mortar fire) made two thrusts at Con Thien. The first (and largest) of these attacks specifically targeted the Marine position at Hill 160. Operation Buffalo commenced on 2 July. Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. “Spike” Schening deployed his 1st Battalion, 9th Marines (1/9) in and around Con Thien. Alpha Company and Bravo Company operated north-northeast of a strong point along Route 561, Delta Company and H&S Company occupied the battalion’s perimeter, and Charlie Company was detached to provide security for HQ 9th Marines at Dong Ha.
According to the 9th Marine’s commander, Colonel George E. Jerue, “The TAOR assigned to the 9th Marines was so large that the regiment did not have the option of conducting security patrols on a regular basis. The NVA, realizing these limitations, would withdraw from the area until after a patrol had completed its mission, and then re-infiltrate the area just cleared.” It was for this reason that Alpha and Bravo companies were sent to control Route 561.
On the morning of 2 July, Captain Sterling K. Coates led his Bravo Company into its heaviest engagement of the Vietnam War. Bravo Company and Captain Albert C. Slater’s Alpha Company moved abreast in a northward direction along Route 561. Both companies stepped off at 08:00. Alpha Company was on the right. Route 561 was a ten-foot-wide cart path bordered by waist-high hedgerows. Unknown to either Coates or Slater, two NVA infantry battalions were waiting for them behind well-prepared fighting positions. The next few hours would transform the Hill of Angels into a meat grinder.
Within an hour, 2nd Platoon (2ndPlt) Bravo Company achieved its first objective, a small crossroad some 1,200 meters north of the trace. Enemy snipers began taking 3rdPlt and the company command element under fire as soon as they reached the crossroad. As Captain Coates shifted the 3rdPlt to suppress the enemy fire, the NVA intensified its delivery. Coates halted the 3rdPlt’s advance and directed 2ndPlt to shift right in an attempt to outflank the enemy’s position. At the same time, Captain Coates ordered 1stPlt to move forward for rear area security and/or reinforcement if required. NVA fire halted 2ndPlt’s advance. Within a few moments, Bravo Company began receiving heavy small arms fire from the front and both flanks. With the Marines halted and assuming a defense, the NVA began to deliver artillery and mortar fire.
Alpha Company Marines tripped two booby traps, injuring several Marines. The company advance was halted while Captain Slater called for a medevac. Once the wounded Marines had been evacuated, Slater moved forward in an attempt to link up with Coates but was prevented from doing so by heavy enemy fire.
Bravo Company casualties were mounting by the second — its position rapidly deteriorating as the NVA successfully cut 3rdPlt and the command element from 2ndPlt. With the Marines under heavy fire, enemy soldiers armed with flame weapons ignited the hedgerows on both sides of the road. 2ndPlt launched an assault to help 3rdPlt, but enemy artillery and mortar fire increased. With a grass fire threatening to overwhelm them, Marines withdrew only to enter into a killing zone of NVA machine guns.
Enemy artillery killed Captain Coates, his radio operator, two platoon commanders, and the company artillery forward observer. The Forward Air Controller, Captain Warren O. Keneipp, assumed command of Bravo Company, but without a radio operator, Captain Keneipp lost contact with 2ndPlt and had no control over subsequent events (please see comment below). The company executive officer (XO) (2nd in command) was with 2ndPlt; his radio was the only source of comms with the battalion command post (CP), but cut off from the rest of the company, the XO was in no position to influence the action.
Staff Sergeant Leon R. Burns commanded 1stPlt. He led the platoon forward to reinforce 2ndPlt and 3rdPlt, but enemy assaults hindered his advance. Burns called in air strikes and specifically asked for napalm. The strike delivered the much-needed munitions within twenty meters of the 1stPlt’s position. After the airstrike, the enemy assault faltered, which allowed Burns to move forward and incorporate what remained of the 2ndPlt. After placing his Marines into a hasty defense, the company’s Navy Corpsmen began treating their wounded Marines.
Upon learning that Alpha and Bravo companies had run into a hornet’s nest, and the Bravo Company commander had been killed, Colonel Schening dispatched Captain Henry J. Radcliffe (the Battalion Operations Officer) to take command of Bravo Company. Radcliffe led forward an additional rifle platoon from Delta Company and four tanks. First Lieutenant Gatlin J. Howell (the Battalion Intelligence Officer) accompanied Radcliffe because his familiarity with the terrain surrounding Con Thien.
Radcliffe’s arrival at the point of contact was timely because his relief platoon foiled an NVA attempt to encircle Bravo Company. As the tanks and helicopter gunships dispersed the NVA, Delta Company moved forward with its two remaining rifle platoons. Radcliffe directed the Delta Company commander to secure a landing zone. Within minutes, Charlie Company began to arrive by helicopter from Dong Ha.
With additional support from Charlie and Delta companies, Radcliffe continued his assault. When Captain Radcliffe made contact with Staff Sergeant Burns, he asked, “Where is the rest of Bravo Company?” Burns answered, “Sir, you’re looking at all that’s left of Bravo Company.”
With Burns supervising the evacuation of wounded and dead Marines, Radcliffe continued forward to Bravo Company’s furthest advance. At that point, Radcliffe established defensive positions and began attending to the 3rdPlt’s dead and wounded. Lieutenant Howell, who had previously commanded 3rdPlt, quickly searched for Marines and helped move them back to the corpsman for triage. At that moment, the enemy re-initiated artillery fire and the company’s withdrawal was made more difficult when two of the supporting tanks triggered landmines.
Radcliffe shepherded the casualties into the landing zone for medevac. While waiting for the airlift, NVA dropped mortars into the LZ, inflicting even more casualties on the medical corpsmen and litter bearers. By this time, the fog of war had completely descended upon 1/9’s forward elements. With officers and senior NCOs killed and wounded, corporals took charge. The NVA’s artillery assault on the landing zone precluded additional helicopter support, so ambulatory Marines began carrying their wounded brothers back to Con Thien.
Throughout the battle, Marine and naval gunfire engaged the enemy in a furious duel. During that day, Schening’s CP received over 700 enemy artillery rounds. Marine aircraft flew 28 sorties, dropping 90 tons of munitions on the well-fortified enemy positions.
Meanwhile, Captain Slater’s Alpha Company remained heavily engaged. The number of Marine casualties brought the company to a standstill, prompting Slater to order his 3rdPlt to establish a hasty landing zone defense in the company rear area. After the first flight of evac helicopters departed the zone, NVA hit the 3rdPlt with mortar fire and a ground assault. Slater moved his 2ndPlt and command group to reinforce the 3rdPlt. The NVA moved to within 50 meters of the company line before Marine fire broke the attack, but owing to the number of their casualties, Alpha Company was relegated to a defensive position until the NVA force withdrew later that evening.
As Colonel Schening moved his CP forward, he sent his XO, Major Darrell C. Danielson, ahead with additional reinforcements and transport to help evacuate the casualties. When Danielson contacted the fifty remaining Marines, he organized a medical evaluation and called for medevacs. Several Marines were bleeding out, everyone appeared to be in a state of shock. Despite on-going enemy artillery and mortar fire, Danielson managed to extricate Alpha and Bravo companies back to Con Thien.
Colonel Schening reported his situation to the Colonel Jerue, the regimental commander: situation critical. Jerue ordered Major Willard J. Woodring, commanding 3/9, to reinforce Schening. Upon arrival, Schening directed Woodring to assume operational control of Alpha and Charlie companies (1/9). Major Woodring directed a five-company assault on the enemy flanks while what remained of Bravo and the LZ security platoon from Delta company withdrew into Con Thien. Woodring’s aggressive assault caused the NVA units to withdraw. Later in the day, Staff Sergeant Burns reported only 27 combat effectives remained in Bravo Company. In total, 1/9 had lost 84 killed in action, 190 wounded, and 9 missing. Of enemy casualties, no precise number exists.
Enemy contact continued for the next three days. At 09:00 on 3 July, an Air Force aerial observer reported several hundred NVA soldiers advancing on Marine positions north of Con Thien. Echo Battery 3/12 dropped a massive number of rounds on the NVA position killing an estimated 75 communists. To the east, Major Woodring called in artillery strikes for twelve hours in preparation for an assault scheduled for 4 July.
Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Wickwire’s BLT 1/3 (Special Landing Force Alpha) reinforced the 9th Marines and tied in with Woodring’s right flank. Colonel George E. Jerue, commanding the 9th Marines, planned his assault to push the NVA out of the Long Son area, some 4,000 meters north of Con Thien. Woodring began his assault at around 0630, encountering heavy resistance from well-concealed enemy positions southwest of Bravo Company’s engagement on 2 July. A prolonged battle involving tanks, artillery, and close air support ensued for most of the day. At 18:30, when Woodring halted his advance, 3/9 had lost 15 dead and 33 wounded. Wickwire’s 1/3 had lost 11 wounded in the same action.
BLT 2/3 (SLF Bravo) under Major Wendell O. Beard’s BLT 2/3 effected an air assault at Cam Lo, joining Operation Buffalo at mid-afternoon on 4 July. This battalion moved west and then northward toward the western edge of the battle area toward Con Thien.
At daylight on 5 July, NVA artillery began firing on Marine units located northeast of Con Thien but kept its ground units away from the Marines as they advanced. Meanwhile, search and recovery teams had begun the grim task of retrieving Bravo Company’s dead.
On 6 July, all battalions continued moving north. Beard’s 2/3 ran into an enemy force supported by mortars less than two miles south of Con Thien. Within an hour, 2/3 killed 35 NVA, while suffering 5 killed and 25 wounded. Major Woodring and Colonel Wickwire advanced their battalions under intermittent artillery fire. At around 09:00, Woodring decided to send a reinforced rifle company 1,500 meters to the north-northwest to cover his left flank. Captain Slater’s Alpha Company, which now included the survivors of Charlie Company and a detachment from 3rd Recon Battalion, moved into position without enemy resistance and established a strong combat outpost.
Slater’s movement went unnoticed, but that wasn’t the case with the main elements of Woodring’s and Wickwire’s battalions. Both units encountered heavy artillery fire. By 16:00, neither of the battalions could go any further. Wickwire had lost a tank but due to concentrated enemy artillery fire, was forced to pull back without recovering it. Captain Burrell H. Landes, commanding Bravo Company 1/3, received a report from an aerial observer that 400 or more NVA were heading directly to confront Woodring and Wickwire. A short time later, accurate NVA artillery fire began blasting the Marines. As Woodring and Wickwire prepared to meet the approaching NVA under the enemy’s artillery assault, Captain Slater’s recon patrol reported that the approaching NVA was heading directly into Alpha Company’s position.
The NVA force was unaware of Slater’s blocking position until they were within 500 feet, at which time Slater’s Marines engaged the NVA. Since the NVA didn’t know where the Marine’s fire was coming from, they scattered in every direction, some of them running directly into the Marine line. Once the enemy had figured out where Slater’s Marines were positioned, they organized an assault. The Marine lines held, however. At one point, NVA troops began lobbing grenades into the Marine position. Lance Corporal James L. Stuckey began picking the grenades up and tossing them back. Stucky lost his right hand on the third toss when the grenade exploded as it left his hand. Stuckey remained with his fireteam throughout the night without any medical assistance.
While the Alpha Company fight was underway, elements of the 90th NVA Regiments attacked Woodring’s and Wickwire’s Marine with blocks of TNT. Marines called in air support, artillery, and naval gunfire. By 21:30, the Marines had repelled the enemy assault and caused the NVA regiment to withdraw. At around 22:00, Woodring radioed Slater to return to the battalion perimeter at first light.
Alpha Company mustered before daylight on 7 July. As the sun began to light the sky, Slater’s Marines discovered 154 dead NVA just beyond the Marine perimeter. About an hour later, after Slater had returned to Woodring’s lines, the NVA unleashed a terrible barrage on Slater’s old position. In front of Woodring and Wickwire’s battalion lay an additional 800 dead communists. Later that morning, however, an NVA artillery shell found its way to 1/9’s command bunker, killing eleven Marines, including First Lieutenant Gatlin J. Howell, who had gone to the aid of Bravo Company on 2 July. Lieutenant Colonel Schening was wounded in the same incident.
Operation Buffalo ended on 14 July. Marines reported enemy losses at 1,290 dead, two captured. Total Marine losses were 159 killed, 345 wounded. The NVA attack at Con Thien was relatively short in duration but particularly vicious and the communists paid a heavy price. Since the enemy dead were so horribly chewed up from air, artillery, and naval gunfire, the Marines were forced into counting the NVA solder’s water canteens for a sense of enemy dead.
Telfer, G. L. and Lane Rogers. U. S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967. Washington: Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, 1984.
Bowman, J. S. The Vietnam War: Day by Day. New York: Mallard Books, 1989.
Nolan, K. W. Operation Buffalo: USMC Fight for the DMZ. Dell Publishing, 1992.
 In this context, Robert McNamara was a war criminal.
 Located south of the DMZ, Leatherneck Square was a TAOR extending six miles (east-west) by nine miles (north-south); it’s corners were measured from Con Thien (northwest) to Firebase Gio Linh (northeast), and from Dong Ha to Cam Lo on its southern axis (an area of more than 54 square miles). Between March 1967 to February 1969, 1,500 Marines and Navy Corpsmen were killed in this area, with an additional 9,265 wounded in action.
 Awarded Silver Star Medal for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action between 2 July – 9 July 1967. Colonel Woodring passed away in 2003.
 After 14 July, estimates of enemy KIA ranged from 525 to 1,200.
 Colonel Wickwire was awarded the Silver Star Medal for conspicuous gallantry for service on 6 July 1967.
 Retired Lieutenant Colonel Wendell Otis “Moose” Beard, a former NFL football player with the Washington Redskins, served in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam Wars. He was the recipient of the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal. He passed away in 1980.
 First Lieutenant Howell was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross for his actions on 2 July 1967.
 Colonel Schening was also wounded at Cape Gloucester, Peleliu, and during the Korean War. This was his fourth Purple Heart Medal. He was awarded the Silver Star Medal for service during the Korean War while serving as XO, Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. Colonel Schening passed away in 1996.
Late in October 1914, two Ottoman warships (operating under the command of German officers) conducted a raid in the Black Sea. They bombarded the Ukrainian port of Odessa and sank several ships. Two days later, the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War on the side of Germany against Russia. Before the end of the year, the central powers had badly mauled British and French forces on the Western Front and effectively cut off overland trade routes by blockading the entrance to the Black Sea through the Dardanelles and cutting Russia off from resupply.
Although the idea to attack the Ottoman Empire originally came from French Minister Aristide Briand, the United Kingdom defeated the motion because the British hoped to convince the Turks to join the Allied effort. Later, however, First Sea Lord Winston Churchill (who was then 41-years old) proposed a naval campaign to attack the Ottoman Empire at Gallipoli, a peninsula located in the southern portion of East Thrace, east of the Aegean Sea and west of the Dardanelles. Churchill’s plan intended to threaten Constantinople, protect the Suez Canal, and open up a warm-water supply route through the Black Sea.
All good plans fall apart sooner or later. In this case, the First Sea Lord didn’t know much about military operations beyond the small unit level and virtually nothing about naval warfare. Consequently, the intelligence used to formulate the Gallipoli campaign was flawed. After eight months of fighting, each side lost a quarter of a million men. It was a resounding defeat for the Entente Powers, Turkey gained international prestige, and Churchill nearly lost his political career. However, the operation did help propel the Turks toward their war of independence eight years later and prompted Australia and New Zealand to reconsider their relationship with the British Empire.
