In the days of the Merovingian dynasty (c. 450 – 751 AD), when Latin was still the language of the high-born, some people were called cappellani. In the fourth century, the word referred to priests who dedicated themselves to preserving the religious relics of St. Martin of Tours. St. Martin (b. 316 – d. 397 AD) was the patron saint of France, the father of the monastic life in Gaul, and the first “great leader” of Western Monasticism. One of these relics was St. Martin’s half-cape (cappella). St. Martin’s Cappella gave its name to the tent, later chapel, where the Cappella was preserved — over time, adding religious relics to the collection. During the Carolingian dynasty (751 – 880 AD), and in particular, during the reign of Charlemagne, the priests who guarded St. Martin’s relics were called, in Old French,Chapelain.
In those days, Chaplains were appointed by the King, later Holy Roman Emperor. They lived in the palace, and in addition to guarding the sacred relics, performed mass for the monarch on feast days, worked with the royal notaries , and prepared any documents the emperor required of them. In these duties, Chaplains gradually evolved into ecclesiastical and secular advisors to the king/emperor. It became a tradition throughout western Christendom for monarchs to appoint their own chaplains. Many of these chaplains became bishops. This tradition continues today, as evidenced by the fact that the British Crown appoints members of the Royal College of Chaplains, although they no longer serve as the official keepers of records.
In modern usage, the term chaplain no longer addresses itself to any particular church or denomination. Clergy and ministers appointed to various institutions (cemeteries, prisons, legislatures, hospitals, colleges, embassies, legations, and within the armed forces) are called chaplains.
Chaplains serve in the armed forces of most countries, usually as commissioned officers. They are non-combatants and, as such, are not required to bear arms. They may bear arms, if they choose, in defense of themselves and the sick or wounded. In the United States, Roman Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and Moslem chaplains serve as chaplains in the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Navy Chaplains provide the ecclesiastical needs of the Marine Corps.
U. S. Armed Forces chaplains provide religious services and advise their commander and fellow staff officers on religion, morality, and ethics. They offer counseling services to service members and their families, operate pre-marriage counseling programs, make regular visitations to the sick and wounded, and provide opportunities for prayer services and last rites. The Army, Navy, and Air Force Chief of Chaplains provide similar advice to the U. S. Secretary of Defense.
All military chaplains must be ordained and endorsed by a recognized religious organization. A military chaplain’s rank is determined by years of service and criteria established by the military organization in which commissioned. Chaplains are recognized in uniform by rank and religious affiliation. The symbol for Christian Chaplains is the Roman Cross; a symbol of the Ten Commandments identifies Jewish Chaplains. Moslem Chaplains wear a crescent as their religious symbol.
On 29 July 1775, the Continental Congress established the military chaplaincy, but chaplains did not wear a symbol of their faith until 1880. In 1835, Army regulations required chaplains to wear black uniform coats without shoulder boards or symbols of rank. The first symbol for chaplain was a shepherd’s crook or staff, approved in 1880; the Latin Cross replaced the shepherd crook was adopted in 1898. The first Jewish Chaplain was appointed during the American Civil War, but it wasn’t until World War I that Jewish Chaplains had their own religious symbol.
On 28 November 1775, the Continental Navy published its regulations provided that, “The Commanders of the ships of the Thirteen United Colonies are to take care that divine service be performed twice a day on board, and a sermon preached on Sundays unless bad weather or other extraordinary accidents prevent.” The Navy recognized the need for chaplains but did not foresee a requirement for uniformed attire or insignia of rank or religious affiliation until 1847. At that time, the prescribed uniform was a black coat with a black collar and cuffs with no insignia. In 1864, the Navy Department authorized Navy Chaplains to wear the standard uniform of commissioned officers and the symbol of the Latin Cross. Essentially, Navy chaplains served “as officers without rank.”
In 1905, Navy Uniform Regulations provided that Chaplains would have ranks equivalent to line officers; they were to wear the standard navy officer’s uniform with the service braid in lustrous black (not gold as with line officers). The Navy later modified this requirement in 1918 to include both the officer rank insignia and a gold cross.
Naval Staff Corps regulations discontinued the black braid and replaced it with the same gold braid worn by other officers – along with the Latin Cross.
In modern times, the Navy accepts clergy from religious denominations and faith groups, but an applicant’s request is contingent upon a favorable recommendation by their religious governing authority. An applicant must meet the Navy’s requirements, including appropriate age and physical fitness. Even after acceptance, the endorsing religious authority can revoke their endorsement at any time, the effect of which leads to the separation of the chaplain from naval service.
An applicant for service as a chaplain in the Navy must be a US citizen, be at least 21 years old, hold a post-graduate degree which includes 72-hours of study in theology, religious philosophy, ethics, and foundational writing. Upon acceptance and commission, chaplains attend the Navy Chaplain School at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. There is also a Chaplain Candidate Program Officer program for seminary students interested in obtaining a commission before completing their graduate studies.
The modern mission for Navy chaplains includes religious ministry, religious facilitation for all religious beliefs, caring for Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard personnel (and their families), advising their commanding officers in spiritual matters, promote ethical and moral behavior, increase combat readiness through ministerial programs, improve morale and retention, and employ modern technology to support their missions. Assisting Navy chaplains are enlisted religious program specialists.
Several Navy chaplains have distinguished themselves in combat, including Lieutenant Vincent Capodanno (Medal of Honor), Lieutenant Commander Joseph T. O’Callahan (Medal of Honor), Commander George S. Rentz (Navy Cross), Lieutenant Thomas N. Conway (Navy Cross), and Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Aloysius H. Schmitt (Silver Star). Navy ships were named in honor of O’Callahan, Rentz, and Schmitt.
There has seldom been a Navy chaplain far from the forward edge of the battle area, whether serving aboard ship or in the field with the Marines. Pictured right, Navy chaplains conduct religious serves on Mount Suribachi, on Iwo Jima, Easter Sunday, 1945.
My personal salute to all military chaplains, particularly those of the U. S. Navy who, at the risk of their own lives, provide injured and dying Marines with comfort in their final moments. In many cases, the face of a Navy Chaplain or a Navy Corpsman is the last face our mortally wounded Marines see.
Burgsma, H. L. Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam (1962-1971). Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1985.
Drury, C. M. History of the Chaplain Corps. Washington: Navy Publications Center, 1994.
 In Gaul and early France, the title of Notary was an employee of the Royal Chancelleries, titled “Notaries of the King” and served as scribes in the royal seigniorial and communal courts of justice who maintained records of all official proceedings.
 I have only known one chaplain who wore a sidearm in combat – a Presbyterian.
 A Catholic Priest, Lieutenant Conway was assigned as the chaplain aboard USS Indianapolis when a Japanese submarine torpedoed the vessel off the Philippine Island of Leyte on 30 July 1945. More than 800 crewmen were forced into the ocean, some of whom were badly injured, and remained at the mercy of nature for three days. These men were severely dehydrated and suffered numerous shark attacks. Only 316 men survived the ordeal. Conway was recognized for swimming through shark infested waters to administer to suffering crewmen, saving as many as 67 men. Conway was one of the crew who didn’t survive; he stood by these men when they needed him most. His award was delayed for 75 years, finally presented to family members on 8 January 2021.
As summarized in McNamara’s Folly, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara threw a costly wrench into the contest for control of the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ). His inane plan not only escalated the material costs of fighting the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), but it also dramatically increased the number of Marines, soldiers, and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops who were killed and wounded while building it.
Not a single Marine commander favored the so-called McNamara Line in I CTZ. Shaking his head in disgust, one Marine officer said, “With these bastards, you’d have to build the [wall] all the way to India and it would take the entire Marine Corps and half the Army to guard it — and even then, they’d probably burrow under it.” Even the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in his testimony before Congress, rigorously opposed the McNamara Line.
The Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) assigned overall operational responsibility for I CTZ to the Third Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF). In land area, I CTZ involved roughly 18,000 square miles. III MAF included the 1st Marine Division (1stMarDiv), 3rd Marine Division (3rdMarDiv), 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1stMAW), 3rd Force Logistics Command (3rdFLC), Provisional Corps, Vietnam, 1st Cavalry Division, 101st Airborne Division, Americal Division, Sub Unit 1, First Radio Battalion, 29th Civil Affairs Company, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion, and several ARVN and Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) commands.
The McNamara Line placed US Forces in I CTZ in a dangerous position because in order to construct the barrier, III MAF had to divert Marines away from their combat assignments to build it. With the 1stMarDiv operating near Chu Lai, in Quang Nam Province (65 miles south of Da Nang), responsibility for northern I Corps (abutting the demilitarized zone (DMZ)) fell to the 3rdMarDiv. Despite the fact that the 3rdMarDiv was the largest Marine division ever formed in the history of the Marine Corps, it still didn’t have the men it needed to defend northern I Corps.
The task of building the McNamara Line fell upon Navy and Marine Corps combat engineers; Marine infantrymen provided much of the manual labor, and 3rdMarDiv regiments and separate battalions had to provide protection to those who labored in its construction. Beside the already complicated matter of building the line, COMUSMACV wanted to project completed “yesterday.”
NVA commanders watched the construction activities with keen interest, no doubt asking themselves how the NVA could use the McNamara disruption to their advantage. At the beginning of July 1967, the NVA had 35,000 troops assembled just north of the DMZ. Their intention was to swarm across the Marine outpost at Con Thien, overwhelm US forces operating in Leatherneck Square, and invade en mass all of Quang Tri Province.
Con Thien (The Hill of Angels) was important to the Marines because the location was situated high enough in elevation to provide an excellent observation post over one of the primary NVA routes into South Vietnam. Moreover, anyone standing atop the 160-meter hill at Con Thien looking southeast could observe the entire forward logistics base at Dong Ha.
The NVA (supported by heavy artillery and mortar fire) made two thrusts at Con Thien. The first (and largest) of these attacks specifically targeted the Marine position at Hill 160. Operation Buffalo commenced on 2 July. Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. “Spike” Schening deployed his 1st Battalion, 9th Marines (1/9) in and around Con Thien. Alpha Company and Bravo Company operated north-northeast of a strong point along Route 561, Delta Company and H&S Company occupied the battalion’s perimeter, and Charlie Company was detached to provide security for HQ 9th Marines at Dong Ha.
According to the 9th Marine’s commander, Colonel George E. Jerue, “The TAOR assigned to the 9th Marines was so large that the regiment did not have the option of conducting security patrols on a regular basis. The NVA, realizing these limitations, would withdraw from the area until after a patrol had completed its mission, and then re-infiltrate the area just cleared.” It was for this reason that Alpha and Bravo companies were sent to control Route 561.
On the morning of 2 July, Captain Sterling K. Coates led his Bravo Company into its heaviest engagement of the Vietnam War. Bravo Company and Captain Albert C. Slater’s Alpha Company moved abreast in a northward direction along Route 561. Both companies stepped off at 08:00. Alpha Company was on the right. Route 561 was a ten-foot-wide cart path bordered by waist-high hedgerows. Unknown to either Coates or Slater, two NVA infantry battalions were waiting for them behind well-prepared fighting positions. The next few hours would transform the Hill of Angels into a meat grinder.
Within an hour, 2nd Platoon (2ndPlt) Bravo Company achieved its first objective, a small crossroad some 1,200 meters north of the trace. Enemy snipers began taking 3rdPlt and the company command element under fire as soon as they reached the crossroad. As Captain Coates shifted the 3rdPlt to suppress the enemy fire, the NVA intensified its delivery. Coates halted the 3rdPlt’s advance and directed 2ndPlt to shift right in an attempt to outflank the enemy’s position. At the same time, Captain Coates ordered 1stPlt to move forward for rear area security and/or reinforcement if required. NVA fire halted 2ndPlt’s advance. Within a few moments, Bravo Company began receiving heavy small arms fire from the front and both flanks. With the Marines halted and assuming a defense, the NVA began to deliver artillery and mortar fire.
Alpha Company Marines tripped two booby traps, injuring several Marines. The company advance was halted while Captain Slater called for a medevac. Once the wounded Marines had been evacuated, Slater moved forward in an attempt to link up with Coates but was prevented from doing so by heavy enemy fire.
Bravo Company casualties were mounting by the second — its position rapidly deteriorating as the NVA successfully cut 3rdPlt and the command element from 2ndPlt. With the Marines under heavy fire, enemy soldiers armed with flame weapons ignited the hedgerows on both sides of the road. 2ndPlt launched an assault to help 3rdPlt, but enemy artillery and mortar fire increased. With a grass fire threatening to overwhelm them, Marines withdrew only to enter into a killing zone of NVA machine guns.
Enemy artillery killed Captain Coates, his radio operator, two platoon commanders, and the company artillery forward observer. The Forward Air Controller, Captain Warren O. Keneipp, assumed command of Bravo Company, but without a radio operator, Captain Keneipp lost contact with 2ndPlt and had no control over subsequent events (please see comment below). The company executive officer (XO) (2nd in command) was with 2ndPlt; his radio was the only source of comms with the battalion command post (CP), but cut off from the rest of the company, the XO was in no position to influence the action.
Staff Sergeant Leon R. Burns commanded 1stPlt. He led the platoon forward to reinforce 2ndPlt and 3rdPlt, but enemy assaults hindered his advance. Burns called in air strikes and specifically asked for napalm. The strike delivered the much-needed munitions within twenty meters of the 1stPlt’s position. After the airstrike, the enemy assault faltered, which allowed Burns to move forward and incorporate what remained of the 2ndPlt. After placing his Marines into a hasty defense, the company’s Navy Corpsmen began treating their wounded Marines.
Upon learning that Alpha and Bravo companies had run into a hornet’s nest, and the Bravo Company commander had been killed, Colonel Schening dispatched Captain Henry J. Radcliffe (the Battalion Operations Officer) to take command of Bravo Company. Radcliffe led forward an additional rifle platoon from Delta Company and four tanks. First Lieutenant Gatlin J. Howell (the Battalion Intelligence Officer) accompanied Radcliffe because his familiarity with the terrain surrounding Con Thien.
Radcliffe’s arrival at the point of contact was timely because his relief platoon foiled an NVA attempt to encircle Bravo Company. As the tanks and helicopter gunships dispersed the NVA, Delta Company moved forward with its two remaining rifle platoons. Radcliffe directed the Delta Company commander to secure a landing zone. Within minutes, Charlie Company began to arrive by helicopter from Dong Ha.
With additional support from Charlie and Delta companies, Radcliffe continued his assault. When Captain Radcliffe made contact with Staff Sergeant Burns, he asked, “Where is the rest of Bravo Company?” Burns answered, “Sir, you’re looking at all that’s left of Bravo Company.”
With Burns supervising the evacuation of wounded and dead Marines, Radcliffe continued forward to Bravo Company’s furthest advance. At that point, Radcliffe established defensive positions and began attending to the 3rdPlt’s dead and wounded. Lieutenant Howell, who had previously commanded 3rdPlt, quickly searched for Marines and helped move them back to the corpsman for triage. At that moment, the enemy re-initiated artillery fire and the company’s withdrawal was made more difficult when two of the supporting tanks triggered landmines.
Radcliffe shepherded the casualties into the landing zone for medevac. While waiting for the airlift, NVA dropped mortars into the LZ, inflicting even more casualties on the medical corpsmen and litter bearers. By this time, the fog of war had completely descended upon 1/9’s forward elements. With officers and senior NCOs killed and wounded, corporals took charge. The NVA’s artillery assault on the landing zone precluded additional helicopter support, so ambulatory Marines began carrying their wounded brothers back to Con Thien.
Throughout the battle, Marine and naval gunfire engaged the enemy in a furious duel. During that day, Schening’s CP received over 700 enemy artillery rounds. Marine aircraft flew 28 sorties, dropping 90 tons of munitions on the well-fortified enemy positions.
Meanwhile, Captain Slater’s Alpha Company remained heavily engaged. The number of Marine casualties brought the company to a standstill, prompting Slater to order his 3rdPlt to establish a hasty landing zone defense in the company rear area. After the first flight of evac helicopters departed the zone, NVA hit the 3rdPlt with mortar fire and a ground assault. Slater moved his 2ndPlt and command group to reinforce the 3rdPlt. The NVA moved to within 50 meters of the company line before Marine fire broke the attack, but owing to the number of their casualties, Alpha Company was relegated to a defensive position until the NVA force withdrew later that evening.
