June 2022 – Fix Bayonets!

No Peace to Keep — Part I

Somalia, 1992-95

Introduction

For well over seventy years, the United Nations Organization (UNO) has continuously involved itself in so-called peacekeeping/humanitarian operations — at best with mixed, but at worst with disastrous results. It is a complex conversation because, over those seventy years, the nature of armed conflict has changed dramatically, and the challenges peacekeepers face have evolved into highly complex if not impossible-to-accomplish missions. Warfare is always complicated, of course, but making matters worse is the utter incompetence of UNO officials and, in the case of the United States (in its past role in such operations), the unbelievable ineptitude of executives and members of both parties of the United States Congress.

In 2019, 14 separate UNO peacekeeping missions involved well over 100,000 soldiers, police, and senior UNO civilians. The cost of these operations in 2019 exceeded $7 billion. The United States paid out $2 billion as its “fair share” of keeping the peace.

To understand the “complexity” of UNO peacekeeping operations, it is first necessary to divide them into categories. The oldest of these are operations that attempt to resolve border disputes. A second category involves multi-dimensional operations, such as might include civil war. A third type, the most difficult, involves protection and stabilization missions — which are further complicated by cultural factors. I am writing now about the cultural influences of the people to whom the aid is directed and the UNO culture responsible for overseeing such missions (particularly when UNO surrogates incorporate globalist/socialist thinking into mission structure, which obfuscates matters even further).

Of the third type, in addition to the complexities mentioned, we must add peacekeeping operations in the face of violent extremism. Generally, UNO effectiveness is only possible when opposing interests invite the participation of the UNO, when the UNO remains strictly neutral in facilitating the conflict, and when the use of force is limited to self-defense of peacekeeping units. Operational disaster is the result of the UNO’s failure to adhere to these principles. Two examples stand out: The Congo in 1960 and Somalia in 1991-95. The reality of the fiasco in Somalia was that the UNO (and its surrogate, the U.S. government) quite miserably failed to realize (or acknowledge) that there was no peace to keep. It was a doomed-to-fail effort before it began, made worse along the way with poorly conceived shifts in mission.

In the case of Somalia, the UNO became involved as a response to inhumane conditions of starvation and forced migration. In both instances, millions were affected … with forced migration causing tribal conflicts with fifteen separate rebel groups. Rushing to take advantage of the situation was the Saudi-funded Al Qaeda organization which sought to damage the credibility of the UNO, the U.S. government, and the U.S. Armed Forces.

Unfortunately, the global situation is not improving. Neither the UNO nor the United States has learned valuable lessons from their past mistakes. Despite the impropriety of U.S. involvement in Somalia, the Department of State continues to spend billions of the taxpayer’s money “ … in developmental assistance [in Somalia] to support economic, political, and social sectors to achieve greater stability, establish a formal economy, obtain access to basic services, and attain representation through legitimate, credible governance.” The wording comes from the writers of the popular television series Madam Secretary. “The United States works closely with other donor partners and international organizations to support social services and the development of an effective and representative security sector, including military, police, and justice organizations while supporting ongoing African Union peacekeeping efforts.”

Whenever the UNO wants to divorce itself from costly peace-keeping/humanitarian assistance operations, it mismanages such efforts so horribly that it becomes only a matter of time before a progressive American president steps in to relieve the UN of it’s responsibility. Somalia is an excellent example. The price paid by the American people to maintain this irrational facade is the bloodshed of American servicemen, a lifetime of woe by the parents, wives, and children of slain soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, and adding the costs of war to the backs of American taxpayers.

Some History

Geographically, Somalia sits on the Horn of Africa at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Bordering states include Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. The people who live in these border regions number around 9 million; 98% are Somali tribesmen. About 45% of Somalia’s population is under 15 years of age. Seventy percent of the Somali people are nomads who travel at will with their clans and livestock through Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya. This migratory pattern generates land disputes between Somalis and their neighbors.

Civil war and massive starvation in Somalia prompted UN and Organization of African Unity (OAU) interventions in 1991 because half of the nation’s 10 million people were starving to death. Between January and March 1992, at least three-quarters of a million Somalis died from starvation; another 3 million fled the country as refugees. Nothing about this situation was unusual in East Africa in 1991.

The area of present-day Somalia was one of the first places Islamic conquerors stopped at the beginning of their murderous campaigns in 700 A.D. From that point on, East Africans have suffered one war after another, beginning around 900 A.D. Nothing improved in the lives of native people after Italian and British imperialists began warring with one another over possession of the Horn of Africa. Following World War II, the United Kingdom placed British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland under its protection.

In 1960, both trust territories united to form the Somali Republic, with Great Britain and Italy deciding the location of its borders. A formal government took shape under the auspices of the Somali National Assembly through a national referendum that excluded 70% of the Somali people. The fun began nine years later with a series of assassinations of government leaders and a military coup d’état. Between 1969-1991, the Somali government fell under the control of the so-called Supreme Revolutionary Council — under which Somalia became known as the Somali Democratic Republic. Culturally, the SDR was closely linked to the Arab world and joined the Arab League in 1974. Somali government leaders abandoned democracy in 1976 to establish a one-party scientific-socialist government based on Marxism and Islamism.

War broke out between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977. The issue of contention was the placement of Somalia’s western border. Initially, the Somalis gained an advantage over their enemy until the Soviet Union intervened with “advisors” and 20,000 Cuban mercenaries. The USSR’s involvement in East Africa prompted the Somali government to ask for American assistance. U.S. diplomats were over-joyed; they’d wanted a piece of East Africa since around 1960. Thanks to the American taxpayer (who hadn’t a clue about any of this), Somalia created the largest army on the African continent.[1]

By the 1990s, mainly due to the end of the Cold War, East Africa no longer offered any strategic value to either the new Russian federation or the United States. Left to its own devices, Somalia began a steep spiral into authoritarianism. Through clever instigation, Ethiopia started rebel movements throughout Somalia, which led to civil war, food and fuel shortages, and a period of cripling inflation. Somali government leaders clamped down even more by establishing curfews and surveiling and harassing foreigners.

