A Great Naval Officer

I feel privileged to have been part of our country’s naval establishment.  In my years as a Marine, I have known and worked with superb Navy officers.  So, I enjoy relating stories about the best of the lot, as opposed to officers (of any service) who allowed politics to interfere with their obligations as officers: we have had too many instances of this in our history going all the way back to the Revolutionary War—some of these more recent.

In my opinion, one of the great Naval officers in our history was Bowman Hendry McCalla (1844-1910), a man who was not only proficient in the application of naval power, but also one who demonstrated personal courage in the face of the enemy, and an officer who knew how to best utilize his Marines.  He wasn’t a perfect man; he made mistakes, as we all have from time to time, but he was a good man who did his best to serve the United States of America.

McCalla was appointed to the United States Naval Academy in November 1861.  At that time, the USNA was temporarily located at Newport, Rhode Island (note 1).  In November 1864, young McCalla graduated fourth in his class.  After graduation, he was assigned to the South Atlantic Blocking Squadron.

Following the Civil War, McCalla served successively with the South Pacific Squadron, the Home Squadron, and the European Squadron through 1874.  Within this ten year period, McCalla was promoted to Lieutenant Commander.  Upon completion of his tour with the European Squadron, he was assigned to serve as an instructor at the US Naval Academy.  He afterward served as the Executive Officer (second in command) of the steamer USS Powhatan, and from 1881 to 1887, as assistant bureau chief of the Navy’s Bureau of Navigation.  He first came to public notice in April 1885 when he led an expeditionary force of Marines and Sailors in Panama to protect American interests during an uprising against Colombian control.  

From 1888 to 1890, then Commander McCalla served as Commanding Officer, USS Enterprise, which was then part of the European Squadron.  Known as a strict disciplinarian, McCalla crossed the line in his dealings with subordinates and, as a result, faced a highly publicized court-martial upon his return to the United States.  Among other charges, he was accused of striking an enlisted man.  Convicted of all charges, McCalla was suspended from duty for three years, which caused him to lose several numbers on the navy’s seniority (lineal precedence) list.  He was restored to duty in 1893 and served three years as the equipment officer at the Mare Island Navy Yard in San Francisco, California —it was not a great assignment, but McCalla had to demonstrate that he had learned his lesson.

In 1897, Commander McCalla assumed command of the Montgomery-class cruiser USS Marblehead (note 2).  With the beginning of the Spanish American War, McCalla was placed in command of Navy Forces blockading Havana and Cienfuegos, Cuba.  He shelled the port city of Cienfuegos on 29 April 1898.  Then, on 11 May, members of the ship’s crew, along with sailors from the USS Nashville, cut two of the three telegraph cables located at Cienfuegos.  McCalla later made arrangements with local Cuban insurgents regarding ship-to-shore communications, but he erred in failing to so inform his superiors.  This oversight caused a significant delay in Commodore Winfield Scott Schley’s ability to blockade the enemy’s naval forces, then under the command of Rear Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete at Santiago de Cuba.

USS Marblehead participated in the blockade before being detached to reconnoiter and seize Guantanamo Bay in southeastern Cuba.  McCalla bombarded Spanish positions there on 7 June, capturing the outer harbor for use as a supply base for the American blockading squadron.  He then provided material support to the amphibious assault by the 1st Marine Battalion on 10 June.  With the Marblehead, McCalla remained on station while the Marines solidified their positions, and, having done so, taking an instrumental part in the effective bombardment of a Spanish fort at Cayo del Toro in Guantanamo Bay.  In appreciation of his actions, the Marines honored the commander by naming their encampment after him —Camp McCalla.

Owing to his courage in the face of the enemy, McCalla was advanced six numbers in grade, restoring him to the seniority he had held before his court-martial.  

McCalla was promoted to Captain in 1899 and ordered to assume temporary command of the Norfolk Navy Yard; he assumed command of the USS Newark in September for service on the Asiatic Station.  Arriving on station, McCalla participated in the naval campaign against Filipino insurgents during the Philippine-American War (1899-1902).  It was during this time that Newark was directed to provide reinforcements and needed supplies to the American Legation in Peking. 

Captain McCalla afterward led 112-sailors and Marines, reinforcing the Seymour Expedition; as senior US Naval officer, Vice Admiral Seymour appointed McCalla to serve his deputy commander.  Confronted by overwhelming Chinese forces, the Seymour Expedition was unsuccessful in reaching Peking, but during a series of engagements, Captain McCalla was cited for displaying calm and steady courage under fire despite being wounded.  Captain McCalla was later commended for bravery by the Congress of the United States, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, and King Edward VII of Great Britain.

McCalla completed his sea service as Commanding Officer of the battleship USS Kearsarge and, as an additional duty, serving as Chief of Staff to the Commander, North Atlantic Squadron.  He was then assigned to command the Mare Island Navy Yard.  Promoted to Rear Admiral on 11 October 1903, McCalla oversaw the Navy’s immediate response to the San Francisco earthquake in April 1906 —which involved ordering ships, sailors, and Marines to aid the stricken city.  

Rear Admiral McCalla retired from active naval service in June 1906.  He remained in the San Francisco area after retirement; in 1908, he helped welcome the ships of the Great White Fleet to San Francisco Harbor.  

Admiral McCalla passed away in Santa Barbara, California on 6 May 1910.

