Somalia – Fix Bayonets!

No Peace to Keep — Part II

Somalia, 1992-95

The Ongoing Threat

Somalia remained a dangerous place because of the randomness of armed assaults. Marines and soldiers on patrol could never be sure when they might walk into a factional firefight or run into a gang of thugs. On 12 January 1993, a security patrol was making a routine sweep along the southwest corner of the Mogadishu airfield. At 2140, the patrol walked into an ambush and engaged in a firefight with several Somalis.

PFC Domingo Arroyo, a member of the security patrol, was mortally wounded. Arroyo’s military occupational specialty was “field wireman,” primarily assigned to Headquarters Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines (artillery). His participation in the security patrol was in keeping with this Marine Corps tradition: Every Marine is a Rifleman. PFC Arroyo was the first Marine killed in Somalia.

General Wilhelm realized that to carry out his security mission, Mogadishu would have to be stabilized. He wanted an aggressive plan to develop intelligence sources to enable Marines to become better prepared for their dangerous duties. The result was a four-phase plan within which each phase would turn simultaneously, like the wheels in a timepiece.

The phases were (a) collect information about the human population (clans, where they lived, location of gang leaders, etc.), (b) Increased foot patrols and checkpoints, increase the visibility of the troops, (c) direct action as required, and (d) evaluation, assessment, and formulating an updated plan for ongoing actions.

The units involved in this new process, organized within the MARFOR Mogadishu Task Force under Colonel Jack W. Klimp, were 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines, 3rd Amphibious Assault Battalion, 3rd Light Armored Infantry Battalion, Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines.

The task force numbered 2,000 Marines with its CP at the sports stadium in the northern section of the city — where most of the factional conflicts took place. Its main activity was patrolling, which enabled Marines to gather intelligence and demonstrate their constant presence. Patrolling reduced violence and reassured citizens of the Marine’s benign intent. Patrols also raided arms merchants within the outdoor markets and confiscated firearms whenever encountered.[1]

Shift in Mission

In January 1993, Bill Clinton assumed the presidency. What Mr. Clinton understood about military operations would fit entirely on a post-it note. Worse, all Clinton had available to advise him was Defense Secretary Les Aspin, Chairman of the JCS, General John Shalikashvili, and Commander, Central Command, General Joseph P. Hoar.

In early March 1993, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted to the UN Security Council his plan for returning Somali operations to the United Nations. He acknowledged that the US-led peacekeeping/humanitarian missions were successful. However, there was still no national government, police, or national army, and tribal factions continued to threaten the stability of the Horn of Africa. To that end, the Secretary-General authorized UNOSOM II to establish a more secure environment throughout Somalia to achieve national reconciliation and a democratic state.

At a National Reconciliation Conference in Somalia, all fifteen Somali factions agreed to restore peace and democracy. However, within a month, General Aideed’s faction had another think and decided not to cooperate with UNOSOM. Aideed began broadcasting anti-UN propaganda over Radio Mogadishu, which prompted the Commander, UNOSOM II, Lieutenant General Cervik Bir, to shut down the radio station.

Meanwhile, UNOSOM’s principal staffers were all Somalis with no direct benefit in the success of the UN mission. This explains how the UNOSOM organization became saturated with factional spies. Aideed, for example, knew what UNOSOM was planning almost before General Bir. After Aideed’s forces assaulted a Pakistani peacekeeping force, killing 24 and wounding 57 (also wounding 1 Italian and 3 American soldiers), the UN ordered the arrest and prosecution of General Aideed.

The search for Aideed began in earnest on 12 June. Despite a house-to-house search for Aideed, he was never located. On 12 July (Bloody Monday), US forces assaulted a house believed to contain Aideed. Killed in the attack were several tribal leaders who, post mortem, were said to have been discussing peace arrangements with other factions — but that isn’t the information US forces had before the attack. They believed Aideed was present at that “meeting of elders.” Whatever the truth, the International Red Cross stated that 54 Somalis died in the attack, with an additional 161 wounded. Aideed was not among the casualties.[2]

On 8 August, Aideed’s forces detonated a remote-controlled bomb against a US military vehicle, killing all four of its occupants. Two weeks later, another bomb killed or injured seven more soldiers. President Bill Clinton responded by ordering a Special Forces Task Force, including 400 Army Rangers, to deal with Aideed. The Special Forces unit arrived in Somalia on 22 August 1993. A month later, forces under Aideed shot down a Black Hawk Helicopter in the New Port area of Mogadishu. All three crewmen died in the explosion/crash.

The Battle of Mogadishu

Also referred to as Operation Gothic Serpent, the battle began as a military quest by the U.S.-led peacekeeping and humanitarian coalition to capture Mohamed Farrah Aideed.[3] General Aideed’s assault against coalition forces was part of a larger scheme by Saudi Arabia-funded Al-Qaeda to discredit the American armed forces and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East/Africa.

As part of the operation, led by the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), coalition troops were deployed to arrest two of Aideed’s lieutenants. It quickly evolved into the Battle of Mogadishu (22 August-13 October 1993) and resulted in an unmitigated disaster for coalition troops and a strategic victory for Al Qaeda and the Somali National Alliance. It was one of the most devastating battle losses in U.S. history. By using the phrase “battle losses,” I do not refer simply to the 19 American, 25 Pakistani, or 1 Malaysian soldier killed; I refer to the fact that President Bill Clinton’s weak leadership, his lack of resolve, and the imposition of overly-restrictive rules of engagement allowed barely armed Somalis to hand the U.S. military a resounding defeat.