As Colonel Schening moved his CP forward, he sent his XO, Major Darrell C. Danielson, ahead with additional reinforcements and transport to help evacuate the casualties. When Danielson contacted the fifty remaining Marines, he organized a medical evaluation and called for medevacs. Several Marines were bleeding out, everyone appeared to be in a state of shock. Despite on-going enemy artillery and mortar fire, Danielson managed to extricate Alpha and Bravo companies back to Con Thien.
Colonel Schening reported his situation to the Colonel Jerue, the regimental commander: situation critical. Jerue ordered Major Willard J. Woodring, commanding 3/9, to reinforce Schening. Upon arrival, Schening directed Woodring to assume operational control of Alpha and Charlie companies (1/9). Major Woodring directed a five-company assault on the enemy flanks while what remained of Bravo and the LZ security platoon from Delta company withdrew into Con Thien. Woodring’s aggressive assault caused the NVA units to withdraw. Later in the day, Staff Sergeant Burns reported only 27 combat effectives remained in Bravo Company. In total, 1/9 had lost 84 killed in action, 190 wounded, and 9 missing. Of enemy casualties, no precise number exists.
Enemy contact continued for the next three days. At 09:00 on 3 July, an Air Force aerial observer reported several hundred NVA soldiers advancing on Marine positions north of Con Thien. Echo Battery 3/12 dropped a massive number of rounds on the NVA position killing an estimated 75 communists. To the east, Major Woodring called in artillery strikes for twelve hours in preparation for an assault scheduled for 4 July.
Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Wickwire’s BLT 1/3 (Special Landing Force Alpha) reinforced the 9th Marines and tied in with Woodring’s right flank. Colonel George E. Jerue, commanding the 9th Marines, planned his assault to push the NVA out of the Long Son area, some 4,000 meters north of Con Thien. Woodring began his assault at around 0630, encountering heavy resistance from well-concealed enemy positions southwest of Bravo Company’s engagement on 2 July. A prolonged battle involving tanks, artillery, and close air support ensued for most of the day. At 18:30, when Woodring halted his advance, 3/9 had lost 15 dead and 33 wounded. Wickwire’s 1/3 had lost 11 wounded in the same action.
BLT 2/3 (SLF Bravo) under Major Wendell O. Beard’s BLT 2/3 effected an air assault at Cam Lo, joining Operation Buffalo at mid-afternoon on 4 July. This battalion moved west and then northward toward the western edge of the battle area toward Con Thien.
At daylight on 5 July, NVA artillery began firing on Marine units located northeast of Con Thien but kept its ground units away from the Marines as they advanced. Meanwhile, search and recovery teams had begun the grim task of retrieving Bravo Company’s dead.
On 6 July, all battalions continued moving north. Beard’s 2/3 ran into an enemy force supported by mortars less than two miles south of Con Thien. Within an hour, 2/3 killed 35 NVA, while suffering 5 killed and 25 wounded. Major Woodring and Colonel Wickwire advanced their battalions under intermittent artillery fire. At around 09:00, Woodring decided to send a reinforced rifle company 1,500 meters to the north-northwest to cover his left flank. Captain Slater’s Alpha Company, which now included the survivors of Charlie Company and a detachment from 3rd Recon Battalion, moved into position without enemy resistance and established a strong combat outpost.
Slater’s movement went unnoticed, but that wasn’t the case with the main elements of Woodring’s and Wickwire’s battalions. Both units encountered heavy artillery fire. By 16:00, neither of the battalions could go any further. Wickwire had lost a tank but due to concentrated enemy artillery fire, was forced to pull back without recovering it. Captain Burrell H. Landes, commanding Bravo Company 1/3, received a report from an aerial observer that 400 or more NVA were heading directly to confront Woodring and Wickwire. A short time later, accurate NVA artillery fire began blasting the Marines. As Woodring and Wickwire prepared to meet the approaching NVA under the enemy’s artillery assault, Captain Slater’s recon patrol reported that the approaching NVA was heading directly into Alpha Company’s position.
The NVA force was unaware of Slater’s blocking position until they were within 500 feet, at which time Slater’s Marines engaged the NVA. Since the NVA didn’t know where the Marine’s fire was coming from, they scattered in every direction, some of them running directly into the Marine line. Once the enemy had figured out where Slater’s Marines were positioned, they organized an assault. The Marine lines held, however. At one point, NVA troops began lobbing grenades into the Marine position. Lance Corporal James L. Stuckey began picking the grenades up and tossing them back. Stucky lost his right hand on the third toss when the grenade exploded as it left his hand. Stuckey remained with his fireteam throughout the night without any medical assistance.
While the Alpha Company fight was underway, elements of the 90th NVA Regiments attacked Woodring’s and Wickwire’s Marine with blocks of TNT. Marines called in air support, artillery, and naval gunfire. By 21:30, the Marines had repelled the enemy assault and caused the NVA regiment to withdraw. At around 22:00, Woodring radioed Slater to return to the battalion perimeter at first light.
Alpha Company mustered before daylight on 7 July. As the sun began to light the sky, Slater’s Marines discovered 154 dead NVA just beyond the Marine perimeter. About an hour later, after Slater had returned to Woodring’s lines, the NVA unleashed a terrible barrage on Slater’s old position. In front of Woodring and Wickwire’s battalion lay an additional 800 dead communists. Later that morning, however, an NVA artillery shell found its way to 1/9’s command bunker, killing eleven Marines, including First Lieutenant Gatlin J. Howell, who had gone to the aid of Bravo Company on 2 July. Lieutenant Colonel Schening was wounded in the same incident.
Operation Buffalo ended on 14 July. Marines reported enemy losses at 1,290 dead, two captured. Total Marine losses were 159 killed, 345 wounded. The NVA attack at Con Thien was relatively short in duration but particularly vicious and the communists paid a heavy price. Since the enemy dead were so horribly chewed up from air, artillery, and naval gunfire, the Marines were forced into counting the NVA solder’s water canteens for a sense of enemy dead.
Telfer, G. L. and Lane Rogers. U. S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967. Washington: Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, 1984.
Bowman, J. S. The Vietnam War: Day by Day. New York: Mallard Books, 1989.
Nolan, K. W. Operation Buffalo: USMC Fight for the DMZ. Dell Publishing, 1992.
 In this context, Robert McNamara was a war criminal.
 Located south of the DMZ, Leatherneck Square was a TAOR extending six miles (east-west) by nine miles (north-south); it’s corners were measured from Con Thien (northwest) to Firebase Gio Linh (northeast), and from Dong Ha to Cam Lo on its southern axis (an area of more than 54 square miles). Between March 1967 to February 1969, 1,500 Marines and Navy Corpsmen were killed in this area, with an additional 9,265 wounded in action.
 Awarded Silver Star Medal for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action between 2 July – 9 July 1967. Colonel Woodring passed away in 2003.
 After 14 July, estimates of enemy KIA ranged from 525 to 1,200.
 Colonel Wickwire was awarded the Silver Star Medal for conspicuous gallantry for service on 6 July 1967.
 Retired Lieutenant Colonel Wendell Otis “Moose” Beard, a former NFL football player with the Washington Redskins, served in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam Wars. He was the recipient of the Bronze Star Medal and Purple Heart Medal. He passed away in 1980.
 First Lieutenant Howell was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross for his actions on 2 July 1967.
 Colonel Schening was also wounded at Cape Gloucester, Peleliu, and during the Korean War. This was his fourth Purple Heart Medal. He was awarded the Silver Star Medal for service during the Korean War while serving as XO, Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. Colonel Schening passed away in 1996.
The first colonial resolution for creating a naval force came from Rhode Island on 12 June 1775. One old saying is that “necessity is the mother of invention.” Not that a navy was a new idea, but rather the realization that if the colonies intended to make good on their declaration of independence, they would need freedom of navigation and stout defense of the colony’s long coastline to do it. Rhode Island took this initiative because the Royal Navy’s harassment costs to that colony’s shipping were high. Two months later, Rhode Island proposed a single Continental Fleet (funded by all thirteen colonies, of course).
In October 1775, Congress passed a resolution creating the Continental Navy. It would take something more than a piece of paper to build an adequate navy, of course, and the fact is that the Continental Navy had a somewhat rough beginning. But by the early part of 1779, America’s naval effort against British shipping had a favorable impact. Privateers, particularly those working the Atlantic between New York and Nova Scotia, had become exceptionally proficient in intercepting and assaulting British cargo vessels — so well, in fact, that by the spring, the Royal Navy began escorting convoys of cargo ships to North America.
The downside of the British convoy system was that it siphoned off Royal Navy ships from other tasks. Moreover, the activities of American privateers forced the British to develop the strategy of taking shelter in protected anchorages near active sea lanes — places from which they could dispatch patrols against American raiders. The coast of Maine was especially useful in this regard because of its many estuaries, because the region contained a large number of British loyalists, and because the forested areas in Maine were a primary source of timber for American shipbuilding.
General Sir Henry Clinton, Commander-in-Chief of British forces in the colonies, instructed the commander of British forces in Nova Scotia, Brigadier General Francis McLean, to establish a fortification on the Penobscot River — one capable of housing 400-500 men, with a magazine. Beyond the construction of a fortification, Clinton also instructed McLean to offer land grants to local inhabitants in exchange for their oath of loyalty to the British Crown. McLean’s regiment would consist of 400 men from the 74th Regiment of Foot (Argyle Highlanders) and another 100 men from the King’s Orange Rangers (a loyalist regiment in New Jersey).
In May 1779, General McLean decided to enlarge his force to 640 men. Four-hundred forty of these would come from the 74th Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel John Campbell, and, since the King’s Orange Rangers could not provide an additional 100 men, McLean decided to excuse the rangers from service and replace them with 200 men from his own regiment, the 82nd.
General McLean’s convoy departed Halifax on 30 May escorted by HMS Blonde, HMS North, HMS Nautilus, HMS Albany, and HMS Hope. Pathfinders reconnoitered the banks of the Penobscot River in mid-June to find a suitable site for the fort. McLean decided on a peninsula that extends into the bay from the eastern shore known as Bagaduce. At the time of McLean’s arrival at Bagaduce, the land was covered by an evergreen forest of fir and pine. A protected bay opened to the South. For his building site, the General chose an elevated plateau near the middle of the peninsula. From that position, McLean’s cannon could command access to the bay. A thick forest obscured the river (western side) of the arm.
Once General McLean’s force and supplies had been off-loaded, he anticipated that Captain Andrew Barkley, commanding the flotilla, would leave several ships at anchor in the bay. Barkley, however, intended to withdraw all his ships except HMS Albany (under Captain Henry Mowat). An argument ensued between Barkley and McLean, which was only resolved when Barkley became aware that several American frigates operated off the coast of Halifax. Without Barkley’s flotilla, Halifax was virtually at the mercy of the American navy. Eventually, Captain Barkley permitted HMS Albany, HMS North, and HMS Nautilus to remain behind at Bagaduce along with McLean’s transport ships.
American rebels quickly learned of McLean’s landing. One rumor warned that General McLean commanded 1,500 men. Brigadier General Charles Cushing of the Massachusetts militia suggested that several county militias might be required to disengage McLean. Rebel spies kept the Council of Massachusetts regularly informed of McLean’s activities. With so much reliance upon the sea for its economic welfare, it would only be a matter of time before the Americans challenged the British in Nova Scotia.
The alarmed Council of Massachusetts wasted no time in making an appeal to the Congressional Navy Board for their assistance in removing the British threat. The Navy Board advised its Marine Committee of these circumstances and tendered its recommendation that Congress order its ships to address this new British threat.
Money was tight in 1779. Even before the Marine Committee could formulate its reply, the Navy Board sent a letter back to the Massachusetts Council informing them that the Navy Board concurred with any “proper measures” Massachusetts may undertake to dislodge the enemy from Penobscot. Apparently, without saying as much, the Continental Congress thought it would be great if Massachusetts paid for the operation. Congress did offer them the services of Captain Dudley Saltonstall and four Continental Navy ships to achieve the ouster of the British garrison at Penobscot, however.
As a senior Continental Navy officer, Saltonstall would serve as commodore of Continental and Massachusetts ships. Preparation for the sea began aboard the sloops Warren, Providence, and Brige. Taking a ship to sea in 1779 was difficult because recruiting experienced crews was nearly impossible. Experienced sailors preferred to serve aboard privateers where the pay was better and sea passages much safer.
On 29 June 1779, the Council of Massachusetts formed a small committee whose task was to direct the province of New Hampshire to raise a militia. The Council of New Hampshire agreed to send a 20-gun privateer, the Hampden. Hampden was armed with six and 9-pound cannon and carried a complement of 130 men. In addition to Hampden and the four Continental ships, the American flotilla would include three vessels of the Massachusetts Navy, twelve privateers paid for by Massachusetts, and several merchant ships hired to carry supplies from Boston and militia from York Lincoln, and Cumberland counties.
In addition to Continental Marines serving aboard Captain Saltonstall’s ships, the plan for the Penobscot Expedition included 1,500 militia recruited from Maine’s three southern-most counties. Unfortunately, it was no easier to recruit soldiers than it was sailors and Maine recruiters fell short of their quota by around six hundred men.
The solution to Maine’s shortage of volunteers was conscription, which netted mostly young boys, invalids, and elderly men. Without waiting for a second draft effort, Maine’s Adjutant General marched his 433 men to a rendezvous at Townsend (present-day Boothbay Harbor). The number of men drafted from York and Lincoln was also disappointing. At Townsend, militia Brigadier General Solomon Lovell, the designated commander of land forces, could only muster 873 men.
There was no time to train these men. The Council of Massachusetts wanted to assault Bagaduce before the British could complete the construction of their fort. General Lovell opted to take his small force ahead to Bagaduce while a call for more men went out to adjacent colonies. If mustered, these additional men would proceed to Bagaduce as soon as possible; if not, then Lovell would have to make do with what he had.
Small groups of transport ships and privateers rendezvoused in Nantasket Roads during mid-July. Given the primitive communications of the day, one wonders how long a ship’s captain would wait around for something to happen before losing interest. Still, by 23 July, all naval units were anchored off Townsend, and militia began boarding their transports.
Captain Saltonstall’s flotilla set sail on 24 July. He had earlier sent Tyrannicide and Hazard ahead to scout for British ships. A short distance into the Bay, Captain Williams of the Hazard dispatched Marine Second Lieutenant William Cunningham ashore to find local inhabitants who might provide valuable intelligence about enemy activities. We do not know the details of Cunningham’s scouting party; we only know that he returned with three men.
After Saltonstall arrived in Penobscot Bay on 25 July, Captain Williams dispatched Cunningham and his men to the flagship Warren to brief Commodore Saltonstall on what they’d learned. Meanwhile, through other sources, Saltonstall learned of the presence in nearby Camden of Mr. James Mills Mitchell, a man reputedly familiar with the area where the British fort was under construction. We know Saltonstall conferred with Mitchell; we simply do not know what they discussed.
After that, Captain Saltonstall ordered Lieutenant Brown, commanding Diligent, to reconnoiter the riverbank near Bagaduce. While performing this mission, Brown observed three men waving from shore to gain his attention. One of the three men reported that he had observed British activities and estimated the number of soldiers between 450-500. He said that the fort was not quite half-completed. Brown sent these men along to Warren, where they made their report to Captain Saltonstall. Lieutenant Brown had no personal knowledge of McLean’s dispositions or activities, but that didn’t prevent him from advising Saltonstall to prepare for an immediate attack. In Brown’s opinion, the fort could be “easily taken.”
Commodore Saltonstall was not easily persuaded. He remarked to Brown, “Only a madman would go in before they had reconnoitered, and it would be the height of madness even to attempt it.” Saltonstall was wisely prudent because nothing of what had been reported to him had any basis in fact. Saltonstall, for example, was told that the fort’s walls were barely three feet high when the fortification was much further along.
General McLean had either co-opted local inhabitants or pressed them into labor parties to strengthen the fort. He had mounted his cannon to support his infantry, the defensive lines had been closed, and his construction included chevaux-de-frise defensive works. His shore battery firing positions had been raised to allow for firing in barbette. McLean had also stripped the cannon from the starboard side of British vessels (they were arranged in line with the port side outward), placing these cannons at various sites ashore.