Sources:

  1. Blow, Michael. A Ship to Remember: The Maine and the Spanish-American War, Morrow, 1992
  2. Coletta, Paolo. Bowman Hendry McCalla: A Fighting Sailor, University Press of America, 1979
  3. Feuer, A.B. The Spanish American War at Sea: Naval Action in the Atlantic, Praeger, 1995
  4. Marine Corps Museum, Manuscript Register Series No.1, Register of the Henry Clay Cochrane Papers (1809-1957) 
  5. Trask, David F.  The War with Spain in 1898, University of Nebraska Press, 1996.
  6. Tucker, Spencer C., Ed. Encyclopedia of the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars, ABC-CLIO LLC 2009

Notes:

1Following the Baltimore Riot on April 19, 1861, pro-Confederate Marylanders took action to stop the movement of Union volunteers through the city on their way to Washington.  Telegraph wires were cut, and railroad bridges were destroyed.  USNA Superintendent George S. Blake, who was concerned about the possibility of a Confederate attempt to occupy the Naval Academy, decided to relocate the school to Newport, Rhode Island on 25 April 1861.

2 USS Marblehead was an unprotected cruiser commissioned on 2 April 1894.  She was decommissioned on 21 August 1919.  An unprotected cruiser was in common use during the late Victorian period; she was little different from a large gunboat.

Send in the Marines!

Chinese Imperial Colors

The United States’ first interest in China was demonstrated in 1784 when an American flagged merchant ship departed from New York bound for Canton, China. Denied access to British markets, which, given the number of ports then controlled by Great Britain, had a stifling effect on an emerging American economy.  Americans went to China looking for new markets to buy goods.  They were well received by the Chinese, and in fact some historians have suggested that the Chinese preferred dealing with Americans who wanted to purchase Chinese made goods, while the European nations were only interested in selling to the Chinese.

By the mid-1800s, Sino-American relationships had grown.  The interest in markets continued, but so too did an interest in converting millions of Chinese to the Christian faith.  Christian missionaries were among the first Americans to study Chinese language, culture, and history—and it was these missionaries that helped to shape America’s overall perceptions of Imperial China.

As for the Chinese, America was seen as a land of opportunity.  Thousands of Chinese migrated to the United States during the California gold rush, and labor was in high demand to help build transcontinental railway systems.  Some Chinese leaders were so inspired by the American political system that they sought to model a new China on the American Republic.

Thus, for much of America’s history, relationships between the United States and China were positive. In the late Nineteenth Century, however, European powers and Imperial Japan were expanding their colonial interests. Some of these wanted to break China up into colonies, each of these controlled by one European power or another.

The Chinese “Boxer”

Discontent with foreigners had been on the rise in China since 1898, when the “I Ho Ch’uan Society” (Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists) began gaining popularity in northwest China. This group, commonly referred to as Boxers, opposed foreign influence and developed strong opposition to Christian missionaries.  As the Boxers became better known, their ranks swelled with farmers and laborers who were adversely affected by droughts that had come on the heels of devastating floods.  The Boxers believed that these misfortunes were the result of foreigners and Christian missionaries.

Over time, Boxer activity spread to additional provinces; provincial leaders, as well as the Imperial Court were inconsistent in their stand relative to the issues.  On some occasions, Chinese authorities sought to protect foreigners and Christians.  At other times, these same officials stood by and watched the resentment escalate.  Tzu Hsi, the empress dowager of the Manchu Dynasty, was publicly anti-Boxer, but privately she encouraged the Boxers.

Turn of the Century cartoon depicting Uncle Sam dictating the Open Door Policy to European and other interests.

In the fall of 1899, the United States was a late arrival in China.  Nevertheless, the US wanted to maintain what Secretary of State John Hay called an “open door” policy in China.  That is to say, a proposal that China keep its door open to foreign trade, but at the same time barring any foreign nation from controlling the internal affairs of China.  If the Boxers succeeded in pushing the United States and other foreign countries out of China, this newly opened door could soon be shut.  Secretary Hay maintained that it was in America’s best interests to maintain an independent China.  Nevertheless, maintaining an open door in China was a challenge, since nations seeking to colonize and control China pursued their own interests irrespective of what the United States thought.

In the next year, a crisis erupted in China as Boxers increased their resistance to foreign influence and presence.  This increased violence served as an impetus to the alliance of eight nations: Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, Japan, and the United States.  Each of these nations maintained legations in Peking.  As the Boxers became progressively violent, hundreds of foreign missionaries and Chinese Christians began flocking into that city asking for the protection of the foreign legations.

On 28 – 29 May 1900, Boxers burned several strategically placed railroad stations.  Receiving word of this, the foreign legations wisely suspected that they were being systematically isolated, and it wasn’t long before they telegraphed for help.  The 8-nation alliance responded immediately.

LtCol John Twiggs Myers

On 31 May, Captain John Twiggs Myers, USMC [1] arrived in Peking in overall command of two ship’s detachments of American Marines.  This newly formed Legation Guard consisted of Myers’ twenty-five Marines from the USS Oregon along with Captain Newt Hall, USMC and twenty-three marines, five sailors, and an assistant surgeon from the USS Newark.  Also arriving in Peking were 350 sailors and naval infantry from other foreign nations.

A second multi-national force was organized on 10 June under the command of British Vice Admiral Sir Edward Seymour —the largest contingent of which were British, with but 112 American sailors and Marines.  US Navy Captain Bowman McCalla [2] was detailed to serve as Admiral Seymour’s second in command.  The Seymour Expedition traveled north, rebuilding the railroad line as they went—and did so with the Chinese government’s authorization.  The Chinese government knew that the railway lines between Tianjin and Peking had been severed —in fact, had ordered it done. It was a set up.

In Peking, the first Boxer was seen in the Legation Quarter on 11 June 1900.  The German Minister, Clemens von Ketteler, ordered his soldiers to capture the Boxer, who was but a young lad.  Inexplicably, Ketteler ordered the boy’s execution.  The boy’s death served as the catalyst of a massive attack by thousands of Boxers into the walled city, who commenced a systematic campaign of pillaging and burning Christian churches and cathedrals.  Captured Christians (foreign or Chinese) were burned alive.  American and British missionaries took refuge inside the Methodist Mission and an attack there was repulsed by US Marines.

