When he was just a little guy, Jack Lewis became separated from his mother in a large department store. Anyone who’s been lost in a department store at the age of five or six knows that it’s a terrifying experience. But then, two young men came to his rescue. They were Marine Corps recruiters, wearing the dress blue uniform that makes Marines stand out among all other servicemen. They returned him to his mom. Jack Lewis never forgot those Marines.
So, in 1942, when it came time for Americans to stand up against fascism, C. Jack Lewis made his way to the local recruiting office and joined the Marines. Now, for the uninitiated, there are only two kinds of Marines: live Marines and dead Marines. You see, becoming a United States Marine is a lifetime endeavor. My good friend Colonel Jim Bathurst titled his autobiography on this very concept: as long as Marines keep faith with one another, and with the code of honor to which we all subscribe, then, We’ll All Die As Marines.
I met Lieutenant Colonel Jack Lewis while assigned as the Adjutant, Marine Aircraft Group 46 in 1979-81. Lewis was a reserve officer, then serving as the Reserve Liaison Officer for Southern California. I suspect that there was no better-qualified individual to serve in that capacity than Colonel Lewis. He served in World War II, the Korean War, and in Vietnam. In each instance, after serving a tour of combat duty, Jack left the active-duty force and went back into the Marine reserve. He did this, he told me because there was too much “chicken shit” in the active force … and if there was one thing Lewis could not abide, it was “oppressive regulations, careerist officers, and people who called themselves Marines but wouldn’t have made a pimple of a dead Marine’s ass.”
Like many young men of his day, the teenaged Jack Lewis became what he described as an “amateur juvenile delinquent.” He was always in trouble. The problem wasn’t so much Jack’s behavior as it was that he wanted more out of life than his circumstances would allow. By the late 1930s, Jack was looking for something special in his life. Something that would offer him a challenge, hold him accountable, and something that he could love with unbridled passion. In this regard, the Second World War probably came along at the right time for Jack Lewis. Jack Lewis joined the Marines out of a sense of patriotism, but in doing so, he found that “special something” he was looking for. The Marines squared his ass away, gave him a reason to get up in the morning, inculcated him with the values so dear to anyone who has ever (honorably) worn the uniform of a United States Marine. The U. S. Marine Corps became the organization that set him on the pathway of success for the balance of his life.
Jack was born in Iowa on 19 November 1924 but at the age of two, his family moved to Florida. As a lad, he was a voracious reader and a writer and at age 14, he sold his first novel … The Cherokee Kid’s Last Stand. The novel earned him five dollars. Now, while five dollars doesn’t sound like a lot of money, one must recall that in those days a field hand earned a dollar a day for backbreaking work. No, it wasn’t much, but he was fourteen years of age, and it was a start in a writing career that lasted the balance of his 84-years.
Following World War II, Lewis returned to Iowa, where in 1949 he graduated from the state university with a degree in journalism. He was subsequently commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve. A short time later he was assigned to help produce a Marine Corps training film, and then owing to his service in World War II, he became a technical advisor to the John Wayne film, Sands of Iwo Jima. Of this later effort, Lewis said that he basically advised members of the cast on how to lace up their leggings. He no doubt contributed far more than that.
When the Korean War erupted in June 1950, Lewis returned to active duty for six years. He served as a combat correspondent and photographer. Now this may not seem like much in terms of what Hollywood tells us about combat (which is mostly wrong), but every Marine — no matter what his occupational specialty, no matter what his rank — is first and foremost a rifleman. Initially, Jack Lewis carried an M-1 carbine as his T/O weapon. It was the first time he’d carried that particular firearm, considerably smaller than the M-1 Garand. In one fire fight, Jack shot a communist Chinese soldier eight times, hitting him six times, without doing any noticeable damage to this enemy. Another Marine standing nearby, who was armed with a Thompson submarine gun, stepped up and blew the communist into the afterlife. Allowing that no matter where you hit a man with a .45 caliber weapon he’s going down, Lewis thereafter armed himself with a Thompson and would not part with it. During a second combat tour of duty in Korea, Lewis earned a Bronze Star for his work filming Marine Corps aircraft engaging the enemy from an exposed position.
During the Korean War, Jack Lewis submitted over two dozen magazine articles to Marine Corps headquarters for publication in the Leatherneck Magazine. HQMC returned the articles telling Lewis that they all sounded too much like Marine Corps propaganda. Miffed, Lewis then sent the articles to his civilian literary agent who had them published, earning Lewis $200.00 each. Lewis sent copies of the published articles to the individual at HQMC who had rejected them. Knowing Jack, I can easily imagine that he sent these copies with a caustic note, but I don’t know that for a fact.
Following the Korean War, Jack commanded a rifle company in the 4th Marines at Camp Pendleton, California. He was subsequently transferred to the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii where he served as a public information officer. During this tour of duty, Lewis was assigned as a technical advisor on John Ford’s film titled Mister Roberts. When no one could locate a stunt performer to drive a motorcycle off a pier, Lewis did the job himself. Lewis later appeared in a minor role in Admiral Ford’s film, Sergeant Rutledge.
Marines, by their nature, are exceptional. Jack’s stellar performance prompted his commanding officer to encourage Jack to apply for a regular (as opposed to reserve) commission. Jack would have none of this, however. He wanted to pursue a writing career and upon expiration of his active duty obligation, Jack Lewis returned to inactive service in the reserves.
In addition to writing screenplays for films, Lewis found work as a magazine editor in 1956; after three years of learning how magazines are done, he teamed up with Dean Grennell to publish Gun World magazine in 1959. He continued to author the monthly knife column until his death in 2009. Lewis was highly critical of the capabilities of various weapons marketed to military and law enforcement agencies. In fact, he was so critical that the firearms manufacturing companies refused to advertise in his magazine. Lewis once told the Commandant of the Marine Corps that the M16’s only consistent effect was that it changed the world’s perception of the American rifleman. Americans, he said, used to be sharpshooters, but after the M16, they were little more than “sprayers.”
Jack Lewis developed a story that he originally titled Year of the Tiger. When Marshall Thompson selected Lewis’ work for a 1963 film, he hired Lewis to write the screenplay and the title was changed to A Yank in Viet-Nam, which was filmed on location in South Vietnam in 1963, often in the midst of, or within range, of actual fire fights.
In 1966, Lewis published a novel titled Tell it to the Marines. It is the story of a Marine officer who, during the Korean War, is placed in command of a band of misfits in a motion picture unit. In the preface of this book, Jack penned, “Any similarity to persons, places, or incidents is highly plausible; only the names have been changed to avoid court-martial.” The humor in this book may be lost among those who never earned the Marine Corps emblem, and among those born in the 21st Century, life in the Marine Corps during the Korean war may not resonate. I have a copy of this book on my shelf.
He was also the author of White Horse, Black Hat: A Quarter Century on Hollywood’s Poverty Row; Renegade Canyon; Mohave; Massacre Mountain; and The Coffin Racers.
In 1969, Lewis returned to active duty to serve a full-length tour in Vietnam with the III Marine Amphibious Corps. During this tour, Lewis earned his second and third air medal, signifying 50 air missions exposed to enemy fire. Lewis retired from the Marine Corps in 1984, one day prior to his 60th birthday.
Colonel Jack Lewis was a man of many talents and many careers. He did not suffer fools gladly; he was a maverick, not at all concerned about becoming someone else’s vision of a Marine —but his own vision was good enough for him and almost everyone who knew him. He may have been a bit rough around the edges, and blunt, but he was a decent man whose professionalism was well-balanced with his friendliness. He loved his Corps, and he loved Marines until his last breath. In the company he managed for 37 years, he preferred hiring retired and former Marines. When Jack Lewis retired, he moved to Hilo, Hawaii, where he continued to write. Colonel C. Jack Lewis, United States Marine Corps Reserve, passed away at his home on 24 May 2009.
 Dean Grennell (1923-2004) served as a firearms instructor in the Army Air Corps during World War II and is remembered as an American firearms expert, writer, editor, managing editor of Gun World magazine, and the editor of the science fiction “fanzine” Grue.
 Marshall Thompson (1925-1992) (a classmate of Norma Jean Baker) was an actor, director, and producer of films beginning in the 1940s of science fiction genre. One film titled The Terror from Beyond Space in 1958 became the inspiration for Ridley Scott’s Alien films. A second Viet Nam era film was titled To the Shores of Hell (1965).
Throughout America’s history, no citizen with common sense ever wanted to go to war. “We the people” do not start wars — our elected officials and bureaucrats do that. At no time in my memory has the US government offered a compelling argument or justification for involving our nation in a foreign war. When they try to provide a convincing reason for war, they always wrap it in a lie. For example, the government told Americans that the United States sent combat troops to Vietnam to defend the South Vietnamese people from their authoritarian cousins in the north. In fact, both North Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh and South Vietnam’s Ngo Dinh Diem had the same aspirations: unification under their leadership. Neither man ever gave a damn about the poor South Vietnamese peasant. War is bad enough, but when politicians and unelected bureaucrats contrive to make things worse for the combat soldier — which is the topic of this essay, the American voter should put his or her foot down and loudly and angrily proclaim, “enough is enough!”
Combat units of the 3rd Marine Division (3rdMarDiv) began offering important lessons to the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) in 1965. One of these lessons was that they should refrain from firing their weapons at U. S. Marines — because being shot at makes American Marines very cranky.
At the beginning of 1966, the 3rdMarDiv employed its 24,000 men against several communist thrusts into Quang Tri Province, also known as the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ). The five provinces of the I CTZ were the northernmost area of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). General William C. Westmoreland, U. S. Army, Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), ordered the 3rdMarDiv to defend this northern tier. In 1966, the 3rdMarDiv was the Marine Corps’ largest (ever) combat division. There were five infantry regiments, one artillery regiment, all of the usual supporting units, Army artillery units, Navy logistical units (including Seabees), and two Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) infantry regiments. The division was huge — but then, so too was their area of defense.
The 3rdMarDiv’s tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) encompassed 1,800 square miles of Indian country. The terrain was all rugged, elevated, menacing, and over-populated with things that hurt, such as an abundant enemy — and predatory cats. At the far northern tip of South Vietnam, along its border with North Vietnam, was the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Defending the DMZ was one of the division’s primary missions, but not the only one.
To achieve this defensive objective, two unusual behaviors were necessary. First, the United States had to adopt the strategy of the North Vietnamese, which was to prosecute a war of attrition. Simply stated, the US and North Vietnamese agreed to see which of them could afford to give up the most human lives to further their political goals. Think about that for a moment. Second, for the Marines to defend the northern provinces, they had to establish a wide arc of defensive bases (euphemistically called combat bases) that would permit the 3rdMarDiv to respond to the enemy within an area of 1,800 square miles.
The main north-south highway within I CTZ was Route 1. It connected Marine combat bases at Dong Ha and Quang Tri City in the North to Phu Bai and Da Nang in the South. Any obstruction along this highway would disrupt vital logistical support of the division’s forward-most units; the enemy knew this exceptionally well. So, the primary logistical highway became the Cua Viet River, which extended from its mouth on the coast to Dong Ha.
At Dong Ha, the river was about as wide as a mountain footpath. Additionally, Route 9 linked Dong Ha with Khe Sanh. East of Khe Sanh, the 3rdMarDiv created a series of outposts that offered some protection for Route 9 and the Cam Lo River Valley (which extended from Dong Ha to the coastal plain). Of these outposts, the more critical were located at Ca Lu (ten miles east of Khe Sanh), the “Rockpile” (a sheer outcrop eight miles north), Camp Carroll (10 miles eastward), and “Leatherneck Square,” which was a quadrilateral region outlined by Cam Lo, Con Thien, Gio Linh, and Dong Ha.
As previously mentioned, the 3rdMarDiv’s TAOR was massive. The division’s defense plan further divided the TAOR among its regiments and separate battalions. Each of these had a code name, such as Napoleon, Kentucky, Lancaster, and Scotland.
The Third Marine Division defeated the NVA and Viet Cong (VC) in every engagement — but in confronting and defeating this enemy, the Marines encountered a high casualty rate. By the end of 1967, Marine commanders were frustrated; the division lost good men and had nothing to show for it. Between 1966-67, the division had lost 5,000 killed and wounded Marines. It was an unacceptable casualty rate … and a direct result of the imbecilic static war concept.
In 1965, Washington bureaucrats began experimenting with various schemes for achieving their political goals through static defensive measures. This may be all fine and good when looking at the larger picture, but on closer examination, the cost of “experimentation” was an excessively high US casualty rate. Most of these “good ideas” had been rejected by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because, to implement them, the US would have to increase (at least initially) its troop strength in South Vietnam. Moreover, implementing these ideas would force the North Vietnamese to change its strategy — specifically, a full-scale invasion of Laos by the NVA, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to avoid.
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara was known as one of Ford Motor Company’s “whiz kids.” He was one of those “good idea” people who thought he knew everything he needed to know about fighting a war. In reality, McNamara was a bean counter who knew nothing about warfare.
One of McNamara’s schemes was constructing a defensive line along the northern border of South Vietnam and its border with Southeast Laos. McNamara met with former national security advisor Carl Kaysen. Kaysen convinced McNamara that the key to success in static defensive strategies was establishing an electronic barrier. Kaysen argued (successfully) that an electronic barrier would limit NVA infiltration into South Vietnam. An electronic wall made great sense to McNamara, so he convened a feasibility group consisting of several science technologists. They submitted their proposals in March 1966 — which McNamara dutifully passed along to the JCS for their comments.
At best, the JCS was lukewarm to the idea of an electric barrier, particularly since the barrier wouldn’t prevent infiltration and because creating the barrier would still require additional forces in Vietnam. Moreover, it would require a significant construction effort, would involve a massive logistical effort, exponentially increasing the costs of the war. McNamara didn’t like being told “no.” It might have been better for everyone if McNamara had any knowledge of history — specifically, of Hadrian’s Wall.
Somewhat rebuffed, McNamara then turned to the JASON Group. The JASON group had impressed McNamara by proclaiming that Lyndon Johnson’s bombing campaign over North Vietnam was an utter failure. Junior Airman Smith of the Strategic Air Command could have told McNamara that for a lot less money.
JASON recommended a two-tier defensive barrier system. The first tier involved conventional detection/response capability inland from the coast along the southern portion of the DMZ and another system along the remote western section abutting Laos that would trigger electronic detection, air interdiction, and remotely triggered minefields. JASON thought that such a system could be in place within a year. At this point, McNamara had tiny electric tingles running up and down his leg.
Mr. McNamara sent the JASON proposal to the JCS for review. Every service chief rejected it, save one. JCS Chairman General Earle G. Wheeler, U. S. Army, was positively enthralled with the idea. Despite the overwhelming JCS rejection of the JASON plan, Wheeler sent the report to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Command, Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp, for his review. Admiral Sharp rejected the plan as impractical; General Westmoreland agreed.
With the backing of only one uniformed flag rank officer, McNamara took the plan to President Johnson, who knew no more about fighting a war than Junior Airman Smith of the Strategic Air Command. McNamara’s cost estimate — in dollars — was $1.5 billion. Well, another $750-million (annually) for operating costs. President Johnson, who never saw a spending package he didn’t like, approved it. In terms of combat casualties, the project would far exceed the material costs of McNamara’s Wall.
Marine Corps combat engineers began preparing the ground for the construction of Project Dye Marker along a strip of land 500 meters wide from Gio Linh westward to Con Thien in early 1967. The Marines assigned to this project (infantry, artillery, and combat engineers) were utterly exhausted, a fact first expressed by (then) Brigadier General Louis Metzger, who served as Assistant Division Commander, 3rdMarDiv/CG 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade — because in addition to providing security for construction of McNamara’s Wall, they also constantly responded to the enemy’s initiatives in Northwest South Vietnam. For the Marines, the project involved sustained periods of heavy combat. Major General Raymond L. Murray, Deputy Commander, III MAF, echoed Metzger’s sentiments. “The division commander’s primary mission was the tactical handling of his troops … rather than build the damn line that nobody believed in, in the first place.” In December 1967, Murray angrily remarked, “How in the hell were you going to build this thing when you had to fight people off while you were building it?”
The actual cost of McNamara’s Wall was dear. Not including the lives lost and the men wounded in trying to construct Dye Marker, the Marines spent close to a million man-hours and 114,000 equipment hours on the project; they had also lost more than $1.6 million in combat equipment to the enemy’s ground and artillery assaults. Everything associated with Dye Marker became an enemy target, from convoys moving equipment forward to killing combat engineers while seated atop their bulldozers.
In 1967, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, warned senior commanders in Vietnam that for the Marines to succeed, they must be allowed to wage war on their terms — not as part of a static defensive strategy subject to the prerogatives of the enemy — but as a lethal force that set its terms of engagement. By this time, the NVA had already demonstrated its willingness to lose large numbers of men in exchange for a fewer number of Americans, but over a sustained period.
Krulak identified three options along the DMZ: (1) Withdraw the Marines further south of the DMZ, out of range of NVA artillery (which, while tactically sound, offered a propaganda victory to the NVA exceeding Ted Kennedy and Jane Fonda’s visit to North Vietnam); (2) Invade North Vietnam (tactically and logistically difficult, not to mention politically impossible); or (3) Reinforce the 3rdMarDiv and intensify US air and artillery assaults on North Vietnam. The ball was thus placed in Westmoreland’s court. He needed to either crap or got off the pot. Westmoreland elected to get off the pot.
At the beginning of 1968, the NVA used the western end of the barrier, from Khe Sanh, through the Special Forces camp at Lang Vei, to attack American forces in that region. Lang Vei was overrun with 309 killed, 64 wounded, and 122 captured by the NVA, and Khe Sanh was placed under a siege that lasted for 77 days. After the blockade, Westmoreland’s replacement, General Creighton W. Abrams, ordered Khe Sanh abandoned. Abrams also ordered the destruction of all infrastructure along Route 9 toward Laos, including all roadways and bridges. In October 1968, all work relating to Dye Marker ceased.
In March 1968, Major General Raymond G. Davis, USMC, served As Deputy Commander, Provisional Corps. In May, he was assigned as Commanding General, 3rdMarDiv, through April 1969. During his tenure in this position, Davis refused to leave his men in static positions where they could be targeted and slaughtered by the NVA. Soon after taking command, he ordered his subordinate commanders to move out of their static combat bases and execute their traditional mission: locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver and close combat. Operation Dewey Canyon was how he took the war to the enemy. With a stream of officers who agreed with this philosophy following him as the division commander, the Marines of I CTZ inflicted a terrible price upon the enemy. At the end of 1972, the NVA began conscripting young teenagers. The war might have turned out much differently were it not for Washington politicians (of both parties) who shocked NVA General in Chief Vo Nguyen Giap by ordering the withdrawal of US Forces.
I have long given up my hope that the American people will begin to exercise their sovereignty over the federal government. They seem not to mind burying their children in massive national cemeteries — and they apparently have never learned that elections have costly consequences. John Kennedy’s election to the presidency was one of our nation’s more corrupt campaigns. Kennedy’s running mate was one of the most corrupt politicians in the history of the U. S. Congress. Kennedy selected McNamara to serve as SecDef; Johnson kept him on the payroll. Who, then, is to blame for getting the American people engaged in a land war that politicians had no intention of winning? The blame rests with the American voter. Democrats lied — to both the American people and our South Vietnamese allies — and tens of thousands of Americans died.