In preparation for the American assault, General Lovell directed Marines and militia to probe the British line. Undercover of naval artillery from Hazard, Tyrannicide, and Sally, Lovell ordered the landing force ashore on Sunday, 25 July (the first day of hostilities). Seven American boats were able to approach the shore, but strong winds produced a severe chop in bay waters, preventing most boats from reaching shore. Seven boats did approach the beach, but intense British fire turned them back. Irregular cannonades were exchanged with minor damage to either side. Lovell canceled the attack.
The sporadic naval fire was again exchanged throughout the day on 26 July, with minor damage to either side. Still, the action did cause the British to re-position their ships further up into the harbor to tighten their defensive line.
At 18:00 on Monday, Captain Saltonstall dispatched Marine Captain John Walsh to Banks Island, where the British had established several cannon positions. Walsh secured his objective, but with no further orders, he set up defensive positions on the island and ordered his Marines to begin constructing field cannon positions from which the Americans might fire on British ships and land positions. Walsh’s landing forced the British ships to once again re-position themselves.
While Walsh led his Marines to Banks Island, Major Daniel Littlefield, commanding militia, led an assault force to seize a British position near the entrance to the Bagaduce River. While approaching the shore, a shot from British cannon landed in Littlefield’s boat, killing him and three others. General Lovell detailed a third force of men to go ashore and begin constructing a siege position. The Americans were under constant British fire throughout their effort to develop a foothold.
On Tuesday evening, a substantial disagreement developed between General Lovell, his deputy, Brigadier General Peleg Wadsworth, Captain Saltonstall, and a few more senior naval commanders. Militia officers favored a vigorous naval assault against the British vessels in the harbor. If these ships could be destroyed, they argued, the land campaign would be more easily started and more likely of success on the harbor side of the peninsula. Navy officers, including Saltonstall, argued that the army and Marines should first land and overrun the fort; this would allow the American fleet to “safely destroy the British vessels.” Overrunning the fort would be easier said than done given the precipitous cliffs fronting the fort. Further complicating the discord between the naval and land commanders, several privateer captains grew impatient and circulated a petition urging Saltonstall to proceed with this operation without further delay.
At this council of war, which was held aboard Warren, the Americans decided to proceed with their assault on Bagaduce. The landing force consisted of around 850 militia and 227 Marines. Eighty cannoneers served under Lieutenant Colonel Paul Revere.
Saltonstall directed that preparations for the assault begin at midnight, which achieved little more than deprive the men of sleep. His plan divided the landing force into three sections. As the senior Marine officer, Captain John Walsh would lead his men ashore on the American right. Colonel McCobb’s Lincoln County militia and LtCol Revere’s artillerists would serve in reserve. Colonel Jonathon Mitchell’s Cumberland County militia would go ashore on the American left. Once ashore, Brigadier General Wadsworth would exercise overall command of the land forces.
Loading flat bottomed boats with so many armed men was a time-consuming effort, and the men were left standing in the boats for most of the night. American naval fire began at 03:00. At first light, the landing boats began their movement to shore under the cover of a dense fog, which made the movement to shore dangerously confusing. Marines and militia began their landing at around 05:00; they were met by heavy British musket fire. Moving in small groups, the men started their climb up the precipice essentially one-handed while holding their weapons on their non-dominant hand.
Mitchell’s force encountered McLean’s 82nd Regiment. For the most part, the 82nd was composed of inexperienced soldiers, which allowed the militia to overrun them without much difficulty. On the right, Walsh confronted McLean’s more experienced men, then serving under Lieutenant John Moore. While the Marines advanced with deadly resolve, Lieutenant Moore, with only twenty soldiers remaining alive, was equally tenacious in holding the line. Captain Walsh was killed, his second in command, First Lieutenant William Hamilton was severely wounded, yet the Marines continued their assault. Moore, in danger of being encircled, finally withdrew to the fort.
As the Marines regrouped, they counted their losses of 34 men, including Welsh and Hamilton. Marine First Lieutenant William Downe assumed command on the right and continued his assault. According to Downe, it looked as if General McLean was ready to concede the fort — and might have done so were it not for the fact that the Marines did not receive the naval artillery support they expected from Saltonstall. Saltonstall’s failure to support the Marines and murderous fire from the British forced Downe to assume defensive positions.
By the end of the day, the Americans had established a 180° defense and proceeded to move their artillery ashore. McLean, however, was firmly in control of Fort George. Concentrated artillery fire forced the Americans to entrench. Sleep-deprived, the militia were becoming unruly and not simply a little displeased with the navy’s lack of artillery support.
Sometime during the morning of 29 July, Commodore Saltonstall decided that it might be a good idea to construct a fortification facing the British. Captain Salter of Hampden and Captain Thomas of Vengeance would supervise the work of sixteen engineers to build the American fort. Now, if Saltonstall believed the militiamen were rowdy on 29th July, the attitude of the troops on 5 August was positively murderous. They were tired of “dicking around.”
General Lovell, commanding ground forces, sent a note to Saltonstall asking whether his ships would enter the harbor to support the land force. Everyone ashore wanted to know the answer, but Saltonstall felt it necessary to convene another series of war councils before answering. Saltonstall decided, finally, that Lovell would receive no naval support until after he had taken Fort George. At a subsequent meeting of militia officers, it was unanimously decided that if those were Saltonstall’s terms, he could bloody well take the fort himself.
For his part, General Lovell was steadfast in keeping the Massachusetts Council apprised of the progress of the Penobscot Expedition; the Council had heard nothing at all from Saltonstall. When the Council finally understood how dire the situation was at Penobscot, they requested immediate reinforcements from General Horatio Gates, who was then at Providence. Gates had no opportunity to respond to this emergency — it would have taken him far too long to recruit adequate reinforcements. In any case, by that time, the Penobscot Expedition had already fallen apart.
By 13 August, General McLean had nearly completed his fort and a British fleet, having heard of the assault on 28 July, was en route to Penobscot under the command of Admiral Sir George Collier. Lovell and his officers, no longer participating in expedition planning with the naval force, developed their own plan for assaulting the British fort. Before the operation could be implemented, however, a heavy fog set in. When it lifted, Collier’s flotilla was observed entering the lower bay with ten warships. Although fewer in number than the Americans, the British fleet was experienced, proven in warfare, and more heavily armed. Saltonstall was lucky that a rain squall appeared, followed by more fog and then darkness — but the American’s luck didn’t hold.
At first light, the British began their approach. The American ships broke and ran from the fight and headed upstream, hoping to find small inlets where they could hide. By nightfall, most American ships, including transports, had either been captured by the British or destroyed by their own crews. Most of the landing force fled through the Maine wilderness, leaving behind them on the shores of the Penobscot River the smoldering remains of the American fleet. The expedition’s survivors began filtering into Boston during the first week in September.
News of the Penobscot disaster shocked and demoralized the colony of Massachusetts. Except for the three Continental ships and one ship from New Hampshire, the Massachusetts colony agreed to indemnify the owners of its ships for any damages or losses. Including the cost of the expedition, Massachusetts added more than £4-million to its debt. Worse, Massachusetts had lost its entire navy. Someone would have to account.
Courts-martial exonerated Generals Lovell and Wadsworth of ineptitude. Commodore Saltonstall, on the other hand, was tried and found guilty of gross incompetence. A navy board determined that Saltonstall was wholly unfit to command a navy ship and stripped him of his commission.
As for the Continental Marines, their numbers being relatively small, they were never able to influence the events of the Penobscot River Expedition. They performed admirably when called upon, as evidenced by the seizure of Banks Island, and seizing the heights at Bagaduce. Still, this valor was insufficient to compensate for the navy’s failed leadership.
There are as many lessons in failure as there are from success. Despite achieving a near-victory, the Americans guaranteed their own defeat — first by failing to maintain unity of command, second by failing to develop a communications plan, third by poor operational planning, the employment of an untrained militia, and worst of all, timid senior commanders.
The cost of Penobscot was high. From a strength of around 700 soldiers and ten warships, McLean held off an American force of 3,000 (navy and militia), 19 warships, and 25 support vessels. McLean lost 86 men, killed, wounded, captured, or missing. The Americans gave up 474 killed, wounded, captured, or missing, 19 warships destroyed, and 25 support ships sunk, destroyed, or captured. General McLean retained his small settlement in Maine until the British force was withdrawn of their own accord. General McLean passed away from an illness in 1781.
The United States did not seriously consider another large-scale amphibious operation until the Mexican-American War (1846-48).
Bicheno, H. Redcoats, and Rebels: The American Revolutionary War. London: Harper Collins, 2003.
Buker, G. E. The Penobscot Expedition: Commodore Saltonstall and the Massachusetts Conspiracy of 1779. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2002.
Smith, C. R. Marines in the Revolution: A History of the Continental Marines in the American Revolution, 1775-1783. Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1975.
 Maine was then known as the Eastern Provinces of Massachusetts Bay. Some historians believe that Maine might have been looked upon as a location for a new British colony — one set aside for British loyalists in American. It would be called New Ireland, and it would be located between the Penobscot and St. Croix rivers.
 Roughly one-third of the residents of New Jersey remained loyal to the British crown.
 Boston had become a center for privateering activities; McLean’s presence in Maine threatened the privateers, who were heavily invested in ships and crews.
 Saltonstall (1738-1796) was a descendant of Sir Richard Saltonstall and John Winthrop, who governed the Massachusetts Bay Colony in the 17th Century. Politically well-connected in the colonies, Dudley received his commission in the Continental Navy upon the recommendations of his brother-in-law, Silas Deane, who served on Connecticut’s Naval Committee. He first commanded the flag ship of Commodore Esek Hopkins, Alfred and was responsible for hiring John Paul Jones as First Lieutenant. In 1779, Saltonstall was the senior Continental Navy officer based in Boston.
 The chevaux-de-frise was an anti-cavalry defense work consisting of a portable frame covered with several to many long-iron projections, spikes, or spears.
 Brigadier General Peleg Wadsworth (1748-1829) served as a general officer in the Massachusetts militia, district of Maine, as Adjutant General of Massachusetts, and as second in command to Brigadier Solomon Lovell during the Penobscot Expedition. He later served as a congressman from Massachusetts. He was the grandfather of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow.
 Thirty-two naval officers from 11 ships signed the petition.
 Later, Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore (1761-1809), also known as Moore of Corunna, was known for his tenacity in combat. During the Peninsular War, Moore repulsed the army of Marshal Soult at Corunna, giving up his life in a valiant contest of martial will.
 A fictionalized account of the Penobscot Expedition was the subject of Bernard Cornwall’s book entitled The Fort (published 2010).
There was a time when American liberalism was identified with anti-Communism. That time ended with the Vietnam War, because in starting that war, the Democratic Party delivered American liberalism into the arms of global communism.
During the Vietnam War, the III Marine Amphibious Force had overall tactical responsibility for the I Corps Tactical Zone (also, I Corps and I CTZ). I Corps was one of four separate military operating zones and the northern-most in the region of the former Republic of Vietnam (also, South Vietnam and RVN).
In land area, the size of I Corps involved around 1,800 square miles. Its vast size is further complicated by terrain dominated by hills and the Annamite Mountains, steep slopes, sharp crests, deep narrow valleys, and dense broadleaf forests. Most o the peaks range from 4,000 to 8,000 feet high. The narrow coastal plain is compartmented by rocky headlands and belts of large sand dunes. Prior to 1975, I Corps was the official border with North Vietnam—the two warring nations separated by the so-called Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
The I CTZ encompassed five political regions or provinces: Quang Tri, Thira Thien-Hue, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai. Major cities or population centers included Khe Sanh, Dong Ha, Quang Tri City, Da Nang, How An, Tam Ky, Chu Lai, and Quang Ngai City.
Tactical units subordinate to III MEF included the 1st Marine Division, 3rd Marine Division, the US Americal Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, US 35th Tactical Wing, and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 1st Division, 2nd Division, and 51st (Independent) Regiment.
Operation Union II was a search and destroy mission within the Que Son Valley between 26 May — 5 June 1967. The operational commander for Union II was Colonel Kenneth J. Houghton. Que Son was in the southern part of South Vietnam’s I Corps. Populous and “rice rich,” the valley was one of the keys to controlling South Vietnam’s five northern provinces. The densely vegetated area was occupied by two regiments of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 2nd Division. Que Son was also strategically important to the theater commander, (then) General Westmoreland, Commander U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (also, COMUSMACV).
During Operation Union (21 April—16 May 1967) 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (3/1) engaged the 21st NVA Regiment near the Marine outpost on Loc Son Mountain. Operation Union II focused on the destruction of the 21st Regiment. Colonel Houghton’s 5th Marines coordinated offensive operations with the ARVN 6th Regiment and 1st Ranger Group.
Operation Union II called for two rifle companies (A & D) of 1/5 and Company F 2/5 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Hilgartner, to establish a blocking position in the western portion of the valley. Lieutenant Colonel Esslinger’s 3/5 would make a helicopter (vertical) assault into the southern portion of the valley and sweep northeast. 2/5 would serve as Houghton’s reserve. Meanwhile, three ARVN battalions would attack southwest from Thang Bing, and two additional ARVN battalions would attack northwest from Tam Ky.
Union II kicked off as planned on 26 May. 1/5 took up its position and 3/5 (three rifle companies, a weapons company, and the battalion headquarters element) flew in to Landing Zone (LZ) Eagle, 3 miles east of Loc Son. The first two waves of helicopters received light enemy small arms fire. By the time the rest of 3/5 arrived, however, the battalion was under heavy weapons and mortar fire. Lima and Mike companies launched an attack to relieve the pressure on the LZ and discovered a well-entrenched NVA force, which turned out to be elements of the 3rd NVA Regiment. India Company, supported by Marine artillery, enveloped the enemy’s flank. The assault was expensive for both sides, with 118 NVA dead and 38 Marine KIA/82 WIA. Marine and ARVN forces swept the area for the next three days, but the NVA force had withdrawn. ARVN commanders withdrew having concluded that their enemy had been routed.
Colonel Houghton, on the other hand, was not convinced that the NVA had been routed. Relying on numerous intelligence reports, Houghton directed the regiment continue with the plan for Union II (less ARVN forces). On the morning of 2 June, 3/5 swept toward the village of Vinh Huy. Operating adjacent to 3/5, the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (3/1) encountered an estimated 200 NVA troops about one mile east of the engagement site on 26 May. 3/1 engaged and overran the defending NVA. Meanwhile, while pushing forward to relieve the pressure on 3/5, 1/5 ran into a NVA ambush while crossing a 3,000 yard-wide rice paddy. On battalion point, the well-concealed NVA caught Fox Company in a murderous crossfire with mounting casualties due to enemy mortar fires. 1/5 established a hasty defense posture.
Captain James A. Graham, commanding Fox Company, immediately set about consolidating his Marines, and calling for artillery and air support. Hardest hit in the enemy assault was 2nd Platoon, which was pinned down by two enemy machine gun positions. Forming his headquarters unit into an assault force, Captain Graham boldly led an attack against NVA positions. The effect of Graham’s attack was that it diverted the enemy’s attention away from 2nd Platoon.
While Graham attacked the NVA, platoon NCOs began evacuating wounded Marines back toward positions of relative safety. Determined to silence the NVA’s second machine gun, Graham’s small assault force withstood concentrated enemy fire and accounted for fifteen enemy dead, but Captain Graham suffered two bullet wounds and the assault force was inadequate to dislodging the enemy.
Running low on ammunition, and with one man critically wounded, Captain Graham ordered his men to withdraw back to the company perimeter. Realizing that he could not survive in the forward position, Graham nevertheless elected to remain in place with his one critically wounded Marine, who could not be moved. Shortly after his men withdrew, an NVA force of twenty-five men attacked Graham who resisted for as long as he had ammunition and gave up his life for the wounded Marine, whom he would not abandon. In recognition of his exceptional courage while under fire, his indomitable fighting spirit, and his intrepidity while relieving his second platoon from danger, Captain Graham received a posthumous award of the nation’s highest recognition for gallantry in combat, the Medal of Honor.
At around 14:00, Colonel Houghton called for reinforcement from the Division’s rapid-reaction force. Jackson’s force arrived by helicopter at 19:00 in total darkness. Delta and Echo Companies (1/7) were inserted northeast of the fortified enemy position and quickly moved south to engage the NVA’s left flank. Both companies encountered stiff enemy resistance; Delta Company suffered many casualties. Owing to the darkness, Division operations denied Delta Company’s request for Medevac helicopters. At that moment, a Marine CH-53 helicopter that had just inserted Echo 2/5 heard the call for assistance and responded to the call for help.