Following the First World War, the Gallipoli campaign led many military theorists to conclude that amphibious warfare was folly. These experts decided that given the weapons of modern warfare, there was no way that a seaborne organization could force its way ashore and defeat a well-entrenched enemy. It was not a belief shared by intellectuals in the United States Navy and Marine Corps, who began a protracted study of amphibious warfare capability in the 1920s. They became convinced that successful amphibious operations were possible and set about discovering how to do it.
Between 1921 and 1939, Navy-Marine Corps war planners created the capabilities necessary for success in both the European and Pacific theaters of World War II. Through innovative thinking, trial, and error, the work accomplished by Navy and Marine Corps officers allowed the allied powers to project military power across vast oceans, wrest the continent of Europe away from the Axis powers, and seize Pacific bases on the long road to Japan. Not only did the Navy-Marine Corps develop Amphibious Warfare Doctrine, but they also taught it to the armies of the United States and Great Britain for use in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the invasion of the Atlantic.
Since then, the Navy and Marine Corps have continually evaluated and improved US amphibious doctrine. Today, naval operations include pre-positioned logistics ships, carrier-borne close air support of amphibious forces, and vertical lift assault capabilities. These competencies are what makes the Navy-Marine Corps team relevant to America’s national defense — even despite the ridiculous assertion of General of the Army Omar Bradley, who while serving as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1949 said, “I predict that large scale amphibious operations will never occur again.” He could not have been more wrong. General Bradley was apparently unaware of the observation by Karl von Clausewitz in 1832: “A swift and vigorous transition to attack — the flashing sword of vengeance — is the most brilliant point of the defense.” Modern naval warfare capability is America’s flashing sword. The only question is whether political leaders have the will to employ it in the nation’s defense.
The Navy and Marine Corps meet the challenges of a wide range of contingencies through task force organization. All naval task forces are mission-centered, which is to say that both the Navy and Marine Corps organize their combat units for one or more specific missions. All Marine Corps combat units are capable of becoming part of an air-ground task force, referred to as MAGTF, which consists of a ground combat element (GCE), air combat element (ACE), and a combat logistics element (CLE).
MAGTFs are organized under a single commander and structured to accomplish one or more specific missions. According to official Marine Corps doctrine, “A Marine air-ground task force with separate air-ground headquarters is normally formed for combat operations and training exercises in which substantial combat forces of both Marine aviation and Marine ground units are part of the task organization of participating Marine forces.”
The basic organization of a MAGTF is the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) — generally organized as follows:
The MEU command element (CE) includes a colonel (commanding officer) supported by a regular staff: S-1 (Manpower), S-2 (Intelligence), S-3 (Operations/Training), S-4 (Logistics), S-6 (Communications), naval gunfire liaison, and other special staff personnel. The MEU CE includes about 200 Marines and sailors.
The GCE is a reinforced infantry battalion called a battalion landing team (BLT), commanded by a lieutenant colonel. A BLT is a reinforced battalion consisting of three rifle companies, a weapons company, and a headquarters and service company. Depending on the MEU’s mission, reinforcements may include an artillery battery, armored vehicle platoons, reconnaissance platoons, attached U. S. Navy field corpsmen, and a detachment of combat engineers. All members of the BLT are trained to conduct seaborne operations in several landing craft variants and tiltrotor vertical assault operations. A BLT will contain between 950-1,200 Marines.
The ACE is usually a composite air squadron (reinforced) commanded by a lieutenant colonel. The ACE includes a medium tiltrotor squadron augmented by detachments of heavy, light, and attack helicopters, one detachment of amphibious flight deck capable jet aircraft, and a Marine air control group detachment with tactical air, traffic control, direct air support, and anti-aircraft defense assets. The ACE also includes headquarters, communications, and logistical support personnel. The number of personnel in a typical MEU ACE is around 600 troops.
The CLE is Combat Logistics Battalion. A major or lieutenant colonel commands the CLB, responsible for providing service support, intermediate maintenance, intermediate supply, transportation, explosive ordnance technology, utilities, and bulk fuel. The CLB consists of approximately 400-500 Marines.
The size of a MAGTF may expand if its mission increases in scope. A more extensive operation may demand a larger MAGTF organization, such as a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). The MEB consists of a regimental combat team (RCT), a composite Marine Aircraft Group, and a Combat Logistics Regiment. The officer commanding an MEB is usually a brigadier general. The MEB can function as part of a joint task force, as the lead element of a Marine Expeditionary Force, or alone.
Any mission that exceeds the capability of a brigade will involve a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). A MEF commander is usually a lieutenant general who exercises operational authority over a reinforced Marine infantry division, reinforced Marine aircraft wing, and a Combat Logistics Group.
Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force
The Navy’s Amphibious Ready Group consists of an amphibious task force (ATF) and an amphibious landing force called Special Landing Force (SLF). The ARG/SLF was first established in 1960. The SLF deployed to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) as part of the first deployment of American ground forces. The 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines (BLT 2/9) served as the SLF to support the Marine expeditionary landing at Da Nang in March 1965. In mid-April, III MAF temporarily dissolved the SLF because its amphibious assets were required to support the 3rd Marine Amphibious Brigade (3rdMAB) landing at Chu Lai.
Subsequently, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) and the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (CG FMFPac) outlined the advantages of maintaining an amphibious capability in support of the Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) — a dedicated force for conducting amphibious raids, assaults, and floating reserve.
President Lyndon Johnson’s formal commitment of US military forces to RVN in March 1965 presented General William C. Westmoreland (COMUSMACV) with a dilemma. As a military assistance/advisory commander, Westmoreland lacked sufficient ground combat forces to meet threats imposed by North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) forces operating in the central highlands. Without adequate ground troops, General Westmoreland had no way of defending US military installations, particularly those in the area of Qui Nhon, where the threat of VC hostilities was most imminent. US Army units and allied forces from South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand would not arrive in RVN until June. Westmoreland didn’t like it, but he had no choice but to turn to the Marines for security. Accordingly, the National Military Command Center (NMCC) directed the Commanding General, Third Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), to provide air/ground security operations until the arrival of the Army’s ground combat forces.
III MEF headquarters was located in Okinawa. Its ground combat subordinate was the 3rd Marine Division (3rdMarDiv), also located in Okinawa. 3rdMarDiv routinely provided two BLTs to the Commander, US Seventh Fleet (COMSEVENTHFLT), to satisfy the landing force requirement for two special landing forces (designated SLF(A) and SLF(B)). Tasked to provide Marines to support COMUSMACV, III MAF requested the support of COMSEVENTHFLT), who promptly made the ARG/SLF available to Westmoreland.
Action in the Central Highlands
Qui Nhon was a densely populated agricultural region located along the coastal plain southwest of Da Nang. Population density and agricultural production were the magnets that attracted VC and NVA forces in the area. Within three days of the NMCC’s tasking, the Special Landing Force conducted combat operations in the central highlands.
Operations in and around Qui Nhơn could not have been better timed. The Marine’s surprise assault threw the VC force structure into confusion and delayed their hostilities along the coastal plain, but the landing also helped facilitate the gathering of local intelligence and allowed the Marines to test hypotheses for the pacification of local civilians. The actual operation was uneventful, but it did demonstrate the flexibility and responsiveness of the ARG and the SLF to achieve limited objectives within a more extensive operation.
In mid-August 1965, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) intelligence officers communicated their belief that the 1st VC Regiment was preparing to attack the Marines at Chu Lai in Quảng Tri Province. The basis for this assessment was an early July VC assault that overran ARVN units stationed at Ba Gia. Accordingly, III MAF developed a plan to launch a preemptive assault against the enemy regiment, then located on the Van Tuong Peninsula, ten miles south of Chu Lai. Its precursor was Operation Thunderbolt, conducted adjacent to the Trà Bồng River, a two-day area security/information collection mission jointly assigned to the 4th Marines and 51st ARVN Regiment.
The Marine assault against the 1st VC Regiment, designated Operation Starlight, occurred between 18-24 August 1965. It was the first major offensive campaign conducted by the US military in South Vietnam. Colonel Oscar Peatross commanded the RLT. His subordinate commanders and their battalions included Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. Fisher, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines (2/4), Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Muir, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines (3/3), and Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Bodley, 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (3/7), which operated as the SLF reserve force.
The combined arms assault of three battalions of Marines on the 1,500-man 1st VC Regiment, located in and around the village of Van Tuong, was overwhelmingly effective; the Marines reduced the communist regiment to half of its effective strength.
Meanwhile, in late July, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), approved Operations Dagger Thrust and Harvest Moon. Dagger Thrust was a series of amphibious raids on suspected enemy concentrations along the coastal regions of South Vietnam. Of the five raids, only two produced significant contact with communist forces, but three uncovered notable stores of arms and munitions. The raids were so effective that the enemy never knew when the Marines would come — only that they eventually would come, and the result of their visitations would not be pleasant. As a consequence, some VC soldiers began floating their resumes for a new line of work.
In December 1965, Operation Harvest Moon was a reaction to the 1st VC Regiment’s attack on the Regional Force garrison at Hiệp Đức near the entrance to the Quế Son Valley. Initially serving as a reserve force, heavy fighting prompted the operational commander to commit the SLF, quickly turning the tide against the Viet Cong regiment. The staggering losses imposed on VC forces by the Marines caused General Võ Nguyên Giáp to increase the NVA’s footprint in South Vietnam, and this redirection of the American’s attention would enable new VC cadres to infiltrate population centers. Apparently, Giáp assumed that the U. S. Marine Corps was a one-trick pony. He was wrong.
By 1969, the ARG/SLF had conducted sixty-two amphibious landings against VC/NVA elements operating inside the Republic of Vietnam. The SLFs made significant contributions to MACV’s operational mobility and flexibility by offering a timely striking power.
Among the significant benefits of the two SLFs were their flexibility, the element of surprise from “over-the-horizon” assaults, and their on-shore maneuverability. Once ashore, operational control of the SLF passed from the ARG Commander to the senior ground combat commander. Another plus was the SLF’s self-sustaining character, which stood in contrast to regular force ground units that relied on static functional organizations for airlift, logistics/resupply, fire support, and medical triage capabilities.
In the early 1990s, the Navy-Marine Corps planners began a re-examination of the ARG/SLF concept and developed an innovation they termed Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG). Currently, there are nine ESGs, ten Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs), and several Surface Warfare Action Groups (SWAGs). ESGs allow the Navy to provide highly mobile/self-sustaining naval forces for missions in all parts of the world. The ESG incorporates the capabilities of CSGs, SWAGs, ARGs, and MEUs to enhance the capabilities of combat commanders within six geographical regions.
Currently, there are seven Marine Expeditionary Units — three under the I Marine Expeditionary Force (US West Coast), three operating under the II Marine Expeditionary Force (US East Coast), and one operating under the III Marine Expeditionary Unit (Japan).
No one in the Navy and Marine Corps wants to go to war, but they know how to go to war. They are America’s flashing sword. Quite frankly, only an idiot would like to see these forces come knocking on their door, but we will need the Navy-Marine Corps combat team until the world has finally rid itself of idiots.
Bean, C. The Story of ANZAC from 4 May 1915 to the Evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Canberra: Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, 1921 (11 editions).
Broadbent, H. Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore. Camberwell: Viking Press, 2005.
Cassar, G. H. Kitchener’s War: British Strategy from 1914-1916. Lincoln: Potomac Books, 2004.
Halpern, P. G. A Naval History of World War I. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995.
Simmons, E. H. The United States Marines: A History (Fourth Edition). Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
 Temporarily changed to III MAF because the government of RVN objected to the word “expeditionary.”
 My reference to places in Vietnam, used in past tense, speaks to events in locations that then existed. Since the end of the Vietnam War, the government of Vietnam has renamed many of the hamlets, villages, and districts of the former South Vietnamese republic. Qui Nhơn is now known as Quy Nhơn.
 Short name for the National Liberation Front of Southern Vietnam, an armed communist revolutionary organization that operated in South Vietnam and Cambodia. The VC organized both regular and guerrilla forces to combat the South Vietnamese and United States military forces.
 ESGs are part of the Navy’s Expeditionary Task Force concept.
There was a time when American liberalism was identified with anti-Communism. That time ended with the Vietnam War, because in starting that war, the Democratic Party delivered American liberalism into the arms of global communism.
During the Vietnam War, the III Marine Amphibious Force had overall tactical responsibility for the I Corps Tactical Zone (also, I Corps and I CTZ). I Corps was one of four separate military operating zones and the northern-most in the region of the former Republic of Vietnam (also, South Vietnam and RVN).
In land area, the size of I Corps involved around 1,800 square miles. Its vast size is further complicated by terrain dominated by hills and the Annamite Mountains, steep slopes, sharp crests, deep narrow valleys, and dense broadleaf forests. Most o the peaks range from 4,000 to 8,000 feet high. The narrow coastal plain is compartmented by rocky headlands and belts of large sand dunes. Prior to 1975, I Corps was the official border with North Vietnam—the two warring nations separated by the so-called Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
The I CTZ encompassed five political regions or provinces: Quang Tri, Thira Thien-Hue, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai. Major cities or population centers included Khe Sanh, Dong Ha, Quang Tri City, Da Nang, How An, Tam Ky, Chu Lai, and Quang Ngai City.
Tactical units subordinate to III MEF included the 1st Marine Division, 3rd Marine Division, the US Americal Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, US 35th Tactical Wing, and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 1st Division, 2nd Division, and 51st (Independent) Regiment.
Operation Union II was a search and destroy mission within the Que Son Valley between 26 May — 5 June 1967. The operational commander for Union II was Colonel Kenneth J. Houghton. Que Son was in the southern part of South Vietnam’s I Corps. Populous and “rice rich,” the valley was one of the keys to controlling South Vietnam’s five northern provinces. The densely vegetated area was occupied by two regiments of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 2nd Division. Que Son was also strategically important to the theater commander, (then) General Westmoreland, Commander U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (also, COMUSMACV).
During Operation Union (21 April—16 May 1967) 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (3/1) engaged the 21st NVA Regiment near the Marine outpost on Loc Son Mountain. Operation Union II focused on the destruction of the 21st Regiment. Colonel Houghton’s 5th Marines coordinated offensive operations with the ARVN 6th Regiment and 1st Ranger Group.
Operation Union II called for two rifle companies (A & D) of 1/5 and Company F 2/5 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Hilgartner, to establish a blocking position in the western portion of the valley. Lieutenant Colonel Esslinger’s 3/5 would make a helicopter (vertical) assault into the southern portion of the valley and sweep northeast. 2/5 would serve as Houghton’s reserve. Meanwhile, three ARVN battalions would attack southwest from Thang Bing, and two additional ARVN battalions would attack northwest from Tam Ky.
Union II kicked off as planned on 26 May. 1/5 took up its position and 3/5 (three rifle companies, a weapons company, and the battalion headquarters element) flew in to Landing Zone (LZ) Eagle, 3 miles east of Loc Son. The first two waves of helicopters received light enemy small arms fire. By the time the rest of 3/5 arrived, however, the battalion was under heavy weapons and mortar fire. Lima and Mike companies launched an attack to relieve the pressure on the LZ and discovered a well-entrenched NVA force, which turned out to be elements of the 3rd NVA Regiment. India Company, supported by Marine artillery, enveloped the enemy’s flank. The assault was expensive for both sides, with 118 NVA dead and 38 Marine KIA/82 WIA. Marine and ARVN forces swept the area for the next three days, but the NVA force had withdrawn. ARVN commanders withdrew having concluded that their enemy had been routed.