President Richard Nixon was roundly criticized by the vocal American communist/anti-war/progressive movement for expanding the war into Cambodia and Laos — but this was precisely what Nixon needed to do to defeat the NVA, who were already operating in Cambodia and Laos — but progressive Democrats/neo-communists gave Kennedy/Johnson a pass for having committed troops to Vietnam in the first place.
Brush, P. The Story Behind the McNamara Line. Vietnam Magazine, 1996.
Cash, J. A. The Other Side of the Hill. Army Center of Military History, 2014.
Philips, W. R. Night of the Silver Stars: The Battle of Lang Vei. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997.
Prados, J. The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail
Shulimson, J. And Blasiol, L. A. And others. U. S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968. Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1997.
 Marines defend the United States of America. They do that through aggressive, overpowering combat. There are defensive tactics in the Marine Corps, but they are designed as a temporary respite while transitioning from one attack to another. A bended knee is not a Marine Corps tradition, and neither is establishing defensive positions while waiting for the enemy to make his next move. US Policy in Vietnam tied the hands of the Marines (indeed, all air, ground, and naval forces), by restricting offensive operations and imposing our combat forces criminally malfeasant rules of engagement.
 A DMZ is an area of land in which treaties or agreements forbid the establishment of any military activity (installations, activities, or personnel). It is a buffer zone between two warring factions. In the case of Vietnam, it was the official border area between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the Republic of South Vietnam. The NVA frequently violated this agreement, in much the same way they violated the neutrality of neighboring Laos.
 Never before in US history had the government of the United States adopted an enemy’s game plan. Whether this was Westmoreland’s idea, or one imposed upon him from Washington, the result was the devastating loss of 58,000 American lives in a conflict that they could not win.
 The aggressive nature of USMC combat operations has always been to save lives, not waste them. If the United States must fight a war, then the sooner the enemy is defeated, the better. Washington/Westmoreland denied this proven strategy to the Marines during the Vietnam War.
 McNamara served in the Army Air Corps in World War II, gaining a commission as a captain, and achieving the rank of lieutenant colonel before the end of the war. During the war, he served in the Office of Statistical Control where he analyzed the effectiveness of bomber efficiency. In 1946, McNamara and ten others of the OSC joined Ford Motor Company. Collectively, they became known as the Whiz Kids because they helped reform a money-losing FMC. McNamara became the first president of Ford Motor Company outside the Ford family. Kennedy appointed him as SecDef at the beginning of his administration.
 Kaysen (1920-2010) was an academic advisor in the Kennedy administration, a “specialist” in international security at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). His field of expertise was nuclear warfare, foreign trade, international economic policy, and international security policy. Presumably, Kaysen was an architect of the “Mutual Atomic Destruction,” which essentially changed forever the psychological characteristics of American society.
 The JASON Group was established in 1960. It is affiliated with the MITRE Corporation, which operates seven Federally funded research and development centers at the expense of the American taxpayer. Consisting of between thirty and sixty scientific technologists, JASON focuses on the development of military technology, with additional interests in global warming and renewable energy. The term JASON came from “July-August-September-October-November,” the months in which the group typically met. They are also skeptically known as “Junior Achiever Somewhat Older Now.” Most developmental ideas originating from JASON were costly failures, shepherded through Washington bureaucrats by theoretical physicists, biologists, chemists, oceanographers, mathematicians, and computer geeks. They no doubt had a hand in the creation of unmanned naval ships that currently sail the nation’s oceans.
 “Bus” Wheeler was a career staff officer and school instructor with active service between 1924-1970. The Vietnam War may be a direct result of appointing a non-combat officer to head the JCS, particularly one who simply could not kiss enough political ass inside the Washington beltway.
 Admiral Sharp served as Commander, U. S. Pacific Fleet from 1963-64, and as Commander, U. S. Pacific Command from 1964-68. Sharp was Westmoreland’s boss.
 Johnson’s only military experience occurred during World War II when he served as a Congressman/Navy Lieutenant Commander in the Public Affairs Section in Washington, D. C. The 1965 epic war film In Harm’s Way based the character of LCdr Neal Owynn, a sycophant congressman, on Lyndon Baines Johnson. When the project’s classified code name was leaked to the American press, Operation Practice Nine became Operation Illinois City and then later Project Dye Marker.
 Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac) (1941-Present} is the largest maritime landing force in the world. The general officer commanding reports directly to the Commander, U. S. Pacific Command, and exercises command authority over all subordinate commands of the Navy/Marine Corps expeditionary units operating in the Pacific, from California to the Far East. During the Vietnam War, the CG FMFPac did not exercise operational control of Marines in Vietnam, but he nevertheless had something to say about how the Marines were employed within USMACV.
 Raymond G. Davis (1915-2003) served as a U. S. Marine from 1938-1972. He participated in the Guadalcanal/Tulagi landings-campaigns, Cape Gloucester campaign, and the invasion of Peleliu. He was awarded the Navy Cross and Purple Heart while commanding 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. During the Korean War, Davis commanded 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, during which time he was awarded the Medal of Honor during the Battle of Chosin Reservoir. He was also awarded the two Silver Stars, Bronze Star, and two Legions of Merit.
It is probably fair to say that Mexico and the United States, with few exceptions, never achieved the status of good neighbors. There are reasons for this, of course. For a summary of this long-troubled relationship, please visit Old West Tales.José De La Cruz Porfirio Díaz Mori served as President of Mexico for 31 years. Some historians claim that he was a ruthless dictator; others picture him as a bit kinder. Either way, he was a Mexican patriot who developed a worldview that was consistent with his background and experience. He first served as president from 1876 to 1880 and again from 1884-1911. Throughout this period, Diaz was legally elected to the presidency. That he was a no-nonsense chief executive, there can be no doubt. The reality of politics is that it is a ruthless business, and in Mexican history, there has never been a shortage of bandit revolutionaries. This particular history, of course, helps to explain present-day Mexico. In any case, circumstances forced President Diaz to resign from the presidency on 25 May 1911, and he subsequently fled to Spain, where he lived the balance of his life.
Beginning in 1911, Mexico suffered through a number of revolutionary contenders for the presidency, including Bernardo Reyes, Francisco Madero, Pascual Orozco, Pancho Villa, Emiliano Zapata, Ricardo Magon, Jose Maria Pino Suarez, Venustiano Carranza, Aureliano Blanquet, Plutarco Calles, Mario Velasques, Felix Diaz, Victoriano Huerta, and Alvaro Obregon. The Mexican revolution lasted until 1920.
President James Monroe (1817-1825) was the first executive to formulate US policy toward Latin America, referred to as the Monroe Doctrine. President Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909) issued his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904, but we must credit President Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) for implementing the US policy that refused to recognize any revolutionary leader not elected by popular vote. In 1913, President Wilson refused to acknowledge the presidency of General Victoriano Huerta, who had been installed as president (by agreement with U. S. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson). According to President Wilson’s biographer, the president stated, “There can be no certain prospect of peace in America until General Huerta has surrendered his usurped authority.”
Civil upheaval in Mexico threatened the safety of American citizens and the properties of Americans doing business there. Owing to Wilson’s concern for American lives and business interests, Admiral Henry T. Mayo, Commanding the US Fifth Squadron, Atlantic Fleet, was dispatched to Tampico, Mexico in 1914.
Admiral Mayo’s squadron included USS Dolphin, USS Connecticut, USS Minnesota, USS Chester, and USSDes Moines. Tampico, a central oil-producing region, was besieged by Constitutional forces. Generally, the relationship between the U. S. Navy and President Huerta’s federal garrison remained cordial. For example, on 2 April, Admiral Mayo directed the captain of his flagship USS Dolphin to render honors to Mexico to honor the commemoration of General Porfirio Diaz’s capture of Puebla from the French in 1867. Dolphin fired a 21-gun salute.
Typically, at the end of duty hours, ship’s work permitting, ship captains allowed crew members to boat ashore and engage in recreational activities, such as baseball, with the local townsmen. On 6 April, Constitutionalist rebel forces under Colonel Emiliano Nafarrete occupied La Barra, Doña Cecilia, and Arbol Grande. General Ignacio Zaragoza, the Tamaulipas governor and commander of the federal garrison, sent his gunboat Veracruz to shell the rebel forces that had stationed themselves behind oil storage tanks. Admiral Mayo played it straight. He sent a letter to both leaders stating that while he intended to remain neutral, he would take all steps to protect American lives and property. Admiral May began to evacuate Standard Oil Company executives, workers, and their families but refused to land troops to cover its refinery.
After additional rebel attacks near the Iturbide Bridge on 7-8 April 1914, foreign nationals began asking for refuge on Admiral Mayo’s ships. The U. S. Consul in Tampico sent an urgent message requesting help in evacuating the American population. On the evening of 8 April, Mexican rebels detained a Marine Corps courier from the US Consulate, but he was released unharmed after an hour. Meanwhile, running short of fuel, USS Dolphin’s skipper, Captain Ralph Earle, visited the American Consulate on 9 April, where he arranged refueling from a German national named Max Tyron. Captain Earle agreed to take fuel delivery from Mr. Tyron’s dock, located near the Iturbide Bridge.
The duty of taking possession of this fuel fell to Ensign Charles C. Copp, who organized a whaleboat and crew to proceed to Tyron’s dock, pick up the fuel, and return to Dolphin. Ensign Copp and his crew were unarmed; the American flag was flying fore and aft on the whaleboat. Neither Copp nor anyone in his crew was able to speak Spanish. While loading the fuel, an armed squad of Zaragoza’s soldiers surrounded the sailors. Two crewmen, Coxswain G. H. Siefert and Seaman J. P. Harrington, remained on the whaleboat, but they too were taken at gunpoint. Mexican soldiers escorted the men to Colonel Ramón Hinojosa. Hinojosa released the sailors to continue their work but informed them that they would not be permitted to leave the dock without Zaragoza’s permission.
Mr. Tyron took a launch out to Dolphin to inform Captain Earle and Admiral Mayo of what happened. Mayo ordered Earle to seek the release of his men under strong protest to the government of Mexico. Earle, accompanied by Consul Miller, met with Zaragoza, who apologized — offering that his soldiers were ignorant of the laws of war. Within an hour, Hinojosa released the sailors, and they returned to their ship with the fuel.
Admiral Mayo viewed the incident as an insult to American sovereignty, grave enough in Mayo’s opinion, to demand reparations. Mayo ordered Commander William A. Moffett to deliver a note to Zaragoza informing him that seizing men from a naval vessel, flying the United States flag, was an inexcusable act of war. Admiral Mayo further demanded a formal repudiation, punishment of the individual responsible, and that he hoist the American flag in a prominent position ashore and render a 21 gun salute, which Mayo would return from Dolphin.
General Zaragoza referred the matter to the Mexican ministry of war in Mexico City. President Wilson learned about this incident from William Jennings Bryan. The president told Bryan, “Mayo could not have done otherwise.” President Wilson then added that unless the government of Mexico complied with Mayo’s dictate, grave consequences might result.
At the time, Nelson J. O’Shaughnessy was the American chargé d’affaires in Mexico City. Roberto Ruiz, Mexico’s foreign minister, paid a visit to O’Shaughnessy on 10 April and informed him of the incident. Ruiz’ opined that Admiral Mayo should withdraw his demand. After all, Zaragoza did apologize. O’Shaughnessy and Ruiz met with President Huerta later that day. Huerta agreed with Ruiz. After the meeting, Mr. O’Shaughnessy released a statement to the press that indicated Zaragoza had detained Marines, not sailors, and that the Mexicans had paraded them through the streets of Tampico. None of that was true, but its effect on the American people was electric.
On 12 April, President Huerta decided that Zaragoza’s verbal apology was sufficient. In his opinion, the United States was given ample satisfaction. The Mexican government would not apologize further, nor would any Mexican officials salute the American flag. The next day, O’Shaughnessy further informed the press that either the salute would be rendered — or else. On 14 April, President Wilson ordered Vice Admiral Charles Badger to sail the Atlantic Fleet into Mexican waters. When President Huerta learned of Wilson’s order, he was elated, thinking it was the best thing to happen during his administration. Still, on 16 April 1914, Huerta agreed to a simultaneous saluting which signified that both sides were satisfied with the end of a conflict which “at no time” had been severe.
Despite Huerta’s reversal, Wilson decided that the Atlantic Fleet would remain in Mexico to prevent any incidents of ill-will or contempt for the United States — which Huerta had exhibited in the past. Wilson had misunderstood Huerta’s meaning by “simultaneous.” President Wilson warned Huerta that he would consult with Congress on 19 April with a view of taking such actions as may be necessary to enforce respect for the flag of the United States if Huerta did not render proper honors to the flag of the United States.
True to his word, on 20 April, President Wilson sought Congressional approval for the employment of the Armed Forces. President Wilson intended to seize Vera Cruz “to get rid of Huerta” and his illegitimate authority in Mexico. Wilson also learned on 20 April that a large shipment of arms and munitions were en route to Mexico from Germany. Thus, the unfolding incident was far more involved than the issue of Huerta’s disrespect to the nation’s colors. Congress provided its consent that same evening, and President Wilson immediately ordered landings at Vera Cruz, seizure of the city’s customs house, and directed the interception of arms from Germany.
On to Veracruz
On the morning of 21 April, Rear Admiral Frank F. Fletcher began preparations for the seizure of Veracruz. His orders were simple and direct: seize the customs house, prohibit off-loading war materials to Huerta’s forces or any other Mexican political party. Landing operations under Navy Captain William Rees Rush began at approximately 11:00 when Marines of the 2nd Advanced Base Regiment from USS Prairie and Bluejackets from USS Florida started their movement to shore. A provisional battalion was also formed from the Marine Detachments, USS Florida, and USS Utah, who accompanied the Bluejackets into Veracruz.
Commanding the port of Veracruz was Mexican General Gustavo Maass, who, despite the American Consul’s warning not to interfere, could not surrender his post to the Americans. He ordered the 18th Regiment under General Luis Becerril to distribute rifles to citizens of Veracruz and prisoners in the La Galera military prison and then proceed to the waterfront. He then ordered the 19th Regiment under General Francisco Figueroa to defend the piers. Finally, Maass sent a telegram to the Minister of War, General Aurelio Blanquet. General Blanquet ordered Maass not to resist the landing but withdraw his forces to Tejería.
Once ashore, Captain Rush exercised overall command of the Bluejackets while Lieutenant Colonel Wendell C. Neville assumed command of the Marines. In furtherance of Admiral Fletcher’s objectives, Rush dispatched three companies of Bluejackets to occupy the customs house, the post office, and the telegraph office. Colonel Neville directed his Marines to capture the railroad terminal, roundhouse, train yard, cable office, and the power plant.
Although most of Maass’s troops accompanied him to Tejería, liberated prisoners under Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Contreras (and a few civilians) opposed the Marines as they made their way inside the city. The first casualty was a navy signalman stationed at the top of the Terminal Hotel. At around 13:30, the U. S. Navy intercepted and detained the ship Ypiranga before its crew could unload its shipment of arms and munitions.
At the end of the first day, American casualties included four dead and 20 wounded. Given these shootings, Admiral Fletcher decided that he had no choice but to expand his operations to include the entire city. The following day, Fletcher ordered Rush and Neville to occupy Veracruz. To accomplish this, Admiral Fletcher signaled USS San Francisco, USS Minnesota, USS Hancock, and USS Chester to land their Marine Detachments, bringing the number of Marines and Bluejackets ashore to around 3,000 men.
Marines began their advance into Veracruz at 07:45 on 22 April. The Marines, experienced in street fighting, made an orderly and tactical movement, but a regiment of Bluejackets under Captain F. A. Anderson, without experience in urban warfare, marched in parade formation toward the Mexican Naval Academy. Mexican partisans, who had barricaded themselves inside the parade ground, easily targeted Anderson’s Bluejackets, which halted his advance. After Captain Anderson signaled for naval gunfire support, USS Prairie, San Francisco, and Chester pounded the Naval Academy, ending Mexican resistance.
As Marines and Bluejackets continued their advance, Colonel John A. Lejeune led the 1st Advanced Base Regiment (originally bound for Tampico) ashore. By nightfall, more than 6,000 Americans occupied Veracruz, including a small aviation detachment from USS Mississippi. The aviation detachment’s participation marked the first time naval aircraft became targets of ground fire.
Meanwhile, Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton assembled the Fourth Marine Regiment (4th Marines) at Puget Sound. The regimental headquarters units incorporated the 25th, 26th, and 27th Marine companies. After sailing from Washington State aboard the USS South Dakota, the regiment added four additional companies from Mare Island (31st, 32nd, 34th, and 35th companies). Along with USS Jupiter, the task group proceeded to Mazatlán (west coast of Mexico), joined later by USS West Virginia, and reinforced by the 28th and 36th companies. Pendleton’s 4th Marines was a contingency reserve. There was no landing by the 4th Marines in Mexico.
A third provisional regiment of Marines, assembled in Philadelphia, arrived at Veracruz on 1 May under the command of Colonel Littleton W. T. Waller, who, upon landing, formed a Marine Brigade and assumed overall command of the 3,141 Marines. Pending the arrival of an Army brigade under Brigadier General Frederick Funston, Admiral Fletcher declared martial law. Once the Army arrived in Veracruz, seagoing Marines and bluejackets withdrew back to their respective ships, and Admiral Fletcher turned over control of the port city to General Funston.
After Venustiano Carranza overthrew President Huerta, the United States withdrew its armed forces from Veracruz on 23 November 1914. Subsequently, relations between the United States and Mexico improved somewhat. However, the American occupation of Veracruz did lead to several anti-American revolts in Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Uruguay. Mexico expelled resident US citizens from Mexican territories, and the British government criticized Wilson’s policies in Mexico. On a positive note, however, the US occupation of Veracruz did persuade Mexico to remain neutral during World War I. After the Zimmerman affair, however, the United States and Mexico returned to their traditional rocky relationships.
Cooper, J. Woodrow Wilson: A Biography. New York: Vintage Books, 2011.
McBride, W. M. Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.
Millett, A. R. Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps. New York: The Free Press, 1991.
Quirk, R. An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962.
Santelli, J. S. A Brief History of the Fourth Marines. Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1970.
Sweetman, J. The Landing at Veracruz, 1914. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1968.
 See also, a six part series of the relationship between the United States and New Spain, Mexico, and Mexican Texas, beginning with Spanish America (24 June 2019).
 The statement only suggests that while he may have availed himself of corrupt voting irregularities, a tradition in Mexican politics, he didn’t seize power through force of arms.
 Victoriano Huerta (1850-1916) was a Mexican military officer and the 35th President of Mexico who seized power from Francisco Madero in 1913, installed Pedro Lascuráin Paredes as his puppet, who then appointed Huerta as Secretary of the Interior. Within an hour, Lascuráin resigned the presidency — an action that brought Huerta into the presidency.
 President Wilson removed Henry Wilson from office as a result of making the so-called Embassy Agreement.
 Henry Thomas Mayo (1856-1937) graduated from the USNA in 1876, served in a number of career progressing billets, including his service as aide-de-camp to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels. After graduating from the Naval War College, he commanded several capital ships. He was promoted to rear Admiral in 1913.
 Admiral Mayo criticized Ensign Copp for allowing foreign soldiers to seize his vessel.
 A three time candidate for the presidency, Bryan served as Wilson’s Secretary of State.