The blood-letting continued as soldiers at the British and German Legations shot and killed several Boxers, further alienating the Chinese population, and the effect of which nudged the Qing government toward supporting the Boxers.  Vengeance-seeking Moslems soon joined the Boxers in attacking and killing Chinese Christians.

Vice Admiral Edward Seymour, Royal Navy

Seymour received news about the Chinese attacks on foreign legations on 18 June; he decided to continue his advance.  The expedition had come within 25-miles of Peking when it was set upon by overwhelming Chinese forces.  By the next day, Chinese resistance was so severe that Seymour was forced to withdraw. Two-hundred of his men had been either killed or wounded.  The expedition was low on food, ammunition, and medical supplies.  It was at this point that the expedition discovered a cache of munitions at an arsenal.  Seymour captured the arsenal, occupied it, and decided to wait for reinforcements.

Also on 18 June, the Chinese government informed the foreign ministers that a state of war would soon be in effect, unless the legations withdraw from China within the next 24-hours. As a plum, the Chinese government promised safe passage as far south as Tientsin.  On the following day, the foreign ministers announced that they had no intention of leaving China.  Thus, on 20 June 1900, as promised, the empress dowager issued her declaration of war that included praise for the Boxer insurrectionists.  A siege of the city began on that very day.

U. S. Marine Corps field uniform, c. 1900.

Chinese artillery and small arms fire became a constant form of harassment, although initially, there were no organized attacks against the foreign legations, but each agreed to form pro-active, mutually supporting military defense.  On 25 June, Marines placed themselves at a critical position on the Tartar Wall—otherwise, the entire legation would have been subjected to devastating fires from the Chinese rebels.

The Boxers constructed barricades some distance from the front of the Marine position.  During the night of 28 June, Private Richard Quinn reconnoitered one of these barricades by crawling on his hands and knees to the Chinese position, and in so doing, gathered vital intelligence about Boxer activities.  Each day, the Chinese moved their barriers closer to the Marine position on the Tartar Wall and by 2 July, these barricades had become unacceptably close to the Marine position.

Captain Myers responded by attacking the Chinese barricade.  At a time when the Chinese least expected it, Myers led an attack against the barricades on the Tartar Wall.  The Chinese fell back to another barricade hundreds of yards further on.  During the engagement, two Marines were killed, and Myers received a serious wound to his leg from a Chinese lance.  With Myers seriously wounded, Captain Hall assumed command of the Guard.  An informal truce was made on 16 July, although Chinese harassment continued until the foreign legations were relieved on 14 August 1900.

American Marines participated in several actions after Myers’s force reached Peking.  After the failure of the Seymour Expedition, the United States quickly scrambled additional troops to help end the siege of Peking. Two separate detachments of Marines left Cavite in the Philippine Islands and joined up near Taku, China. The first detachment consisted of 107 Marines from the 1stMarines, who left Cavite on USS Solace.  A second detachment of thirty-two marines sailed from Cavite aboard USS Nashville.  These two detachments were combined to form a battalion under the command of Maj. Littleton W. T. Waller.  On 20 June, the Marine battalion, augmented by approximately four hundred Russian soldiers engaged the Chinese near Tientsin.

Although the marines served as the spearhead of the American-Russian attack, they had scant success against the greater Chinese force.  Following an overwhelming counterattack, Waller decided to withdraw. The Marines formed the rear guard of the retreat, in which they were pursued for four hours, ending up where they started, suffering three killed and seven wounded.

Two days later, Waller’s battalion and the Russian force were strengthened to two thousand men with the arrival of British, Russian, German, Italian, and Japanese troops.  This enlarged force went on the offensive the next day and took all but the inner walled city of Tientsin.  On 28 June, the international force relieved Seymour’s expedition, which had been held up for a month at the Hsi-Ku Arsenal north of Tientsin.

The 9thUS Infantry arrived on 6 July, joining the allied force near Tientsin.  The number of Marines serving in China increased when 318 men under the command of Colonel Robert L. Meade arrived on 10 July from the Philippines.  Meade’s Marines moved from the coast to Tientsin, where it joined Waller’s battalion with Colonel Meade assuming command of the all Marine forces.

The next day, the allied force launched an attack against Tientsin to rid the walled inner city of any remaining Boxer forces.  The attacking force, commanded by a British general officer, included American Marines, the 9th US Infantry, British, French, German, Japanese, and Russian infantry.  Fighting took place most of the day, but there was little to show for it.  Of the 451 Marines engaged in this action, seventeen enlisted men and four officers became casualties.  A Japanese night attack finally broke through the Chinese defenses, which allowed the international force to enter the walled city of Tientsin.

General Chaffee, U. S. Army

On July 30, US Army General Adna R. Chaffee [3] arrived in Tientsin and assumed command of all US forces in China.  Arriving with Chaffee was another battalion of Marines under the command of Major William P. Biddle [4], two battalions of the 14thUS Infantry, the 6thUS Cavalry, and one battery from the 5thUS Artillery.

The mission of the China Relief Expedition was to relieve the legations in Peking and protect American interests in China.  On 4 August 1900, the international force of approximately 18,000 combat troops left Tientsin for Peking.  Chaffee’s force of 2,500 Americans included 482 Marines.

On 5 August, Japanese infantry engaged and defeated a Chinese force at Pei-tsang.  The next day, Marines fought successfully at Yang-stun. The international force reached Peking and relieved the foreign legation on 14 August but experienced several casualties from heat exhaustion during the 85-mile march to Peking.

