I suspect that few today even know who Mark Fidel Kools is — which is, perhaps, perfectly understandable. Mr. Kools is the illegitimate son of John Kools. John was a gangster who operated in the Watts section of Los Angeles, California, and, as a consequence of his domestic terrorism as a gangster, was sent to prison. The State of California released John from prison in 1974 — but not before falling in with another gang, which we today call the Moslem Brotherhood — an organization funded by the Saudi Kingdom as part of their Wahhabist invasion of western civilization. John Kools, having converted to Islam (at the taxpayer’s expense), changed his name to Akbar.
At the time of John’s release from prison, Mark was three years old. By then, his mother had also converted to Islam and married William Bilal, also a convert to Islam. Mrs. Bilal is known today as Quran Bilal. With apparent pride in her former lover’s accomplishments, Mrs. Bilal changed Mark’s name to Hasan Karim Akbar.
In 1988, Hasan began attending the University of California (Davis); he graduated nine years later with bachelor’s degrees in Aeronautical and Mechanical Engineering. During his somewhat elongated college experience, Hasan participated in the Army Reserve Officer’ Training Corps (ROTC), but he was not offered a commission upon his graduation in 1997. Deeply in debt, Hasan subsequently enlisted in the US Army.
A few years later, Hasan served as a sergeant with the 326th Engineer Battalion, 101st Airborne. In 2003, the Army staged elements of the division at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait. In the early morning hours of 23 March 2003, Akbar cut off the generator that powered the lights inside the encampment. He then tossed four fragmentation grenades into three tents where other soldiers were sleeping, causing numerous injuries. In the resulting chaos, Akbar used his service rifle to kill Army Captain Christopher S. Seifert, an intelligence officer whom Akbar shot in the back. Air Force Major Gregory L. Stone was killed from one of the four hand grenades.
An Army court-martial convicted Akbar of murder and sentenced him to death. Having exhausted all of his appeals, he remains on death row at the disciplinary barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. All that remains, in this case, is presidential authority to carry out the execution.
Also awaiting execution at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is former Army major Nidal Hasan. We all know what he did at Fort Hood, Texas. While awaiting his execution, Hassan petitioned the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant for citizenship. Whether he remains in close contact with former sergeant Akbar is unknown, but it is plausible that they offer one another comfort and encouragement since they are both confined on death row.
Carrying forward in my snake hunt, I similarly expect that few people today know who Ali Abdul Saoud Mohamed is. Mr. Mohamed has a long and interesting history working against the interests of the United States of America and its people. He was born in Egypt in 1952. For some period of time until 1984, Ali Mohamed served in the Egyptian army as an intelligence officer, reaching the rank of colonel. From around 1979 through 1984, he was instrumental in training anti-Soviet fighters en route to Afghanistan.
Afterward, back in Egypt, Mr. Mohamed went to the US Embassy in Cairo, asked to speak to the CIA Station Chief. During this meeting, Mohamed volunteered his services as an informant against the emerging Al-Qaeda organization. Apparently, the CIA was unaware of Mohamed’s former association with the Egyptian Army or his involvement with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Despite the CIA’s suspicions that he might be an Islamist agent, they appointed him as a junior CIA intelligence officer and tasked him with collecting information about the Islamist movements. One of his first tasks was to infiltrate a mosque with known ties to Hezbollah. Mohamed affiliated with the mosque but soon informed the Imam that he was working for the United States as a spy. He may have suggested that this situation would be an excellent opportunity to feed the Americans misinformation about Islamist movements.
As it turned out, Mohamed was not the only informant in that particular mosque. There was another who informed the CIA that Mohamed was a double agent. The CIA subsequently dismissed Mohamed and took measures to bar him from entering the United States. However, Mohamed somehow evaded the ban and once more went to the United States. He married an American woman, became a US citizen, and joined the U. S. Army.
After Mohamed’s initial training, he found his way into the US Special Forces. In that organization, his leaders encouraged him to pursue advanced degrees in Islamic Studies. They wanted Mohamed to become an instructor so that he could teach courses involving the Middle East. They thought he was a pretty sharp tack, not knowing he was a former Egyptian army colonel. Mohamed was a “self-starter,” they said.
Throughout his service in the US Army, Mohamed collected information from the Army. He made copies of technical manuals, doctrinal publications, and training manuals to inform Al-Qaeda better how to defeat the American armed forces. He provided information about weapons, tactical formations, and Special Forces operations.
In 1988, Mohamed took a 30-day leave from the Army and returned to the middle east. He informed his superiors that he wanted to fight in Afghanistan. When he returned, he bragged about killing Soviets, and to back up his claim, he showed people his “war relics.” Alarm bells sounded in the head of his immediate commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Anderson, who initiated action to have Mohamed investigated by Army Intelligence. Anderson’s reports went unanswered; no investigation was ever conducted (that we know about) — which led Anderson to wonder if Mohamed was part of the US clandestine services.
Mohamed left the US Army in 1989, finding work with a defense contractor providing security at a factory that produced Trident Missile systems. When he wasn’t doing that, he began training Middle Eastern refugees and American-born Islamists in such areas as demolitions, including those who were later associated with the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, Mahmud Abouhalima and Ramzi Yousef.
In the early 1990s, Mohamed returned to Afghanistan. He trained Al-Qaeda volunteers in unconventional warfare techniques, including kidnapping, assassination, and aircraft hijacking, which he had learned during Special Forces training. According to some, Mohamed even trained a wealthy Saudi fighter named Osama bin-Laden and later helped bin-Laden plan the US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Mohamed became the “go-to” guy when bin-Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri needed to know or understand something about the US Army. In 1993, Mohamed toured California with Zawahiri, who posed as a Kuwait Red Crescent Society representative. Together, the two men hoped to raise money from Islamic-American charities to fund Jihadi movements (otherwise known as global terrorism).
In May 1993, Mohamed became an FBI informant in San Jose, California. In exchange for worthless information, Mohamed provided Al-Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad with valuable American intelligence. It was also in 1993 that Mohamed was nearly arrested in Canada while meeting with a representative of Osama bin-Laden. He escaped arrest by telling Canadian authorities that he was an FBI informant, and they promptly released him.
After the 1998 bombings, FBI agents searched Mohamed’s apartment and discovered his complicity in terrorist activities. Such evidence included plans and scripts of Al-Qaeda training, plans to meet with Osama bin-Laden, and so forth. On the day Mohamed was scheduled to give testimony in another case, FBI agents arrested him.
Federal authorities charged Mohamed with several offenses, including five counts of conspiracy to kill US nationals, conspiracy to kidnap, murder, and maim others outside of the United States, conspiracy to kill government employees, conspiracy to destroy US buildings and property, and conspiracy to destroy or disrupt utilities vital to the security of the United States. Mohamed faced the death penalty, but he made a deal with the federal prosecutor. He would plead guilty in exchange for life in prison. To date, Ali Mohamed has not appeared in court. He remains in federal custody at an undisclosed location.
These are the snakes among us. How many of these snakes exist is — unknown. What the US government is doing about the snakes inside America is equally obscure. It would be comforting to have some indication that the United States is on top of the problem rather than unwittingly playing a role in global terrorism. Still, I cannot comment about that possibility, either. However, here’s what we know: all three men are US citizens, all three are Moslems, all three murdered American citizens, and all three remain alive at the taxpayer’s expense. Pest control specialists say that if you see one cockroach, there are 50 more that you don’t see. I wonder if the same ratio applies to venomous snakes.
In a televised interview, Ali Mohamed explained his rationale for becoming a terrorist: “Islam without political dominance cannot survive.” If this isn’t good advice, then I’ve never heard it.
Atwan, A. B. The Secret History of Al-Qaeda. UC Berkley, 2006.
Bergen, P. Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden. Free Press, 2001.
Esposito, J. L. Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. Oxford University, 2002.
Mura, A. The Symbolic Scenarios of Islamism: A study in Islamic political thought. Routledge Publishing, 2015.
Kǒng Fūzǐ, otherwise known in the western world as Confucius (551-479 BC), was a paragon of Chinese philosophers and sages and, perhaps, one of the most influential individuals in all human history. His teachings emphasized personal morality, justice, kindness, and sincerity — but his school of thought was only one of a hundred philosophical and legalistic academies during China’s Qin dynasty. He once warned, “Before you embark on a journey of revenge, dig two graves.”
Operation Cyclone was the brainchild of Texas Congressman Charles Nesbit Wilson (also known as Charlie Wilson). It was the codename for a Central Intelligence Agency program to arm and finance the Afghan mujahideen (1979-1989) during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. It was one of the most protracted and most expensive covert CIA operations ever undertaken.
Wilson’s idea was to funnel black money through the CIA to financially support radical Islamists who more or less worked under the control of Pakistani military dictator Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988). We don’t know how much of this money Zia diverted to his atomic weapons project, but it may have been substantial. Between 1980-1986, the CIA sent between $20-40 million to Afghanistan annually; in 1987, this amount increased to $640 million annually. CIA funding continued after the Soviet Union departed Afghanistan in 1989 to support the Afghan Civil War (1989-1992). Before Zia’s death, he successfully wooed both the United States and China into a ménage à trois — which was “just fine” with Charlie Wilson, a Democrat, who leaned in that direction anyway.
The CIA’s arms deal included the state-of-the-art Stinger surface-to-air shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapon that cost around $38,000 each. We sent thousands of these to Afghanistan to help the Islamists rid themselves of the Soviet MI-24 (Hind) helicopter. Once CIA operatives instructed the Islamists how to employ these weapons, no Russian helicopter was safe. How many of these Stinger missiles remained in Afghanistan after the CIA withdrew its support is unknown. Still, at some point, the supplies diminished — driving Islamists to employ a much cheaper and easier to obtain weapon: the Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG).
The RPG fires a shaped charge explosive warhead. There are various warheads, but the most common is the high explosive (HE) round and high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) round. Either of these is devastating to helicopters.
As it turned out, the Americans instructing mujahideen on fighting a sophisticated enemy combat force did an extraordinary job. Radical Islamists later turned these skills toward the Americans once the United States decided to replace the Russian invaders in 2003. Americans in Afghanistan have been digging graves ever since.
Extortion One Seven
Members of the U. S. Navy’s Seal Team Six assaulted a Pakistani compound on 2 May 2011, killing the founder and leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden. It was a CIA-led operation with the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) codenamed Operation Neptune Spear. Operating alongside the Navy’s special warfare group was an element of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (Night Stalkers). This operation ended a nearly ten-year search for bin Laden, the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attack upon the United States.
One month earlier, the US Tenth Mountain Division turned control of Combat Outpost Tangi over to Afghan government forces. It was an interesting “turnover” since the Afghan Defense Force (ADF) never actually occupied the base, so Taliban forces took the initiative to seize it for their use. There could be a connection here, but I hesitate to judge. In any event, US forces continued to operate in the Tangi area. By 2011, the number of Taliban in Tangi was significant. On 8 June, Taliban ground forces engaged a US Army CH-47 Chinook helicopter from five or six different locations with 14 separate RPG attacks forcing the overwhelmed helicopter to abandon its mission.
At about this same time, US intelligence determined that senior Taliban leader Qari Tahir might have operated from within the Tangi Valley. Thus, the International Security Force (ISF) command group ordered American/Coalition forces working within Wardak Province to locate Tahir and capture or kill him.
Beginning around 22:30 hours (local time) on 5 August, a platoon of 47 Army Rangers departed their forward operating base in Logar Province aboard two CH-47D aircraft. After a thirty-minute flight, the two helicopters landed near a compound believed to be the location of Tahir. After disembarking the Rangers, the helicopters departed the area. It was a high-risk operation. Two AH-64 Apache gunships and an AC-130 gunship remained on station to provide intelligence, surveillance, and aerial reconnaissance of the area. Seventeen SEALS served as a reserve force.
As the Rangers approached the designated compound, ISR aircraft observed numerous individuals leaving the compound, but the Rangers did not engage these people. Apache aircraft did engage a different group of around eight insurgents, reporting six of these insurgents killed in action. Meanwhile, ISR assets continued to observe the disengaged group, estimating between 9-11 fighters. The on-site commander believed that these individuals might include Tahir. At 0100, the task force commander directed the SEALS to engage these suspected insurgents. The Aviation Brigade Commander took nearly an hour to approve a new landing zone for the SEAL infiltration. At 02:00, the task force commander decided to increase the size of the SEAL Team from 17 to 33 warriors and then, to reduce transportation time, command authority loaded SEAL reinforcements into a single CH-47D; another aircraft served as a decoy that would land at a separate landing site.
While this part of the operation was unfolding, the Taliban force split into two sections. At around 02:15, one team of three insurgents went to a stand of trees; the other group entered a building located 1.2 miles from the original compound. Since the Apache helicopters were involved in tracking these two groups of insurgents, they could not offer security or fire support to either of the two in-bound CH-47Ds.
Six minutes out, the decoy CH-47D split off and returned to base. The remaining helicopter, callsign Extortion One Seven, proceeded to the earlier landing zone. One minute out, Extortion One Seven descended to an altitude of 100 feet and reduced its airspeed to around 58 knots. A third group of Taliban previously undetected by the Americans fired 2-3 RPGs from a two-story building. The second round fired struck Extortion One Seven’s aft rotor assembly. Within five seconds, the CH-47D crashed and exploded, killing everyone on board. It took the Apache aircraft another thirty seconds to report the 47’s destruction.
The official determination in the after-action report was “wrong place/wrong time.” Such things do happen in war. People die. Suddenly. But former Navy JAG Officer, Lieutenant Commander Don Brown, disagrees. He claims the US military intentionally concealed what happened to Extortion One Seven, much in the way the Army lied about the circumstances of Patrick Tillman’s death in 2004.
After reviewing all the evidence available to him (unclassified material), Brown concluded that military command sacrificed the SEAL Team through gross negligence during mission planning and covering up what happened. As Brown understood the facts, seven ADF personnel slipped aboard Extortion One Seven without authority (a significant security breach), men who had no role in the operation. Moreover, the rules of engagement (ROE) precluded pre-landing suppression fire within the CH-47D’s designated landing zone. Brown argued that a pre-landing suppression fire would have saved Extortion One Seven from destruction.
On the issue of the seven ADF personnel, Brown contends that the remains of these men were flown to the United States and cremated, as reported in the Washington Times, leading Brown to conclude, “Something went terribly wrong inside that helicopter, and whatever went wrong was most likely beyond the pilot’s control.” Brown also raises the question about a so-called helicopter black box, which the Army contends does not exist in that model aircraft. But Commander Brown was adamant, asking why the Brigade commander sent Rangers back to the crash site looking for something that doesn’t exist.
Brown additionally claimed that the AC-130 gunship circling above the LZ spotted suspected Taliban insurgents moving on the ground toward Extortion One Seven’s designated landing site and requested permission to engage those insurgents. According to Brown’s investigation, the task force commander denied the gunship permission to engage. US Air Force Captain Joni Marquez, assigned to the AC-130 gunship at the time as firing officer, confirmed Brown’s assertions, and agreed with his conclusion that denying the gunship permission to engage sealed the fate of the CH-47D.
