In 1968, President Richard Nixon created a commission to advise him on setting up an all-volunteer force (AVF). Referred to as the Gates Commission, its members considered manpower issues, logistics matters, attrition, retention, and long-term pensions and benefits accorded to careerists. They also had to evaluate combat effectiveness, combat sustainability, and the kind of individual that would make an ideal candidate for volunteer military service. It was an enormous task because the questions demanded in-depth research across a wide range of disciplines: economics, psychology, sociology, and legality. Some of the critical elements in deciding whether to proceed were budgetary because if the government wanted to create an AVF, then it would have to offer bonuses to enlist and reenlist, higher pay tables, and improved benefits
The new AVF became law in 1971 when President Nixon ended the draft and reduced the role of the Selective Service System to one of the pre-emergency registration programs. These changes became effective in 1973. Current law requires that all male citizens between the ages of 18-25 register with the SSS. In the event of a national emergency, and if authorized by Congress and the President, registered individuals could be rapidly called up for military service. At the same time, the government could compel individuals claiming conscientious objection to war for service in alternative (non-military) services to the country.
AVF Mixed Results
Since the implementation of the AVF, the active-duty force has become younger. Forty-nine percent of active-duty personnel are between the ages of 17-24. Today, 15% of the active-duty enlisted force is female (compared to only 2% of the force during the draft years), and 16% of the commissioned ranks are female.
Unlike the draft years, where only 42% of the forces were high school graduates, 92% of today’s service members graduated from high school. Among officers, 95% graduated from a four-year college or university, and 38% hold advanced degrees.
The AVF also created a more extensive “career force,” which means the number of married military personnel has increased. Again, 49% of the enlisted force structure is married, and 68% of the commissioned officer structure is married. These statistics significantly increase the government’s annual military manpower expenditures.
Most volunteers come from lower-to-middle class families. For the most part, upper-class people have no interest in serving their country. Racially, black Americans are over-represented in the AVF, presumably because these individuals have the most to gain from military service. America’s minorities generally do not benefit from public education, whereas the military provides valuable vocational training that enhances their post-military service employment opportunities. Conversely, Hispanics are under-represented in the AVF, possibly due to issues relating to immigration status.
The strength of effectiveness of the AVF relies on quality leadership. Many will argue that Americans aren’t getting quality leadership in 2022, beginning with the Commander-in-Chief and filtering down through department and service secretaries and the senior-most positions of the various military services. In essence, the problems include:
Persistent allegations that rather than focusing on combat readiness and effectiveness, the policies of top leaders (both civilian and military) place greater emphasis on social engineering and widespread social justice activism.
Americans are wary of protracted conflicts where there is no apparent national interest.
After training young men and women to fight, government officials are too quick to prosecute them for war crimes in conflict areas where the enemy dresses in civilian clothing and hide behind their women and children.
Rules of engagement seek more to protect enemy aliens than they do the safety and security of US combat forces.
US policies (such as the application of politically correct mandates) prevent rather than encourage battlefield victories.
Protracted conflicts obligate service-members to two or more combat tours within the period of their three or four-year enlistments.
Military personnel, particularly those from the lower enlisted ranks to the middle commissioned ranks, have lost confidence in their military leaders and no longer trust them to keep faith with those who work in the trenches, at home or abroad. As one example, the downsizing of the military increases the operational tempo of those who remain in uniform. Many feel that the service chiefs sacrifice the welfare of the troops for their own advancements — that the senior flag officers aren’t speaking clearly or powerfully enough to civilian leaders, who haven’t a clue about military service or operations.
While the government relinquishes military equipment to the enemy (Afghanistan), the military’s operational equipment is inadequate to their assigned missions. Cuts in recruitment and training endanger the front-line forces; the troops are working harder, with less, and senior leaders concentrate more on making Congress happy than they do in maintaining combat-ready troops.
American military volunteers have stepped up to the plate in defense of their homeland. Throughout all our history, despite the piffle in some quarters about America’s greatest generation, today’s young soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines are second-to-none in categories of military service prominence. And yet, morale within all the services is at an all-time low.
While most of the military’s large budget goes toward cost overruns and armament industry profits for producing second-rate weapons systems, large segments of our front line troops are required to attend racial sensitivity training (a re-hash of the old Human Relations Training discarded in the mid-1970s), and they are fed up with being called racists or misogynists.
Meanwhile, promotion for white soldiers has been placed on hold until the army adjusts the racial or gender balances. People who warrant promotion based on merit are denied promotion because of the government’s policy of reverse discrimination. It’s purely and simply reverse racism with the accompanying danger of “volunteer forces,” leaving the military drastically unprepared as they take their discharges at the end of their enlistments. Suppose that happens, and there is every indication that it is happening. How does the Biden government intend to address the problematic aggressive behaviors of America’s most likely enemies, China, Russia, and Iran? Without an AVF, Biden will likely have to arm himself and fight any subsequent battles alone.
The United States compelled military service in six wars: The Revolutionary War, Civil War, First World War, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. In most of these instances, war was already upon us before we realized that our standing military didn’t have sufficient manpower resources to sustain a large number of battle casualties. Before the United States entered into World War II, Congress passed, and President Roosevelt signed the Selective Training and Service Act, 1940. It was the country’s first “peacetime” military draft. Between 1940-1973, during peace and war, the government compelled military service because there were insufficient volunteers with which to fully staff a force-in-readiness, but the numbers of individuals needed have always been within the purview of the President of the United States because it is the President’s budget that decides staffing levels relative to the military’s tables of organization.
Colonial and Early American Period
During the colonial period, the primary means of military defense involved militia units. Colonial (and later, the law of the United States) required able-bodied men to enroll in a local militia, undergo minimal training, and serve for limited periods in times of war or emergency. The bedrock of this system was the several states because, under the Articles of Confederation, the central government could not compel the states to do anything. Nevertheless, the states had no hesitation in requiring their men to serve in the state’s militia. Generally, these militia inductees would serve for one year after the states placed them into service with the Continental Army.
In ratifying the U. S. Constitution, states acknowledged the power of Congress to impose mandatory military service, particularly Article I, Section 8, Clauses 11 through 16. Despite its authority to maintain a military force, Congress was not always disposed to doing so. The House of Representatives publicly derided President James Madison when he asked for 40,000 men to serve during the War of 1812.
American Civil War
Although most of the Union forces were volunteers, the first national conscription occurred during the Civil War — about 2% of the 2.2 million men fighting for the Union Army. Within the Confederate States, however, military officials imposed conscription almost immediately. The popular reaction to this law was violent and widespread because many southern whites viewed it as a form of slavery. There were more “desertions” in the southern states than in the north because the Confederacy (a) had far fewer volunteers, and (b) the application of conscription standards was much harsher.
World War I
Initially, President Woodrow Wilson (who campaigned on keeping the United States out of the European War) imagined he could rely on volunteers to man the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), but when 73,000 men responded to calls for military service, Wilson signed into law the Selective Service Act of 1917. The law offered exemptions for married men, religious objectors, and essential occupations (such as railroad workers). Initially, the law applied to males aged 21 to 31, but this later increased to include 18-45-year-old men.
In that year, ten million men registered for the draft. By 1918, the government had registered 24 million men. Ultimately, 3 million men found themselves in uniform … the success of which is frequently explained by the censorship laws imposed by the Wilson administration. Despite these successes, there was widespread opposition to the military draft in 1917-18. The Army court-martialed any draftee who refused to wear a uniform declined to bear arms or submit to military authority. Some of these men received sentences of up to twenty years in prison, but those men were the fortunate cases. Other convictions included 17 death sentences, 142 life sentences and sent 345 men to work in labor camps. Other war protestors were arrested, charged, and convicted for sedition and obstruction of the law.