Libya assisted in overthrowing the Somali government and installing a loose confederation of tribalists to replace it. An international group consisting of Egyptians, Arabians, and Italians subsequently determined that Ali Mahdi Mohamed should serve as the President of Somalia. Unfortunately, Mohamed was only capable of controlling the capital city; tribal groups divided up the rest of the country.

Enter the United Nations

The time was right for the United Nations to stick its nose under the Somali tent. The United Nations Organization Somali Command (UNOSOM) attempted to arrange several “cease-fire” agreements — emphasis on attempted. A fifty-man detachment of UN Peacekeepers tried to stabilize the country enough to conduct humanitarian relief operations. Such a small detachment had no chance of success, so the UN increased its military footprint to around 500 troops.

However, rebel factions in Somalia ignored all previously agreed-to cease-fire agreements, and the fighting continued. According to its own guidelines, the UNO should have withdrawn all military and civilian aid workers from Somalia.

In August 1992, the UN Security Council discussed sending an additional 3,000 troops to Somalia. Discussing the proposition was as far as the proposal ever got. Conditions in Somalia worsened as tribal factions splintered into even smaller groups and then splintered again. As the fighting became nastier its effects grew worse. For example, rebel factions used UN forces for target practice, attacked ships laden with food stores, and cargo aircraft became targets of opportunity. If aid workers knew what was good for them, they hired bodyguards.

By November 1992, General Mohamed Farrah Aideed tired of the fun and games and ordered all UN forces (the so-called Unified Task Force (UNITAF) out of Somalia. There is probably a no better example of UN failure than this — and it was at this point that President George H. W. Bush demonstrated his brilliance as a national leader for the second time (appointing April Glaspie as Ambassador to Iraq was his first). Bush volunteered the U.S. military to lead a “multinational” force to secure humanitarian operations in Somalia.

The UN General Secretary became so giddy that he authorized the American-led force (designated Operation Restore Hope) to use all necessary means to ensure the protection of UNITAF relief efforts. Eventually, UNITAF involved personnel from 24 countries (but mainly from the United States). The plan was simple enough: the U.S. military protected civilian aid workers while UNOSOM continued its efforts to negotiate an end to the fighting and distribute food stores.[2]

Land the Marines

Training and readiness have been the hallmark of the United States Marine Corps since the Revolutionary War. In the Marines, training and operational planning are continuous and concurrent. President Bush made his televised announcement on 4 December 1992; planning for Somali operations began on the morning of 5 December.

U.S. planners at the U.S. Central Command envisioned four operational phases. First, deploy troops to secure harbors and airfields. Second, establish and expand security zones throughout southern Somalia. Third, expand the security zone and secure land routes for humanitarian missions. Fourth, return Somali operations to the UN (presumably so that the UN could undo all of the U.S. military’s accomplishments).[3]

Mission planners also struggled with their assessment of the enemy. As previously mentioned, the Somali “enemy” were splintered tribalists. The answers to such questions as “how well is he armed,” and “under what conditions can he best employ his power” were largely unknown because Marines could face a different enemy every day. But in addition to “enemy” capabilities, there was also the issue of rampant lawlessness. Under the best of circumstances, U.S. operations in Somalia were volatile in the extreme.

After extensive “special operations” training, Headquarters I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) designated the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines (2/9) as the lead battalion within the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (15thMEU), earmarked for humanitarian assistance operations in Somalia.[4] These Marines would spearhead the mission ashore as part of the UN mandate.[5] Fox Company “raiders” went in first to secure the seaport, the Recon detachment, followed by Golf Company, secured the Mogadishu airport.

15th MEU became an integral part of Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) Tripoli, including USS Tripoli, USS Juneau, and USS Rushmore. ARG Tripoli was on station off the coast of Somalia on 3 December. The initial landing commenced at 0540 with Marines and Navy Seals going ashore at Mogadishu, where the dolts from CNN had set up television cameras and bright lights to offer advantages to the enemy, should they care to resist the landing. With that one significant glitch in violation of operational security, the landing proceeded quickly and smoothly.

2/9 Marines proceeded to the U.S. Embassy compound, where they secured the chancery. Colonel Greg Newbold set up his command post (CP) at the airfield. Also, on that first day, the first coalition partner arrived and joined the Marine security plan: a company from the 2nd French Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment, which came by aircraft from Djibouti.

The Marine’s “overwhelming show of force” allowed them to seize, hold, and expand their control. They discovered in Mogadishu a modern-looking city reflecting the effects of two years of warfare: anarchy, terror, no electricity, running water, or sanitation. There were no police officers. Public buildings had been damaged, looted, and stood vacant. With closed schools, gangs of youths roamed the streets looking for things to pillage. Crowded refugee camps filled every parcel of open land. The only visible civic activities were those involving the burial of human remains.

Toward the end of the first day, a vehicle containing nine Somalis ran a roadside checkpoint manned by French Legionnaires. They opened fire at the fleeing automobile — killing two and wounding seven others. Afterward, Somali snipers added UN Peacekeepers to their list of potential targets. They weren’t hitting anyone, but the shooting was bothersome and worrisome.