Colonel Houghton, on the other hand, was not convinced that the NVA had been routed. Relying on numerous intelligence reports, Houghton directed the regiment continue with the plan for Union II (less ARVN forces). On the morning of 2 June, 3/5 swept toward the village of Vinh Huy. Operating adjacent to 3/5, the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (3/1) encountered an estimated 200 NVA troops about one mile east of the engagement site on 26 May. 3/1 engaged and overran the defending NVA. Meanwhile, while pushing forward to relieve the pressure on 3/5, 1/5 ran into a NVA ambush while crossing a 3,000 yard-wide rice paddy. On battalion point, the well-concealed NVA caught Fox Company in a murderous crossfire with mounting casualties due to enemy mortar fires. 1/5 established a hasty defense posture.
Captain James A. Graham, commanding Fox Company, immediately set about consolidating his Marines, and calling for artillery and air support. Hardest hit in the enemy assault was 2nd Platoon, which was pinned down by two enemy machine gun positions. Forming his headquarters unit into an assault force, Captain Graham boldly led an attack against NVA positions. The effect of Graham’s attack was that it diverted the enemy’s attention away from 2nd Platoon.
While Graham attacked the NVA, platoon NCOs began evacuating wounded Marines back toward positions of relative safety. Determined to silence the NVA’s second machine gun, Graham’s small assault force withstood concentrated enemy fire and accounted for fifteen enemy dead, but Captain Graham suffered two bullet wounds and the assault force was inadequate to dislodging the enemy.
Running low on ammunition, and with one man critically wounded, Captain Graham ordered his men to withdraw back to the company perimeter. Realizing that he could not survive in the forward position, Graham nevertheless elected to remain in place with his one critically wounded Marine, who could not be moved. Shortly after his men withdrew, an NVA force of twenty-five men attacked Graham who resisted for as long as he had ammunition and gave up his life for the wounded Marine, whom he would not abandon. In recognition of his exceptional courage while under fire, his indomitable fighting spirit, and his intrepidity while relieving his second platoon from danger, Captain Graham received a posthumous award of the nation’s highest recognition for gallantry in combat, the Medal of Honor.
At around 14:00, Colonel Houghton called for reinforcement from the Division’s rapid-reaction force. Jackson’s force arrived by helicopter at 19:00 in total darkness. Delta and Echo Companies (1/7) were inserted northeast of the fortified enemy position and quickly moved south to engage the NVA’s left flank. Both companies encountered stiff enemy resistance; Delta Company suffered many casualties. Owing to the darkness, Division operations denied Delta Company’s request for Medevac helicopters. At that moment, a Marine CH-53 helicopter that had just inserted Echo 2/5 heard the call for assistance and responded to the call for help.
With the arrival of E 2/5, NVA forces began to disengage and withdraw southwest; it was a costly decision because they ran right into elements of 3/5 and Marine artillery. Despite being wounded himself, Houghton remained in the field to supervise re-consolidation of his regiment. The next morning, Houghton directed another sweep of the area, during which the Marines uncovered the remains of 701 dead NVA soldiers and 23 injured NVA who were medically treated and taken as prisoners of war. Operation Union II Marine casualties included 71 killed in action with 139 wounded. This action rendered the 2nd NVA Division combat-ineffective for several months.
Operation Union II was significant for another, albeit unrelated reason. It was during this operation that Marines began communicating with their parents and loved-ones back home that their M-16 rifles were malfunctioning with such regularity that Marines were being killed because of jammed weapons at critical moments during battle. In a random inspection of rifles by the III MAF staff, weapons experts and armors reported that a large number of rifles had pitted and eroded chambers. Marine headquarters then suspended issuance of the M-16s in December 1967 because of the 9,844 rifles inspected, experts found 67% of the rifles required immediate replacement.
Telfer, G. L. And Lane Rogers (et.al.). U. S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese. Washington: Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, 1984.
Carland, J. M. Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965-Oct 1966. Washington: Center of Military History, 2000.
 The Marine Corps has since renamed its largest task force organizations “Expeditionary Forces.” Today, III MAF is known as III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF).
 Colonel (later, Major General) Houghton (1920-2006) was commissioned in September 1942 and served during World War II and participated in the Battles of Tarawa and Saipan. During the Korean War, he participated with the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade at Pusan and the 1st Marine Division at the landing at Inchon. He served in I Corps RVN during the Vietnam War commanding the 5th Marine Regiment. He was awarded the Navy Cross, two Silver Stars, three Legion of Merits, two Bronze Star medals, and three Purple Heart medals.
 Fox Company 2/5 reinforced the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.
 Known as the Bald Eagle Reaction Force, a battalion-sized reserve then composed of Echo Company, 2/5, Delta Company, 1/7, and Echo Company, 2/7 (under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Mallett C. Jackson, Jr., whose primary assignment was Commanding Officer, 2/5).
 When the CH-53 returned to Da Nang, it had received 57 hits from small arms fire and mortar fragments.
During the Second Indochina War (known to the west as the Vietnam War), the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) consisted of four tactical zones. The northern-most of these was the First Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ), which included South Vietnam’s five northern provinces: from north to south, Quảng Trị, Thừa Thiên, Quảng Nam, Quảng Tín, and Quảng Ngãi. The responsibility for combat operations within these provinces was assigned to the Third Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), involving about 14,000 square miles. The Commanding General, III MAF, answered to the Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV).
Efforts to create a stabilizing security force in South Vietnam had begun in the mid-1950s. The only way to describe these efforts — and their effects — is that they were an unmitigated disaster. The most significant security force in 1955 was the Civil Guard, a paramilitary organization administered by South Vietnam’s interior ministry but controlled by the country’s 38 province chiefs. The civil guard was a 55,000 man force serving in static defense positions. Lacking mobility and modern communications, the civil guard’s small company and platoon sized units had no way to respond to Viet Cong attacks. But even if they were capable of challenging the VC, most provincial chiefs had no interest in doing so.
In 1960, the South Vietnamese military force was no more capable of performing combat operations than it was in 1955. Built mainly on the remnants of French-trained colonial forces, the South Vietnamese army, navy, and air force numbered 150,000; the army (known as ARVN) numbered 138,000. On paper, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) looked formidable. It wasn’t. The military chain of command was convoluted. The quality of its officer corps ranged from excellent to horrible. The efficiency and loyalty of ARVN units was dependent on the personality of its senior-most commander. Few ARVN units were interested in sharing information with other units. Vietnamese commanders were inflexible, prideful, and arrogant; they would spare no effort making themselves look good at someone else’s expense.
The Vietnamese high command treated the ARVN much in the same way as the civil guard — relegating them to static positions where the enemy always knew where they were. This worked out well enough for senior commanders since few of them were willing to put their necks on the line confronting Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army units.
Despite significant funding from the United States for military training in1963, most combat training in Vietnam was a paper chase. Vietnamese troops themselves were poorly paid, poorly educated, unmotivated, and inexperienced. Some were capable of extraordinary acts of courage, but not many. In the Battle of Ap Bac in 1963, which took place over several days, 300 Viet Cong irregulars fought 1,200 South Vietnamese Army troops to a standstill. Once the VC had had their way with the ARVN, they melted away into the dense jungle.
Nui Loc Son
In mid-1966, American intelligence learned that the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 2nd Infantry Division had begun infiltrating the Que Son Valley. The densely populated valley was a central agricultural area that sat astride the boundaries of Quảng Nam and Quảng Tin provinces in the I CTZ. Both US and NVA military commanders recognized that available food sources and the rugged terrain made the Que Son Basin a crucial military objective. To control the valley was to dominate the entire I CTZ.
In January 1967, the 3rd and 21st NVA Regiments began operations within the Que Son Valley. Joining them a short time later was the 3rd VC regiment from Quảng Ngãi Province. The NVA intended to seize Que Son, which meant destroying isolated ARVN units, who at the time were occupying static defensive positions. COMUSMACV directed the CG III MAF to replace all ARVN units with American forces. III MAF’s challenge in carrying out his directive was the constant demand for combat troops elsewhere in I CTZ. The Marines could simply not afford to send battalions or regiments into the Que Son region. Yet, it was at the same time evident that ARVN units lacked the strength or effectiveness to carry out their defensive burden alone. To bolster Marine forces, USMACV assigned US Army units to the southern I CTZ, which released the 1st Marine Division (1stMarDiv) for operations within the Que Son Valley area.
Operation Union I
Operation Union I was the initiating campaign for what evolved into a bitter contest for control of the Que Son Basin. In mid-January 1967, Fox Company 2/1 relieved the ARVN unit at Nui Loc Son and began operations under its parent command’s operational authority, the 1st Marine Regiment, commanded by Colonel Emil J. Radic. By placing a Marine company on this small hill mass, III MAF hoped to achieve three goals: (1) deny VC/NVA access to this rice-producing area, (2) initiate a much-needed civic action effort, and (3) force the NVA into open battle. The Marines of Fox 2/1 were the bait.
Under the command of Captain Gene A. Deegan, Fox Company was reinforced by an 81mm Mortar section, a 106mm Recoilless Rifle section, and a 4.2-inch Mortar Battery from the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines (artillery) (1/11). Deegan soon began engaging small enemy units attempting to cross the valley floor. Fox Company also undertook limited civic action projects, which generated a mutually beneficial relationship with local citizens and aided in collecting critical intelligence concerning VC/NVA operations.
The NVA found Fox Company’s aggressive behavior irksome. Previously, NVA and VC units operated in the Que Son Basin with impunity but irritating the communists was why Marine HQ sent Fox Company to Nui Loc Son to begin with. The 2nd NVA Division took the bait.
By mid-April, Captain Deegan informed his battalion commander that he believed enemy forces operating near Nui Loc Son involved two regiments in strength. Colonel Radic decided to initiate a vertical assault against the enemy. Radic’s plan called for Fox Company to initiate contact from its observation post while elements of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 1st Marines (1/1) (3/1) would make a heliborne assault into the operational area; another battalion would serve in reserve. Additionally, elements of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines would move by helicopter to Que Son village to provide artillery support to the operation. Colonel Radic would control the operation from Nui Loc Son. The CG 1stMarDiv approved Radic’s plan but delayed its execution until another operation had reached its final objective.
At 0700 on 21 April, Captain Deegan led his company out of Nui Loc Son. The company experienced several minor encounters with small groups of enemy soldiers en route to the village of Binh Son, three miles to the northeast. At 0930, Fox Company encountered heavy enemy small arms fire, pulled back into a tree line, and set up a hasty defense. From that location, Deegan called for artillery fire and airstrikes on the enemy’s positions. At 1100, Deegan moved his 2nd and 3rd platoons against the village while the 1st platoon provided covering fire. Initially, Deegan’s assault elements encountered little resistance, but as they approached the village, the intensity of enemy fire increased to such a degree that Deegan could no longer maneuver the assault platoons. The 1st platoon, having attempted a flanking maneuver, was also halted.
Lieutenant Colonel Hillmer F. DeAtley, commanding 3/1, led his command group and India and Mike companies into the fight some 1,500 meters from Fox Company’s position. Eventually, 3/1 fought its way to Deegan’s location. Despite his several wounds, Captain Deegan continued to direct his company’s action until Colonel DeAtley relieved him of his command and ordered his evacuation.
Lieutenant Colonel Dean E. Esslinger, commanding 3/5, arrived from Chu Lai at around 1600 and linked up with DeAtley’s flank. Lieutenant Colonel Van D. Bell’s 1/1 arrived from Da Nang after dark. After reforming his Battalion adjacent to Colonel Radic’s command post, Bell led his Marines into the battle, which was already shaping up into a hell of a fight. At the conclusion of the first day, Fox 2/1 and India & Mike 3/1 had borne the brunt of the fighting. At dawn on the morning of the second day, 1/1, 3/1, and 2/5 had joined the battle.
Punishing Marine fire and aggressive maneuvering finally began to dislodge the enemy from their positions, forcing them northward into a blocking force of three ARVN ranger battalions. In its withdrawal, the NVA suffered significant casualties from artillery fire and airstrikes. Bell and Esslinger continued their attack, pursuing the enemy east and north of Nui Loc Son, but there were only intermittent contacts with the retreating enemy.
On 25 April, Colonel Kenneth J. Houghton’s 5th Marines (-) arrived from Chu Lai and moved into the Que Son Valley. Responsibility for Union I passed to Colonel Houghton, and by the end of next day, all of Colonel Radic’s 1st Marines had returned to Da Nang — leaving Fox Company under a new commander to man the outpost at Nui Loc Son.
3/5 began a thorough search of the mountains south and west of the basin; enemy contact was generally light until the evening of the 27th when a Marine triggered an anti-personnel mine that set off several explosions. One Marine died; 43 received wounds, and of those, 35 required medical evacuation. On the 28th, Esslinger’s 3/5 was joined by Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Wickwire’s 1/3, which was part of the Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force Alpha. Both battalions began a sweep within their respective tactical zones. Despite intelligence reports indicating a significant enemy presence, contact with enemy forces was sporadic and light.
Colonel Houghton was an experienced combat commander. On 1 May, he directed 1/5, under Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Hilgartner, into the mountains eight miles east of Hiep Duc. 1/5’s sweep initially encountered light resistance, but as the Battalion moved westward, the frequency and intensity of enemy engagements increased. On 5 May, Delta Company 1/5 stumbled upon an enemy storage site containing weapons, ammunition, military uniforms, surgical kits, and other military gear. Both 1/5 and 3/5 continued sweeping north; 1/3 began sweeping northwest of the Que Son village. All three battalions were experiencing only sporadic enemy contacts — the enemy withdrew away from the Marines.
On 10 May, the Marines ran into a more significant enemy force. Charlie 1/5 was moving up the slope of Hill 110 some 4,000 meters north of Que Son when the company came under heavy fire from a battalion-sized unit entrenched along the edge of Nui Nong Ham. The Marines took Hill 110, but when they set into a hasty defense on the hill’s summit, they began taking heavy fire from a cane field below and inside caves along Nui Nong Ham’s lower slopes. Captain Russell J. Caswell, commanding Charlie Company, called for assistance.
The nearest units were Bravo and Charlie companies 1/3. They responded to relieve Caswell, but heavy NVA resistance stopped their advance. Operational control of Bravo & Charlie shifted to Hilgartner’s 1/5. Calls for artillery fire were ineffective because the Marines and the NVA forces were too close. Bravo & Charlie companies soon called for reinforcements. One platoon from Alpha Company 1/3 arrived by air to support them, but enemy fires were so intense that Hilgartner’s air officer waived off subsequent landings.
Alpha Company 1/5, commanded by Captain Gerald L. McKay, situated 2,000 meters to the east, moved to support Wickwire’s companies and came under heavy enemy fire. Captain McKay was determined to push through. Just as he positioned his company for an assault, an air support controller mistakenly marked the company’s position for an airstrike. Marine F-4’s strafed the company — killing five Marines and wounded 24. The combination of the enemy and friendly fire halted McKay’s advance.
By 15:00, Colonel Hilgartner’s command group (with Delta Company 1/5), was positioned on the slope of Nui Nong Ham from which they could lend fire support to Delta 1/3. Hilgartner’s Marines began lobbing mortars into the enemy’s positions. Soon after, helicopters landed Esslinger’s Mike Company 3/5 at Hilgartner’s position and joined Captain Caswell’s Charlie Company. The two companies quickly consolidated their position and began delivering fire into NVA positions. With this support, Bravo & Charlie Company 1/3 aggressed the NVA positions in the cane field and on Nui Nong Ham’s northern slope. By nightfall, the Marines had driven off the NVA force, leaving behind 116 dead communists; the cost to the Marines was 33 killed and 135 wounded (including those killed and injured from friendly fire).