On 3 October, the joint-task force commander dispatched 160 combat troops, twelve vehicles, and 19 aircraft to make the arrest. Aideed’s lieutenants were soon taken into custody and, along with an injured soldier, loaded into vehicles for transportation back to the mission command post. However, armed militiamen surrounded by women and children converged on the target area from throughout the city. Gunfire erupted, resulting in one Somali and one coalition death. The radio report “stunned” the operational commander because “they expected no casualties.”[4]

In the violence that followed, Somali insurgents shot down two Black Hawk Helicopters, killing crew members and rescuers. Somalis also quickly surrounded the reaction force dispatched to the scene. A bloody battle ensued as coalition troops became overwhelmed by civilian men, women, and teenagers closing to within a few feet to give a fight. In addition to the twenty coalition troops killed in action, 82 others received combat wounds/injuries. Of the Somalis, coalition troops killed an estimated 1,000 and wounded 3,000. These “estimates” remain questionable, however.

The Aftermath

Under the auspices of a UNO Peacekeeping/Humanitarian effort, the United States entered Somalia in December 1992 to stop the imminent starvation of millions of people. For a time, these substantial efforts succeeded in feeding the hungry, but neither the UNO nor its surrogate, the United States, managed to broker peace among warring factions.

It was a poorly organized, ineffectually managed nation-building operation. American officials, demonstrating either their incompetence or naivete, expected gratitude for their humanitarian efforts. That did not happen because U.S. officials were blind to the reality of Saudi Arabia’s behind-the-scenes Wahhabist activities. Nation-building did not work in South Vietnam; it did not work (again) in Somalia — and yet, the United States still had not learned any valuable lessons from this by the time of the Iraqi War in 2003.

In the long-term, UNO and United States diplomatic and military efforts failed to achieve its mission: peace and security in Somalia and starvation relief for its 10 million people. It wasn’t even a good try. It was a case of diplomatic and military ineptitude combined with numerous Somali factions trying to out-jockey one another for supreme control. The Somali people proved themselves their own worst enemy. Still, America gave up 42 of its young men. Despite its superiority in armaments and technology, it allowed stone-age people to divert them from a worthwhile mission and force them to capitulate.

American military power allowed the United States access to conditions that might have led to conditions for peace amid famine and bloodshed, but the various factions were not yet exhausted from fighting, and they were themselves unwilling to stop the carnage. Ignoring the befuddled actions of UNO/American operational managers (who acted more like senior civilian officials and lieutenants than they did senior civilian officials and general officers), the troops did their best under the worst possible conditions. Simply stated, there was no peace in Somalia to keep. We must learn that the best soldiers in the world can only deliver up a foundation for peace — they cannot create peace itself.

Sources:

Allard, K. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. National Defense University Press, 1995.
Bowden, M. Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern Warfare. Atlantic Monthly Press,1999.
Mroczkowski, D. P. Restoring Hope: In Somalia with the Unified Task Force, 1992-1993. HQMC History Division, 2005.
Sangvic, R. N. The Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of Failure. Army Command and General Staff School, 1998.
Wright, L. The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. Knopf Publishing, 2006

Endnotes:

[1] The arms merchants weren’t “gun dealers.” Arms merchants sold RPGs, assault rifles, machine guns, mortars, missiles, tank rounds, and weapons from nearly every manufacturer in the world. In the first raid, Marines confiscated 1,500 assorted weapons. Of course, the market raids merely drove the markets underground, but the word was out, and it made the city a safer place for everyone.

[2] Four western journalists (Dan Eldon, Hos Maina, Hansi Kraus, and Anthony Macharia) rushed to cover the story. An angry Somali mob turned on these journalists and killed them — so the day wasn’t a total loss.

[3] “General” Mohamed Farrah Aideed was killed by another Somali faction on 5 August 1996. His son, Hussein Mohamed Farrah (Aideed) is a naturalized US citizen and a former U. S. Marine (1987-1995). Corporal Farrah subsequently served as Deputy Prime Minister of Somalia. He now lives in Eritrea.

[4] It is inconceivable to me that any military commander would send 160 troops, 19 aircraft, and 12 vehicles on a mission and not anticipate the possibility of casualties … particularly in light of the incident on 8 September when a large Somali force attacked coalition troops at a roadblock location. Two additional assaults occurred on 16 and 21 September. Crumbs.

No Peace to Keep — Part I

Somalia, 1992-95

Introduction

For well over seventy years, the United Nations Organization (UNO) has continuously involved itself in so-called peacekeeping/humanitarian operations — at best with mixed, but at worst with disastrous results. It is a complex conversation because, over those seventy years, the nature of armed conflict has changed dramatically, and the challenges peacekeepers face have evolved into highly complex if not impossible-to-accomplish missions. Warfare is always complicated, of course, but making matters worse is the utter incompetence of UNO officials and, in the case of the United States (in its past role in such operations), the unbelievable ineptitude of executives and members of both parties of the United States Congress.

In 2019, 14 separate UNO peacekeeping missions involved well over 100,000 soldiers, police, and senior UNO civilians. The cost of these operations in 2019 exceeded $7 billion. The United States paid out $2 billion as its “fair share” of keeping the peace.

To understand the “complexity” of UNO peacekeeping operations, it is first necessary to divide them into categories. The oldest of these are operations that attempt to resolve border disputes. A second category involves multi-dimensional operations, such as might include civil war. A third type, the most difficult, involves protection and stabilization missions — which are further complicated by cultural factors. I am writing now about the cultural influences of the people to whom the aid is directed and the UNO culture responsible for overseeing such missions (particularly when UNO surrogates incorporate globalist/socialist thinking into mission structure, which obfuscates matters even further).