 Nelson O’Shaughnessy (1876-1932) was a career diplomat born in New York City, was well-educated, gaining degrees from Georgetown University, St. John’s College, Oxford University, and the Inner Temple in London. His earliest posts were at diplomatic missions in Denmark, Russia, Austria-Hungary, 1905-1911, and most notably in Mexico, 1911-1914, where his service gained him national notoriety. As chargé d’affaires, O’Shaughnessy represented the interests of the United States in Mexico after the recall of the Ambassador following the coup of Victoriano Huerta in 1913. A Republican, O’Shaughnessy alienated himself from President Wilson’s Democratic administrations by his cordial relationship with Huerta.
 Germany had long sought to incite a war between Mexico and the United States. Another Mexican-American war would reduce the possibility of bringing the United States into the European war and slowed the export of American arms to the European allies. For quite some time before World War I, Germany aided Mexican revolutionaries by arming them, funding them, and advising them. German Naval Intelligence Officer Franz von Rintelen attempted to incite war between the US and Mexico by giving Victoriano Huerta $12 million in cash. The German saboteur Lothar Witzke, who was responsible for bombings at Mare Island (San Francisco) and in New Jersey was operationally based in Mexico City.
 The Marine Corps Advanced Base Force was the Corps’ first task organized combat unit made up of coastal and naval base defense forces generally of battalion or regimental sized units (depending on its mission). Initially, Neville’s unit was more or less on the same level as a reinforced battalion landing team which expanded in size once the Marines went ashore.
 The term “bluejacket” is generally used to denote a British or American sailor and often used to distinguish sailors performing landing force operations ashore from Marines.
 “Fighting Fred” Funston (1865-1917) was a Medal of Honor recipient with combat experience gained in the Spanish-American and Philippine-American wars. In 1896, Funston was a volunteer with the Cuban Revolutionary Army who fought for Cuba’s independence from Spain. Suffering with malaria, Funston returned to his home to recover. In preparation for war with Spain, Funston was commissioned a colonel with the 20th Kansas Infantry. He was promoted to Brigadier General in recognition of his undaunted courage under fire during the Philippine Insurrection. Funston was not a favorite of Mark Twain, an avowed anti-Imperialist, who denounced Funston in an article published in the North American Review. Funston’s public argument with Republican Senator George Frisbie Hoar resulted in President Theodore Roosevelt reprimanding Funston and ordering him to remain silent on public issues. Funston was promoted to Major General in November 1914. Funston died of a heart attack while attending a concert in San Antonio, Texas.
The Marine Corps mission, now a long tradition, is to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, or to repel the enemy’s assault by fire and close combat. No matter what occupational specialty assigned, every Marine is a trained rifleman. Up-close and personal is how Marines fight. As an organization, the Corps has two essential purposes: (1) making Marines, and (2) winning battles.
People who seek to join the Marine Corps are already psychologically unique because every potential recruit knows what the Marine Corps will expect from them from the very beginning of their enlistment process. Knowing this, however, is insufficient. Every enlisted recruit and every officer candidate must measure up to the Corps’ uncompromising high standards. They must demonstrate that they have what it takes to serve as a US Marine. They do this either at recruit training depots or at the officer candidate school — which is where they earn the title, MARINE.
Marines are naval infantry. Between 1775-1900, Marines primarily served in ship’s detachments, navy yards, and provisional forces for expeditionary service ashore. Between 1900-1940, Marines participated in irregular warfare and counter-insurgency operations in support of American foreign policy. Conventionally, Marines served with enviable distinction in the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and in the Middle Eastern Wars.
Organizationally, the Marine Corps is composed of its Headquarters element (Headquarters Marine Corps) (HQMC), its supporting establishments (Marine Corps Bases and Air Stations), and the Operating Forces. The Operating forces (presently) consist of three infantry divisions, three air wings, three logistical commands, and their reserve counterparts. The Marine Corps organizes its deployed forces as Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs), which range from battalion landing teams to reinforced infantry divisions. While war strategies are matters for senior (flag rank) officers, battlefield tactics frequently fall within the purview of Marine noncommissioned officers (NCOs).
The structure of the Marine Corps (1775-present) has been an evolutionary process. At its beginning, Congress authorized the recruitment of two Marines battalions and directed that their officers organize them for service aboard ships of war as riflemen. Historically, the size of the Marine Corps has expanded and contracted to meet the nation’s demands in times of peace and war. In the Revolutionary War period, for example, the size of shipboard detachments depended on the ship’s size to which assigned. The size of the Marine Corps depended on the missions assigned to it by Congress. Following the Revolutionary War, the new U.S. Congress determined that it could no longer afford to maintain a naval force, so both the Navy and Marine Corps disbanded between 1783-1798. The Navy and Marine Corps have continuously served the American people since 1798; their size in ships and manpower ceilings is always a matter for the Congress to decide.
Victory over Spain in 1898 was a pivotal event because it propelled a somewhat backwater United States onto the world stage and had a sudden and significant influence on the growth of the US Navy and Marine Corps. With victory over Spain came vast territorial acquisitions that included the Philippine Islands, Guam, Samoa, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. These were in addition to already existing US interests in Central America (Nicaragua and the Isthmus of Panama). Territorial acquisition meant that the United States would have to defend these faraway places, and the only service that could do that was the US Navy — challenges never imagined before 1898.
Realizing that the post-Civil War Navy was initially out of its depth in this new world order, the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) established the General Board of the Navy in 1900. The Board’s membership included the Navy’s most senior officers, men who were at the end of their careers upon whom he could rely on offering deliberate and objective analyses of world events and offering recommendations on a wide range of issues — from ship design to naval strategy and contingency planning and training. The General Board undertook the development of war plans for responding to anticipated threats against the US East Coast, the Antilles, and, eventually, the Panama Canal.
Initially, the General Board of the Navy viewed Great Britain as a “most likely” threat to American interests and sovereignty. With greater allied cooperation with the United Kingdom, however, the General Board turned its attention toward Imperial Germany, especially after Spain sold its Central Pacific territories to Imperial Germany and German military construction projects in the Pacific and coastal China. Japan’s victory over Imperial Russia in 1905 forced the US to consider conflict with the Japanese, as well.
In late 1901, the Navy General Board demanded that (then) Major General Commandant Charles Heywood develop a four-company infantry battalion for expeditionary and advanced base defense training. The Navy Board envisioned a Marine battalion that could rapidly deploy (ship to shore) in defense of American territories as part of the Asiatic Fleet and do so without awaiting the arrival of US Army units from the United States. The writings of Captain Dion Williams, (then assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence), emphasized the importance of the Navy’s ability to refuel its ships from Pacific coaling stations. Since it was incumbent upon the Navy to defend those advanced bases, the Navy turned to the Marine Corps for this purpose.
One achieves an understanding of warfare by reading history and then thinking about an event’s causes, its actors, what they did, why they did it, the mistakes they made, and the consequences of conflict. Learning how to prepare for war is a bit more complicated — often involving many years of trial and error. In 1907, a battalion under Major Eli K. Cole participated in a training exercise in Subic Bay, the Philippine Islands. It took his Marines ten weeks to set emplace 44 heavy shore battery guns. The lesson the Marine Corps learned from this exercise pointed to the wisdom of pre-staging men and material as “rapid response” elements of the naval expeditionary forces. Cole’s exercise prompted the Navy Board to recommend establishment of permanent advanced bases within the Navy’s defensive sphere.
In 1913, Major General Commandant William P. Biddle ordered a Marine Corps Advanced Base Force. He named it the 1st Advanced Force Brigade. Biddle further re-designated the Brigade’s two regiments as the Fixed Defense Regiment (under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Long) and the Mobile Defense Regiment (under Colonel George Barnett).
World events temporarily interfered with the Corps’ effort to improve the Advanced Base Force concept. In 1914, the President dispatched a Marine expeditionary force to Vera Cruz, Mexico. The Marines used this event to test and validate previously developed theories; these, in turn, providing essential lessons for ongoing developments in Marine Corps force structure.
During World War I, the 4th Marine Brigade operated as one of two brigades within the US Second Infantry Division. The 4th Marine Brigade consisted of the 5th Marine Regiment, 6th Marine Regiment, and the 6th Machine-gun Battalion. A fully deployed combat brigade was a significant increase in overall Marine Corps strength, but the American Expeditionary Force in Europe was not the only iron in the fire. HQMC formed an additional expeditionary brigade for service in the Caribbean and Central America during the so-called banana wars. In 1919-1920, post war reductions in funding forced the Marine Corps to disband several infantry regiments/separate battalions.
In 1921, Major General Commandant John A. Lejeune continued the work undertaken in previous decades — work that actually continues today. Each achievement, methodological or technological, becomes the foundation upon which new ideas emerge — and so it goes. In 1933, creating and perfecting the Advanced Base Force led to the creation of the Fleet Marine Forces (Atlantic and Pacific) — which became an integral part of the United States Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.
The primary mission of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) was the seizure and temporary defense of advanced bases, in concert with US fleet operations. In the 1920s and 1930s, the United States participated in a series of naval conferences designed to reduce the likelihood of war by limiting armaments (i.e., the size of national navies). It was, at best, a romantic assumption. The US Congress began thinking defensively, prompting a significant reduction in the size of the military services. Defense is not how the Marine Corps wins battles; senior Marine officers remained focused on offensive operations and defensive thinking had no appreciable impact on the readiness planning of the Fleet Marine Force.
The vast range of US territories and the requirement to defend them continued as a vital interest to the Navy and as a primary responsibility of the Marine Corps. A formal review of responsibilities assigned to the Army and Navy, designed to avoid duplication of effort, determined that the Army should confine itself to continental land operations. The Navy should focus its attention on the security of overseas territories and possessions.
By 1937, the Navy began to consider creating Marine Corps security detachments, particularly at vulnerable locations in the Pacific, in conjunction with Plan Orange. Initially, the Navy Board envisioned security detachments as battalion-sized organizations. In 1938, the Navy Board recommended the placement of defense battalions at Midway, Wake, and Johnston Islands —in sufficient strength and size to repel minor naval raids.
Defense battalions were coastal artillery units armed with 5-inch guns (6), anti-aircraft guns (12), machine guns (48 .30 caliber) (48 .50 caliber), searchlights (6), and sound locators (6). The Battalion’s usual complement involved 28 officers and 482 enlisted men, but a battalion’s size depended on the specific size of the area the battalion was charged to defend. Once ashore, owing to the size of naval guns, the Battalion would become “immobile.” In effect, once defense battalions assumed their positions, there would be no retreat.
Initially, the Marine Corps envisioned four defense battalions; their importance (in relation to the Marine Corps as a whole) was significant. Of the Corps’ total strength (27,000 officers and enlisted men), 9,000 Marines would serve as part of the Fleet Marine Force, and 2,844 of those would serve in defense battalions.
Defense battalions began to form in late 1939. By 7 December 1941, there were seven active battalions: the 1st, 2nd, 6th, and 7th formed at Marine Corps Base, San Diego, California; the 3rd, 4th, and 5th formed at Parris Island, South Carolina. The 5th Defense Battalion was the first such battalion to deploy to a potentially hostile shore.
Under the command of Colonel Lloyd L. Leech, the 5th Defense Battalion deployed to Iceland in June 1941 as part of the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional). In addition to the 5th Defense Battalion, the Brigade included the 6th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 10th Marines, and various other supporting units to reinforce British forces charged with blocking any German attempt to seize Iceland. To facilitate training and instruction for the American Marines, the brigade commander assented to the 5th Defense Battalion’s incorporation into the British air defense system.
Over time, it became increasingly unlikely that Germany would seize Iceland. However, while the Pacific command urgently needed the 1st Brigade, its eventual reassignment was contingent upon the arrival in Iceland US Army units to replace the Marines. Before Pearl Harbor, statutory provisions precluded the assignment of non-volunteer troops to overseas locations. Army conscripts could not serve in Iceland until a state of war existed between the United States and its adversaries. The Brigade was finally relieved by Army units in March 1942.
Of the remaining defense battalions, all but one (2nd) deployed to the Pacific before Pearl Harbor. The 2nd Defense Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Raymond E. Knapp, joined the 2nd Marine Brigade in Samoa in January 1942. Already serving in Samoa was the 7th Defense Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Lester A. Dessez. The 7th Defense Battalion was the first FMF unit to operate in the South Pacific theater of operations.
The 3rd Defense Battalion formed in late 1939. After initial training, the Battalion embarked for Pearl Harbor in April 1940. In September, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific ordered elements of the Battalion to Midway Island. The entire Battalion reformed at Midway in February 1941. In September 1941, the 6th Defense Battalion replaced the 3rd Battalion at Midway, which then returned to Hawaii and participated in defense of Pearl Harbor. Also, in Hawaii on 7 December 1941, was the 1st Defense Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Bert A. Bone, and the 4th Defense Battalion, under Colonel Harold S. Fassett.
The preceding may seem like an orderly process, but it was far from that. Moving large numbers of Marines and their heavy (and expensive) equipment is never easy, rarely tidy, and always compounded by higher headquarters. For instance, in 1939, the 1st Defense Battalion formed by renaming the 2nd Battalion, 15th Marines, and then reorganizing it, re-equipping it, and re-positioning it to serve in its new role. In February 1941, the 1st Defense Battalion arrived at Pearl Harbor from San Diego. No sooner had the Battalion arrived when higher authority split it apart into subunits and redistributed them throughout the Central Pacific. FMF Pacific (also, FMFPac) dispatched Detachment A, 1st Defense Battalion to Palmyra Island (arriving 10 March). A month later, HQMC renamed the unit “Marine Detachment, 1st Marine Defense Battalion, Palmyra Island.” Additional subunits became Marine Detachments at Johnston (mid-July) and Wake (late-July). Thus, on 7 December 1941, the 1st Defense Battalion had subunits on three atolls with their headquarters element remaining at Pearl Harbor.
By early December, Marine defense battalions defended Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, and Wake. The global war plan, then in effect, renamed “Rainbow Five,” called for the development of air bases at all these sites. After 7 December, the United States had to concede Guam (and its small naval facility) to the Japanese owing to its position in the center of the Japanese-held Marianas Island group. The Navy’s intention behind creating these small forward bases was two-fold. Samoa would help protect communication routes in the Southwest Pacific; Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake were offered for the protection of Oahu installations. None of the forward bases provided much protection, however.
At Pearl Harbor
Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor started at 0755 on 7 December 1941. The assault lasted two hours. The defense battalions offered limited (and generally ineffective) opposition to Japanese forces. This generally poor performance was not the fault of the defense battalions, however. Japan’s attack was a surprise event well-timed for Sunday morning. Accordingly, all US responses were haphazard.
Before the Japanese attack, the United States was already preparing for hostilities — albeit with only limited intelligence information. Hawaii-based commanders heard nothing from Washington beyond cautionary advice. Reacting with caution, senior commanders ordered all munitions secured at widely dispersed locations. Motor vehicles were carefully stored in are motor pools, berthed ships and parked aircraft were lined up neatly for ease of monitoring security — in case Japanese agents attempted to sabotage American military equipment. When the Japanese attacked, air defense positions had no ammunition with which to shoot down enemy planes. Within a few moments of the attack, air and ground commanders ordered munitions, but there were no vehicles available to transport it. By the time ammunition did arrive, the Japanese attack was over.
Within six minutes of the beginning of the Japanese attack, Marines from the defense battalion had machine guns set up and engaged the enemy. These were the only weapons used in the defense of Pearl Harbor. It was a bit too little.
Within mere hours after Japan’s attack, Navy and Marine commanders took steps to reinforce outlying island garrisons, rushing substantial numbers of Marines to Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra. These Marines and their equipment came from the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Defense Battalions. Midway’s assets included 17 Scout/Bombers, ferried to the island commander via the aircraft carrier USS Lexington. Once the ship returned to Pearl Harbor, additional flights were direct over-ocean movements. The distance from Pearl Harbor to Midway was 1,137 miles.
The situation on Guam was bleak. Lieutenant Colonel William K. McNulty’s 122 Marines (and 15 additional Marines serving on detached duty with the Guamanian Police Force) were overwhelmed by Japanese forces.
Johnston Island, a spec of sand in the middle of the ocean, was too small and too close to the Hawaiian Islands to risk a land assault, but it was a tempting target. Major Francis B. Loomis, serving as the 1st Defense Battalion executive officer, was present at Johnston Island when the Japanese made their move against Pearl Harbor. As the senior officer present, Loomis assumed overall command of American military assets.
The first contact the Johnson Island Marines had with the Japanese occurred on 12 December when a submarine surfaced 8,000 yards off Sand Island and began firing green star clusters, which exploded high overhead. Marines returned fire with a 5-inch gun, and the submarine withdrew. Three days later, two Japanese ships opened fire and damaged several buildings and an oil storage facility. Again, the Marines answered with a 5-inch gun, and the enemy ships withdrew before suffering any damage. On the nights of 18, 21, and 22 December, enemy submarines returned to deliver harassing fire. By the end of the month, reinforcements arrived from Hawaii, adding another 5-inch battery, another 3-inch battery, and 16 more machine guns —but the Marines heard no more from the Japanese for the duration of the war.
Palmyra Island experienced a single Japanese attack on 24 December. A Japanese submarine surfaced 3,000 yards offshore and fired its deck guns at a dredge in the lagoon. The 5-inch battery drove the submarine away. Lieutenant Colonel Bone, commanding the 1st Defense Battalion, arrived with reinforcements at the end of December. The Palmyra garrison became 1st Defensive Battalion in March. Spreading Marines all over the Central Pacific had the effect of diminishing unit cohesiveness within the defense battalions. To solve this problem, local commands absorbed the various “detachments” into their organizations.
By mid-December world attention was focused on events unfolding at Wake Island. The unfolding battle electrified everyone. On 7 December 1941, the Wake Island detachment totaled barely 400 officers and men, including 9 officers and 200 enlisted men who had only joined the detachment in the previous month. The detachment commander was Major James P. S. Devereux. The Island’s air support squadron included 12 F4F-3 Wildcats of Major Paul A. Putnam’s VMF-211 detachment, which arrived on 4 December. Putnam reported to Devereux, who reported to the Island Commander, Commander Winfield S. Cunningham, USN.
There were no optimists among the Marines of Wake Island. Devereux’s detachment was understrength; one battery of 3-inch guns was completely unmanned. Two other batteries could field only three of four guns (each), and Echo Battery had no height-finding equipment. Ground and anti-air crew-served weapons were only half manned. The detachment had no radar and no sound-locator equipment. By the time Wake Marines learned of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, VMF-211’s dawn patrol was already aloft. Putnam dispersed his remaining aircraft, and the detachment’s Marines manned their posts.
Shortly before noon on 8 December (Wake Island was in a different date-time-zone from Hawaii), 36 Japanese bombers attacked Wake Island, their bomb load mostly hitting the airstrip where seven of the eight parked Wildcats were destroyed, exploding aviation gas storage tanks, and killing 23 of the 55 enlisted aviation ground crewmen. The bombers returned each day for the next six days, always at the same time of day. Each day, the Japanese inflicted more damage and took more lives. At 0300 on 11 December, a Japanese assault force appeared offshore. Warships moved in after dawn to begin raking fire prelude to troop landings. By 0615, the Marines had severely damaged the cruiser Yubari and sunk the destroyer Havate. Additionally, Marines damaged a light cruiser, two destroyers, and a troop transport. The Japanese withdrew to Kwajalein Island.