Upon reaching Peking, Marines aggressed the north gate to destroy Chinese snipers and set up an observation post.  Two enlisted men, along with First Lieutenant Smedley D. Butler, were wounded in the assault. By the time the siege was lifted, the Legation Guard suffered eighteen casualties: 7 were killed, 11 wounded, which included Captain Myers and the assistant surgeon.

Marines advanced to the Imperial City on the next day, but light resistance to the presence of foreign military forces continued throughout China for several months.  A Boxer Protocol was finally signed in September 1901. Afterwards, US Marines returned to their former assignments and locations.

Of those who served during the Boxer Rebellion, 33 enlisted men were awarded the Medal of Honor, including the first posthumous award of the Medal of Honor: Private Harry Fisher was killed on 16 July while engaged in combat on the Tartar Wall.  Private Dan Daly received his first Medal of Honor for heroic action on the night of 15 July.

Brevet Medal

At this time, military officers were not eligible for the award of the Medal of Honor; instead, those noted for courage under fire were distinguished by advancement of numbers in grade, or on occasion, they were awarded brevet rank [5].  Captain John T. Myers was brevetted Major; First Lieutenant Butler was advanced to brevet captain, and First Lieutenant Henry Leonard was advanced two numbers in grade.  Three officers who served during the Boxer Rebellion would become commandants of the United States Marine Corps.

In its aftermath, there was an unfortunate downside to the Boxer Rebellion.  A few civilians and members of the news media [6] first claimed and then reported that Captain Newt Hall was “over cautious” in the defense of the legation by abandoning the barricades —the suggestion being that in doing so, he jeopardized the safety of members of the legation [7].  The fact was that Captain Hall was a somewhat taciturn individual who was not especially liked by members of the legation, whereas Captain Myers was both personable and popular.  With his name sullied and given the competitive nature of service in the Marine Corps, Captain Hall demanded a court of inquiry.

RAdm Bowman H. McCalla, USN

Captain Bowman McCalla, USN, who, according to Marine Corps historian Colonel Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., was “neither fool nor faint of heart,” unreservedly recommended Hall for a brevet promotion for his conduct under fire in Peking [8].

Captain Hall’s court of inquiry convened on 1 March 1901 in Cavite, Philippine Islands.  It cleared Captain Hall of any malfeasance, but the wording of the court noted that he was not charged “for the reasons that he has already suffered enough for the worldwide publication and criticism for his conduct in Peking.” This was clearly a case of damnation by faint praise.

The Secretary of the Navy further confounded the issue when he approved brevet promotions for Myers and Hall but, in advancing Captain Myers four numbers in grade for eminent and conspicuous conduct, failed to give a similar compliment to Hall.

Nevertheless, Captain Hall served a full and distinguished career in the United States Marine Corps, retiring in grade of Colonel in 1929.

Notes:

[1] The story of Handsome Jack of the Marines is told here.

[2] McCalla, later to serve as a Rear Admiral, was cited for conspicuous gallantry during this expedition.

[3] Adna Romanza Chaffee (April 14, 1842 – November 1, 1914) played a key role in the US Civil War, the Indian Wars, Spanish-American War, and the Boxer Rebellion.  He rose to the rank of lieutenant general, United States Army and served as Chief of Staff from 1904 to 1906.

[4] William P. Biddle served as a United States Marine from 1875 to 1919.  He participated in the Spanish-American War, Battle of Manila Bay, Boxer Rebellion, China Relief Expedition, Philippine-American War, and World War I.  He was the 11th Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps from 1910 to 1914.

[5] A warrant that gave commissioned officers a higher title in rank in recognition for gallantry or meritorious conduct in battle without conferring authority, precedence, or pay of actual rank/promotion.  An officer so promoted was referred to as Brevet Major or other ranks.  An officer so promoted would be noted as Bvt. Major Harold Jones.

[6] G. E. Morrison, The London Times, as one of the complainants.

[7] The late Marine historian, retired Colonel Robert Debs Heinl Jr., in Soldiers of the Sea, wrote, “Other charges circulated that Hall had hesitated to lead his men forward over the barricade on the final day when relief was in sight.  Ugly talk it was,” noted Heinl. The talk came to the attention of U.S. Army Major General Adna R. Chaffee, who commanded all U.S. forces in China.  He detailed Captain William Crozier, who had distinguished himself in the relief column, to look into it. Crozier found that virtually all the complaints were from civilians (who would not know courage if it bit them on the leg) and recommended no further action.

[8] It was at about this same time that Century Magazine published a slanderous, attack on Hall by a civilian named W. N. Pethick, who had been at Peking during the siege.

 

Among the Old Breed

As with many of the so-called old breed, Littleton W. T. Waller was an authoritarian officer whose initial commission as second lieutenant of Marines occurred on 24 June 1880.  These old breed Marines were of a different type from those wearing the uniform today.  In the late 1800’s, Marine officers and enlisted men lived hard, drank hard, and fought hard.  Their near-legion consumption of liquor was part of the norm, but with that said, there was no tolerance for an inebriated Marine on duty.  The Marines of Waller’s time were trained by strict disciplinarians … the old salts that accepted no excuses for less than stellar performance; they demanded results and left an indelible mark on their subordinates.  If officer candidates survived their harsh training, they became officers; if they failed, they were dismissed from the Corps.

I have described Waller’s exploits as a battalion commander in the Philippine Islands in two earlier posts (here and here); he became a controversial figure owing to two significant events: his march across Samar, and his court-martial.  Some historians have argued that even though he achieved the rank of major general, his court-martial (although acquitted) may have kept him from serving as Commandant of the Marine Corps.  Others have said that the court-martial was not a factor[1].