With the arrival of E 2/5, NVA forces began to disengage and withdraw southwest; it was a costly decision because they ran right into elements of 3/5 and Marine artillery. Despite being wounded himself, Houghton remained in the field to supervise re-consolidation of his regiment. The next morning, Houghton directed another sweep of the area, during which the Marines uncovered the remains of 701 dead NVA soldiers and 23 injured NVA who were medically treated and taken as prisoners of war. Operation Union II Marine casualties included 71 killed in action with 139 wounded. This action rendered the 2nd NVA Division combat-ineffective for several months.
Operation Union II was significant for another, albeit unrelated reason. It was during this operation that Marines began communicating with their parents and loved-ones back home that their M-16 rifles were malfunctioning with such regularity that Marines were being killed because of jammed weapons at critical moments during battle. In a random inspection of rifles by the III MAF staff, weapons experts and armors reported that a large number of rifles had pitted and eroded chambers. Marine headquarters then suspended issuance of the M-16s in December 1967 because of the 9,844 rifles inspected, experts found 67% of the rifles required immediate replacement.
Telfer, G. L. And Lane Rogers (et.al.). U. S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese. Washington: Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, 1984.
Carland, J. M. Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965-Oct 1966. Washington: Center of Military History, 2000.
 The Marine Corps has since renamed its largest task force organizations “Expeditionary Forces.” Today, III MAF is known as III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF).
 Colonel (later, Major General) Houghton (1920-2006) was commissioned in September 1942 and served during World War II and participated in the Battles of Tarawa and Saipan. During the Korean War, he participated with the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade at Pusan and the 1st Marine Division at the landing at Inchon. He served in I Corps RVN during the Vietnam War commanding the 5th Marine Regiment. He was awarded the Navy Cross, two Silver Stars, three Legion of Merits, two Bronze Star medals, and three Purple Heart medals.
 Fox Company 2/5 reinforced the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.
 Known as the Bald Eagle Reaction Force, a battalion-sized reserve then composed of Echo Company, 2/5, Delta Company, 1/7, and Echo Company, 2/7 (under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Mallett C. Jackson, Jr., whose primary assignment was Commanding Officer, 2/5).
 When the CH-53 returned to Da Nang, it had received 57 hits from small arms fire and mortar fragments.
During the Second Indochina War (known to the west as the Vietnam War), the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) consisted of four tactical zones. The northern-most of these was the First Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ), which included South Vietnam’s five northern provinces: from north to south, Quảng Trị, Thừa Thiên, Quảng Nam, Quảng Tín, and Quảng Ngãi. The responsibility for combat operations within these provinces was assigned to the Third Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), involving about 14,000 square miles. The Commanding General, III MAF, answered to the Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV).
Efforts to create a stabilizing security force in South Vietnam had begun in the mid-1950s. The only way to describe these efforts — and their effects — is that they were an unmitigated disaster. The most significant security force in 1955 was the Civil Guard, a paramilitary organization administered by South Vietnam’s interior ministry but controlled by the country’s 38 province chiefs. The civil guard was a 55,000 man force serving in static defense positions. Lacking mobility and modern communications, the civil guard’s small company and platoon sized units had no way to respond to Viet Cong attacks. But even if they were capable of challenging the VC, most provincial chiefs had no interest in doing so.
In 1960, the South Vietnamese military force was no more capable of performing combat operations than it was in 1955. Built mainly on the remnants of French-trained colonial forces, the South Vietnamese army, navy, and air force numbered 150,000; the army (known as ARVN) numbered 138,000. On paper, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) looked formidable. It wasn’t. The military chain of command was convoluted. The quality of its officer corps ranged from excellent to horrible. The efficiency and loyalty of ARVN units was dependent on the personality of its senior-most commander. Few ARVN units were interested in sharing information with other units. Vietnamese commanders were inflexible, prideful, and arrogant; they would spare no effort making themselves look good at someone else’s expense.
The Vietnamese high command treated the ARVN much in the same way as the civil guard — relegating them to static positions where the enemy always knew where they were. This worked out well enough for senior commanders since few of them were willing to put their necks on the line confronting Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army units.
Despite significant funding from the United States for military training in1963, most combat training in Vietnam was a paper chase. Vietnamese troops themselves were poorly paid, poorly educated, unmotivated, and inexperienced. Some were capable of extraordinary acts of courage, but not many. In the Battle of Ap Bac in 1963, which took place over several days, 300 Viet Cong irregulars fought 1,200 South Vietnamese Army troops to a standstill. Once the VC had had their way with the ARVN, they melted away into the dense jungle.
Nui Loc Son
In mid-1966, American intelligence learned that the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 2nd Infantry Division had begun infiltrating the Que Son Valley. The densely populated valley was a central agricultural area that sat astride the boundaries of Quảng Nam and Quảng Tin provinces in the I CTZ. Both US and NVA military commanders recognized that available food sources and the rugged terrain made the Que Son Basin a crucial military objective. To control the valley was to dominate the entire I CTZ.
In January 1967, the 3rd and 21st NVA Regiments began operations within the Que Son Valley. Joining them a short time later was the 3rd VC regiment from Quảng Ngãi Province. The NVA intended to seize Que Son, which meant destroying isolated ARVN units, who at the time were occupying static defensive positions. COMUSMACV directed the CG III MAF to replace all ARVN units with American forces. III MAF’s challenge in carrying out his directive was the constant demand for combat troops elsewhere in I CTZ. The Marines could simply not afford to send battalions or regiments into the Que Son region. Yet, it was at the same time evident that ARVN units lacked the strength or effectiveness to carry out their defensive burden alone. To bolster Marine forces, USMACV assigned US Army units to the southern I CTZ, which released the 1st Marine Division (1stMarDiv) for operations within the Que Son Valley area.
Operation Union I
Operation Union I was the initiating campaign for what evolved into a bitter contest for control of the Que Son Basin. In mid-January 1967, Fox Company 2/1 relieved the ARVN unit at Nui Loc Son and began operations under its parent command’s operational authority, the 1st Marine Regiment, commanded by Colonel Emil J. Radic. By placing a Marine company on this small hill mass, III MAF hoped to achieve three goals: (1) deny VC/NVA access to this rice-producing area, (2) initiate a much-needed civic action effort, and (3) force the NVA into open battle. The Marines of Fox 2/1 were the bait.
Under the command of Captain Gene A. Deegan, Fox Company was reinforced by an 81mm Mortar section, a 106mm Recoilless Rifle section, and a 4.2-inch Mortar Battery from the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines (artillery) (1/11). Deegan soon began engaging small enemy units attempting to cross the valley floor. Fox Company also undertook limited civic action projects, which generated a mutually beneficial relationship with local citizens and aided in collecting critical intelligence concerning VC/NVA operations.
The NVA found Fox Company’s aggressive behavior irksome. Previously, NVA and VC units operated in the Que Son Basin with impunity but irritating the communists was why Marine HQ sent Fox Company to Nui Loc Son to begin with. The 2nd NVA Division took the bait.
By mid-April, Captain Deegan informed his battalion commander that he believed enemy forces operating near Nui Loc Son involved two regiments in strength. Colonel Radic decided to initiate a vertical assault against the enemy. Radic’s plan called for Fox Company to initiate contact from its observation post while elements of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 1st Marines (1/1) (3/1) would make a heliborne assault into the operational area; another battalion would serve in reserve. Additionally, elements of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines would move by helicopter to Que Son village to provide artillery support to the operation. Colonel Radic would control the operation from Nui Loc Son. The CG 1stMarDiv approved Radic’s plan but delayed its execution until another operation had reached its final objective.
At 0700 on 21 April, Captain Deegan led his company out of Nui Loc Son. The company experienced several minor encounters with small groups of enemy soldiers en route to the village of Binh Son, three miles to the northeast. At 0930, Fox Company encountered heavy enemy small arms fire, pulled back into a tree line, and set up a hasty defense. From that location, Deegan called for artillery fire and airstrikes on the enemy’s positions. At 1100, Deegan moved his 2nd and 3rd platoons against the village while the 1st platoon provided covering fire. Initially, Deegan’s assault elements encountered little resistance, but as they approached the village, the intensity of enemy fire increased to such a degree that Deegan could no longer maneuver the assault platoons. The 1st platoon, having attempted a flanking maneuver, was also halted.
Lieutenant Colonel Hillmer F. DeAtley, commanding 3/1, led his command group and India and Mike companies into the fight some 1,500 meters from Fox Company’s position. Eventually, 3/1 fought its way to Deegan’s location. Despite his several wounds, Captain Deegan continued to direct his company’s action until Colonel DeAtley relieved him of his command and ordered his evacuation.
Lieutenant Colonel Dean E. Esslinger, commanding 3/5, arrived from Chu Lai at around 1600 and linked up with DeAtley’s flank. Lieutenant Colonel Van D. Bell’s 1/1 arrived from Da Nang after dark. After reforming his Battalion adjacent to Colonel Radic’s command post, Bell led his Marines into the battle, which was already shaping up into a hell of a fight. At the conclusion of the first day, Fox 2/1 and India & Mike 3/1 had borne the brunt of the fighting. At dawn on the morning of the second day, 1/1, 3/1, and 2/5 had joined the battle.
Punishing Marine fire and aggressive maneuvering finally began to dislodge the enemy from their positions, forcing them northward into a blocking force of three ARVN ranger battalions. In its withdrawal, the NVA suffered significant casualties from artillery fire and airstrikes. Bell and Esslinger continued their attack, pursuing the enemy east and north of Nui Loc Son, but there were only intermittent contacts with the retreating enemy.
On 25 April, Colonel Kenneth J. Houghton’s 5th Marines (-) arrived from Chu Lai and moved into the Que Son Valley. Responsibility for Union I passed to Colonel Houghton, and by the end of next day, all of Colonel Radic’s 1st Marines had returned to Da Nang — leaving Fox Company under a new commander to man the outpost at Nui Loc Son.
3/5 began a thorough search of the mountains south and west of the basin; enemy contact was generally light until the evening of the 27th when a Marine triggered an anti-personnel mine that set off several explosions. One Marine died; 43 received wounds, and of those, 35 required medical evacuation. On the 28th, Esslinger’s 3/5 was joined by Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Wickwire’s 1/3, which was part of the Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force Alpha. Both battalions began a sweep within their respective tactical zones. Despite intelligence reports indicating a significant enemy presence, contact with enemy forces was sporadic and light.
Colonel Houghton was an experienced combat commander. On 1 May, he directed 1/5, under Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Hilgartner, into the mountains eight miles east of Hiep Duc. 1/5’s sweep initially encountered light resistance, but as the Battalion moved westward, the frequency and intensity of enemy engagements increased. On 5 May, Delta Company 1/5 stumbled upon an enemy storage site containing weapons, ammunition, military uniforms, surgical kits, and other military gear. Both 1/5 and 3/5 continued sweeping north; 1/3 began sweeping northwest of the Que Son village. All three battalions were experiencing only sporadic enemy contacts — the enemy withdrew away from the Marines.
On 10 May, the Marines ran into a more significant enemy force. Charlie 1/5 was moving up the slope of Hill 110 some 4,000 meters north of Que Son when the company came under heavy fire from a battalion-sized unit entrenched along the edge of Nui Nong Ham. The Marines took Hill 110, but when they set into a hasty defense on the hill’s summit, they began taking heavy fire from a cane field below and inside caves along Nui Nong Ham’s lower slopes. Captain Russell J. Caswell, commanding Charlie Company, called for assistance.
The nearest units were Bravo and Charlie companies 1/3. They responded to relieve Caswell, but heavy NVA resistance stopped their advance. Operational control of Bravo & Charlie shifted to Hilgartner’s 1/5. Calls for artillery fire were ineffective because the Marines and the NVA forces were too close. Bravo & Charlie companies soon called for reinforcements. One platoon from Alpha Company 1/3 arrived by air to support them, but enemy fires were so intense that Hilgartner’s air officer waived off subsequent landings.
Alpha Company 1/5, commanded by Captain Gerald L. McKay, situated 2,000 meters to the east, moved to support Wickwire’s companies and came under heavy enemy fire. Captain McKay was determined to push through. Just as he positioned his company for an assault, an air support controller mistakenly marked the company’s position for an airstrike. Marine F-4’s strafed the company — killing five Marines and wounded 24. The combination of the enemy and friendly fire halted McKay’s advance.
By 15:00, Colonel Hilgartner’s command group (with Delta Company 1/5), was positioned on the slope of Nui Nong Ham from which they could lend fire support to Delta 1/3. Hilgartner’s Marines began lobbing mortars into the enemy’s positions. Soon after, helicopters landed Esslinger’s Mike Company 3/5 at Hilgartner’s position and joined Captain Caswell’s Charlie Company. The two companies quickly consolidated their position and began delivering fire into NVA positions. With this support, Bravo & Charlie Company 1/3 aggressed the NVA positions in the cane field and on Nui Nong Ham’s northern slope. By nightfall, the Marines had driven off the NVA force, leaving behind 116 dead communists; the cost to the Marines was 33 killed and 135 wounded (including those killed and injured from friendly fire).
On 12 May, Colonel Wickwire’s 1/3 was withdrawn and replaced by Colonel Bell’s 1/1. On the 12th and 13th, 1/1, 1/5, and 3/5 remained in perpetual contact with enemy forces. Esslinger assaulted an enemy battalion 3 miles east of Que Son in the evening of 13 May. After making maximum use of artillery and airstrikes, Esslinger’s Marines ruthlessly attacked the NVA; artillery and aircraft support then shifted to block an NVA withdrawal. On the other end of the Marine assault, 122 dead communists littered the battle site.
On 13-14 May, the Marines continually employed artillery and air power to strike enemy positions. In the late afternoon of 14 May, Delta Company 1/1 discovered 68 enemy dead — all killed by either fragmentation or concussion.
The last battle of Union I took place on 15 May when Alpha 1/5 and Mike 3/5 discovered another bunker complex. After preparatory fires and a coordinated assault, the Marines found 22 dead enemies within the bunker complex. Operation Union I ended the next day. Within these 27 days, the Marines had killed 865 enemy troops, of which 465 were NVA regulars of the 2nd NVA Division. The number of communists killed was impressive, but Colonel Houghton believed that the most significant damage inflicted on the enemy was the psychological impact on the Que Son Valley population. Houghton thought that the VC’s hold over local villages and hamlets was broken.
If Colonel Houghton was right about that — the enemy didn’t seem to realize it. The story of the fight for the Que Son Valley continues next week.
Steward, R. W. Deepening Involvement: 1945-1965. Washington: Center for Military History, 2012.
Telfer, G. L. et al. U. S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese. Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1974.
 The official name of this Marine Corps organization is III Marine Expeditionary Force. It was temporarily changed to III Marine Amphibious Force in 1965 because the South Vietnamese government expressed a psychological objection to use of the word “expeditionary.”
 The SLF(A) code name for this operation was Beaver Cage.
Before the American Revolution, the thirteen British Colonies experienced few difficulties in matters of commercial navigation because all commercial shipping was protected by the Royal Navy, at the time the strongest navy in the world. This invaluable protection came to an end when the colonies rebelled. After the Revolution, the United States (having achieved its independence), would have to fend for itself. That, of course, was easier said than done. It would take the newly created country several decades to sort it all out.
The revolution threw the United States deeply into debt. Complicating those matters was the fact that the United States was operating under the Articles of Confederation. In 1783, the cash-strapped congress disbanded the Continental Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.
Three hundred years before the United States won its independence, the Barbary Coast states (Tripoli, Algiers, Morocco, and Tunis) began preying upon European ships. The method used by the Mohammedan pirates was simple enough. Cruising the Mediterranean in small but fast ships, pirates overtook merchant ships, boarded them, overpowered the crew, captured crew and passengers, and held them as prisoners until either their home country paid a ransom demand, or until the captives were sold into slavery. To avoid these difficulties, most European states reasoned that in the long-term, it would be cheaper to pay the Barbary states an annual tribute, guaranteeing free passage through the Mediterranean Sea.
Barbary pirates seized their first American-flagged ship, the merchantman Betsey, in 1785. The crew of that ship languished in irons for eight years. The Maria, home ported in Boston, was taken a few months later. Dauphin, from Philadelphia was next. Ship owners complained, of course, but there being no money for a naval force, there was nothing congress or the states could do about the Barbary Pirates. Between 1785 and 1793, 13 American ships were lost to the Mediterranean pirates. In 1793 alone, the Mohammedans seized eleven ships. To America’s shame, Congress agreed to pay the pirates tribute, and, at that point, the camel’s nose was under the tent. The amount of tribute increased with each passing year. In 1792, the United States paid ransoms totaling $40,000.00, and paid a tribute of $25,000.