In the following week, Marines lost an additional three aircraft to Japanese bombers, half their trucks, and engineering equipment, most of their diesel fuel and dynamite, and the motor pool, warehouse, machine shop, and the blacksmith shop was wholly destroyed. The Japanese destroyed the last two Wildcats on 22 December during aerial combat. By this time, the Marines at Wake Island were running a pool on their expected shelf-life.
At dawn on 23 December, another Japanese assault force appeared offshore. One-thousand Imperial Japanese Army and 500 Imperial Japanese Navy prepared to land on Wake Island. Marines engaged the first wave of Japanese at 0245, but none of the 5-inch guns were able to take destroyers/transports under fire. The 3-inch guns inflicted some damage, but not enough to hinder the landing. Lacking any infantry support, overwhelming Japanese forces pushed the Marines back to secondary defensive positions. Gun crews, in defending themselves, had to forsake the big guns. By 0500, the Marines realized that the dance was about over. At dawn, enemy carrier-based fighters and bombers arrived overhead. Devereux advised Cunningham that he could no longer maintain organized resistance. With Cunningham’s concurrence, Devereux surrendered his force to the Japanese landing force commander.
The story of Wilkes Island unfolded differently, however. At Wilkes, the battle raged so fiercely that at daybreak, Captain Wesley Mc. Platt not only destroyed the Japanese landing party after the initial Japanese assault, but he also reorganized his men and ordered a ruthless counterattack, killing every Japanese soldier he could find, one after another. Captain Platt was out of contact with Devereux and did not know of the surrender until around 1330 when Platt saw Devereux approaching a Japanese officer. Platt was not a happy camper, but he obeyed Major Devereux’s order to relinquish his arms to the Japanese.
Admiral Yamamoto’s plan for seizing Midway Island was typically complex. He also based his assumptions on faulty intelligence. He believed that only two aircraft carriers were available to the Pacific Fleet after the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942. After the repair of USS Yorktown, the Navy had three carriers: Enterprise, Hornet, and Yorktown. He also misread the morale of the US Armed Forces and the general American population. Admiral Yamamoto was a crafty fellow, but he did not know that the Americans had broken the naval code. The key for the Americans was learning that the Japanese designation of Midway Island was JN-25.
Lieutenant Colonel Harold D. Shannon ordered his 6th Defense Battalion to “general quarters” as soon as he learned of the Japanese attack at Wake Island. It was a sensibly prudent order, but its effect was that it kept his Marines on edge for an extended period. No action developed that day, but shortly after dark, the Japanese destroyers Akebono and Ushio arrived offshore. Their mission was to harass the Island’s defenders and determine the placement of Marine shore batteries. Two Japanese rounds hit the Island’s power plant and disrupted the communications center. As the two ships set up for their second run into the beach, Shannon ordered his Marines to engage enemy targets at will. Battery A’s 5-inch guns remained silent due to the break down in communications, but Battery B and Battery D opened up with their 5-inch naval artillery and 3-inch anti-aircraft guns. The .50 caliber machine-guns fired once the destroyers were within range. The Japanese ships withdrew shortly afterward.
Reinforcements and resupply soon arrived from Hawaii. Among the heavy weapons were 7-inch guns removed from World War I ships that had been in storage for many years. Midway Island was well-armed and adequately manned to repel an enemy assault; the American defenders responded to several Japanese probing raids early in 1942. Aviation assets at Midway included both Navy and Marine Corps combat aircraft. The Navy had four PBY squadrons (31 Patrol planes), and six Grumman TBF Avengers from VT-8. Marine Corps aircraft included Scout/Bomber squadron VMSB-231 (17 SB2U-3 Vindicators), and the remainder of VMF-221 (arriving at Midway from USS Saratoga with 14 F2A-3 Brewster Buffaloes). Following the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Pacific Fleet quickly replaced lost aircrews with additional Navy and Marine Corps air squadrons.
In May 1942, FMFPac reinforced the 6th Defense Battalion with three additional 3-inch batteries, a 37-mm anti-aircraft battery, a 20-mm anti-aircraft battery, and two rifle companies from the 2nd Raider Battalion with five light tanks in direct support. FMFPac ordered all Marine aircraft at Midway consolidated under Marine Aircraft Group (MAG)-22. The MAG received 16 SMD-2 Dauntless Diver Bombers and seven Grumman Wildcat fighters.
As the Battle of Midway Island began on 4 June 1942, it became apparent that the defense of the atoll was of secondary importance to the air engagements at sea, but Midway was the bait that had drawn Yamamoto’s task forces within range of US carrier aircraft. The Marines ashore were, however, ready for any eventuality. PBYs from Midway first spotted Japanese naval units at 0900 on 3 June. Army B-17s launched that afternoon to bomb the Japanese fleet, but none of the bombs hit their targets. At 0545 on 4 June, Navy PBYs fixed an approaching air assault position consisting of over 100 Japanese torpedo, dive bombers, and escort fighters (numbers estimated). US aircraft were in the air within ten minutes to intercept them. Japanese Zeros easily destroyed Marine buffaloes, but not without losing several bombers and fighters of their own. The survivors arrived over Midway at around 0630. The Japanese attacked lasted thirty minutes. Marine anti-air defenses claimed ten kills and seemed anti-climactic, but Japan’s air assault was what the Navy fleet commander wanted. As these planes returned to their carriers, US aircraft followed them.
The Battle of Midway’s significance was that it signaled the end of the United States’ defensive war and the beginning of America’s offensive. In these early days of a long war, the Defense Battalions’ Marines had played their role and contributed to the war effort. With the arrival of additional Marines, most of whom had enlisted after the attack on Pearl Harbor, many found their way into the Defense Battalions. By the end of 1942, the Marine Corps had 14 defense battalions. Two years later, there were twenty such battalions.
Guadalcanal and beyond
The assault of Guadalcanal was the first American land offensive in the Pacific war. The 3rd Defense Battalion provided support to the 1st Marine Division’s landing. The landing force commander split the Battalion to support simultaneous operations at Guadalcanal and Tulagi. The Battalion’s machine-gun sections and 90-mm anti-aircraft guns went ashore in the first assault waves. Similarly, the 9th Defense Battalion supported the assault on the Munda Peninsula in July 1943. By this time, defense battalions employed 155-mm and 40-mm guns. On Vella Lavella, the 4th Defense Battalion’s 90-mm gun was the Japanese pilot’s worst nightmare. Both the 9th and 14th Defense Battalion went ashore with the landing forces at Guam in 1944. When Japanese aircraft were no longer capable of threatening Marine occupied terrain, senior officers decided that the battalions had served their purpose. HQMC disbanded most defense battalions after the war —but one (sort of) remains today. One Marine responsibility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is to defend the naval base. This mission is similar to that of the World War II-era defense battalion.
Cole, E. K. Advanced Base Force Training. Philadelphia: 1915.
Davis, H. C. Advanced Place Training. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1911.
Jackson, R. H. History of the Advanced Base. Records of the General Board of the Navy, 1913.
Jackson, R. H. The Naval Advanced Base. Records of the General Board of the Navy, 1915.
McBride, W. M. Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.
Millett, A. R. Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps. New York: The Free Press, 1991.
Simmons, E. H. The United States Marines: A History. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1974.
 Eli Kelley Cole (1867-1929) graduated from the US Naval Academy in 1888, served as a naval officer for two years, and transferred to the US Marine Corps in 1890. In 1915, Cole, Williams, Earl H. Ellis, John H. Russell, and Robert H. Dunlap were the Marine Corps’ deepest thinkers. While commanding the 1st Provisional Brigade in Haiti, he received the Navy Cross Medal. He later commanded the US Army’s 41st Infantry Division during World War I, and served as the first Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. He passed away while still serving on active duty.
 Designated 2nd Regiment, Advance Base Brigade on 18 February 1914 (today, 1st Marines).
 Designated 1st Regiment, Advance Base Brigade on 18 February 1914 (today, 2nd Marines).
 Fleet exercises were important rehearsals in the development of amphibious warfare and the establishment of advanced base defenses, including the art and science of loading/un-loading ships, transfer of equipment from ship to shore, employment of shore artillery, signal science, combat engineering, harbor construction/defense, and the employment of automatic weapons.
 Colonel Dessez’ also formed and trained the 1st Samoan Battalion (infantry) (territorial reserve).
 One of Putnam’s flight officers was Captain Frank C. Tharin, a graduate of the US Naval Academy (1934). While serving on Wake Island, Tharin distinguished himself through his courage and aeronautical skill against overwhelming Japanese air forces. He was a recipient of the Distinguished Flying Cross, Silver Star Medal, and two Air Medals. Tharin spend the war in a Japanese POW camp. I worked for LtGen Tharin in 1968 at a time when Tharin served as the Operations Deputy to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. General Tharin passed away in 1990.
 Wesley McCoy Platt survived the war as a POW. The United States subsequently awarded him the Silver Star Medal, Legion of Merit, and Purple Heart Medal. During the Korean War, Colonel Platt died of wounds while serving on the staff of Major General Oliver P. Smith, USMC, who commanded the 1st Marine Division at the Chosin Reservoir.
 Warfare is by its nature complex; overly complicated war plans simply increase the likelihood of failure at critical moments of the battle.
 First Lieutenant George H. Cannon, a communications officer, received severe wounds from Japanese guns but he refused evacuation until the communications center was once more up and running. Cannon died shortly afterwards. He received the Medal of Honor posthumously, the first Marine to receive the nation’s highest medal during World War II.
 The round of the 90-mm gun weighed 23 pounds. It had a maximum range of 39,500 feet.
Lott, Texas is a small town in Falls County. The settlement began in 1889 with the construction of the San Antonio & Aransas Pass Railroad. The town was named after Uriah Lott, who at the time was president of the railroad company. In 1889, the settlement involved a total of around two-hundred folks. They were church-going people, as evidenced by the fact that Lott, Texas had three churches in 1892. There were also two cotton gins, and two gristmills. In 1892, there were 350 people living in Lott and by then the town had a weekly newspaper. In eight more years, the town had grown to 1,200 citizens. Besides those working for the railroad, there were local farmers who raised corn and cotton.
But Lott was typical of small Texas towns. Economic conditions were meager, and folks scratched out their existence through hard work barely rewarded. And, as with most other Texas communities, the Great Depression took its toll and people began to move away. In 1930, only 650 people were recorded living there in the national census. Roosevelt’s Public Works Administration helped, of course. Government subsidies encouraged diversification from farming into stock raising and truck farming. Even now, though, economic opportunities are limited, and the town relies heavily on the speed trap along State Highway 44/US Highway 77. In 2010, 759 people lived in Lott, Texas.
One of its citizens, born and raised for a time in Lott, was John Wilson Hoffman. One of four children, John was born in 1922. His parents, John Wilson Hoffman, Sr., and Sadie Hoffman, moved their family to Houston in 1929. John graduated from Stephen F. Austin High School in the class of 1940 and the 18-year old went to work for Lindle Air Products Company as a shipping clerk. In August 1942, John was 20-years-old, the nation was at war, and the young patriot John Wilson Hoffman, Jr. joined the United States Marine Corps.
After recruit training, the Marines assigned Hoffman to the 18th Marine Regiment — combat engineers with the 2nd Marine Division. The regiment was not slated to participate in the Battle of Guadalcanal, but the 6th Marine Regiment was organizing and needed men to fill their ranks. In mid-December 1942, John Hoffman was one of several dozen engineers transferred to the 6th Marines and Hoffman ended up in Lima Company, 3/6. The regiment shipped out to New Zealand for pre-combat training.
The ladies of New Zealand are lovely to look at, and young Marines are easy to fall in love — as did John W. Hoffman, and he was so much in love with his New Zealand lassie that he didn’t want to leave her. When 3/6 sailed for the Solomon Islands, John was not among them. In fact, no one saw Hoffman again until 7 January 1943, when he surrendered to New Zealand police in Wellington.
When 3/6 returned from Guadalcanal in late February 1943, Hoffman was waiting for them at Camp Russell. Hoffman received a court-martial for missing his movement. During war, this is a serious offense — but it could have been worse. Had his superiors charged him with desertion in time of war, he may have faced a death penalty. Hoffman was found guilty of “missing movement,” and sentenced to ninety days in the brig. He was also fined $15.00 per month for three months. It doesn’t seem like much of a fine, but Hoffman was only making $50/month in 1943.
After three months of confinement in a Marine Corps brig, Hoffman was a changed man. Upon release, he returned to his unit, stayed out of trouble, and applied himself to combat training. His transformation from a love-starved puppy to a fighting grunt was so impressive that his company commander promoted him to Private First Class (PFC).
John Hoffman had become a “squared away” Marine. When Lima Company mustered for their next combat assignment, John Hoffman was present and accounted for. What no one in Lima Company knew was that their next assignment would take them to a tiny atoll in the middle of a very large ocean. The atoll had a name — Tarawa. The island was Betio.
Far above the station of mere privates, America’s war planners had been looking for an air base capable of supporting operations across the mid-Pacific — to the Philippines in the South, and to Japan in the North. The need for advanced bases led these war planners to focus their attention on the Mariana Islands, which at the time were heavily defended by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. Before the US could seize the Marianas group, they would have to control the Marshall Islands, but the Marshalls were cut off from direct communications with Hawaii by a Japanese garrison on the small island of Betio, on the western side of the Tarawa Atoll in the Gilbert Islands. Before the Americans could concentrate on the Mariana Islands, they would have to neutralize the Japanese on Betio.
Betio Island is Tarawa’s largest. It is located about 2,400 miles southwest of Pearl Harbor. Despite its size on the atoll, it is infinitesimally small. It is a flat island, two miles long, triangle shaped, and at its widest point, only 800 yards from shore to shore.
If Evans Carlson’s diversionary raid at Makin Island accomplished anything at all, besides getting good Marines killed, it was that it sent a signal to the Imperial Japanese that their Island defenses were vulnerable to American attack — and that the Americans viewed the Gilbert Islands as an important objective.
Thus warned, the Japanese reinforced Betio with its 6th Special Landing Force (Japanese Marines). In total, the Japanese island commander, Rear Admiral Tomonari Saichiro, commanded 5,000 defenders. An experienced engineer, Saichiro directed the construction of the Betio defenses. Saichiro’s plan was to stop the Americans before they reached the island’s shore; and if that failed, then to make the American’s pay dearly for their audacity. The Evans Carlson gave the Japanese a year to perfect Betio Island’s defenses.
The Gilbert Islands campaign was the largest invasion force yet assembled for a single operation in the Pacific. There were seventeen aircraft carriers, twelve battleships, twelve cruisers, sixty-six destroyers, and thirty-six troop transports. Aboard the transports were the 2nd Marine Division and the US 27th Infantry Division — totaling 35,000 troops. The Marines began their assault at 0900 on 20 November 1943. The 6th Marines, under the command of Colonel Maurice G. Holmes, would dedicate the 1st Battalion (William K. Jones, commanding) and 3rd Battalion (Kenneth F. McLeod, commanding) in the third and fourth wave assaults at Green Beach.
It was at Green Beach, during the fourth wave attack, that Private First Class John Wilson Hoffman, Jr., met his end. As Lima Company moved up to relieve elements of the 1st Battalion, an enemy bullet found Hoffman and instantly killed him. The Marines of Lima Company gently laid his body to rest along with thirty other members of his company. They did their best to mark the grave site as lethal battle raged around them and the Marines continued to move forward under heavy Japanese resistance. It was a horrific battle. The movement of tanks, artillery, and troops soon obliterated the grave marker.
As with so many other Marines who died at Betio over a period of 72-hours — 1,009 killed, 2,101 wounded — the Marine Corps eventually notified Hoffman’s parents that their son’s remains were unrecoverable. History Flight recovered John Hoffman’s body, where it had lain undisturbed on Betio Island for 76 years. John Hoffman finally came back home to Texas in the spring of 2020. There was no one left alive in John’s family who remembered him.
Some gave all.
Alexander, J. H. Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995.
Graham, M. B. Mantle of Heroism: Tarawa and the Struggle for the Gilberts. Presidio Press, 1998.
Hammel, E. & J. E. Lane. Bloody Tarawa. Zenith Press, 1998.
Smith, H. M. Coral and Brass. New York: Scribeners & Sons, 1949.
 The 2nd Battalion (Raymond G. Murray, commanding) was assigned to assault and occupy the outer islands of Tarawa. Murray later commanded the 5th Marines during the Battle of the Pusan Perimeter during the Korean War and in that capacity, participated in the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir. Both Jones and Murray achieved flag rank with Jones retiring as a lieutenant general and Murray as a major general.
 History Flight is a privately operated non-profit organization dedicated to researching, recovering, and repatriating the remains of American servicemen from World War II through the Vietnam War period. Since 2003, History Flight has recovered 130 missing servicemen in both the ETO and PTO. John Hoffman’s remains were one of these.
One could refer to this incident as the last episode of the Vietnam War, but doing so would only present half the picture. Cambodia was also involved — and Laos — and China, and the Soviet Union. We could probably call it a Southeast Asian War or the Third Indochina War. But no matter what one chooses to call it, by mid-May 1975, the American people were gut-wrenchingly tired of Southeast Asia.
In over 25 years of direct or indirect combat operations, the American people gave up 58,000 of their sons, daughters, brothers, sisters, husbands, wives, fathers, and mothers. Seventy-five thousand Americans sustained severe wounds; of those, more than 23,000 were permanently disabled, including five thousand who lost limbs and over a thousand multiple amputees.
Beyond this, the United States government squandered the nation’s wealth — with untold billions spent shoring up French Imperialism, bribing Vietnamese officials, bombing North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In the final analysis, the United States of America walked away from the entire episode with nothing to show for its mind-numbing costs. Not one presidential administration, from Harry S. Truman to Gerald Ford, had any intention of winning that war.
In the middle of May 1975, just weeks after the fall of Saigon, the Khmer Rouge (Cambodian Reds) “coast guard” seized a United States flagged ship named SS Mayaguez. Following Phnom Penh’s fall on 17 April, the communists moved to control Cambodia, including its offshore islands. Khmer Rouge and (north) Vietnamese forces clashed over territory claimed by both countries. Operating in defense of Cambodian territory, the Khmer navy/coast guard instituted coastal patrolling to prevent Vietnamese incursions — and because of their belief that the CIA used merchant shipping to conduct intelligence-gathering operations along coastal areas.
Within this tense environment, the Khmer navy captured seven Thai fishing boats on 2 May and charged them with territorial violations. They also pursued a South Korean freighter on 4 May. On 7 May, the Khmer navy seized a Panamanian-flagged ship near the island of Poulo Wai and questioned its crew for more than 36 hours. Five days later, the Khmer navy fired on a Swedish vessel in the same area. On that same day, the Khmer Rouge dispatched a company-sized unit to occupy Poulo Wai. None of the merchant ships operating off the coast of Cambodia knew about this transfer.
Cambodia asserted its sovereignty twelve nautical miles outward from the shoreline of its mainland and all claimed islands — and had done so since 1969. In 1975, Poulo Wai Island was a potential site for oil exploration, explaining Cambodia’s sensitivity to foreign trespass. The US had no interest in Poulo Wai other than suppressing what it believed to be a base for Cambodian pirates’ operations.
On 12 May, the US container ship SS Mayaguez (owned by Sea-Land, Inc.) transited near Poulo Wai en route from Hong Kong to Sattahip, Thailand. At 1418, a Khmer navy swift boat approached Mayaguez and fired a shot across her bow. Seven Khmer Rouge seamen boarded Mayaguez and ordered the captain to proceed to Poulo Wai. The ship transmitted a mayday, which was picked up by an Australian vessel. Mayaguez was carrying 107 cargo containers, 77 of which were US government and military cargo — including material from the United States Embassy in Saigon.