World War II
By the summer of 1940, Germany was marching through Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and France. Most Americans supported military conscription because 67% believed that the Axis Powers posed a danger to the security of the United States. Roosevelt’s Selective Training and Service Act was the nation’s first peacetime military draft and established the Selective Service System (SSS) as an independent agency responsible for identifying and inducting young men for military service. Initially, the law set a limitation on 900,000 men for training at any one time and mandated one year’s service.
After Japan’s attack at Pearl Harbor, Congress amended the STSA to require service for the duration of the war, plus six months for those between 18 to 64 years. During World War II, the SSS registered 49 million men and inducted ten million.
Between 1942 and 1945, federal law enforcement agencies investigated 373,000 draft evaders, charging, and sentencing 16,000 men for draft evasion. Of those opposed to the draft, most were of African descent living in the northern cities who were encouraged to refuse service by the Nation of Islam. Another minority group included 300 Japanese-Americans whom Roosevelt interned. The government charged all of these men with felony draft evasion and most served time in federal prison. Only 72,000 men registered as conscientious objectors in World War II; of those, 6,300 went to jail for refusing to answer their draft notices.
The Cold War Period
While the American people were willing to accept compulsory military service when the nation was at war or responding to other national emergencies, they also expected that the government would universally apply mandatory service. This sense of fairness began to erode in the 1960s when the government required service from some people but not others. For example, the SSS compelled single men over married men, poor men over those from wealthy families, proportionally more blacks than whites and offered exemptions to college students when those with no interest in attending college received notices to appear.
Politically, Americans differed with one another over the concept of compulsory service. Democrats, who’ve been most responsible for America’s involvement in lethal conflict, saw no problem forcing men into uniformed service, while Republicans and Libertarians insisted that the federal government had no right to impose military service on anyone. War protestors not only demonstrated against the Vietnam War, but they also demonstrated against the draft. Some of these men were even willing to serve a prison sentence (felony draft evasion) than serve in Vietnam, while others of their number simply moved to Canada.
(Continued next week)
 Officially, Table of Organization and Equipment, prescribes what a military unit should look like and how it should be equipped, to achieve its assigned combat mission. Generally, within a service organization, all combat units are structured the same (infantry, artillery, armor, fighter vs. bomber groups, etc.) and non-combat organizations mirror one another according to their assigned roles and missions are part of the so-called supporting establishment.
Following the Meiji Restoration in Japan and a devastating economic recession, people began migrating from the Japanese Islands because they needed jobs. Between 1869 and 1924, some 200,000 Japanese arrived in the Hawaiian Islands. An additional 180,000 migrated to the US mainland and the majority of those settled on the West Coast. Many of these people started small businesses and farms. Most arrived on the mainland before 1908. In that year, the United States banned the immigration of unskilled workers. A loophole in the law allowed the wives of men living in the United States to join their husbands — from this, the practice of women marrying by proxy and immigrating to the US, which resulted in a significant increase in the number of picture brides.
The increase of Japanese living in California resulted in steady resistance by European-Americans living on the West Coast. It was purely and simply racialism, as evidenced by the Asiatic Exclusion League, California Joint Immigration Committee, and Native Sons of the Golden West — all organized in response to the so-called “yellow peril.” These groups quite effectively influenced politicians to restrict Japanese immigrants’ property and citizenship rights in a manner similar to anti-Chinese migration. The Immigration Act of 1924 restricted the Japanese in the same way as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.
One effect of the 1924 ban is that it produced unusually well-defined generational groups within the Japanese-American community. The Issei, for example, were exclusively those who immigrated before the ban, some of whom elected to return to Japan. Because the United States placed a moratorium on Japanese immigration. Within Japanese-American communities, they were called Nisei. They were distinct from the Issei cohort — generally 15-20 years older than their wives.
Nisei were English speakers; Issei were generally not. Because the 1924 law prohibited Japanese immigrants from becoming naturalized citizens, the Issei became dependent upon their children whenever they rented or purchased property. By 1940, most Nisei had married and started their own families. Despite these handicaps, Japanese-Americans made significant contributions to California agriculture (and in other Western states), but overt racism forced them into establishing unique communities. The communities were, in turn, divided into Japanese prefecture groups. They also created Buddhist women’s associations, set up businesses to provide loans and financial assistance, and started Japanese language schools.
The rise of fascism in Japan in the 1930s prompted the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) to begin monitoring and surveilling Japanese-American communities in Hawaii. In 1936, under the direction of Democrat President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the ONI began compiling “suspect lists” of Japanese-Americans — citizens of the United States whom Roosevelt intended to place in “concentration” camps in the event of war with Imperial Japan.
The FBI began working with ONI in 1939. FDR commissioned a Detroit businessman named Curtis Munson to coordinate these efforts. In 1941, Munson informed the President that the so-called Japanese-American problem was “non-existent.” He reported “an extraordinary” degree of loyalty to the United States within Japanese-American communities. ONI Director Kenneth Ringle made a similar report to the President in 1942.
Still, six weeks after Japan’s “sneak attack” on Pearl Harbor, Army Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt openly questioned the loyalty of Japanese-Americans and proclaimed, “A Jap’s a Jap.” The State of California vigorously joined DeWitt in questioning Japanese-American loyalty by claiming that persons of Japanese ancestry were “totally unassimilable.”
FDR’s Executive Order 9066 (signed on 19 February 1942) authorized military commanders to designate military exclusion zones at their discretion. DeWitt did precisely that on 2 March 1942, ordering all Japanese-Americans living within those zones to depart immediately. Within a few weeks, however, DeWitt reversed himself. After that, he prohibited Japanese-Americans from leaving these exclusion zones, imposed curfews, and placed restrictions on their freedom of movement.
Only one civilian official protested this treatment: Colorado governor Ralph Lawrence Carr. Meanwhile, DeWitt issued more than a hundred exclusion orders over the next five months. By August 1942, federal officials moved American citizens of Japanese ancestry to far distant/remote locations.
Toward the end of the war, the relocation centers began to close. Of more than 70,000 Japanese-American internees, only three (3) challenged the constitutionality of Roosevelt’s order.
Threats to American Constitutional guarantees and liberties continue today. If the reader believes these historical examples were severe, some today argue that it’s getting even worse. Certain political groups, activists, and other morons demand restrictions on freedoms of speech, association, and pamphleteering. Political militants aside, there is no more significant threat to individual liberty than that imposed by the United States government, which conspires to undermine the rights and privileges of American citizenship.
The government’s intrusion into our private lives, as demonstrated by the so-called Patriot Act, the creation of secret courts, the policy of intercepting, reading, and storing data obtained from electronic media, and the government dictate that we (a free people) remain under arrest in our quarters — threatens our American Republic. The preceding “case histories” serve as warnings to us about presidents and their henchmen who not only think they have extraordinary power over us — they do.
The Supreme Court may safeguard the Constitution, but it does nothing to safeguard the rights of citizens who became victims of the government’s unconstitutional overreach. It did nothing to free those who sat in isolated cells while remaining uncharged, unindicted, and untried by a jury of their peers. The high court did not prevent Woodrow Wilson from targeting Americans for expressing their dissenting opinions, and it did nothing to protect Japanese-Americans from President Roosevelt’s Gestapo.
We know what the federal government is capable of doing. With this knowledge, every American must view politicians, bureaucrats, and government policy with deep suspicion. No government is trustworthy. After all, the government reintroduced blacks to the slavery of low expectation and government subsidy; in the same way, the government destroyed the American Indians. It remains up to people who value their liberty to refuse to relinquish their human rights, their rights as citizens. No one in the government will protect us. Preserving our freedom is OUR duty.
Connell, T. America’s Japanese Hostages: The US Plan for a Japanese Free Hemisphere. Praeger-Greenwood, 2002.