On 12 May, Colonel Wickwire’s 1/3 was withdrawn and replaced by Colonel Bell’s 1/1. On the 12th and 13th, 1/1, 1/5, and 3/5 remained in perpetual contact with enemy forces. Esslinger assaulted an enemy battalion 3 miles east of Que Son in the evening of 13 May. After making maximum use of artillery and airstrikes, Esslinger’s Marines ruthlessly attacked the NVA; artillery and aircraft support then shifted to block an NVA withdrawal. On the other end of the Marine assault, 122 dead communists littered the battle site.
On 13-14 May, the Marines continually employed artillery and air power to strike enemy positions. In the late afternoon of 14 May, Delta Company 1/1 discovered 68 enemy dead — all killed by either fragmentation or concussion.
The last battle of Union I took place on 15 May when Alpha 1/5 and Mike 3/5 discovered another bunker complex. After preparatory fires and a coordinated assault, the Marines found 22 dead enemies within the bunker complex. Operation Union I ended the next day. Within these 27 days, the Marines had killed 865 enemy troops, of which 465 were NVA regulars of the 2nd NVA Division. The number of communists killed was impressive, but Colonel Houghton believed that the most significant damage inflicted on the enemy was the psychological impact on the Que Son Valley population. Houghton thought that the VC’s hold over local villages and hamlets was broken.
If Colonel Houghton was right about that — the enemy didn’t seem to realize it. The story of the fight for the Que Son Valley continues next week.
Steward, R. W. Deepening Involvement: 1945-1965. Washington: Center for Military History, 2012.
Telfer, G. L. et al. U. S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese. Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1974.
 The official name of this Marine Corps organization is III Marine Expeditionary Force. It was temporarily changed to III Marine Amphibious Force in 1965 because the South Vietnamese government expressed a psychological objection to use of the word “expeditionary.”
 The SLF(A) code name for this operation was Beaver Cage.
When he was just a little guy, Jack Lewis became separated from his mother in a large department store. Anyone who’s been lost in a department store at the age of five or six knows that it’s a terrifying experience. But then, two young men came to his rescue. They were Marine Corps recruiters, wearing the dress blue uniform that makes Marines stand out among all other servicemen. They returned him to his mom. Jack Lewis never forgot those Marines.
So, in 1942, when it came time for Americans to stand up against fascism, C. Jack Lewis made his way to the local recruiting office and joined the Marines. Now, for the uninitiated, there are only two kinds of Marines: live Marines and dead Marines. You see, becoming a United States Marine is a lifetime endeavor. My good friend Colonel Jim Bathurst titled his autobiography on this very concept: as long as Marines keep faith with one another, and with the code of honor to which we all subscribe, then, We’ll All Die As Marines.
I met Lieutenant Colonel Jack Lewis while assigned as the Adjutant, Marine Aircraft Group 46 in 1979-81. Lewis was a reserve officer, then serving as the Reserve Liaison Officer for Southern California. I suspect that there was no better-qualified individual to serve in that capacity than Colonel Lewis. He served in World War II, the Korean War, and in Vietnam. In each instance, after serving a tour of combat duty, Jack left the active-duty force and went back into the Marine reserve. He did this, he told me because there was too much “chicken shit” in the active force … and if there was one thing Lewis could not abide, it was “oppressive regulations, careerist officers, and people who called themselves Marines but wouldn’t have made a pimple of a dead Marine’s ass.”
Like many young men of his day, the teenaged Jack Lewis became what he described as an “amateur juvenile delinquent.” He was always in trouble. The problem wasn’t so much Jack’s behavior as it was that he wanted more out of life than his circumstances would allow. By the late 1930s, Jack was looking for something special in his life. Something that would offer him a challenge, hold him accountable, and something that he could love with unbridled passion. In this regard, the Second World War probably came along at the right time for Jack Lewis. Jack Lewis joined the Marines out of a sense of patriotism, but in doing so, he found that “special something” he was looking for. The Marines squared his ass away, gave him a reason to get up in the morning, inculcated him with the values so dear to anyone who has ever (honorably) worn the uniform of a United States Marine. The U. S. Marine Corps became the organization that set him on the pathway of success for the balance of his life.
Jack was born in Iowa on 19 November 1924 but at the age of two, his family moved to Florida. As a lad, he was a voracious reader and a writer and at age 14, he sold his first novel … The Cherokee Kid’s Last Stand. The novel earned him five dollars. Now, while five dollars doesn’t sound like a lot of money, one must recall that in those days a field hand earned a dollar a day for backbreaking work. No, it wasn’t much, but he was fourteen years of age, and it was a start in a writing career that lasted the balance of his 84-years.
Following World War II, Lewis returned to Iowa, where in 1949 he graduated from the state university with a degree in journalism. He was subsequently commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve. A short time later he was assigned to help produce a Marine Corps training film, and then owing to his service in World War II, he became a technical advisor to the John Wayne film, Sands of Iwo Jima. Of this later effort, Lewis said that he basically advised members of the cast on how to lace up their leggings. He no doubt contributed far more than that.
When the Korean War erupted in June 1950, Lewis returned to active duty for six years. He served as a combat correspondent and photographer. Now this may not seem like much in terms of what Hollywood tells us about combat (which is mostly wrong), but every Marine — no matter what his occupational specialty, no matter what his rank — is first and foremost a rifleman. Initially, Jack Lewis carried an M-1 carbine as his T/O weapon. It was the first time he’d carried that particular firearm, considerably smaller than the M-1 Garand. In one fire fight, Jack shot a communist Chinese soldier eight times, hitting him six times, without doing any noticeable damage to this enemy. Another Marine standing nearby, who was armed with a Thompson submarine gun, stepped up and blew the communist into the afterlife. Allowing that no matter where you hit a man with a .45 caliber weapon he’s going down, Lewis thereafter armed himself with a Thompson and would not part with it. During a second combat tour of duty in Korea, Lewis earned a Bronze Star for his work filming Marine Corps aircraft engaging the enemy from an exposed position.
During the Korean War, Jack Lewis submitted over two dozen magazine articles to Marine Corps headquarters for publication in the Leatherneck Magazine. HQMC returned the articles telling Lewis that they all sounded too much like Marine Corps propaganda. Miffed, Lewis then sent the articles to his civilian literary agent who had them published, earning Lewis $200.00 each. Lewis sent copies of the published articles to the individual at HQMC who had rejected them. Knowing Jack, I can easily imagine that he sent these copies with a caustic note, but I don’t know that for a fact.
Following the Korean War, Jack commanded a rifle company in the 4th Marines at Camp Pendleton, California. He was subsequently transferred to the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii where he served as a public information officer. During this tour of duty, Lewis was assigned as a technical advisor on John Ford’s film titled Mister Roberts. When no one could locate a stunt performer to drive a motorcycle off a pier, Lewis did the job himself. Lewis later appeared in a minor role in Admiral Ford’s film, Sergeant Rutledge.
Marines, by their nature, are exceptional. Jack’s stellar performance prompted his commanding officer to encourage Jack to apply for a regular (as opposed to reserve) commission. Jack would have none of this, however. He wanted to pursue a writing career and upon expiration of his active duty obligation, Jack Lewis returned to inactive service in the reserves.
In addition to writing screenplays for films, Lewis found work as a magazine editor in 1956; after three years of learning how magazines are done, he teamed up with Dean Grennell to publish Gun World magazine in 1959. He continued to author the monthly knife column until his death in 2009. Lewis was highly critical of the capabilities of various weapons marketed to military and law enforcement agencies. In fact, he was so critical that the firearms manufacturing companies refused to advertise in his magazine. Lewis once told the Commandant of the Marine Corps that the M16’s only consistent effect was that it changed the world’s perception of the American rifleman. Americans, he said, used to be sharpshooters, but after the M16, they were little more than “sprayers.”
Jack Lewis developed a story that he originally titled Year of the Tiger. When Marshall Thompson selected Lewis’ work for a 1963 film, he hired Lewis to write the screenplay and the title was changed to A Yank in Viet-Nam, which was filmed on location in South Vietnam in 1963, often in the midst of, or within range, of actual fire fights.
In 1966, Lewis published a novel titled Tell it to the Marines. It is the story of a Marine officer who, during the Korean War, is placed in command of a band of misfits in a motion picture unit. In the preface of this book, Jack penned, “Any similarity to persons, places, or incidents is highly plausible; only the names have been changed to avoid court-martial.” The humor in this book may be lost among those who never earned the Marine Corps emblem, and among those born in the 21st Century, life in the Marine Corps during the Korean war may not resonate. I have a copy of this book on my shelf.
He was also the author of White Horse, Black Hat: A Quarter Century on Hollywood’s Poverty Row; Renegade Canyon; Mohave; Massacre Mountain; and The Coffin Racers.
In 1969, Lewis returned to active duty to serve a full-length tour in Vietnam with the III Marine Amphibious Corps. During this tour, Lewis earned his second and third air medal, signifying 50 air missions exposed to enemy fire. Lewis retired from the Marine Corps in 1984, one day prior to his 60th birthday.
Colonel Jack Lewis was a man of many talents and many careers. He did not suffer fools gladly; he was a maverick, not at all concerned about becoming someone else’s vision of a Marine —but his own vision was good enough for him and almost everyone who knew him. He may have been a bit rough around the edges, and blunt, but he was a decent man whose professionalism was well-balanced with his friendliness. He loved his Corps, and he loved Marines until his last breath. In the company he managed for 37 years, he preferred hiring retired and former Marines. When Jack Lewis retired, he moved to Hilo, Hawaii, where he continued to write. Colonel C. Jack Lewis, United States Marine Corps Reserve, passed away at his home on 24 May 2009.
 Dean Grennell (1923-2004) served as a firearms instructor in the Army Air Corps during World War II and is remembered as an American firearms expert, writer, editor, managing editor of Gun World magazine, and the editor of the science fiction “fanzine” Grue.
 Marshall Thompson (1925-1992) (a classmate of Norma Jean Baker) was an actor, director, and producer of films beginning in the 1940s of science fiction genre. One film titled The Terror from Beyond Space in 1958 became the inspiration for Ridley Scott’s Alien films. A second Viet Nam era film was titled To the Shores of Hell (1965).
Throughout America’s history, no citizen with common sense ever wanted to go to war. “We the people” do not start wars — our elected officials and bureaucrats do that. At no time in my memory has the US government offered a compelling argument or justification for involving our nation in a foreign war. When they try to provide a convincing reason for war, they always wrap it in a lie. For example, the government told Americans that the United States sent combat troops to Vietnam to defend the South Vietnamese people from their authoritarian cousins in the north. In fact, both North Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh and South Vietnam’s Ngo Dinh Diem had the same aspirations: unification under their leadership. Neither man ever gave a damn about the poor South Vietnamese peasant. War is bad enough, but when politicians and unelected bureaucrats contrive to make things worse for the combat soldier — which is the topic of this essay, the American voter should put his or her foot down and loudly and angrily proclaim, “enough is enough!”
Combat units of the 3rd Marine Division (3rdMarDiv) began offering important lessons to the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) in 1965. One of these lessons was that they should refrain from firing their weapons at U. S. Marines — because being shot at makes American Marines very cranky.
At the beginning of 1966, the 3rdMarDiv employed its 24,000 men against several communist thrusts into Quang Tri Province, also known as the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ). The five provinces of the I CTZ were the northernmost area of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). General William C. Westmoreland, U. S. Army, Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), ordered the 3rdMarDiv to defend this northern tier. In 1966, the 3rdMarDiv was the Marine Corps’ largest (ever) combat division. There were five infantry regiments, one artillery regiment, all of the usual supporting units, Army artillery units, Navy logistical units (including Seabees), and two Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) infantry regiments. The division was huge — but then, so too was their area of defense.
The 3rdMarDiv’s tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) encompassed 1,800 square miles of Indian country. The terrain was all rugged, elevated, menacing, and over-populated with things that hurt, such as an abundant enemy — and predatory cats. At the far northern tip of South Vietnam, along its border with North Vietnam, was the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Defending the DMZ was one of the division’s primary missions, but not the only one.
To achieve this defensive objective, two unusual behaviors were necessary. First, the United States had to adopt the strategy of the North Vietnamese, which was to prosecute a war of attrition. Simply stated, the US and North Vietnamese agreed to see which of them could afford to give up the most human lives to further their political goals. Think about that for a moment. Second, for the Marines to defend the northern provinces, they had to establish a wide arc of defensive bases (euphemistically called combat bases) that would permit the 3rdMarDiv to respond to the enemy within an area of 1,800 square miles.
The main north-south highway within I CTZ was Route 1. It connected Marine combat bases at Dong Ha and Quang Tri City in the North to Phu Bai and Da Nang in the South. Any obstruction along this highway would disrupt vital logistical support of the division’s forward-most units; the enemy knew this exceptionally well. So, the primary logistical highway became the Cua Viet River, which extended from its mouth on the coast to Dong Ha.
At Dong Ha, the river was about as wide as a mountain footpath. Additionally, Route 9 linked Dong Ha with Khe Sanh. East of Khe Sanh, the 3rdMarDiv created a series of outposts that offered some protection for Route 9 and the Cam Lo River Valley (which extended from Dong Ha to the coastal plain). Of these outposts, the more critical were located at Ca Lu (ten miles east of Khe Sanh), the “Rockpile” (a sheer outcrop eight miles north), Camp Carroll (10 miles eastward), and “Leatherneck Square,” which was a quadrilateral region outlined by Cam Lo, Con Thien, Gio Linh, and Dong Ha.
As previously mentioned, the 3rdMarDiv’s TAOR was massive. The division’s defense plan further divided the TAOR among its regiments and separate battalions. Each of these had a code name, such as Napoleon, Kentucky, Lancaster, and Scotland.
The Third Marine Division defeated the NVA and Viet Cong (VC) in every engagement — but in confronting and defeating this enemy, the Marines encountered a high casualty rate. By the end of 1967, Marine commanders were frustrated; the division lost good men and had nothing to show for it. Between 1966-67, the division had lost 5,000 killed and wounded Marines. It was an unacceptable casualty rate … and a direct result of the imbecilic static war concept.
In 1965, Washington bureaucrats began experimenting with various schemes for achieving their political goals through static defensive measures. This may be all fine and good when looking at the larger picture, but on closer examination, the cost of “experimentation” was an excessively high US casualty rate. Most of these “good ideas” had been rejected by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because, to implement them, the US would have to increase (at least initially) its troop strength in South Vietnam. Moreover, implementing these ideas would force the North Vietnamese to change its strategy — specifically, a full-scale invasion of Laos by the NVA, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to avoid.
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara was known as one of Ford Motor Company’s “whiz kids.” He was one of those “good idea” people who thought he knew everything he needed to know about fighting a war. In reality, McNamara was a bean counter who knew nothing about warfare.
One of McNamara’s schemes was constructing a defensive line along the northern border of South Vietnam and its border with Southeast Laos. McNamara met with former national security advisor Carl Kaysen. Kaysen convinced McNamara that the key to success in static defensive strategies was establishing an electronic barrier. Kaysen argued (successfully) that an electronic barrier would limit NVA infiltration into South Vietnam. An electronic wall made great sense to McNamara, so he convened a feasibility group consisting of several science technologists. They submitted their proposals in March 1966 — which McNamara dutifully passed along to the JCS for their comments.