SS Mayaguez’ SOS call prompted notification to the US Embassy Jakarta, which transmitted the information to the National Military Command Center in Washington. The National Security staff notified President Ford of the incident the next morning (Washington time). Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger urged Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to direct the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command, Admiral Noel Gayler, to launch a reconnaissance aircraft to locate Mayaguez — but even before any analysis of photographs, Kissinger and Deputy National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft had already decided that the crisis deserved a decisive response. In the wake of the United States’ recent withdrawal from Cambodia and Vietnam, both Kissinger and Scowcroft believed that the US’s reputation was at stake. Presidential advisors also wanted to avoid another USS Pueblo incident. President Ford directed Kissinger to petition China for its help in releasing the Mayaguez.
President Ford and Kissinger drafted a press release to the American public stating that the seizure of a US-flagged ship was an act of piracy. Technically, it was no such thing. Meanwhile, Secretary Schlesinger ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to locate the ship and undertake measures to prevent its movement to the Cambodian mainland. Kissinger sent a terse note to the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington demanding the “immediate release” of the ship and its crew. The Chinese liaison office refused to accept the message, however — apparently, the Chinese were not in the mood for accepting demands from a country recently defeated by a nation of rice farmers.
In compliance with Schlesinger’s instructions, the Pacific command launched aerial reconnaissance missions from the Philippines and Thailand and diverted the USS Coral Sea from its course en route to Australia. Pacific Command also dispatched a guided-missile destroyer with escort toward Mayaguez’s last known location. Admiral Gayler also issued a warning order to the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), placing them on standby. III MEF passed the mission through the 3rd Marine Division to the 9th Marine Regiment on Okinawa and to the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines (1/4) at Subic Bay, Philippine Islands. As a rapid reaction company from 1/4 assembled at Cubi Point Naval Air Station for possible airlift to Thailand, a Battalion Landing Team (BLT) from the 9th Marines began its pre-deployment procedures on Okinawa.
On 13 May, an Orion aircraft identified a significant radar return near Poulo Wai and dropped flares on the suspected location of Mayaguez. Young Khmer Rouge sailors, believing that they were under attack, opened fire. Both photo-reconnaissance aircraft, already low on fuel, withdrew. Replacement aircraft also received gunfire from Khmer ground forces.
Within a few hours after seizing the ship, the Khmer navy officials ordered the master of the Mayaguez, Captain Miller, to get underway. He was instructed to follow a swift boat toward the Northeast. Orion aircraft continued to track the ship’s movement. Admiral Gayler ordered the Commanding General, 7th US Air Force, Lieutenant General John J. Burns, USAF, to assume operational control over US military recovery efforts. Burns marshaled rotary-wing aircraft for a possible air assault mission.
A flight of two F-111’s marked the ship’s position, which was then nearing Koh Tang Island. Soon after, F-4 Phantoms arrived and began firing into the water ahead of Mayaguez, indicating to Captain Miller that he was to halt. It was then that the Khmer naval commander ordered the ship’s crew into two fishing boats for transfer to Koh Tang Island.
Meanwhile, the Navy’s flotilla — Coral Sea, Holt, and Wilson — signaled that they would not arrive on station until 15 May. None of these ships carried a Marine landing force. USS Hancock (CVA-19), with a small contingent of Marines, would not arrive until 16 May, and USS Okinawa (LPH-3), with a BLT, would not arrive until 18 May.
On Okinawa, III MAF assigned the Special Landing Force (Task Force 79.9) to recover Mayaguez. Company D, 1/4 was designated as the unit that would actually take Mayaguez, but General Burns wanted a more significant force. Ultimately, the 3rdMarDiv assigned BLT 2/9 as its air assault force. The battalion flew to Thailand on the morning of 14 May. Only a few of the 1,100 officers and NCOs of 2/9 had any combat experience.
Seventh US Air Force earmarked nineteen of its helicopters to participate in the air assault. Nine of these were HH-53C (Jolly Green) aircraft, and ten were CH-53s. The HH-bird was capable of aerial refueling; the CH-53 was not. Meanwhile, General Burns developed a plan to re-take Mayaguez with an assault force from the 56th Security Police Squadron. He intended to drop 75 SPS volunteers on the containers aboard the ship on 14 May.
En route to Cambodia’s Southeast coastal region, one of the CH-53s (call sign Knife 13) crashed, killing all on board (18 police and five crewmen). President Ford subsequently canceled General Burns’ plan because, beyond the loss of one aircraft and 23 men, these large helicopters were too heavy to land on shipping containers. Instead, President Ford decided to await the arrival of the Navy and Marines. However, President Ford ordered Burns to stop any Cambodian boats moving between Koh Tang and the mainland.
Early on 14 May, at Koh Tang, the Khmer navy loaded the Mayaguez crew onto a fishing vessel and, with an escort of two swift boats, headed toward the mainland at Kampong Som. Air Force F-4s, A-7s, and an AC-130 gunship sunk one fast boat and convinced another to turn back. Orbiting pilots reported the presence of 30 to 40 Caucasians on the fishing boat. One senior pilot opined that he might be able to shoot the rudder off the fishing boat to stop its progress.
By this time, communicators had established a link between the White House situation room, the Pacific Command in Hawaii, and General Burns’ headquarters at Nakhon Phanom. General Burns relayed the pilot’s idea for shooting off the fishing boat’s rudder to the White House, which NSC staffers immediately denied. Ford decided that if anything, the Air Force should only drop tear gas onto the fishing boat but gave the go-ahead to sink all patrol boats.
Acting JCS Chairman, U. S. Air Force General David C. Jones, provided the NSC staff with a range of military options. One major complication for the rescue operation was that no one knew for certain the Mayaguez crewmen’s location. There was a long list of things the forward area commander didn’t know.
The NSC decided to proceed with a Marine assault to retake Mayaguez with a simultaneous attack by Air Force and Navy assets on Koh Tang and against Khmer naval vessels.
The Air Force’s tear gas assault did not affect the fishing boat, and it proceeded to Kampong Som. Upon arrival, the ranking Khmer area commander wisely refused to allow the boat to dock; he anticipated a massive retaliatory attack by American aircraft. The redirected fishing boat proceeded to Koh Rang Sanloem undetected by orbiting aircraft.
Marines from Delta Company 1/4 arrived in Thailand during the early-morning hours of 14 May; insofar as the American high command knew, the Cambodians detained crew members at Kampong Som, so higher authority canceled the planned assault on Mayaguez. Delta Company Marines did what they always do … they waited for someone higher on the totem pole to make up their minds. Meanwhile, Marines from BLT 2/9 began arriving at U-Tapao, Thailand.
That afternoon, President Ford ordered General Burns to proceed with a simultaneous assault on Koh Tang and Mayaguez; the assault would begin at sunrise on 15 May. Since the Americans had no information about Koh Tang, the 2/9 Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Randall W. Austin, and his operations officer boarded a Beechcraft U-21 to conduct aerial reconnaissance of the island.
The problem with Colonel Austin’s aerial reconnaissance was that he could not get close enough to the island to see anything worthwhile without compromising the upcoming assault. All Colonel Austin could tell about Koh Tang for sure was that heavy jungle foliage covered the island and that there were only three (potential) landing zones for an air assault. He found two of these on the northern section of the island, which he designated East Beach and West Beach, and another beach located center of the island’s eastern shore. The center beach was too narrow for vertical assault operations.
From photographs taken by reconnaissance flights, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimated an enemy footprint of between 150-200 Khmer Rouge with heavy weapons. Colonel Austin never received this information; he proceeded with his planning on the generally held assumption that only a small number of Khmer navy irregulars were on the island.
Austin planned a two-company air assault, assigning the mission to Company E and Company G (Echo and Golf) 2/9. They would fly to Koh Tang aboard three USAF CH-53s and three USAF HH-53Cs to seize and hold Koh Tang. Two additional helicopters would make a diversionary thrust toward West Beach; the main assault would occur at East Beach. From that East Beach, Austin planned to proceed to a small compound believed to be the location of Mayaguez’s crewmen. Flight time from U-Tapao to Koh Tang was two hours.
Fifty-seven Marines from Delta Company 1/4, including a detachment of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technicians, a team of volunteers from the Military Sealift Command, and a Cambodian linguist, were transferred by helicopter to USS Holt, from which they would re-take Mayaguez.
Acting JCS Chairman Jones briefed President Ford and the NSC Staff on the operation plan. Jones wanted to incorporate B-52s from Guam in bombing Kampong Som and the Ream Naval Base, but the president believed the B-52s were “excessive” and limited aerial bombing to carrier-based aircraft. With that modification, President Ford approved the operation and gave the go-ahead.
None of the Mayaguez crewmen were at Koh Tang. Moreover, island defenses included around 150 Khmer defenders. These troops had not been placed on Koh Tang to counter an American assault but rather to prevent a Vietnamese takeover of the island. The island’s commander had set up two heavy machine gun emplacements on East Beach with interlocking fires and well-developed defensive positions every twenty or so meters behind a sand berm. The commander also set up one heavy machine gun at West Beach and armed those defenders with RPGs, 75-mm recoilless rifles, and mortars.
Meanwhile, the senior Khmer commander at Rong Sang Lem interviewed Captain Miller. Miller was asked to contact the American military and persuade them to call off their anticipated attack; the Cambodian did not want an engagement with the Americans. Miller told this commander that if he could return to the ship, restart her engines, it may be possible to contact his company in Bangkok, and they, in turn, could communicate with the US military. The Cambodian military commander decided to return Captain Miller and nine of his crew to the ship the following day.
The operation to retake Mayaguez occurred the next morning, beginning at about 0600. Delta Company Marines successfully conducted one of the few hostile ship-to-ship boarding operations since the American Civil War; the ship was secure within an hour.
On to Koh Tang
At about the same time, eight USAF helicopters approached the Koh Tang landing zones. At West Beach, the first helicopter section (two aircraft) to arrive received heavy machine gunfire. The aircraft with call-sign Knife 21 safely offloaded its Marines, but enemy fire destroyed one of its engines. After disembarking the Marines, Knife 21 struggled into the air only to ditch two miles offshore. Inbound Knife 22 also received damage while in-flight, forcing it to withdraw with Marines still on board — including the Gulf Company commander.
Thirty minutes later, CH-53s approached East Beach and encountered intense automatic weapons and RPG fire. Knife 31 was hit by two RPGs, causing it to crash in a ball of fire fifty meters offshore. The aircraft’s co-pilot, five Marines, and two Navy corpsmen were killed in the crash; another Marine drowned while swimming away from the wreck. Three additional Marines were killed by Khmer automatic weapons while trying to reach the shoreline. Ten surviving Marines and three USAF crewmen were forced to swim for two hours before being rescued from the sea. Among the surviving Marines was the battalion’s forward air controller, who used a USAF survival radio to call in A-7 strikes against the enemy position — doing so until the radio’s batteries failed.
An RPG hit Knife 23, which blew off the aircraft’s tail section, causing it to crash land on East Beach. Twenty Marines and five aircraft crewmen safely exited the aircraft and set up a hasty defensive perimeter. Knife 23’s co-pilot used his survival radio to direct airstrikes. This group remained cut off for twelve hours.
Knife 32, inbound to East Beach, was hit by an RPG and aborted its landing. After dumping his fuel, the pilot proceeded to rescue three of Knife 21’s crewmen. The remaining inbound helicopters were diverted from East Beach to West Beach and landed their Marines; an AC-130 gunship, call-sign Specter, was called in to suppress Cambodian defensive fires. Knife 32, Jolly 41, and Jolly 42 eventually landed 81 Marines on West Beach. Gulf Company’s executive officer assumed command; Jolly 43 landed 29 Marines a half-mile further southwest.
By 0700, 109 Marines and five USAF crewmen were on Koh Tang, but in three isolated beach areas, each in close contact with Khmer Rouge defenders. Marines on the northern end of West Beach attempted to link up with Colonel Austin’s command element but were beaten back by overwhelming enemy fire. Lance Corporal Ashton Loney lost his life in this attempt. Although isolated, the Marines could employ their 81-mm mortars for fire support, and communicators set up a makeshift radio net for directing air support operations.
An effort to extract the Marines on East Beach failed when Jolly 13 received severe damage in the attempt; with fuel lines ruptured, the aircraft flew to Rayong, Thailand. Of the eight birds assaulting Koh Tang, enemy fire destroyed three and damaged five birds sufficiently to remove them from further operations. Because only three helicopters of the assault force remained operational, two aircraft initially assigned to sea and rescue operations, Knife 51 and Knife 52, became part of the airlift element. These five birds picked up the second wave of the Marine assault force and headed back toward Koh Tang. Enemy fire damaged the fuel lines of Knife 52, which had to abort its landing; Knife 41 and Jolly 43 likewise aborted their landings and remained in a holding pattern offshore.
Meanwhile, Cambodia’s press minister announced that the crew of Mayaguez would be released and went further to explain why the ship had been “detained” in the first place. The White House then engaged the Cambodian government in a war of press releases. President Ford immediately took credit for the release of Mayaguez crew members when their release had nothing to do with Ford. Meanwhile, the president ordered airstrikes to continue until the successful withdrawal of the assault force.
Acting JCS Chairman Jones determined that since the Mayaguez’s crew had been returned to US control, there was no reason to reinforce the Marines at Koh Tang. The JCS notified all American forces to “ceasefire” and withdraw. General Burns ordered the return of Austin’s second wave, but Austin convinced him that reinforcements were needed to prevent the Khmer Rouge from overrunning the Marine positions. Austin ordered an additional one hundred additional Marines ashore. At that point, there were 225 Americans on Koh Tang, 205 Marines on West Beach, and 20 Marines and five airmen at East Beach.
By 1400, enemy fire at West Beach had diminished substantially; the Khmer defenders’ main force had moved back from the shoreline with a minimal force remaining to keep pressure on the Marines. Colonel Austin contacted the airborne command post for permission to push across the northern end of the Island to link up with the isolated Marines at East Beach. He was advised to hold until another helicopter extraction attempt was made. Jolly 11 and Jolly 43 made their attempt at 1415 but were repulsed by heavy fire. Jolly 43 was forced to land aboard the Coral Sea. Jolly 43’s pilot reported that he had received fire from one of the swift boats partially sunk the previous day. A-7’s soon arrived to destroy the boat.
At 1610, a USAF OV-10, call-sign Nail 68, arrived to take over air support functions above Koh Tang. The arrival of Nail 68 was the first time the Marines had dedicated overhead fire support direction. At 1700, the Khmer Rouge commander moved his men back to a previously established ammo dump. Thus, resupplied with ammunition, the Khmer Rouge could re-engage the Marines. At 1815, Jolly 11, though sustaining battle damage, was able to extract the Marines and airmen from East Beach. Once the bird was clear, a C-130 dropped a daisy-cutter 15,000-pound bomb on the area of East Beach. The bomb’s massive shockwave extended over the Marines at West Beach. Colonel Austin directed that no more such bombs be employed, as they endangered his Marines.
In the darkness of the night, Knife 51, Jolly 43 (hastily repaired), Jolly 44 (brought online from a repair facility at Nakhom Phanom) began extracting the Marines from West Beach. Knife 51 extracted forty-one Marines and flew them to the Coral Sea. Jolly 43 extracted fifty-four Marines. As Jolly 44 picked up forty-four Marines, the 66 remaining Marines came under intensive Khmer fire and were in danger of being overrun.
The flight time to Coral Sea was around thirty minutes; to shorten the extraction time, First Lieutenant Robert Blough, USAF, delivered his Marines to USS Holt, which in a moonless night was a difficult maneuver. Once the Marines had been offloaded, Blough returned to Koh Tang and picked up an additional thirty-four Marines. Lieutenant Blough, whose aircraft began experiencing mechanical issues, flew the Marines to Coral Sea.
At 2000, Knife 51 landed and began loading Marines in the dark. The only light available came from the muzzle flashes of enemy weapons. Captain Davis and Gunnery Sergeant McNemar began combing the beach, looking for stragglers. USAF Technical Sergeant Wayne Fisk stood on the ramp of his aircraft as two additional Marines appeared from the brush. Fisk asked Davis if all his Marines were accounted for; Davis replied in the affirmative. Nevertheless, Fisk combed the beach one last time, looking for stragglers and finding none, Knife 51 launched for the Coral Sea.
Because of the intensive enemy fire and no way to communicate with the Khmer defenders, the bodies of Marines and airmen killed in action were left where they fell, including LCpl Loney at West Beach.
As the Air Force birds pulled Marines off the beach, the Marine’s defensive perimeter was contracted to facilitate force protection. Lance Corporal John S. Standfast, the squad leader of the third squad, third platoon, Echo Company, provided cover for Gulf Company during its withdrawal; Standfast directed the pullback of his own men. As his men contracted, he and platoon guide Sergeant Anderson continually checked to account for all hands. Before boarding his extraction helicopter, the Echo Company commander, Captain Mike Stahl, informed Captain Davis from Gulf Company that all his men were inside the perimeter. Captain Stahl did not realize that three Marines of one of his machine gun teams had set up a firing position behind a rocky outcrop beyond the perimeter’s right flank.
As Knife 51 lifted off, Marines began insisting that some of the men were missing. Knife 51’s pilot, First Lieutenant Brims, radioed the FAC that he believed there were still Marines on the island. Captain Davis assured the FAC that all Marines were off-island. Two hours later, Captain Stahl discovered three of his Marines were missing: Lance Corporal Joe Hargrove, Private First Class Gary Hall, and Private Danny Marshall — the machine gun team — were missing. Sergeant Anderson was the last to see these Marines alive when he ordered them back to the shrinking perimeter.
At 2020, USAF Staff Sergeant Robert Veilie at the airborne command post received a radio transmission from an unidentified American asking when the next helicopter was coming to pick them up. Veilie authenticated the transmission and radioed to advise Holt that Marines were still on the island. Holt instructed Veilie to pass the instruct the Marines to swim out to sea where they could be rescued. The Marines declined because only one of the three Marines could swim. Veilie advised the caller to take cover since airstrikes were scheduled at their likely position. After acknowledging Veilie’s instructions, whomever Veilie talked to went off the air, and no more was heard from him.
Aboard Coral Sea, the Commander, Task Force 73, Rear Admiral Robert P. Coogan, met with Colonel Austin, Commander Coulter, who had just arrived from Subic Bay with a 14-man Seal Team, Captain Davis, and Gunnery Sergeant McNemar to discuss possible courses of action. Admiral Coogan suggested that Coulter take the Wilson’s gig ashore at first light with a white flag to see if he could recover the remains of those killed in action and any possible stragglers. Coulter was cool to the idea; he preferred taking his men ashore for a nighttime reconnaissance. Coogan refused this notion; his orders from COMSEVENTHFLT were to cease hostilities — and he had no confirmation that these “missing” men were still alive. Despite Wilson’s efforts to spot Marines between East Beach and West Beach, which included cruising offshore and loudspeaker announcements in English and Cambodian, there was no indication that the three Marines were still alive. Moreover, Coogan was certain more lives would be lost during any forced rescue attempt.
On 16 May, Hargrove, Hall, and Marshall were declared “missing in action.” On 21 July 1976, all three Marines were reported Killed in Action, bodies not recovered.