McGinty, B. The Body of John Merryman: Abraham Lincoln and the Suspension of Habeas Corpus. Harvard University Press, 2011.
Hall, K. L. (Ed.) The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States. Oxford University, 1992.
Lewis, W. Without Fear or Favor: A Biography of Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney. Houghton Mifflin, 1965.
Robinson, G. By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans. Harvard University Press, 2009.
 Carr also lost his bid for reelection because of his stance.
 Tule Lake, California, Minidoka, Idaho, Manzanar, California, Topaz, Utah, Jerome, Arkansas, Heart Mountain, Wyoming, Poston, Arizona, Granada, Colorado, and Rohwer, Arkansas.
My thanks to Mr. Koji KANEMOTO for his much-valued assistance and participation in the research, preparation, and editing of this post.
No one can say that Abraham Lincoln didn’t have a full plate during the American Civil War and filling up that plate began even before he assumed office. No one should have to endure that kind of stress — tensions that lasted for four long years — but it was Lincoln himself who signed up for that slog-fest. In 1861, the nation’s capital lay in the center of southeastern slave territories. Although Maryland didn’t secede from the Union, Southern sympathies were widespread in that state. Maryland’s possible secession was one of many factors Lincoln had to consider in defining his domestic agenda.
John Merryman (1824-1881) was the father of eleven children, a farmer in Cockeysville, Maryland, and a president of the Board of County Commissioners of Baltimore County. Before the outbreak of the Civil War, Merryman also served as Third Lieutenant of Baltimore County Troops. In 1861, he served as First Lieutenant in the Baltimore County Horse Guards. On Friday, 19 April 1861, anti-war Democrats (calling themselves Copperheads) joined with other Southern sympathizers to oppose certain Massachusetts and Pennsylvania militia members. They were mobilizing in Baltimore as a defense force for the city of Washington. Hostilities erupted when the Copperheads attempted to prevent the aforementioned Yankee militia from moving to Washington.
On 20 April, Maryland’s governor Thomas H. Hicks (a pro-slave/anti-secession Democrat) and Baltimore mayor George W. Brown dispatched Maryland State Militia to disable the railroad tracks and bridges leading out of Baltimore. Hicks later denied issuing any such order. In any case, one of the low-level Maryland militia leaders was none other than John Merryman.
On 27 April, President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus. This Latin phrase means, “We command that you must produce the body at court.” The writ prohibits unlawful detention or imprisonment and compels “government authority” to produce a prisoner to the court so that the accused can appear before a jurist. It is a mechanism for ensuring the right of an accused to have his day in court.
In suspending the writ, Lincoln’s purpose was to give military authorities power to arrest, detain, and silence dissenters and rebels. Was Lincoln’s act lawful? According to experts in Constitutional law — yes. A president may suspend the Constitution when rebellion or invasion occurs, and public safety requires it.
On 25 May, Union military forces arrested Mr. Merryman for his role in destroying railroad tracks and bridges and escorted him to a cell at Fort McHenry. Merryman remained there for several months. If it were up to President Lincoln, Merryman would stay in that cell to this very day. Some would argue that the federal government violated Mr. Merryman’s constitutional rights. Through his lawyer, Merryman petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition was presented to, of all people, the Chief Justice of the United States, Roger B. Taney — a native of Maryland and the federal circuit court judge for Maryland.
We know from history that Lincoln’s election to the presidency led several states to secede from the Union. We also know that the first hostile act of the Civil War occurred in Baltimore, which means that the bombardment of Fort Sumter was not the initiating action of the Civil War — so we should stop saying that.
Roger B. Taney was an anti-Lincoln jurist who saw it as his duty to remain seated on the high court rather than resigning his appointment to serve the Confederacy. As with Governor Hicks (and many others of his day), Taney was a pro-slavery anti-secessionist. As a jurist, he believed that states had a Constitutional right to secede from the Union. As a man, he detested Lincoln, believing that he was responsible for destroying the Union. From his position on the high court, Taney would challenge Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, arguing that only Congress could do that. And he loathed Lincoln’s interference with civil liberties.
Through non-acquiescence (where one branch of the government refuses to acknowledge the authority of another branch of government), Lincoln ignored Taney’s ruling. Lincoln nevertheless addressed the issue in a message to Congress in July 1861. In his letter, Lincoln cited Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution (previously mentioned).
Eventually, Lincoln doubled down on suspending habeas corpus by extending it on a much larger scale, which some would argue violated the rights of citizens throughout the war. Eventually, Lincoln’s policy softened somewhat in Maryland, but only out of concern that Maryland might also secede from the Union. After the Merryman arrest, however, Lincoln channeled such actions through Congress. It was a workable arrangement because, in 1863, Congress passed the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act.
Chief Justice Taney passed away in 1864, aged 87 years. He served as Chief Justice of the United States for 28 years, 198 days — the second-longest tenure of any chief justice and the oldest ever serving Chief Justice in United States’ history.
Ultimately, John Merryman was turned over to civilian authorities and allowed to post bail. The government finally dropped its treason charges against Merryman in 1867; he was never brought to trial. Six years later, in a case unrelated to Merryman’s, the high court ruled that civilians were not subject to military courts even in times of war. As it turned out, the Merryman case was not the last time the federal government suspended American civil rights.
America in 1916
Americans saw no reason to involve themselves in Europe’s “great war” of 1914. Few people knew where the Austro-Hungarian Empire was, much less who was in charge of it, so the assassination of the heir to the throne was a non-event. Nor did many Americans care about the wartime alliances. The whole affair, in the mind of most Americans, was none of our business. President Woodrow Wilson, a progressive Democrat, proclaimed United States’ neutrality — a view widely supported by the American people — including many immigrants from the belligerent countries.
Yet, despite Wilson’s claim of neutrality, American capitalists were quick to take advantage of war-related opportunities. Europeans needed food, materials, and American-made munitions. Not only were American companies happy to sell these goods to the Europeans, but American banks were also happy to loan money to the Europeans so that they could purchase those goods. This financial involvement gave the United States a stake in the winner of the Great War. The trick for the Americans was to find a way to safely send American-made goods to the allied powers — through seas patrolled by German submarines.
When RMS Lusitania was laid down in 1904, the British government decided to subsidize its construction costs, provided that the Cunard Line agreed to allow Lusitania to serve as an Armed Merchant Cruiser (AMC) should Great Britain need her in time of war or other national emergencies. The British government placed Lusitania on its list of AMCs in 1914, but Lusitania’s exorbitant operating costs caused the government to reverse that decision. Whether the British ever got around to informing the Germans of this decision is unknown.
For their part, Imperial Germany gave due notice and warning to anyone booking passage on Lusitania: since a state of war existed between Germany and Great Britain, all Allied vessels were targets of the German Imperial Navy. From Germany’s point of view, knowing full well that Lusitania’s holds contained U. S. manufactured war materials intended to aid the Allied powers, Lusitania became a legitimate target. After all, Britain’s decision to allow passengers on a de facto AMC vessel wasn’t Germany’s problem — and besides — the United States’ claim of neutrality was laughable.
It was no surprise to anyone in the hierarchy of either government when a German submarine torpedoed Lusitania on 7 May 1915. Twelve hundred people lost their lives, including 128 Americans. By this time, anti-German war propaganda was in full swing. Stories of German military atrocities targeting civilians appeared regularly in the American press, such as the Rape of Belgium, which claimed that the German army was responsible for the death or injury to 46,000 innocents. Even though President Wilson maintained his non-intervention policy, anti-German passions increased throughout the United States.
