War with Mexico
The US Navy added to its growing experience in inland operations during the Mexican War. When hostilities began, Commodore David Conner, commanding the Home Squadron, blockaded the Mexican Gulf Coast. The blockade forced the enemy to use inland waterways and overland routes to move supplies. San Juan Bautista, 74 miles up the Tabasco River from Frontera, was a distribution center for contraband war materials. The river had ample depth to accommodate large vessels but there were significant obstacles in planning for an assault. The river’s current was strong, dense vegetation provided good cover for riflemen and snipers. The river also took a sharp (and hazardous) “S” bend (called the Devil’s Turn) and there were two strategically placed forts guarding the approaches to San Juan Bautista. Normally, sailing vessels alone would have little chance of success —but at this time, the US Navy was incorporating steam engines into the fleet. The Home Squadron had several small steam-powered ships of war.
On 23 October 1846, a naval expeditionary force under Commodore Matthew C. Perry crossed the sand bar at Frontera and seized the town with little to no resistance. Then, with three steamers and four other vessels, proceeded upriver to San Juan with a 200-man landing party. The journey took around 33 hours. Anticipated resistance 9 miles below San Juan never materialized because the Mexican garrisons fled as soon as they could see the American ships closing for action.
Arriving at San Juan before noon on 25 October, Perry demanded the town’s surrender. When the Alcalde returned an insolent reply, Perry fired on the central flag staff, destroying it. Perry spared the town but to keep shipping out of the hands of insurgents and gun runners, he seized two Mexican steamers, five schooners, and several smaller craft. When Mexican riflemen opened fire on Perry’s squadron, Perry had his cannon rake the streets, which effectively ended all interest in firing on the Americanos. Neither of the two towns was occupied, but Frontera was blockaded for six months. When the blockade was lifted, Mexican smugglers began their activities anew.
In mid-June 1847, Commodore Perry was ready to ascend the Tabasco River for the second time. This time, Perry assembled a larger force. An advocate of naval infantry drill and landing party training, Perry formed a naval brigade of 2,500 officers, seamen, and Marines. Captain J. Mayo was appointed to command the brigade. Perry’s squadron included four small steam warships, six schooners, bomb brigs, and numerous ships’ boats.
At the first elbow of the Devil’s Turn, lead ships encountered small arms fire from dense chaparral banks. Ships’ fire silenced the shooters, but obstructions had been placed in the river around the turn. Well-manned breastworks on the shore provided a Mexican firing platform. After reconnoitering the obstructions, Perry landed his brigade for the nine-mile march overland to San Juan.
While Perry led his naval brigade through the swamps and jungle, Lieutenant David Dixon Porter assumed command of the flotilla and worked his ships through the obstructions. Perry’s combined force successfully routed 600 Mexican troops at Accachappa and moved on to Fort Iturbide situated just below San Juan. Fort Iturbide had a battery of six guns and 400 infantry troops. Porter led the flotilla into Mexican fire and then, under the protective cover of ship’s cannonade, he released a landing party to assault the fort. The Mexicans broke before the charge. When Perry and the brigade arrived, the American flag was already flying above the fort.
In two separate instances, Perry demonstrated the value of coordinated tactical inland penetrations. The operation against San Juan Bautista was a valuable lesson for the US Navy; it would come in handy again in the not-too-distant future.
The Rude War
The U. S. Navy’s main advantage over the Confederate States of America in 1861 was that the south had no navy at the beginning of the Civil War. Accordingly, the Union navy had, and retained, its control of the sea at all stages of this conflict. The U. S. Navy implemented three broad strategies: (a) naval blockade of southern coastal regions, (b) amphibious assault and capture of port cities and strong points, (c) splitting the Confederacy along the Mississippi River (and tributaries) and seizing inland waterways to crush Confederate resistance. The Union navy’s effective 3,000-mile blockade and the imbalance of opposing naval forces resulted in its ability to focus on coastal and inland riverine operations.