Except — they weren’t.
In 1999, the Khmer Rouge commander at Koh Tang Island approached the Joint Task Force for Full Accounting, who advertised that they were looking for additional information about Koh Tang’s event. The man’s name was Em Son. According to his memory, on the morning of 16 May, he ordered his men to search the West Beach for any remaining Americans. Around a hundred meters into the search, one of the Khmer defenders was hit by M-16 fire. The Cambodians fired mortars into the area and captured a wounded Marine. Em Son’s description of the man matched that of Joseph Hargrove. The Cambodians continued their search and located an abandoned M60 machine gun and other various equipment. A few minutes later, the Khmer discovered the body of a black Marine, believed to be LCpl Loney. They buried Loney and took their wounded prisoner to Em Son. When the wounded Khmer soldier died, Em Son ordered Hargrove executed.
Em Son also testified that about a week later, he and his men noticed that their food stores were being disturbed. On searching, they discovered boot prints in the soil. They set up a night ambush and, on the third night of their vigil, they captured two Americans. Em Son’s descriptions matched those of Gary Hall and Danny Marshall. On instructions from Kampong Som, the two Americans were taken to the mainland and transferred to the Ti Near Pagoda, where they were stripped to their underwear and shackled. A week later, on orders from Phnom Penh, each prisoner was beaten to death with, he said, a B-40 rocket launcher. Hall’s body was buried in a shallow grave near the beach; Marshall’s body was dumped into a nearby cove.
The next of kin of all three of these abandoned Marines received the Purple Heart Medal. They weren’t the only casualties. In total, forty-one Americans were killed in the rescue of Mayaguez — one more American serviceman killed than the whole crew saved in the operation. These casualty numbers reflect the 23 SPS and aircrewmen who died in the helicopter crash, the 18 killed assaulting Koh Tang Island (which includes Hargrove, Hall, and Marshall), and eighty personnel wounded or injured during the operation.
Caro, R. A. The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent. New York: Random House, 1991.
Lamb, C. J. The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and Civil-Military Relations. Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, 2018.
Rumsfeld, D. When the Center Held: Gerald Ford and the Rescue of the American Presidency. New York: Free Press, 2018.
Shafer, J. “The Honest Graft of Lady Bird Johnson: How she and Lyndon came by their millions.” Slate Magazine, 16 July 2007.
 I have no evidence suggesting that this claim had any merit. I will only observe that if it was true, it was very poor headwork inside the CIA and shipping company boardrooms if they agreed to conduct it.
 Cambodia had long claimed a twelve-mile territorial limit of adjacent seas. Its national policy toward seizing, detaining, questioning maritime crews had been in effect since 1969. Most countries since 1982 claim a twelve-mile territorial limit. But in 1975, the United States (and many other countries) only recognized a three-mile territorial limit.
 A major shareholder in Land-Sea/Maersk was none other than the wife of President Lyndon B. Johnson, Lady Bird Johnson. According to Robert A. Caro, the Pulitzer Prize winning biographer of President Johnson (The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent), Johnson used his political power and influence to build her fortune beginning in 1943. “Johnson had worked at politics for years to achieve power; now he was working at politics to make money.” According to award winning journalist Jack Shafer, “Under Texas law, Lyndon Johnson owned half of her profits.” The truth of Johnson’s Indochina War may thus be revealed to us; he, as a sitting president, profited from the war through his wife ownership of stock in a company that became the primary shipper logistics and war materials to the Republic of Vietnam.
 America’s reputation was already a shamble since Harry S. Truman’s gross incompetence involved us in the easily avoided Korean War (which, as of this date, technically still continues) and laid the foundation for similar events in Indochina eleven years later.
USS Pueblo (AGER-2), initially constructed for the US Army as a freight and supply ship during World War II, was transferred to the US Navy in April 1966 as a light cargo ship. Her subsequent designation as an environmental research vessel was a cover for her real purpose, signals intelligence (known informally as a “Spy Ship”). In early 1968, USS Pueblo engaged in surveilling Soviet naval activity off the Japanese coast and gathered electronic intelligence from North Korea. Claiming that Pueblo was illegally operating in North Korean waters (North Korea at the time claimed 50 nautical miles of sovereign territory), North Korean gunboats fired upon Pueblo (killing one crewman), seized the ship, interned the crew as prisoners of war, mistreated the crew, tortured the ship’s commander, and demanded a written apology by the US government as a condition of releasing the crew. The United States signed the admission, and the North Koreans released the crew in late 1968 but retained possession of the ship and all of its highly classified material (hardware and software).
There is so much myth surrounding the life and times of David Crockett that hardly anyone knows the truth about the man. We know he was born in 1786 and gave up his life for Texas Independence on 6 March 1836. He was 49-years old when he died — in those days, 49-years was a long time to live. One of the stories about Crockett surrounds his political career. He served in the Tennessee General Assembly between 1821-1823 and served as a member of the U. S. House of Representatives from 1827-1831 and 1833-1835. When Crockett decided that he was done with politics, he allegedly told someone, “You can go to hell; I’m going to Texas.” And he did.
Crockett went to Texas for the same reasons as other folks back then. There was an adventurer in Crockett, the same as there was a sense of adventure in most people who migrated west. The difference was that as a member of the US House, Crockett was fully aware of what was going on between the Texians and Mexico’s centrist government. Most of the pioneers had no clue at all. Crockett entered Texas with both eyes wide open. He knew what he was getting himself into — and he believed that the Texas fight was one worth having. Was he also looking to enrich himself in land? Of course, he was. There were no “commies” back then seeking to hold hands and sing kumbaya. Taking a piece of scrub land and molding it into a profitable enterprise wasn’t for the faint of heart.
What we also know to be a fact is that Texians, Texans, and Americans have never gotten along well with Mexicans. There are no similarities between the two cultures, and while there are plenty of good arguments from both sides of any issue confronting Texians, Texans, and Americans, there was never any “earned trust” between these people. This uneasy relationship continues to this very day; and today, as in 1915 (or at any other time in our history with Mexico), the association was often deadly.
There was always a good reason for revolution in Mexico. The reasons are as valid today as they were in 1824, 1836, and in 1910. Arguably, no one associated with government in Mexico ever developed compassion for their citizens. Ever. Mexican politicians who became the inheritors of Spanish America were always completely focused on enriching themselves; building a vibrant nation and society was never a priority, and still isn’t. As the descendants of Spanish Peninsulares and creoles, today’s politicians remain welded to an unwieldy class structure that makes one group of people forever better than the one just below their own. One would think that after 500 years of this “caste” system, the people would throw it off and demand better from their government. But — no.
What caused the Mexican Revolution of 1910 was the increasing unpopularity of El Presidenté Jose de la Cruz Porfirio Diaz Mori. He was known simply as Porfirio Diaz. He’d served as President of Mexico for 31 years. He served in office for so long because he observed the golden rule: whoever owns the gold, makes the rules. Plus, it seems that Mexico’s founding fathers never quite got around to solving the question of presidential succession.
Not only did Mexico have a revolution in 1910, one that lasted for ten long, bloody years, Mexico also experienced a series of armed insurrections. It was a time when every thug with a bandolier called himself general, and every army general commanding a platoon was a self-perpetuating thug. The groups in armed conflict, and the men involved in these lawless shootouts, when listed altogether, remind one of the greater Chicago telephone directory.
In 1910, one might have imagined that things could not have ever gotten worse in Mexico. They would have been wrong. The situation in Mexico between 1910-1920 was so bad that no rational person could have imagined what was next on the agenda. Casualty estimates range from 1.7 million to 2.7 million people killed (military and civilian). Of innocent bystanders alone, somewhere between 700,000 and 1.1 million. Within four years, conditions were such inside Mexico that American politicians began to view them as presenting a clear and present danger to the peace and stability of the United States. It was serious enough to justify two (2) separate US interventions: the invasion of Vera Cruz (1914) and the twelve-month-long Poncho Villa Expedition (1916-17). In addition to the two US expeditions, there was another confrontation — which occurred after thousands of Mexicans invaded Texas to escape the violence in Mexico (see also, Sedition in Texas and The Bandit War). It did not help to improve relations with Mexico when it was learned that Germany was making an attempt to coopt Mexico into attacking the US southern border.
Send in the Marines
When President Woodrow Wilson decided to commit American blood to the defense of Paris, France in 1917, it was necessary to mobilize the U. S. Armed Forces. At the very moment when Wilson made his fateful decision, there were only two (2) military services even partially ready for combat: The United States Navy and the U. S. Marine Corps. The Navy and Marines were “most ready” because they had already demonstrated their capabilities in the Spanish-American War. The Army, meanwhile, were still organized almost exclusively for fighting hostile Indians in the western states. Mobilization in 1917 was a herculean task — and it speaks well for the American people that they were able to pull it off in such a short period of time.
One of the units activated in 1917 was my first (home) regiment, the Eighth Marines. Of course, a number of regiments were brought online in 1917, not only for use in Europe, but also in areas far away from the European battle zone. In total, fourteen regiments of Marines were activated by the middle part of 1918. Most of these never served in the European conflict but were deployed either in the Caribbean or remained in readiness inside the United States. The 8th Marine Regiment was one of these stateside infantry units.
At the time, Marine Corps regiments lacked the structure of subordinate battalions. There was only a regimental headquarters element, and independent numbered companies. The 8th Marines included its headquarters, 103rd, 104th, 105th, 106th, 107th, 108th, 109th, 110th, 111th, and 112th rifle companies totaling 1,000 officers and men under the command of Major Ellis B. Miller. In 1917, owing to the “different kind of war” unfolding for the United States in Europe, the Marine Corps recognized the wisdom of adopting the U. S. Army’s battalion structure. If the Marines were going to fight a sustained land engagement, particularly alongside Army units, they would have to adopt an organizational structure that was identical to that of the Army. The structure, for the regiments dispatched to Europe, included three subordinate battalions, each with a headquarters company, and four rifle companies — an increase in strength to 3,000 men. Since the 8th Marines was not earmarked for service in Europe, the standard pre-war organization was retained.
The regiment’s first orders from HQMC was to prepare for deployment — to Texas. The contingency plan was to send the 8th Marines into Mexico if needed in the defense of the United States’ southern border — particularly in light of the fact that there was no improvement in Mexican/American relations after Pershing’s pursuit of Pancho Villa, and the growing concern among American citizens living along the border for their safety — particularly in light of Germany’s attempt to involve Mexico against the United States. Should it become necessary, the 8th Marines would make an amphibious assault at Tampico and seize the oilfields there.
After arriving at Fort Crockett, the 8th Marines resumed its normal duties, which included field training, weapons training, and amphibious operations. In August 1918, a newly organized 9th Marine Regiment under the Third Marine Brigade joined the 8th Marines at Fort Crockett. These units had been stationed in Cuba to safeguard sugar mills from insurrectionists and saboteurs working with German agents. It was in this way that the 8th Marine Regiment became a subordinate command, along with the 9th Marines, of the 3rd Marine Brigade.
This presence of a large force of U. S. Marines in Texas — not too far distant from the Mexican border, continued through 1919. There was never any attempt to hide the purpose of these Marines and Mexican officials were fully aware of the United States’ willingness to intervene in Mexico’s internal affairs. Accordingly, a steady supply of oil from Tampico continued to flow to the United States and its allies. This duty assignment was the 8th Marines most important contribution to the First World War. After eighteen months in Texas, HQMC directed that the 8th Marines move to Philadelphia. There, on 25 April 1919, the regiment was deactivated.
 Fort Crockett, constructed in 1903, was named in honor of frontiersman and member of the U. S. House of Representatives, David Crockett. Fort Crockett was a facility of the U. S. Army Coastal Artillery Corps at Galveston, Texas. During World War I, Fort Crockett served as a training base and pre-deployment training facility.
that the process does not become a monster. —Nietzsche
We cannot begin to demonstrate an understanding of history’s great tragedies until we appreciate and acknowledge the strengths and weaknesses of the men who shaped them. Occasionally, high officials’ statements and behaviors reveal who they were, how they reasoned, and how they arrived at decisions that affected tens of thousands of other human beings. Of course, people are complex animals, and we are all flawed in some ways. Knowing that people are flawed should give those of us living in democracies something to think about before choosing our national leaders.
As one example, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was a man who had no qualms about developing atomic weapons or approving chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, but he was consistently an anti-colonialist and sympathetic to popular independence/nationalist movements. Roosevelt’s compassion, coupled with his moralism, limited his interest in colonialism to work performed by missionaries in far distant places unknown to most Americans. It was Roosevelt’s anti-colonial sentiments that brought him to loggerheads with other leaders of the allied powers — notably Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle.
Mr. Roosevelt believed colonialism opened the door to secret diplomacy, which led to bloody conflicts. These deeply held beliefs created tensions between Roosevelt, Churchill, and de Gaulle. Both Churchill and de Gaulle intended to re-engage their pre-World War II colonial interests — including those in Southeast Asia and North Africa.
But Roosevelt, the pragmatist, also kept his focus on winning the war against Germany and Japan. To achieve that primary objective, he curbed his anti-colonial sentiments throughout most of the war — with some exceptions. Roosevelt, for example, did not hesitate to signal his belief that the people of Indochina (present-day Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) were much better off without French meddling in their internal affairs. After World War II, Roosevelt intended to “push” France toward an agreement placing its Southeast Asian colonies into an international trusteeship — a first step, Roosevelt believed — toward achieving Indochinese independence.
Unfortunately, Franklin D. Roosevelt died in office on 12 April 1945 — before the end of the Second World War. Whatever his intentions toward Southeast Asia, it was left unfulfilled. Upon Roosevelt’s death, Harry S. Truman ascended to the presidency, and Truman was an entirely different man. Truman did not share Roosevelt’s anti-colonialist sentiments; he was more concerned about maintaining good relations with the United Kingdom and France. As a result, America’s world war allies had little trouble retaining their colonial holdings once the war was over. When nationalist leader Ho Chi Minh announced Viet Nam’s independence in 1945, Truman ignored him — preferring instead to back De Gaulle.
In fact, Truman developed no distinct policy toward Indochina until around 1947 and only then because of the re-emergence of the Soviet Union and its totalitarian power over most of Eastern Europe and not until Winston Churchill forewarned of a clash between communism and capitalism — his now-famous Iron Curtain speech in 1946. Always “slow on the up-take,” or if not that, then his preoccupation with post-war US domestic policy, the Iron Curtain speech, and George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” nudged Truman’s attention toward the Soviet Union, Europe, and the domino theory of global communism.
The Truman Doctrine led US foreign policy toward two interrelated goals — the first being an ambitious (American taxpayer-funded) program designed to rebuild a massively destroyed Europe as a democratic, capitalist dominated, pro-US collection of nations and a global defense against Soviet-style communism. The first of these attentions went to Greece and Turkey but soon extended into East and Southeast Asia, as well. The connection between events in Europe and far-distant Indochina was the re-established colonial empires of Great Britain and France, precisely the clash between French colonialism and the Vietnamese nationalist Ho Chi Minh, which began in 1945.
In 1943, the outcome of the Pacific war was inevitable: Japan would lose. What remained uncertain was how many allied troops would perish if it became necessary to invade the Japanese home islands. Encouraged, perhaps, by Italy’s campaign against Abyssinia in 1939, the US Army contracted with the University of Illinois (Urbana/Champaign) and a botanist/bioethicist named Arthur Galston to study the effects of chemical compounds (notably, dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4-D) and trichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4,5-T)) on cereal grains (including rice) and broadleaf crops.
What Galston discovered was that certain chemicals could be used to defoliate vegetation. It was from this discovery that the question arose — how best to disperse such chemicals?
Since the beginning of powered flight, highly placed civilian and military officials have debated aeronautics’ utility in conflict. During the First World War, French, British, and American forces employed airpower to counter enemy aircraft, perform intelligence gathering functions, attack enemy observation balloons, and drop bombs on enemy troop and artillery concentrations. In the Second World War, the allied powers refrained from using chemical and biological weapons — perhaps out of fear that the enemy would reciprocate its use — and (mostly) confined its lethal air assault to enemy industrial and transportation centers. There were two exceptions, however. Fire-bombing destroyed Dresden, Germany, Tokyo, Japan — and the civilians who lived in those cities. It was a travesty surpassed only by the use of atomic weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in early August 1945 — the point being that aerial delivery of weapons or other means of mass destruction was not a new phenomenon among the world’s first nations.
In early 1945, the US Army tested various chemical mixtures at the Bushnell Army Airfield in Florida. These tests were so successful that the US began planning to use defoliants against Japan — should it become necessary to invade the home islands. The people working on the application of chemical warfare did not know about the Manhattan Project. Because of the use of two atomic bombs in Japan, the allied invasion of the home islands was unnecessary — and neither was the use of herbicides.
Nevertheless, Great Britain and the United States continued their evaluations of defoliants’ use in the years following World War II. The Americans tested well over 1,100 chemical compounds in various field tests, and the British conducted similar tests in India and Australia. The first western nation to deploy chemical defoliants in conflict was the United Kingdom during the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960).
By the mid-1950s, events unfolding in Southeast Asia were already leading the United States toward an unmitigated disaster in foreign policy and economic expenditures. In 1961, given the “success” of the use of defoliants on the Malaysian Peninsula, American and Vietnamese officials began to consider their service in Vietnam, as well.
Even before President Lyndon Johnson escalated the United States’ involvement in Vietnam, war planners realized that the region’s dense foliage would challenge those involved in ground and air campaigns. This factor led to Operation Ranch Hand — a U. S. Air Force effort between 1961-1971 to reduce jungle vegetation and deny food sources to North Vietnamese troops and Viet Cong insurgents by spraying the dense forests with an estimated 20-million gallons of various herbicides. The Air Force concoction, code-named Agent Orange, contained the deadly chemical dioxin, later proven to cause cancer, congenital disabilities, rashes, and severe psychological and neurological problems among those exposed to it and their offspring.
Elmo Russell “Bud” Zumwalt accepted an appointment to the US Naval Academy in 1939. Upon graduation, he was commissioned an Ensign on 10 June 1942. Upon selection to Rear Admiral (Lower Half), Zumwalt assumed overall command of Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Seven in 1965. As Rear Admiral (Upper Half), Zumwalt became Commander, US Naval Forces (Vietnam) and Chief, U. S. Naval Advisory Group within the USMACV. In 1968, he was promoted to Vice Admiral and served as the principal navy advisor to US Army General Creighton Abrams, serving as Commander, MACV.
Zumwalt’s command was part of the “brown water” navy, which in his advisory capacity, controlled the Navy’s swift boats that patrolled the coasts, harbors, and river systems of South Vietnam. Among his subordinate boat commanders was his son, Elmo Russell Zumwalt III (and John F. Kerry). The brown water navy also included Task Force 115 (Coastal Surveillance Force), Task Force 116 (River Patrol Force), and Task Force 117 (Joint Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force).
In 1968, the United States had been fully engaged in the Vietnam War for three years. No one wants to fight a never-ending war, not the people who have to fight in it, not the people back home who suffer the loss of loved ones, and not the politicians whose popularity and careers are diminished by unhappy citizens. American war planners wanted to turn the war over to Vietnamese military officials to decide their fate vis-à-vis the conflict with North Vietnam. This task of turning the war over to the Vietnamese government was called Vietnamization, first implemented by President Richard M. Nixon. Nixon, who previously served as Eisenhower’s vice president, wanted the United States out of the Vietnam conflict — but with honor.