On 10 December, Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, assumed command of Marine Forces (MARFOR), Somalia. MARFOR provided the basic structure around which the Unified Task Force evolved. Behind the Marines, the most prominent American force was the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division, eventually forming the centerpiece for Army Forces, Somalia (ARFOR). General Wilhelm’s command authority included the 15thMEU and French forces. Wilhelm focused his attention on securing ports of arrival and departure and the Embassy compound. When 1st Battalion, 7th Marines arrived, Wilhelm expanded his control over areas outside Mogadishu — notably into Bale Dogle. Wilhelm assigned that mission to BLT 2/9 (supported by HMM 164), which they accomplished within 48 hours.

The first U.S. Army unit into Somalia was Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry (deployed with 2/87), which flew into the Bale Dogle airfield. Upon arrival, Alpha Company relieved the Marines and assumed control of the airfield.

The first direct attacks on UNITAF members occurred in two separate incidents on 12 December. Three aircraft of HMM 164 received fire from unknown persons with damage to their rotors. Marines returned fire with 20mm guns and missiles, destroying two “technicals” and damaging one US-made armored personnel carrier.[6]

On 6 January 1993, unknown persons fired on a convoy moving through Mogadishu from two authorized weapons storage facilities belonging to General Aideed’s faction. The unified commander, Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston USMC, decided to take decisive action, or the danger to coalition forces would only increase. He tasked General Wilhelm to develop a plan of action. He wanted it simple and dramatic.

During the night of 6-7 January, Kilo Company 3/9 and Charlie Company 1/7 surrounded the two weapons sites. LAVs from the 3rd LAI Battalion screened the area. Snipers took positions in the high ground surrounding Aideed’s turf. A two-company reserve force formed at the Embassy compound. PsyOps personnel from the U.S. Army’s 9th Psychological Operations Battalion augmented each rifle company. At 0553 on 7 January, PsyOps broadcasters began to issue warnings to the Somalis that they were surrounded, instructing them that they would not be harmed if they surrendered.

At that moment, helicopters assumed a hovering position around the ammunition sites. Somalis in storage site No. 8 surrendered. The men in site No. 2 decided to go out in a blaze of glory. Helicopter crew chiefs reported that one tank inside the compound was turning over, and two Somalis had operated a heavy anti-aircraft machine gun. Guns were cleared for snipers to take out the two machine gunners. Within mere seconds, two machine gunners discovered the path to Allah, and then for good measure, the sniper rendered their machine gun inoperable.

The engagement that followed was loud, sharp, and somewhat short. Initially, the Somalis opened up with a heavy volume of machine guns, recoilless rifles, and small arms. At 0615, helicopters were cleared to engage targets inside the compound. They fired for 30 minutes. At 0647, U.S. tanks entered the compound, followed by Kilo Company Marines, who systematically cleared storage site No. 2. Helicopters continued to receive periodic sniper fire.

General Wilhelm ordered Marines to confiscate all firearms. It turned into a long day as Marines inventoried 4 M47 Tanks, nine howitzers, 13 APCs, three anti-aircraft guns, 11 mortars, and one recoilless rifle. In addition to losing several tons of weapons and munitions, General Aideed lost his self-esteem.

Despite this demonstration, coalition forces continued to receive sniper fire from “who knows where.” Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni opined that sniping was simply the Somali way of testing the resolve of U.S. personnel — emphasis on “opinion.”[7]

Continued next week

Sources:

Allard, K. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. National Defense University Press, 1995.
Bowden, M. Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern Warfare. Atlantic Monthly Press,1999.
Mroczkowski, D. P. Restoring Hope: In Somalia with the Unified Task Force, 1992-1993. HQMC History Division, 2005.
Sangvic, R. N. The Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of Failure. Army Command and General Staff School, 1998.
Wright, L. The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. Knopf Publishing, 2006

Endnotes:

[1] This wasn’t the first time the U.S. government spent its treasure propping up a Communist-Islamic dictatorship.

[2] One of UNOSOMs grand ideas was to pay out over $130 million to purchase guns from Somali rebels. It was a great deal for the Somalis, who never seemed to run out of guns to sell.

[3] When CENTCOM planners asked the UN to identify “implied tasks” that would help planners assess mission fulfilment, no one in the UN had a clue. In other words, no one in the UN had any idea how to measure operational successes.

[4] Commanding Officer, Colonel Gregory S. Newbold.

[5] Actually, some forces were already in place before the Marines arrived. Teams from special operations command provided some security at several airfields, providing security for air combat control teams. Charlie Company, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) provided sniper support to the U.S. Special Envoy while in Mogadishu.

[6] “Technical” (also, Non-Standard Tactical Vehicle) (NSTV) is the term used to describe ordinary and four-wheel-drive pickup trucks converted to carry heavy weapons. The term “technical” originated in Somalia.

[7] Anthony Zinni was one of those “political generals” who ingratiated himself with Democratic Party elites. He retired from active service in 2000. In 2004, Diana B. Henriques of the New York Times identified Zinni as one of a cabal of “retired military people” recruited to deceive active duty military personnel and veterans into investing in the corporations they were paid to represent. Specifically, First Commercial Financial Planning, Inc., tried to deflect the charge, but a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation confirmed the allegation that First Commercial Financial Planning used “retired flag rank officers” to perpetrate fraud against military veterans.

Mulai Ahmed al-Raisuli

Introduction

I am always fascinated by the origin of words. Berber, for example, generally describes the people who live in Northeast Africa. The word, however, was Greek — meaning someone who does not speak Greek, a non-Greek person. The Romans used to refer to German tribesmen as “Berbers.” Even in medieval times, Greeks, Italians, and Byzantines used similar words to describe various tribes that inhabited what was once called “Greater Libya,” or what is now the entire region of North Africa.

The Berbers of North Africa, however, called themselves by other names. Our confusion, if that’s what it is, comes from the fact that so many different people controlled that region of the world — at one time or another — all speaking different languages: different languages always equate to different names for the people who lived in North Africa. The Berbers are the Mauri cited in the Chronicle of 754 during the Umayyad conquest of Hispania (Spain). Since the 11^th Century, the word Moor has been the word most commonly used in place of Mauri.