Waller was born in York County, Virginia.  Both sides of his family originated in England, migrating to the Americas during the colonial period.  They were wealthy, well-educated, and politically astute.  His ancestors included men with military titles, lawyers, justices, and politicians.  Some of these men served in Virginia’s House of Burgesses; one served on the Virginia delegation to consider the Declaration of Independence.

Referred to as “Tony” by his friends, Waller was regarded as bright, but he was no scholar.  He was an outdoorsman who was fond of hunting, fishing, and riding.  As with many others in his own time, Waller was intimately familiar with three works: The King James Bible, the works of Shakespeare, and John Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress.  The evidence for this appears in his writing of reports from foreign shore where he incorporates phrases from each of these.  In their own memoirs, Major General Smedley D. Butler and Colonel Frederick M. Wise, described Waller as an eloquent speaker and a fascinating story-teller.

Wallers initial tours of duty were shore-based commands.  The first at the Marine Barracks in Norfolk, Virginia, and the second at the Marine Barracks, Washington, D. C.  He then embarked on his first tour at sea, assigned as executive officer under Captain Henry Clay Cochrane, commanding the Marine Detachment, USS Lancaster.  Lancaster was the flagship of the European squadron, and Cochrane was a veteran of the American Civil War (you don’t get more “old school” than this).

In 1882, Cochrane and Waller were present at the British naval bombardment of Alexandria, Egypt and participated in an amphibious landing of mixed bluejackets and Marines.  As the French had withdrawn their forces from the city, American Marines and sailors were needed to provide protection to the US Consulate, American citizens, and displaced foreign nations.  The landing force consisted two companies: one consisting of sixty-nine sailors under the command of Lieutenant Frank L. Denny, USN and 63 Marines commanded by Lieutenant Waller, USMC.  The overall landing force commander was Lieutenant Commander Charles Goodrich, USN, Captain Cochrane served as Goodrich’s executive officer.

Denny and Waller approached the city center with due caution, reaching the Square of Mehmet Ali (location of the US Consulate).  Designating this location as their headquarters, Marines and sailors began to patrol the city streets.  Subsequently, Waller and his Marines were placed under the command of Lord Charles Beresford’s British forces protecting the European quarter.  The anticipated rebel attack never materialized, however, and after ten days a four-thousand-man British force arrived to relieve the American company.  The Times of London later reported, “Lord Charles Beresford states that without the assistance of the American Marines, he would have been unable to discharge the numerous duties of suppressing fires, preventing looting, burying the dead, and clearing the streets.”[2]

As there was no wireless radio in those days, and the telegraphic cable office in Alexandria was not functioning, the Squadron Commander had approval to land the naval force, but once ashore Goodrich had been on his own. It was he who made the decision to stay with the British rather than follow in trace behind the French.  As one of only four officers in the landing force, Waller would have been present as important decisions were made.  It was an experience that stood him in good stead in later years.

During the Spanish American War, Captain Waller served aboard the battleship USS Indiana as Commanding Officer, Marine Detachment.  He was present during the battle of Santiago on 3 July 1898.  Indiana’s position in the American fleet precluded her participation in the initial chase of the Spanish Navy, but Waller’s Marines did participate in naval gunnery against the Spanish ships Pluton and Furor.  Waller’s Marines pulverized the Spanish ships.  Waller later said that the only problems he encountered during this engagement was in keeping Marines not engaged in gunnery under appropriate cover.

It wasn’t long before the Spanish Navy fell to American naval fires; it may have been one of the most lopsided engagements in naval history: every Spanish ship was destroyed and no US ship suffered more than minor damage.  Within a period of a single hour, Waller’s gunners fired five-hundred rounds from their six-inch guns.  In their hour of triumph, however, the American then performed acts of mercy.  Indiana’s commander, Captain Robley D. Evans, directed Waller to launch the ship’s whaleboats to pick up as many of the shipwrecked Spanish sailors as possible.  With sailors at the oars and Marines in the bow and stern to haul in swimmers, Waller’s detail worked throughout the day.  Here were men already weary from passing ammunition during a naval engagement now sunburned and hands swollen and cracked from salt water, saving their enemy from sure death.  The squadron commander, Admiral William T. Sampson, wrote of Waller’s service to the Secretary of the Navy: “… This rescue of prisoners, including the wounded from the burning Spanish vessels, was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the day.  The [Spanish] ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main magazines.  In addition to this a heavy surf was running just inside of the Spanish ships.  But no risk deterred our officers and men until their work of humanity was completed.”

Waller later wrote of this service: “After working for hours with the wounded, we took the prisoners on board ship; there were on board my ship, two hundred and forty-three in all.  We issued clothes to the naked men, and the officers gave up their clothes and beds to the Spanish officers.  Only a few months ago I received a letter from the widow of one of the officers of Admiral Cervera’s staff, telling me of her husband’s death, and saying that it was his wish that she should thank me for all that I had done for him; and I have received many tokens and letters besides this in grateful acknowledgement of the mercy shown.”

Waller later received recognition for this service by award of the Specially Meritorious Service Medal; he is believed to be the only Marine to receive this award.