The cost in American lives from the US teaching a potential enemy how to kill our sons and daughters has been too high. It is incomprehensible that any official of the US government would plant the seeds for a lethal future conflict for no other reason than to engage in an illicit relationship with a socialite. Worse, Wilson soon had the full cooperation of the White House, CIA, and House of Representatives.
How many graves have we dug so far in the war on terror — graves that a US Congressman helped to dig?
Bergen, P. Manhunt: The Ten Year Search for Bin Laden. Crown Publishing, 2012.
Bowden, M. The Finish: The Killing of Osama Bin Laden. Atlantic Monthly Press, 2012.
Carter, S. “Retired Air Force Captain says Pentagon covered up the real cause of deadly chopper crash.” On-air broadcast, 18 April 2017.
Herring, J. K. Diplomacy and Diamonds: My Wars from the Ballroom to the Battlefield. Center Street Publications, 2011.
 Wilson’s motivation for starting the so-called Charlie Wilson War was his infatuation with Joanne Herring, a quite-wealthy anti-Communist crusader. Herring, appalled by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, employed her feminine wiles in convincing Wilson to take up her cause of revenge against the Soviet Union. Joanne Herring is also believed to have had an intimate relationship with Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq while serving as “Honorary Consul” at the Pakistani Consulate in Houston, Texas. Osama bin-Laden may have been the founder and leader of al-Qaeda, but it may have been Joanne Herring who started it. Treason, anyone? Anyone?
 Brown served as legal counsel to Army Lieutenant Clint Lorance, who was charged and convicted for war crimes. Brown’s subsequent book Travesty of Justice: The Shocking Persecution of Lt. Clint Lorance was a major factor in Lorance’s pardon by President Donald J. Trump in 2019.
Men have used spears in warfare for well over 3,000 years —and they continued using them even after the invention of firearms. The use of spears began as implements for hunting in pre-history. They were fashioned by burning one end of a straight stick until it had become pointed, its makers scraping the wood further to make the pointed end even sharper, which increased its lethality.
The hunting spear may have been one of mankind’s earliest technological advances, inspired by early man’s demand for food. Scientists in Germany discovered this kind of weapon embedded into the skeletal remains of an elephant. No one is quite sure when humans turned these hunting weapons upon one another; we only know that it was a long time ago. What we do know is that spears were far more efficient than clubs, and likely preferable because of their versatility. A spearman could thrust his weapon into an enemy or throw it from a distance.
Over time, hunters-gatherers became agriculturalists. With farming came the domestication of animals and less demand for hunters. One demand remained, however: the defense of small villages to protect loved ones and food stores. When men learned that more spearmen were far more efficient in self-defense than one or two uncoordinated defenders, they began to develop offensive and defensive tactics. At first, it is likely that the employment of these maneuvers more closely resembled a Chinese fire drill than a military formation, but in time someone came up with the idea that a well-drilled formation fared better in warfare than a mish-mash of stick-wielding yahoos.
The earliest formation was the phalanx, a closely packed block of spearmen. The phalanx made the spear far more deadly in close combat; even back then there was no ribbon for coming in second. The phalanx formation made ancient Greece into a military power with subsequent armies adopting similar formations over the next 2,000 years.
The Roman armies did such a good job of emulating Greek strategies that they eventually took over the known world. The Roman started with the basics of Greek tactics and improved on them. While retaining the spear (pilus) the Romans also used swords (Gladius). Initially, Roman swords were much like those used by the Greeks, but from around the third century BC, Rome adopted the Celtiberian sword; they called it Gladius Hispaniensis. This sword was shorter in length, better made, and far more manageable for close-in fighting. The Roman spear was especially adapted to Roman tactics, used as a kind of close-combat artillery, but constructed more on the order of a javelin. After throwing their pilum in a single volley, Roman legions then charged into their enemy in close formation with shield (scutum) and gladius.
Rome’s demise, after 1,100 years of military domination, produced several hundred years of political and social instability. The next innovation of the spear came in the form of the lance, a weapon used from horseback by mounted knights. Knights led infantry (foot) formations (that retained the spear as its primary weapon), but it was the mounted warrior that led to most military innovation in subsequent years—such as saddles, stirrups, a longer “cavalry” sword. Cavalry (or its earliest form) became the Middle Ages’ most important combat component. Eventually, polearms replaced spears as infantry weapons.
The polearm provided a defense against mounted assaults —an innovation that enabled the Swiss to become the most feared military force in Europe during the Middle Ages. The most widely recognized polearm of that period was called a halberd, a cross between a spear and an ax with a hook. The halberd was useful in stabbing, slashing, and pulling riders from their horses.
The pike was an exceptionally long spear fielded by large blocks of men (similar in many ways to the Greek phalanx, but without shields). Pikes enabled infantry to hold off charging cavalry. By this time, military formations had begun to field fire arms so the pike blocks also protected musketeers while they reloaded their weapons. When muskets and rifles became the primary weapon of field armies, bayonets became the primary means used by riflemen to defend themselves in close combat. When attached to the musket or rifle, the two weapons served the same purpose as the ancient spear.
Bayonets continue to function as a close-in weapon in modern military arsenals. They are primarily used while searching for the enemy in confined spaces, or whenever a field commander anticipates close combat. There are many examples of the use of the bayonet in World War II and the Korean War. The command, “Fix Bayonets” is chilling because at that point, everyone knows that a knife fight is about to take place.
When First Lieutenant Arthur E. Karell ordered “Fix Bayonets,” the hunkered down Marines of Fox Company’s 3rd Platoon began to perspire. The sound of Marines withdrawing their bayonets from scabbards and affixing them to the ends of their rifles was distinctive. Click, click, click. Lieutenant Karell’s order was precautionary because he didn’t know what to expect in the quiet darkness. All he knew was that his orders placed he and his men at that specific spot, and that Helmand Province (later known as Marineistan) is where someone high up in his chain of command had decided that U.S. Marines could do the most good. Karell was part of the vanguard of Marines who would become predators —their prey was the Taliban.
Nawzad, Afghanistan was a ghost town. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (2/7) assumed responsibility for pacifying this enemy-occupied but once-populated town in a remote and god-forsaken area of southeast Afghanistan. The people who used to live in Nawzad (some 10,000 in number (estimated)) abandoned their mud-brick homes and melted away into the dusty area surrounding it. With the departure of these simple people, the Taliban moved in and made themselves at home. Karell’s battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Richard D. Hall, had sent Fox Company to issue eviction notices.
The fact was that Colonel Hall didn’t know much more about Nawzad than Karell; Hall had no “intel” of the enemy situation because Helmand Province wasn’t a priority for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO’s coalition headquarters in Kabul. Up until 2/7’s arrival in Helmand Province, the ISAF had ignored Nawzad.
The quiet darkness of early morning was periodically interrupted by the sounds of distant jackals, which was enough to straighten the Marine’s neck hair. Karell’s Marines didn’t know what awaited them, but whatever it was, it was about to get its ass kicked. The Taliban were dangerous, of course, but they weren’t U.S. Marines. They may have intimidated poor farmers and the U.S. Army led ISAF in Kabul, but they weren’t going to cower Fox 2/7. Still, neither Lieutenant Karell nor his company commander had a firm picture of the enemy situation.
The 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines was initially activated on 1 January 1941 at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Its world war service included Guadalcanal, Cape Gloucester, Peleliu, and Okinawa. During the Korean War, 2/7 participated in the landing at Inchon, the Battle of Seoul, the landing at Wonsan, and the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir. Captain William Barber received the Medal of Honor for his extraordinary courage while commanding Fox Company. The battalion deployed to Vietnam from July 1965 until October 1970. While based at Twenty-nine Palms, California, the battalion was deployed for Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-91 with additional service in Iraq in 2004, 2005, 2006. The battalion deployed to Afghanistan in 2008, and again from 2012-2013.
2/7 spearheaded the return of Marines to Afghanistan in April 2008, engaging in combat almost from the very first day. It was the hardest hit battalion in the Marine Corps in 2008. During its eight month deployment, the battalion lost 20 Marines killed in action; 160 wounded in action, and of these, thirty amputees.
It was 15th June 2008 and Karell was seconds away from launching his first combat assault. Most of his noncommissioned officers were combat veterans, but their previous experience had been in Iraq. Afghanistan was a horse of a different color. From their position in a dried-up irrigation ditch, in the pitch-black early morning, the only thing the Marines could see was the vague outline of a thick mud wall that stood higher than most Marines were tall. The wall separated the town from a small, scraggly forest. Up until then, it was “Indian country,” and no one from Fox Company had seen what lay on the other side. They only knew that whenever a patrol came near the wall, someone from the other side started shooting at them. Not knowing the enemy situation beyond the wall prompted Karell to issue his order, “Fix Bayonets.”
Karell began the platoon’s advance, stealthily creeping along in the dark with he and his platoon sergeant, Staff Sergeant (SSgt) Gabriel G. Guest, leading the way. This is how Marines do combat: leaders at the tip of the spear. Despite a long list of unknowns, the Marines of the 3rd Platoon had confidence in their lieutenant. Karell possessed all the positive attributes of an outstanding combat leader. He was calm in stressful situations. He moved with purpose and self-confidence. He was open with and respectful of his men. He was willing to admit when he’d messed up. He learned from his mistakes. In the eyes of his superiors, Karell had additional traits: knowledgeable, thoughtful, aggressive, good at planning and even better in execution. In short, Karell was a hunter-warrior —a dangerous predator.
As Karell’s Marines moved forward, they could hear the growling engines of support vehicles coming up behind them. Suddenly, from behind the wall, a rocket-propelled grenade shattered the silence of the night —the explosive swooshing above the heads of the leathernecks toward the approaching support vehicles. Marine machine guns opened up; enemy machine guns answered. Muzzle flashes from the base of the wall revealed the enemy’s positions.
The instant before the shooting started, Karell’s Marines were nervous; an instant after, Marine Corps training took over. The Marine’s first emotion was that they were pissed off that someone was shooting at them. After coordinating by radio with Fox Actual, once the Marine’s machine guns shifted their fires, Karell launched his assault toward the enemy. 2nd Squad laid down a base of fire as Karell and the 1st Squad rushed forward. Then 1st Squad took up suppressing fires as 2nd Squad advanced. The Marines of 3rd Platoon ignored the enemy’s fire as deadly rounds snapped past them, but they were expending a lot of ammunition. SSgt Guest began relaying ammo resupply forward. The enemy machine gun went silent and the enemy began running in the opposite direction.
Lieutenant Karell brought combat engineers forward. After firing mine clearing devices into the area in front of the wall, they blew a gaping hole through the adobe barrier. Karell’s platoon poured through the wall and took up a hasty defense position until the platoon was ready to pursue the enemy. What they found inside the compound stood in stark contrast to the desolate moonscape on the outside. It was a garden setting, complete with flowing water and a forest of fruit trees.
Karell and his Marines had no time to enjoy it; the lieutenant organized his Marines to begin destroying enemy bunkers. Their progress took them into the light forest. Standing before them was a white mound that rose above the trees. Karell estimated that the damn thing was forty-feet above ground. The skipper supposed it could be a command bunker.
From where the 3rd Platoon was standing the mound looked like a stone fortress. It was “no big deal.” The Marines started climbing weighted down by the intense morning heat, their weapons, ammunition, and body armor. They were looking for caves —but found none. They expected enemy resistance —but there was none. When he reached the top, Lieutenant Karell did a quick search of the area. All he found were scars from artillery of some earlier battle. Karell laughed —his 3rd Platoon had captured a huge rock.
2/7 was sent to Nawzad to train Afghan police. The ISAF reasoned that if the Marines could train local police, the police would then be able to protect their own community. The fly in that ointment was that there were no police in Nawzad. Absent the police training mission, Colonel Hall queried higher headquarters about his new mission. He was told to make it possible for the Afghan people to return to their long-deserted town. There was no mention of how he was to accomplish this task, of course, only that the Marines needed to “get it done.” So, Hall executed the Marine Corps plan: find the Taliban and convince him that he’s in the wrong business.
While it was true that the battalion’s mission had changed, little else had. Since ISAF controlled all in-theater air assets, 2/7 would not have dedicated air support. Marine grunts love their aviators, and this has been true all the way back to the early days of Marine aviation —when Marines began to explore the utility of aircraft for ground support missions. For two decades, the Marines perfected air-ground operations during the so-called Banana Wars. During World War II, Navy and Marine Corps aviation perfected the art and science of close air support. They employed these skills in the Korean War. In fact, it was during the Korean War that the Marines taught the Army a thing or two about on-call close air support. In Afghanistan, however, the Marines would have to REQUEST air support through the ISAF. Maybe they would get it, maybe they wouldn’t. There was no guarantee that 2/7 Marines would have their USMC Cobra pilots (their combat angels) overhead.
By the time 2/7 arrived in Nawzad, the once-thriving city was already long-abandoned. It was likely that Taliban or drug trafficking warlords had driven them away. But Colonel Hall was resourceful and smart. Before the scheduled deployment of his Battalion, Hall went to Helmand Province and talked to people on the ground. He came away with the understanding that, despite his (then) stated mission to train a police force, his Marines would do more fighting than training.
A week after Lieutenant Karell’s rock climb, Captain Russ Schellhaas, the Fox Company commander, assigned Karell’s 3rd Platoon to support of his 1st Platoon during an operation that unfortunately found 1st Platoon in the middle of a minefield. It was a horrible day for twenty-six seriously wounded Marines. A few days after that, Staff Sergeant Chris Strickland, an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technician was killed while attempting to disarm an improvised explosive device (IED).
The mission of the Marine combat engineer is to enhance the mobility and survivability of ground combat forces. Among its several specific tasks are expedient demolition, route/area minesweeping operations, and a range of other force protection measures. Thirty days later, it was Lance Corporal John Shrey’s duty to conduct minesweeping operations while leading Lieutenant Karell and his platoon’s 3rd Squad through a potential IED minefield. Karell and his Marines followed him as if they were baby ducks.
Once the Marines had made it through the minefield, they concealed themselves in a grove of scrubby underbrush within sight of their point of interest —a supposedly abandoned compound with a single adobe shack. Intel claimed that insurgents were using the compound as a rallying point, a place where they stored their gear before laying in more IEDs. North of the rally point was a band of trees, within which was another series of compounds —in distance, about a half-mile in length. Heavily armed Taliban occupied these compounds and used them as IED factories and safe havens. According to the 2/7 operations officer, the Taliban were Pakistanis who had come to fight through what the Marines were calling “Pakistan Alley.” And the Marines knew that it was only a matter of time before they would have to clear it out. For now, though, the Karell concentrated on the immediate threat: the rally point.
At daybreak, the 3rd Squad could hear the Moslem call to prayer echoing through the northern forest. Lieutenant Karell also detected the sound of armored vehicles bringing up the rest of his platoon. Shouts erupted from insurgents just inside the tree line; two Pakis ran from the wood carrying RPGs. They were unaware of Karell’s presence in the grove.