Commander John D. Rodgers, placed in overall charge of riverine operations for the navy, selected vessels and readied a force under Army control in northwestern waters with its headquarters near Cairo, Illinois (at the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers). From this location, Union vessels could influence river traffic in Illinois, Kentucky, and Missouri. Rodgers purchased and converted river steamers into wooden gunboats: Tyler, Lexington, and Conestoga. Through the War Department, Rodgers contracted for seven additional gunboats (named for the cities they would defend). These “city class” vessels became the backbone of the river fleet. They were 175-feet long, had a 50-foot beam, and the top deck was shielded with heavy armor. Thirteen guns included old-fashioned 42-pounders (supplied by the Army), and 8-inch and 32-pound navy guns.
While the city class boats were under construction, the wooden gunboats made significant contributions to the Union effort. These former sidewheelers, unarmored and vulnerable, could not have challenged a seagoing warship or stout fortification but they did achieve good results. In a nation with few and exceedingly poor roads, they controlled the river highways. Moreover, they provided mobility and speed of movement of troops and supplies, surprise attack, and flexibility in strategy and tactics, and rapid exchange of information between and among field commanders.
Strong southern sentiment permeated the Ohio and Mississippi river systems. One effect of the gunboats was that they discouraged secessionists and gave confidence to Unionists. Fence-sitters stayed out of the way. Alfred Thayer Mahan was convinced that the riverine force was of inestimable service in keeping alive attachment to the Union and preventing secession by Kentucky and Missouri.
The Battle of Belmont (Missouri) was joined on 7 November 1861, the first combat test in the Civil War for Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant. On 6 November, Grant moved his 3,000 troops by riverboat from Cairo to assault the Confederate outpost near Belmont, which was across the river from the rebel stronghold at Columbus, Kentucky. Grant and his men went ashore on the Missouri side and marched overland to Belmont. Grant succeeded in surprising and over-powering the Confederates, but they were quickly reorganized and reinforced by Major General Leonidas Polk. Grants victory was short lived as Polk endeavored to cut off Grant’s withdrawal. It was only through the gunboats that Grant and the Union survivors made good their escape.
River gunships were effective, but they could not aggress rebel fortifications. This mission would fall to the semi-ironclad ships ordered by Rodgers, who was replaced by Flag Officer Andrew Hull Foote, U. S. Navy. Foote is remembered as an aggressive officer who, along with Grant, combined their forces to attack and defeat Fort Henry. There could be no question among Confederate officers that they had no answer to the Navy’s riverine warfare strategy.
Damn the Torpedoes
As the Mississippi River Flotilla steadily beat the CSA Army and Navy into submission, Flag Officer David Glasgow Farragut prepared for service in the Gulf of Mexico. During his assault of New Orleans, Farragut moved his entire fleet up the Mississippi River to contest the heavy guns at Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philips. During the five-day bombardment, Farragut employed a mortar flotilla built especially for riverine operations. The rebels put up an exceptional defense of New Orleans but were eventually overpowered by Farragut’s relentless assault and the threat of Union guns over New Orleans’ levees convinced the citizens to submit to Union authority. What made Farragut’s victory sweet was that New Orleans was the only southern city with a chance of matching the Union’s overwhelming riverine forces.
Meanwhile, behind Foote’s gunboats, one catastrophe after another descended upon the Confederates, whose armies could not match the Union advantages in riverine operations, which were expanded into the Tennessee River and down and across the state of Mississippi. Rather than arteries of life for the Confederacy, they became highways of death. Advancing behind the gunboats, Grant’s army cut off western Tennessee. More than any other factor, gunboats were the deciding factor at the Battle of Shiloh.
From New Orleans, Farragut’s heavy ships, while suffering much damage in the restricted and turbulent Mississippi, forged ahead to Vicksburg, a mighty fortress with batteries situated high on the bluff where Farragut’s guns could not effectively reach. And, with Confederate forces numbering around 33,000, it would take more than Farragut’s 3,500 men to defeat that fortress. Eventually, after a siege lasting a year, Vicksburg did fall to Grant’s army of 77,000 men. Confederate casualties numbered 32,687 (3,202 killed, wounded, or missing in action, 29,495 surrendered).