Modern scholars believe that the historian Herodotus referred to the Mauri as Mazyes. Latin sources referred to the tribe as Mazaces (later, Massylii). There were different terms in Coptic. Everyone in North Africa seemed to know about these people — they raided almost everyone, including the Egyptians. These names, by the way, are how the Berbers referred to themselves. I’ll just stay with the Greek/Roman words: Berber, Moors, and Barbary Pirates.

Background

The Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 (also known as the West Africa Conference) coincided with Germany’s sudden emergence as an imperial power. The conference was organized by Otto Von Bismarck, the first chancellor of Germany. The outcome of this conference was Europe’s often chaotic scramble for Africa — denied by some modern historians (particularly the European scholars), arguing instead that the partition of Africa had more to do with subsequent bilateral agreements, which is somewhat akin to arguing about who fired the first shot at the O.K. Corral. It doesn’t matter who started it; what matters is that this conference contributed to the beginning of a period of heightened European colonial activity, which eliminated or supplanted the right of Africans to govern themselves. Of the fourteen nations attending the Berlin Conference, only six had no interest in colonizing Africa: The United States, Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden-Norway, and Russia.

Mulai Ahmed al-Raisuli (1871 – 1925) was a Sharif (noble, highborn person) (descendant of Muhammed the Prophet) and a leader of the Jebala tribal confederacy in Morocco at the turn of the 20^th century. Foreigners saw Raisuli as a brigand. Some Moroccans saw him as an enemy, as someone to fear. But among the Jebala tribes, he was a magnificent hero. Western historians view Raisuli as someone who falls between an English Robin Hood, a feudal baron, and a tyrannical bandit. He was, according to some, the last Barbary Pirate. As with every successful Moroccan politician, Raisuli was part criminal and part saint.

Mulai Ahmed al-Raisuli

Raisuli was born in the village of Zinat (a coastal village 16 miles outside Tangier), where villagers referred to him as the Eagle of Zinat. He was the son of a military leader (Qaid) and quite naturally followed in his father’s footsteps. At certain times and at certain places, military men became raiders, criminals, brigands — but this was all part of the Berber culture. No self-respecting Berber chieftain could be a goodie-two-shoe.

While it is true that Raisuli eventually drifted into brigandry, the term is entirely subjective.[1] Raisuli helped himself to other people’s cattle because everyone and everything located in Raisuli’s territory belonged to Raisuli. But if it is true that he stole sheep and cattle, he provided these animals to feed the members of his (large) tribe. Moreover, he didn’t hesitate to terminate (with extreme prejudice) anyone who dared get in his way. Raisuli was arrested and jailed on more than one occasion — not because of his barbarous acts but because he always seemed to get in the way of influential Arabs.

Some historians claim that the most significant formative event in Raisuli’s life was his arrest and imprisonment by Abd-al-Rahman Abd-al-Saduk, Pasha of Tangier. Saduk was Raisuli’s cousin and foster brother. Having accepted Saduk’s invitation to dine, Raisuli was apprehended almost as soon as he stepped inside Saduk’s home. Culturally, the Pasha’s behavior was an affront to traditional Arab courtesy. Saduk made this travesty worse by throwing Raisuli into a dungeon at Mogador, chaining him to a wall for four years. Sultan Abd-al-Laziz released Raisuli as part of a general amnesty, but the Sultan eventually became Raisuli’s greatest enemy.

The primary consequence of throwing Raisuli into prison was that it made him even more dangerous after his release. Once released, Raisuli became more ambitious, more anti-foreign, and nearly fanatically pro-nationalist. Then, to make the sultan’s life as difficult as possible, particularly in his relations with foreign powers, Raisuli began kidnapping prominent officials of foreign governments and holding them for ransom. His first victim was a British journalist named Walter Burton Harris.

Harris lived in Tangier for most of his life (1866 – 1933). He was wealthy, a socialite, spoke Arabic fluently, and his physical appearance permitted him to pose as a native Moroccan. His appearance and language skills allowed him to visit places off-limits to most foreign correspondents. This access helped Harris create or inspire numerous political and diplomatic intrigues — which Mr. Harris dutifully reported to his employer, The Times. It allowed him to create a problem and get paid for reporting on it (typical of journalists, I’d say).

Raisuli did kidnap Harris, but he didn’t demand money. Instead, Raisuli demanded that the Moroccan government release several of his tribesmen from prison. The government’s prompt response to these demands saw Harris released within three weeks. The strategy proved so successful that Raisuli accelerated his kidnapping efforts — focusing mainly on Moroccan military and political officials. In between his kidnapping activities, Raisuli demanded tribute payments from villages within his provincial area; the penalty for refusing to pay this tribute was death. Raisuli used some of this tribute to purchase and employ sailing vessels for seagoing piracy. Raisuli’s piracy was only marginally successful — no doubt owing to the modernization of European navies.

But there was a lighter side to Mulai Ahmed al-Raisuli. He was chivalrous, respectful toward his captives, protective of them, friendly, generous to those who demonstrated respect and loyalty, and a well-educated man. However, his treatment of some prisoners could only be classified as downright cruel and barbaric. Officials working for the Sultan of Morocco, or the Pasha of Tangier were often tortured, blinded, or their tongues cut out. On at least one occasion, Raisuli disconnected the head of a government envoy and returned it to the Pasha in a basket of fruit.

Raisuli’s international reputation began when he kidnapped the Greek-American expatriate Ion H. Perdicaris and his step-son, Cromwell Varley, Jr., and demanded payment of $70,000.00 for their release. The event triggered a near-armed conflict between the government of Morocco and the United States in 1904, narrowly averted when Morocco paid the ransom and Perdicaris was released. For a summary of this event, see The Perdicaris Affair.