Enemy machine-gun fire opened-up against a Marine bulldozer as it barreled its way through a minefield, clearing a lane to the rally point. An RPG was fired at the MRAP carrying Karell’s second squad. The leader of the 2nd Squad was a young corporal by the name of Aaron Tombleson. At 23-years of age, Tombleson was responsible for the lives and welfare of twelve Marines. His point man was Private First Class Ivan Wilson, whom everyone called “Willie.”
Explosions began erupting near the MRAP. Lieutenant Karell heard a loud detonation and this was followed by the giant tire of an MRAP flying toward 3rd Squad. With none of his men injured in the blast, Corporal Tombleson quickly transferred his squad to a second vehicle. It was already a jumbled day and it was still early in the morning.
The bulldozer went on to punch a hole through the wall of the compound but had gotten stuck in the rubble and tight surroundings. A fire team from 2nd Squad dismounted to provide security for the engineers while they attempted to straighten out the bulldozer. Willie led the fireteam alongside the MRAP toward the rear of the dozer, but incoming small arms fire began pinging the side of the MRAP. The fire team took cover and began returning fire. PFC Wilson on point ran to the edge of the compound and took a kneeling position to return fire. In that instant, an IED exploded under him. Lieutenant Karell heard the explosion, followed seconds later by a radio report that the 2nd Squad had four or five casualties with one KIA.
3rd Squad’s Navy Corpsman was HM3 Tony Ameen. He requested Karell’s permission to move up to help attend to the wounded. Assuming 2nd Squad’s corpsman was overwhelmed in treating the injured, Karell told Ameen he could go —but only with an engineer to sweep for mines.
With Lance Corporal Shrey leading the way, Ameen and another Corpsman, HM Jack Driscoll, and a few additional Marines to provide security, moved up. The going was slow. As the medical team inched forward behind Shrey, another explosion erupted, and a plume of smoke appeared behind the tree line.
“Doc” Ameen, impatient with the rate of march, bolted out of line and rushed forward. This is what Navy Corpsmen are trained to do. They run to their wounded Marines —and this explains why 2,012 Navy Corpsmen have been killed in combat since the Navy Medical Corps was founded in 1871. Forty-two corpsmen lost their lives in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are 21 U.S. Navy ships named after Navy Corpsmen; they have received over six-hundred medals for valor —including 23 Medals of Honor and 179 Navy Cross medals.
A few steps past Shrey, Ameen stepped on another IED. Ameen went flying head over heel. He lost one foot and half of his left hand. Shrey, knocked to the ground by the concussion and bleeding from both ears, got groggily to his feet. Despite his injury, Shrey maintained his presence of mind and shouted to Doc Driscoll to halt in place. LCpl Shrey did not want another casualty among the corpsmen.
Meanwhile, Corporal Tumbleson and seven of his Marines —all that was left of his squad— carried Willie to the MRAP; as the Marines struggled to place him inside the vehicle, Wilson attempted to help them. It was then that he and realized that his arm was missing. Willie slipped into unconsciousness. Nearby, a contingent of ISAF Estonian soldiers rushed forward to help get Willie to the Medevac Landing Zone.
Lieutenant Karell called for an airstrike, which after a few minutes destroyed the compound. Afterward, Karell moved his platoon forward and occupied the compound. That afternoon, during retrograde back to Nawzad, another MRAP set off an IED, but there were no more human casualties; the truck was damaged beyond repair. When the Marines arrived back at the company command post (CP), Karell learned that Willie had died on the medical evacuation helicopter.
Even though 3rd Platoon Marines were shaken and exhausted from the day’s events, Karell assembled them to break the news about PFC Wilson. Afterward, the Marines never spoke about the battle of the compound —they only talked about the day Willie died. That night, Karell led an eight-man patrol from 1st Squad back to the enemy rally point. The Marines had learned that the Taliban often returned to a battle site to assess the damage and lay in more IEDs. No sooner had Karell and his men reached the area just outside the compound, they heard movement ahead of them. Apparently, the enemy also heard the Marines approaching and withdrew. Karell wasn’t looking for another fight —he wanted to get his Marines back in the saddle after losing Wilson.
Conditions in Nawzad were what one might expect in Afghanistan. 2/7 Marines were fighting in temperatures that hovered around 120-degrees Fahrenheit. The chow sucked —but then, all MREs do. Critical resupply was continually interrupted by enemy activity along the main supply route (MSR). There was no running water. The constant swirling of powdery Afghan dust clogged the Marine’s throats —they were continually rinsing their mouths with water, gargling, and spitting it out. Lack of contact with the outside world challenged unit morale, but worse than that, the Marines believed that their sacrifices were serving no worthwhile purpose. They were sent there to train police, but instead, the Marines became the police. And the fact was that a single battalion of Marines was an insufficient force to deal with the overwhelming number of Taliban/Pakistani insurgents over so large an area. As a result, the Marines were spread too thin —a direct consequence of President Obama’s decision to withdraw the military from Afghanistan. There were no replacements for evacuated casualties; the Marines would have to fight with what they had. Corporal Tombleson’s squad, for example, started off with twelve Marines, casualties reducing it to eight —a 33% reduction in combat efficiency.
The attitudes of Marines of Fox Company mirrored those of the other line companies. Everyone believed that when 2/7 was pulled out, as one day it must, there would be no one to replace them —and they wondered, if this was true, then why were they in Afghanistan at all? Staff Sergeant Kevin Buegel, who replaced the wounded and evacuated Staff Sergeant Guest as platoon sergeant, was pissed off. The very idea of losing Marines for no good purpose was a constant source of irritation. Eventually, word came down that Obama had reversed his earlier decision to withdraw all US forces. 2/7 would be replaced by another battalion landing team after all.
In late October 3rd Platoon assumed the company vanguard (the point) position when Fox Company plunged into Paki Alley to root out and destroy Taliban forces. Hall’s 2/7 had already cleared Nawzad but clearing the Taliban from the alley would be a tough fight, as urban-type warfare always is.
Lieutenant Karell’s platoon was engaged in clearing operations; each of his rifle squads moving deliberately through their assigned sectors. At one location, the 1st Squad encountered a Taliban shooter in the structure’s basement. Marines called out to him in Pashtu to surrender, but he kept shooting at them with an AK-47. Corporal Joe Culliver was an intelligence analyst temporarily attached to Fox company. He wanted the shooter taken alive, if possible; one of the Karell’s Marines told him, “Don’t count on it.” Nothing the Marines did convinced this shooter that it would be to his advantage to surrender.
1st Squad’s delay of advance was becoming a critical issue because the three squads moving forward provided mutual security during the platoon’s operation. Lieutenant Karell decided that they’d wasted enough time on this one holdout. Marines tossed hand grenades into the basement; the insurgent answered with more rifle fire. Staff Sergeant Buegel was pissed off; he always was about something. He rigged a C-4 explosive and tossed it into the basement. Whatever impact the explosion had appeared negligible because the shooter continued to unleash measured fire. Karell knew that the shooter was wounded, knew that he wasn’t going to surrender, and he knew that he was not going to leave him alive in the rear of his Marines.
Elsewhere in the Alley, the Taliban was putting up one hell of a fight. The enemy employed mortars, machine guns, and hand grenades against the 3rd Platoon. Karell needed to close the door on this shooter. Marines inched down the stairwell and poured hot lead around the adobe corer into the open basement. The shooter finally went silent. Karell, with his pistol at the ready, entered the basement with Corporal Culliver right behind him. The Taliban was laying on the floor along the wall on the far side of the room. He was badly wounded. Spread out across the floor in front of him were dozens of needles and empty ampules of morphine. The shooter was higher than a kite, and this explained his apparent lack of pain. As Karell approached the shooter, he suddenly heaved, reaching for his AK-47. One of the Marines behind Karell fired twice, killing the Taliban.
Folks back home believe (because this is what the U.S. media tells them) that the Taliban are deeply religious people, dedicated to their belief system, that they are willing to sacrifice themselves in the name of their god. This could be true among those who run dozens to hundreds of madrassas, and it may even apply to Afghanistan’s dozens of warlords. Taliban fighters, on the other hand, are seriously malnourished men radicalized by drug addiction. Culturally and historically, the average Afghan is opposed to any form of government and there is nothing any western coalition can do to change that. It is a situation that has existed since the days of Alexander the Great. The only options available to western forces is that of (a) relieving them of their misery and sending them into whatever awaits them in the afterlife (although, with a population exceeding 36 million people, this is highly unlikely), or (b) leaving them alone.
3rd Platoon fought on. Now, finally, with the backing of newly assigned cobra gunships, pilots could see Karell’s three squads dangerously separated in the urban setting. 3rd Platoon’s fight lasted well over seven hours. Karell believed his Marines were making progress, but that’s not what the cobra pilots were seeing. From their vantage point, dozens of insurgents were swarming eastward toward the Karell’s Platoon. It was only the gunship’s well-aimed rockets that drove them back toward Pakistan.
After seven hours, Lieutenant Karell was running out of daylight —and everything else— and his platoon was only half-way through the series of walled compounds. Marine engineers destroyed several IED factories and knew more of them lay ahead. The problem was that the 3rd Platoon was an insufficiently sized force to seize and hold the compounds. Worse, the combat engineers were out of explosives —so that even if the 3rd Platoon did capture additional IED factories, there was no way to destroy them. Captain Schellhaas knew that when he ordered the withdrawal of his platoons, it would be only a matter of time before the insurgents filtered back in.
Caught in the middle of all this was the Afghan farmer who only wanted to raise his poppies in peace. The day following 3rd Platoon’s assault on Paki Alley, Karell led a motorized patrol to a small hamlet known as Khwaja Jamal. In the spring, someone from this village was always taking pot-shots at patrolling Marines; since then, the insurgents there had either withdrawn or gone underground. More recently, 2/7 Marines had established a dialogue with village elders. Everyone in Khwaja Jamal was curious about these American interlopers. It worked to the Marine’s advantage that their living conditions were equal to those of the poor farmers, but while the Marines —the product of 21st Century American society— enjoyed their creature comforts, Afghanis steadfastly rejected modernization in every form.
Were these villagers’ friend or foe? A third of them were intent on selling Marines their ample supply of illicit drugs; another third wanted to know about American farming and irrigation techniques —and then there was a group of younger men who demanded to know why the Marines were in Afghanistan at all, how many soldiers they had, and how far could their guns shoot.
In December, when 2/7 was withdrawn, Nawzad was still empty of civilians. By then, a third of Karell’s platoon had been killed or wounded. Platoon sergeant Buegel was himself wounded by an IED, but he was one of the lucky ones. Maybe the good Lord likes cranky people. Relieved by Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 3/8, BLT 2/7 Marines returned to California to resume their lives. Some of these men left the Corps at the end of their enlistments, some remained on active duty. The majority of those who remained on active duty were transferred to other posts or stations. As new men reported for duty with 2/7, replacing those ordered out, the battalion began its workup for a subsequent tour in Afghanistan.
Lieutenant Karell, who was at the end of his obligated service, decided to remain on active duty.
Brady, J. The Scariest Place in the World: A Marine Returns to North Korea. New York: Dunne Books, 2005
Drury, B., and Tom Clavin. The Last Stand of Fox Company. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2009
Henderson, K. A Change in Mission. Washington: Washington Post Company, 2009
Kummer, D. W. S. Marines in the Global War on Terrorism. Quantico: History Division, USMC. 2014
Martin, R. Breakout—The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, Korea 1950. Penguin Books, 1999.
 Celtiberians were Celticized people inhabiting the central-eastern Iberian Peninsula during the final centuries BC.
 There are dozens of explanations for the collapse of Rome, among them corruption, social malaise, and the fact that Rome attempted to incorporate barbarians into the Republic/Empire —people who were culturally non-Roman, and who therefore lacked the uniqueness of Roman esprit-de-corps.
 At the end of 2007, the most optimistic description possible for Helmand Province was that it was a gaggle turned stalemate. When the Marines were sent to Helmand Province, Marine commanders decided they had had enough of fighting battles the Army way; they intended to fight the Taliban on their own terms. It wasn’t long before the U.S. Army hierarchy in Kabul complained to Washington that the leathernecks had gone rogue; the Marines refused to do anything their Army superiors wanted them to do. But the Marines know how to win battles. They win battles through aggressiveness, thinking outside the box, and terrifying the hell out of the enemy. This mindset is a significant contrast to Army careerism. The Army began referring to Helmand Province as Marineistan.
 Skipper is an informal naval term denoting the Commanding Officer of a Marine company, the Commanding Officer of a Navy ship, or a Navy/Marine Corps aircraft squadron.
 Meals, Ready to Eat. Also, Meals Rejected by Ethiopians.
 Every Marine officer is trained as an infantry officer. A combat pilot knows exactly what his ground counterpart is facing and strives to support the grunts in every way possible.
 Fifty-two percent of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) is generated by their illicit drug trade. Given that the majority of its 36 million people are happy to remain in the stone age, one wonders how “saving” Afghanistan is in the United States’ national interests.
It ought to be comforting to the American people, in an odd sort of way, to realize that when it comes to idiotic politicians and bureaucrats, self-serving senior flag officers, and agenda-driven anti-nationalists, we aren’t standing alone in the world. Somehow, though, this is not at all reassuring —it’s downright worrisome. Like our own government, the United Kingdom decided to send its young men off to war. These well-trained warriors did their jobs and completed their missions and were officially recognized for their performance above and beyond the call of duty. But then the British government publicly called into question their honor and their courage on the field of battle.
What kind of people are we?
(Then) Lance Corporal Brian Wood, British Army, 1stBattalion, Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment, was called in to reinforce an insurgency attack directed against a combat patrol of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders near a checkpoint known as “Danny Boy.” The incident took place near Majar al-Kabir on 14 May 2004. It was one of the most ferocious engagements involving British forces in Iraq; it involved close-quarter combat against a larger force of the so-called Mahdi Army fighting to the death.
In the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, British forces were sent there to act as peacekeepers. They were in Iraq to demonstrate solidarity with the western world, to win the hearts and minds of the local people, the goal of which was to help reconstruct the nation after the Iraq War. This, quite naturally, was all political rubbish. If these peacekeepers accomplished anything at all, they became the targets of a ruthless insurgency. American and British forces were routinely sniped at, mortared, and attacked by armed extremists who were being cleverly manipulated by Moqtada al-Sadr. In this initial stage, and for the sake of brevity, we can call peacekeeping what it was: standing around looking stupid while senior military leaders figured out what was going on. Meanwhile, combat soldiers suffered the around-the-clock rocket and mortar fire,
When the leaders of these coalition forces finally decided that enough was enough, they planned several operations intending to confront the Mahdi army, locate and arrest key leaders, bomb-makers, and those who had no hesitation in sending children wrapped in explosives toward coalition camps.
14 May began with the usual rocket attack of the British position at Abu Naji. The command ordered Corporal Wood and his men into the Warrior fighting vehicle; his mission: discover the location of insurgent (enemy) mortar positions. While on patrol, the Wood’s unit was redirected to reinforce elements of the Argyll Sutherland Highland, a platoon being ambushed near checkpoint Danny Boy. As they sped to reinforce the beleaguered unit, vehicle commander Sergeant Broome provided Wood and his team with constant updates on the situation. Wood and his men, sitting in the rear compartment, had no way of observing the vehicle’s surroundings.