In early 1900, Major Waller was assigned at the Naval Station, Cavite, Philippines.  He was ordered to command a detachment of Marines assigned to take part in an expedition to relieve the siege of Peking, China—then Imperial China’s capital city.  The city, with its enclave of foreign legations, was besieged by a mixed force of Boxers, so called because their official group moniker was “Righteous and Harmonious Fists,” and the Chinese Imperial troops egging them on.  Waller and his Marines arrived at Taku, China on 19 June 1900, soon afterwards moving inland where they linked up with a Russian column of some 400 men.  On 21 June, the Americans and Russians set out for Tientsin, an enemy-held city.  Their route took them through areas estimated to contain between 1,500 to 2,000 hostile Chinese.  Coming under heavy enemy fire, the column was forced to withdraw with the Russians in the vanguard, and Waller faced with a desperate rearguard struggle.  Waller, leaving behind the dead, dragged along his wounded and fought off numerically superior forces to reach safety.  The Marine Detachment immediately returned to duty, however, and was attached to a British column led by Commander Christopher Craddock.  On 24 June, an international contingent consisting of Italian, German, Japanese, Russian, British, and American forces, again set off for Tientsin.

After participating in the final battle for the City of Peking on 13-14 July, Waller’s Marines took possession of the American sector and brought order out of the chaos caused by the Chinese retreat.  Waller was subsequently promoted to Brevet[3] Lieutenant Colonel and advanced two numbers on the lineal precedence list of officers.  Waller thus became one of only twenty Marines to receive the Marine Corps Brevet Medal when the decoration was created in 1921.  The Brevet Medal was replaced by the Navy Distinguished Service Medal.

It was during Waller’s service in China that he began a long-running friendship with a Lieutenant by the name of Smedley D. Butler.  Butler was the only Marine officer to receive two awards of the Medal of Honor.  In 1905, Waller served as best man at Butler’s wedding.  These two Marines remained close friends for the rest of Waller’s life.

Tony Waller was promoted to Brigadier General in 1916, and advanced to the rank of Major General (temporary) in 1918.  However, having failed for selection to the post of Commandant of the Marine Corps, there was very little else Waller could do but retire.  On 22 March 1920, Waller appeared in front of the Marine Corps Retirement Board.  The board concluded that Waller was incapacitated for further service due to arterial sclerosis, that the incapacity was the result of military service, and recommended retirement in grade of Major General.  The White House approved the recommendation and ordered Waller retired effective 22 May 1920.  However, at the direction of President Woodrow Wilson, Waller was retained on active duty until 16 June 1920.  According to at least one military historian, Waller took part in more actions than any other Marine Corps officer of his period.  He lived out the remainder of his days in Philadelphia, passing away on 13 July 1926 at the age of 69-years.  General Waller is buried at Arlington National Cemetery.

Notes:

[1] Selection to serve the post as Commandant of the Marine Corps was highly political in the period before 1940.  Military aide to both Theodore Roosevelt and William H. Taft, Captain Archibald Butt, U. S. Army, indicated that the Samar incident had nothing at all to do with Waller’s non-selection to the highest post in the Corps; rather there were forces in the Senate that worked feverishly to have their own man advanced as Commandant.  Still, the anti-Imperialist press did maul Waller at every opportunity, suggesting very heavily that a man lacking concern for his fellow man didn’t deserve to represent the entire Marine Corps.  The politicians won the day.

[2] In these times, there was no wireless radio and the telegraphic cable in Alexandria was not functioning.  The US Naval Commander had obtained the approval of Washington D. C. to land the mixed company of Marines and Sailors, but once ashore Lieutenant Commander Goodrich was entirely on his own.  Goodrich made the decision to remain with the British rather than to return his men to their ship.  Waller, as one of only four officers, would have been privy to all decisions being made ashore.  As a 24-year old lieutenant, Waller learned about independence of command; it would stand him in good stead in future years.

[3] A brevet promotion entitles an officer to wear the rank insignia of the next higher grade, albeit without any increase in pay.  It the Marine Corps, a brevet promotion only came as the result of exceptionally meritorious service or gallantry during a period of combat.

 

On to Corregidor —Part VIII

Most of the men assigned to Company A ended up fighting the Japanese on their own initiative during the night of 5/6 May 1942. Lieutenant Harris was forced to withdraw from Cavalry Point once Mercurio’s position was overrun. PFC Nixon got into a bayonet dual with one Japanese soldier, and after wounding him, continued moving toward the sound of gunfire.

IJA CommanderMost of the 1st Battalion, 61st Infantry came ashore within fifteen minutes; within 30 minutes, Japanese infantry were moving toward Marine positions. The plan concocted by Colonel Gempachi Sato (pictured right conferring with his staff) seemed to be working, but the 785 men of the reinforced 2nd Battalion were not quite as successful. The current worked against them, and when the landing force neared North Point, where all defensive positions were intact, within ten minutes of the first assault, the Marines were ready and waiting. This fight raged for 35 minutes; Japanese lost 9 of their 10 landing craft. Most of the Japanese officers were killed within a few moments and the soldiers that did make it ashore were trapped behind rocks that were nestled into the beach sand. One machine gunner declared, “It’s like shooting ducks in a rain barrel.” He no doubt experienced adrenalin-induced euphoria. It wouldn’t last.

Once the Marines realized the extent of the Japanese Army successes, they initiated a counterattack designed to eject them from the area of Denver Battery. This was the location of the heaviest fighting; it was where Imperial Japanese soldiers came face to face with the American defenders. A few reinforcements did make their way to the frontline of the 4th Marines, but the battle became a duel of obsolete World War I weapons against accurate Japanese knee mortars. The defenders were outmatched.

Colonel Howard committed his last reserves at 0430 … some 500 Marines, sailors, and soldiers of a provisional fourth battalion. Movement forward was very costly because Japanese snipers took positions of great advantage to themselves. An additional force of 900 Japanese soldiers arrived at 0530. The Marine regiment was able to hold its position at some locations, while losing ground in others. The Japanese, running short of ammunition, resorted to bayonet charges; the Marines were happy to accommodate them, but any successes were strictly temporary.