At best, the JCS was lukewarm to the idea of an electric barrier, particularly since the barrier wouldn’t prevent infiltration and because creating the barrier would still require additional forces in Vietnam. Moreover, it would require a significant construction effort, would involve a massive logistical effort, exponentially increasing the costs of the war. McNamara didn’t like being told “no.” It might have been better for everyone if McNamara had any knowledge of history — specifically, of Hadrian’s Wall.
Somewhat rebuffed, McNamara then turned to the JASON Group. The JASON group had impressed McNamara by proclaiming that Lyndon Johnson’s bombing campaign over North Vietnam was an utter failure. Junior Airman Smith of the Strategic Air Command could have told McNamara that for a lot less money.
JASON recommended a two-tier defensive barrier system. The first tier involved conventional detection/response capability inland from the coast along the southern portion of the DMZ and another system along the remote western section abutting Laos that would trigger electronic detection, air interdiction, and remotely triggered minefields. JASON thought that such a system could be in place within a year. At this point, McNamara had tiny electric tingles running up and down his leg.
Mr. McNamara sent the JASON proposal to the JCS for review. Every service chief rejected it, save one. JCS Chairman General Earle G. Wheeler, U. S. Army, was positively enthralled with the idea. Despite the overwhelming JCS rejection of the JASON plan, Wheeler sent the report to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Command, Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp, for his review. Admiral Sharp rejected the plan as impractical; General Westmoreland agreed.
With the backing of only one uniformed flag rank officer, McNamara took the plan to President Johnson, who knew no more about fighting a war than Junior Airman Smith of the Strategic Air Command. McNamara’s cost estimate — in dollars — was $1.5 billion. Well, another $750-million (annually) for operating costs. President Johnson, who never saw a spending package he didn’t like, approved it. In terms of combat casualties, the project would far exceed the material costs of McNamara’s Wall.
Marine Corps combat engineers began preparing the ground for the construction of Project Dye Marker along a strip of land 500 meters wide from Gio Linh westward to Con Thien in early 1967. The Marines assigned to this project (infantry, artillery, and combat engineers) were utterly exhausted, a fact first expressed by (then) Brigadier General Louis Metzger, who served as Assistant Division Commander, 3rdMarDiv/CG 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade — because in addition to providing security for construction of McNamara’s Wall, they also constantly responded to the enemy’s initiatives in Northwest South Vietnam. For the Marines, the project involved sustained periods of heavy combat. Major General Raymond L. Murray, Deputy Commander, III MAF, echoed Metzger’s sentiments. “The division commander’s primary mission was the tactical handling of his troops … rather than build the damn line that nobody believed in, in the first place.” In December 1967, Murray angrily remarked, “How in the hell were you going to build this thing when you had to fight people off while you were building it?”
The actual cost of McNamara’s Wall was dear. Not including the lives lost and the men wounded in trying to construct Dye Marker, the Marines spent close to a million man-hours and 114,000 equipment hours on the project; they had also lost more than $1.6 million in combat equipment to the enemy’s ground and artillery assaults. Everything associated with Dye Marker became an enemy target, from convoys moving equipment forward to killing combat engineers while seated atop their bulldozers.
In 1967, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, warned senior commanders in Vietnam that for the Marines to succeed, they must be allowed to wage war on their terms — not as part of a static defensive strategy subject to the prerogatives of the enemy — but as a lethal force that set its terms of engagement. By this time, the NVA had already demonstrated its willingness to lose large numbers of men in exchange for a fewer number of Americans, but over a sustained period.
Krulak identified three options along the DMZ: (1) Withdraw the Marines further south of the DMZ, out of range of NVA artillery (which, while tactically sound, offered a propaganda victory to the NVA exceeding Ted Kennedy and Jane Fonda’s visit to North Vietnam); (2) Invade North Vietnam (tactically and logistically difficult, not to mention politically impossible); or (3) Reinforce the 3rdMarDiv and intensify US air and artillery assaults on North Vietnam. The ball was thus placed in Westmoreland’s court. He needed to either crap or got off the pot. Westmoreland elected to get off the pot.
At the beginning of 1968, the NVA used the western end of the barrier, from Khe Sanh, through the Special Forces camp at Lang Vei, to attack American forces in that region. Lang Vei was overrun with 309 killed, 64 wounded, and 122 captured by the NVA, and Khe Sanh was placed under a siege that lasted for 77 days. After the blockade, Westmoreland’s replacement, General Creighton W. Abrams, ordered Khe Sanh abandoned. Abrams also ordered the destruction of all infrastructure along Route 9 toward Laos, including all roadways and bridges. In October 1968, all work relating to Dye Marker ceased.
In March 1968, Major General Raymond G. Davis, USMC, served As Deputy Commander, Provisional Corps. In May, he was assigned as Commanding General, 3rdMarDiv, through April 1969. During his tenure in this position, Davis refused to leave his men in static positions where they could be targeted and slaughtered by the NVA. Soon after taking command, he ordered his subordinate commanders to move out of their static combat bases and execute their traditional mission: locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver and close combat. Operation Dewey Canyon was how he took the war to the enemy. With a stream of officers who agreed with this philosophy following him as the division commander, the Marines of I CTZ inflicted a terrible price upon the enemy. At the end of 1972, the NVA began conscripting young teenagers. The war might have turned out much differently were it not for Washington politicians (of both parties) who shocked NVA General in Chief Vo Nguyen Giap by ordering the withdrawal of US Forces.
I have long given up my hope that the American people will begin to exercise their sovereignty over the federal government. They seem not to mind burying their children in massive national cemeteries — and they apparently have never learned that elections have costly consequences. John Kennedy’s election to the presidency was one of our nation’s more corrupt campaigns. Kennedy’s running mate was one of the most corrupt politicians in the history of the U. S. Congress. Kennedy selected McNamara to serve as SecDef; Johnson kept him on the payroll. Who, then, is to blame for getting the American people engaged in a land war that politicians had no intention of winning? The blame rests with the American voter. Democrats lied — to both the American people and our South Vietnamese allies — and tens of thousands of Americans died.
President Richard Nixon was roundly criticized by the vocal American communist/anti-war/progressive movement for expanding the war into Cambodia and Laos — but this was precisely what Nixon needed to do to defeat the NVA, who were already operating in Cambodia and Laos — but progressive Democrats/neo-communists gave Kennedy/Johnson a pass for having committed troops to Vietnam in the first place.
Brush, P. The Story Behind the McNamara Line. Vietnam Magazine, 1996.
Cash, J. A. The Other Side of the Hill. Army Center of Military History, 2014.
Philips, W. R. Night of the Silver Stars: The Battle of Lang Vei. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997.
Prados, J. The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail
Shulimson, J. And Blasiol, L. A. And others. U. S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968. Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1997.
 Marines defend the United States of America. They do that through aggressive, overpowering combat. There are defensive tactics in the Marine Corps, but they are designed as a temporary respite while transitioning from one attack to another. A bended knee is not a Marine Corps tradition, and neither is establishing defensive positions while waiting for the enemy to make his next move. US Policy in Vietnam tied the hands of the Marines (indeed, all air, ground, and naval forces), by restricting offensive operations and imposing our combat forces criminally malfeasant rules of engagement.
 A DMZ is an area of land in which treaties or agreements forbid the establishment of any military activity (installations, activities, or personnel). It is a buffer zone between two warring factions. In the case of Vietnam, it was the official border area between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the Republic of South Vietnam. The NVA frequently violated this agreement, in much the same way they violated the neutrality of neighboring Laos.
 Never before in US history had the government of the United States adopted an enemy’s game plan. Whether this was Westmoreland’s idea, or one imposed upon him from Washington, the result was the devastating loss of 58,000 American lives in a conflict that they could not win.
 The aggressive nature of USMC combat operations has always been to save lives, not waste them. If the United States must fight a war, then the sooner the enemy is defeated, the better. Washington/Westmoreland denied this proven strategy to the Marines during the Vietnam War.
 McNamara served in the Army Air Corps in World War II, gaining a commission as a captain, and achieving the rank of lieutenant colonel before the end of the war. During the war, he served in the Office of Statistical Control where he analyzed the effectiveness of bomber efficiency. In 1946, McNamara and ten others of the OSC joined Ford Motor Company. Collectively, they became known as the Whiz Kids because they helped reform a money-losing FMC. McNamara became the first president of Ford Motor Company outside the Ford family. Kennedy appointed him as SecDef at the beginning of his administration.
 Kaysen (1920-2010) was an academic advisor in the Kennedy administration, a “specialist” in international security at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). His field of expertise was nuclear warfare, foreign trade, international economic policy, and international security policy. Presumably, Kaysen was an architect of the “Mutual Atomic Destruction,” which essentially changed forever the psychological characteristics of American society.
 The JASON Group was established in 1960. It is affiliated with the MITRE Corporation, which operates seven Federally funded research and development centers at the expense of the American taxpayer. Consisting of between thirty and sixty scientific technologists, JASON focuses on the development of military technology, with additional interests in global warming and renewable energy. The term JASON came from “July-August-September-October-November,” the months in which the group typically met. They are also skeptically known as “Junior Achiever Somewhat Older Now.” Most developmental ideas originating from JASON were costly failures, shepherded through Washington bureaucrats by theoretical physicists, biologists, chemists, oceanographers, mathematicians, and computer geeks. They no doubt had a hand in the creation of unmanned naval ships that currently sail the nation’s oceans.
 “Bus” Wheeler was a career staff officer and school instructor with active service between 1924-1970. The Vietnam War may be a direct result of appointing a non-combat officer to head the JCS, particularly one who simply could not kiss enough political ass inside the Washington beltway.
 Admiral Sharp served as Commander, U. S. Pacific Fleet from 1963-64, and as Commander, U. S. Pacific Command from 1964-68. Sharp was Westmoreland’s boss.
 Johnson’s only military experience occurred during World War II when he served as a Congressman/Navy Lieutenant Commander in the Public Affairs Section in Washington, D. C. The 1965 epic war film In Harm’s Way based the character of LCdr Neal Owynn, a sycophant congressman, on Lyndon Baines Johnson. When the project’s classified code name was leaked to the American press, Operation Practice Nine became Operation Illinois City and then later Project Dye Marker.
 Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac) (1941-Present} is the largest maritime landing force in the world. The general officer commanding reports directly to the Commander, U. S. Pacific Command, and exercises command authority over all subordinate commands of the Navy/Marine Corps expeditionary units operating in the Pacific, from California to the Far East. During the Vietnam War, the CG FMFPac did not exercise operational control of Marines in Vietnam, but he nevertheless had something to say about how the Marines were employed within USMACV.
 Raymond G. Davis (1915-2003) served as a U. S. Marine from 1938-1972. He participated in the Guadalcanal/Tulagi landings-campaigns, Cape Gloucester campaign, and the invasion of Peleliu. He was awarded the Navy Cross and Purple Heart while commanding 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. During the Korean War, Davis commanded 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, during which time he was awarded the Medal of Honor during the Battle of Chosin Reservoir. He was also awarded the two Silver Stars, Bronze Star, and two Legions of Merit.
One could refer to this incident as the last episode of the Vietnam War, but doing so would only present half the picture. Cambodia was also involved — and Laos — and China, and the Soviet Union. We could probably call it a Southeast Asian War or the Third Indochina War. But no matter what one chooses to call it, by mid-May 1975, the American people were gut-wrenchingly tired of Southeast Asia.
In over 25 years of direct or indirect combat operations, the American people gave up 58,000 of their sons, daughters, brothers, sisters, husbands, wives, fathers, and mothers. Seventy-five thousand Americans sustained severe wounds; of those, more than 23,000 were permanently disabled, including five thousand who lost limbs and over a thousand multiple amputees.
Beyond this, the United States government squandered the nation’s wealth — with untold billions spent shoring up French Imperialism, bribing Vietnamese officials, bombing North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In the final analysis, the United States of America walked away from the entire episode with nothing to show for its mind-numbing costs. Not one presidential administration, from Harry S. Truman to Gerald Ford, had any intention of winning that war.
In the middle of May 1975, just weeks after the fall of Saigon, the Khmer Rouge (Cambodian Reds) “coast guard” seized a United States flagged ship named SS Mayaguez. Following Phnom Penh’s fall on 17 April, the communists moved to control Cambodia, including its offshore islands. Khmer Rouge and (north) Vietnamese forces clashed over territory claimed by both countries. Operating in defense of Cambodian territory, the Khmer navy/coast guard instituted coastal patrolling to prevent Vietnamese incursions — and because of their belief that the CIA used merchant shipping to conduct intelligence-gathering operations along coastal areas.
Within this tense environment, the Khmer navy captured seven Thai fishing boats on 2 May and charged them with territorial violations. They also pursued a South Korean freighter on 4 May. On 7 May, the Khmer navy seized a Panamanian-flagged ship near the island of Poulo Wai and questioned its crew for more than 36 hours. Five days later, the Khmer navy fired on a Swedish vessel in the same area. On that same day, the Khmer Rouge dispatched a company-sized unit to occupy Poulo Wai. None of the merchant ships operating off the coast of Cambodia knew about this transfer.
Cambodia asserted its sovereignty twelve nautical miles outward from the shoreline of its mainland and all claimed islands — and had done so since 1969. In 1975, Poulo Wai Island was a potential site for oil exploration, explaining Cambodia’s sensitivity to foreign trespass. The US had no interest in Poulo Wai other than suppressing what it believed to be a base for Cambodian pirates’ operations.
On 12 May, the US container ship SS Mayaguez (owned by Sea-Land, Inc.) transited near Poulo Wai en route from Hong Kong to Sattahip, Thailand. At 1418, a Khmer navy swift boat approached Mayaguez and fired a shot across her bow. Seven Khmer Rouge seamen boarded Mayaguez and ordered the captain to proceed to Poulo Wai. The ship transmitted a mayday, which was picked up by an Australian vessel. Mayaguez was carrying 107 cargo containers, 77 of which were US government and military cargo — including material from the United States Embassy in Saigon.
SS Mayaguez’ SOS call prompted notification to the US Embassy Jakarta, which transmitted the information to the National Military Command Center in Washington. The National Security staff notified President Ford of the incident the next morning (Washington time). Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger urged Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to direct the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command, Admiral Noel Gayler, to launch a reconnaissance aircraft to locate Mayaguez — but even before any analysis of photographs, Kissinger and Deputy National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft had already decided that the crisis deserved a decisive response. In the wake of the United States’ recent withdrawal from Cambodia and Vietnam, both Kissinger and Scowcroft believed that the US’s reputation was at stake. Presidential advisors also wanted to avoid another USS Pueblo incident. President Ford directed Kissinger to petition China for its help in releasing the Mayaguez.
President Ford and Kissinger drafted a press release to the American public stating that the seizure of a US-flagged ship was an act of piracy. Technically, it was no such thing. Meanwhile, Secretary Schlesinger ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to locate the ship and undertake measures to prevent its movement to the Cambodian mainland. Kissinger sent a terse note to the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington demanding the “immediate release” of the ship and its crew. The Chinese liaison office refused to accept the message, however — apparently, the Chinese were not in the mood for accepting demands from a country recently defeated by a nation of rice farmers.