To achieve Vietnamization, the “press was on” to move Vietnamese military forces as quickly as possible to the point where they could take over the war, allowing the United States to withdraw their forces. President Nixon didn’t want to hear any excuses about how or why USMACV could not achieve it.
Admiral Zumwalt related the story of how he attended a briefing with General Abrams in 1968 when the discussion emerged about how soon the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) might assume control of the air war over South Vietnam. A senior US Air Force officer opined that the VNAF might be ready as early as 1976. Abrahams threw a fit … Vietnamization was taking too long, and the Air Force didn’t seem to understand that MACV didn’t have eight more years to fool around with the project. When it was Zumwalt’s turn to speak, he laid out his plan for increasing the pace of Vietnamization among the riverine forces. This moment was when the Admiral made his fateful decision to increase defoliation along South Vietnam’s inland waterways. Zumwalt later said that he specifically checked with the Air Force about possible harmful effects of Agent Orange on US personnel; he said, “We were told there were none.”
But in 1988, Dr. James Clary, a USAF researcher associated with Operation Ranch Hand, wrote to Senator Tom Daschle, stating, “When we initiated the herbicide program in the 1960s, we were aware of the potential damage [to humans] due to dioxin contamination in the herbicide. However, because the material was to be used on the enemy, none of us was overly concerned. We never considered a scenario in which our own personnel would become contaminated with the herbicide.”
Admiral Zumwalt’s son was diagnosed with stage four non-Hodgkins lymphoma in 1983; in 1985, doctors also discovered stage three Hodgkins (another form of lymphoma). Elmo R. Zumwalt III died in 1988, 42-years old. His son, Elmo R. Zumwalt IV, suffers from congenital dysfunction that confuses his physical senses. In 1985, Admiral Zumwalt told the press, “I do not have any guilt feelings because I was convinced then, and I am convinced now, that the use of Agent Orange saved literally hundreds and maybe thousands of lives.”
The Admiral could not have been more wrong as to the effects of Agent Orange and “saving lives.” The consequences of using dioxin to defoliate Vietnam’s dense jungle ended up killing up to 40,000 American servicemen, causing untold sickness and suffering to their offspring and killing as many as four million Vietnamese civilians. Agent Orange killed his son — and the effect of this incomprehensible decision continues to manifest itself in 2021. Admiral Zumwalt passed away in 2000 from mesothelioma. He was 79 years old – he outlived his son by twelve years.
Associated Press (Online). “Elmo Zumwalt, Son of Admiral, Dies at Age 42.” 13 August 1988.
Clark, C. S. and Levy, A. Sprectre Orange.The Guardian.com. 2003.
Mach, J. T. Before Vietnam: Understanding the Initial Stages of US Involvement in Southeast Asia, 1945-1949. Centennial Library: Cedarville University, 2018.
Stellman, J. M. and Stellman, S. D., Christian, R., Weber, T., and Tomasallo, C. The Extent and Patterns of Usage of Agent Orange and other herbicides in Vietnam. School of Public Health, Columbia University, 2002.
Veterans and Agent Orange. National Academies, Institute of Medicine, Committee to Review Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans of Exposure to Herbicides, 2012.
Vietnam Express (online). Due Hoang, Hoang Phuong, Dien Luong. Out of Sight/Out of Mind: Vietnam’s Forgotten Agent Orange Victims, 2017.
Zumwalt, E. Jr., and Zumwalt, E. III. Agent Orange and the Anguish of an American Family. New York: New York Times Magazine, 1986.
 On 5 March 1946, then former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill condemned the Soviet Union’s policies in Europe, declaring that “… an iron curtain has descended across the [European] continent.” It was the opening volley of the Cold War.
 George F. Kennan (1904-2005) was one of the US’ foreign policy wise men. He was a historian and diplomat who advocated a containment policy toward the Soviet Union and helped Truman formulate the so-called Truman Doctrine.
 British forces entered Indochina in rather substantial numbers to accept the surrender of Imperial Japanese forces at the end of World War II. Free French forces re-entered Vietnam soon after and observing the growing discord between French legionnaires and Vietnamese nationalists, and with no desire to be caught between the two, the British forces soon withdrew. British colonial forces concentrated on their interests in Malaya (which also became a hotbed for communist inspired nationalism), Singapore, and Hong Kong.
 Raids conducted by my than 1,400 allied aircraft between 13-15 February 1945, resulting in 25,000 civilian deaths.
 Part of Operation Meeting House conducted on 9-10 March 1945 is the single most destructive bombing raid in human history. It destroyed 16 square miles of central Tokyo and killed about 100,000 people.
Most people associate the World War II Era Navy and Marine Corps with the Pacific War — which is certainly accurate; the U. S. Navy was unquestionably the dominant force in the Pacific. But the Allied powers could not have won the European war without superior naval power, as well. Victory at sea was a keystone for allied triumph over the Axis power in all World War II theaters.
Europe (Nordic, Western, Eastern fronts)
Mediterranean, Africa, Middle East
Victory at sea involved the formidable task of keeping sea lanes open for the movement of troop transports, combat equipment, raw materials, and food stores — in massive quantities earmarked for the United Kingdom, nearly isolated by hostile German forces.
Complicating the Navy’s Atlantic mission was the fact that theater area commanders had to compete for limited naval resources. There were only so many aircraft carriers, only so many landing craft, only so many carrier-based aircraft — only so many men. It was up to theater area commanders to find the best way of distributing these limited assets where they would do the most good. As one can imagine, the Navy’s mission to protect ships, men, and material over vast areas of the world’s major oceans was no small undertaking — and neither was denying access to them by the Axis powers.
Within 15 years from the end of World War I, Germany began rebuilding its military and naval forces. Between 1933 and 1939, without opposition and emboldened by European politicians who sought to avoid war at any cost, Germany seized and annexed Alsace-Loraine, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. When Adolph Hitler discovered that the “free world’s” only response to this aggression was appeasement, and in concert with the Soviet Union, he launched a lightning invasion of Poland. Allied powers responded to the invasion by declaring war on Germany, prompting Germany’s invasion of Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France — and then began its assault on the United Kingdom through aerial bombing and naval blockades. Once Germany believed that it had neutralized the United Kingdom, Hitler foolishly invaded the Soviet Union.
Following the First World War, the United Kingdom decided to place all of its military aircraft under the Royal Air Force, completely neglecting its naval arm vis-à-vis sea-launched aircraft. As a result of this poor thinking, the United Kingdom lost its maritime superiority.
In the years leading up to World War II, Royal Navy Aviation competed with the RAF for scant resources. The decision taken by Britain’s war policy board was that strategic bombing must occupy a higher priority than seaborne attack aircraft — and did so even after the United States proved that long-range bomber aircraft were only marginally effective against moving ships at sea. The use of B-24 Liberator aircraft against Japanese ships of war during the Guadalcanal campaign in 1942-43 reinforced the American’s earlier conclusion.
In 1939, the Royal Navy had a substantial base structure at both ends of the Mediterranean, at Alexandria, Egypt, Gibraltar, and Malta. The French Navy had naval bases at Toulon and Mers-el-Kébir and deluded themselves into believing that the Mediterranean was “their sea.”
In September 1939, when the UK declared war against Germany, there were only seven aircraft carriers in the British fleet. These were capital ships highly vulnerable to German submarines, battleships, and land-based aircraft. Because the British had no carriers in the First World War, there was no battle-tested procedure for protecting aircraft carriers.
Substantial loses during the UK’s initial carrier operations underscored weaknesses of command decisions and employment doctrine. HMS Courageous was lost in the second week of the war, sunk by the German submarine U-29. HMS Ark Royal might have been lost in the following week were it not for defective torpedoes fired by U-39. From these two incidents, the British Admiralty decided that carriers were too vulnerable for use as a submarine screening force. In early June 1940, HMS Glorious was lost to German battleships off the coast of Norway [Note 1].
At the beginning of 1942, the U. S. Atlantic Fleet operated Carrier Division Three, which included the fleet attack carriers (CVA) USS Ranger, USS Hornet, and USS Wasp, and the escort carrier (CVE) USS Long Island. Over the course of the war, American and British carriers became increasingly effective in a number of operational assignments — from providing air cover during amphibious operations to patrolling in search of enemy ships.
Unlike the Pacific war, where naval and ground commanders planned and implemented combat strategies and operations, European heads of government were the decision-makers in the Atlantic war. Both Winston Churchill and Adolph Hitler directly involved themselves in the details of operational planning; in contrast, Franklin Roosevelt left the details of fighting to his military commanders.
The Battle of the Atlantic
The Battle of the Atlantic was a contest of strategies between the Allied and Axis powers. Both sides attempted to deny use of oceanic shipping. British and American navies sought to blockade German shipments of raw materials from Norway; the Germans attempted to block American shipments of food and vital supplies to the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.
Germany relied principally on its submarines, merchant raiders, battle cruisers, and land-based aircraft to destroy American shipping — of those, submarines were by far the most effective [Note 2]. Allied use of aircraft carriers contributed significantly to the ultimate success of the Battle of the Atlantic — used not only to protect convoys, but to locate and destroy German submarines, as well. This success was the direct result of the Allied capture and deciphering German code machines.
In September 1939, Germany had fifty-seven submarines; twenty-two were suitable for combat operations in the Atlantic and only eight or nine could operate “on station” because of the time it took to return to their base for fuel, refit, and replenishment. By March 1940, this small submarine force accounted for the sinking of 222 Allied ships — including two aircraft carriers, a cruiser, and two destroyers. Germany’s application of underwater naval assault was “unrestricted,” evidenced by Germany’s sinking of the civilian passenger ship Athenia.
On land, it took Germany only six weeks to conquer France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (10May-24 June 1940). With the fall of France, Germany was able to establish a submarine base along the French coast, which brought their U-boats 1,000 miles closer to Allied convoy routes.
Within the space of two years, the production of German U-boats was sufficient to allow Germany’s Grand Admiral Erich Raeder and Admiral Karl Dönitz to begin employing submarines in groups (from eight to twenty) (the wolf pack). In April 1941, German submarines destroyed half the convoy ships transiting from Halifax to Liverpool. The action was significant enough to cause President Roosevelt to order the transfer of USS Yorktown, three battleships, and six destroyers from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet. In September 1941, Roosevelt transferred 50 American destroyers to the Royal Navy [Note 3]. It was at this time that the United States Navy began escorting Britain-bound convoys as far as Iceland. Despite these efforts, by the time the United States entered the war, German U-boats had destroyed 1,200 cargo ships.
American Attitudes, 1939-41
The American people well-remembered the terrible loss of life during World War I and they wanted nothing whatever to do with another European War. Franklin Roosevelt campaigned for reelection with the promise of neutrality [Note 4]. When war broke out in Europe in 1939, Roosevelt declared American neutrality — but he also established a “neutral zone” in the Atlantic within which the United States would protect shipping. The Navy assigned USS Ranger to patrol this “neutral” zone.
Even before 1939, Roosevelt’s opposition party in Congress watched developing world events and the president with growing concerns. Members of Congress were well aware that Roosevelt was itching to involve himself in the European war, so in the 1930s, the congress passed a series of neutrality acts (1935, 1936, 1937, and 1939) that reflected the mood of the American people. Americans had become isolationist and non-interventionist. Whether these were carefully thought-out restrictions may not matter today, but the Acts made no distinction between victim or aggressor.
As Congress pushed back against Roosevelt’s apparent desire to engage in the emerging world war, Mr. Roosevelt crafted clever ways around congressional restrictions. The so-called Lend-Lease program was enacted in early March 1941; it permitted President Roosevelt to provide Great Britain, Free France, the Republic of China, and Soviet Union with food, oil, and war materials [Note 5]. Congress earmarked more than $50-billion for this purpose (about 17% of the USA’s total war expenditure) (in modern dollars, around $600-billion), most of which went to the United Kingdom. Under this agreement, nations receiving war materials could use them until returned to the United States (or were destroyed). Very little war material was returned to US control [Note 6]. The net-effect of Lend-Lease was that it removed any pretense of neutrality by the United States.
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, President Roosevelt asked Congress for a declaration of war against the Empire of Japan. On 11 December, Germany and Italy declared war against the United States. Mr. Roosevelt had his war.
Carriers and Their Functions
Large areas of the Atlantic were beyond the range of land-based aircraft in Canada, Iceland, and Great Britain. The UK, with insufficient fleet resources, initiated programs to enhance convoy protection. In 1940-41, Britain converted three ocean-going vessels, a seaplane tender, and an auxiliary cruiser [Note 7] to help extend the protective range of land-based aircraft. They called these vessels Fight Catapult Ships (FACs), Catapult Aircraft Merchant Ships (CAMs), and Merchant Aircraft Carriers (MACs). Germany sank three of these ships in 1941 — the same year the British converted thirty-five additional merchant ships into catapult ships.
In January 1941, the United Kingdom began converting captured German merchant ships to escort carriers (CVEs). While CVEs were slow and lightly armored, they did provide platforms for dispatching and retrieving land-based aircraft. Britain’s first CVE was christened HMS Audacity. The ship carried six operational aircraft with room for an additional eight, but because there was no hanger deck or elevator, aircraft were maintained on the flight desk.
In April 1941, the United States began converting merchant hulls to CVEs. The first American CVE was christened USS Long Island. A second American CVE was transferred to the UK, who christened her HMS Archer. Archer was capable of operating 15 aircraft. The Americans constructed five additional CVEs, (transferring four to the Royal Navy): HMS Avenger, HMS Biter, HMS Dasher, HMS Tracker, and the USS Charger.
Lessons learned from USS Long Island led to substantial improvements to forty-four successive CVEs. The new constructs were capable of carrying between 19-24 aircraft. Thirty-three of these went to the United Kingdom. Additional CVEs were constructed from tanker hulls, which were longer and faster than the merchant hull ships.
Aircraft carriers operating in both oceans had similar functions. They supported amphibious landings, raided enemy ports, searched for enemy submarines, escorted merchant convoys, transported aircraft, troops, vital supplies, and served as training platforms for carrier-rated pilots.
The Turning Point
In the spring of 1943, German submarines assaulted 133 Allied ships, a major decline from previous periods. The Battle for the Atlantic had taken an abrupt turn. On 21 April, Germany sent 51 U-boats to attack a 42-ship convoy transiting from Liverpool to Halifax. Designated Convoy ONS-5, the shipments were protected by nine naval escorts. U-boats sunk thirteen ships; escort vessels and Catalina flying boats sunk seven U-boats and badly damaged seven more. In total, for that month, Allied forces destroyed 43 German submarines. For the next six months, beginning in May 1943, the Allies dispatched 64 North Atlantic convoys with 3,546 ships to Great Britain. Not a single ship was sunk en route.
Faced with such massive losses, Grand Admiral Dönitz ordered his submarines into the Central Atlantic, South Atlantic, and Indian Oceans. These were the areas used by the United States to transport men and materiel to the Mediterranean to support operations in Sicily and the India-Burma campaign. To counter Dönitz’ strategy, the U. S. Navy authorized anti-submarine groups, which included destroyers and CVEs, to operate apart from convoys. Between June – December 1943, Allied hunter-killer groups [Note 8] destroyed 31 German U-boats, including ten of the so-called resupply submarines. Admiral Dönitz’ strategy in the Central and South Atlantic fared no better than his North Atlantic scheme.
Hunter-killer battle groups were a team effort. CVEs used the F4F Wildcat fighter to look for submarines, and when spotted (either by air or radar), dispatched TBF Avengers with bombs, depth charges, and torpedoes. Allied destroyers and destroyer escorts served to screen the CVE hunter-killer groups [Note 9].
By the end of 1944, the Allied powers dominated the Atlantic. Dönitz moved his submarine force around, but the US & UK were reading the admiral’s mail. He ordered 58 U-boats to counter Allied landings at Normandy. German U-boats sank four Allied ships at the cost of 13 U-boats. After Normandy, Dönitz withdrew his submarines to Norwegian waters, which drew the Allies’ attention to the German battleship Tirpitz (a sister ship to Bismarck), which lay at anchor in Norway. Tirpitz did very little during World War II, but the ship did offer a potential threat to Allied navies. In early 1944, the Allies’ focus on Tirpitz deceived the German high command into believing that an Allied invasion of Norway was imminent. Once Tirpitz was sunk in November 1944, the Royal Navy felt comfortable sending the carriers HMS Formidable and HMS Indefatigable to the far east to join the British Pacific Fleet.
At the beginning of 1945, HMS Implacable was the only Allied fleet carrier in the Atlantic, supported by 12 British and 10 American CVEs. All other fleet carriers were sent to the Pacific Theater to finish the war with Japan even as the war with Germany continued. Thirty German U-boats attacked a 26-ship convoy in February 1945, supported by German Torpedo-Bombers, but aircraft from CVEs Campania and Nairana drove the U-boats away with no loss of merchantmen. Convoys bound for Russia continued through May 1945 [Note 10].
Marines in the Atlantic
We seldom read or hear about Marines who served in the Atlantic War. This is very likely because fewer than six-thousand Marines participated in Atlantic, North African, and European campaigns during World War II. Of course, before the war, US Marines served at various U. S. Embassies.
In 1941, about four-thousand Marines of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade served in Iceland through February 1942. But given the expertise of U. S. Marines in amphibious warfare, the Navy Department assigned several senior Marine officers to serve as planners/advisors for invasions of North Africa, Sicily, and Normandy. For example, Colonel Harold D. Campbell [Note 11], an aviator, was responsible for planning air support for the 6,000 man raid on Dieppe [Note 12]. Marines were also responsible for training four U. S. Army combat divisions in preparation for their amphibious assault of North Africa. In North Africa, Marines from ship’s detachments executed two raids in advance of the main invasion: one operation involved seizure of the old Spanish Fort at the Port of Oran; a second raid secured the airfield at Safi, Morocco. Both operations took place on 10 November 1942, the Marine Corps’ 167th birthday.
Fifty-one Marines served with the U. S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), participating in behind the lines operations in Albania, Austria, Corsica, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Rumania, Sardinia, and Yugoslavia from 1941 to 1945. See also: Marines and Operation Torch, Behind the Lines, and Every Climb and Place.
At sea, Marines assigned to detachments aboard battleships and heavy cruisers served as naval gun crews during the North African, Sicily, and Normandy invasions [Note 13]. Reminiscent of the olden days of sailing ships, Navy ship commanders sent their Marine sharpshooters aloft to explode German mines during Operation Overlord (the invasion of Normandy) [Note 14]. On 29 August 1944, Marines from USS Augusta and USS Philadelphia participated in the Allied acceptance of the surrender of Marseilles and 700 German defenders.
When General Eisenhower assumed the mantle of Supreme Allied Commander, his staff consisted of 489 officers. Of these, 215 were American officers, including Colonel Robert O. Bare, who served on the staff of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey, Allied Naval Commander. Bare worked on the plan for the Normandy invasion. While serving with the British Assault Force, Bare was awarded the Bronze Star Medal. At the completion of his tour in Europe, Bare participated in the Palau and Okinawa campaigns. During the Korean War, Bare served as Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Division.
Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk served Eisenhower as Commander, Western Naval Task Force. Assigned to Kirk’s staff was Marine Colonel Richard H. Jeschke [Note 15]. Jeschke served Kirk as an assistant planning officer in the operations staff. Of the total 1.5 million Americans serving in Europe, 124,000 were naval personnel. Fifteen-thousand of those served on combat ships, 87,000 assigned to landing craft, 22,000 assigned to various naval stations in the UK, and Marine Security Forces, United Kingdom. On 6 June 1944, Rear Admiral Don P. Moon (Commander, Force Uniform), frustrated with delays in landing operations, dispatched Colonel Kerr ashore to “get things moving.” Kerr diverted troops scheduled to land at Green Beach to Red Beach, which expedited the operation. Colonel Kerr credited the low casualty rates during the landing to the accuracy and rate of fire of naval artillery.
The landing at Omaha Beach was a different story. German defenses inflicted 2,000 casualties on a landing force of 34,000 men. Rear Admiral John L. Hall dispatched Colonel Jeschke and First Lieutenant Weldon James ashore at Omaha Beach to observe and report back to him the effectiveness of naval gunfire support from USS Texas.
Colonel John H. Magruder II, USMC served as the naval liaison officer to Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s 21st Army Group. Many Marine officers were assigned to various posts because of their fluency in foreign languages. Magruder was fluent in Dutch. Major Francis M. Rogers served as an interpreter for General Edouard de Larminent, Commander, II French Corps. Rogers was fluent in both French and Portuguese.
Allen, H. C. Britain and the United States. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1955.
Dawson, R. H. The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959.
DeChant, J. A. Marine Corps Aviation Operations in Africa and Europe. Washington: Marine Corps Gazette, 1946.
Donovan, J. A. Outpost in the North Atlantic. Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1992.
Edwards, H. W. A Different War: Marines in Europe and North Africa. Washington: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1994.
Eisenhower Foundation. D-Day: The Normandy Invasion in Retrospect. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1971.
Morrison, S. E. The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963.
Menges, C. A. History of U. S. Marine Corps Counter-intelligence. Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1991.
Roskill, S. The Navy at War, 1939-1945. Chatham, Kent, Great Britain: Mackays of Chatham, 1960.
 Glorious was ordered to help evacuate aircraft during the UK’s withdrawal from Norway. The ship left the main body of the fleet when discovered by the German battleships. German 11-inch guns literally ripped Glorious apart. Alone, without aircraft aloft, and only 4-inch protective guns, Glorious had no chance of survival in a hostile sea. Captain Guy D’Oyly-Hughes, commanding Glorious, was a former submarine skipper. He decided to set out alone so that he could, once at sea, court-martial Wing Commander J. B. Heath, RN, and Lieutenant Commander Evelyn Slessor, RN, who had refused to obey an order to attack shore targets. Heath admitted his refusal, but argued that his mission was ill-defined and his aircraft unsuited to the task.
 German submarines accounted for 70% of world-wide allied shipping losses.
 The agreement was also known as the Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement.
 In a joint statement issued on 14 August 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill announced their joint goals for the world following World War II. Later dubbed The Atlantic Charter, it established an outline of objectives that included dismantling the British Empire, the formation of NATO, and a general agreement on tariffs and trade. An American-British alliance was formed in 1939 with Roosevelt and Churchill secretly meeting eleven times. The Atlantic Charter made clear Roosevelt’s support of Great Britain, but in order to achieve the charter’s objectives, the United States would have to become a participant in the war. This could not happen, politically, unless there was first of all a cataclysmic event that propelled the United States into the war. From 1939 forward, Roosevelt did everything he could to cause the Japanese to attack the United States —which they did on 7 December 1941.
 Canada had a similar program they referred to as “Mutual Aid.”
 The Lend-Lease arrangement with China (suggested in 1940) involved a plan for 500 modern aircraft and enough war materials to supply thirty divisions of ground troops. With the Chinese civil war “on hold” until the defeat of China’s common enemy (Japan), Roosevelt dealt independently with both sides through General Joseph Stilwell. Neither Chiang Kai-shek nor Mao Zedong ever intended to return Lend-Lease equipment to the United States; rather, both sides intended to use these armaments on each other after war with Japan was settled. As it turned out, American Marines died from weapons and ammunition manufactured in the United States when turned against them by Mao’s communist forces in 1945.
 OBVs were merchant ships pressed into service by the Royal Navy and converted into auxiliary carriers.
 The hunter-killer groups included US CVEs Card, Bogue, Core, Block Island, Santee, and HMS Tracker and Biter. USS Block Island was the only American CVE sunk in the Atlantic War.
 At a time when the Washington Naval Arms Limitation Treaty (1922) limited the construction of large battleships, the United States began building replacement ships for obsolete World War II destroyers. The Navy produced 175 Fletcher-Class destroyers (DD), designed as torpedo attack ships with a secondary mission of anti-submarine warfare and screening for capital ships. Destroyer Escorts (DE) were a smaller variant ship with specialized armaments capable of a smaller turning radius. Both ships were referred to as “tin cans” because they were lightly armored. They relied more on their speed for self-defense. During World War II, the U. S. Navy lost 97 destroyers and 15 destroyer-escorts.
 Convoys to Russia during the war involved 740 ships in 40 convoys, which provided 5,000 tanks and more than 7,000 aircraft. German U-boats destroyed 97 of these merchantmen and 18 escorting warships. Germany lost three destroyers and 38 U-boats.
 Harold Denny Campbell (1895-1955) served in both the First and Second World War. On 6 December 1941, Colonel Campbell assumed command of Marine Aircraft Group 11 at Quantico, Virginia. In May 1942, he was personally selected by Lord Mountbatten to serve as a Marine Aviation advisor to the British Combined Staff. After promotion to Brigadier General in 1943, Campbell assumed command of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing in Samoa and in 1944 commanded the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing in the Peleliu campaign.
 The raid was conducted by British and Canadian commandos. Tagged as Operation Jubilee, the purpose of the amphibious raid to test the feasibility of lightening raids for intelligence gathering and boosting the morale of “folks back home.” It was a much-needed learning experience because aerial and naval support was inadequate, the tanks were too heavy for a “lightening raid” and the Allies under-estimated the strength of German defenses. Within ten hours of the landing, the German army killed, wounded, or captured 3,623 British/Canadian commandos. The British also lost 33 landing craft and a destroyer. Operation Jubilee became a textbook lesson on what not to do in an amphibious operation.
 U. S. Navy battleships usually included a detachment of two-hundred Marines; battle cruisers usually had a detachment of around 80 Marines.
 I am trying to imagine a Marine sharpshooter 200 feet in the air on a pitching ship, shooting German anti-ship mines with any degree of accuracy. Damn.
 Colonel (later, Brigadier General) Jeschke (1894-1957) served with distinction in both the Atlantic and Pacific campaigns: on Guadalcanal, and during the invasions of Sicily and Normandy.
What most Americans know about the British Army in North America is this: they were the most powerful Army in the world, partnered with the most powerful navy in the world, and that the American colonists in rebellion never stood a chance. This, of course, is only true in the context of a refined, well trained army sent to confront farmers, shopkeepers, barmen, and boat builders who were drafted into the colonial militia.
In 1754, the British Army had about 4,000 regulars serving in the North America [Note 1]. To understand what this means, in terms of manpower strength, the average size of an infantry regiment was between 700-800 men. Given these numbers, then there were five regiments assigned to the colonies, each consisting of ten companies, the entirety being a brigade. The brigade commander may have formed battalions of five companies each. It is likely that British Army units were placed where they were most needed; given the size in area of the thirteen colonies, they were hardly an effective fighting force. The soldiers in residence had been long neglected by the home government; they had become complacent in their duties and posed no threat to anyone, much less the French or their Indian surrogates.
Regimental Colonels were honorary positions of well-placed gentlemen. The colonel’s frequent absences from the regiment made the lieutenant colonel the officer commanding, and he was assisted by a major. Aiding the officer commanding was a small staff of five men (excluding personal batmen). If the lieutenant colonel and major were absent from the regiment, then the senior captain stepped in as officer commanding. In such conditions, with captains commanding the regiment, then it fell upon the lieutenants to command the companies.
The British infantry company was composed of 3 officers, 2-4 musicians, 6 noncommissioned officers, and 56 privates. Sickness, desertion, and battle losses meant that British companies/battalions/regiments/brigades seldom — if ever — went into combat at full strength.
Young men of the eighteenth century often joined the British Army for economic reasons. The onset of the Industrial Revolution and land closure brought enormous social changes in Great Britain. Common laborers, textile workers, and displaced artisans joined the army to escape poverty. The British private received eight pence per day before taxes — about £1.00 per month. It was’t much, but it was better than the soldier could make “back home” as a laborer — £1.00 being somewhere in the neighborhood of $25.00/month in 2021 currency.
Where the British Soldiers Came From
The common soldier enlisted in the British Army under widely varied circumstances. The unemployed textile worker may have sought out the recruiter and accepted the King’s shilling for his service “at the pleasure of the King.” In other words, this recruit may have been recruited for life. But the British Army also hired mercenaries; men who fought for money, and only when the money was right. Most recruitments in the British Isles came from poverty stricken sections of the larger cities. Each regiment recruited for itself and regimental colonels would often lead recruiting parties into towns and villages. Some people were, with the permission of the Crown and local courts, pressed into service. They were vagrants, homeless people, drunkards, and some were prisoners who thought it would be a better life in the Army than eating rat meat in a dark, dank prison in the midlands.
British military officers purchased their commissions (and sold them). The purchase price of a military officer’s commission was high enough that it precluded men of moderate means from becoming British officers, or ascending higher in rank. Most officers up to the rank of major were of the middle class. Only sons of nobility could afford high command; they had to be well-born, and as such, they served concurrently as politicians and general officers.
The Braddock Expedition
On 20 February 1755, Major General Edward Braddock arrived in the colonies with two regiments and assumed command of all British land forces as Commander-in-Chief of the British North American Army. He met with several of the colonial governors in Alexandria on 14 April. They persuaded him to undertake vigorous actions against the French, who had instigated native populations against British settlements. With colonial militia reinforcing British regulars, Braddock planned his punitive expedition against the French around the following: a militia officer from Massachusetts would lead an attack against Fort Niagara; General Sir William Johnson from New York would lead an assault against the French at Crown Point; Colonel Monckton would lead an attack on the Bay of Fundy, and Braddock would himself march an expedition against Fort Duquesne (Pittsburg) on the Ohio River.
The main thrust of the British attack was Fort Duquesne. General Braddock commanded the 44th and 48th Regiments of Foot (1,350 men), an additional force of 500 regular and colonial militia, field artillery, and other support troops, for a total of around 2,100 men [Note 2]. A twenty-three year old lieutenant colonel of militia accompanied Braddock — a surveyor, who knew the landscape, and a man capable of serving as Braddock’s aide-de-camp. His name was George Washington. Major General Braddock fell mortally wounded at the Battle of Monongahela on 9 July 1755, carried from the field by Colonel Washington and Colonel Meriwether. Although Washington had no official position within the chain of command, he nevertheless brought order to the regiments and commanded a rearguard for the evacuation of the British expedition from the field. Of Braddock’s regular force, 456 were killed, 422 wounded. Of his officers numbering 86, 26 were killed, 37 were wounded. There were 50 women in the Braddock expedition, all but four were killed. Subsequent defeats along the frontier prompted London to expand the British Army in North America. It was easier said than done.
The average Englishman had little interest in serving in the British Army; it was a challenging lifestyle at the best of times. Between 1755-57, only 4,500 Englishmen enlisted for service in the colonies. At the same time, 7,500 British colonists enlisted in the British Army of North America. After Grat Britain formerly declared war against France in 1756, recruiting efforts on the Homefront were more successful. Some 11,000 regulars were sent from Britain to America in 1757. Simultaneously, the flow of colonial recruits diminished to a mere trickle of what it had been.
In early 1758, the British government appointed General James Abercromby to serve as Commander-in-Chief in North America. Abercromby brought reform and improvement in an army that grew to twenty-three battalions (about 8,000 men). That year marked the turning point of the war and the British Army reclaimed its prestige. After the Treaty of Paris of 1763, the regular British Army serving in North America was raised to 10,000 men. Americans living on the frontier welcomed these men; the British regular represented colonial security. On the other hand, while Americans enjoyed the peace of mind and safety provided by the British Army, no one wanted to pay for them in the form of taxes. This made no sense to any thinking person, but it is difficult to argue that most American colonists in 1770 were skilled in that regard.
The American Revolution
In terms of the sentiments of American colonists, there were only two sorts where the British soldier was concerned: those who loved them, and those who hated them. There was no middle group. The rabble-rousers in Boston fell into the latter category and sought to create confrontations with the symbol of British authority at every opportunity [Note 3]. By 1775, the British North American soldier was a highly proficient, extremely professional soldier — one could not look upon the colonial militiamen with anything but contempt. British soldiers didn’t run away from a fight.
The colonist’s fuss about paying their “fair share” of taxes to support the British Army in the colonies brought disdain from the British regular. He didn’t respect the colonist, and he didn’t respect the leaders of the emerging American government or its militia. A few years earlier, no one wanted to serve as a British regular officer more than George Washington, but the British establishment responded to his every effort with scorn. After 1770, colonial farmers, shopkeepers, and militia came to realize that despite all they did for England, the British would always regard them as second-class citizens.
France’s entry into the colonial revolution on the side of the Americans changed Great Britain’s strategic calculus. The British were no longer masters of the sea along America’s sea coast. While the British Army was widely distributed from Canada to Florida and the West Indies, the French could deliver fresh troops to any place along the East Coast at a time of their own choosing — unchallenged by either the British Army or the Royal Navy. Because the West Indies was more valuable to the British than the rebellious colonies, a large number of British Army and Royal Navy resources were diverted to protect British interest there.
The government in London soon realized that the colonies in New England were probably beyond saving. British loyalists living in New England were few in number. The southern colonies, on the other hand, had large populations of loyalists; there was hope that these colonies might be saved, and so the British Army and Royal Navy turned its attention to the Carolinas and West Florida. Britain’s effort toward saving the southern colonies was the match that lit the kindling in the southern colonies; capturing Charleston added logs to the fire.
General Cornwallis surrendered to General George Washington at Yorktown (Oct 1781). One key feature in the southern campaign was the number of British Loyalists who fought the British fight. The Battle of King’s Mountain in 1780 was an exclusively American engagement. The outcome of King’s Mountain prompted the Loyalists to reconsider; after all, there was never a guarantee that the British would win the war — and if they didn’t, then what would happen to the loyalists? Loyalists would have been suicidal to throw their lot behind the British if there was any chance at all that the patriots would end up as the victors — which, of course, they were.
British regular soldiers continued to fight well and the colonial militia always maintained their fear of British regular formations. The problem was that the British Army was getting smaller with each battle. Cornwallis did not have a regular pipeline for troop replacements, which meant that each British victory came at a high price. The British soldier was poorly fed, poorly cared for, and quite often poorly led … but they steadfastly performed courageously in battle after battle — at the beginning of the conflict and at the end of it.
The Age of Sail
It was never easy to support the British Army 3,000 miles away on the North American continent. To feed these soldiers a daily ration, the British government contracted with food producing companies who transported the rations in bulk across the Atlantic. By the time they arrived and found their way into the Red Coat’s mess kit, the rations were inedible. Biscuits were full of weevils, the bread was moldy, the butter rancid, the flour spoiled, insects infested peas, and then came the maggoty beef. It is no surprise to learn that the British soldier was seriously malnourished and toothless by the time he reached 30 years of age. Senior officers did register complaints, but they fell on deaf ears.
Adding to the difficult task of crushing rebellion was the corruption of British bureaucrats, contractors, ship’s captains, and commissary officers in the supply chain. Corruption didn’t begin with the British war ministry, and it certainly didn’t end there. One may wonder how well the family of Lyndon Baines Johnson profited from the Vietnam War.
Thirty Years Later
Many historians will argue that the American Revolution ended in 1783 with the Treaty of Paris of that year. I disagree. Oh, there may have been a treaty with Great Britain, but the behavior of the officers commanding British Army forces in North America never changed toward the Americans, nor — for that matter — did the behavior of the Royal Navy toward American flagged ships. Among more than a few senior British Army and Navy officers, an American Revolution “re-do” was a worthwhile undertaking. Officers commanding British forts in Canada never once stopped instigating Indian attacks against American western settlements or westward migrations — even to the extent of paying Indians for American scalps.
Renewed conflict with Great Britain in 1812 favored the Americans because, at the time, the British were up to their nickers in a fight with Napoleon Bonaparte. Because the priority for army forces was given to Europe, the British manned their North American forts with cadre staffs. Sadly, by 1812, America no longer had a George Washington to lead them. They had to rely on much older revolutionary era generals who, truth be known, weren’t all that good as generals when they were much younger.
While it was true that the early conflict favored the Americans, we should recall that America was once more at war with a powerful nation — and one that had one hand tied behind its back. It would have been advantageous to the Americans to win its War of 1812 early on — but no. Incompetent generals and one disaster after another denied the Americans a clear victory, even while confronting a much-diminished British army. It may have been too much for the Americans to covet Canada.
In 1814, Napoleon was soundly defeated, and when this occurred, the British were then able to turn their full attention to the United States. In that year, the British mauled the American army at Bladensburg, Maryland (See also: At Bladensburg, 1814), burned the city of Washington, and reasserted the Royal Navy’s control over the Eastern Seaboard (See also: Joshua Barney). It wasn’t until after the Treaty of Ghent, which officially ended the War of 1812, that General Jackson destroyed the British Army in New Orleans — (See also: At Chalmette, 1815) an American victory at last, but it was a superficial victory. The Americans did kill a lot of British soldiers — but to no good purpose.
Anderson, F. The War that Made America: New York: Penguin Books, 2005.
Brumwell, S. Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Curtis, E. E. The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution. New York: AMS Press, 1969.
Ellis, J. J. His Excellency, George Washington. New York: Knopf, 2004.
Fortescue, J. W. A History of the British Army (Thirteen volumes). New York: AMS Press, 1976.
Schenawolf, H. British Army Command and Structure in the American Revolution; Grenadier & Light Infantry Battalions. Revolutionary War Journal Online.
 North America included the thirteen British Colonies and after 1763, Canada.
 General Braddock’s overwhelming defeat was partly due to his lack of understanding about French activities and their shenanigans with native tribes. He also didn’t understand the Indians and had no interest in recruiting them for service with the British Army, which may have been a product of his aristocratic arrogance. Several additional issues plagued the operation from the beginning, including the difficulty in procuring the necessary supplies that would sustain his force while in the field. One the expedition began, he found the roadway was too narrow and in constant need of widening to move artillery and cargo wagons, it was rutted and painfully slow. His frustration in the lack of speed caused him to split his force. With 1,300 men in his “flying column,” he crossed the Monongahela River on 9 July, ten miles away from Fort Duquesne … but it was difficult terrain. The collision of both British and French/Indian forces surprised both groups. Braddock’s advance guard was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage. The Indians immediately assumed their usual practice of independent action; most of the French fled back to the Fort. Gage’s line of soldiers, wearing red coats, were difficult for the Indians to miss. As the soldiers began taking casualties, somewhat shaken by the war whoops of the Indians, Gage’s line became a shamble. Several of the British, in their confusion, fired on other British formations. Thereafter, the battle became a rout. Though Braddock exhibited personal courage and tenacity, the advantage went to the Indians, who were able to fire at the red coats from behind trees. It was the first time in North America where a British force was destroyed by an inferior number of enemy.
 In a manner similar to the way the modern-day BLMOs seek confrontations with police officers and random members of white society.