Meanwhile, the Mexican Revolution (1910-1921) was in full swing. Mexican bandits attacked, murdered, and looted American homesteaders living along the US/Mexican border with increasing regularity. In 1916, Wilson dispatched US troops to the southern border and ordered General “Black Jack” Pershing into Mexico to capture or kill Pancho Villa. Anticipating conflict on two fronts, President Wilson asked for and gained congressional authority to increase the size of the U. S. Army, National Guard, and U. S. Navy.
American voters reelected Wilson to a second term in November 1916. By this time, the anti-German passions led some Americans to join the French Army, French Foreign Legion, and French Air Service.
After the German Imperial government announced its intent to resume unrestricted submarine warfare, President Wilson severed diplomatic relations with Germany. Germany responded by targeting American merchant ships in the North Atlantic.
In January 1917, British codebreakers intercepted an encrypted German telegram addressed to the German Ambassador to Mexico. The telegram instructed the Ambassador to propose an alliance between Germany and Mexico against the United States. In essence, should the United States join the allied war effort, Germany suggested a pact with Mexico with military assistance regaining the territory lost to the United States during the Mexican-American War (1848): Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. History recalls this communique as the Zimmerman Telegram.
British diplomats handed the Zimmerman Telegram to Wilson on 24 February, and Wilson released it to the American press on 1 March. The effect of publishing this information was, as anticipated, wide-scale public outrage toward both Germany and Mexico (even though Mexico never officially acknowledged the proffered alliance). The United States declared war on Germany on 4 April 1917.
After declaring war, Wilson focused almost exclusively on his foreign policy agenda — leaving domestic affairs to his “war cabinet.” The cabinet’s chief concern was the expansion of the military, food distribution, fuel rationing, and consumer conservation. Within three years, America’s annual budget exploded from around $1 billion in 1916 to nearly $20 billion in 1920. Congress raised taxes through the War Revenue Act of 1917 and the Revenue Act of 1918, increasing the top tax rate to 77% and expanding the number of citizens subject to personal income taxes.
Wilson’s tax scheme was unsettling from several points of view. Because tax increases were by themselves insufficient, the federal government began issuing low-interest war bonds. To encourage investment, Congress made the interest paid on these bonds tax-free. One consequence of this policy was that it encouraged citizens to borrow money for the purchase of bonds. This, in turn, produced two additional effects: an increase in inflation and (by 1929) the Stock Market crash.
Not everyone was pleased with Wilson’s decision to enter World War I. Without realizing their country’s economic involvement with European nations at war, many Americans demanded that the United States maintain its neutrality. Other groups opposed the military draft (the first of its kind in the world). Other opposition groups included pacifists, anarchists, socialists, labor union workers, Christians, anti-militarists, the so-called “Old Right,” and women’s peace groups. Among the socialists were Irish, German, and Russian immigrants whose “loyalty” to the United States Wilson always questioned. While young Americans were fighting and dying for the American way, Wilson, fearing that dissidents would undermine his war effort, signed the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918. Both acts criminalized disloyal, profane, scurrilous, and abusive language toward the United States government, the military, or any speech or language intended to incite insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of conscription. They were among the most egregious of the government’s violations of the Constitution and Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court upheld several convictions based on “limitations of free speech in a time of war.” See also Schenck v. United States and Note 4.
(Continued next week)
Connell, T. America’s Japanese Hostages: The US Plan for a Japanese Free Hemisphere. Praeger-Greenwood, 2002.
McGinty, B. The Body of John Merryman: Abraham Lincoln and the Suspension of Habeas Corpus. Harvard University Press, 2011.
Hall, K. L. (Ed.) The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States. Oxford University, 1992.
Lewis, W. Without Fear or Favor: A Biography of Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney. Houghton Mifflin, 1965.
Robinson, G. By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans. Harvard University Press, 2009.
 The sinking of the Lusitania underscored Germany’s success in espionage, and America’s failure in counter-espionage.
 Wall Street investors were making large profits from their arrangement with the Allied Powers — even after federal taxes, but they would make a lot more money by investing in post-war reconstruction. This would become part of the post-war boom that was so profitable, people borrowed money to invest in the stock market. When the Stock Market crashed in 1929, due to the over-valuation of stocks, people not only lost their investments, they also became indebted with no way to repay their personal loans. It was a behavior that caused investors to throw themselves off buildings.
 Later, partially in reaction against the Bolshevik Revolution and the rising tide of socialism in Europe, a more general anti-immigrant sentiment gripped America. For example, through the Palmer Raids of the 1920s, the Department of Justice rounded up thousands of foreigners who were alleged communists, anarchists, labor reformers, or otherwise menaces to society. Many were forcibly deported.
 The years surrounding America’s involvement in World War I were a watershed for how the United States treated foreigners within its borders during wartime. Immigrants had flooded the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. When the United States declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917, almost a third of Americans were either first or second-generation immigrants. Those born in Germany and even American-born citizens of German descent fell under suspicion of being disloyal.
My thanks to Mr. Koji KANEMOTO for his much-valued assistance and participation in the research, preparation, and editing of this post.
On 15 April 1861, two days after South Carolina militia bombarded Fort Sumter, President Abraham Lincoln issued a proclamation declaring an insurrection against the laws of the United States. In total, there were only 15,000 men in U. S. Army uniform — hardly enough men to impose Lincoln’s will on eight seceding states, so to suppress the Confederacy and restore federal authority, Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers for 90-days service. Apparently, Mr. Lincoln was thinking that forcing southern states into compliance would be an abbreviated affair. He later accepted the voluntary service of 40,000 additional troops with three-year enlistments. These combined actions increased the strength of the Army to around 200,000. Whether prudent, Mr. Lincoln’s actions prompted four other states to secede.
In the North
During April, thousands of bright-eyed, excited, adventurous young men streamed into the nation’s capital to join the fight and defend the nation’s capital. The Army’s General-in-Chief was Lieutenant General Winfield Scott. His plan for suppressing the rebels was to send an army of 80,000 men down the Mississippi River and capture New Orleans. As the Army strangled the southern economy, the Navy would blockade all Southern ports along the eastern United States and western Gulf Coast of Florida. The press was not particularly kind to General Scott or his scheme of maneuver.
In July 1861, thousands of young men were wearing army uniforms and encamped at various locations around the city of Washington. With members of the press and politicians wagging their tongues daily, political pressure was building for Mr. Lincoln to do something. Lincoln’s problem was that his Army Commanding General was 75-years-old. Who would lead these young men into battle? The president’s ultimate selection was both political and expedient.
Irvin McDowell was a graduate of the United States Military Academy, class of 1838. McDowell was a competent staff officer with limited command experience. In April 1861, McDowell was an Army major assigned to the office of the Adjutant General. In less than a month, McDowell advanced from Major to brigadier general. The staff officer suddenly found himself in command of the Military Department of Northeast Virginia and Army of Northern Virginia — on paper, around 35,000 men organized into five infantry divisions. No one knew better than McDowell that he was entirely out of his depth.
Politics ruled the day, however. With everyone clamoring for Lincoln to do something, he did. He placed 35,000 men in uniform. There was no time for much combat training, of course, and McDowell was at least smart enough to realize that this was a problem. After voicing his concerns to Lincoln, the president told McDowell, “You are green, but they are green also; you are all green alike.” One can only imagine what McDowell was thinking about that sage advice. But McDowell was more than out of his depth as a field commander. Thanks to Confederate spy/socialite Rose O’Neal Greenhow, the Confederacy had a copy of McDowell’s battle plan for Manassas.
In any case, Brigadier General McDowell’s battle plan was exceedingly ambitious. He intended to make a diversionary attack with two divisions, send a third against the Confederate flank, cut off the railway line to Richmond, push the rebels out of Manassas and save the city of Washington. After reading McDowell’s battle plan, Brigadier General P. G. T. Beauregard, commanding the Alexandria Line, must have laughed. McDowell couldn’t have accomplished that even with an experienced army. He would be facing around 24,000 Confederate and state militia.