Suddenly, the Warrior began to receive overwhelming small-arms fire. The vehicle commander hit the brakes and the gunner began delivering return fire. Wood and his men were completely in the dark as to what was happening outside the vehicle. Broome evaluated the situation: there were ten to fifteen insurgents dug in some 125 yards from the highway directing fire at the Warrior. Entrenched, the firepower generated by the vehicle’s gunner is having no effect on the insurgent’s position. Broome ordered Wood and his men to dismount. Wood said to his men, “prepare for a close-quarter assault.” Wood informed his sergeant they were ready to go. Broome replied, “On my mark … there’s a gully to the left, go for that, I’ll provide covering fire.” On the count of three, Wood and his men exited the vehicle.
Woods (shown right, Royal Army photo) could see the enemy, well entrenched, their heads bobbing up and down as they fired the weapons and then took cover. Wood realized immediately that his radio wasn’t working; there was no way to receive any further instructions from Broome. He decided to attack the insurgents “hard and fast.” His team of five scrambled out of the gully in team formation, running a zig-zag pattern across the open ground, stopping, kneeling, returning fire, advancing in a leap-frog pattern. Enemy bullets whipped around them. It was a demonstration of pure courage … and hope.
As the British team reached the trench, the insurgents seemed surprised. What kind of crazy men were these to attack their well-manned and fortified position? Some of the insurgents began an immediate withdrawal. Some threw down their weapons and raised their hands. The Brits jumped into the trench, suddenly faced with dead bodies, prisoners, loosed weapons, shouting, and overhead fire. The adrenalin was pumping. Wood ordered those with their hands in the air to get on the ground; he ordered his men to ceasefire. One insurgent was acting “jumpy,” as if he was getting ready to do something stupid, and the British team was still receiving fire from the withdrawn insurgents; they’d taken up a new position further back. Wood grabbed Abu-Jumpy and threw him to the ground —for that man’s own protection, and his own. He tied his hands with plastic cuffs, at the same time ordering his men to collect the enemy’s weapons and safe them.
Wood and his team were quickly augmented with reinforcements: two additional Warriors and a couple of battle tanks. Sergeant Major Dave Falconer made his presence known. “Is the battlefield clear?” It wasn’t clear. Falconer ordered a clearing patrol, directing Wood to lead him in the direction of the withdrawing insurgents. The two of them had just set off when an insurgent popped up and began firing at them. Falconer dispatched him. Another fighter stood up —but not for long before Wood shot him. Two more Iraqis stood up, but they had their hands in the air. Wood recognized one of these men: an Iraqi policeman who had been working with the British forces. Apparently, he’d switched sides. It was a common occurrence among the Iraqis. None of these people could be trusted. Out of plastic cuffs, Wood and Falconer frog-walked these two men back to the British line.
The ordeal wasn’t over. Falconer ordered Wood and his men to collect the bodies. It was a gruesome task and having to do these kinds of things are part of what causes combat veterans to have bad dreams. The smell of death lingers for a lifetime. In any case, a few days after the battle, military police conducted an inquiry of what had happened on the morning of 14 May. Wood and his men made their statements. As far as he was concerned, the issue was history. In time, Wood rotated back home with his unit.
A few months later, while undergoing additional training, a couple of men from the special investigations branch appeared. They wanted to ask Corporal Wood a few more questions. A few things needed clarification, they said. They showed him some pictures of dead Iraqis and asked him to identify them. It isn’t pleasant having to look at pictures of dead men, particularly men who’ve been killed in combat. Wood didn’t recognize any of these men. The interview lasted more than an hour.
Time progressed and Wood was notified that he was being awarded the Military Cross . He received his medal from Her Royal Highness, Queen Elizabeth. It was an honor for Wood to have been so recognized. Her Majesty was kind toward Wood and offered him her thanks and appreciation for his service.
In 2009, Wood learned of the so-called Al-Sweady investigation. It had been five years since the Battle of Danny Boy. The investigation had been initiated by a civil rights attorney named Phil Shiner (shown right, photo from the public domain). A number of soldiers had been accused of assault, along with inhumane treatment of detainees. One of these soldiers copped a plea and served one year in prison. As a result of one man admitting inappropriate conduct, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) paid out £3-million to the aggrieved Iraqis for “substantive breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights.” The admission also led the liberal press to assume that human rights violations were prevalent within the British forces. A witch-hunt was started. The Battle of Danny Boy resurfaced.
A group of six Iraqis and the uncle of Hamid al-Sweady, one of those killed at Danny Boy, claimed that they had been ill-treated by British forces in the aftermath of the battle. They claimed to be innocent bystanders, simple farmers who were not part of the insurgency. They were simply caught up in the crossfire. They also claimed that the fighters who had been captured had been murdered in cold blood by the British troopers. The MoD dismissed these allegations, but Solicitor Shiner persisted with his claims. He suggested to the press that as many as 20 Iraqis had been murdered by British forces. In November 2009, it was announced that a public inquiry would be held to look into these claims.
Colour Sergeant  Wood was called to give evidence in 2013 … nine years later. It wasn’t a trial; it was a public inquiry, but Wood was still placed in the dock and questioned by the attorneys representing the Iraqi complainers. Wood thought the whole show was ridiculous—and indeed, it was. Lacking any familiarity with military training or front line experience, the attorneys did not even know what questions to ask, and so they focused on the idiotic. It was a fishing expedition: they wanted to know how long the firefight lasted, they asked Wood whether he went to the right or left when he exited the Warrior, and they wanted to know “how tightly” the plastic cuffs were placed on the Iraqi prisoners. Was it true that Wood had denied a prisoner a drink of water? Wood asked himself, “Why are we even discussing this?”
Wood gave his evidence and retired from the courtroom. The result of the inquiry wasn’t announced for another nine months. Meanwhile, Wood wondered what might happen next. He’d not done anything wrong, so why was he now being made to suffer the stress of these unsubstantiated accusations? And the liberal British press was having a field day. One might think that Wood was the reincarnated Jack the Ripper.
On 17 December 2014, the final report summed up 189-days of testimony from 55 Iraqi witnesses and 222 British servicemen. There were 328 statements from additional witnesses. The final report consisted of more than 1,200 pages. What were the findings? “The vast majority of allegations made against British military were wholly and entirely without merit or foundation. Very many of those baseless allegations were the product of deliberate and calculated lies on the part of those who made them, and who then gave evidence to this inquiry in order to support and perpetuate them. Other false allegations were the result of inappropriate and reckless speculation on the part of witnesses. The evidence clearly showed that the British soldiers responded to this deadly ambush with exemplary courage, resolution, and professionalism.”
The inquiry cost the British taxpayer £31 million. The firm called Public Interest Lawyers and Leigh Day, a second law firm involved in cases against British troops were referred to the Solicitors Regulatory Authority. In August 2016 Public Interest Lawyers went out of business, while the British government announced it would take steps to prevent further spurious claims against Her Majesty’s troops. In December 2016, Phil Shiner was compelled to attend a hearing seated to consider the misconduct of attorneys. He admitted guilt in relation to claims of wrongdoing by Wood and his men and. The evidence against these lawyers was that they knew far in advance of the 2009 inquiry that allegations of murder and torture were false. They knew that Hamid al-Sweady was a member of the Mahdi army —and knowing this, they allowed the allegations to go forward.
Martyn Day and Phil Shiner (and others) lost their license to practice law in 2017, but it didn’t undo the years of anguish and suffering among the British troopers and their families.
Neither Day or Shiner has ever apologized to these men.
John F. Kennedy once said, “A nation reveals itself not only by the men it produces but also by the men it honors, the men it remembers.” How does the United States and the United Kingdom honor the men who serve?
It could be argued, of course, by distinguished jurists that the legal process must begin with allegations that are either substantiated or defeated in a court of law. But there is another point of view. Nations spend billions of dollars training and equipping their soldiers to fight; they spend billions more sending them into combat. Some of these men never come home. Far more are permanently injured while fighting these wars. What right do lawyers or politicians have to constantly look over the shoulders of these men, second-guessing what goes on within the space of mere seconds in lethal combat? What right do these people have to question the actions of these men in moments of adrenalin, fear, and their quest for survival? More to the point, what right do they have in accepting the testimony of known liars  (the insurgents) over the word of the men who fought against them?
Presently, in the United States, another warrior is facing life in prison owing to allegations of war crimes. According to the New York Times, decorated Navy SEAL, Special Operations Chief Ed Gallagher (Shown right, photo from public domain) has been charged with indiscriminately shooting at civilians, premeditated murder of a “teenage ” ISIS fighter, obstruction of justice, and bringing discredit upon the armed forces by posing in a picture next to the body of aforementioned teenager.
Ed Gallagher has achieved 19 years of honorable service. He is a trained hospital corpsman and a sniper. He is the recipient of his country’s third highest combat decoration, the Silver Star. Now, aged 39, Gallagher is facing life in prison. He isn’t the first combat soldier or sailor to face such accusations.
Chief Gallagher denies all charges. I hope he has a good defense team; he’ll need one, because there are other Navy chiefs who are lined up to testify against him, now claiming that he was blood-thirsty, reckless, and out of control. But one has to wonder, if these characterizations are true, then why didn’t his officers in charge and senior enlisted supervisors take action to remove him from the combat force? Why wasn’t he referred to medical authorities for a proper psychiatric evaluation?
We cannot now know what actually happened in Gallagher’s case. This is why we have courts of inquiry and, when necessary, formal court-martial proceedings. And yet, here we are, once more examining a situation in which governments send their young men into battle, and have the audacity to question them about what actually happened in the heat of combat. Last week, we learned about the plight of Major Fred Galvin and the Marines of Fox Company, MARSOC-7. In Galvin’s case, the exalted leadership didn’t have his back, and the British government sure didn’t support Brian Wood and twenty others who were falsely accused. Now we are witness to another set of allegations unfolding in the liberal press.
The British and Americans have a long history of the warrior ethos. Whenever called upon, young men from these two countries have always stepped up —twice against one another. But despite this proud history, I have to wonder how much longer anyone, in either country, with any common sense at all, will willingly place themselves in harm’s way if all they can ever expect is punishment for doing what their governments paid them to do —which, for the record, is to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver.
Wood, B. Double Crossed. Virgin Books, London, 2019
“Decorated Navy Seal is Accused of War Crimes in Iraq,” Dave Phillips, The New York Times, 15 November 2018
 The Military Cross (MC) is awarded to all ranks of the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, Army, and Royal Air Force in recognition of exemplary gallantry during active operations against the enemy on land. It is an ornamental cross in silver, with straight arms terminating in broad finals decorated with the Imperial Crown. The Queen does not usually present this decoration but may do so at her pleasure, which she did on this occasion.
 In the British Army, a colour sergeant ranks above sergeant and just below warrant officer.
 The age, sex, socio-economic status, level of education, or the worthiness of his or her parents do not matter when someone is trying to kill you. It is either kill the enemy or be killed by the enemy. Choose wisely.
On 4thMarch 2007, a platoon of thirty Marines were being transported in a six-vehicle convoy when it was ambushed in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. The area was notorious as a terrorist route into Afghanistan from Pakistan. The smoke hadn’t cleared over the point of contact when the news media began reporting that these Marines had gone on a wild rampage, killing massive numbers of innocent civilians in the process. The unit was called Task Force Violent. In reality, it was the direct-action platoon of Fox Company, Marine Special Operations Command. In the press, they were undisciplined cowboys who brought shame upon the United States Marine Corps. The characterization was both unfair, and untrue.
The facts are these: Fox Company was sent into a war zone under-manned, with muddled orders, confusing rules of engagement, and un-prepared for the political environment within which they were destined to serve; they were sent to war with equipment that was inadequate to their mission. By under-manned, there was but one mechanic to maintain 45 company vehicles. The Marines did not even know where they were going until after they boarded the ships that would carry them into harm’s way. Their specific mission wasn’t finally communicated to Major Galvin until his company was at sea for two weeks, which was to train the Afghani security forces.
When Fox Company arrived in Afghanistan, they were assigned to a facility at the Jalalabad airfield that had been allocated to French troops. The facility was in a state of disrepair. Fecal matter had tainted their well-water. The Marines were not within the logistics system, so obtaining food was a problem. They were borrowing food from adjacent units. The Marine Corps’ first deployment of a special operations capable infantry company was an orphaned unit. Worse, the Army hierarchy didn’t want these Marines in-country and found themselves at odds with the command structure.
The ambush took place on 4thMarch. The Marines departed their base of operations at 0600 for a pre-approved three-phase mission. The patrol took them toward the Bora Bora mountains, which were snow covered. The roads were muck. The Marines proceeded through Bati Kot to a key border crossing. There, they met with an army military police unit. The patrol continued on to search for suspected insertion points along the base of the mountains. Having discovered no clear evidence of insertion points, the Marine turned back toward Bati Kot, where they intended to meet with village elders to learn more about enemy activities in the area.
The attack, when it came, was alarming. Entering Bati Kot, the Marines noticed several military-aged men lining the street. A bomber driving a van packed with fuel, raced toward the convoy and attempted to wedge himself between the first two vehicles before detonating the bomb. When the explosion came, there was a massive ball of fire that rose into the air and briefly engulfed the second vehicle. Small arms immediately erupted from both sides of the roadway. The Marines immediately responded in the manner in which they were trained: they fired disabling shots to get the convoy free of danger … moving meant avoiding being pinned down by enemy fire. Warning shots were fired to disperse a forming crowd. It was, in fact, a textbook response.
Afghan witnesses, however, had a different story to tell. They said that the Marines panicked and started killing everyone in sight. Some of these witnesses claimed that the Marines exited their vehicles and threatened local journalists who were snapping pictures of the attack. Other Afghans said that the Marines appeared drunk. None of these claims were true, but this was the story that appeared in the international press.
Upon return to base, one injured Marine was taken in for medical treatment. The experience was scary, but the Marines weathered it and took it in stride. They’d survived the mission. They saved the convoy. But later, in the mess hall, a television new report was reporting about the incident … claiming that the Marines had killed noncombatant civilians.
The Special Operations Command convened an investigation almost immediately. Upon order of Major General Frank Kearney, US Army, commanding the Special Operations Command, Colonel Patrick Pihana, U. S. Air Force, was appointed to conduct a fact-finding investigation. At the time, Pihana was serving as Kearny’s Chief of Staff —and, as such, was not a disinterested party to the investigation.
Nevertheless, during this investigation, Pihana attempted to convince an Army EOD expert to recant his conclusion that in-coming small arms fire damaged one of the Marine vehicles. When the expert refused to abandon his evaluation, Colonel Pihana excluded his statement. Ultimately, Colonel Pihana recommended charges against four Marines for negligent homicide. In order for Pihana to reach this conclusion, it was necessary that he disregard the statements of every Marine in the convoy.