Historians estimate that between the early-to-mid 1500s through 1800, Moslem pirates captured over one million white Christians from France, Italy, Spain, Holland, Great Britain, Iceland, and the Americas. Released crew and passengers recounted horrifying tales of their inhumane treatment, but even if some of these stories were exaggerated, they weren’t very far off the mark. The Berbers made no distinction between passengers or crew, or whether they were male or female. All captives were stripped of their clothing, robbed of all their possessions, and imprisoned awaiting ransom or enslavement. Women were repeatedly raped — which under Islamic law, was permitted and encouraged. Most captives languished in prison filth for years; many died in captivity. The only possible respite available to those luckless captives was to convert to Islam. Many of the converted sailors joined the corsairs as raiders.
In modern parlance, Barbary pirates carried out state-sponsored terrorism. It was an extortion racket, pure and simple, and every North African state was complicit. How the extortionists made their living was not entirely unusual and European heads of state well-understood the game. British, French, and Spanish privateers pursued a similar (albeit, more civilized) course of action. Insofar as the Europeans were concerned, paying tribute was merely the cost of doing business in the Mediterranean. Tribute costs increased as a matter of course whenever a new ruler assumed power. What made this a complication is that the voyage from Philadelphia to Tripoli took around six weeks. An increase in tribute between the time a ship left the United States and its arrival in North Africa would involve an additional twelve (or more) weeks sailing time.
Global Conflict and American Diplomacy
Barbary Pirates were not the United States’ only concern. The outbreak of war between France and Great Britain (and other countries) in 1793 ended the ten years of peace that enabled the United States to develop a system of national finance and trade. Ship building and commercial shipping were America’s largest industries in 1793.
From the British perspective, improved relations with the United States was most desirable, particularly in terms of the UK’s attempt to deny France access to American goods. From the American point of view, it would be most beneficial to normalize relations with the British because in doing so, the US would be in a better position to resolve unsettled issues from the 1783 Treaty of Paris. This is not how things worked out, however.
In mid-1793, Britain announced its intention to seize any ships trading with the French, including those flying the American flag. In protest, widespread civil disorder erupted in several American cities and by the end of the following year, tensions with Britain were so high that President Washington ordered the suspension of trade to European ports. But, at the same time, Washington sent an envoy to England in an attempt to reconcile differences with the United Kingdom. Britain’s behavior, meanwhile, particularly given its earlier preference for good relations with the United States, was perplexing. The British began the construction of a fortress in Ohio, sold guns and ammunition to the Indians, and urged them to attack American western settlements.
President Washington’s strongest inclination, as a response to British provocations, was to seek a diplomatic solution. Unhappily, Washington’s envoy to England, John Jay, negotiated a weak treaty that undermined America’s preference for free trade on the high seas and, moreover, the treaty failed to compensate American shippers for loss of cargo seized by the Royal Navy during the revolution. Worse than that, however, the Jay Treaty did not address the British practice of impressment. Given the fact that there were several favorable aspects to the Jay Treaty, the US Senate approved it with one caveat: trade barriers imposed by the UK must be rescinded.
Mr. Washington, while dissatisfied with the Jay Treaty, nevertheless signed it. Doing so brought the President his first public criticism and helped set into motion political partisanship within the Congress, toward the administration, and popularly directed at both. It was also in 1794 that the President and Congress had finally reached the limits of their patience with the Islamic barbarians.
President Washington asked Congress to reestablish a naval force and for authorization to construct six new warships. Clearly, there was no reason to build six warships if the United States didn’t intend to use them. Mr. Washington’s message to Congress was unambiguous: “If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it. If we desire to secure peace, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.”
The Naval Act of 1794 authorized the construction of six warships at a total cost of just under $700,000. It was not a unanimous decision; some members of Congress believed that the money could be better spent elsewhere — such as in westward expansion. The navy hawks won that argument. Along with six new ships, the navy began to appoint offers to command those ships and recruit the men who would crew them. And one more thing — the Navy would require United States Marines as well.
It took time to build the ships, reform the naval service, and hire the right men as captains. Meanwhile, in 1796, the United States concluded a peace treaty with Algiers. The United States paid $642,500 cash, up front, and agreed to a healthy annual tribute and assorted naval stores. The total cost to the United States for this one treaty was $992,463. In modern value, this would amount of well over $14-million. By way of comparison, the entire federal budget for 1796 was $5.7 million.
The Jay Treaty was not well received in France because in 1778, the United States signed an agreement with King Louis XVI of France — termed the Franco-American treaty of Alliance — where, in exchange for French support for the American Revolution, the United States agreed to protect French colonial interests in the Caribbean. The Alliance had no expiry date.
The French Revolution began in 1789. By 1791, the crowned heads of Europe watched developments in France with deep concerns. Several crowned heads proposed military intervention as a means of putting an end to the chaos and the terror. The War of the First Coalition (1792-1797) involved several European powers against the Constitutional Kingdom of France (later the French Republic) — a loose coalition, to be sure, and a conflict fought without much coordination or agreement. The one commonality in the coalition was that everyone had an eye on a different part of France should they eventually divide the country among them.
France looked upon the United States as its ally, pursuant to the Alliance of 1778, but there were several contentious issues:
First, the Americans strenuously objected to the execution of King Louis XVI in 1793.
Second, the Senate ratified the Jay Treaty (Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation).
Third, the United States passed the Neutrality Act of 1794. The Act forbid any American to engage in war with any nation at peace with the United States. Hence, no American could side with France against the British.
Fourth, the Neutrality Act cancelled the United States’ war debt to France. Members of Congress reasoned that since America’s debt agreement existed between the United States and the King of France, the king’s execution cancelled America’s debt Adding insult to injury, the Act also ended the Alliance of 1778.
Fifth, in retribution for reneging on the Alliance of 1778, the French Navy began seizing American ships engaged in trade with the UK — both as part of its war with the First Coalition, and as a means of collecting America’s revolutionary war debt.
Sixth, there was the so-called XYZ affair. With Diplomatic relations already at an all-time low between these two countries and owing to the fact that the United States had no naval defense, the French expanded their aggressive policy of attacking US commercial ships in American waters.
Re-birth of the United States Navy and Marine Corps
Without an American Navy, there could be no American response to French or Barbary depredations on the high seas. Driven by Thomas Jefferson’s objections to federal institutions, Congress sold the last Continental warship in 1785. All the United States had remaining afloat was a small flotilla belonging to the US Revenue Cutter Service; its only coastal defense was a few small and much neglected forts. As a result, French privateers roamed American coastal waters virtually unchecked. Between 1796-97, French privateers captured 316 American ships — roughly 6% of the entire US merchant fleet. The cost to the United States was between $12-15 million.
What the French accomplished through their program of retribution was to convince Federalists that the United States needed a Navy. In total, Congress authorized the construction of eight ships, including USS United States, USS Constellation, USS Constitution,USS Congress, USS Chesapeake, USS President, USS General Greene, and USS Adams. Congress additionally authorized “subscription ships.” These were ships supported (paid for) by American cities. The ships included five frigates and four sloops, which were converted from commercial ships. Two noteworthy of these was USS Philadelphia and USS Boston.
In finally realizing that national honor demanded action, Congress re-established the U. S. Navy and along with it, the United States Marine Corps — as before, during the Revolutionary War, providing seagoing detachments became the Corps’ primary mission. Serving aboard ship as naval infantry is the Marine Corps’ oldest duty. Americans didn’t invent this duty; it’s been around for about 2,500 years — all the way back to when the Greeks placed archers aboard ship to raise hell with the crews of enemy ships.
The Marines had several missions while at sea. During the 18th and 19th centuries, ship’s crews were often surly and undisciplined, and mutiny was always a possibility. With armed Marines aboard, the chance of mutiny dropped to near zero. Marines not only enforced navy regulations and the captain’s orders, but they also meted out punishments awarded to the crew when required. In those days, there were no close-knit feelings between sailors and Marines — which has become an abiding naval tradition.
Marines led naval boarding parties … a tactic employed to invade and overrun enemy officers and crews in order to capture, sabotage, or destroy the enemy ship. They were also used to perform cutting out operations, which involved boarding anchored enemy ships from small boats, often executed as ship-to-ship boarding operations after nightfall. Marine detachments provided expert riflemen to serve aloft in their ship’s rigging, their duty was targeting enemy officers, helms men, and gunners. When the ship’s captain ordered landing operations or raiding parties, Marines were always “first to fight.” Marines also served as gunners aboard ship. Naval artillery was always a Marine Corps skill set, one that later transitioned to field artillery operations — as noted during the Battle of Bladensburg, Maryland.
The Quasi-War with France
Ships of the Royal Navy blockaded most of France’s capital ships in their home ports. The U. S. Navy’s mission was twofold: first, to locate and seize or destroy smaller French ships operating along the US seacoast and in the Caribbean, and to protect convoys of cargo ships across the Atlantic. There was no formal agreement between the US and UK — it simply worked out as an informal cooperative arrangements between British and American sea captains.
The largest threat to American shipping came from small, but well-armed French privateers. These ships were constructed with shallow drafts, which enabled them to operate close to shore and within shallow estuaries. French privateers used French and Spanish ports to launch surprise attacks on passing ships before running back to port. To counter this tactic, the US Navy employed similarly sized vessels from the Revenue Cutter Service.
The first US victory over the French was capture of La Croyable, a privateer, by USS Delaware. La Croyable was captured after a lengthy pursuit along the southern New Jersey coast. After the ship’s capture, she was renamed USS Retribution. There were several other sea battles, but it may be sufficient to say that the U. S. Navy shined in its confrontation with a major European naval power.
U. S. Navy Captain Silas Talbot previously served during the Revolutionary War as an officer in the Continental Army. On 28th June 1777, Talbot received a commission to serve as a captain of the 2nd Rhode Island Regiment. After the siege of Boston, Talbot marched with his regiment to New York. En route, the regiment rested at New London, Connecticut where he learned of Navy Captain Esek Hopkins’ request for 200 volunteers to assist in operations in the Bahamas. Silas Talbot was one of Hopkins’ volunteers, but he retained his status as an officer of the Continental Army.
After having been recognized for his exceptional performance of duty and promotion to lieutenant colonel in the Continental Army (while serving at sea), the Congress commissioned Silas Talbot to captain, U. S. Navy, and gave him command of the American privateer General Washington on 17th September 1779. In his final Revolutionary War engagement, the feisty Talbot tangled with the British fleet off the coast of New York. He attempted to withdraw but was forced to strike his colors to HMS Culloden. Talbot remained a prisoner of war until December 1781.
Following the Revolutionary War, Talbot served in the New York state assembly and as a member of the U. S. House of Representatives. In early June 1794, President Washington selected Talbot to become the third of six newly commissioned captains of the United States Navy. His first assignment was supervision of the USS President then under construction in New York. On 20th April 1796, Congress suspended work on President and Talbot was discharged. Two years later, with the outbreak of the Quasi War, Talbot was recommissioned and assigned command of USS Constitution.
Captain Talbot’s mission was to protect American commercial ships, and to seek out and capture or destroy French Privateers. In addition to commanding Constitution, Talbot was assigned overall command of the Santo Domingo Station. In early May 1800, Constitution noted the presence of an armed French vessel anchored in Puerto Plata. Talbot planned a “cutting out” expedition to either capture this vessel or fire it. The ship’s identification was Sandwich, formerly a Royal Navy ship that had been captured by the French and operated as a privateer.
Sandwich, in addition to being well-armed, was anchored under the protection of heavy guns of Fortaleza San Felipe. Talbot’s problem was that Constitution was too large to enter the harbor at Puerto Plata. On 9th May, Talbot detained a small American sloop christened Sally, a 58-ton ship based out of Providence, Rhode Island, under the command of Thomas Sanford. Since Sally frequented the waters off Puerto Plata, her presence was not likely to raise the alarm of French and Spanish forces protecting Sandwich.
Commodore Talbot’s plan called for the detachment of one-hundred sailors and Marines from Constitution to serve under the command of Lieutenant Isaac Hull, USN with Marines under the command of Captain Daniel Carmick, USMC. The American sailors and Marines would hide inside Sally as the ship sailed into the harbor and then execute the capture of Sandwich. Overall command of the cutting out operation would fall to Captain Carmick. According to Carmick’s journal, “By this means it was easy to take the vessel by surprise [sic]; it put me in mind of the wooden horse at Troy.”
As Sally made her way into port, she was fired on by a British frigate and subsequently boarded. The British officer commanding found not a small vessel engaged in trade, but one filled below decks with US sailors and Marines. Lieutenant Hull provided the British officer with an overview of the intended operation. As it happened, the British were also watching Sandwich with interest. After some discussion, the Americans were allowed to continue their mission with the Royal Navy’s best wishes for success.
On 11th May, with Sally maintaining her cover, the ship sailed into Puerto Plata. Hull ordered the sailors and Marines to remain below decks until his order to board Sandwich.Sally laid alongside the French privateer and, when Hull ordered it, Carmick led his Marines over the side of Sandwich in “handsome style, carrying all before them and taking possession” of the enemy ship without any loss to themselves. Following Captain Talbot’s plan, Captain Carmick and First Lieutenant Amory led their Marines toward the fort. Their assault was stealthy and quick. Before the Spanish Army commander had time to react, the Marines were already in control of the fort, had spiked its guns, and withdrew to board Sandwich, which they promptly attempted to sail out of the harbor. Unfavorable winds delayed their departure until the middle of the night.
The action at Puerto Plata was significant because it marked the first time United States Marines conducted combat operations on foreign soil. The operation was boldly executed and lauded by Commodore Talbot. He wrote, “Perhaps no enterprize [sic] of the same moment has ever better executed and I feel myself under great obligation to Lieutenant Hull, Captain Carmick, and Lieutenant Armory, for their avidity in taking the scheme that I had planned, and for the handsome manner and great address with which they performed this dashing adventure.”
Commodore Talbot was criticized, however, because it was the decision of the admiralty court that seizure of Sandwich whilst anchored in a neutral port, was an illegal act. Not only was Sandwich returned to France, the officers and crew forfeited their bounty. Not even the official history of the Marine Corps remembers this FIRST action on foreign shore. Rather, the official history of the Corps skips over the Quasi-War and addresses the Barbary Wars as if the former never happened.
The United States Navy and Royal Navy reduced the activities of French privateers and capital warships. The Convention of 1800, signed on 30 September 1800, which ended the Quasi-War, affirmed the rights of Americans as neutrals upon the sea and reiterated the abrogation of the Alliance of 1778. It did not compensate the United States for its claims against France.
The courage and intrepidity of the naval force at Tripoli was without peer in the age of sail, heralded at the time by British Admiral Horatio Nelson as “The most-bold and daring act of the age.” Pope Pius VII added, “The United States, though in their infancy, have done more to humble the anti-Christian barbarians on the African coast than all the European states have done.” But politically, all we can say is that the United States government is consistent in its perfidy.
While Thomas Jefferson proclaimed victory, his ambassadors were working behind the scenes cutting deals with barbarian pirates. Consul-General Tobias Lear negotiated a less-than-honorable peace treaty with Tripoli. Jefferson agreed to pay $60,000 for all American prisoners, agreed to withdraw all naval forces, granted a secret stipulation allowing the Pasha to retain Ahmad’s family as hostages, and without a single blink, betrayed Ahmad Qaramanli. The Senate ratified this treaty in 1806 over the objection of Federalists and it did not seem to matter, to either Jefferson or James Madison, that they lost the respect of the American people. Of course, Madison added to this in 1812 by starting a war with the United Kingdom that ultimately ended up with the destruction of the nation’s capital — except for the US Marine Barracks and Eighth and I Streets.
Nor did the Barbary pirates end their misdeeds; the United States simply decided to ignore them (even at the expense to American-flagged merchant ships). After the end of the War of 1812, it was again necessary to address Mohammedan piracy. On 2nd March 1815, Madison asked Congress for a declaration of war against the pirates. Madison dispatched two naval squadrons to deal with the miscreant Moslems. Commodore William Bainbridge commanded one of these, Commodore Stephen Decatur commanded the other.