In The South
In 1861, Brigadier General Joseph E. Johnson served as Quartermaster General of the U. S. Army. When his home state seceded from the Union, Johnson resigned his commission and returned to Virginia. Initially, Virginia officials offered Johnson a commission as a major general in the state militia but later rescinded it and instead offered him a commission as a brigadier general. Virginia only needed one major general, and they preferred Robert E. Lee to Johnson. Johnson’s problem was that in the Union Army, he was a brigadier general, while Lee was only a colonel. Seniority matters, so, rather than serving under someone junior in rank, Johnson accepted a commission as a brigadier general in the Confederate States Army.
Johnson was a talented officer with considerable experience throughout his tenure in the U. S. Army, but there was between him and Confederate President Jefferson Davis a strained relationship. Initially, Davis appointed Brigadier General Johnson to relieve Colonel Thomas J. Jackson of his command at Harpers Ferry; he later ordered Johnson to assume command of the Army of Shenandoah. In this capacity, Johnson would be in a position to support Brigadier General Beauregard at Manassas.
Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard (also known as P. G T. Beauregard) was the brother-in-law of John Slidell, a lawyer, politician, and businessman. Slidell previously served as U. S. Minister to Mexico (1844-45). In January 1861, the War Department appointed Beauregard to serve as Superintendent of the U. S. Military Academy at West Point. Five days later, Louisiana seceded from the Union, and the War Department revoked Beauregard’s appointment. Beauregard vigorously protested such treatment and soon after resigned from the U. S. Army and returned to his home in Louisiana. Beauregard anticipated that the governor of Louisiana would offer him command of the state militia, but that position was instead offered to and accepted by General Braxton Bragg. Bragg offered Beauregard a colonelcy, but there was an issue of pride once again, and Beauregard instead enlisted as a private in the Orleans Guards.
Again, President Davis came to the rescue and, on 1 March 1861, appointed Beauregard a Brigadier General and placed him in command of the defenses at Charleston, South Carolina. Beauregard was the first general officer appointment of the Confederacy, but the process of general officer appointments was haphazard. In a few months, Beauregard would become a full (four-star) general, one of only seven promoted to that rank, but he would end up junior to four others: Samuel Cooper, Albert S. Johnson, Robert E. Lee, and Joseph E. Johnson.
On 12 April, Beauregard ordered the commencement of hostilities with Fort Sumter, a bombardment lasting 34 hours. President Davis later summoned Beauregard to Richmond for a new assignment. He would assume command of the Alexandria Line. Beauregard immediately began planning for the defense of Manassas, including a concentration of forces along with those of General Johnson at Harpers Ferry. Johnson was senior to Beauregard, but he was unfamiliar with the Manassas area and ceded tactical planning to Beauregard. President Davis had great confidence in Beauregard as a field commander, but less with his ability as an operational planner. Beauregard tended to formulate overly complicated schemes of maneuver without due consideration for logistics, intelligence, and political realities.
There is nothing particularly glorious about battle except, perhaps, in the minds of those who’ve never experienced it. When the fighting is finally over, there is, of course, deep gratitude among survivors, and a peculiar bonding takes place among those survivors — for a little while — until everyone returns home and the nightmares and guilt arrive. The guilt isn’t reflective of what combatants had to do in combat. It’s for having the audacity (or luck) of living through it. Many of their friends didn’t.
No doubt, the young men of both armies, whether officer or enlisted, had similar thoughts. Aside from the excitement of a great undertaking, no doubt caused by increased adrenalin, there was also fear — a fear so palpable, one can smell it. Ordinary people fear death, of course, but what concerned these youngsters most was the prospect that fear would paralyze them. Fear is a powerful thing — no one wants to be a coward. Youngsters worry about such things. They fear that in an unannounced split second when it occurs to them that running away offers life and remaining behind guarantees death, they will choose to run away. A reasonable person will conclude that remaining behind in a fight that they’re losing is an irrational response to utter chaos — but there is nothing rational about combat, and adrenalin is an equally powerful antidote.
Two untrained armies began moving toward one another in mid-July 1861. Oh, they may have had enough training to know how to line up, and maybe even how to wheel right or left, but they didn’t know (or trust) their officers, they barely knew their NCOs, and they may not have known the name of the man standing next to them. The bonding process among combatants had yet to take hold. It was a time when there was no leadership — only followership. How the man standing next to them reacted to gunfire or exploding artillery influenced how they, themselves, responded to such trauma. Watching someone running to the rear was a powerful incentive to join him — and so too was witnessing the decapitation of the next man in line. Panic in the ranks can arrive as fast as flood water, and no one is immune to its effects without intense training and prior experience on the line.
The morning of 16 July began shaping up as a genuine goat-rope; it only got worse as the day progressed. Formed regiments milled around along the roads while their officers tried to organize them into a line of march, and the men waited patiently while their officers and NCOs struggled to figure it out. Hurry up and wait is an American military tradition.
After hours of fumbling about, General McDowell finally led his army out of Washington. It was the largest army ever formed on the North American continent — around 28,000 men (18,000 infantry) present. Army commanders mustered everyone they could get their hands on — even Marines.
With pressure from the War Department to bolster McDowell’s army, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Wells ordered the Commandant of the Marine Corps to form a battalion of “disposable” Marines for duty in the field. In 1861, U. S. Marines were seagoing infantry; they were not trained for field duty. Major John G. Reynolds assumed command of the Marine battalion and reported to McDowell. None of the Marines had any field equipment — all of them were raw recruits. The best they could do in the upcoming fight was to help resupply artillery units with powder and shot.
McDowell hoped to have his army at Centerville by 17 July, but the troops were unaccustomed to marching long distances. The distance from Washington to Manassas was 30 miles. En route, formations would bunch up along the road, stop, wait, and start again. Some soldiers, bored with the walk (it was hardly a march), would break formation to wander off into an orchard to rest and pick apples from the trees. They were an undisciplined lot and largely ignored the orders of their officers and NCOs to “get back in ranks.”
On 17 July, Beauregard encamped his army near Manassas — the men busily preparing their defenses along the south bank of Bull Run. His left flank, under Brigadier General Evans, blocked the stone bridge. General McDowell was initially confident that he would overwhelm a numerically inferior enemy and equally optimistic that Brigadier General Robert Patterson, whose orders were to engage General Johnson’s Army of the Shenandoah, would prevent Johnson from reinforcing Beauregard.
Weather and climate are among the more critical factors of warfare because it affects both strategy and tactics. July in Northern Virginia is hot and humid, and that’s what it was on 21 July 1861. Rain-swollen rivers impede the flow of troops and supplies. Muddy roads bring everything to a halt. Rain prevents muskets from firing — which often necessitated bayonets and hand-to-hand combat. Wind and rain made everyone miserable. The exposure to the elements made people sick. Heat and humidity cause heat casualties. In short, weather can be a war stopper.
By the time McDowell reached Manassas, he was under a great deal of stress. The ninety-day enlistments of several regiments were about to expire. He also received word from Patterson that General Johnson had slipped out of the Shenandoah Valley. If true, McDowell would face 34,000 rebels rather than 22,000. On the morning of 22 July, two of McDowell’s commands, their enlistments having expired, left the field. Despite his pleadings, the soldiers had no interest in remaining on the field. In McDowell’s mind, time was running out. He began making rash decisions. He was starting to panic, and his subordinate commander’s lost confidence in his leadership.
By the time the shooting started, Beauregard’s and Johnson’s armies were tied in with one another, and more reinforcements were on the way. McDowell received a string of faulty intelligence.