The battle raged for several hours, a final blow coming around 0930 when three Japanese tanks landed and went into action. The defenders of Denver Battery withdrew to the ruins of a concrete trench just as Japanese artillery delivered a massive barrage. Fearful of the consequences should the Japanese be forced to take the Malinta tunnel, especially owing to the fact that the tunnel contained 1,000 sick and wounded men, and realizing that the defenders outside the tunnel were unable to hold back the Japanese assault for much longer, Lieutenant General Wainwright decided to surrender his men as a means of saving their lives.

General Wainwright sent a radio message to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, saying, “There is a limit of human endurance, and that point has long been passed.”

Colonel Howard dutifully burned the National Ensign and the Battle Color of the 4th Marine Regiment. He then led his men into captivity.

US-USMC ColorsIn the defense of the Philippine Islands, the 4th Marine Regiment gave up 72 killed in action, 17 who died of wounds, 167 wounded in action, and 474 died in captivity. The regiment would remain decommissioned until 1 February 1944.

End of series; next week, a miracle.

 

On to Corregidor —Part VII

Corregidor Marines 004Initially, the area of responsibility assigned to 1/4 was heavily wooded and dotted with coastal artillery barracks and other buildings; by early May the entire region was completely barren of any vegetation and the buildings were mere remnants; dust a foot thick covered the entire area, the result of heavy pummeling by Japanese bombs. The Marines (a term which now includes all other assigned personnel, regardless of their service affiliation) were constantly repairing beach defenses. Enemy fire was so accurate that the troops could only be fed at night. Shown right, LtCol Curtis T. Beecher and his battalion runner.

Casualties began to mount, including the officers. Major Harry Lang, commanding Company A was killed; Captain Paul Brown and one of his platoon commanders in Company B received serious wounds. Company D lost one Marine officer and three Army officers to Japanese bombs. While Army officers were quickly appointed to command these companies, they had scant knowledge about infantry tactics or how to lead men in combat. The troops had little confidence in them, but this wouldn’t matter for very long.

Colonel Howard reported to General Wainwright and briefed him about the condition of the 4th Marines. After delivering his report, General Wainwright informed Howard, “We will never surrender this command to the Japanese.” Colonel Howard realized that Wainwright was under tremendous pressure. “The matter of surrender never came up; I was on there to brief him about the effectiveness of my command.”

Early in the evening of 5 May 1942, a Philippine civilian arrived in a small fishing boat on the beach at Corregidor. He carried a message from Philippine intelligence on Bataan. He was promptly taken to LtCol George Hamilton, the regimental intelligence officer. The message warned of a Japanese amphibious assault on the night of 5/6 May 1942. The Japanese plan was to land the 61st Infantry Regiment during the evening of 5 May, seize the airfield, and then capture Malinta Hill. A second regiment of the 4th Infantry Division would land on Morrison and Battery Points. The two forces would then join for the capture of topside.

IJA landing Corregidor 1942At 2240 hours artillery shelling concentrated on the north shore beach defenses, in the sector of 1st Battalion, 4th Marines. At 2300, supplies of food and water were just reaching the beach positions when landing boats were reported offshore. Then, a second concentration of artillery pounded the beach for just under ten minutes; the barrage ended with phosphorous shells —no doubt a signal for the landing force to proceed. The landing consisted of 790 men of the 1st Battalion, 61st Infantry Regiment. Captain Lewis Pickup of Company A watched as the landing craft angled toward his company’s position. He ordered searchlights turned on and Marines began pouring fire into the landing craft with 37mm guns, machine guns, and individual rifle fire. The Japanese troops struggled in the mire created by layers of oil from the ships that had been sunk earlier. PFC Barnes and one other position were the only remaining automatic weapons of 13 positions—the rest destroyed by enemy bombardments.

First Lieutenant Bill Harris passed the word to his Marines, “Fix bayonets.” Master Gunnery Sergeant Mercurio ordered one of his Marines to go forward observe and report the location of the Japanese. When PFC Nixon got to the beach, the Japanese were only 30 yards away. In the darkness, Japanese infantry were able to by pass the Marine positions, which were spread too thin to be effective. Fighting quickly became hand-to-hand. Corporal Franklin remembered, “It was damn bloody.” A grenade went off close to Franklin, who sustained shrapnel wounds to the face and head. Stunned, he laid down on the ground and hazily saw a Japanese coming at him with a bayonet. Franklin suddenly jumped up, and with his own bayonet, attacked the Japanese soldier. Franklin received a bayonet wound to his chest, but he managed to kill his enemy. Afterward, Franklin ran up the trail past another enemy soldier, who shot him in the leg, but the Marine kept moving until he reached the safety of Malinta Hill.

Continued next week

On to Corregidor —Part VI

Battery A moved to Corregidor on 17 February 1942. Remaining on Bataan was the Marine Air Warning Detachment, the USAFFE Guard, and Battery C. Disease became a significant problem: malaria began to take its toll, along with the heat and insufficient food to keep the Marines going.

Washington relieved MacArthur of his duties in the Philippines on 22 February. Major General Wainwright assumed command of the newly designated US Forces in the Philippines (USFIP).

The Japanese knew what they were doing: cleverly timed aerial bombardments kept the Marines from getting badly needed rest. After 24 March, air raids increased in their frequency; throughout the night, Japanese artillery harassed the Marines every 25 to 30 minutes. In one typical 24-hour period, two periods of shelling began at 0950 and 1450; six bombing raids began at 0400 and spaced throughout the day. PFC Kenneth R. Paulin of Company M was killed during the day by shellfire from the Cavite shore. Bombing raids ended at 2205, but began again at 0100.