Decatur reached the Barbary Coast first, quickly defeated the blighters, and forced a new arrangement favorable to the United States. Decatur would not negotiate, but he didn’t mind dictating terms and in doing so, marked the first time in over 300 years that any nation had successfully stood up to the barbarian horde. Commodore Decatur’s success ignited the imaginations of the European powers to — finally — stand up for themselves. In late August 1816, a combined British and Dutch fleet under Lord Exmouth visited hell upon Algiers, which ended piracy against almost everyone except France. Mohammedan depredations against France continued until 1830 when France invaded the city of Algiers — remaining there until 1962.
Abbot, W. J. The Naval History of the United States. Collier Press, 1896.
Bradford, J. C. Quarterdeck and Bridge: Two centuries of American Naval Leaders. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1955.
McKee, C. A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U. S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794-1815. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991
Rak, M. J., Captain, USN. The Quasi-War and the Origins of the Modern Navy and Marine Corps. Newport: US Naval War College, 2020
 The Articles served as a letter of instruction to the central government, giving it only those powers which the former colonies recognized as those belonging to king and parliament. Although referred to as the Congress of the Confederation, the organization of Congress remained unchanged from that of the Continental Congress. Congress looked to the Articles for guidance in directing all business … including the war effort, statesmanship, territorial issues, and relations with native Indians. Since each state retained its independence and sovereignty, all congressional decisions required state approval. Congress lacked enforcement power, the power to raise revenues, or the power to regulate trade. Under the Confederation, government had no chief executive beyond “president of the congress assembled,” nor were there any federal courts.
 There was a single casualty from all this. Washington’s advisers presented him with evidence that Edmund Randolph, Jefferson’s successor as secretary of state, had allegedly solicited a bribe from a French envoy to oppose the treaty with England. Although Randolph denied the charges, an angry Washington forced his old friend to resign. With this action, another important precedent was set. The Constitution empowers the President to nominate his principal officers with the advice and consent of the Senate; it says nothing, however, about the chief executive’s authority to dismiss appointees. With Washington’s dismissal of Randolph, the administrative system of the federal government was firmly tied to the President. In total, Washington dismissed three foreign ministers, two consuls, eight collectors, and four surveyors of internal revenue — all without seeking the advice or approval of Congress.
 An American diplomatic mission was sent to France in July 1797 to negotiate a solution to problems that were threatening to escalate into war. American diplomats included Charles Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry. These diplomats were approached through informal channels by agents of French foreign minister Charles Talleyrand, who demanded bribes and a loan before formal negotiations could begin. Talleyrand had made similar demands of other nation’s diplomats and collected from them. The Americans, however, were offended by these demands and returned to the US without engaging in any diplomatic resolution to the problems.
 A frigate was any warship built for speed and maneuverability. They could be warships carrying their principal batteries of carriage-mounted guns on a single deck (with smaller carriage-mounted guns on the fo’c’sle and quarterdeck. Frigates were too small to stand in the line of battle, but they were full rigged vessels (square rigged on all three masts).
 A sloop of war had a single gun deck that carried up to 18 guns, an un-rated ship, a sloop could be a gun brig or a cutter, a bomb vessel or a fireship.
 In 1800 (as today) a navy lieutenant was equivalent in rank to Marine Corps captain. In the navy, however, there were but three ranks: lieutenant, master commandant, and captain. In the Marine Corps, there were five ranks: lieutenant colonel commandant, major, captain, first lieutenant, and second lieutenant. Navy command has always taken precedence for seaborne operations, including of the landing force until the Marines first set foot ashore. At that time, if a Marine officer is present, he would assume command of land operations. Daniel Carmick also served with distinction in the Mediterranean and commanded US Marines in the Battle of New Orleans during the War of 1812 (See also: At Chalmette, 1815). He passed away in 1816 from wounds sustained in December 1814.
 Captain Silas Talbot resigned from the Navy following the Quasi War. He passed away at the age of 67-years in New York on 30th June 1813. In two wars, Captain Talbot was wounded in action thirteen times. He carried with him to the grave the fragments of five bullets.
 Captain H. A. Ellsworth published this history in 1934 (reprints in 1964, 1974) in a work titled One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines, 1800-1934. Captain Ellsworth stated, “Every United States Marine should have indelibly impressed upon his mind a picture of the island which now contains the Dominican Republic, because the city of Puerta Plata (Port Au Platte), in this republic is the birthplace of the history of the landings, other than in time of war, of his Corps.”
It is probably fair to say that Mexico and the United States, with few exceptions, never achieved the status of good neighbors. There are reasons for this, of course. For a summary of this long-troubled relationship, please visit Old West Tales.José De La Cruz Porfirio Díaz Mori served as President of Mexico for 31 years. Some historians claim that he was a ruthless dictator; others picture him as a bit kinder. Either way, he was a Mexican patriot who developed a worldview that was consistent with his background and experience. He first served as president from 1876 to 1880 and again from 1884-1911. Throughout this period, Diaz was legally elected to the presidency. That he was a no-nonsense chief executive, there can be no doubt. The reality of politics is that it is a ruthless business, and in Mexican history, there has never been a shortage of bandit revolutionaries. This particular history, of course, helps to explain present-day Mexico. In any case, circumstances forced President Diaz to resign from the presidency on 25 May 1911, and he subsequently fled to Spain, where he lived the balance of his life.
Beginning in 1911, Mexico suffered through a number of revolutionary contenders for the presidency, including Bernardo Reyes, Francisco Madero, Pascual Orozco, Pancho Villa, Emiliano Zapata, Ricardo Magon, Jose Maria Pino Suarez, Venustiano Carranza, Aureliano Blanquet, Plutarco Calles, Mario Velasques, Felix Diaz, Victoriano Huerta, and Alvaro Obregon. The Mexican revolution lasted until 1920.
President James Monroe (1817-1825) was the first executive to formulate US policy toward Latin America, referred to as the Monroe Doctrine. President Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909) issued his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904, but we must credit President Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) for implementing the US policy that refused to recognize any revolutionary leader not elected by popular vote. In 1913, President Wilson refused to acknowledge the presidency of General Victoriano Huerta, who had been installed as president (by agreement with U. S. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson). According to President Wilson’s biographer, the president stated, “There can be no certain prospect of peace in America until General Huerta has surrendered his usurped authority.”
Civil upheaval in Mexico threatened the safety of American citizens and the properties of Americans doing business there. Owing to Wilson’s concern for American lives and business interests, Admiral Henry T. Mayo, Commanding the US Fifth Squadron, Atlantic Fleet, was dispatched to Tampico, Mexico in 1914.
Admiral Mayo’s squadron included USS Dolphin, USS Connecticut, USS Minnesota, USS Chester, and USSDes Moines. Tampico, a central oil-producing region, was besieged by Constitutional forces. Generally, the relationship between the U. S. Navy and President Huerta’s federal garrison remained cordial. For example, on 2 April, Admiral Mayo directed the captain of his flagship USS Dolphin to render honors to Mexico to honor the commemoration of General Porfirio Diaz’s capture of Puebla from the French in 1867. Dolphin fired a 21-gun salute.
Typically, at the end of duty hours, ship’s work permitting, ship captains allowed crew members to boat ashore and engage in recreational activities, such as baseball, with the local townsmen. On 6 April, Constitutionalist rebel forces under Colonel Emiliano Nafarrete occupied La Barra, Doña Cecilia, and Arbol Grande. General Ignacio Zaragoza, the Tamaulipas governor and commander of the federal garrison, sent his gunboat Veracruz to shell the rebel forces that had stationed themselves behind oil storage tanks. Admiral Mayo played it straight. He sent a letter to both leaders stating that while he intended to remain neutral, he would take all steps to protect American lives and property. Admiral May began to evacuate Standard Oil Company executives, workers, and their families but refused to land troops to cover its refinery.
After additional rebel attacks near the Iturbide Bridge on 7-8 April 1914, foreign nationals began asking for refuge on Admiral Mayo’s ships. The U. S. Consul in Tampico sent an urgent message requesting help in evacuating the American population. On the evening of 8 April, Mexican rebels detained a Marine Corps courier from the US Consulate, but he was released unharmed after an hour. Meanwhile, running short of fuel, USS Dolphin’s skipper, Captain Ralph Earle, visited the American Consulate on 9 April, where he arranged refueling from a German national named Max Tyron. Captain Earle agreed to take fuel delivery from Mr. Tyron’s dock, located near the Iturbide Bridge.
The duty of taking possession of this fuel fell to Ensign Charles C. Copp, who organized a whaleboat and crew to proceed to Tyron’s dock, pick up the fuel, and return to Dolphin. Ensign Copp and his crew were unarmed; the American flag was flying fore and aft on the whaleboat. Neither Copp nor anyone in his crew was able to speak Spanish. While loading the fuel, an armed squad of Zaragoza’s soldiers surrounded the sailors. Two crewmen, Coxswain G. H. Siefert and Seaman J. P. Harrington, remained on the whaleboat, but they too were taken at gunpoint. Mexican soldiers escorted the men to Colonel Ramón Hinojosa. Hinojosa released the sailors to continue their work but informed them that they would not be permitted to leave the dock without Zaragoza’s permission.
Mr. Tyron took a launch out to Dolphin to inform Captain Earle and Admiral Mayo of what happened. Mayo ordered Earle to seek the release of his men under strong protest to the government of Mexico. Earle, accompanied by Consul Miller, met with Zaragoza, who apologized — offering that his soldiers were ignorant of the laws of war. Within an hour, Hinojosa released the sailors, and they returned to their ship with the fuel.
Admiral Mayo viewed the incident as an insult to American sovereignty, grave enough in Mayo’s opinion, to demand reparations. Mayo ordered Commander William A. Moffett to deliver a note to Zaragoza informing him that seizing men from a naval vessel, flying the United States flag, was an inexcusable act of war. Admiral Mayo further demanded a formal repudiation, punishment of the individual responsible, and that he hoist the American flag in a prominent position ashore and render a 21 gun salute, which Mayo would return from Dolphin.
General Zaragoza referred the matter to the Mexican ministry of war in Mexico City. President Wilson learned about this incident from William Jennings Bryan. The president told Bryan, “Mayo could not have done otherwise.” President Wilson then added that unless the government of Mexico complied with Mayo’s dictate, grave consequences might result.
At the time, Nelson J. O’Shaughnessy was the American chargé d’affaires in Mexico City. Roberto Ruiz, Mexico’s foreign minister, paid a visit to O’Shaughnessy on 10 April and informed him of the incident. Ruiz’ opined that Admiral Mayo should withdraw his demand. After all, Zaragoza did apologize. O’Shaughnessy and Ruiz met with President Huerta later that day. Huerta agreed with Ruiz. After the meeting, Mr. O’Shaughnessy released a statement to the press that indicated Zaragoza had detained Marines, not sailors, and that the Mexicans had paraded them through the streets of Tampico. None of that was true, but its effect on the American people was electric.
On 12 April, President Huerta decided that Zaragoza’s verbal apology was sufficient. In his opinion, the United States was given ample satisfaction. The Mexican government would not apologize further, nor would any Mexican officials salute the American flag. The next day, O’Shaughnessy further informed the press that either the salute would be rendered — or else. On 14 April, President Wilson ordered Vice Admiral Charles Badger to sail the Atlantic Fleet into Mexican waters. When President Huerta learned of Wilson’s order, he was elated, thinking it was the best thing to happen during his administration. Still, on 16 April 1914, Huerta agreed to a simultaneous saluting which signified that both sides were satisfied with the end of a conflict which “at no time” had been severe.
Despite Huerta’s reversal, Wilson decided that the Atlantic Fleet would remain in Mexico to prevent any incidents of ill-will or contempt for the United States — which Huerta had exhibited in the past. Wilson had misunderstood Huerta’s meaning by “simultaneous.” President Wilson warned Huerta that he would consult with Congress on 19 April with a view of taking such actions as may be necessary to enforce respect for the flag of the United States if Huerta did not render proper honors to the flag of the United States.
True to his word, on 20 April, President Wilson sought Congressional approval for the employment of the Armed Forces. President Wilson intended to seize Vera Cruz “to get rid of Huerta” and his illegitimate authority in Mexico. Wilson also learned on 20 April that a large shipment of arms and munitions were en route to Mexico from Germany. Thus, the unfolding incident was far more involved than the issue of Huerta’s disrespect to the nation’s colors. Congress provided its consent that same evening, and President Wilson immediately ordered landings at Vera Cruz, seizure of the city’s customs house, and directed the interception of arms from Germany.
On to Veracruz
On the morning of 21 April, Rear Admiral Frank F. Fletcher began preparations for the seizure of Veracruz. His orders were simple and direct: seize the customs house, prohibit off-loading war materials to Huerta’s forces or any other Mexican political party. Landing operations under Navy Captain William Rees Rush began at approximately 11:00 when Marines of the 2nd Advanced Base Regiment from USS Prairie and Bluejackets from USS Florida started their movement to shore. A provisional battalion was also formed from the Marine Detachments, USS Florida, and USS Utah, who accompanied the Bluejackets into Veracruz.
Commanding the port of Veracruz was Mexican General Gustavo Maass, who, despite the American Consul’s warning not to interfere, could not surrender his post to the Americans. He ordered the 18th Regiment under General Luis Becerril to distribute rifles to citizens of Veracruz and prisoners in the La Galera military prison and then proceed to the waterfront. He then ordered the 19th Regiment under General Francisco Figueroa to defend the piers. Finally, Maass sent a telegram to the Minister of War, General Aurelio Blanquet. General Blanquet ordered Maass not to resist the landing but withdraw his forces to Tejería.
Once ashore, Captain Rush exercised overall command of the Bluejackets while Lieutenant Colonel Wendell C. Neville assumed command of the Marines. In furtherance of Admiral Fletcher’s objectives, Rush dispatched three companies of Bluejackets to occupy the customs house, the post office, and the telegraph office. Colonel Neville directed his Marines to capture the railroad terminal, roundhouse, train yard, cable office, and the power plant.
Although most of Maass’s troops accompanied him to Tejería, liberated prisoners under Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Contreras (and a few civilians) opposed the Marines as they made their way inside the city. The first casualty was a navy signalman stationed at the top of the Terminal Hotel. At around 13:30, the U. S. Navy intercepted and detained the ship Ypiranga before its crew could unload its shipment of arms and munitions.
At the end of the first day, American casualties included four dead and 20 wounded. Given these shootings, Admiral Fletcher decided that he had no choice but to expand his operations to include the entire city. The following day, Fletcher ordered Rush and Neville to occupy Veracruz. To accomplish this, Admiral Fletcher signaled USS San Francisco, USS Minnesota, USS Hancock, and USS Chester to land their Marine Detachments, bringing the number of Marines and Bluejackets ashore to around 3,000 men.
Marines began their advance into Veracruz at 07:45 on 22 April. The Marines, experienced in street fighting, made an orderly and tactical movement, but a regiment of Bluejackets under Captain F. A. Anderson, without experience in urban warfare, marched in parade formation toward the Mexican Naval Academy. Mexican partisans, who had barricaded themselves inside the parade ground, easily targeted Anderson’s Bluejackets, which halted his advance. After Captain Anderson signaled for naval gunfire support, USS Prairie, San Francisco, and Chester pounded the Naval Academy, ending Mexican resistance.
As Marines and Bluejackets continued their advance, Colonel John A. Lejeune led the 1st Advanced Base Regiment (originally bound for Tampico) ashore. By nightfall, more than 6,000 Americans occupied Veracruz, including a small aviation detachment from USS Mississippi. The aviation detachment’s participation marked the first time naval aircraft became targets of ground fire.
Meanwhile, Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton assembled the Fourth Marine Regiment (4th Marines) at Puget Sound. The regimental headquarters units incorporated the 25th, 26th, and 27th Marine companies. After sailing from Washington State aboard the USS South Dakota, the regiment added four additional companies from Mare Island (31st, 32nd, 34th, and 35th companies). Along with USS Jupiter, the task group proceeded to Mazatlán (west coast of Mexico), joined later by USS West Virginia, and reinforced by the 28th and 36th companies. Pendleton’s 4th Marines was a contingency reserve. There was no landing by the 4th Marines in Mexico.
A third provisional regiment of Marines, assembled in Philadelphia, arrived at Veracruz on 1 May under the command of Colonel Littleton W. T. Waller, who, upon landing, formed a Marine Brigade and assumed overall command of the 3,141 Marines. Pending the arrival of an Army brigade under Brigadier General Frederick Funston, Admiral Fletcher declared martial law. Once the Army arrived in Veracruz, seagoing Marines and bluejackets withdrew back to their respective ships, and Admiral Fletcher turned over control of the port city to General Funston.