The Union forces began their day at 02:30 when two divisions under Hunter and Heintzelman (12,000 men) marched from Centerville toward Sudley Springs. General Tyler’s division (8,000 men) marched toward Stone Bridge. In many places, the road approach to Sudley Springs was inadequate for so many men, artillery, and supply wagons in many places being no more than rutted footpaths. The Union advance slowed to a crawl. Fording Bull Run did not begin until 09:30, and the Union advance was no surprise to the Confederates. When the two forces finally engaged that morning, it was more of an exercise in maneuver warfare than frontal assault or envelopment. McDowell’s commanders struggled to get their men in position.
However, when the Union forces finally did strike the Confederate line, the rebel line collapsed, sending inexperienced boys into a panicked retreat. The Union might have pursued them were it not for the exceptional artillery support from men like Captain John D. Imboden. McDowell’s failure to press his advantage gave the Confederates time to reform their line.
At this time, Brigadier General Thomas J. Jackson’s Virginia Brigade came forward in support of the re-organizing Confederate defense. Jackson, accompanied by J. E. B. Stuart’s cavalry and Wade Hampton’s Legion, quickly set up a defensive line along the Henry House Hill ridgeline. Hampton’s Legion thoroughly decimated the New York 79th, whose troops began a helter-skelter retreat. The only Union soldier from the NY 79th who advanced under Hampton’s withering fire was Colonel James Cameron, the regimental commander. As Cameron advanced, his men abandoned him and ran to the rear. Cameron was soon killed.
To shield his men from the Union’s direct fire, Jackson posted his five regiments on the reverse slope of Henry House Hill. Jackson then placed thirteen artillery pieces to best defend the line, all out of sight of the Union troops. The Confederate’s smooth-bore guns gave them an advantage over the Union artillery’s rifled guns because the Union guns were too close to their enemy’s positions and fired their more powerful pieces over the heads of the Confederate troops.
When Confederate Brigadier General Barnard E. Bee (Commanding 3rd Brigade) complained to Jackson that the Union was driving them (forcing them back), Jackson calmly replied, “Then, sir, we will give them the bayonet.” Bee then returned to his brigade and exhorted them, “There [pointing] is Jackson standing like a stone wall. Let us determine to die here, and we will conquer. Let us rally behind the Virginians!”
It was Jackson’s refusal to yield the line that gave him the nickname Stonewall Jackson. Afterward, Jackson’s brigade launched a crushing assault against the Union line, capturing Union artillery and quickly sending hundreds of Union soldiers to the rear. Jackson’s brigade devastated these troops with fire and bayonet. Still, nothing spooked the Yankees more than the rebel yell, which Jackson (a college professor at the Virginia Military Institute) knew it would. It was the first time Union troops heard the rebel yell, but it would not be the last time. It was this daring assault that changed the course of the Battle of Bull Run.
At about 16:00, two Confederate Brigades (Early’s and Smith’s) assaulted Howard’s Union Brigade on Chinn Ridge and pushed it off the hill, delivering devastating casualties. It was not long before the young boys dressed in Union uniforms decided to live another day.
McDowell’s decision to withdraw was anything but orderly. Rather than controlling their men and easing their panic, Union officers were running foot races with their soldiers to see who could get back to the city of Washington first. McDowell ordered Miles’ division to form a rearguard, but those troops were only interested in protecting themselves. McDowell’s army didn’t rally until they reached the outskirts of Washington. To President Davis’ great dismay, neither Johnson nor Beauregard pressed their advantage on the retreating Union. Had they done so, Washington might have fallen to the Confederates at the beginning of the war.
That evening, President Lincoln received his much-awaited report on the battle of Manassas, but it wasn’t what he was hoping to hear. The message, in abbreviated form, was: “The day is lost. Save Washington.”
This is the story of two numerically powerful armies, both untrained, both (for the most part) poorly led, and both leaving behind a large number of casualties. McDowell lost 2,708 men (481 killed, 1,011 wounded, and 1,216 missing). Generals Johnson and Beauregard lost 1,982 men (387 killed, 1,582 wounded, 13 missing). On the morning of 21 July 1861, the ranks of both armies contained young boys who were excited beyond measure and full of vinegar. At the end of the day, some of those boys were broken, discouraged, or dead. In one single day, the survivors had learned all they would ever need to know about combat. It would never get any better, but it would get worse. Whether north or south, everyone who fought that day knew that this one battle was only the beginning of unspeakable carnage.
There would be a second battle at Manassas — in about a year.
Alexander, E. P. Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Gary W. Gallagher, ed. University of North Carolina Press, 1989.
Beatie, R. H. Army of the Potomac: Birth of Command, November 1860-September 1861. Da Capo Press, 2002.
Detzer, D. Donnybrook: The Battle of Bull Run, 1861. Simon & Schuster, 2001.
Longstreet, J. From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. Da Capo Press, 1992.
 The Orange and Alexandria Railroad linked markets in northern and central Virginia. Construction of the railroad began in 1850 and extended to Manassas and Gordonsville in 1851 and 1853. It was a primary communication route between Richmond and northern Virginia. The Alexandria Line became a strategic prize coveted by both Union and Confederate forces at Manassas, Bristoe Station, and Brandy Station.
 Brother of U. S. Secretary of War Simon Cameron.
 One casualty of the Union artillery was 89-year-old Judith Carter, an invalid, who was confined to her bed inside Henry House. Miss Carter was killed when Union artillery targeted the house, thinking that rebel snipers were shooting from upstairs windows.
 Jefferson Davis observed the fight from the battlefield, arriving at around 15:00 that afternoon.
The story of Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus, as with most of what we know about the ancient world, is wrapped in both fact and myth. Historians believe this because ancient record-keepers were more storytellers than historians. It is also likely that what they didn’t know as an absolute fact, they made up. That’s what storytellers do — and it usually does make for a good story.
In any case, according to the story, Cincinnatus saved Rome on two occasions. In 458 BC and 439 BC, the Senate of Rome summoned Cincinnatus, a modest farmer, and gave him dictatorial powers to raise an army to defend Rome — which he accomplished. Then, when the fighting was over, Cincinnatus promptly relinquished his power and returned to his beets.
If the story is true, then the account of Cincinnatus could provide us with the earliest example of a citizen-soldier (also known as militia). A militia is a military force raised from the civilian population during an emergency to serve in defense of the state (or community) or enforce the laws thereof.
Four hundred years later, during the Gallic Wars (a series of conflicts between 58-50 BC), Julius Caesar invaded Britannia because the Celts aided and assisted the enemies of Rome. Once Caesar had completed his punitive campaign, he returned to the continent — mission accomplished.
Rome’s formal occupation of Britain occurred between 43-410 AD. Roman government in Britain started well enough, but bribery, fraud, and treasonous behavior soon followed — presumably because corruption was part of Rome’s political landscape. Apparently, this is something the United States inherited from the ancients, as well. But life in Roman-Britain was further complicated by a more-or-less constant stream of invasions and assaults on Roman settlements by those who objected to Rome’s presence: the Picts, Irish/Scots, and later, the Anglo-Saxon hordes. By the beginning of the fifth century, Rome’s military resources were stretched to the limit. A more pressing need for military manpower at home forced the Romans to withdraw their legions.
During Britain’s Anglo-Saxon period (410-660), also known as the Migration Period, massive numbers of Germanic people escaped the chaos of their homeland and made their way to the Albion shore. Upon arrival, they quickly learned that they were no safer in Britain because of the constant presence of marauders from northern Europe. At best, these invaders helped create a sense of insecurity among the British people — at worst, the seeds of national paranoia. Of course, when people are trying to kill you, then you aren’t paranoid.