In compliance with Schlesinger’s instructions, the Pacific command launched aerial reconnaissance missions from the Philippines and Thailand and diverted the USS Coral Sea from its course en route to Australia. Pacific Command also dispatched a guided-missile destroyer with escort toward Mayaguez’s last known location. Admiral Gayler also issued a warning order to the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), placing them on standby. III MEF passed the mission through the 3rd Marine Division to the 9th Marine Regiment on Okinawa and to the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines (1/4) at Subic Bay, Philippine Islands. As a rapid reaction company from 1/4 assembled at Cubi Point Naval Air Station for possible airlift to Thailand, a Battalion Landing Team (BLT) from the 9th Marines began its pre-deployment procedures on Okinawa.
On 13 May, an Orion aircraft identified a significant radar return near Poulo Wai and dropped flares on the suspected location of Mayaguez. Young Khmer Rouge sailors, believing that they were under attack, opened fire. Both photo-reconnaissance aircraft, already low on fuel, withdrew. Replacement aircraft also received gunfire from Khmer ground forces.
Within a few hours after seizing the ship, the Khmer navy officials ordered the master of the Mayaguez, Captain Miller, to get underway. He was instructed to follow a swift boat toward the Northeast. Orion aircraft continued to track the ship’s movement. Admiral Gayler ordered the Commanding General, 7th US Air Force, Lieutenant General John J. Burns, USAF, to assume operational control over US military recovery efforts. Burns marshaled rotary-wing aircraft for a possible air assault mission.
A flight of two F-111’s marked the ship’s position, which was then nearing Koh Tang Island. Soon after, F-4 Phantoms arrived and began firing into the water ahead of Mayaguez, indicating to Captain Miller that he was to halt. It was then that the Khmer naval commander ordered the ship’s crew into two fishing boats for transfer to Koh Tang Island.
Meanwhile, the Navy’s flotilla — Coral Sea, Holt, and Wilson — signaled that they would not arrive on station until 15 May. None of these ships carried a Marine landing force. USS Hancock (CVA-19), with a small contingent of Marines, would not arrive until 16 May, and USS Okinawa (LPH-3), with a BLT, would not arrive until 18 May.
On Okinawa, III MAF assigned the Special Landing Force (Task Force 79.9) to recover Mayaguez. Company D, 1/4 was designated as the unit that would actually take Mayaguez, but General Burns wanted a more significant force. Ultimately, the 3rdMarDiv assigned BLT 2/9 as its air assault force. The battalion flew to Thailand on the morning of 14 May. Only a few of the 1,100 officers and NCOs of 2/9 had any combat experience.
Seventh US Air Force earmarked nineteen of its helicopters to participate in the air assault. Nine of these were HH-53C (Jolly Green) aircraft, and ten were CH-53s. The HH-bird was capable of aerial refueling; the CH-53 was not. Meanwhile, General Burns developed a plan to re-take Mayaguez with an assault force from the 56th Security Police Squadron. He intended to drop 75 SPS volunteers on the containers aboard the ship on 14 May.
En route to Cambodia’s Southeast coastal region, one of the CH-53s (call sign Knife 13) crashed, killing all on board (18 police and five crewmen). President Ford subsequently canceled General Burns’ plan because, beyond the loss of one aircraft and 23 men, these large helicopters were too heavy to land on shipping containers. Instead, President Ford decided to await the arrival of the Navy and Marines. However, President Ford ordered Burns to stop any Cambodian boats moving between Koh Tang and the mainland.
Early on 14 May, at Koh Tang, the Khmer navy loaded the Mayaguez crew onto a fishing vessel and, with an escort of two swift boats, headed toward the mainland at Kampong Som. Air Force F-4s, A-7s, and an AC-130 gunship sunk one fast boat and convinced another to turn back. Orbiting pilots reported the presence of 30 to 40 Caucasians on the fishing boat. One senior pilot opined that he might be able to shoot the rudder off the fishing boat to stop its progress.
By this time, communicators had established a link between the White House situation room, the Pacific Command in Hawaii, and General Burns’ headquarters at Nakhon Phanom. General Burns relayed the pilot’s idea for shooting off the fishing boat’s rudder to the White House, which NSC staffers immediately denied. Ford decided that if anything, the Air Force should only drop tear gas onto the fishing boat but gave the go-ahead to sink all patrol boats.
Acting JCS Chairman, U. S. Air Force General David C. Jones, provided the NSC staff with a range of military options. One major complication for the rescue operation was that no one knew for certain the Mayaguez crewmen’s location. There was a long list of things the forward area commander didn’t know.
The NSC decided to proceed with a Marine assault to retake Mayaguez with a simultaneous attack by Air Force and Navy assets on Koh Tang and against Khmer naval vessels.
The Air Force’s tear gas assault did not affect the fishing boat, and it proceeded to Kampong Som. Upon arrival, the ranking Khmer area commander wisely refused to allow the boat to dock; he anticipated a massive retaliatory attack by American aircraft. The redirected fishing boat proceeded to Koh Rang Sanloem undetected by orbiting aircraft.
Marines from Delta Company 1/4 arrived in Thailand during the early-morning hours of 14 May; insofar as the American high command knew, the Cambodians detained crew members at Kampong Som, so higher authority canceled the planned assault on Mayaguez. Delta Company Marines did what they always do … they waited for someone higher on the totem pole to make up their minds. Meanwhile, Marines from BLT 2/9 began arriving at U-Tapao, Thailand.
That afternoon, President Ford ordered General Burns to proceed with a simultaneous assault on Koh Tang and Mayaguez; the assault would begin at sunrise on 15 May. Since the Americans had no information about Koh Tang, the 2/9 Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Randall W. Austin, and his operations officer boarded a Beechcraft U-21 to conduct aerial reconnaissance of the island.
The problem with Colonel Austin’s aerial reconnaissance was that he could not get close enough to the island to see anything worthwhile without compromising the upcoming assault. All Colonel Austin could tell about Koh Tang for sure was that heavy jungle foliage covered the island and that there were only three (potential) landing zones for an air assault. He found two of these on the northern section of the island, which he designated East Beach and West Beach, and another beach located center of the island’s eastern shore. The center beach was too narrow for vertical assault operations.
From photographs taken by reconnaissance flights, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimated an enemy footprint of between 150-200 Khmer Rouge with heavy weapons. Colonel Austin never received this information; he proceeded with his planning on the generally held assumption that only a small number of Khmer navy irregulars were on the island.
Austin planned a two-company air assault, assigning the mission to Company E and Company G (Echo and Golf) 2/9. They would fly to Koh Tang aboard three USAF CH-53s and three USAF HH-53Cs to seize and hold Koh Tang. Two additional helicopters would make a diversionary thrust toward West Beach; the main assault would occur at East Beach. From that East Beach, Austin planned to proceed to a small compound believed to be the location of Mayaguez’s crewmen. Flight time from U-Tapao to Koh Tang was two hours.
Fifty-seven Marines from Delta Company 1/4, including a detachment of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technicians, a team of volunteers from the Military Sealift Command, and a Cambodian linguist, were transferred by helicopter to USS Holt, from which they would re-take Mayaguez.
Acting JCS Chairman Jones briefed President Ford and the NSC Staff on the operation plan. Jones wanted to incorporate B-52s from Guam in bombing Kampong Som and the Ream Naval Base, but the president believed the B-52s were “excessive” and limited aerial bombing to carrier-based aircraft. With that modification, President Ford approved the operation and gave the go-ahead.
None of the Mayaguez crewmen were at Koh Tang. Moreover, island defenses included around 150 Khmer defenders. These troops had not been placed on Koh Tang to counter an American assault but rather to prevent a Vietnamese takeover of the island. The island’s commander had set up two heavy machine gun emplacements on East Beach with interlocking fires and well-developed defensive positions every twenty or so meters behind a sand berm. The commander also set up one heavy machine gun at West Beach and armed those defenders with RPGs, 75-mm recoilless rifles, and mortars.
Meanwhile, the senior Khmer commander at Rong Sang Lem interviewed Captain Miller. Miller was asked to contact the American military and persuade them to call off their anticipated attack; the Cambodian did not want an engagement with the Americans. Miller told this commander that if he could return to the ship, restart her engines, it may be possible to contact his company in Bangkok, and they, in turn, could communicate with the US military. The Cambodian military commander decided to return Captain Miller and nine of his crew to the ship the following day.
The operation to retake Mayaguez occurred the next morning, beginning at about 0600. Delta Company Marines successfully conducted one of the few hostile ship-to-ship boarding operations since the American Civil War; the ship was secure within an hour.
On to Koh Tang
At about the same time, eight USAF helicopters approached the Koh Tang landing zones. At West Beach, the first helicopter section (two aircraft) to arrive received heavy machine gunfire. The aircraft with call-sign Knife 21 safely offloaded its Marines, but enemy fire destroyed one of its engines. After disembarking the Marines, Knife 21 struggled into the air only to ditch two miles offshore. Inbound Knife 22 also received damage while in-flight, forcing it to withdraw with Marines still on board — including the Gulf Company commander.
Thirty minutes later, CH-53s approached East Beach and encountered intense automatic weapons and RPG fire. Knife 31 was hit by two RPGs, causing it to crash in a ball of fire fifty meters offshore. The aircraft’s co-pilot, five Marines, and two Navy corpsmen were killed in the crash; another Marine drowned while swimming away from the wreck. Three additional Marines were killed by Khmer automatic weapons while trying to reach the shoreline. Ten surviving Marines and three USAF crewmen were forced to swim for two hours before being rescued from the sea. Among the surviving Marines was the battalion’s forward air controller, who used a USAF survival radio to call in A-7 strikes against the enemy position — doing so until the radio’s batteries failed.
An RPG hit Knife 23, which blew off the aircraft’s tail section, causing it to crash land on East Beach. Twenty Marines and five aircraft crewmen safely exited the aircraft and set up a hasty defensive perimeter. Knife 23’s co-pilot used his survival radio to direct airstrikes. This group remained cut off for twelve hours.
Knife 32, inbound to East Beach, was hit by an RPG and aborted its landing. After dumping his fuel, the pilot proceeded to rescue three of Knife 21’s crewmen. The remaining inbound helicopters were diverted from East Beach to West Beach and landed their Marines; an AC-130 gunship, call-sign Specter, was called in to suppress Cambodian defensive fires. Knife 32, Jolly 41, and Jolly 42 eventually landed 81 Marines on West Beach. Gulf Company’s executive officer assumed command; Jolly 43 landed 29 Marines a half-mile further southwest.
By 0700, 109 Marines and five USAF crewmen were on Koh Tang, but in three isolated beach areas, each in close contact with Khmer Rouge defenders. Marines on the northern end of West Beach attempted to link up with Colonel Austin’s command element but were beaten back by overwhelming enemy fire. Lance Corporal Ashton Loney lost his life in this attempt. Although isolated, the Marines could employ their 81-mm mortars for fire support, and communicators set up a makeshift radio net for directing air support operations.
An effort to extract the Marines on East Beach failed when Jolly 13 received severe damage in the attempt; with fuel lines ruptured, the aircraft flew to Rayong, Thailand. Of the eight birds assaulting Koh Tang, enemy fire destroyed three and damaged five birds sufficiently to remove them from further operations. Because only three helicopters of the assault force remained operational, two aircraft initially assigned to sea and rescue operations, Knife 51 and Knife 52, became part of the airlift element. These five birds picked up the second wave of the Marine assault force and headed back toward Koh Tang. Enemy fire damaged the fuel lines of Knife 52, which had to abort its landing; Knife 41 and Jolly 43 likewise aborted their landings and remained in a holding pattern offshore.
Meanwhile, Cambodia’s press minister announced that the crew of Mayaguez would be released and went further to explain why the ship had been “detained” in the first place. The White House then engaged the Cambodian government in a war of press releases. President Ford immediately took credit for the release of Mayaguez crew members when their release had nothing to do with Ford. Meanwhile, the president ordered airstrikes to continue until the successful withdrawal of the assault force.
Acting JCS Chairman Jones determined that since the Mayaguez’s crew had been returned to US control, there was no reason to reinforce the Marines at Koh Tang. The JCS notified all American forces to “ceasefire” and withdraw. General Burns ordered the return of Austin’s second wave, but Austin convinced him that reinforcements were needed to prevent the Khmer Rouge from overrunning the Marine positions. Austin ordered an additional one hundred additional Marines ashore. At that point, there were 225 Americans on Koh Tang, 205 Marines on West Beach, and 20 Marines and five airmen at East Beach.
By 1400, enemy fire at West Beach had diminished substantially; the Khmer defenders’ main force had moved back from the shoreline with a minimal force remaining to keep pressure on the Marines. Colonel Austin contacted the airborne command post for permission to push across the northern end of the Island to link up with the isolated Marines at East Beach. He was advised to hold until another helicopter extraction attempt was made. Jolly 11 and Jolly 43 made their attempt at 1415 but were repulsed by heavy fire. Jolly 43 was forced to land aboard the Coral Sea. Jolly 43’s pilot reported that he had received fire from one of the swift boats partially sunk the previous day. A-7’s soon arrived to destroy the boat.
At 1610, a USAF OV-10, call-sign Nail 68, arrived to take over air support functions above Koh Tang. The arrival of Nail 68 was the first time the Marines had dedicated overhead fire support direction. At 1700, the Khmer Rouge commander moved his men back to a previously established ammo dump. Thus, resupplied with ammunition, the Khmer Rouge could re-engage the Marines. At 1815, Jolly 11, though sustaining battle damage, was able to extract the Marines and airmen from East Beach. Once the bird was clear, a C-130 dropped a daisy-cutter 15,000-pound bomb on the area of East Beach. The bomb’s massive shockwave extended over the Marines at West Beach. Colonel Austin directed that no more such bombs be employed, as they endangered his Marines.
In the darkness of the night, Knife 51, Jolly 43 (hastily repaired), Jolly 44 (brought online from a repair facility at Nakhom Phanom) began extracting the Marines from West Beach. Knife 51 extracted forty-one Marines and flew them to the Coral Sea. Jolly 43 extracted fifty-four Marines. As Jolly 44 picked up forty-four Marines, the 66 remaining Marines came under intensive Khmer fire and were in danger of being overrun.
The flight time to Coral Sea was around thirty minutes; to shorten the extraction time, First Lieutenant Robert Blough, USAF, delivered his Marines to USS Holt, which in a moonless night was a difficult maneuver. Once the Marines had been offloaded, Blough returned to Koh Tang and picked up an additional thirty-four Marines. Lieutenant Blough, whose aircraft began experiencing mechanical issues, flew the Marines to Coral Sea.
At 2000, Knife 51 landed and began loading Marines in the dark. The only light available came from the muzzle flashes of enemy weapons. Captain Davis and Gunnery Sergeant McNemar began combing the beach, looking for stragglers. USAF Technical Sergeant Wayne Fisk stood on the ramp of his aircraft as two additional Marines appeared from the brush. Fisk asked Davis if all his Marines were accounted for; Davis replied in the affirmative. Nevertheless, Fisk combed the beach one last time, looking for stragglers and finding none, Knife 51 launched for the Coral Sea.
Because of the intensive enemy fire and no way to communicate with the Khmer defenders, the bodies of Marines and airmen killed in action were left where they fell, including LCpl Loney at West Beach.
As the Air Force birds pulled Marines off the beach, the Marine’s defensive perimeter was contracted to facilitate force protection. Lance Corporal John S. Standfast, the squad leader of the third squad, third platoon, Echo Company, provided cover for Gulf Company during its withdrawal; Standfast directed the pullback of his own men. As his men contracted, he and platoon guide Sergeant Anderson continually checked to account for all hands. Before boarding his extraction helicopter, the Echo Company commander, Captain Mike Stahl, informed Captain Davis from Gulf Company that all his men were inside the perimeter. Captain Stahl did not realize that three Marines of one of his machine gun teams had set up a firing position behind a rocky outcrop beyond the perimeter’s right flank.