Of the third type, in addition to the complexities mentioned, we must add peacekeeping operations in the face of violent extremism. Generally, UNO effectiveness is only possible when opposing interests invite the participation of the UNO, when the UNO remains strictly neutral in facilitating the conflict, and when the use of force is limited to self-defense of peacekeeping units. Operational disaster is the result of the UNO’s failure to adhere to these principles. Two examples stand out: The Congo in 1960 and Somalia in 1991-95. The reality of the fiasco in Somalia was that the UNO (and its surrogate, the U.S. government) quite miserably failed to realize (or acknowledge) that there was no peace to keep. It was a doomed-to-fail effort before it began, made worse along the way with poorly conceived shifts in mission.

In the case of Somalia, the UNO became involved as a response to inhumane conditions of starvation and forced migration. In both instances, millions were affected … with forced migration causing tribal conflicts with fifteen separate rebel groups. Rushing to take advantage of the situation was the Saudi-funded Al Qaeda organization which sought to damage the credibility of the UNO, the U.S. government, and the U.S. Armed Forces.

Unfortunately, the global situation is not improving. Neither the UNO nor the United States has learned valuable lessons from their past mistakes. Despite the impropriety of U.S. involvement in Somalia, the Department of State continues to spend billions of the taxpayer’s money “ … in developmental assistance [in Somalia] to support economic, political, and social sectors to achieve greater stability, establish a formal economy, obtain access to basic services, and attain representation through legitimate, credible governance.” The wording comes from the writers of the popular television series Madam Secretary. “The United States works closely with other donor partners and international organizations to support social services and the development of an effective and representative security sector, including military, police, and justice organizations while supporting ongoing African Union peacekeeping efforts.”

Whenever the UNO wants to divorce itself from costly peace-keeping/humanitarian assistance operations, it mismanages such efforts so horribly that it becomes only a matter of time before a progressive American president steps in to relieve the UN of it’s responsibility. Somalia is an excellent example. The price paid by the American people to maintain this irrational facade is the bloodshed of American servicemen, a lifetime of woe by the parents, wives, and children of slain soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, and adding the costs of war to the backs of American taxpayers.

Some History

Geographically, Somalia sits on the Horn of Africa at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Bordering states include Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. The people who live in these border regions number around 9 million; 98% are Somali tribesmen. About 45% of Somalia’s population is under 15 years of age. Seventy percent of the Somali people are nomads who travel at will with their clans and livestock through Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya. This migratory pattern generates land disputes between Somalis and their neighbors.

Civil war and massive starvation in Somalia prompted UN and Organization of African Unity (OAU) interventions in 1991 because half of the nation’s 10 million people were starving to death. Between January and March 1992, at least three-quarters of a million Somalis died from starvation; another 3 million fled the country as refugees. Nothing about this situation was unusual in East Africa in 1991.

The area of present-day Somalia was one of the first places Islamic conquerors stopped at the beginning of their murderous campaigns in 700 A.D. From that point on, East Africans have suffered one war after another, beginning around 900 A.D. Nothing improved in the lives of native people after Italian and British imperialists began warring with one another over possession of the Horn of Africa. Following World War II, the United Kingdom placed British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland under its protection.

In 1960, both trust territories united to form the Somali Republic, with Great Britain and Italy deciding the location of its borders. A formal government took shape under the auspices of the Somali National Assembly through a national referendum that excluded 70% of the Somali people. The fun began nine years later with a series of assassinations of government leaders and a military coup d’état. Between 1969-1991, the Somali government fell under the control of the so-called Supreme Revolutionary Council — under which Somalia became known as the Somali Democratic Republic. Culturally, the SDR was closely linked to the Arab world and joined the Arab League in 1974. Somali government leaders abandoned democracy in 1976 to establish a one-party scientific-socialist government based on Marxism and Islamism.

War broke out between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977. The issue of contention was the placement of Somalia’s western border. Initially, the Somalis gained an advantage over their enemy until the Soviet Union intervened with “advisors” and 20,000 Cuban mercenaries. The USSR’s involvement in East Africa prompted the Somali government to ask for American assistance. U.S. diplomats were over-joyed; they’d wanted a piece of East Africa since around 1960. Thanks to the American taxpayer (who hadn’t a clue about any of this), Somalia created the largest army on the African continent.[1]

By the 1990s, mainly due to the end of the Cold War, East Africa no longer offered any strategic value to either the new Russian federation or the United States. Left to its own devices, Somalia began a steep spiral into authoritarianism. Through clever instigation, Ethiopia started rebel movements throughout Somalia, which led to civil war, food and fuel shortages, and a period of cripling inflation. Somali government leaders clamped down even more by establishing curfews and surveiling and harassing foreigners.

Libya assisted in overthrowing the Somali government and installing a loose confederation of tribalists to replace it. An international group consisting of Egyptians, Arabians, and Italians subsequently determined that Ali Mahdi Mohamed should serve as the President of Somalia. Unfortunately, Mohamed was only capable of controlling the capital city; tribal groups divided up the rest of the country.

Enter the United Nations

The time was right for the United Nations to stick its nose under the Somali tent. The United Nations Organization Somali Command (UNOSOM) attempted to arrange several “cease-fire” agreements — emphasis on attempted. A fifty-man detachment of UN Peacekeepers tried to stabilize the country enough to conduct humanitarian relief operations. Such a small detachment had no chance of success, so the UN increased its military footprint to around 500 troops.

However, rebel factions in Somalia ignored all previously agreed-to cease-fire agreements, and the fighting continued. According to its own guidelines, the UNO should have withdrawn all military and civilian aid workers from Somalia.

In August 1992, the UN Security Council discussed sending an additional 3,000 troops to Somalia. Discussing the proposition was as far as the proposal ever got. Conditions in Somalia worsened as tribal factions splintered into even smaller groups and then splintered again. As the fighting became nastier its effects grew worse. For example, rebel factions used UN forces for target practice, attacked ships laden with food stores, and cargo aircraft became targets of opportunity. If aid workers knew what was good for them, they hired bodyguards.