During this period of great peril, Anglo-Saxons established a tradition called “the common burden.” It was an obligation of community service toward the collective defense of towns and villages, and it was particularly noteworthy in the ancient settlements of Kent, Mercia, and Wessex. It would be safe to say that thousands of able-bodied men were called upon to defend their boroughs from evil-doers over several hundred years. By the 10th century, the common burden tradition had evolved, and it became the duty of landowners to assume the responsibility for organizing and maintaining armed militias.
Following the Norman invasion of England in 1066, William I saw the wisdom and prudence of local militias, and he incorporated the Anglo-Saxon tradition of the common burden. William’s grandson, Henry I of England, mandated the following: “He will possess these arms and will bear allegiance to the Lord King Henry, namely the son of Empress Maud, and he will bear these arms in His service according to His order and in allegiance to the Lord King and his realm.” — The Assize of Arms, 1181.
The Assize of Arms established armed militias (on-call) by dividing the free populations into socio-economic categories. Those who were wealthiest had the greater obligation to acquire and maintain various prescribed weapons. In 1285, the Statute of Winchester expanded the Assize to include every able-bodied male person regardless of their status (free men or those bonded to the land), who were between 15 and 60. Local gentry made the decision which of them served and under what circumstances. The Statute stated, “Every man shall have in his house arms for keeping peace according to the ancient Assize.” When called upon, the duty of these men might include expeditions away from their shire, local guard duty, local defense, and occasionally escort duties. Feudal military service ended during the reign of Edward III (1327-1377) — replaced by indentured service.
Indentured soldiers incurred an obligation to serve their lord for a specified length of time. It was the beginning of the profession of arms. When the lord no longer needed professional soldiers or could no longer afford them, he might sell the contract to another, or the lord might have permitted the soldier to serve another as a mercenary. In this way, soldiers began migrating from one conflict to another — mainly because the profession of arms is all they knew how to do.
A problem arose when there were no conflicts. In these instances, it was common to find that soldiers turned to outlawry — marauders who preyed on defenseless hamlets, villages, or towns. Circumstances like these caused town officials to return to the idea of local militias, and once more, locals served “on-call” of their community’s needs.
In 1581, British law stipulated, “If any [highborn] man being a Queen’s subject, and not having a reasonable cause or impediment, and being within the age of sixty years (except spiritual men, justices of the bench, or other justices of Assize, or barons of the Exchequer) have not a longbow and arrows ready in his house, or have not for every man child in his house between seven years and seventeen of age, a bow and two shafts, and every such being above seventeen years a bow and four shafts, or have not brought them up in shooting, if any man under the age of four and twenty years have not shot at standing targets (being above that age) have shot at any marks under eleven score yards with any pick shaft or flight,” shall be punished.
Translated, the Latin term Posse Comitatus means “force of the county.” It refers to a citizens group assembled by officials to deal with an emergency. The term also applied to any force or band called forth to confront hostiles.
By the time the English fixed their sights on North America, France and Spain already claimed much of it, and neither kingdom was well-disposed to share it with Englishmen. There was no regular English soldiery in the early formation of British colonies, so to protect themselves from assaults by Spanish coastal raiders and from hostile Indians sicced upon them by French colonial officials, English settlers created local militias modeled on those of the mother country. These early American militias were crucial to the survival of the British colonies.
Naturally, the Englishmen who migrated to North America took with them their long-held British values and traditions. Among these traditions was a general loathing for standing armies and the profession of arms. The reason for their profound contempt for the military was simple enough: British soldiers were instruments of government tyranny. Even after more than 100 years, British-American colonists viewed the Redcoat as a clear and present danger to colonial autonomy and liberty.
Beyond the preceding, British-American settlements were bastions of Puritan values. Outside instruments of a tyrannical parliament and king, American settlers were deeply offended by the uncouth Redcoat. He was profane, bawdy, and addicted to Satan’s beverages. Besides, the professional soldier was an outsider. Militia, on the other hand, was part of the community. They were family by blood or marriage, they were neighbors, and they were people who everyone could count on when needed — and so it was understandable that organized militia also viewed the Redcoats with suspicion.
The issue of suspicion and contempt was a two-way street because British regulars also had little regard for local militias. In the view of professional soldiers, militias were undisciplined and unreliable mobs who tended to bolt once the sound of that first shot reverberated through their ranks. This claim was, of course, valid. Colonial militia were not soldiers; they were farmers. They were undisciplined because they followed their own hook. They decided for themselves whether they liked the odds on the battlefield. More often than not, they made these decisions at the spur of the moment, prompted by others with similar fears, and usually, at the worst possible time.
The American militia was not an ideal defense mechanism, although some militias were more reliable than others. Some militia refused to fight outside their county/colony — but there were also great successes, such as demonstrated at the Battle of Louisbourg in Nova Scotia. But the militia was generally useful to colonial governments because once they activated the militia, officials could reposition the Redcoats elsewhere — where the need was greater.
Each British colony had a unique system for creating and maintaining its militia force. In most cases, regulations specified “able-bodied white males between the ages of 18 to 45.” Militias were formed under the auspices of the colonial charter, which required militia members to furnish their own armaments.
The first colonial militia was formed in Massachusetts in 1636. Historians tell us that the early organization of the Massachusetts militia explains how the New England militias became part of the political framework. More than one hundred years later, New England militia, having been thoroughly infiltrated by the Sons of Liberty, became the fuse that lit the American Revolution.
From Colonial to American Militia
American militia became the foundation of the Continental Army and played an important role in General Washington’s strategies throughout the war of independence. Militia carried out the siege of Boston, which gave Washington the time to organize his army and decide how best to prosecute the war. It was the militia that later became part of Washington’s sophisticated spy network.
After the war, the colonist’s distrust of standing armies carried over to the new United States, and Congress disbanded the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. A small American Legion was restored, but the only seaborne force remaining was the Revenue Cutter Service. Issues involving a state militia (and who should control it/pay for it) became hotly debated.
Despite the traditional distrust of standing armies, President Washington realized that the United States could not remain sovereign if it did not have the capacity of protecting its communities, ports, coastal regions, or its commerce — and so began the process of reconstituting the armed forces. The timing of Washington’s initiatives could not have been better; the Quasi-War (with France) and the War of 1812 (in which the American militia played an important role) were just around the corner.
The militia is a long-held American tradition — part of our British heritage — and, one might argue, one that has maintained faith with its original purpose. If modern Americans understood this history, they would realize that the strength of a community is that everyone belongs to it; everyone carries the burden of community obligation. Community watch programs are one manifestation of this. Community militias do not force membership — they are volunteer organizations. Such militias offer no monetary benefit; there is only a sense of accomplishment by serving the community’s interests. What are those interests? Common cause, mutual security, and survival.
In early America, militia organizations combined military defense with community policing. Militiamen served because their community needed them. But as we all know, time changes all things. In the past, American militia played a key role in the common burden even if it was not always professionally competent or efficient — but this is because they weren’t regular soldiers. They were homeboys who did the best they could with what they had and, much like another militia unit that we’ve all learned to respect — the Texas Rangers — militiamen were often shoddy looking characters, undisciplined, and would only follow the orders of the officers they themselves respected and elected. American militiaman decided whether and when to fight — and they chose when they’d had enough of it.
The American Civil War was a crossover period. There were militia organizations back then, but they became fewer once the regular army assumed responsibility for protecting settlers from Indian hostilities. They also became fewer in number when the law took hold. County sheriffs could hire deputies and raise (volunteer) posses. The United States had an army in 1861, but it wasn’t large enough to complete the task of preserving the Union. It fell upon the states to raise a force of volunteers to augment the regular armies on both sides of the issue. The people who volunteered to serve their state were the same kinds of people from an earlier period, albeit identifying more with their respective states than with their counties. Even so, recruitment for state regiments came from one or more counties. There were exceptions, of course. The Kansas Red Legs and Missouri Bushwhackers are two — but it is difficult to say whether these were truly area militias or simply armed thugs with a mean streak.