After Perdicaris’ release, the Sultan appointed Raisuli Pasha of Tangier as governor of Jibala province and released all of Raisuli’s followers from prison. By 1906, however, Raisuli’s cruelty and corruption prompted the Sultan to oust him from office and declare him an outlaw. In response, Raisuli kidnapped Sir Harry Maclean, a British army officer serving as a military aide and advisor to the Sultan’s army. Maclean was ransomed for £20,000.

Raisuli antagonized the Moroccan government for several years, even after Abd-al-Laziz abdicated. He briefly regained favor with the Moroccan government by siding with Abdel al-Hafad in overthrowing al-Laziz, and for a time, the Sultan restored Raisuli as Pasha of Tangier. However, at the insistence of the Spanish government, which exercised control over Morocco, the Sultan was removed from office again in 1912.

In 1913, Raisuli began an insurrection against the Spanish and continued a protracted guerrilla war against them for six years. Eventually, Spanish Colonel Manuel Silvestre defeated Raisuli in the Battle of Fondak Pass, but Raisuli and most of his men avoided capture.

At the beginning of the First World War, Raisuli established contact with Imperial Germany, offering to serve the German cause by leading a rebellion against French Imperialists. Setting aside whether Mulai Ahmed al-Raisuli was a bandit, he was faithful to the culture and traditions of his people; he did not want foreigners in his country, and he did not want his people falling under the heavy boot of European powers. When the French learned of this “treason,” they initiated a punitive expedition into Spanish Morocco. The French did manage to disperse Raisuli’s forces, but they could not capture him.

In 1921, Silvestre re-engaged the Berbers at a small village named Annual. It evolved into a fight lasting 18 days. At its conclusion on 9 August, Spanish military forces (again) serving under Colonel Silvestre suffered the worst defeat in Spanish military history.

In September 1922, Raisuli submitted to the will of Spanish authorities and joined the Spanish army in the Rif War (1921 – 1926). The Rif War was an armed conflict fought between occupying Spanish (and later, French) colonists and Berber tribes in the mountainous Rif region of northern Morocco. The Berbers were led by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi, also known as Abd al-Krim, who waged a guerilla war. At first, al-Krim’s force inflicted several defeats on the Spanish, their mission to seize and re-employ as many Spanish (and French-made) weapons as possible. Eventually, French troops captured al-Krim and sent him into exile.[2]

In 1921, in an attempt to consolidate control over the region, Spanish troops suffered the catastrophic Disaster of Annual in addition to a rebellion led by al-Krim. As a result, the Spanish retreated to a few fortified positions while al-Krim ultimately created an independent state — the Republic of the Rif.

The conflict coincided with the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, who commanded the campaign from 1924 to 1927. France intervened in 1925 and established a collaboration with Spain that culminated in the amphibious landing at Alhucemas. Spain had no hesitance in using chemical weapons against the Berbers. To many historians, the Rif War was one of the last colonial wars in North Africa — and a pre-cursor to the Algerian War of Independence (1954 – 1962). Raisuli was intensely jealous of al-Krim and was not sorry to see him exiled. Afterward, al-Krim’s followers viciously attacked Raisuli’s palace, killing most of his guards. The captured Raisuli was promptly placed in a jail near Tamasin — where he died at the end of April 1925. Mulai Ahmed al-Raisuli remains a folk hero to the Moroccan people — with a somewhat mixed reputation, of course.

Endnotes:

[1] At the beginning of the story of Lawrence of Arabia the son of a tribal chieftain shoots and kills Major Lawrence’s Arab escort and guide because he had the affrontery to drink from a well without first gaining the tribal chieftain’s permission. That is how the Arab mind works, illustrated over a thousand times in any Arab tribal culture you choose.

[2] Background to Rif War: in July 1909, Spanish workers constructing a rail-bridge providing access to iron mines near Melilla came under attack by Rifian tribesmen. The incident led to a Spanish military response which cost them more than a thousand casualties. Spain increased their footprint to 40,000 troops in northern Morocco.

The Perdicaris Incident

Introduction

Few Americans stand out as much as Alfred Thayer Mahan as one of the foremost thinkers on naval warfare and maritime strategy. Some even say that Mahan was THE leading thinker on sea power and the conduct of war at sea. Admiral Mahan was respected as a scholar in his own time, served as President of the American Historical Association, and is remembered as the author of The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. Mahan’s studies examine the role of navies in determining the outcome of wars fought by the great European powers during the period between the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries and remain valuable for their insight into sea power and strategy.

Admiral Mahan was also a student of international relations and attempted to apply the study of history toward an understanding of foreign policy and strategic problems of his day. For a quarter of a century, he was a visible scholar and was sought by news outlets and public figures for his insight and advice. Theodore Roosevelt was his friend, Franklin Roosevelt was a student, and Woodrow Wilson sought to silence him. In President Wilson’s opinion, no good could come from military or naval officers who could think for themselves.

Mahan was, himself, a student of Thucydides — placing a high value on understanding the strategies pursued by the ancient Greeks, but he was dubious about the ability of states to promote cooperation by employing international law or the organization and political activity of peace societies because arbitration agreements among states, or the establishment of norms for conduct in the international arena were likely to work only so long as the issues at stake were limited in importance. Once a great power’s vital interests were threatened, Mahan believed that international agreements to promote cooperation would give way to armed forces searching for security. Mahan had no faith in the ramblings of liberal globalists who thought that agreements between nations would ensure peaceful relations — and as it turned out, Mahan was right. In Mahan’s view, the best way to prevent war was for a country to be so well-armed that potential adversaries would be deterred from risking a conflict.