By November 1992, General Mohamed Farrah Aideed tired of the fun and games and ordered all UN forces (the so-called Unified Task Force (UNITAF) out of Somalia. There is probably a no better example of UN failure than this — and it was at this point that President George H. W. Bush demonstrated his brilliance as a national leader for the second time (appointing April Glaspie as Ambassador to Iraq was his first). Bush volunteered the U.S. military to lead a “multinational” force to secure humanitarian operations in Somalia.

The UN General Secretary became so giddy that he authorized the American-led force (designated Operation Restore Hope) to use all necessary means to ensure the protection of UNITAF relief efforts. Eventually, UNITAF involved personnel from 24 countries (but mainly from the United States). The plan was simple enough: the U.S. military protected civilian aid workers while UNOSOM continued its efforts to negotiate an end to the fighting and distribute food stores.[2]

Land the Marines

Training and readiness have been the hallmark of the United States Marine Corps since the Revolutionary War. In the Marines, training and operational planning are continuous and concurrent. President Bush made his televised announcement on 4 December 1992; planning for Somali operations began on the morning of 5 December.

U.S. planners at the U.S. Central Command envisioned four operational phases. First, deploy troops to secure harbors and airfields. Second, establish and expand security zones throughout southern Somalia. Third, expand the security zone and secure land routes for humanitarian missions. Fourth, return Somali operations to the UN (presumably so that the UN could undo all of the U.S. military’s accomplishments).[3]

Mission planners also struggled with their assessment of the enemy. As previously mentioned, the Somali “enemy” were splintered tribalists. The answers to such questions as “how well is he armed,” and “under what conditions can he best employ his power” were largely unknown because Marines could face a different enemy every day. But in addition to “enemy” capabilities, there was also the issue of rampant lawlessness. Under the best of circumstances, U.S. operations in Somalia were volatile in the extreme.

After extensive “special operations” training, Headquarters I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) designated the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines (2/9) as the lead battalion within the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (15thMEU), earmarked for humanitarian assistance operations in Somalia.[4] These Marines would spearhead the mission ashore as part of the UN mandate.[5] Fox Company “raiders” went in first to secure the seaport, the Recon detachment, followed by Golf Company, secured the Mogadishu airport.

15th MEU became an integral part of Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) Tripoli, including USS Tripoli, USS Juneau, and USS Rushmore. ARG Tripoli was on station off the coast of Somalia on 3 December. The initial landing commenced at 0540 with Marines and Navy Seals going ashore at Mogadishu, where the dolts from CNN had set up television cameras and bright lights to offer advantages to the enemy, should they care to resist the landing. With that one significant glitch in violation of operational security, the landing proceeded quickly and smoothly.

2/9 Marines proceeded to the U.S. Embassy compound, where they secured the chancery. Colonel Greg Newbold set up his command post (CP) at the airfield. Also, on that first day, the first coalition partner arrived and joined the Marine security plan: a company from the 2nd French Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment, which came by aircraft from Djibouti.

The Marine’s “overwhelming show of force” allowed them to seize, hold, and expand their control. They discovered in Mogadishu a modern-looking city reflecting the effects of two years of warfare: anarchy, terror, no electricity, running water, or sanitation. There were no police officers. Public buildings had been damaged, looted, and stood vacant. With closed schools, gangs of youths roamed the streets looking for things to pillage. Crowded refugee camps filled every parcel of open land. The only visible civic activities were those involving the burial of human remains.

Toward the end of the first day, a vehicle containing nine Somalis ran a roadside checkpoint manned by French Legionnaires. They opened fire at the fleeing automobile — killing two and wounding seven others. Afterward, Somali snipers added UN Peacekeepers to their list of potential targets. They weren’t hitting anyone, but the shooting was bothersome and worrisome.

On 10 December, Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, assumed command of Marine Forces (MARFOR), Somalia. MARFOR provided the basic structure around which the Unified Task Force evolved. Behind the Marines, the most prominent American force was the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division, eventually forming the centerpiece for Army Forces, Somalia (ARFOR). General Wilhelm’s command authority included the 15thMEU and French forces. Wilhelm focused his attention on securing ports of arrival and departure and the Embassy compound. When 1st Battalion, 7th Marines arrived, Wilhelm expanded his control over areas outside Mogadishu — notably into Bale Dogle. Wilhelm assigned that mission to BLT 2/9 (supported by HMM 164), which they accomplished within 48 hours.

The first U.S. Army unit into Somalia was Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry (deployed with 2/87), which flew into the Bale Dogle airfield. Upon arrival, Alpha Company relieved the Marines and assumed control of the airfield.

The first direct attacks on UNITAF members occurred in two separate incidents on 12 December. Three aircraft of HMM 164 received fire from unknown persons with damage to their rotors. Marines returned fire with 20mm guns and missiles, destroying two “technicals” and damaging one US-made armored personnel carrier.[6]

On 6 January 1993, unknown persons fired on a convoy moving through Mogadishu from two authorized weapons storage facilities belonging to General Aideed’s faction. The unified commander, Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston USMC, decided to take decisive action, or the danger to coalition forces would only increase. He tasked General Wilhelm to develop a plan of action. He wanted it simple and dramatic.

During the night of 6-7 January, Kilo Company 3/9 and Charlie Company 1/7 surrounded the two weapons sites. LAVs from the 3rd LAI Battalion screened the area. Snipers took positions in the high ground surrounding Aideed’s turf. A two-company reserve force formed at the Embassy compound. PsyOps personnel from the U.S. Army’s 9th Psychological Operations Battalion augmented each rifle company. At 0553 on 7 January, PsyOps broadcasters began to issue warnings to the Somalis that they were surrounded, instructing them that they would not be harmed if they surrendered.