Thus far, the Navy demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of naval warfare on inland waters. The Navy’s ability to control the sea made riverine warfare possible. The Navy’s exercise of its control made riverine warfare flexible. Seagoing ships were adapted to fight in lakes and rivers to oppose shore batteries. The Navy learned not only how to build riverine vessels, it learned how to fight them through an appreciation for local environments and conditions and devising appropriate circumstantial responses.
In 1898, the U. S. Navy-Marine Corps was ready for the Spanish-American War. The U. S. Army was not. A few years later, the Navy dusted off the lessons it learned from previous periods and addressed head-on the challenges associated with the Philippine Insurrection and the Boxer Rebellion. In the Philippines, riverine warfare facilitated an end to the violence.
In the early decades of the twentieth century, a flotilla of shallow draft gunboats protected American life and property in war-torn China. Along more than 1,500-miles of the Yangtze River, riverine patrols faced hostile Chinese war lords, snipers, and bandits; landing parties were kept on a moment’s notice for intervention or defense. Natural dangers, such as swift currents, fast rising tides, and navigational obstacles were as formidable as any encountered by Commodores Barney, Perry, or Farragut.
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- Joiner, G. Lincoln’s Brown Water Navy: The Mississippi Squadron. Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.
- Marolda, E. J. Riverine Warfare: U. S. Navy Operations on Inland Waters. Annapolis: Naval History and Heritage Command, 2006
- Rowlands, K. Riverine Warfare: Naval War College Review, Vol 71, No. 1. Art. 5., Annapolis: Naval War College, 2018
 Porter was a rather extraordinary naval officer from a prominent American family. Porter began his naval career at age 10. In 1824, after receiving a reprimand, Porter’s father resigned from the US Navy and accepted Mexico’s appointment as their navy’s commander-in-chief. David Dixon Porter became a midshipman in the Mexican navy at age 12. In 1829, Porter received an appointment to the USNA. He was then 16 years old and a bit too salty for the culture of the Academy. Were it not for the intervention of Commodore James Biddle, Porter would not have received his commission in the US Navy. The second naval officer to achieve the rank of admiral, Porter served with distinction for over 62 years.
 There is no intent to suggest that the Confederate navy didn’t offer considerable challenges to the Union navy … only that it lacked the experience and traditions of the US Navy. The CSA navy made a gallant attempt to offset its disadvantages with technological innovation (iron clads, submarines, torpedo boats, mines) and a stout defense of ports and harbors. In February 1861, the CSA navy had a total 30 vessels; 14 of these were seaworthy.
 Mahan was a Navy captain (advanced to rear admiral after retirement) and historian who is generally regarded as the most influential American strategist of the 19th century. He served as president of the Naval War College and became a close friend of Theodore Roosevelt.
 Grants men were so elated by their victory that they began celebrating and drinking strong beverages. To regain control over his men, Grant ordered the rebel camp set afire. Unbeknownst to Grant, wounded rebel soldiers were burned to death inside medical treatment tents.
 Grant suffered 607 casualties (120 KIA, 383 WIA, 104 captured or MIA), the Confederates 641 (105 KIA, 419 WIA, 117 captured or MIA).
 Flag Officer was an impromptu rank. Foote was promoted to captain in 1861. When assigned to command the Mississippi River Squadron, which technically came under the War Department, he was advanced to flag officer (equivalent to Commodore) in recognition of his authority and responsibility. Foote was a heroic officer with long distinguished service. In 1862, Foote was promoted to Rear Admiral. He died unexpectedly while on active service in 1863.
 Farragut was the adopted brother of D. D. Porter. He was the nation’s first rear admiral, first vice admiral, and first full admiral in the U. S. Navy. In April 1862, Farragut captured New Orleans, which gave the Union control of the lower Mississippi.