After Venustiano Carranza overthrew President Huerta, the United States withdrew its armed forces from Veracruz on 23 November 1914. Subsequently, relations between the United States and Mexico improved somewhat. However, the American occupation of Veracruz did lead to several anti-American revolts in Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Uruguay. Mexico expelled resident US citizens from Mexican territories, and the British government criticized Wilson’s policies in Mexico. On a positive note, however, the US occupation of Veracruz did persuade Mexico to remain neutral during World War I. After the Zimmerman affair, however, the United States and Mexico returned to their traditional rocky relationships.
Cooper, J. Woodrow Wilson: A Biography. New York: Vintage Books, 2011.
McBride, W. M. Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.
Millett, A. R. Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps. New York: The Free Press, 1991.
Quirk, R. An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962.
Santelli, J. S. A Brief History of the Fourth Marines. Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1970.
Sweetman, J. The Landing at Veracruz, 1914. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1968.
 See also, a six part series of the relationship between the United States and New Spain, Mexico, and Mexican Texas, beginning with Spanish America (24 June 2019).
 The statement only suggests that while he may have availed himself of corrupt voting irregularities, a tradition in Mexican politics, he didn’t seize power through force of arms.
 Victoriano Huerta (1850-1916) was a Mexican military officer and the 35th President of Mexico who seized power from Francisco Madero in 1913, installed Pedro Lascuráin Paredes as his puppet, who then appointed Huerta as Secretary of the Interior. Within an hour, Lascuráin resigned the presidency — an action that brought Huerta into the presidency.
 President Wilson removed Henry Wilson from office as a result of making the so-called Embassy Agreement.
 Henry Thomas Mayo (1856-1937) graduated from the USNA in 1876, served in a number of career progressing billets, including his service as aide-de-camp to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels. After graduating from the Naval War College, he commanded several capital ships. He was promoted to rear Admiral in 1913.
 Admiral Mayo criticized Ensign Copp for allowing foreign soldiers to seize his vessel.
 A three time candidate for the presidency, Bryan served as Wilson’s Secretary of State.
 Nelson O’Shaughnessy (1876-1932) was a career diplomat born in New York City, was well-educated, gaining degrees from Georgetown University, St. John’s College, Oxford University, and the Inner Temple in London. His earliest posts were at diplomatic missions in Denmark, Russia, Austria-Hungary, 1905-1911, and most notably in Mexico, 1911-1914, where his service gained him national notoriety. As chargé d’affaires, O’Shaughnessy represented the interests of the United States in Mexico after the recall of the Ambassador following the coup of Victoriano Huerta in 1913. A Republican, O’Shaughnessy alienated himself from President Wilson’s Democratic administrations by his cordial relationship with Huerta.
 Germany had long sought to incite a war between Mexico and the United States. Another Mexican-American war would reduce the possibility of bringing the United States into the European war and slowed the export of American arms to the European allies. For quite some time before World War I, Germany aided Mexican revolutionaries by arming them, funding them, and advising them. German Naval Intelligence Officer Franz von Rintelen attempted to incite war between the US and Mexico by giving Victoriano Huerta $12 million in cash. The German saboteur Lothar Witzke, who was responsible for bombings at Mare Island (San Francisco) and in New Jersey was operationally based in Mexico City.
 The Marine Corps Advanced Base Force was the Corps’ first task organized combat unit made up of coastal and naval base defense forces generally of battalion or regimental sized units (depending on its mission). Initially, Neville’s unit was more or less on the same level as a reinforced battalion landing team which expanded in size once the Marines went ashore.
 The term “bluejacket” is generally used to denote a British or American sailor and often used to distinguish sailors performing landing force operations ashore from Marines.
 “Fighting Fred” Funston (1865-1917) was a Medal of Honor recipient with combat experience gained in the Spanish-American and Philippine-American wars. In 1896, Funston was a volunteer with the Cuban Revolutionary Army who fought for Cuba’s independence from Spain. Suffering with malaria, Funston returned to his home to recover. In preparation for war with Spain, Funston was commissioned a colonel with the 20th Kansas Infantry. He was promoted to Brigadier General in recognition of his undaunted courage under fire during the Philippine Insurrection. Funston was not a favorite of Mark Twain, an avowed anti-Imperialist, who denounced Funston in an article published in the North American Review. Funston’s public argument with Republican Senator George Frisbie Hoar resulted in President Theodore Roosevelt reprimanding Funston and ordering him to remain silent on public issues. Funston was promoted to Major General in November 1914. Funston died of a heart attack while attending a concert in San Antonio, Texas.
Lott, Texas is a small town in Falls County. The settlement began in 1889 with the construction of the San Antonio & Aransas Pass Railroad. The town was named after Uriah Lott, who at the time was president of the railroad company. In 1889, the settlement involved a total of around two-hundred folks. They were church-going people, as evidenced by the fact that Lott, Texas had three churches in 1892. There were also two cotton gins, and two gristmills. In 1892, there were 350 people living in Lott and by then the town had a weekly newspaper. In eight more years, the town had grown to 1,200 citizens. Besides those working for the railroad, there were local farmers who raised corn and cotton.
But Lott was typical of small Texas towns. Economic conditions were meager, and folks scratched out their existence through hard work barely rewarded. And, as with most other Texas communities, the Great Depression took its toll and people began to move away. In 1930, only 650 people were recorded living there in the national census. Roosevelt’s Public Works Administration helped, of course. Government subsidies encouraged diversification from farming into stock raising and truck farming. Even now, though, economic opportunities are limited, and the town relies heavily on the speed trap along State Highway 44/US Highway 77. In 2010, 759 people lived in Lott, Texas.
One of its citizens, born and raised for a time in Lott, was John Wilson Hoffman. One of four children, John was born in 1922. His parents, John Wilson Hoffman, Sr., and Sadie Hoffman, moved their family to Houston in 1929. John graduated from Stephen F. Austin High School in the class of 1940 and the 18-year old went to work for Lindle Air Products Company as a shipping clerk. In August 1942, John was 20-years-old, the nation was at war, and the young patriot John Wilson Hoffman, Jr. joined the United States Marine Corps.
After recruit training, the Marines assigned Hoffman to the 18th Marine Regiment — combat engineers with the 2nd Marine Division. The regiment was not slated to participate in the Battle of Guadalcanal, but the 6th Marine Regiment was organizing and needed men to fill their ranks. In mid-December 1942, John Hoffman was one of several dozen engineers transferred to the 6th Marines and Hoffman ended up in Lima Company, 3/6. The regiment shipped out to New Zealand for pre-combat training.
The ladies of New Zealand are lovely to look at, and young Marines are easy to fall in love — as did John W. Hoffman, and he was so much in love with his New Zealand lassie that he didn’t want to leave her. When 3/6 sailed for the Solomon Islands, John was not among them. In fact, no one saw Hoffman again until 7 January 1943, when he surrendered to New Zealand police in Wellington.
When 3/6 returned from Guadalcanal in late February 1943, Hoffman was waiting for them at Camp Russell. Hoffman received a court-martial for missing his movement. During war, this is a serious offense — but it could have been worse. Had his superiors charged him with desertion in time of war, he may have faced a death penalty. Hoffman was found guilty of “missing movement,” and sentenced to ninety days in the brig. He was also fined $15.00 per month for three months. It doesn’t seem like much of a fine, but Hoffman was only making $50/month in 1943.
After three months of confinement in a Marine Corps brig, Hoffman was a changed man. Upon release, he returned to his unit, stayed out of trouble, and applied himself to combat training. His transformation from a love-starved puppy to a fighting grunt was so impressive that his company commander promoted him to Private First Class (PFC).
John Hoffman had become a “squared away” Marine. When Lima Company mustered for their next combat assignment, John Hoffman was present and accounted for. What no one in Lima Company knew was that their next assignment would take them to a tiny atoll in the middle of a very large ocean. The atoll had a name — Tarawa. The island was Betio.
Far above the station of mere privates, America’s war planners had been looking for an air base capable of supporting operations across the mid-Pacific — to the Philippines in the South, and to Japan in the North. The need for advanced bases led these war planners to focus their attention on the Mariana Islands, which at the time were heavily defended by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. Before the US could seize the Marianas group, they would have to control the Marshall Islands, but the Marshalls were cut off from direct communications with Hawaii by a Japanese garrison on the small island of Betio, on the western side of the Tarawa Atoll in the Gilbert Islands. Before the Americans could concentrate on the Mariana Islands, they would have to neutralize the Japanese on Betio.
Betio Island is Tarawa’s largest. It is located about 2,400 miles southwest of Pearl Harbor. Despite its size on the atoll, it is infinitesimally small. It is a flat island, two miles long, triangle shaped, and at its widest point, only 800 yards from shore to shore.
If Evans Carlson’s diversionary raid at Makin Island accomplished anything at all, besides getting good Marines killed, it was that it sent a signal to the Imperial Japanese that their Island defenses were vulnerable to American attack — and that the Americans viewed the Gilbert Islands as an important objective.
Thus warned, the Japanese reinforced Betio with its 6th Special Landing Force (Japanese Marines). In total, the Japanese island commander, Rear Admiral Tomonari Saichiro, commanded 5,000 defenders. An experienced engineer, Saichiro directed the construction of the Betio defenses. Saichiro’s plan was to stop the Americans before they reached the island’s shore; and if that failed, then to make the American’s pay dearly for their audacity. The Evans Carlson gave the Japanese a year to perfect Betio Island’s defenses.
The Gilbert Islands campaign was the largest invasion force yet assembled for a single operation in the Pacific. There were seventeen aircraft carriers, twelve battleships, twelve cruisers, sixty-six destroyers, and thirty-six troop transports. Aboard the transports were the 2nd Marine Division and the US 27th Infantry Division — totaling 35,000 troops. The Marines began their assault at 0900 on 20 November 1943. The 6th Marines, under the command of Colonel Maurice G. Holmes, would dedicate the 1st Battalion (William K. Jones, commanding) and 3rd Battalion (Kenneth F. McLeod, commanding) in the third and fourth wave assaults at Green Beach.
It was at Green Beach, during the fourth wave attack, that Private First Class John Wilson Hoffman, Jr., met his end. As Lima Company moved up to relieve elements of the 1st Battalion, an enemy bullet found Hoffman and instantly killed him. The Marines of Lima Company gently laid his body to rest along with thirty other members of his company. They did their best to mark the grave site as lethal battle raged around them and the Marines continued to move forward under heavy Japanese resistance. It was a horrific battle. The movement of tanks, artillery, and troops soon obliterated the grave marker.
As with so many other Marines who died at Betio over a period of 72-hours — 1,009 killed, 2,101 wounded — the Marine Corps eventually notified Hoffman’s parents that their son’s remains were unrecoverable. History Flight recovered John Hoffman’s body, where it had lain undisturbed on Betio Island for 76 years. John Hoffman finally came back home to Texas in the spring of 2020. There was no one left alive in John’s family who remembered him.
Some gave all.
Alexander, J. H. Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995.
Graham, M. B. Mantle of Heroism: Tarawa and the Struggle for the Gilberts. Presidio Press, 1998.
Hammel, E. & J. E. Lane. Bloody Tarawa. Zenith Press, 1998.
Smith, H. M. Coral and Brass. New York: Scribeners & Sons, 1949.
 The 2nd Battalion (Raymond G. Murray, commanding) was assigned to assault and occupy the outer islands of Tarawa. Murray later commanded the 5th Marines during the Battle of the Pusan Perimeter during the Korean War and in that capacity, participated in the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir. Both Jones and Murray achieved flag rank with Jones retiring as a lieutenant general and Murray as a major general.
 History Flight is a privately operated non-profit organization dedicated to researching, recovering, and repatriating the remains of American servicemen from World War II through the Vietnam War period. Since 2003, History Flight has recovered 130 missing servicemen in both the ETO and PTO. John Hoffman’s remains were one of these.
There is so much myth surrounding the life and times of David Crockett that hardly anyone knows the truth about the man. We know he was born in 1786 and gave up his life for Texas Independence on 6 March 1836. He was 49-years old when he died — in those days, 49-years was a long time to live. One of the stories about Crockett surrounds his political career. He served in the Tennessee General Assembly between 1821-1823 and served as a member of the U. S. House of Representatives from 1827-1831 and 1833-1835. When Crockett decided that he was done with politics, he allegedly told someone, “You can go to hell; I’m going to Texas.” And he did.
Crockett went to Texas for the same reasons as other folks back then. There was an adventurer in Crockett, the same as there was a sense of adventure in most people who migrated west. The difference was that as a member of the US House, Crockett was fully aware of what was going on between the Texians and Mexico’s centrist government. Most of the pioneers had no clue at all. Crockett entered Texas with both eyes wide open. He knew what he was getting himself into — and he believed that the Texas fight was one worth having. Was he also looking to enrich himself in land? Of course, he was. There were no “commies” back then seeking to hold hands and sing kumbaya. Taking a piece of scrub land and molding it into a profitable enterprise wasn’t for the faint of heart.
What we also know to be a fact is that Texians, Texans, and Americans have never gotten along well with Mexicans. There are no similarities between the two cultures, and while there are plenty of good arguments from both sides of any issue confronting Texians, Texans, and Americans, there was never any “earned trust” between these people. This uneasy relationship continues to this very day; and today, as in 1915 (or at any other time in our history with Mexico), the association was often deadly.
There was always a good reason for revolution in Mexico. The reasons are as valid today as they were in 1824, 1836, and in 1910. Arguably, no one associated with government in Mexico ever developed compassion for their citizens. Ever. Mexican politicians who became the inheritors of Spanish America were always completely focused on enriching themselves; building a vibrant nation and society was never a priority, and still isn’t. As the descendants of Spanish Peninsulares and creoles, today’s politicians remain welded to an unwieldy class structure that makes one group of people forever better than the one just below their own. One would think that after 500 years of this “caste” system, the people would throw it off and demand better from their government. But — no.
What caused the Mexican Revolution of 1910 was the increasing unpopularity of El Presidenté Jose de la Cruz Porfirio Diaz Mori. He was known simply as Porfirio Diaz. He’d served as President of Mexico for 31 years. He served in office for so long because he observed the golden rule: whoever owns the gold, makes the rules. Plus, it seems that Mexico’s founding fathers never quite got around to solving the question of presidential succession.
Not only did Mexico have a revolution in 1910, one that lasted for ten long, bloody years, Mexico also experienced a series of armed insurrections. It was a time when every thug with a bandolier called himself general, and every army general commanding a platoon was a self-perpetuating thug. The groups in armed conflict, and the men involved in these lawless shootouts, when listed altogether, remind one of the greater Chicago telephone directory.
In 1910, one might have imagined that things could not have ever gotten worse in Mexico. They would have been wrong. The situation in Mexico between 1910-1920 was so bad that no rational person could have imagined what was next on the agenda. Casualty estimates range from 1.7 million to 2.7 million people killed (military and civilian). Of innocent bystanders alone, somewhere between 700,000 and 1.1 million. Within four years, conditions were such inside Mexico that American politicians began to view them as presenting a clear and present danger to the peace and stability of the United States. It was serious enough to justify two (2) separate US interventions: the invasion of Vera Cruz (1914) and the twelve-month-long Poncho Villa Expedition (1916-17). In addition to the two US expeditions, there was another confrontation — which occurred after thousands of Mexicans invaded Texas to escape the violence in Mexico (see also, Sedition in Texas and The Bandit War). It did not help to improve relations with Mexico when it was learned that Germany was making an attempt to coopt Mexico into attacking the US southern border.
Send in the Marines
When President Woodrow Wilson decided to commit American blood to the defense of Paris, France in 1917, it was necessary to mobilize the U. S. Armed Forces. At the very moment when Wilson made his fateful decision, there were only two (2) military services even partially ready for combat: The United States Navy and the U. S. Marine Corps. The Navy and Marines were “most ready” because they had already demonstrated their capabilities in the Spanish-American War. The Army, meanwhile, were still organized almost exclusively for fighting hostile Indians in the western states. Mobilization in 1917 was a herculean task — and it speaks well for the American people that they were able to pull it off in such a short period of time.