At that moment, helicopters assumed a hovering position around the ammunition sites. Somalis in storage site No. 8 surrendered. The men in site No. 2 decided to go out in a blaze of glory. Helicopter crew chiefs reported that one tank inside the compound was turning over, and two Somalis had operated a heavy anti-aircraft machine gun. Guns were cleared for snipers to take out the two machine gunners. Within mere seconds, two machine gunners discovered the path to Allah, and then for good measure, the sniper rendered their machine gun inoperable.

The engagement that followed was loud, sharp, and somewhat short. Initially, the Somalis opened up with a heavy volume of machine guns, recoilless rifles, and small arms. At 0615, helicopters were cleared to engage targets inside the compound. They fired for 30 minutes. At 0647, U.S. tanks entered the compound, followed by Kilo Company Marines, who systematically cleared storage site No. 2. Helicopters continued to receive periodic sniper fire.

General Wilhelm ordered Marines to confiscate all firearms. It turned into a long day as Marines inventoried 4 M47 Tanks, nine howitzers, 13 APCs, three anti-aircraft guns, 11 mortars, and one recoilless rifle. In addition to losing several tons of weapons and munitions, General Aideed lost his self-esteem.

Despite this demonstration, coalition forces continued to receive sniper fire from “who knows where.” Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni opined that sniping was simply the Somali way of testing the resolve of U.S. personnel — emphasis on “opinion.”[7]

Continued next week

Sources:

Allard, K. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. National Defense University Press, 1995.
Bowden, M. Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern Warfare. Atlantic Monthly Press,1999.
Mroczkowski, D. P. Restoring Hope: In Somalia with the Unified Task Force, 1992-1993. HQMC History Division, 2005.
Sangvic, R. N. The Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of Failure. Army Command and General Staff School, 1998.
Wright, L. The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. Knopf Publishing, 2006

Endnotes:

[1] This wasn’t the first time the U.S. government spent its treasure propping up a Communist-Islamic dictatorship.

[2] One of UNOSOMs grand ideas was to pay out over $130 million to purchase guns from Somali rebels. It was a great deal for the Somalis, who never seemed to run out of guns to sell.

[3] When CENTCOM planners asked the UN to identify “implied tasks” that would help planners assess mission fulfilment, no one in the UN had a clue. In other words, no one in the UN had any idea how to measure operational successes.

[4] Commanding Officer, Colonel Gregory S. Newbold.

[5] Actually, some forces were already in place before the Marines arrived. Teams from special operations command provided some security at several airfields, providing security for air combat control teams. Charlie Company, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) provided sniper support to the U.S. Special Envoy while in Mogadishu.

[6] “Technical” (also, Non-Standard Tactical Vehicle) (NSTV) is the term used to describe ordinary and four-wheel-drive pickup trucks converted to carry heavy weapons. The term “technical” originated in Somalia.

[7] Anthony Zinni was one of those “political generals” who ingratiated himself with Democratic Party elites. He retired from active service in 2000. In 2004, Diana B. Henriques of the New York Times identified Zinni as one of a cabal of “retired military people” recruited to deceive active duty military personnel and veterans into investing in the corporations they were paid to represent. Specifically, First Commercial Financial Planning, Inc., tried to deflect the charge, but a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation confirmed the allegation that First Commercial Financial Planning used “retired flag rank officers” to perpetrate fraud against military veterans.

The Law of War

Some Background

Extract:

“2. Purposes of the Law of War

The conduct of armed hostilities on land is regulated by the law of land warfare which is both written and unwritten. It is inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war by:

Protecting both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering
Safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and civilians; and
Facilitating the restoration of peace.

—U. S. Army Field Manual 27-10: The Law of Land Warfare

While I agree that there must be a standard — a bridge across which no combatant should cross, such as the murder of a POW, rape, and perfidy — I also think it is essential for the American people to realize, as they send their children off to join the US military, that their government offers advantages to the enemy that it denies to their own troops. The government calls this their “rules of engagement.”

Partial Rules of Engagement Extract

A. Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the commanders’ tools for regulating the use of force, making them a cornerstone of the Operational Law discipline. The legal sources that provide the foundation for ROE are complex and include customary and treaty law principles from the laws of war. As a result, Judge Advocates (JA) [military lawyers] participate significantly in the preparation, dissemination, and training of ROE; however, international law is not the sole basis for ROE. Political objectives and military mission limitations are necessary to the construction and application of ROE. Therefore, despite the important role of the JA, commanders bear ultimate responsibility for the ROE

B. To ensure that ROE are versatile, understandable, easily executable, and legally and tactically sound, JAs and operators [combatants] alike must understand the full breadth of policy, legal, and mission concerns that shape the ROE and collaborate closely in their development, implementation, and training. JAs must become familiar with mission and operational concepts, force and weapons systems capabilities and constraints, War-fighting Functions (WF), and the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), and Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). Operators must familiarize themselves with the international and domestic legal limitations on the use of force and the laws of armed conflict. Above all, JAs and operators must talk the same language to provide effective ROE to the fighting forces.

C. This chapter provides an overview of basic ROE concepts. In addition, it surveys Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces, and reviews the JA’s role in the ROE process. Finally, this chapter provides unclassified extracts from both the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) and other operations in order to highlight critical issues and demonstrate effective implementation of ROE.

NOTE: This chapter is NOT a substitute for the SROE. The SROE are classified SECRET, and as such, important concepts within it may not be reproduced in this handbook. Operational law attorneys must ensure they have ready access to the complete SROE and study it thoroughly to understand the key concepts and provisions. JAs play an important role in the ROE process because of our expertise in the laws of war, but one cannot gain ROE knowledge without a solid understanding of the actual SROE.