As Knife 51 lifted off, Marines began insisting that some of the men were missing. Knife 51’s pilot, First Lieutenant Brims, radioed the FAC that he believed there were still Marines on the island. Captain Davis assured the FAC that all Marines were off-island. Two hours later, Captain Stahl discovered three of his Marines were missing: Lance Corporal Joe Hargrove, Private First Class Gary Hall, and Private Danny Marshall — the machine gun team — were missing. Sergeant Anderson was the last to see these Marines alive when he ordered them back to the shrinking perimeter.
At 2020, USAF Staff Sergeant Robert Veilie at the airborne command post received a radio transmission from an unidentified American asking when the next helicopter was coming to pick them up. Veilie authenticated the transmission and radioed to advise Holt that Marines were still on the island. Holt instructed Veilie to pass the instruct the Marines to swim out to sea where they could be rescued. The Marines declined because only one of the three Marines could swim. Veilie advised the caller to take cover since airstrikes were scheduled at their likely position. After acknowledging Veilie’s instructions, whomever Veilie talked to went off the air, and no more was heard from him.
Aboard Coral Sea, the Commander, Task Force 73, Rear Admiral Robert P. Coogan, met with Colonel Austin, Commander Coulter, who had just arrived from Subic Bay with a 14-man Seal Team, Captain Davis, and Gunnery Sergeant McNemar to discuss possible courses of action. Admiral Coogan suggested that Coulter take the Wilson’s gig ashore at first light with a white flag to see if he could recover the remains of those killed in action and any possible stragglers. Coulter was cool to the idea; he preferred taking his men ashore for a nighttime reconnaissance. Coogan refused this notion; his orders from COMSEVENTHFLT were to cease hostilities — and he had no confirmation that these “missing” men were still alive. Despite Wilson’s efforts to spot Marines between East Beach and West Beach, which included cruising offshore and loudspeaker announcements in English and Cambodian, there was no indication that the three Marines were still alive. Moreover, Coogan was certain more lives would be lost during any forced rescue attempt.
On 16 May, Hargrove, Hall, and Marshall were declared “missing in action.” On 21 July 1976, all three Marines were reported Killed in Action, bodies not recovered.
Except — they weren’t.
In 1999, the Khmer Rouge commander at Koh Tang Island approached the Joint Task Force for Full Accounting, who advertised that they were looking for additional information about Koh Tang’s event. The man’s name was Em Son. According to his memory, on the morning of 16 May, he ordered his men to search the West Beach for any remaining Americans. Around a hundred meters into the search, one of the Khmer defenders was hit by M-16 fire. The Cambodians fired mortars into the area and captured a wounded Marine. Em Son’s description of the man matched that of Joseph Hargrove. The Cambodians continued their search and located an abandoned M60 machine gun and other various equipment. A few minutes later, the Khmer discovered the body of a black Marine, believed to be LCpl Loney. They buried Loney and took their wounded prisoner to Em Son. When the wounded Khmer soldier died, Em Son ordered Hargrove executed.
Em Son also testified that about a week later, he and his men noticed that their food stores were being disturbed. On searching, they discovered boot prints in the soil. They set up a night ambush and, on the third night of their vigil, they captured two Americans. Em Son’s descriptions matched those of Gary Hall and Danny Marshall. On instructions from Kampong Som, the two Americans were taken to the mainland and transferred to the Ti Near Pagoda, where they were stripped to their underwear and shackled. A week later, on orders from Phnom Penh, each prisoner was beaten to death with, he said, a B-40 rocket launcher. Hall’s body was buried in a shallow grave near the beach; Marshall’s body was dumped into a nearby cove.
The next of kin of all three of these abandoned Marines received the Purple Heart Medal. They weren’t the only casualties. In total, forty-one Americans were killed in the rescue of Mayaguez — one more American serviceman killed than the whole crew saved in the operation. These casualty numbers reflect the 23 SPS and aircrewmen who died in the helicopter crash, the 18 killed assaulting Koh Tang Island (which includes Hargrove, Hall, and Marshall), and eighty personnel wounded or injured during the operation.
Caro, R. A. The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent. New York: Random House, 1991.
Lamb, C. J. The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and Civil-Military Relations. Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, 2018.
Rumsfeld, D. When the Center Held: Gerald Ford and the Rescue of the American Presidency. New York: Free Press, 2018.
Shafer, J. “The Honest Graft of Lady Bird Johnson: How she and Lyndon came by their millions.” Slate Magazine, 16 July 2007.
 I have no evidence suggesting that this claim had any merit. I will only observe that if it was true, it was very poor headwork inside the CIA and shipping company boardrooms if they agreed to conduct it.
 Cambodia had long claimed a twelve-mile territorial limit of adjacent seas. Its national policy toward seizing, detaining, questioning maritime crews had been in effect since 1969. Most countries since 1982 claim a twelve-mile territorial limit. But in 1975, the United States (and many other countries) only recognized a three-mile territorial limit.
 A major shareholder in Land-Sea/Maersk was none other than the wife of President Lyndon B. Johnson, Lady Bird Johnson. According to Robert A. Caro, the Pulitzer Prize winning biographer of President Johnson (The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent), Johnson used his political power and influence to build her fortune beginning in 1943. “Johnson had worked at politics for years to achieve power; now he was working at politics to make money.” According to award winning journalist Jack Shafer, “Under Texas law, Lyndon Johnson owned half of her profits.” The truth of Johnson’s Indochina War may thus be revealed to us; he, as a sitting president, profited from the war through his wife ownership of stock in a company that became the primary shipper logistics and war materials to the Republic of Vietnam.
 America’s reputation was already a shamble since Harry S. Truman’s gross incompetence involved us in the easily avoided Korean War (which, as of this date, technically still continues) and laid the foundation for similar events in Indochina eleven years later.
USS Pueblo (AGER-2), initially constructed for the US Army as a freight and supply ship during World War II, was transferred to the US Navy in April 1966 as a light cargo ship. Her subsequent designation as an environmental research vessel was a cover for her real purpose, signals intelligence (known informally as a “Spy Ship”). In early 1968, USS Pueblo engaged in surveilling Soviet naval activity off the Japanese coast and gathered electronic intelligence from North Korea. Claiming that Pueblo was illegally operating in North Korean waters (North Korea at the time claimed 50 nautical miles of sovereign territory), North Korean gunboats fired upon Pueblo (killing one crewman), seized the ship, interned the crew as prisoners of war, mistreated the crew, tortured the ship’s commander, and demanded a written apology by the US government as a condition of releasing the crew. The United States signed the admission, and the North Koreans released the crew in late 1968 but retained possession of the ship and all of its highly classified material (hardware and software).
that the process does not become a monster. —Nietzsche
We cannot begin to demonstrate an understanding of history’s great tragedies until we appreciate and acknowledge the strengths and weaknesses of the men who shaped them. Occasionally, high officials’ statements and behaviors reveal who they were, how they reasoned, and how they arrived at decisions that affected tens of thousands of other human beings. Of course, people are complex animals, and we are all flawed in some ways. Knowing that people are flawed should give those of us living in democracies something to think about before choosing our national leaders.
As one example, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was a man who had no qualms about developing atomic weapons or approving chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, but he was consistently an anti-colonialist and sympathetic to popular independence/nationalist movements. Roosevelt’s compassion, coupled with his moralism, limited his interest in colonialism to work performed by missionaries in far distant places unknown to most Americans. It was Roosevelt’s anti-colonial sentiments that brought him to loggerheads with other leaders of the allied powers — notably Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle.
Mr. Roosevelt believed colonialism opened the door to secret diplomacy, which led to bloody conflicts. These deeply held beliefs created tensions between Roosevelt, Churchill, and de Gaulle. Both Churchill and de Gaulle intended to re-engage their pre-World War II colonial interests — including those in Southeast Asia and North Africa.
But Roosevelt, the pragmatist, also kept his focus on winning the war against Germany and Japan. To achieve that primary objective, he curbed his anti-colonial sentiments throughout most of the war — with some exceptions. Roosevelt, for example, did not hesitate to signal his belief that the people of Indochina (present-day Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) were much better off without French meddling in their internal affairs. After World War II, Roosevelt intended to “push” France toward an agreement placing its Southeast Asian colonies into an international trusteeship — a first step, Roosevelt believed — toward achieving Indochinese independence.
Unfortunately, Franklin D. Roosevelt died in office on 12 April 1945 — before the end of the Second World War. Whatever his intentions toward Southeast Asia, it was left unfulfilled. Upon Roosevelt’s death, Harry S. Truman ascended to the presidency, and Truman was an entirely different man. Truman did not share Roosevelt’s anti-colonialist sentiments; he was more concerned about maintaining good relations with the United Kingdom and France. As a result, America’s world war allies had little trouble retaining their colonial holdings once the war was over. When nationalist leader Ho Chi Minh announced Viet Nam’s independence in 1945, Truman ignored him — preferring instead to back De Gaulle.
In fact, Truman developed no distinct policy toward Indochina until around 1947 and only then because of the re-emergence of the Soviet Union and its totalitarian power over most of Eastern Europe and not until Winston Churchill forewarned of a clash between communism and capitalism — his now-famous Iron Curtain speech in 1946. Always “slow on the up-take,” or if not that, then his preoccupation with post-war US domestic policy, the Iron Curtain speech, and George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” nudged Truman’s attention toward the Soviet Union, Europe, and the domino theory of global communism.
The Truman Doctrine led US foreign policy toward two interrelated goals — the first being an ambitious (American taxpayer-funded) program designed to rebuild a massively destroyed Europe as a democratic, capitalist dominated, pro-US collection of nations and a global defense against Soviet-style communism. The first of these attentions went to Greece and Turkey but soon extended into East and Southeast Asia, as well. The connection between events in Europe and far-distant Indochina was the re-established colonial empires of Great Britain and France, precisely the clash between French colonialism and the Vietnamese nationalist Ho Chi Minh, which began in 1945.
In 1943, the outcome of the Pacific war was inevitable: Japan would lose. What remained uncertain was how many allied troops would perish if it became necessary to invade the Japanese home islands. Encouraged, perhaps, by Italy’s campaign against Abyssinia in 1939, the US Army contracted with the University of Illinois (Urbana/Champaign) and a botanist/bioethicist named Arthur Galston to study the effects of chemical compounds (notably, dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4-D) and trichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4,5-T)) on cereal grains (including rice) and broadleaf crops.
What Galston discovered was that certain chemicals could be used to defoliate vegetation. It was from this discovery that the question arose — how best to disperse such chemicals?
Since the beginning of powered flight, highly placed civilian and military officials have debated aeronautics’ utility in conflict. During the First World War, French, British, and American forces employed airpower to counter enemy aircraft, perform intelligence gathering functions, attack enemy observation balloons, and drop bombs on enemy troop and artillery concentrations. In the Second World War, the allied powers refrained from using chemical and biological weapons — perhaps out of fear that the enemy would reciprocate its use — and (mostly) confined its lethal air assault to enemy industrial and transportation centers. There were two exceptions, however. Fire-bombing destroyed Dresden, Germany, Tokyo, Japan — and the civilians who lived in those cities. It was a travesty surpassed only by the use of atomic weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in early August 1945 — the point being that aerial delivery of weapons or other means of mass destruction was not a new phenomenon among the world’s first nations.
In early 1945, the US Army tested various chemical mixtures at the Bushnell Army Airfield in Florida. These tests were so successful that the US began planning to use defoliants against Japan — should it become necessary to invade the home islands. The people working on the application of chemical warfare did not know about the Manhattan Project. Because of the use of two atomic bombs in Japan, the allied invasion of the home islands was unnecessary — and neither was the use of herbicides.
Nevertheless, Great Britain and the United States continued their evaluations of defoliants’ use in the years following World War II. The Americans tested well over 1,100 chemical compounds in various field tests, and the British conducted similar tests in India and Australia. The first western nation to deploy chemical defoliants in conflict was the United Kingdom during the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960).
By the mid-1950s, events unfolding in Southeast Asia were already leading the United States toward an unmitigated disaster in foreign policy and economic expenditures. In 1961, given the “success” of the use of defoliants on the Malaysian Peninsula, American and Vietnamese officials began to consider their service in Vietnam, as well.
Even before President Lyndon Johnson escalated the United States’ involvement in Vietnam, war planners realized that the region’s dense foliage would challenge those involved in ground and air campaigns. This factor led to Operation Ranch Hand — a U. S. Air Force effort between 1961-1971 to reduce jungle vegetation and deny food sources to North Vietnamese troops and Viet Cong insurgents by spraying the dense forests with an estimated 20-million gallons of various herbicides. The Air Force concoction, code-named Agent Orange, contained the deadly chemical dioxin, later proven to cause cancer, congenital disabilities, rashes, and severe psychological and neurological problems among those exposed to it and their offspring.
Elmo Russell “Bud” Zumwalt accepted an appointment to the US Naval Academy in 1939. Upon graduation, he was commissioned an Ensign on 10 June 1942. Upon selection to Rear Admiral (Lower Half), Zumwalt assumed overall command of Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Seven in 1965. As Rear Admiral (Upper Half), Zumwalt became Commander, US Naval Forces (Vietnam) and Chief, U. S. Naval Advisory Group within the USMACV. In 1968, he was promoted to Vice Admiral and served as the principal navy advisor to US Army General Creighton Abrams, serving as Commander, MACV.
Zumwalt’s command was part of the “brown water” navy, which in his advisory capacity, controlled the Navy’s swift boats that patrolled the coasts, harbors, and river systems of South Vietnam. Among his subordinate boat commanders was his son, Elmo Russell Zumwalt III (and John F. Kerry). The brown water navy also included Task Force 115 (Coastal Surveillance Force), Task Force 116 (River Patrol Force), and Task Force 117 (Joint Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force).
In 1968, the United States had been fully engaged in the Vietnam War for three years. No one wants to fight a never-ending war, not the people who have to fight in it, not the people back home who suffer the loss of loved ones, and not the politicians whose popularity and careers are diminished by unhappy citizens. American war planners wanted to turn the war over to Vietnamese military officials to decide their fate vis-à-vis the conflict with North Vietnam. This task of turning the war over to the Vietnamese government was called Vietnamization, first implemented by President Richard M. Nixon. Nixon, who previously served as Eisenhower’s vice president, wanted the United States out of the Vietnam conflict — but with honor.
To achieve Vietnamization, the “press was on” to move Vietnamese military forces as quickly as possible to the point where they could take over the war, allowing the United States to withdraw their forces. President Nixon didn’t want to hear any excuses about how or why USMACV could not achieve it.
Admiral Zumwalt related the story of how he attended a briefing with General Abrams in 1968 when the discussion emerged about how soon the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) might assume control of the air war over South Vietnam. A senior US Air Force officer opined that the VNAF might be ready as early as 1976. Abrahams threw a fit … Vietnamization was taking too long, and the Air Force didn’t seem to understand that MACV didn’t have eight more years to fool around with the project. When it was Zumwalt’s turn to speak, he laid out his plan for increasing the pace of Vietnamization among the riverine forces. This moment was when the Admiral made his fateful decision to increase defoliation along South Vietnam’s inland waterways. Zumwalt later said that he specifically checked with the Air Force about possible harmful effects of Agent Orange on US personnel; he said, “We were told there were none.”