In time, Kearny, who retired from active duty in 2012 as a three-star general, would himself be implicated; not only for his repeated misconduct the handling of the investigation against Fox Company, but also in another matter involving an Army Special Forces detachment (Green Berets). Under scrutiny, Kearny later claimed that he only convened his investigation at the request of the Marine Corps. Pihana maintained that his investigation was properly conducted.
Within one week of this incident, the Marines were ordered out of the war zone. Fox Company’s commanding officer, Major Fred Galvin, was relieved of his command. A board of inquiry was subsequently convened at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina to evaluate the facts … but only after Galvin suffered the shame of his relief for cause and his Marines unceremoniously dispersed.
Meanwhile, in May 2007, Colonel John Nicholson , U. S. Army, addressed the Pentagon Press Corps via satellite hookup from Afghanistan. As the commander of Task Force Spartan, Nicholson had oversight of the region within which Fox Company was operating, including Bati Kot. Nicholson reported that the Army had paid claims to Afghan citizens in Bati Kot. Nicholson opined that what happened that day was a “stain on our honor,” and a “terrible, terrible mistake.” This is the narrative placed against the Marines of Fox Company; this is the narrative that stuck.
The inquiry convened ten months later. The question was whether sufficient credible evidence existed to warrant criminal charges: negligent homicide being the recommendation of the initial investigating officer. The inquiry lasted three weeks. During this time, the press was excluded for attendance due to the presence of classified information. Not being present to hear first-hand testimony, certain members of the media invented their own narrative. It was a rush to judgment by senior army officers and the press.
After the board of inquiry, a Marine Corps 3-star general determined that Major Fred Galvin and his Marines had acted appropriately in combat and pursuant to the rules governing the use of lethal force … but the damage to these Marines had already been done. Galvin was not offered a subsequent command and was forced into retirement in 2014. Fox Company Marines were cleared of any wrong-doing, but the judicial incompetence of senior officers left the Marines, including Galvin, with a stigma that has dogged them ever since 2007. In Major Galvin’s case, his superiors constructed fitness reports that were designed for no other reason than to prevent him from advancing in rank … all of this in spite of the fact that a Navy Department conclusion rebuked those who condemned these men even before the facts were clear.
What actually happened here was an episode that unleased international outrage against good Marines, based on proven fabrications, engineered by the enemy to fuel distrust of the American military. Their dupes were the three senior officers who “rushed to judgment.” In other words, American warriors were betrayed by senior officers who have been “trained” to remain objective in matters relating to the administration of justice.
This wasn’t the first assault upon military justice arising from a combat zone. There was the matter of Haditha, where judgment was rendered far in advance of known facts. In this case, Congressman John Murtha  (D-PA), joined by then Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Michael Hagee, condemned the Marines in the press and claimed that there never was an IED attack, that the Marines killed innocent civilians in cold blood. Only one Marine was ever convicted from this event, one count of dereliction of duty. That one Marine, Staff Sergeant Frank Wuterich (reduced to private) sued Murtha for defamation, but his lawsuit was later dismissed because Murtha, in his congressional capacity, was above the law.
In another case, arising in 2011, Marines were accused of urinating on the dead corpses of Taliban fighters . Then Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Amos attempted to interfere in the legal proceedings —applying unlawful command influence over a pending judicial matter— by firing the Lieutenant General Thomas Waldhauser (the lawful convening authority in the case). Waldhauser refused Amos’ order to “crush and discharge” the accused Marines. To make matters worse, Amos attempted to hide the fact that he’d crossed the line of proper judicial supervision and provided photographs to the press that showed Marines urinating on the corpses, which accompanied the words, “What Does America Think of Her Marines Today.”
It would thus appear that there is a serious problem within that small circle of flag rank officers within the Department of Defense. What kind of leader conspires against his own combat troops? In the case of Kearney and Nicholson, it may have been a byproduct of an age-old rivalry between the Army and Marines; rather that than simply a matter of inexcusable incompetence. It may have also been a case of simple vindictiveness. See also: Marineistan. Colonel Pihana’s inexcusable behavior was a matter of a senior officer exhibiting his flawed character by giving his boss what he wanted —rather than doing what was right and honorable. And, of course, Pihana wanted to be a general too, someday.
Major Fred Galvin offered a correct analysis: Fox Company suffered the consequences of political pressure in an unpopular war. The US military in 2007 was committed to a counterinsurgency strategy that emphasized protecting Afghan civilians. A situation in which building trust and confidence with local Afghans took precedence over killing insurgents. In actuality, Fox Company Marines did nothing beyond defending themselves against a sudden ambush.
Nevertheless, the stress attached to being investigated as war criminals, and the shame of being accused of something they never did, has been a heavy burden to bear among the Fox Company Marines. They have suffered as much as any combat veteran from substance abuse, divorce, and having thoughts of suicide. For what? They did nothing wrong.
There was a substantial failure within the small enclave of Marine Corps leadership as well. What kind of leader constructs fitness reports that were only written with one purpose: to force a fellow officer out of the Corps? Major Galvin, however, never gave up his efforts to urge the Marine Corps to do more for his Marines, to set the record straight. Major Galvin kept faith with his men —the sign of a true leader.
Beginning in 2015, members of Congress petitioned then Commandant of the Marine Corps Joseph F. Dunford and later, Commandant of the Marine Corps Robert B. Neller to do the right thing. Both of these officers “declined” to revisit the plight of Fox Company Marines. In his letter to members of Congress, Dunford simply restated the court’s findings from years prior; he merely emphasized that neither Galvin nor his men faced any punitive measures. “Nor is there any adverse information in their military records associated with this incident,” Dunford wrote. But Dunford was either wrong, or he was lying. Galvin was systematically damned to failure through faint praise.
Congressman Walter Jones (R-NC) would not back off, however and as a result, Major General Frederick M. Padilla, then serving as Neller’s chief of staff, pledged that the Corps would provide counseling and such other assistance to Galvin and his men as necessary to help them recover from this trauma. Of course, Major Galvin never heard about this until several weeks later when he read it in The Washington Post. So much for “following up,” eh General Padilla?
Dunford, now serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon has acknowledged the Navy Review Board’s directive. Dunford’s spokesman said, “General Dunford was pleased to learn about Maj. Galvin’s exoneration and also appreciates his efforts to take care of the Marines from Fox Company.” Commandant Neller added, “We have a system through which Marines can try to remediate actions believed to have been unfair or incorrect. In this case, it seems the system worked as designed, and Maj. Galvin had his record cleared. We all wish him well.”
If these were in fact Dunford’s words, they were only this: underwhelming.
I can’t speak for the Army leadership, but I can say something about the Marines. From Amos on, the Marine Corps’ senior leadership has established a new low record of performance. They’d better get this fixed because if we allow this squalid condition to fester, no one with a strong warrior ethos will ever want to serve as Marine, or in any outfit that won’t back up their combat leaders. Mere platitudes twelve years after the fact doesn’t cut it.
Military Times, Task Force Violent: The unforgiven (and five-part series), Andrew deGrandpre, 4 March 2015
LA Times: For a Marine Unit, the battle to restore reputation goes on, David Zucchino, 14 June 2015
NewsRep:The Untold Story of the Leadership that Failed MARSOC Fox Company: Ambushed (and five-part series), Nick Coffman, 29 March 2016
The Washington Post, The Marines were falsely accused of war crimes. Twelve years later, they have vindication, Andrew deGrandpre. 31 January 2019
Acknowledgment: My sincere thanks to former Marine Corps staff sergeant Carol Martin, who now serves Marines in her capacity as a Defense Investigator, who edited and offered advice concerning this article. Additionally, my deep appreciation to Major Paul Webb Chapman USMC (Retired) for taking the time to read this post and offer suggestions, which I have incorporated.
 Member of the USMC Reserve (1952-1990), one of the “congressional colonels.”
 There is little doubt that these Marines behaved in a despicable way, and yet, few others have walked a mile in their shoes. Combat does things to people. We ought to worry about the effects of sending our young men into a war zone, particularly when there has never been a credible effort to win that war. In any case, the behavior of these Marines was regrettable, and they ought to have been punished at nonjudicial proceedings, not “crushed” as their commandant suggested.
By the end of 2007, the situation on the ground in Afghanistan had reached a stalemate. A de facto border was established east of Garmsir along the banks of the Helmand River that divided British-held and Taliban controlled territory. By this time, British forces were far outnumbered by Taliban insurgents because there was no shortage of Pakistani men with nothing better to do than fight the good fight. Our British cousins had access to NATO artillery and airstrikes, but these, without adequate ground forces, do not a victory make. Given this paucity of infantry forces, senior coalition officers seemed unsure about how to proceed.
One thing everyone agreed on was that NATO needed more ground forces in Afghanistan. In early April 2006, American Marines were sent to bolster the flagging NATO command. The 24th MEU, which included Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/6 (First Battalion, Sixth Marines) began their Afghan tour by initiating an attack on the Taliban-held town of Garmsir on 28 April. US Marines joined up with British troops from the Sixteenth Air Assault Brigade (16 AAB). The Taliban, however, as they are wont to do, withdrew from the town and took up a position further south.
After Garmsir was taken, the Marines pushed south into an area where the Taliban had, over many months, constructed bunkers and tunnels capable of withstanding airstrikes. Initially, planners anticipated that the mission would only take a few days; the operation ended up lasting more than a month. Based on Taliban behavior, General David D. McKiernan, U. S. Army, Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), determined that Garmsir was important to the Taliban, so the Marines were ordered to remain in the area. McKiernan, concerned that the Taliban would likely reemerge after the Marines left and claim that they had run off the ISAF, changed the operational playbook. Now the Marine mission would include both combat operations and civil affairs. Colonel Peter Petronzio, commanding 24th MEU, now faced the task of splitting his force to give attention to both of these missions. Marines provided security to local Afghans as they began to return to their homes after having been displaced by the Taliban. Between April and July 2008, US Marines killed more than 400 Taliban insurgents. On 8 September 24th MEU returned control of Garmsir to British forces.
Deployed independently from 24th MEU, BLT 2/7 dispatched elements to Sangin, Gereshk, Musa Qala, and Nawzad, as well as districts within Farah Province. 2/7 worked with the Afghan National Police and Combined Security Transition Command in implementing police training and important reform programs. Despite being deployed independently, 2/7 was also engaged in heavy fighting. As a sign that the United States had renewed its commitment to Afghanistan, 2/7 was relieved by 3/8 and the Special Purpose MAGTF in December 2008.
Marine Corps arrival in Helmand Province was no small accomplishment. Most people think of amphibious operations as involving a multitude of amphibian tractors cutting through the surf to land Marines on an exotic beach. This was the likely scenario in the 20thCentury, but today’s Marine Corps has advanced its military capability —in the same way the Marines first developed amphibious and vertical assaults.
Afghanistan is land-locked. The southern-most tip of Helmand Province is 400 miles from the shoreline of the northern Arabian Sea. This geographic fact led some defense experts to opine that there was no role for the US Marine Corps in Afghanistan. They must have forgotten that Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) have trained for long-range insertions from the sea for several decades. They must have overlooked the fact that MEUs are capable of performing more than twenty special operational missions, and many of these are long-range assignments.
The way the Marines look at these missions is simple: “If one wants to tango, one has to be inside the dancehall.” It is also certain that Marines don’t go through the trouble of a rather complex forward deployment just to come in second place.
Two combat ready MEUs (4,400 US Marines) were already poised for action when the US Central Command sent them into action. But, why the Marines? Because the Marines were already there, and because the Marines are always looking for a fight “at any climb and place.” Marines and their commanders know combat and view it from a distinctively Marine Corps point of view.
It wasn’t long before the US Army hierarchy in Kabul started complaining that these Leathernecks were “going Rogue” inside Helmand Province. It wasn’t that Marines were ignoring their senior Army commanders; it was only that the Marines have their own way of getting the job done. Thinking outside the box is what Marines are trained to do; ultimately, it is this mindset that saves the lives of Marines and terrifies an enemy. The US Marines know how to win battles. They’ve been doing this for over 243 years. They didn’t need any armchair quarterbacking from people who were, after all, not Marines.
As previously explained, Helmand Province is one of 34 provinces in Afghanistan. By area, it is the largest (20,000 square miles). There are 13 political districts, 1,000 villages, and just under a million inhabitants. For all intents and purposes, Helmand Province was similar to the Comancheria: it was Indian Country.
The Helmand Province campaigns were a series of operations conducted by the ISAF against Taliban insurgents. The Taliban intended to control Helmand Province and its opium production. British forces and their American Marine counterparts intended to destroy the Taliban. Initially, the Helmand mandate fell to British forces as part of a three-stage expansion of the ISAF mandate to exert authority over the southern regions of Afghanistan. Until then, Helmand Province had only seen sporadic ISAF activities. In the spring of 2008, a battalion of US Marines arrived to reinforce the British. One year later, an additional 11,000 Marines arrived pursuant to President Obama’s authorization, as discussed in the introductory paragraphs (above). In June 2009, British Army forces (supported by ISAF and ANA troops) launched Operation Panther’s Claw; on 2 July the Marines began Operation Khanjar. Both of these were major offensives with the goal of securing Helmand Province in advance of national elections.
There were two US/NATO encampments in Helmand Province: Camp Bastion, manned by our British cousins, and Camp Leatherneck —both of which are only a short distance from the capital of Lashkar Gah. Culturally, Helmand province dates back to the Bronze Age. It was invaded by Alexander the Great, became part of the Indian Empire under Ashoka, and then fell under the influence of Islam . Genghis Khan was not a great admirer of the Afghan living in Helmand Province —which he illustrated quite clearly in the Thirteenth Century.
Not long after Barack Obama assumed the presidency in 2009, he ordered an additional 17,000 troops sent to Afghanistan. This deployment would include 8,000 Marines of the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2ndMEB), then commanded by Brigadier General Lawrence D. Nicholson . President Obama subsequently appointed U. S. Army General Stanley A. McChrystal to Command the ISAF. McChrystal’s orders were to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and prevent their return to Afghanistan.
General McChrystal’s approach was to isolate the general Afghan population away from insurgent elements, and, in so doing, he argued, improve Afghanistan’s stability as an emerging nation. McChrystal’s revamped US strategy was to focus on a population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) effort based on lessons learned in Iraq. He presented his plan to the President, recommending a troop surge to bring Afghanistan back from the brink of collapse. In December 2009, President Obama authorized an additional 30,000 troops. The majority of these men would be US Marines.
Before BGen Nicholson’s arrival at the head of the 2ndMEB, the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF  )-Afghanistan had laid a foundation for the MEB’s operations, which commenced on 2 July 2009. Four-thousand Marines and several hundred Afghan National Army (ANA) troops were rapidly introduced into the major population centers of the Helmand River valley that had been previously dominated by Taliban insurgents. BGen Nicholson orchestrated operations named Khanjar, Eastern Resolve, and Cobra Anger from July 2009 into the fall season. In February 2010, 2nd MEB closed in on Marjah during Operation Mostarak. Marine successes cleared the way for an Afghan government and Coalition presence in previously enemy-held areas.