Our Discussion

To place these rules of engagement into their proper perspective, I’ll turn to National Review writer David French, who in December 2015 told us the following story:

“The car was moving at high speed. It had just broken a blockade of American and Iraqi forces and was trying to escape into the gathering dusk. American soldiers, driving larger and slower armored vehicles, mostly the large and unwieldy MRAPs (mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles), gave chase.

“They were intensely interested in the target. Acting on intelligence that high-value al-Qaeda leaders might be present, a cavalry troop — working with Iraqi allies — surrounded an isolated village near the Iranian border. The mission was simple: to search the village and kill or capture identified members of al-Qaeda. It was the kind of mission that the troopers had executed countless times before.

“It wasn’t uncommon to encounter “squirters” — small groups of insurgents who try to sneak or race through American lines and disappear into the desert. Sometimes they were on motorcycles, sometimes on foot, but often they were in cars, armed to the teeth and ready to fight to the death. On occasion, the squirters weren’t insurgents at all — just harmless, terrified civilians trying to escape a deadly war.

“This evening, however, our troopers believed that the car ahead wasn’t full of civilians. The driver was too skilled, his tactics too knowing for a carload of shepherds. As the car disappeared into the night, the senior officer on the scene radioed for permission to fire.

“His request went to the TOC, the tactical operations center, which is the beating heart of command and control in the battlefield environment. There the “battle captain,” or the senior officer in the chain of command, would decide — shoot or don’t shoot.

“If soldiers opened fire after a lawyer had deemed the attack outside the rules, they would risk discipline — even [war crimes] prosecution.

“But first, there was a call for the battle captain to make, all the way to brigade headquarters, where a JAG officer — an Army lawyer — was on call 24 hours a day, seven days a week. His job was to analyze the request, apply the governing rules of engagement, and make a recommendation to the chain of command. While the commander made the ultimate decision, he rarely contradicted JAG recommendations. After all, if soldiers opened fire after a lawyer had deemed the attack outside the rules, they would risk discipline — even prosecution — if the engagement went awry.

“Acting on the best available information — including a description of the suspect vehicle, a description of its tactics, analysis of relevant intelligence, and any available video feeds — the JAG officer had to determine whether there was sufficient evidence of “hostile intent” to authorize the use of deadly force. He had to make a life-or-death decision in mere minutes.

“In this case, the lawyer said no — insufficient evidence. No deadly force. Move to detain rather than shoot to kill. The commander deferred. No shot. Move to detain.

“So, the chase continued, across roads and open desert. The suspect vehicle did its best to shake free, but at last, it was cornered by converging American forces. There was no escape. Four men emerged from the car. American soldiers dismounted from their MRAPs, and with one man in the lead, weapons raised, they ordered the Iraqis to surrender.

“Those who were in the TOC that night initially thought someone had stepped on a land mine. Watching on video feed, they saw the screen go white, then black. For several agonizing minutes, no one knew what had happened.

“Then the call came. Suicide bomber. One of the suspects had self-detonated, and Americans were hurt. One badly — very badly. Despite desperate efforts to save his life, he died just before he arrived at a functioning aid station. Another casualty of the rules of engagement.”

It is certainly true that a suicide bomber killed one of our young men, but it is also true that young man might still be alive were it not for the fact that the United States Army aided and abetted the enemy in his horrendous murder of one of their own. On what rational basis does US military command authority place a lawyer (of all people) in a position to approve or deny a combat soldier from taking appropriate action to save his own life and the lives of the men and women serving under him?

The foregoing development was not only senseless and stupid, but it is also malfeasant. The President of the United States forced these rules on the Armed Forces of the United States; civilian secretaries ordered such policies implemented, and flag rank naval and military officers executed them. These are the men who have blood on their hands — American blood and they act as if such circumstances were the unavoidable consequences of war. No. Too many Americans have died because of these foolish policies.

The American people deserve to know that these unacceptable conditions await their children once they join the U. S. Armed Forces. They need to understand that the US government places a higher value on the enemy than they do on their own troops — which should lead us to ask, why should any American join the All-Volunteer Force? Loyalty, after all, is a two-way street.

To compound the matter further, the US government has aggressively charged American service members with war crimes — that weren’t — and convicted them and handed down prison sentences for doing no more than what the U. S. military trained them to do: locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver. And it was that very same government who sent them into battles, to fight in wars, that the government never intended to win.

It Gets Worse

Moreover, the United States government has become complicit in perpetuating “crimes against humanity,” if that is a case we wish to pursue. There are several angles to this argument, at the top of which is that, diplomatically, the US government has been (a) inept in its formulation and implementation of foreign policy, (b) dishonest in announcing its national interests to justify hostilities, (c) too eager to deploy armed forces to foreign countries, and (d) too accomplished in laying the blame for violations of land warfare conventions on US servicemen, whom the US government recruited, trained, armed, and deployed to carry out its flawed foreign policies.

Numerous violations of human rights, if they in fact exist, are directly related to the behavior of nations and their allies in developing erratic and nonsensical policies that are, themselves, predicated on lies, half-truth, and “spin.” Who are these nations? Who must we hold accountable for human suffering in the worst places on the planet? The list of responsible nations is too long, by far.

As one example, invading Iraq may have made some people feel good about ridding the world of Saddam Hussein, but the consequences of that adventure propelled Iran into its current leading role in the Middle East. No one can argue while keeping a straight face that sending Hussein to hell substantially improved conditions in the Middle East.

We must also understand that Afghanistan between 1980-2001 was entirely the creation of the United States Congress, the American Central Intelligence Agency, Saudi Arabia, and its puppet, Pakistan.