Paying very close attention to Mahan was a young politician with so much personal energy that he made others nervous. It is fair to say that Theodore Roosevelt was an admirer of Admiral Mahan, but it would be a mistake to argue that Roosevelt owed Mahan for all his brilliant pragmatism. Theodore Roosevelt was no shrinking violet in the study of history — and one wonders how much influence Roosevelt may have had on Mahan. In 1879, while still an undergraduate at Harvard, Theodore Roosevelt began his study of the War of 1812, which became a prodigious effort. In his research, what may have struck Roosevelt was that the American Navy had been unable to gain command of the sea despite its successes. This revelation may have driven him toward a keen interest in what Mahan had to say about sea power.

A few years later, Vice President Theodore Roosevelt participated in the opening of the Minnesota State Fair in Minneapolis, where he was asked to deliver a speech. He called it his “National Duties” speech. Historians suspect that few people were paying much attention to Roosevelt when, toward the middle of his talk, he said, “Speak softly and carry a big stick — and you will go far.” Roosevelt borrowed this phrase from an African proverb. But in short order, Roosevelt began to address questions of international relations in the context of “big stick” foreign policy. Nine days later, Theodore Roosevelt would become President of the United States, and while assuring McKinley’s cabinet that he intended to continue their president’s policies, Roosevelt was an ardent imperialist who made the McKinley cabinet a nervous wreck.

Background

In 1826, a young man from Greece arrived in the United States for studies. He was the son of an influential medical doctor and politician named Anthony Perdicaris. Anthony’s father, Licinius, was a physician to the Ottoman Sultan and later named a Count of the Republic of Venice for his services. The Republic of Venice later beheaded Licinius for essentially the same reasons.

In 1822, during the Greek War of Independence, Ottoman forces attacked the city of Naousa and began killing all males and enslaving all Greek women and children. Anthony gathered up his family and fled into the mountains. Gregory was around twelve years old at the time. Within a short time, Gregory had learned that his two brothers-in-law had been killed and that his mother and four sisters were taken captive and sold into slavery. After his separation from his father, Gregory made his way to Jerusalem, where he met and befriended Pliny Fisk, an American missionary who helped arrange his passage to the United States.

Gregory was no slouch. He learned English well enough to attend studies at Washington College (now Trinity) in Connecticut and graduate with a bachelor’s and master’s degree. He later taught Greek and wrote several influential essays about the plight of the Greeks within the Ottoman domain. In time, Gregory Perdicaris would become a naturalized American, and he would marry a young woman named Margaret Hanford, the granddaughter of William DeWitt, sister-in-law to Governor David Williams. Hanford, although an orphan, came from a prominent South Carolina family.

Gregory returned to Greece in 1837 to serve as U.S. Ambassador. When he returned to the United States in 1845, he resumed his life as an academic and a lecturer. Politically associated with the Democratic Party, Gregory Perdicaris became an early investor in the Trenton Light Company and later served as one of its directors. By 1852, he was also the Trenton Mutual Life Insurance Company president, with substantial investments in utility companies in Charleston, South Carolina. In 1858, Gregory sent his son, Ion, to London, England, to study art.

Meanwhile, Margaret’s nephew, Henry McIver, began to demand that Ion be returned to South Carolina where he could participate in the Civil War. Gregory had no intention of recalling his son from Europe. On this basis, McIver sequestered the Perdicaris investments in South Carolina, which in 2020 value amounted to just over a million dollars. In 1867, Gregory Perdicaris and several prominent Americans established a charitable fund for Greek refugees. One of these investors was Theodore Roosevelt, Sr., father of the man who would become president.

Ion Hanford Perdicaris was born in Athens in 1840, grew up in Trenton, New Jersey, but fled to England at his father’s insistence to avoid participating in the American Civil War. This prompted Henry McIver (a signer of the Ordinance of Succession) to confiscate the Perdicaris fortune, of which 1300 shares belonged to Ion. To prevent the sequestration, Ion renounced his American citizenship (which was not permitted until 1868). The issue of sequestration of the family’s wealth eventually made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1877.

Still a U.S. citizen, Ion traveled back and forth to London as a journalist for The Galaxy. He was young, unattached, and somewhat of a playboy. In 1870, he began attending supernatural rituals with Cromwell F. Varley (an electrical engineer) and his wife, Ellen. Cromwell’s profession required a good bit of travel back and forth between the United States and the United Kingdom — and because he and Ellen had four children, it was not practical that his wife should accompany him on his trips. During these business trips, Ion Perdicaris and Ellen Varley began having supernatural seances of their own. When Cromwell discovered the infidelity, he promptly divorced Ellen. Ion, striving either to do the right thing or avoid scandal, promptly married her (1873), and assumed responsibility for raising the children.

In the late 1870s, Ion Perdicaris purchased a substantial home and estate in Tangier, where he collected exotic animals, dabbled in the arts, and maintained ties to influential people in the United States. Ion and Ellen moved (with her children — two boys and two girls) to Tangier in 1882. Ellen Perdicaris (and her children) retained their British nationality. In Tangier, Ion became active in the fight for the rights of the Moors, led several civic commissions, and, as a de facto spokesman for the foreign community, argued for recognition of Tangier as a free port city. Ion retained business interests in England and the United States throughout this period with frequent visits to both countries.

In 1886, after Perdicaris strenuously objected to the treatment offered to a native Moroccan by the American Minister in Tangier, a man who Consul General Felix Matthews accused of rape, the Moroccan government arrested Perdicaris and fined him for interfering in a legal matter. Subsequently, Perdicaris filed charges against Matthews, and the Consul was removed from his post and ordered back to the United States.