Today there are state guard units and national guard organizations. As one example, the Military Department of Texas includes the Texas State Guard and the Texas National Guard. Together, these two organizations are regarded as the Texas State Militia. The commander-in-chief of all state military forces is the governor, directed by the Adjutant General of Texas. The governor of Texas commands the Texas Department of Public Safety similarly, including the Texas Rangers and other state troopers. Unrelated to state government, there are also numerous volunteer militia groups throughout the United States.
Good vs. Bad, Right vs. Left
Lately, almost every discussion about the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States — the right to bear arms, has become a political narrative. There is nothing ambiguous about the Second Amendment, which states, “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.” Nevertheless, some continue to argue against this Constitutional right and regularly seek ways to limit or deny that right to citizens of the United States. Nearly every state addresses “the right of the people to keep and bear arms,” which is every state’s right under our system of constitutional federalism. Still, the debate continues. Pro-gun groups (including almost every private militia group) insist that the Second Amendment means what it says. Anti-gun groups insist that guns in the hands of private citizens pose a danger to public safety. Still, to make that argument, they must also ignore the history of the American militia. Criminals in Chicago have managed to elevate their city to a murder capital in the United States; yet, not one of these murdering thugs has ever belonged to a militia organization.
By claiming that anyone who supports the Second Amendment is a racist or a domestic terrorist, anti-gun arguments have become particularly nasty. In response, pro-gun enthusiasts echo the Gonzalez Flag of 1835: Come and take it.
Today, in making word associations between “militia” and “white supremacy” and “Bible-thumping Christians,” anti-gun criminals (those acting in contravention of the law) have increased the intensity of the debate, even claiming that gun-carrying citizens are un-American. It is an interesting argument given the entire history of militias and the people’s right and responsibility to bear arms dating back to 500 AD.
The English Bill of Rights of 1689 allowed citizens to “have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by the Law.” In modern arguments, particularly among those with a pro-gun point of view, and given Sir William Blackstone’s ageless opinion, we may argue that U.S. gun rights indeed are a primary example of American exceptionalism. Moreover, gun-rights advocates strenuously argue that the Second Amendment is an American’s only protection from federal totalitarianism. When one considers the numerous instances where the federal government has violated the constitutional rights of the American people, it is impossible to find fault with that reasoning.
Among those who argue that militias of an earlier time were ‘white supremacists,’ it is only accurate in the sense that many American communities (north, south, southwest, midwest, and northwest) were mired in the filth of Democratic Party politics and remained in that morass through the early 1970s. In the post-Civil War period, when radical Republicans placed the Freedman’s Bureau in charge of state governments, racial hatred increased — which serves as another example that too much government benefits no one.
Modern militias see themselves as a check against the totalitarian government — and while this would not have been possible in 1776, it certainly was the case a few years later during Shay’s Rebellion (Massachusetts) and the Whiskey Rebellion (western Pennsylvania). Oddly, some militias supported the rebellion, and other militias joining President Washington’s ranks. But returning to today, modern militias (generally) are not part of state mechanisms; they are privately organized, loosely connected groups of men and women who, for some reason, scare the hell out of the Democratic/Progressive Party apparatus.
Less than a year ago, federal authorities charged thirteen so-called Wolverine Watchmen (a Michigan-based militia) with terrorism, conspiracy, and weapons charges. Six men faced additional charges, which included conspiracy to commit the kidnapping of Governor Gretchen Whitmer. Lately, however, there is information that the entire episode was an FBI entrapment operation. Among those who have no trust or confidence in the federal government, they will argue that this isn’t the first time the FBI has created a crime in order to make an arrest. The ploy, so the argument goes, is first to outline a criminal act, plan it, participate in it, arrest the “perpetrators,” lay on them every possible criminal charge, and then let the event play out for years until no one even remembers what happened. Meanwhile, if none of these fellows are convicted, the federal government has destroyed them financially. There must be a lesson in all this, somewhere.
We should know that there are “bad actors” everywhere in our society, but if we hope to restore civil society, then we have to let the facts lead us to proper conclusions. There may be some off-center militias in America today, but they are few in number, and we serve no good purpose by applying a too-broad brush stroke to militias that see themselves as serving their communities.
AL Schuler, A. Sir William Blackstone and the Shaping of American Law. New Law Journal, 1994.
Beckett, I. F. W. Britain’s Part-Time Soldiers: The Amateur Military Tradition, 1558-1945. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Publishing, 2011.
Barnett, R. E., and Heather Gerken. Article I, Section 8: Federalism and the Overall Scope of Federal Power. National Constitution Center online.
Chermak, S. M. Searching for a Demon: The Media Construction of the Militia Movement. Dartmouth, 2002.
Tucker, S. G. Blackstone’s Commentaries: With Notes of Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Volumes 5. Philadelphia, 1803; Reprint 1969.
United States Constitution, Amendment II, 1792.
 Britannia is a personification of the ancient Roman Province, of the isles Britain and the British people; she is a helmeted female warrior, armed with a trident and a shield. In earlier times, the Roman name for Britain was Albion.
 Occupation rather than conquest because it is doubtful that any historian can make the argument that the Romans ever conquered the British people.
 By this time, of course, there was already a substantial Roman civilian presence in Britain. It was a Roman custom to award large land grants to legionnaires once they had served 25-30 years under Rome’s standard. These people and their descendants, became British farmers, blacksmiths, shopkeepers, and teamsters.
 Henry II of England, (also Henry Plantagenet) (1133-1189) (Reign 1150-1189) laid the foundation of English Common Law and influenced the development of societies in Brittany, Wales, and Scotland. Henry’s creation of armed militia to serve on call of the lord king was a reaction no to the so-called Great Revolt (1173-75).
 A court that convened at various intervals in each county of England and Wales to administer civil and criminal law. These courts existed until 1972 when the civil jurisdiction of Assizes was transferred to the High Court, and criminal jurisdiction was assigned to the Crown Court.
 Military indenture was a legal contract between a soldier and the man he served. The contract was written out twice on one sheet of paper and then cut into two in such a way that the jagged edges would fit together (hence the name indenture). The soldier retained one part, his captain the other. Any subsequent dispute would require that both parties fit the copies together to resolve the problem.
 Later reflected in the US Constitution: Article I, Section 8, Clause 12: [The Congress shall have the power …] “To raise and support armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer term than two years.”
 Initially formed as a secret society/separatist group to advance the rights of citizens and oppose the arbitrary imposition of taxes. The group disbanded after repeal of the Stamp Act, but the name was taken up by other local groups prior to the outbreak of hostilities between the British government and the colonies. Some might argue that secret societies and clandestine raids is a mark of cowards, bolstered by the fact that during the so-called Tea Party, they dressed themselves as Indians.
 “This may be the true palladium of liberty … The right of self-defence is the first law of nature. In most governments it has been the study of rulers to confine this right within the narrowest limits possible. Whenever standing armies are kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction.” Sir William Blackstone, 1803.
 In an article by R. E. Barnett, Georgetown University Law Center and Heather Gerken, Professor of Law at Yale, the authors provided an overview of Article 1, Section 8: Federalism and the Overall Scope of Federal Power. Historically, federal-state relations have always contested, with federalism undergoing four distinct phases: Enumerated Powers Federalism (1787), Fundamental Rights Federalism (1865), New Deal Federalism (1933), and State Sovereignty Federalism (1986-). The authors credit the Rehnquist Court with the revival of Enumerated Powers Federalism, and the Roberts Court, which continues the work of Rehnquist favoring state sovereignty over federal authoritarianism.