In its historical context, this situation presents us with a nonsensical juxtaposition to US national interests that defies rational explanation. Saudi Arabia is also behind the “civil wars” in Syria and Yemen, both of which are sectarian kerfuffle’s within the Islamist world that makes no sense to anyone who doesn’t own camels or goats, and yet, the US has become a full partner with the Saudis inflicting pain and suffering on people. Most of them are the unfortunate sods caught between surrogates of both the Saudis and Iranians.

According to Andrea Prasow, a writer for Human Rights Watch, the United States is now under international scrutiny for its long-standing involvement in Yemen. Notably, under a long list of incompetent secretaries, the State Department has facilitated the provision of arms and munitions without regard to the application of these weapons against civilian populations. Prasow argues that the State Department may have violated US laws by providing weapons to Saudi Arabia to offer them to Saudi surrogates, which makes the US government “a global arms dealer.” Of course, no American administration cares about international scrutiny because there are no substantial consequences that the international community could impose.

Similarly, Peter Beaumont of The Guardian (4 Oct 2021) reports that according to sources within the United Nations, war crimes and crimes against humanity are omnipresent throughout the Middle East, Africa, and some in Eastern Europe. In the present, human rights experts claim reasonable grounds for believing a Russian private military company (The Wagner Group) has committed murders not directly involved in Libya’s internal hostilities. UN experts also cite reports indicating that the Libyan coast guard, trained and equipped by the European Union, has regularly mistreated migrants and handed them over to torture centers where sexual violence is prevalent.

T. G. Carpenter, writing for Responsible Statecraft, asserted on 12 October 2021 that there are numerous instances where humanitarian intervention has led directly to crimes against humanity. He cites as examples President Obama’s 2011 air war to overthrow Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi. Obama publicly asserted his high expectations for a brighter future for the Libyan people. Since then, feuding factions of cutthroats have created large numbers of refugees crossing the Mediterranean to find sanctuary while Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Russia have become parties to the conflict, each backing their favored to win, and each making substantial contributions to the bloodshed and chaos.

According to the UN report, “Our investigations have established that all parties to the conflicts, including third states, foreign fighters, and mercenaries, have violated international humanitarian law, in particular the principles of proportionality and distinction, and some have also committed war crimes.” The violence, which includes attacks on hospitals and schools, has dramatically affected the Libyan people’s economic, social, and cultural traditions. The report also documented the recruitment and participation of children in hostilities and the disappearance and extrajudicial killing of prominent women.

All of the preceding offers a stark contrast to Obama’s rosy pronouncement that “Tripoli is slipping from the grasp of a tyrant. The people of Libya are showing that the universal pursuit of dignity and freedom is far stronger than the iron fist of a dictator.” Joining Obama, Senator John McCain and Senator Lindsey Graham jointly stated, “The end of the Qaddafi regime is a victory for the Libyan people and the broader cause of freedom in the Middle East and throughout the world.” A short time later, McCain and Graham sponsored bills that provided combat weapons to Libya’s “freedom fighters.” Astoundingly, these freedom fighters used these weapons to create the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) founded by America’s long-term nemesis, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Iraq’s face of Al-Qaeda. For a short time, Al-Baghdadi was on the target list for US and Coalition forces in Iraq until senior commanders were ordered to “back off.”

On 6 January 2017, UPI writer Struan Stevenson observed that when Obama left the White House, he left behind a legacy of death and destruction in the Middle East. His primary foreign policy opened Pandora’s Box of conflict and sectarian strife across the entire region. It wasn’t until it was too late that Obama realized that his “nuclear deal” with Iran and his foolish concessions not only threatened the security of the Middle East but seriously undermined the interests of the United States. Obama, it appears, the so-called well-spoken and clean-looking Negro, wasn’t the intellectual he thought he was.

As Ted Carpenter wisely observed, “Creating a chaotic environment in which war crimes and massive human rights abuses could flourish did a monumental disservice to the Libyan people, and Washington bears most of the responsibility for that tragedy. Moreover, it matters little if US intentions were good; the road to hell is paved with good intentions. [All] policies must be judged by their consequences, not their motives or goals.”

How it plays out

During the first battle of Fallujah in April 2004, the Associated Press reported that US Marines bombed a mosque, killing forty (40) innocent “civilians” gathered for prayer. From the AP’s initial report, the story took off like gang-busters. False reporting was so intense that it caused senior military commanders to order the Marines out of Fallujah. See also: The War Crimes that Weren’t.

Throughout the war in Iraq, western news sources routinely employed Iraqis to cover firefights, battles, and clearing operations. In most cases, however, media focused almost exclusively on events occurring around the capital city of Baghdad and only occasionally in outlying regions such as Ramadi and Fallujah. As in the case cited above, these Iraqi journalists were not disinterested parties to the conflict, and their reporting was not simply flawed; they were, more often than not, outright lies.

But the principal challenges in Iraq, and the greatest American/Coalition victories, were those that the American people know least about — because news media always handpicks the things they want the folks back home to know.

Haditha

The region was known as the Haditha Triad region in Al Anbar Province. The triad region consists of the city of Haditha and outlying towns of Haqlaniyah, Barwana, and Albu Hyatt, all of which follow the Euphrates River corridor.

The enemy was Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Because US and Coalition leaders failed to establish an early presence in Haditha, AQI felt comfortable putting down roots there. It was a place where new fighters could enter Iraq from Syria, along with weapons, money, and supplies. Haditha was where these men and materials could proceed unmolested into the Iraqi interior, to other strongholds.