In May 1904, despite his reasonable efforts on behalf of the Moroccan people, Mulai Ahmed er Raisuni (also, Raissoulli) kidnapped and held for ransom Ion Perdicaris and his step-son, Cromwell Varley, Jr. A Hollywood film about the abduction was released in 1975 titled The Wind and the Lion starring Sean Connery, Brian Keith, Candace Bergen, and Steve Kanaly. The film, while entertaining, completely misrepresents what transpired during the so-called Perdicaris Affair.

The Raissoulli

Ahmed al-Raissoulli was the leader of three Moroccan tribes near Tangier. In 1903, the Moroccan government arrested and jailed five of Raisuli’s men, no doubt charging them with brigandry — because that’s what they were. That same year, Raisuli learned about the Stone Affair, where Bulgarian revolutionaries kidnapped an American Missionary and held her for ransom. A quick study, Raisuli promptly kidnapped a newspaper correspondent named Walter Harris and held him for ransom. This worked out so well for Raisuli that he then targeted Ion Perdicaris, assuming that the wealthier American would net a larger ransom.

The Incident

Ion, his wife, and stepson Cromwell Varley, Jr., relocated from their townhome in Tangier to their summer estate, Aidonia, on 16 May 1904. Late in the afternoon of 18 May, Raisuli and a band of ruffians abducted Perdicaris and his stepson from Aidonia. The number of ruffians is unknown, but estimates range from nine to 150. Raisuli’s men cut telephone wires and assaulted several of Ion’s servants, leaving Ellen unmolested at the house. She later contacted authorities, including the U.S. and British Consul and Moroccan officials.

American Consul Samuel Gummeré notified the U.S. State Department:

Mr. Perdicaris, the most prominent American citizen here, and his stepson Mr. Varley, a British subject, were carried off last night from their country house, three miles from Tangier, by a numerous band of natives headed by Raisuly. . I earnestly request that a man-of-war be sent at once. . . the situation most serious.

Raisuli carried Perdicaris by horseback through the Rif Mountains. Raisuli demanded $55,000 (later $70,000), the removal of all government troops from the region, a promise to end all harassment of the Riffian people, and the removal and arrest of the Pasha of Tangier (then part of the Ottoman infrastructure) and several other government officials. He also demanded that the United States and Great Britain “guarantee” these demands would be met.

When the State Department received Gummeré’s communiqué, the Secretary of State, John Hay, was out of town. When notified of the incident, President Theodore Roosevelt resolved that the United States would not pay the ransom. The mantra that evolved was “Perdicaris Alive or Raisuli Dead.” Under-Secretary Francis Loomis dealt with the crisis by diverting seven of sixteen U.S. Navy ships from the Mediterranean to the port of Tangier. Admiral F. E. Chadwick was ordered to send a ship from the South Atlantic to Tangier. Simultaneously, the British dispatched a Royal Navy vessel from Gibraltar.

On 21 May, the Sultan’s representatives were sent to begin negotiations with the Raisuli. Two days later, negotiations were in the tank. On 29 May, Raisuli threatened to kill his prisoners if his demands were not met within the next two days. Raisuli’s threats revealed internal tensions: the foreign minister of Morocco allied himself with Raisuli’s enemies. The Sharif of Ouazzane was credited with progress in the negotiations. The Sultan sent a messenger to Raisuli, but upon the messenger’s arrival, Raisuli had his throat cut. (Pictured right, Ahmed al-Raissoulli).

The Navy Department ordered Admiral T. F. Jewell to send three additional ships on that same day. The armored cruisers USS Brooklyn and USS Atlanta reached Tangier on 30 May, and Admiral Chadwick conferred with the Sultan’s representative. Two additional gunboats arrived on the following day. France assured the United States that they would do all they could to rescue the prisoners. On 1 June, Raisuli increased his ransom demand to $70,000.00.

Admiral Jewell arrived with USS Olympia, USS Baltimore, and USS Cleveland a few hours later. With ships at anchor, Jewell appointed Major John Twiggs Myers to overall command of the ship’s Marine Detachments. Washington ordered Jewell to keep a leash on the Marines until he was specifically authorized to employ them against Raisuli. Roosevelt did not want to risk the possibility of Raisuli executing his prisoners. The only Marines sent ashore was a team of four (4) men carrying sidearms, ordered to protect the U.S. Consulate and Mrs. Perdicaris. On 8 June, two additional Marines were dispatched to protect the Belgian legation.

The State Department intended that if Morocco did not meet the United States’ demands, American Marines would seize Morocco’s custom houses, which supplied much of the country’s revenue. Secretary Hay wanted the Sultan to persuade Raisuli to release Perdicaris; if not, or if Perdicaris or his stepson was harmed, the Marines would enter the fray.

On 30 May, Secretary John Hay learned that there was a question about Perdicaris’ citizenship. Hay was given to understand that Perdicaris was a Greek. President Roosevelt’s resolve weakened, but he decided to stay the course and attempted to get Britain and France to join the U.S. in a combined military operation. Neither country was interested because they worked with the Sultan behind the scenes, urging him to accept Raisuli’s terms. Tensions rose substantially on 2 June when an Italian warship dropped anchor in Tangiers harbor.

The international aspects of the Perdicaris Affair increased on 6 June two when two Spanish warships dropped anchor in Tangier. Spain’s concern was that the U.S. would attempt to force Tangier into giving the American Navy portage rights. HMS Prince of Wales arrived two days later.

On 8 June, the Sultan granted Raisuli’s demands by appointing Herid el Barrada as the governor of Tangier. The appointment angered tribesmen, who raided the home of an Englishman. Negotiations dragged on as the Sultan removed his troops from Raisuli’s province on the following day. Tribesmen were still not happy. On 14 June, an attempt was made to kidnap the Italian Consul. On 15 June, Raisuli increased his demands to control six (rather than two) Moroccan political districts. Four days later, the Sultan accepted Raisuli’s demands, and 21 June was the date agreed for the release of Perdicaris and his stepson.