One of the units activated in 1917 was my first (home) regiment, the Eighth Marines. Of course, a number of regiments were brought online in 1917, not only for use in Europe, but also in areas far away from the European battle zone. In total, fourteen regiments of Marines were activated by the middle part of 1918. Most of these never served in the European conflict but were deployed either in the Caribbean or remained in readiness inside the United States. The 8th Marine Regiment was one of these stateside infantry units.
At the time, Marine Corps regiments lacked the structure of subordinate battalions. There was only a regimental headquarters element, and independent numbered companies. The 8th Marines included its headquarters, 103rd, 104th, 105th, 106th, 107th, 108th, 109th, 110th, 111th, and 112th rifle companies totaling 1,000 officers and men under the command of Major Ellis B. Miller. In 1917, owing to the “different kind of war” unfolding for the United States in Europe, the Marine Corps recognized the wisdom of adopting the U. S. Army’s battalion structure. If the Marines were going to fight a sustained land engagement, particularly alongside Army units, they would have to adopt an organizational structure that was identical to that of the Army. The structure, for the regiments dispatched to Europe, included three subordinate battalions, each with a headquarters company, and four rifle companies — an increase in strength to 3,000 men. Since the 8th Marines was not earmarked for service in Europe, the standard pre-war organization was retained.
The regiment’s first orders from HQMC was to prepare for deployment — to Texas. The contingency plan was to send the 8th Marines into Mexico if needed in the defense of the United States’ southern border — particularly in light of the fact that there was no improvement in Mexican/American relations after Pershing’s pursuit of Pancho Villa, and the growing concern among American citizens living along the border for their safety — particularly in light of Germany’s attempt to involve Mexico against the United States. Should it become necessary, the 8th Marines would make an amphibious assault at Tampico and seize the oilfields there.
After arriving at Fort Crockett, the 8th Marines resumed its normal duties, which included field training, weapons training, and amphibious operations. In August 1918, a newly organized 9th Marine Regiment under the Third Marine Brigade joined the 8th Marines at Fort Crockett. These units had been stationed in Cuba to safeguard sugar mills from insurrectionists and saboteurs working with German agents. It was in this way that the 8th Marine Regiment became a subordinate command, along with the 9th Marines, of the 3rd Marine Brigade.
This presence of a large force of U. S. Marines in Texas — not too far distant from the Mexican border, continued through 1919. There was never any attempt to hide the purpose of these Marines and Mexican officials were fully aware of the United States’ willingness to intervene in Mexico’s internal affairs. Accordingly, a steady supply of oil from Tampico continued to flow to the United States and its allies. This duty assignment was the 8th Marines most important contribution to the First World War. After eighteen months in Texas, HQMC directed that the 8th Marines move to Philadelphia. There, on 25 April 1919, the regiment was deactivated.
 Fort Crockett, constructed in 1903, was named in honor of frontiersman and member of the U. S. House of Representatives, David Crockett. Fort Crockett was a facility of the U. S. Army Coastal Artillery Corps at Galveston, Texas. During World War I, Fort Crockett served as a training base and pre-deployment training facility.
The first American ship to carry the name Essex was a 36-gun frigate [Note 1] constructed by Mr. Enos Briggs of Salem, Massachusetts, a design of Mr. William Hackett, and named in honor of Essex County, Massachusetts [Note 2]. United States Ship Essex was launched on 30 September 1799, presented to the United States Navy in December, and accepted for service on behalf of the Navy by Captain Edward Preble, USN, the ship’s first Commanding Officer. In January 1800, USS Essex departed Newport, Rhode Island in company with USS Congress; their mission was to serve as escorts for a convoy of merchant ships. The United States was then engaged in the Quasi-War with France [Note 3]; Essex and Congress were ordered to protect these merchant vessels from assault and confiscation by the French Navy. After only a few days at sea, a storm de-masted Congress and she was forced to return to the American coast. Essex continued on alone. USS Essex was the first US Navy ship to cross the equator and the first American man-of-war to make a double voyage around the Cape of Good Hope (March, August 1800).
The second cruise of the Essex took her to the Mediterranean under the command of Captain William Bainbridge, serving in the squadron of Commodore Richard Dale [Note 4]. During this journey, Essex participated in the Barbary Wars through 1806. Upon return to the United States, Essex underwent refit until 1809 when she was re-commissioned as a patrol vessel along the East Coast of the United States.
The Jay Treaty of 1795, more formally The Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation Between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, was the framework of Alexander Hamilton, supported by George Washington, and brokered by John Jay. The Jay Treaty was intended to resolve certain deficiencies in the Treaty of Paris (1783) whose sole purpose was to avoid further confrontations with Great Britain. The goals of the Jay Treaty were mostly fulfilled (withdrawal of British Army forces in the Northwest Territory, cessation of US confiscation of property belonging to British loyalists, etc.) but several issues remained unresolved, such as Great Britain’s impressment of American sailors from ships and ports. From 1803, when Great Britain went to war with Napoleonic France, the British established a naval blockade to choke off trade with France. The United States disputed this blockade, proclaiming it illegal under internationally recognized laws of the sea. But to enforce the British blockade, and to make its point of naval supremacy, the British navy increased its impressment of American merchant sailors into the Royal Navy. This behavior, more than any other, inflamed the passions of the American people. In 1811, USS President closed with a Royal Navy sloop operating off the coast of North Carolina, challenged her, and then fired upon the smaller vessel. Eleven British sailors were killed. So now the passions of the British people were inflamed. As a result of this incident, the British became greatly annoyed and began arming North American Indians and encouraging them to attack American frontier settlements. The United States declared war against the United Kingdom on 18 June 1812. It became known as Mr. Madison’s War.
With the outbreak of war, David Porter [Note 5] was promoted to Captain on 2 July 1812 and assigned to command USS Essex. Sailing his ship to Bermuda, Porter engaged several British transports, taking one of these as a prize of war. On 13 August, Porter captured HMS Alert, the first British warship captured during the conflict. By the end of September, Essex had taken ten British merchantmen as prizes.
In February 1813, Porter sailed Essex into the South Atlantic where he sought to disrupt the British whaling fleet. His first action in the Pacific was the capture of the Peruvian vessel Nereyda. His purpose in seizing this vessel was that it held captive and impressed American whaling crewmen. Over the next year, Porter captured 13 British whalers; one of these was a French registry vessel, captured by the Royal Navy, sold to the owner of a British whaling fleet, and re-named Atlantic. In capturing these ships, Porter also took 380 British seamen as prisoners. In June, Porter offered parole to these captives, providing that they would not again take up arms against the United States. Porter renamed Atlantic as Essex Junior and appointed his executive officer, Lieutenant John Downes, to command her.
John Marshall Gamble (1791-1836) was only eight-years old when Essex went into service in 1799. Born in Brooklyn, New York, Gamble received his appointment to second lieutenant of Marines on 16 January 1809 when he was only 17 or 18-years old. At the outbreak of the War of 1812, Gamble commanded the Marine Detachment, USS Essex [Note 6]. Gamble was an accomplished Marine Corps officer but he is distinguished as the only Marine officer to command a United States Navy ship of war. Actually, Lieutenant Gamble commanded two ships, both British prizes pressed into United States service — seized and renamed USS Greenwich [Note 7] and USS Sir Andrew Hammond. Gamble also distinguished himself during a land action on an island called Nuku Hiva where Captain David Porter established the first US Navy Base in the Pacific Ocean.
Nuku Hiva is the largest of the Marquesas Islands (French Polynesia). Captain Porter arrived at Nuku Hiva at a time when island natives were at war with one another. Shortly after landing his shore party, Porter claimed the island on behalf of the United States and ordered the construction of a fortification and an adjacent village, which he named Fort Madison and Madisonville, respectively, after President James Madison. He also constructed a dock that was needed to facilitate repairs to his growing fleet of ships. For reasons known only to himself, Porter involved himself in the tribal conflict —possibly to curry favor with the majority of the warring natives.
Porter’s first expedition into the interior was led by Lieutenant Downes. He and forty others, with the assistance of several hundred native islanders called Te I’is, captured a redoubt held by as many as 4,000 Happah warriors. Afterwards, the Happah joined the Te I’is and Americans against another island group called Tai Pi. Captain Porter led a second expedition, which involved an amphibious assault against the Tai Pi shoreline. This second expedition, with Captain Porter in overall command, included 30 American sailors and Marines (with artillery), under Lieutenant Gamble, and 5,000 native warriors. From this point on, however, Captain Porter’s fate took an unfortunate turn.
On or about 13 July 1813, following a sharp naval engagement, Lieutenant Gamble, commanding USS Greenwich, captured the British armed whaler Seringapatam. [Note 8] The engagement was significant because, at the time, Seringapatam posed the most serious British threat to American whalers in the South Pacific. Subsequently, Captain Porter wrote to Lieutenant Gamble, stating, “Allow me to return to you my thanks for your handsome conduct in brining Seringapatam to action, which greatly facilitated her capture, while it prevented the possibility of her escape. Be assured sir, I shall make a suitable representation of these affairs to the honorable Secretary of the Navy.”
Captain Porter reported Gamble’s conduct to the Navy Department: “Captain Gamble at all times greatly distinguished himself by his activity in every enterprise engaged in by the force under my command, and in many critical encounters by the natives of Madison Island, rendered essential services, and at all times distinguished himself by his coolness and bravery. I therefore do, with pleasure, recommend him to the Department as an officer deserving of its patronage.”
During the sea battle between Greenwich and Seringapatam, which took place off the coast of Tumbes, Peru, damage to Seringapatam was not particularly significant, but did necessitate repairs to return the vessel to a state of sea worthiness. There were no human casualties on either side. Once the Americans repaired Seringapatam Captain Porter assigned Masters Mate James Terry of the USS Essex as prize master, and Seringapatam joined Porter’s squadron.
In September 1813, Porter returned Essex to Nuku Hiva (along with four prizes) for repairs. Around mid-December, Porter ordered Essex re-provisioned and readied for sea. With Essex Junior as an escort Porter began a patrol of the Peru Coast. Seringapatam, Hammond, and Greenwich remained at anchor under the guns of Fort Madison and Gamble assumed command of the garrison. Many of the crewmen of the captured ships were American; they and several British crewmen volunteered to serve under Porter. There were also six British prisoners of war who refused to serve the United States. Not long after Porter set sail, local natives became so troublesome that Gamble was forced to land a detachment of men to restore order. At this point, Gamble’s mission was to maintain order, guard the captive ships, guard prisoners of war, and do so with but a hand full of men.
Four months later, Lieutenant Gamble despaired of Porter’s fate [Note 9] and ordered repairs and rigging for sea of Seringapatam and Hammond. When signs of mutiny appeared among the men, Gamble ordered all arms and ammunition placed aboard Greenwich. Despite these precautions, mutineers freed the British prisoners of war and captured Seringapatam on 7 May, wounding Lieutenant Gamble in the scuffle. Mutineers placed Gamble in an open boat and Seringapatam sailed for Australia.
Gamble, returning to Hammond, set sail with a skeleton crew bound for the Caribbean Leeward Islands but was intercepted en route by the British sloop HMS Cherub. As it turned out, Gamble’s capture served the interests of the United States. At the time of his capture, Gamble was in possession of gifts intended for the King of the Leeward Islands. Captain Tucker of HMS Cherub seized these gifts as prizes of war. More than that, Tucker, having discovered several American ships in the Leeward Islands harbor, sent demands to the king to surrender these ships to him at once. When the king refused, Tucker landed a detachment of Royal Marines to enforce his demands.
Upon landing, the Royal Marines discovered that it was literally impossible to enforce their captain’s demands while surrounded by very angry Caribs [Note 10]. Captain Tucker wisely withdrew his force and sailed away. Meanwhile, when the king learned that his gifts had been confiscated by the Royal Navy, he was incensed and diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the Leeward Islands deteriorated.
At the conclusion of the War of 1812, Gamble returned to his duties as a Marine officer. He was promoted to captain on 18 June 1814, advanced to Brevet Major on 19 April 1815, and to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel on 3 March 1827.
John M. Gamble died on 11 September 1836 at the age of about 44-45 years. In terms of the family’s legacy, the destroyer USS Gamble (DD-123) and Port Gamble, Washington were named in honor of John Gamble and his brother, Peter, who served as a Navy lieutenant during the War of 1812. USS Gamble served as a destroyer in World War I and a minesweeper in World War II. Owing to the ship’s condition after two world wars, the Navy scuttled the ship in July 1945.
1.Daughan, G. C. The Shining Sea: David Porter and the Epic Voyage of the USS Essex During the War of 1812. Basic Books, 2013.
2.Captain David Porter, USS Essex, and the War of 1812 in the Pacific. U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command, 2014. Online.
3.Porter, D. D. Memoir of Commodore David Porter of the United States Navy. Albany: J. Munsell, 1875.
4.Toner, R. J. Gamble of the Marines: The Greatest U.S. Marine Corps Stories Ever Told. I. C. Martin, 2017.
5.Turnbull, A. D. Commodore David Porter, 1740-1843. New York and London: Century Press, 1929.
 A frigate in the days of sail was a warship that carried its principal batteries on one or two decks. It was smaller in size than a ship of the line (which is to say, smaller than the warships that were used in the line of battle), but full rigged on three masts, built for speed and maneuverability and used for patrolling and escort duty. They were rated ships having at least 28 guns. The frigate was the hardest-worked warship because even though smaller than a ship of the line, they were formidable opponents in war and had sufficient storage for six-months service at sea. A “heavy frigate” was a ship that carried larger guns (firing 18-24 pound shot) developed in Britain and France after 1778.
 Essex County, Massachusetts was created by the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony on 10 May 1643. Named after the county in England, Essex included the towns of Salem, Lynn, Wenham, Ipswich, Rowley, Newbury, Gloucester, and Andover. Essex County was the home of Elbridge Gerry, known for creating a legislative district in 1812 that gave rise to the word gerrymandering, which suggests that politicians in Massachusetts have been corrupt for at least the past 208 years.
 An undeclared war between the US and France from 1798 to 1800. John Adams was president. When the US refused to repay its debt for the Revolutionary War, American politicians argued that after the French overthrew their king, the nation to whom this debt was owed no longer existed; accordingly, said certain members of the US Congress, the debt was null and void. In response, France began seizing US flagged ships and auctioning them for payment.
 After 1794, the US Congress was unwilling to authorize more than four officer ranks in the Navy. These were Captain, Master Commandant, Lieutenant, and Midshipman. Commodore, therefore, was a title only, temporarily assigned to a U.S. Navy captain who, by virtue of seniority, exercised command over two or more U.S. naval vessels, and the rank Master Commandant was later changed to Commander.
 David Porter (1780-1843) was a self-assured naval officer who served on active duty with the U.S. Navy from 1790-1825, and as Commander-in-Chief of the Mexican Navy from 1826-1829. He later served as Chargé d’Affaires of the United States to the Ottoman Empire (1831-1840) and United States Minister to the Ottoman Empire (1840-1843). Porter was the adoptive father of David G. Farragut, the U.S. Navy’s first admiral.
 Gamble was promoted to Captain USMC in June 1814.
 Captain Porter later decided to burn Greenwich to keep the ship from being recaptured by the British South Atlantic squadron; it was a sensible decision because destroying the ship deprived the British of valuable whale oil, which at the time, was in high demand in England.
 Seringapatam was constructed in 1799 as a warship for Tippu Sultan, the ruler of Mysore. The British stormed his citadel at Seringapatam, and Sultan was killed. The British then sailed the ship to England where it was sold to British a whaling merchant. The ship made six voyages to the Southern Atlantic and Pacific until captured by Greenwich.
 Gamble’s concern was well-founded. On 28 March 1814, Royal Navy Captain James Hillyar forced Captain Porter’s surrender at the Battle of Valparaiso. HMS Phoebe and HMS Cherub disabled Essex to the point where he could no longer resist. Following the battle, Captain Hillyar provided care and comfort to Porter’s wounded crew, disarmed Essex Junior, and gave Porter his parole to return to the United States. Captain Hillyar sailed the Essex to England, where it was used as a transport ship, prison ship, and then ultimately sold at public auction for £1,230.
 The Caribs (now called Island Caribs) for whom the Caribbean was named, inhabited the Windward Islands of the Lesser Antilles. They were noted for their aggressive hostility and fiercely resisted European colonization. They identified themselves with the Kalina people, or mainland Carib of South America. They continue to exist within the Garifuna people, also known as black Caribs in the Lesser Antilles.