Haditha was also the place where defeated AQI soldiers withdrew following such battles as Fallujah and Ramadi. Defeated or not, they became battle-hardened veterans whose embellished tales of glory in the service of Allah inspired newly arrived AQI recruits.^[1]

The US/Coalition made its first attempt to establish order in the Haditha Triad in 2005. AQI responded by decapitating several high-ranking Iraqi police officials and murdering members of their families. To mark their territory, AQI placed the decapitated heads atop stakes at major intersections leading into Haditha. It was a clear warning to Iraqis and Coalition forces: stay out! AQI was so successful in their campaign of intimidation that they even established a shadow government in the region and routinely sent out terrorist patrols to keep the locals “in line.” 2005 was also when the 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines (3/25) arrived in Haditha as a coalition show of force. The battalion lost 49 men during its deployment in what became the deadliest deployment for a Marine battalion since the Beirut bombing in 1983.

At 0715 on 19 November, in this environment of decapitated heads sitting atop signposts, and in an area where 85% of the Iraqi residents oppose coalition forces, where citizens actively aid and abet AQI forces, a Marine security patrol from Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (Kilo 3/1) escorted a resupply convoy along the main supply route (MSR) when an improvised explosive device (IED) composed of 155mm artillery shells within a container filled with a propane igniter erupted, instantly killing Lance Corporal Miguel Terrazas. At the instant of the explosion, Lance Corporal James Crossan was thrown out of the Humvee and was trapped under the vehicle’s rear tire. Private First Class Salvador Guzman was riding in the back of the vehicle. He was thrown from the vehicle, as well. Crossan and Guzman were taken to a landing zone for emergency medical evacuation.

Subsequently, First Lieutenant William T. Kallop arrived on the scene. His arrival coincided with the commencement of enemy fire coming from a nearby cluster of three houses. Kallop instructed the Marines to “take the house.” In clearing these houses, Marines employed standard clearing operations, which included the use of hand grenades and small arms fire. During this action, Marines killed 15 Iraqis. Lieutenant Kallop stated, “The Marines cleared [the houses] the way they had been trained to clear it, which is frags [grenades] first. It was clear just by the looks of the room that frags went in, and then the house was prepped and sprayed with a machine gun, and then they went in. And by the looks of it, they just … they went in, cleared the rooms, everybody was down.”

Significantly, evidence later used during an investigation of the incident included a video captured at the time of the incident by a Hammurabi Human Rights Organization co-founder, which instigated a Time Magazine Reporter’s “armchair” investigative report four months later, on 19 March 2006. This video shot at the time of the incident strongly suggests a “set up” by AQI affiliates, a common tactic employed by terrorist factions in Iraq. It was part of an effort by AQI to initiate an incident and use the consequences of that incident to discredit coalition forces.

Apparently, it worked because military authorities charged eight Kilo Company Marines with violations of the law of war — four enlisted Marines with unpremeditated murder and four officers with dereliction of duty, including the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Chessani. In the military’s rush to judgment, the lives of all these Marines (and their loved ones) were negatively affected for years into the future.

Of the eight Marines charged, a military court convicted only one individual for violating the Uniform Code of Military Justice NOT connected to the Haditha incident. He pled “guilty” for making a false statement that might have been no more than a lapse in memory.

In 2009, Colonel Chessani’s legal counsel, Richard Thompson (Thomas More Law Center), stated, “The government’s persecution of this loyal Marine officer continues because he refused to throw his men under the bus to appease some anti-war politicians and press, and the Iraqi government. Any punishment of LtCol Chessani handed down by a Board of Inquiry would be a miscarriage of justice because he did nothing wrong, and our lawyers will mount the same vigorous defense in this administrative proceeding as they did in the criminal.”

A military court eventually dismissed the charges as spurious or found them “not guilty” because the accusations — preferred against them by incompetent senior officers in their rush to judgment, who either unwittingly or intentionally conspired with Iraqi enemies of the United States, and with their enabler, Times Magazine journalist Tim McGirk — were unfounded. The question of why military officials charged these Marines at all, particularly in light of the fact that they complied with the rules of engagement, remains unanswered — except that attorney Richard Thompson was prescient: “ … to appease some anti-war politicians and press, and the Iraqi government.” Or could it be part of the US government’s intention to destroy the effectiveness of its own Armed Forces or convince young Americans not to join the All-Volunteer Force?

Conclusion

David French’s article (above) offered some food for thought: “Imagine if the United States had fought World War II with a mandate to avoid any attack when civilians were likely to be present. Imagine Patton’s charge through Western Europe constrained by granting the SS safe haven whenever it sheltered among civilians. If you can imagine this reality, then you can also imagine a world without a D-Day, a world where America’s greatest generals are war criminals, and where the mighty machinery of Hitler’s industrial base produces planes, tanks, and guns unmolested. In other words, you can imagine a world where our Army is a glorified police force, and our commanders face prosecution for fighting a real war. That describes our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

US military policy in the Middle East has been inept and criminally negligent. There is no rational basis for spending billions of dollars in maintaining a powerful armed force, for spending billions more sending those troops into combat, and then, through inane “rules of engagement,” restricting their ability to defeat the enemy and then prosecuting them for doing what the US military trained them to do. Such policies present a clear and present danger to the morale and effectiveness of our combat forces and, by extension, demoralize the nation as well.

United States foreign policy is corrupt because the men and women who devise and implement those policies are immoral and inept. United States domestic policy, particularly as it relates to the laws and regulations governing the nation’s prosecution of war, is equally flawed. These unacceptable conditions result in unimaginable pain and suffering among those who live in the Middle East. They cause immeasurable anguish among the loved ones whose husbands, sons, and daughters have died or seriously and permanently injured in a war the US government never intended to win. These Inane policies have caused death and injury for nothing. The United States has not “won” a war since the Second World War. The reason for this is simple: The United States has not had a moral imperative for conflict since the Second World War. I do not understand why the American people put up with such a government.

Endnotes:

^[1] Haditha was rife with AQI fighters and, according to one Time Magazine poll conducted in 2007, 85% of resident Sunnis opposed the presence of Coalition forces.