On 20 June, a hitch in negotiations occurred when a man named Zelai, governor of an inland tribe, refused to act as an intermediary. The ransom money was deposited on 21 June. On 22 June, Raisuli demanded that the Sultan place another district under his authority. Although a settlement had already been reached, a cable from Samuel Gummeré accused the Sultan of holding up negotiations. At the Republican National Convention, Secretary Hay stated, “We want Perdicaris alive, or Raisuli Dead.” There was no doubt that Roosevelt would get the Republican nomination, but Hay’s declaration electrified the convention. Raisuli released Ion Perdicaris on 24 June.

Afterward, Perdicaris and his family moved to Turnbridge Wells, England Raisuni used the money he gained from ransoming Perdicaris to build his palace, known as the “House of Tears.”

It was an interesting incident in history. But the movie was better.

Film Clip: The Wind and the Lion

Handsome Jack of the Marines

John Twiggs Myers (29 January 1871—17 April 1952) was the son of Colonel Abraham C. Myers, for whom Fort Myers, Florida is named, the grandson of Major General David E. Twiggs, and the great-grandson of General John Twiggs, a hero of the American Revolutionary War. Born in Wiesbaden, Germany, Handsome Jack graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1892 and received an appointment as Assistant Engineer two years later. In March 1895, the Marine Corps offered Jack Myers a commission as a second lieutenant.

Despite the fact that few people know of John Twiggs Myers, Hollywood film producers have portrayed this colorful Marine officer in two popular films that were loosely based on his exploits as a “tall, roguishly handsome, global soldier of the sea.” The first film was titled 55 Days at Peking, starring Charlton Heston in the role of Myers, a chap named Major Matt Lewis commanding American Marines during the Boxer Rebellion. In the second film, The Wind and the Lion, actor Steve Kanaly played the role of Captain Jerome. In the actual event, Jerome was John Twiggs Myers.

After completing his studies at the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, and just prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the Marine Corps ordered Jack Myers to active duty. As Commanding Officer of the Marine Detachment, USS Charleston, Myers participated in the capture of Guam from its Spanish garrison, and then later sailed to the Philippine Islands, where he was transferred to USS Baltimore.

During the Philippine-American War, Myers led several amphibious landings against Filipino insurgents, notably at the Battle of Olongapo and the Battle of Zapote River. His courage under fire in both engagements earned him recognition as an exceptional officer. The Marine Corps promoted Myers to captain toward the end of 1899.

In May 1900, Captain Myers accompanied the USS Newark to China. Upon arrival, his navy commanding officer ordered Myers ashore to command a detachment of 48 Marines (including then Private Dan Daly) and 3 sailors. Myers’ assignment in Peking was to protect the American Legation. Because of his reputation for intrepidity under fire, the most vulnerable section of Legation’s defense, the so-called Tartar Wall, became Myers’s responsibility.

The Tartar Wall rose to a height of 45 feet with a bulwark of around forty feet in width that overlooked the foreign legation. Should this edifice fall into Chinese hands, the entire foreign legation would be exposed to the Boxer’s long rifle fires. Each day, Chinese Boxers erected barricades, inching ever closer to the German position (on the eastern wall), and the American position (on the western approach).

Inexplicably, the Germans abandoned their position (and their American counterparts), leaving the Marines to defend the entire section. At 2 a.m. on the night of 3 July 1900, Captain Myers, supported by 26 British Marines and 15 Russians, led an assault against the Chinese barricade, killing 20 Chinese and expelling the rest of them from the Tartar Wall. During this engagement, Myers received a serious spear wound to his leg. As a result of his tenacity under extremely dire conditions, the Marine Corps advanced Myers to the rank of Major and later awarded him the Brevet Medal (See notes), which in 1900 was the equivalent of the Medal of Honor for officers. At that time, Marine officers were ineligible to receive the Medal of Honor.

While recovering from his wounds, Myers served as Provost Marshal on American Samoa. He was thereafter assigned to command the Marine Barracks at Bremerton, Washington.

In 1904, Myers commanded the Marine Detachment, USS Brooklyn, sent to Tangiers, Morocco to address the Perdicaris Incident. Afterward, Major Myers completed the Naval War College, commanded the NCO School at Marine Barracks, Washington, D. C., and later commanded the Barracks for several months. In August 1906, Major Meyers assumed command of the 1st Marine Regiment in the Philippines. One year later, the Marine Corps ordered Myers to serve aboard USS West Virginia as Fleet Marine Officer of the Asiatic Fleet. In 1911, Meyers completed the U. S. Army Field Officer’s School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and after graduating from the Army War College in 1912, Myers assumed command of a battalion with the Second Provisional Brigade at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. A year later he served in command of the Marine Barracks, Honolulu, Hawaii.

In 1916, then Lieutenant Colonel Meyers commanded the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines until assigned as Fleet Marine Officer, U.S. Atlantic Fleet where he served until August 1918. He then assumed command of the Marine Barracks at Parris Island, South Carolina through November 1918.

In 1921, the Marine Corps appointed Colonel Myers to serve as Inspector General of the Department of the Pacific — serving in that position for three years. In 1925, Myers assumed command of the 1st Marine Brigade in Haiti. Following his service as Commanding General, Department of the Pacific in 1935, with 46 years of adventurous service, Major General Myers retired from active service. In recognition of his distinguished service in 1942, the Marine Corps advanced Jack Myers to the grade of lieutenant general on the retired list.

John Twiggs Myers passed away at the age of 81 at his home in Coconut Grove, Florida on 17 April 1952. He was the last living recipient of the Brevet Medal.

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Notes

1. Myers was one of only 20 Marine Corps officers to receive this medal.