But in 1988, Dr. James Clary, a USAF researcher associated with Operation Ranch Hand, wrote to Senator Tom Daschle, stating, “When we initiated the herbicide program in the 1960s, we were aware of the potential damage [to humans] due to dioxin contamination in the herbicide. However, because the material was to be used on the enemy, none of us was overly concerned. We never considered a scenario in which our own personnel would become contaminated with the herbicide.”
Admiral Zumwalt’s son was diagnosed with stage four non-Hodgkins lymphoma in 1983; in 1985, doctors also discovered stage three Hodgkins (another form of lymphoma). Elmo R. Zumwalt III died in 1988, 42-years old. His son, Elmo R. Zumwalt IV, suffers from congenital dysfunction that confuses his physical senses. In 1985, Admiral Zumwalt told the press, “I do not have any guilt feelings because I was convinced then, and I am convinced now, that the use of Agent Orange saved literally hundreds and maybe thousands of lives.”
The Admiral could not have been more wrong as to the effects of Agent Orange and “saving lives.” The consequences of using dioxin to defoliate Vietnam’s dense jungle ended up killing up to 40,000 American servicemen, causing untold sickness and suffering to their offspring and killing as many as four million Vietnamese civilians. Agent Orange killed his son — and the effect of this incomprehensible decision continues to manifest itself in 2021. Admiral Zumwalt passed away in 2000 from mesothelioma. He was 79 years old – he outlived his son by twelve years.
Associated Press (Online). “Elmo Zumwalt, Son of Admiral, Dies at Age 42.” 13 August 1988.
Clark, C. S. and Levy, A. Sprectre Orange.The Guardian.com. 2003.
Mach, J. T. Before Vietnam: Understanding the Initial Stages of US Involvement in Southeast Asia, 1945-1949. Centennial Library: Cedarville University, 2018.
Stellman, J. M. and Stellman, S. D., Christian, R., Weber, T., and Tomasallo, C. The Extent and Patterns of Usage of Agent Orange and other herbicides in Vietnam. School of Public Health, Columbia University, 2002.
Veterans and Agent Orange. National Academies, Institute of Medicine, Committee to Review Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans of Exposure to Herbicides, 2012.
Vietnam Express (online). Due Hoang, Hoang Phuong, Dien Luong. Out of Sight/Out of Mind: Vietnam’s Forgotten Agent Orange Victims, 2017.
Zumwalt, E. Jr., and Zumwalt, E. III. Agent Orange and the Anguish of an American Family. New York: New York Times Magazine, 1986.
 On 5 March 1946, then former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill condemned the Soviet Union’s policies in Europe, declaring that “… an iron curtain has descended across the [European] continent.” It was the opening volley of the Cold War.
 George F. Kennan (1904-2005) was one of the US’ foreign policy wise men. He was a historian and diplomat who advocated a containment policy toward the Soviet Union and helped Truman formulate the so-called Truman Doctrine.
 British forces entered Indochina in rather substantial numbers to accept the surrender of Imperial Japanese forces at the end of World War II. Free French forces re-entered Vietnam soon after and observing the growing discord between French legionnaires and Vietnamese nationalists, and with no desire to be caught between the two, the British forces soon withdrew. British colonial forces concentrated on their interests in Malaya (which also became a hotbed for communist inspired nationalism), Singapore, and Hong Kong.
 Raids conducted by my than 1,400 allied aircraft between 13-15 February 1945, resulting in 25,000 civilian deaths.
 Part of Operation Meeting House conducted on 9-10 March 1945 is the single most destructive bombing raid in human history. It destroyed 16 square miles of central Tokyo and killed about 100,000 people.
Captain George W. Sachtleben, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines
In January 1969, responsibility for combat operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ) (Also, I Corps), which included the five northern-most provinces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) rested with the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), who was then Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr. Cushman commanded 81,000 Marine and Army combat troops situated throughout the Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai.
(a) Major General Charles J. Quilter commanded 15,500 Marines of the First Marine Aircraft Wing (1stMAW), which included 500 fixed and rotary wing aircraft at Chu Lai, Da Nang, Phu Bai, and Quang Tri.
(b) Major General Ormond R. Simpson commanded the 1st Marine Division (1stMarDiv) just outside Da Nang, a force of 24,000 ground-combat Marines primarily assigned to Quang Nam Province.
(c) Major General Raymond G. Davis commanded the 3rd Marine Division (3rdMarDiv), 21,000 ground-combat Marines from Dong Ha, whose primary responsibility was Quang Tri Province.
(d) An additional 10,000 Marines provided combat logistics support to the MAW and two infantry divisions under Brigadier General James A. Feely, Jr., at Da Nang.
(e) An additional 1,900 Marines served in the Combined Action Program under Colonel Edward F. Danowitz — tasked with providing local area security to local villages and hamlets.
(f) In addition to these Marines, III MAF controlled combat operations involving a force of 50,000 U. S. Army troops involving elements of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Colonel James M. Gibson, Commanding, the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) under Major General Melvin Zais, both Army units serving under the US XXIV Corps, Lieutenant General Richard G. Stilwell, U. S. Army, based at Phu Bai.
(g) An additional 23,800 soldiers of Major General Charles M. Getty’s 23rd Infantry (Americal) Division operated in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces.
(h) General Cushman also exercised operational control over the United States Army Advisory Group (USAAG), who advised and assisted RVN military units operating in the I CTZ.
Enemy forces operating in RVN’s I CTZ included 123 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) battalions and 18 Viet Cong (irregular) (VC) battalions involving 90,000 troops. There were additionally around 23,500 guerrillas and 16,000 political and quasi-military cadres and another 30,000 North Vietnamese regulars operating in Laos but within striking distance of the I CTZ. These forces were controlled by five separate headquarters elements.
In January 1969, the communist forces were still reeling from their massive defeat during the Tet 68 campaign [Note 1]; it forced NVA and VC commands to reconsider their strategy for I CTZ. Rather than attempting to defeat the American and RVN forces through massive assault, they adopted the policy of prolonging the conflict through small unit hit and run tactics, sapper attacks, harassment, terrorism, and sabotage. Their focus became severing lines of communications, attacking rear area support bases, storage facilities, and defeating RVN’s pacification efforts. Driving these strategies and tactics was the differences in terrain from II CTZ to the northwestern areas of I CTZ. NVA regular units concentrated their forces in the uninhabited jungle-covered mountainous areas, close to border sanctuaries.
In the Marine Corps mindset, defense is a temporary tactic used to dig in for the night, or rest, regroup, and resupply their combat forces before continuing the attack. Locating the enemy, viciously attacking him, and destroying him is how wars are won. But this wasn’t the national policy of the United States. The mission in Vietnam was to defend South Vietnam — which gave up initiative to the enemy. Marine and Army commanders hated this with a passion, but those were their orders. But Major General Raymond G. Davis, commanding the 3rdMarDiv wasn’t about to sit around waiting for the enemy to attack him. Soon after assuming command of his division, he ordered his regimental commanders to go find the enemy, and kill him. General Cushman completely agreed with Davis’ thinking — as did Lieutenant General Herman Nickerson, Jr., when he replaced Cushman as CG III MAF on 26 March 1969.
General Davis’ idea of mobile operations depended on the helicopter, of course, but Ray Davis was no one trick pony. He also sought to exploit intelligence gathered by small sized reconnaissance patrols, which were continuously employed throughout the 3rdMarDiv TAOR, which supplemented electronic and other human intelligence sources. The recon patrols were called StingRay operations, who mission was to find, fix, and destroy the enemy with all available supporting arms. StingRay operations were augmented by even smaller “snoop and poop” patrols, known as Key Hole forays. Their mission was to “observe,” not engage.
On 9 April, Colonel Edward F. Danowitz [Note 2] relieved Colonel Robert H. Barrow as Commanding Officer, 9th Marines. Danowitz was determined to continue the aggressive operations planned and executed by Colonel Barrow under General Davis’ policy of finding the enemy and killing him.
Despite the success of the 9th Marines in Operation Dewey Canyon and the 3rd Marines in the Vietnam Salient, intelligence reports indicated that several regimental size enemy units were again infiltrating into the northern area of their Base Area 611, south of the salient, specifically elements of the 6th and 9th NVA regiments, the 675th Artillery Regiment, and various support elements. Air reconnaissance indicated as well that the NVA were repairing Route 922 and that significant numbers of enemy were returning to the A Shau Valley and eastward into Base Area 101, which was located astride the Quang Tri/Thua Thien political boundary.
To counter these enemy infiltrations, elements of the 3rdMarDiv and 101st Airborne were ordered to execute Operation Apache Snow in the northern A Shau Valley and southern Da Krong River Valley, cut the enemy supply and infiltration routes at the Laotian border, locate and destroy enemy forces, base camps, and supply caches. Operating under Lieutenant General Stilwell, XXIV commander, 1st Battalion and 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines (1/9 and 2/9) were assigned the task of occupying the southern Da Krong and blocking enemy escape routes into Laos along Route 922.
Movement to Contact
The 2/9 Commanding Officer was Lieutenant Colonel George C. Fox. Apache Snow began on 10 May when Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Culkin’s 1/9 leap-frogged over 2/9 and assaulted Fire Support Base Erskine, which overlooked the upper Da Krong and Route 922. For the Marines, the timing was perfect because the enemy units had yet to reconstitute infantry regiments following their defeat in Dewey Canyon. Culkin’s aggressive patrolling resulted in several skirmishes with enemy forces in transit, but each time the enemy refused the Marine’s invitation to dance. Fox’s 2/9, located 5 miles north, patrolled FSB Razor and LZ Dallas in an area north-northeast of Erskine. They too encountered numerous small sized enemy units, who were also quick to fade into the jungle.
While the Da Krong remained relatively quiet, the same could not be said for the A Shau Valley, where four US Army battalions and an ARVN battalion encountered a well-defended hut and bunker complex on Hill 937 and commenced operations to clear it of elements of the 9th and 29th NVA regiments. The battle lasted a week, concluding on 20 May 1969 with 500 enemy dead on the; Army casualties were 44 killed, 297 wounded. Soldiers from the 187th renamed this hill complex “Hamburger Hill.” Subsequently, surviving elements of the NVA regiments withdrew into Laos and avoided further contact with US and ARVN forces operating in the A Shau Valley.
The 3rdMarDiv continued to maneuver its battalions in western Quang Tri, which reduced the enemy’s threat. During June, the 9th Marines initiated two simultaneous operations, named Cameron Falls and Utah Mesa, which targeted the 304th NVA Division attempting to establish a presence south of Route 9. Evidence from reconnaissance missions indicated that elements of the NVA division had infiltrated into the lower Da Krong Valley, and were moving east and north along Route 616 and the river. A series of rocket attacks on combat base Vandegrift signaled the start of planned NVA pressure on allied positions by the 57th NVA Regiment. Colonel Danowitz’s Marines were assigned the mission of searching for and destroying enemy forces within an area bordered in the North by Song Quang Tri, in the South by the Da Krong River, on the East by FSB Shepherd, and on the West by FSB Henderson. This area was considered critical to the security of Vandegrift and the Ba Long Valley, which led to the population centers of Quang Tri and Dong Ha.
Cameron Falls began on 29 May. 2/9 moved unopposed toward FSB Whisman, which the battalion occupied; 3/9 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Oral R. Swigart, Jr., occupied FSB Shepherd. At Whisman, 2/9 Marines began to shore up their defensives with obstacles, fighting holes, claymore mines, and trip flares. At 0215 on 1 June, a small enemy force began probing 2/9’s defenses and ran up against a listening post manned by Golf Company. Two Marines were killed, but he FSB was alerted. Aggressive reaction by Golf 2/9 resulted in 19 enemy killed with two taken prisoner.
From information provided by the prisoners, Colonel Fox learned that the 57th NVA Regiment’s command post (CP) was located to the southwest of Whisman. The 2/9 commander issued a warning order to Fox and Golf companies to prepare for a sweep of the suspected location of the enemy CP; additional intelligence indicated that a large enemy force was moving northeast toward Hill 824. Danowitz redirected the attack toward Hill 824 with two companies from 2/9 in a sweep northeast along the Da Krong River, and two companies of 3/9 advancing east from FSB Shepherd. Swigart reported the terrain and vegetation exceedingly difficult — the twelve foot high elephant grass restricted air movement, making the advance exceedingly hot. As elements of 2/9 and 3/9 converged on Hill 824, both battalion commanders reported that the enemy force was deployed around the hill in considerable strength.
On 5 June, Hotel Company 2/9 encountered a well-fortified NVA battalion on the southern bank of the Da Krong. The initial engagement was a fight that lasted 12 hours. The best description of this fight comes from the Silver Star award citation issued to Captain George W. Sachtleben, of Chicago, Illinois:
The President of the United States takes pleasure in awarding the Silver Star to Captain George W. Sachtleben, United States Marine Corps, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action while serving as Commanding Officer, Company H, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Marine Division in connection with operations against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam.
On the afternoon of 5 June 1969, during operation Cameron Falls, two platoons of Company H advanced on a trail along the Da Krong River eight miles southwest of the Vandegrift Combat Base when they initiated contact with a company-sized North Vietnamese Army force occupying well camouflaged positions on a cliff overlooking the trail. Due to their location, the Marines were extremely vulnerable to the heavy volume of enemy rocket-propelled grenade, small arms, and automatic weapons fire, but continued to fight from a narrow ledge with their backs against the river.
Despite suffering serious wounds sustained during the initial moments of the fire-fight, Captain Sachtleben skillfully deployed his forces to counter the hostile attacks, directed the accurate delivery of supporting arms fire, and organized the movement of casualties to a relatively safe area.
Throughout the fight, he completely disregarded his own safety as he boldly moved about the hazardous area shouting instructions and encouragement to his men. After establishing an initial perimeter, he directed a limited assault which secured a toe-hold on a portion of one cliff looming over his position.
Throughout the night and the following morning, he directed both offensive and defensive actions which thwarted or repulsed repeated North Vietnamese Army attacks. Although aware that the enemy was reinforcing and faced by the fact that his company was running dangerously low on ammunition, that his key officers and noncommissioned officers were wounded, and that his men were nearing exhaustion, Captain Sachtleben fearlessly deployed his men, directed their fire, and fought with such tenacity that the North Vietnamese force broke contact late in the afternoon of the second day and retreated away from the Marines.
Captain Sachtleben’s’ dynamic leadership and valiant actions inspired all who observed him and were instrumental in his company accounting for 54 enemy killed as his company decisively defeated the North Vietnamese Army force. By his courage, bold initiative, and unwavering devotion to duty in the face of great personal danger, Captain Sachtleben upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.
A subsequent sweep of the area revealed a dozen more enemy remains, enemy bunkers, caves, and senior officer’s living quarters.
The United States Marine Corps paid tribute to Captain Sachtleben at Arlington National Cemetery, shown below:
Sergeant Stanley R. Richard, United States Marine Corps.
Smith, C. R. U. S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Standdown, 1969. Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1988.
 The number of enemy battalions went from around 94 in mid-1968 to around 23 in early 1969.
 Born in Chicago and raised in New Jersey, Edward Danowitz entered the Marine Corps in 1942 and served in World War II, Korea, the Dominican Republic, and in Vietnam. He retired in 1972. After his military service, he joined the faculty at Rollins College where he taught the Russian and Spanish languages. He passed away in 2013 at the age of 92 years.