Corregidor Marines 003By the end of March 1942, rations had been reduced to 1,000 calories per day and Wainwright discovered that all food stores on Corregidor would run out by the end of June. He radioed to MacArthur in Australia, but there was nothing MacArthur could do. No ship could get through the Japanese line. At the beginning of May, the defenders of Corregidor consumed only 30 ounces of food per day: 8 ounces of meat, 7 ounces of flour, 4 ounces of vegetables, 3 ounces of beans and cereals, 2 ounces of rice, and 3 ounces of milk. PFC Ben Lohman recalled that they ate mule meat whenever the Japanese bombing killed one of the animals. In the 4th Marines, some of the men had lost 40 pounds as a result of reduced rations and the stress of Japanese bombardments.

Very slowly, the Marines were being deprived of the energy needed to resist the Japanese assault.

Bataan fell to the Japanese on 9 April 1942; 75,000 American soldiers were taken prisoner.

As men subsequently became available from disintegrating units, they were integrated into the 4th Marines and assigned to support the beach defense. Fifty-eight sailors from the USS Canopus were organized into a reserve company and received training by Marine platoon sergeants. Ten Marines and an additional 40 sailors were added to the company after the fall of Bataan. The largest group of reinforcements involved 72 officers and 1,173 enlisted men from more than 50 different organizations —all of these assigned to the 4th Marines, which may have transformed the regiment into the most unusual organizations in the history of the Corps. They involved Navy, Army, Philippine Army, and Philippine Scouts. Ordinary seamen found themselves alongside Army engineers, tankers, and aviation mechanics. By the end of April, the 4th Marines numbered 229 officers, 3,770 men —of whom only 1,500 were Marines.

Lieutenant Colonel Beecher now commanded 360 Marines, 500 Filipinos, 100 American sailors, and 100 American soldiers. He armed them with the 1903 Springfield rifle, hand grenades, Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR), four 37mm guns, and eight 30-caliber machine guns. A few mortars and .50 machine guns were also available from cannibalized ships. But all these weapons wouldn’t do these defenders any good if the troops became ineffective due to a lack of fresh water.

Continued next week

On to Corregidor —Part V

Malinta Tunnel 001The 4th Marines moved out of its barracks after the Japanese attack on 29 December; it was safer in the field. 1st Battalion, 4th Marines assumed responsibility for the eastern sector (Manila Hill to Hooker Point) on the tail-end of the island; 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines moved to the western sector, and the provisional battalion assigned to the middle section of the island. On 1 January 1942, the 1st Separate Marine Battalion was officially renamed 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines. None of the Marine commanders were kidding themselves. There was no way that a battalion of 350 men could defend a sector of beach extending from between 3,500 to 4,000 yards. Still, the Marines began constructing barbed wire barriers, tank traps, and a system of trenches. When the Marines ran out of sandbags, they improvised with powder cans. Marines also filled bottles with gasoline, intending to drop them on top of landing Japanese forces from their positions in the cliffs of Malinta Hill. They also constructed wooden chutes from which the Marines intended to drop aircraft bombs on the Japanese.

A few Marines remained on the Bataan peninsula, however, and the dispute between General MacArthur and Admiral Rockwell continued over who owned these Marines and how they would be assigned. Two antiaircraft batteries in the Mariveles area formed part of a naval defense battalion assigned to the southern coast of Bataan. When MacArthur learned of these Marines, he ordered one battery to serve as a guard force for USAFFE headquarters, but the battalion commander, Commander Frank J. Bridget countermanded the order and directed the Battery A commander to return to duty at Mariveles. Undeterred, MacArthur wrote directly to Admiral Rockwell requesting suspension of Commander Bridget’s order. Rockwell refused, informing MacArthur that these Marines had not been released to Army control. MacArthur ended the dispute by ordering two officers and forty Marines from Corregidor to serve as guards for USAFFE.

The Japanese made an amphibious landing at Langoskawayan Point on 23 January 1942, some 2,000 yards west of Mariveles. Commander Bridget ordered the commanders of Battery A and Battery C to send patrols to the Point, confirm the landing, and set up a blocking force if necessary. Commander Bridget did not let the battery commanders know that he had issued orders to each; now there were two Marine patrols hunting for Japanese, neither one aware of the presence of the other. Then Commander Bridget organized a hastily gathered platoon of 36 sailors and placed them under the command of Platoon Sergeant Robert A. Clement, who was ordered to “support” his two Marine Corps lieutenants. By hastily formed platoon, I mean that these sailors did not know how to load their rifles with ammunition. Clement held school for individuals unfamiliar with their weapons, and then he pushed on. Clement and his platoon triggered a Japanese ambush a short while later —the firing alerted the two Marine patrols of the presence of other assets. The Marines continued to probe, finding strong Japanese resistance; they soon realized that they didn’t have enough Marines to handle these Japanese troops.

Corregidor Marines 002The Japanese were professional in their conduct, and exceedingly aggressive. They not only moved forward, they sent out patrols to locate the American Marines, and they set up ambushes, inflicting heavy losses. So few Marines could not afford heavy losses. Lieutenant Holdredge and eleven Marines from Battery C were wounded in one early confrontation with the Japanese; one Marine was killed. Whenever the Marines attacked the Japanese, the Japanese put up a vigorous defense and then counterattacked; Lieutenant Hogaboom, commanding Battery A reported to Commander Bridget, “We cannot hold our ground with so few troops.” Bridget was not empathetic; he ordered Hogaboom to dig in for the night and prepare for another attack at first light. Fortunately for these few Marines, the 1st Battalion, 57th Infantry (Philippine Scouts) relieved the Marines during the night permitting Bridget to withdraw his battalion to Mariveles. It took the Philippine Scouts three days to destroy the Japanese landing force, a reinforced battalion.

Continued next week