American Marines also had to contend with vast poppy fields that helped to finance the Taliban insurgency. Nicholson maintained a dynamic vision for COIN operations with non-traditional maneuverings, such as an interaction with local mullahs, the employment of female teams, and the establishment of the Joint Security Academy, a Marine Corps led police training facility.
Some of General Nicholson’s methods were considered controversial by more-senior Army commanders and State Department officials. Nicholson, however, would not be bullied into adopting tactics that he knew were foolish, wasteful, or an unnecessary risk to his Marines. His insistence on autonomy and his doctrinal reliance on the MAGTF operations prompted his critics to label Marine Corps operations in Helmand Province as “Marineistan.” The Marines, senior officials claimed, had gone rogue in Helmand Province; they wouldn’t do anything the Army wanted them to do. Marines had long learned one important lesson: a dangerous enemy can be foreign or domestic.
The NATO command structure in Afghanistan was nothing if not complicated —and political. This was necessary, perhaps, given the complex nature of saving Afghanistan from itself and the fact that the NATO command was a multi-national organization. Overall command authority rested with the Commander, ISAF in Kabul. He directed three subordinate formations after the reorganization in 2009. These consisted of the ISAF Joint Command, responsible for directing tactical operations, NATO Training Mission and Special Operations, and regional commands designated North, West, South, East, and Southwest.
Regional Command Southwest was responsible for security in Helmand and Nimruz Provinces. Regional Command Southwest included military forces from the United States, United Kingdom, Georgia, Denmark, Bahrain, and Estonia. The southwest command also included Task Force Helmand (UK and Danish), Task Force Leatherneck (US Marines operating in northern, southern, and western Helmand Province), and Provincial Reconstruction Teams operating from Lashkar Gah (UK, Denmark, Estonia).
Commanding Task Force Leatherneck, of course, was (then) Brigadier General Lawrence D. Nicholson. Nicholson was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in 1979. As a company-grade officer, he served as a platoon commander in the 1stMarines and commanded a recruit training company at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, California. As a field grade officer, Nicholson commanded Regimental Combat Team One during Operation Phantom Fury (the Second Battle of Fallujah) where he was wounded in action, commanded the 5thMarine Regiment, 2ndMarine Expeditionary Brigade, and later served as Deputy Commander for Operations, ISAF. Lieutenant General Nicholson retired in August 2018 after serving as the Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force.
For eight years, the Obama administration believed that it knew more about fighting a war than did the senior military officers tasked with prosecuting it. They didn’t —and no one demonstrated this better than General Nicholson and the Marines of Task Force Leatherneck.
Delaram, Afghanistan is regarded by some as the end of the earth —which is precisely where one should expect to find US Marines. It is the location of several truckstops populated by a handful of locals. It is in the center of hundreds of miles of desert. Delaram is so far “out there” that it had no strategic importance to senior officers in Kabul. After all, McChrystal’s priority was protecting Afghanis in their largest cities . General Nicholson had a different view: Afghan cities are best protected by destroying Taliban insurgents in outlying areas. Controlling rural areas is essential to promoting economic development; the one-million inhabitants of Helmand Province deserved as much protection as the people in Kandahar or Kabul.
So —the Marines went to Delaram —to wage war in their own way. The Marines pushed into Taliban-held strongholds and invited them out to the dance floor. Next, they set up a school to train Afghan police officers. They took with them Moslem chaplains to pray with local mullahs. They deployed teams of women Marines to reach out to Afghani women. The Marine Corps approach was creative, aggressive, and unorthodox. Marines don’t patrol in helicopters at 500 feet ASL; Marines patrol on foot.
Foot patrols are a risky business, but that’s what Marines do for a living. Patrolling on the ground allowed the Marines to interact with local populations, and it was this interaction that stabilized local communities. These strategies soon resulted in thriving bazaars, functioning schools, and communities of people who prefer living free to dying enslaved by religious tyrants. It did not take most Afghans in Helmand Province very long to align themselves with the Marines; those deciding to remain unaligned soon learned that they had made a very bad choice.
Yet, despite Marine successes in Helmand Province, Army commanders continued to resent these efforts; the Marines continued to resist arm-chair quarterbacking from Kabul. General McChrystal, in particular, was unhappy with the Marines because, or at least it would seem to be, that the Marines had discovered the right mixture of stick vs. carrot. This was the result of doing COIN the Marine Corps way. McChrystal wasn’t alone. One Washington bureaucrat moaned, “We have better operational coherence with virtually all of our NATO allies than we do with the US Marines.” This could be an accurate observation, but Marines weren’t as focused on coherence with Army units as they were in stabilizing Helmand Province. They did that.
These differences in strategies and combat operations are more than a simple matter of conflicting opinions. While senior officials in the White House, at the Pentagon, and in McChrystal’s headquarters would rather have had many of the 20,000 Marines deployed to Kandahar, the fact is that General Nicholson was right, and all of those others were wrong. Success within Helmand Province generated the perception of momentum in the U.S.-led military campaign and it caused severe uncertainty within Taliban elements. This is exactly what the Marines should do: never let the enemy read your playbook. What McChrystal never seemed to understand is that one increases combat effectiveness by allowing Marines to operate together, as a team; the opposite is achieved by breaking them apart and/or deploying them piecemeal.
Marines fight the way they’ve been trained to fight. Every Marine is a rifleman. Every Marine Corps officer is first trained as an infantry leader. This is why Marine Corps helicopter units know how to best support the ground forces, how logistics officers know how to push supplies to forward units. The Marines did not have to rely on Army units or depend on NATO forces to resupply them. Marine Corps units have been mutually supporting since World War II; there is no reason to change what works to something that doesn’t.
Nevertheless, General McChrystal continued to fight the Marines, eventually bringing in the White House. He “tattled.” In early March, General David H. Petraeus, who then headed Central Command, issued an order giving McChrystal operational control of Marine Corps forces in Afghanistan —but with one important caveat: McChrystal had to obtain Central Command authority before he could break Marine infantry units apart from their air and logistical support mechanisms. The caveat limited McChrystal’s ability to move the Marines within Afghanistan.
Here’s something else McChrystal didn’t understand: when Marines move out, they do it quickly and smartly. When they arrive in-theater, they’re ready to fight. Army units move at the speed of molasses in January. One senior defense official commented, “The Marines are a double-edged sword for McChrystal: he got them fast, but he only gets to use them in one place.”
The fact was that the Marines didn’t choose Helmand Province; they were asked to go there by McChrystal’s predecessor, General McKiernan. He needed the Marines because, lacking adequate resources, the British contingent was unable to contain an intensifying insurgency. Once there, the Marines were determined to make their deployment a success —but they would do it, as they always have, the Marine Corps way— which is how the Marines straightened out Anbar Province in Iraq. One final note on this topic: The Marine concentration in Helmand Province gave the Marines “pride of place.” They owned it —along with their successes or their failures.
Nawzad is a city in northern Helmand Province. At one time, the city was the province’s second largest. Over a period of four years, Taliban insurgents took control of the city and its surrounding area. All roads leading into the city were mined, along with key buildings inside the city. The Afghan people living there moved away. British and US Army units attempted to do something about this situation, but in the end, they found themselves confined to the city. Anyone venturing into outlying areas was either shot at or bombed. The Marines fixed this problem by reclaiming the town within a few weeks. It was an outstanding demonstration to every insurgent in Helmand Province that first, the Marines owned the deed to Nawzad, and second, would not countenance any Taliban terrorizing of local citizens.
Nothing the Marines did in Nawzad corresponded to McChrystal’s counter-insurgency strategy. One senior Army official in the JTF commented, “If our focus is supposed to be protecting the population, why are we focusing on a ghost town?” General Nicholson could not have cared less about what the Coalition thought. What he did care about was what the Afghan provincial governor thought about it. The governor approved, and so did local tribal leaders. The people moved back to Nawzad. General Nicholson observed, “Protecting the population means allowing people to return to their homes. We’ve taken a grim, tough place, a place where there was no hope, and we’ve given it a future.”
Next up, Nicholson assigned Marines units to control the desert to put an end to the flow of insurgents, drugs, and weapons from Pakistan. This is where Delaram came to the fore. From Delaram, Marines mounted further operations in Nimruz Province, which the NATO command regarded as so unimportant that not a single US or NATO reconstruction team ever went there. NATO’s lack of attention opened that province up to large numbers of insurgents. General Nicholson was determined to clean it up.
The bellyaching of US and NATO military officials continued. They argued that what the Marines are doing only made sense if there were not a greater demand for troops elsewhere. Okay … so? The fact was that British diplomats and military professionals wanted to enlarge the US Marine Corps footprint. What they were doing in Helmand Province was getting results … but time was the only thing the Marines didn’t have enough of. General Nicholson reminded his Marines, “The clock is ticking. The drawdown will begin next year, and we still have a lot to do.”
What Taliban insurgents never quite absorbed in their dealings with US Marines were these important lessons: (1) A Marine can become a trusted ally or your absolute worst nightmare: choose wisely. (2) Never shoot at an American Marine because it will only piss him off. (3) Marines never run from a fight: a pissed-off Marine will attack you and beat you into the ground, and (4) You can run and hide, but you’ll only die tuckered out.
If an enemy of the United States could learn important lessons about the United States Marines, so too could a few self-serving American politicians: (1) Never send a Marine into combat expecting anything less than combat; (2) Before labeling any combat soldier or Marine as a war criminal, walk a mile in their shoes —preferably while on combat patrol; (3) When it comes to combat operations, there are two ways of doing things: the wrong way, and the Marine Corps way. Marines always complete their mission. Reputation matters —and will matter— unless a potential enemy has a serious mental defect.
We need more senior military leaders like General Nicholson. We need fewer boy scouts in the Department of Defense; more professionals —like the American Marines.
 LtGen Nicholson retired from active duty in 2018; during his service, he held command positions at every echelon of the Marine Corps through the Marine Expeditionary Force. He participated in wartime service in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
 A Marine Air Ground Task Force may also be designated a “Special Purpose” mission. Additional designations might include “crisis response” and/or “Central Command.”
 It is no doubt important to defend large population centers, but such operations must be in addition to controlling outlying areas. The Army has not learned this lesson from the days when it created named forts throughout the western United States.
Helmand Province, Afghanistan is one of 34 Afghani jurisdictions. Located in the southwest of the country, Helmand is the largest province by area, around 20,000 square miles. It has 13 political districts, which encompass over 1,000 villages, and it is populated by just under a million people. Its capital city is Lashkar Gah.
In 2001, Afghanistan became the focus of America’s 911-force, but the war in Iraq diverted significant assets away from Afghanistan. The so-called “nation-building” efforts between 2001 and 2007 were ineffective; the America of the twenty-first century was proving itself incapable of fighting a two-front war. Between 2005-2006, a much-revitalized Taliban were able to conduct several large-scale offensives against coalition forces in Helmand Province, Kandahar, and areas bordering Pakistan. The Afghan government exercised only limited influence over Helmand Province and then only as it applied to the capital city of Lashkar Gah. Within Helmand Province, NATO forces were thin; American personnel numbered around 130 soldiers who were involved in anti-terrorist missions as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.
In April 2006, a British Task Force deployed to Helmand, ostensibly to challenge the supremacy of Taliban insurgents. The Sixteenth Air Assault Brigade numbered around 3,000 men, but only about one-third of these were combat infantry.
If the Taliban weren’t enough of a challenge, the command structure under which the British Task Force operated was a tangled mess. As part of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Brits served under Major General Benjamin Freakley, US Army, Commander, Combined Task Force 76. However, as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the British Commander also answered to the NATO regional command, southern district, then led by Brigadier General David Fraser, Canadian Army. British missions inside Helmand Province ranged from the contradictory to the impossible. On the one hand, the British brigade was tasked with winning the hearts and minds of local populations; on the other, they were charged to confront the Taliban and eliminating them.
The initial mission of the Helmand task force was to carry out a series of construction projects and counterinsurgency operations in the area known as “The Triangle” around Lashkar Gah and Gereshk. The Taliban, observing the weakened condition of coalition forces, launched a series of well-coordinated attacks, seizing the Baghran District in April 2006. On 18 May, they raided Musa Qala killing twenty Afghani policemen. The intensity of these attacks prompted the coalition to rethink their general strategy.
The very possibility that a Taliban offensive could sweep across the entire province moved the provincial governor to demand that already limited ISAF troops be deployed to districts that were under imminent danger of aggressive Taliban operations. Sangin, Nawzad, Musa Qala, and the hydroelectric installations at Kajaki were of particular concern. What evolved from these demands was the implementation of a “platoon house”  strategy; its effect was a significant weakening of lethal forces by tying them to remote locations throughout the province. Disbursed British forces remained under siege for long periods of time and the platoon house concept placed the entire command at risk.
The Sangin Insurgency
Sangin is a town of about 30,000 people and an important trade center in southern Afghanistan, largely controlled by the Taliban before June 2006. It was also among the largest opium markets in Helmand Province. On 18 June, a former district chief and his bodyguards were ambushed and killed in Sangin. The assassination may have been a clash between drug lords, but it did trigger the deployment of additional ISAF troops to Sangin. A company of British paratroopers moved into Sangin on 21 June, supposedly to rescue the son of the current district chief who was wounded in the ambush. In an effort to assert central authority over Sangin, President Hamid Karzai ordered these troops to remain within the city. Initially, the city seemed to stabilize, but this changed a week later when two British soldiers were killed during an area raid.
On 30 June, insurgents launched an attack on the district center, then garrisoned by British troops. The attack was repelled with British forces killing twelve insurgents, but the Taliban were undeterred. They renewed their attacks every night using small arms, RPGs, and 107mm rockets; the British answered with effective automatic weapons fire, mortars, Javelin missiles, artillery, and air strikes. Isolated, resupply of the British garrison became a critical issue.
The Battle for Musa Qala
Coalition forces were deployed to Musa Qala in much the same way as they had been sent to Sangin. Their mission was to defend the town center, which served as both police station and local jail. As with Sangin, the crowded town center actually hampered the efforts of British composite forces to defend the town. Afghan forces consisted of around 80 unpopular militiamen.
The first heavy Taliban attack was launched on 16 July. British forces, consisting mainly of pathfinders, repelled the attack inflicting heavy losses on the insurgents. Ten days later, British forces were relieved by a Danish Light Reconnaissance Squadron (The Griffins). Taliban activity was so intense outside the city that British forces could not be extracted until 8 August. Insurgents continued their attacks on Musa Qala until finally driven out of the town with the help of air support.
NATO pulled the Danish unit out of Musa Qala on 24 August to join Canadians in Operation Medusa. Replacing the Danes was a mixed detachment of British Paratroopers and Royal Irish Rangers —none of whom were armed with heavy weapons. Sensing an advantaged and encouraged by the constant turnover of NATO forces, the Taliban launched a massive attack involving 150 fighters on 26-27 August. The assault was repelled, but the Taliban continued to direct mortars and rockets at the beleaguered British garrison.
By the end of September, the fighting in Musa Qala had come down to a stalemate. The Taliban suffered heavy losses and rendered incapable of driving ISAF forces out of the town, but the coalition had also suffered combat losses and their control of Musa Qala was confined to the space inside the town’s limits. As with Sangin, resupply of the garrison at Musa Qala became a serious issue. The propaganda victory went to the Taliban.
One of the city elders decided that enough was enough. He was able to broker a truce between Taliban and British forces. The officer responsible for this calamity was Lieutenant General David J. Richards, RA. The agreement called for a British withdrawal from Musa Qala; local tribesmen promised to deny aid and comfort to Taliban insurgents. Of course, after the British departure, the Taliban reasserted their control over the city, imposing fundamentalist rules over the citizens. Movement of women was restricted, citizens were taxed to support the insurgency, and the people were summarily executed for violating Islamic rules or for being suspected coalition spies. In spite of the reemergence of fundamentalism, British and Afghan forces stayed away. General Richards wanted to avoid civilian casualties, he said.
The truce fell apart after a local mullah was accidentally killed by an American B-1 bombing mission. The Taliban claimed that the mullah’s death took place in a zone that the truce defined as off-limits. On 1 Feb 2007, three hundred insurgents stormed the town and executed the elder who had helped broker the agreement. The “truce” lasted 143 days. On that same day, General Dan K. McNeil, U. S. Army replaced Richards. McNeill favored a more aggressive strategy —but not too much more.
In early April 2007, coalition forces launched Operation Silver. It was part of a wider operation codenamed Achilles that involved more than one-thousand troops. After giving advance warning of this offensive, coalition forces advanced into Sangin to install a new district chief. McNeill announced that the city was now pacified. Sangin may have been pacified, but Taliban controlled all outlying areas.
Eventually, British engineers were able to draw the Taliban’s attention away from Sangin by constructing two forward operating bases outside the city. These, then, became the focus of subsequent Taliban attacks.
The Kajaki Dam
The dam was critical to Helmand Province for two reasons: providing water for irrigation in the Helmand Valley, and electricity for the entire province. The Taliban began to display a keen interest in the damn in June 2006. Sent to defend this structure was a mixture of Afghan policemen and security guards hired by an American contractor, all of whom were thoroughly demoralized by nightly mortar attacks.
In late June, a team of British Paratroopers set up an ambush intending to destroy a Taliban mortar team. The Brits killed 10 Taliban and wounded two. After this, the British deployed a permanent team at the dam. They occupied fortified posts that had been constructed by the Soviets during their occupation of Afghanistan. The Taliban grew a bit more cautious, but they continued harassing fires throughout the summer months.
In February 2007, British Marines from 42 Commando launched Operation Volcano. It was a clearing operation designed to establish a “safe zone” around the dam and driving Taliban mortar crews out of range of the dam. Experts note that the Kajaki Dam is one of the rare occasions during the entire war where both sides of the conflict established fixed positions and where an actual “front” developed between warring factions. The stalemate continued.
The NATO Counter-offensive
British forces were finally reinforced in April 2007; troop strengths increased from 3,300 to around 5,800 men. They also received heavier equipment, such as the Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicle, MRAP vehicles, and the M270 rocket launcher system.
Brigadier John Lorimer, the new British commander ordered a series of large-scale operations designed to systematically clear the province of insurgent forces. Operation Achilles was the first of these. More than 4,500 British led ISAF troops were involved, reinforced by 1,000 ANA  personnel. This time, however, the Taliban avoided a direct confrontation with the ISAF. They instead implemented guerilla tactics.
Operation Achilles involved a number of sub-operations, each of which targeted specific sectors of Helmand Province: Operation Kryptonite sought to clear the area around the Kajaki Dam. Operation Silver employed US Heliborne paratroopers from the 82ndAirborne Division with 250 Royal Marines, and 100 Dutch assault troops to clear the area surrounding Sangin. Operation Silicon was undertaken by the Royal Anglian Regiment (Vikings) supported by ANA, who sought to clear the area around Gereshk and the lower Sangin valley. During Silicon, the Taliban second in command was killed near Gereshk.
With these successes, the British constructed a number of patrol bases, manned by British and ANA troops. This gave the Task Force a permanent presence in areas where the Taliban had previously exercised almost complete control. NATO now had a permanent foothold in Helmand Province. A permanent foothold wasn’t sufficient, however, and the Taliban continued to control the narrative in several areas of Helmand Province.
This operation took over where Achilles ended. On 30 May 2007, ISAF and ANA troops advanced toward the village of Kajaki Sofle, which lay six miles southwest of Kajaki. The purpose of this operation was to remove Taliban insurgents who threatened the security of the lower Sangin valley. During a night assault of a Taliban compound, a CH-47 helicopter was shot down. Five Americans, one Brit, and a Canadian were killed in the crash. The operation ended on 14 June with both sides claiming success. Taliban claims were confirmed by local residents, who said that Taliban forces always return to threaten and intimidate local citizens as soon as NATO forces withdraw.
Several additional operations were conducted between 24 July and 31 December 2007. These included Operation Hammer, and Operation Sledgehammer —both of which produced positive results and significant losses among Taliban insurgents. On 1 November, 40 Commando (Royal Marines) pushed north in armored vehicles, creating a bridgehead for an important Scots Guards convoy. Having reestablished positions around Musa Qala, the British initiated a series of reconnaissance patrols which were intended to confuse and disrupt Taliban operations and disrupt their supply routes.
Musa Qala had become a major drug trade station; it was of symbolic importance to both sides of the conflict. On 6 December, British and Afghan forces assaulted the town. They were supported by several hundred US troops who came in via helicopter during the night. Taliban defenses included dozens, if not hundreds of landmines. The 2,000 Taliban fighters inside the city were confident that they held the upper hand. In the first day, one Brit and twelve Taliban fighters were killed; two civilian children were also killed.
On the second day, NATO troops captured two villages south of Musa Qala and advanced to within a mile or so of the city border. Taliban reinforcements poured into the city. On the third day, Taliban became less confident in their ability to withstand a NATO assault and withdrew from Musa Qala into the surrounding mountains. When Afghan troops entered the city, they encountered no resistance.
By the end of 2007, the most optimistic description of Helmand Province was that of a stalemate. A de facto border was established east of Garmsir along the banks of the Helmand River that divided British-held and Taliban controlled territory. With Taliban replacements flowing into the Helmand Province from Pakistan, the British were far outnumbered. NATO artillery and airstrikes could only do so much. What was needed at this point were more NATO forces.
This was when the US Marines were sent back to Afghanistan.
Continued Next Week
 Small fortified bases defended by British forces in the towns of Sangin, Musa Qala, Nawzad and Garmsir.
No serviceman today will diminish the service, sacrifice, or achievements of our World War II heroes. After all, they were our fathers, uncles, brothers, or maybe even our grandfathers. What they accomplished in Defending America, under the most difficult of circumstances between December 1941 through September 1945, should cause every one of us to stand in honor of their presence. They are entitled to our deepest respect.
And yet, to claim that one generation of American warrior is “greater” than any other is grossly inaccurate. I have never heard a veteran of World War II proclaim themselves as such. The phrase, as one might expect, originated with a journalist by the name of Tom Brokaw who used that phrase in the title of his book. It was later borrowed by Steven Spielberg and Tom Hanks in several films recreating events in World War II. Neither Brokaw, Spielberg, nor Hanks ever served their country in uniform —so I suspect they wouldn’t have any first-hand knowledge about combat, or what actually defines a “greatest” generation.
Tens of thousands of Americans served in the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Some of these men and women also lived during the Great Depression, experiencing tough times in the 1930s and 1940s. It is certainly true that our Iraqi and Afghan war veterans grew up at a different time, but these men and women stepped up to serve; some gave all they had to give. Most of our latest greatest volunteered for military service; all of them had to leave behind a loved one to worry about them over many months. Do they not also count as among America’s greatest generation(s)?
In World War II, ten million Americans were conscripted into military service; another 3 million were volunteers. Of these, 407,316 US servicemen gave up their lives. An additional 671,846 received serious wounds. In the Korean War, the United States drafted 1.5 million men, with a much smaller number volunteering to fight. In total, 326,823 Americans served in Korea; of these, 33,651 Americans laid down their lives. In Vietnam, 2.2 million Americans were forced to serve; only a quarter of these people actually served in Vietnam. We lost 58,318 Americans in Vietnam; an additional 303,656 received combat wounds.
Do the Americans who served in the Korean and Vietnam wars deserve as much respect as those who served in World War II —particularly since neither of these conflicts received the popular support of the American people?
Of course, they do …
Yet, today, people who never once placed themselves in harm’s way will argue that the modern battlefield is far less demanding than those of earlier wars. I suspect that our Iraqi and Afghan War veterans will disagree. To begin with, while there does continue to be a draft registration, today’s military is an all-volunteer force. These are America’s true warrior class citizens. There is as much (or more) courage displayed on the battlefields of today as in our previous three conflicts. What does stand out is that veterans of the Iraq and Afghan wars received fewer combat awards than those in previous eras. There are several reasons for this, but none of them related to any lack of courage among our modern-day warriors.
For those who think that the Iraq and Afghan Wars were “long distance” engagements, think again. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates once said, “Our enemy generally use weapons at a distance from us, so there’s less hand-to-hand or in-close combat than there has been in previous years.” Mr. Gates probably never met Corporal Clifford Wooldridge, United States Marine Corps.
On 17 June 2010, Cpl. Wooldridge was riding in a convoy when the vehicles came under heavy enemy fire from a group of Taliban fighters in Helmand Province , in Afghanistan. The story of Wooldridge’s heroism is told in the following award presentation:
Navy Cross Citation:
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Corporal Clifford M. Wooldridge, United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving as Vehicle Commander, Combined Anti-Armor Platoon White, Weapons Company, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, Regimental Combat Team 2, FIRST Marine Division (Forward), I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) Afghanistan, on 18 June 2010 in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. When their mounted patrol came under intense enemy fire, Corporal Wooldridge and his squad dismounted and maneuvered on the suspected enemy location. Spotting a group of fifteen enemy fighters preparing an ambush, Corporal Wooldridge led one of his fire teams across open ground to flank the enemy, killing or wounding at least eight and forcing the rest to scatter. As he held security alone to cover his fire team’s withdrawal, he heard voices from behind an adjacent wall. Boldly rushing around the corner, he came face-to-face with two enemy fighters at close range, killing both of them with his M-249 Squad Automatic Weapon. As he crouched back behind the wall to reload, he saw the barrel of an enemy machine gun appear from around the wall. Without hesitation, he dropped his empty weapon and seized the machine gun barrel. He overwhelmed the enemy fighter in hand-to-hand combat, killing him with several blows to the head with the enemy’s own machine gun. His audacious and fearless actions thwarted the enemy attack on his platoon. By his bold and decisive leadership, undaunted courage under fire, and total dedication to duty, Corporal Wooldridge reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service.
This essay addresses why America is performing poorly in 21st Century warfare. War is the act of destroying and killing until the enemy is broken morally, and no longer resists our policy objectives. But President Obama eschews the war he claims to be fighting. Our generals have imposed rules of engagement that lengthen war and increase civilian casualties. Our enemies do not fear us, and our friends do not trust us. America is fighting a war without direction or leadership.
We invaded both Afghanistan and Iraq with inchoate plans and inadequate forces to establish post-war security and governance. After winning the first battle in both countries, President George W. Bush offhandedly decided to build democratic nations, a task for which our State Department and USAID had no competence or interest. By default, the mission fell to our military, also without competence but with unflagging devotion and determination.
In both countries, our true enemies were rabid warriors determined to win or die. For us, the wars were limited —fought with few forces and many restraints. When the Islamists proved dedicated to an unlimited struggle, we reversed course and withdrew. True, President Bush did increase US forces in Iraq in 2007 and that stabilized the country. However, in 2008 he agreed with the sectarian, serpentine Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to withdraw all American troops by 2011. He threw away his success.
When 2011 arrived, President Barack Obama went against the recommendations of the intelligence community, the Pentagon, and the State Department. Instead of politically maneuvering to keep a residual force to check al-Maliki’s dark instincts, Obama pulled out all our troops. He fulfilled Bush’s foolish promise. Al-Maliki then proceeded to oppress the Sunnis, leading to the reemergence of the extremists now called the Islamic State. Obama quit, but Bush made it easy for him to do so.
Mr. Obama claimed Afghanistan was the war that had to be won. But as in Iraq, he headed for the exit. To avoid a humiliating collapse before he departs the White House, he will keep perhaps eight thousand US troops there in 2016.
On balance, the results in Iraq or Afghanistan were not worth the costs in American casualties, money, and global influence. Several policy lessons may be drawn.
First, the Pentagon should project for the president the length of time to achieve a desired post-war end state. In Iraq and Afghanistan, that meant staying for twenty or more years. From the start, Bush failed to explain this to the public. He did not even try to set the conditions in Congress and in the press for a long-term presence, as in South Korea.
Second, if our troops are killing and dying because the indigenous troops are not capable enough to stand on their own, then our commanders have the right and the obligation to select the leaders of those local forces. American diplomats chose Karzai and Maliki behind the scenes. Both choices were disasters. Yet due to unthinking allegiance to the word “democracy,” we allowed those solecistic, incompetent “elected” leaders to promote whom they chose within the ranks of the police, military, and other government agencies. Like Great Britain before us, we were a colonial power. Unlike the Brits, we did not select the commanders of the indigenous armies we were training, equipping, and paying.
Third, we granted sanctuaries to the enemy. Our military after Vietnam had vowed never again to fight such a war. But we forgot that vow. We invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to destroy al-Qaeda. In December of 2001, the core of that organization and its top leaders were trapped in a mountainous region called Tora Bora. Rather than employ a nearby Marine brigade and special operations forces, the American commander, General Tommy Franks, relied upon Afghan warlords whose motley troops allowed the al-Qaeda force to move across the border into Pakistan. That was a grave, unforced military error. Then, in a triumph of legalism over common sense, Bush decided not to cross the border in hot pursuit to destroy the fleeing terrorists.
Afghanistan steadily deteriorated after that. Yet we persisted for fourteen years in fighting an enemy while giving him a 1,500-mile-long sanctuary. Similarly, we knew where the al-Qaeda safe houses were in Syria, just across the border from Iraq. But we didn’t bomb them. We granted our enemy sanctuary.
Fourth, in such countries we should influence the politics through covert means, just as we did in Europe after World War II and occasionally during the Cold War. This includes channeling money, communications channels, and ease of transportation. Politics determines who gets what, when, and why. We fight wars to shape political ends. Influencing indigenous politics during a war should be a goal, not an out-of-bounds marker.
Fifth, we decided not to capture our enemy. In the twentieth century, many more combatants were captured than killed. Today, we don’t capture anyone. The gross pictures from Abu Ghraib, the political storm over water-boarding and Obama’s pledge to close Guantanamo and prosecute terrorists as criminals forced our military to turn over all captured enemies to corrupt Iraqi and Afghan officials. Most of those once in prison are now free, while the wars continue. Our troops call it “catch and release.” America has no comprehensible judicial system for war in the twenty-first century.
Sixth, we remain at war rhetorically, while refusing to fight with determination. How do we fight? The administration launches one or two drone strikes each month. White House spokesmen have bragged that the president routinely reviews dossiers and selects those to be killed. A commander in chief deciding upon a war fighting tactic calls into question management priorities. It also signals incapacity to think strategically, illustrating that he views war as a set of morally wrenching discrete decisions to kill about one hundred enemies each year.
Occasionally, the White House will supplement the drone strikes with a raid by our special operations forces, especially the SEALs. This garners huge favorable press, projecting an image of American superstar invulnerability. No wonder each SEAL vies to receive the most publicity. Distributing photos of the entire National Security Council mesmerized by the video of a squad raid encapsulates a strategic instinct to focus on the capillaries.
War is the act of relentlessly destroying and killing until the enemy is broken physically and morally, and no longer resists the advancement of our policy objectives. By that definition, Obama eschews war. He has declared the Islamic State will be destroyed. But his actions belie his words.
Seventh, our feckless war fighting policies over the past seven years have gravely diminished the respect of our adversaries and the trust of our friends. We refused to provide Ukraine with weapons after the Russians invaded. After declaring a “red line” if Assad used chemical weapons, Obama asked Russia to help him out. Now Russian aircraft in Syria are bombing the rebels Obama armed in the hope of overthrowing Assad. In Iraq, Iranian troops have replaced American troops. Obama’s retort is that both Iran and Russia won’t achieve anything more than he did. At the same time, Obama signed a nuclear agreement with Iran and lifted sanctions, without submitting a treaty to the Senate. In sum, Russia and Iran have undermined American credibility and military power in the Middle East, while China steals on a gigantic scale in cyberspace and exerts control over the South China Sea.
Currently, America has ceased to be the major power-player in the Middle East. Unless confronted by an absolute disaster, Obama will finish out his presidency without applying any more force than occasional bombing against the Islamic State. Russia and Iran will remain the more dominant military actors, along with the Islamic State. Under Iranian influence, Iraq will remain at war, divided between the Shiite and Sunni areas.
Fighting the War
We have done a miserable job at policy planning. But how are we doing on the battlefield? How do we fight that is really different from the twentieth century?
The most obvious difference is our overwhelming conventional superiority. That was clear when we took back Kuwait in 1991. It was reinforced in the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and of Iraq in 2003. The world has never seen the likes of it. Yes, Alexander, Caesar, Genghis Khan, Napoleon … there have been numerous victorious armies and conquests. But none like this, none with such global reach and so few casualties.
What happened here, and why? In the twentieth century, the major wars were fought on an industrial scale. The combatants on opposing sides possessed the same sets of conventional weapons —machine guns, artillery, tanks, ships, vehicles, and aircraft. In the opening decade of the twenty-first century, only America could quickly, and at low cost, destroy all those weapons possessed by any other country.
Why? Because for a brief period —two or three decades?— our military technology had outstripped the rest of the world. The Soviet Union had collapsed, China had not caught up, and no other hostile nation was remotely in our technological league. Most telling was our leap forward in air-to-ground surveillance, detection, and destruction. Militaries cannot move or be supplied without vehicles. Every artillery tube, every internal engine, every human face emits heat that shines like a spotlight. Use any computer or cell phone, walk outdoors, drive down a road —and someone above is watching, electronically or physically. Our air-to-ground surveillance and firepower are astonishing.
Yet we did not win the battles, much less the wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan. Why? Simple: the enemy adapted. He took off his uniform and used our morality and befuddlement as jiu-jitsu to overcome our technological advantages. By hiding among the people, he was safe from our firepower. The enemy lived in the cities and villages, or hid across the border, coming together in small groups and choosing when and where to initiate contact against our patrols. The Vietnam-era tactic of fire and maneuver has gone away. Our troops wear armor and gear weighing about ninety pounds. They cannot run a hundred meters without being exhausted. So when the enemy shoots, a patrol gets down and returns a vicious volume of aimed fire. Except you rarely see a target, because the enemy isn’t stupid. He has selected a covered position before opening fire. Most firefights last less than fifteen minutes, because once a gunship or aircraft comes overhead, the enemy is doomed. So he shoots and scoots. Thus the war goes on and on, because the enemy will not commit suicide by massing or wearing uniforms.
The Islamists in Iraq and Afghanistan did not fight fiercely and stand their ground against our troops. Our training, shooting skills and firepower were overwhelming. The enemy may have been a farm boy, a terrorist from Yemen, a former Iraqi soldier, a youth from a Pakistani madras, a Taliban from Kabul —whomever. They all learned to stay about four hundred meters away from American troops, because every grunt now has a telescopic sight and most are qualified as expert riflemen.
The suicide bomber was a threat to our vehicles and fixed outposts. But it never expanded into an enormous threat. The YouTube videos posted by the Islamic State from the 2015 battles in Iraq suggest an exponential growth. From anecdotal evidence, it appears the suicidal truck bomber is as much a threat as was the kamikaze during the Okinawa campaign in 1945.
There was no solution to the improvised explosive device (IED). There were hundreds of thousands of them, because mixing fuel and fertilizer and packing them into a plastic jug is too easy ever to be stopped. IEDs have to be tolerated on a battlefield just as is a rifle. It’s a simple tool and therefore commonplace. We shouldn’t forget that in Vietnam, we lost over 10,000 killed to mines and booby traps—20 percent of all our fatalities.
What was new in our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was not the profusion of the IED/land mine; instead, it was the reduction in the number of American fatalities. Much has been written about “the magic hour,” meaning: get every wounded to an aid station within sixty minutes. True, the ratio of injured to killed dropped from 4-to-1 in Vietnam to 7-to-1 in Iraq. The underlying reason was better training in life-saving drilled into every squad, along with the tourniquet. Most wounded die from exsanguination. They bleed out because the tourniquet is inadequate. Not anymore. The modern tourniquet with its twist and snap is as much a breakthrough for the grunt as was the stirrup for the horse rider.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, the doctrine of counterinsurgency prevailed. Practically, this meant our troops patrolled by walking about three miles a day in heavy gear in formations of fifteen to twenty men. The idea was to clear a populated area of the enemy by walking around repeatedly. Once the enemy pulled out or was killed, the friendly platoon or company would hold that area until Iraqi or Afghan forces were capable of holding it on their own. The local forces, in conjunction with local officials, were then to use American funds to build projects in order that the people would see a material reason for supporting their government.
Militarily, the goal was to win over the people. Thus, rules of engagement were designed to place severe limits upon the use of indirect firepower (mortars, artillery, rockets, or bombs). Even one civilian casualty caused bitter complaints, although the Islamists were responsible for three out of four killed or wounded.
On our side, there was a yin and yang to a war that had no endpoint. Over the last four years in Afghanistan, it became common for a platoon commander to say, “My mission is to get every one of my men back home in one piece.” Why risk your men when no one could tell you what defined victory? Why go across a field after taking some fire to check out the compound, when you could call in indirect fire? The incentive at the patrol level was to call in indirect fire.
On the yang side, the incentive of the senior commanders was not to allow indirect fire. The longer we stayed, the more frustrated the top command became with the lack of population cooperation. Every civilian casualty translated into some official complaining. So the more rigorous became the rules, especially in Afghanistan. It finally got to the point that the word of the forward air controller (FAC) on the ground was not good enough. The pilot was required to cross-examine the FAC before executing the mission, and a lawyer and/or another pilot back in an operations center miles away also had to authorize the strike.
Today, eight out of ten US attack aircraft return from missions over Islamic State territory without striking any target. To do so, the pilot needs the permission of a senior American officer in an operations center hundreds of miles away. This enormous caution —and expense— to protect the lives of every civilian is unprecedented in history. Only the richest country in the world can do it. However, it gravely slows down the pace of a war and allows the enemy to recuperate indefinitely.
These rules of engagement cannot be sustained when we again fight an enemy who can and does kill us. So far in the twenty-first century, our helicopters and aircraft have been almost invulnerable. Our losses have been very, very small. Similarly, our forces on the ground have not been under pressure. They are not attacked by doughty infantry in full battalions like the North Vietnamese, supported by heavy artillery. When we again fight heavy, sustained battles on a large scale, some commanders claim we can change these highly restrained rules of engagement at the snap of the fingers. More likely, the rules have sapped the aggressive spirit the high command must share with the warriors on the battlefield.
Lastly and regrettably, I must mention the growing trend of victimhood. Our society does not celebrate and single out the heroes. Instead, it tries to compensate those who psychologically or physically did not return home able to fully cope. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides some level of health care for less than half of our veterans. A minority of veterans use the VA. If all who had served turned to the VA for medical assistance, the VA system would collapse.
Yet the VA is now reporting that more 40 percent of all individuals getting out of the service after four years —and the wars essentially are over— apply for compensation for mental or physical injury. During the Vietnam War, the VA had five injury categories; today, it has seventeen. The more free money is available, the more will apply for that money. What does that do to the internal morale of a service when some in every squad put in claims, and others do not?
In summary, our enemies do not fear us and our friends do not trust us. Sensible steps can turn that around, but that depends upon the next commander in chief. So far in the twenty-first century, due to our vast wealth and technologies, we have not been sorely tested. Our beloved nation does not have a martial spirit, and perhaps does not need one. It does need a military inculcated with a warrior spirit.
Our largest deficit is national will. Consider our actions over the past decade. In 2004, we destroyed the Iraqi city of Fallujah in order to root Islamist terrorists. Then in 2011, we pulled our troops out of Iraq, despite predictions that Iraq would fall apart. In 2009, we demanded Assad leave power in Syria, but did not use military force to accomplish our demand. In the resulting civil war partially caused by our blunders, Islamist terrorists seized half of Syria and Iraq.
In November of 2015, the Islamists —now called ISIS or ISIL— massacred 130 civilians in Paris. But the American political system was unable to unite behind committing forces, as we did in Fallujah a decade ago. Why? Our commander-in-chief has rejected deploying Americans in ground combat, because he believes eternal war is the nature of the Muslim Middle East. He refuses to utter the word ‘Islamist terrorist.’ So does the Democratic contender to be our next commander-in-chief. The Republican candidates are divided. Our Congress will not even debate a resolution to authorize the use of ground forces, for fear of how the vote would affect re-election.
President Bush rashly overstepped in extending war to include nation-building. President Obama ideologically retreated by imposing restraints that encouraged our enemies. Congress proved irrelevant, lacking the cohesion to play its Constitutional role in declaring for —or against— war. As 2015 ends, a leaderless America is drifting. That should scare us all.
Bing West is a former combat Marine and an Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan Administration. He has written nine books about war in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
Somewhere out there, there is 40 pounds of explosives waiting to destroy an American life. On the battlefield, terrorism takes the form improvised explosive devices (IEDs). We used to refer to such things as booby traps (meaning a device used to catch the unwary); they have always had a profound psychological effect on military forces —and a devastating effect on civilian populations, as well. After the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the disposal of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, coalition forces remained in that country and assumed a new mission: nation building. The axiom used by former-president George H. W. Bush was, “If you break it, you own it.” George W. Bush broke it.
To combat these American forces, Iraqi and other insurgents used IEDs. It became the leading cause of death and injury among coalition forces in the region; 60% killed or injured in 2010, averaging 2.5 injuries per incident. In the case of those killed in action, injuries were so massive that there was no way to prevent their death. Among those military personnel that did survive IEDs, many also suffered significant brain damage from the concussion of the explosion. None of these people will ever return to their pre-war normalcy.
How did our troops survive in this environment? How did they even muster the courage to go on patrol, realizing that there was an IED out there just waiting for them? In the Marines, the squad looks after one another. Add to this mix the dog handlers augmenting each combat patrol. An experienced set of eyes and a dog’s ability to sniff out explosives will help to save the lives of Marines; not always, but in most cases. The cost: serious injury and death among dog handlers and their canine Marines. It is an amazing story.
On 8 February 2012, Lance Corporal Jarrett Hartley and his dog Blue accompanied 3rd Platoon, Lima Company, 3/3 into Loya Darvishan, Southern Helmand Province. While passing through a tiny village, Afghan National Army partners stopped to search a suspicious compound. They found several mortar castings; enough to prompt a more detailed search of surrounding compounds. The patrol avoided adjacent roads due to the increased threat of IEDs; they opted instead to cross into a nearby field, which took them through an arid canal. However, before the Marines entered the canal, Corporal Hartley noticed a darker patch of dirt that looked recently disturbed.
Hartley halted the patrol and sent Blue to sniff for explosives. Moments later the Labrador retriever laid down next to the area, confirming the presence of an IED. He had just saved several of a dozen lives. Hartley remarked, “While we’re on patrol, everyone looks to Blue and me to keep them safe. If we mess up, my friends will be blown up—because of my mistake.” Hartley was then 21-years old, a rifleman by training, and a volunteer to become a dog handler. But why would this young man place himself into such a dangerous position? Easy enough, he said … “I wanted to help protect Marines from getting hurt.”
Hartley’s previous tour in Helmand Province was running and gunning for insurgents as a member of his platoon. After training as a dog handler, his responsibilities changed. He remained with his platoon, but now he had to think and care for two; now he was carrying a much heavier responsibility on his shoulders. Marine and dog have become IED hunters; they do everything together, from patrolling to boarding helicopters for movement to other areas of the province. Together, the screen pedestrians, the work vehicle checkpoints, and they rest together after exhausting patrols. They experience the biting sandstorms, the bitter cold, and the scorching heat of the summer months. Through it all, Blue seems to realize that he has an awesome responsibility, too. He acts as if he understands that he is a front line defense against death and serious injury.
Nevertheless, the dogs are dogs and they like to goof off just as all dogs like to goof off. They like to jump in pools of water, chase other animals, and they get tired. Some times the animals are playful, other times they are moody. They are a challenge to their handlers, but they are saving lives and some times, at great cost to themselves.
Recently, an eight-year old Belgian Malinois named Lucca accepted her medical discharge from the U. S. Marine Corps and made her way back home to live with her first handler, Gunnery Sergeant Chris Willingham in Finland. As she hobbled through Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport with her handler, Marine Corporal Juan Rodriguez, human passengers stood and applauded the hero dog that lost her leg while looking out for her fellow Marines. On that day, Lucca detected a buried explosive, alerted her Marines, and immediately began to search for other explosives. What she did not know was that the enemy had booby-trapped the IED. When the IED exploded, Corporal Rodriguez could hear her screaming and yelping. He ran to her and began to administer life saving first aid. “It was rough,” Rodriguez said. (See Notes 1, 2)
In between combat patrols, a dog handler is likely to play with their dog; playing fetch is one popular pass time and it is here that these animals provide another invaluable service; they boost the moral among fellow Marines and each of these dogs finally finds a way into their hearts. No, they are not pets. They are highly skilled working animals. No, they are not just government property. They are life savers, morale boosters, and genuine American heroes.
Writer Maria Goodavage told Lucca’s story in an excellent book titled Top Dog: The Story of Marine Hero Lucca. You can find the book at Amazon.
Picture of Lucca and GySgt Willingham by Los Angeles Times photojournalist Gary Friedman