Post-Korea and Beyond
For U.S. Marines, the Korean Peninsula wasn’t the only dance hall. No sooner had HQMC directed the transfer of three battalions of the 10th Marines to the 11th Marines, than the rebuilding of the 10th Marines with new recruitments and artillery training began. In the mid-1950s, the 10th Marines played a pivotal role in the Lebanon Emergency, fleet training exercises, and deployments supporting NATO exercises in Norway, Greece, Crete, Gibraltar, the Caribbean, and West Indies. The Cold War was in full swing.
Between 1955 and 1965, Marine Corps artillery battalions trained with new weapons and maintained their readiness for combat. No one in the Marine Corps wanted to return to the bad old days of the Truman administration. Should the plague of war revisit the United States, the Marine Corps intended to meet every challenge by maintaining a high state of combat readiness. Artillery Battalions trained to support infantry regiments and, as part of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force, firing batteries frequently deploy with battalion landing teams (BLTs). In 1957, new tables of organization increased the size of artillery battalions by adding a 4.2-inch mortar battery. A new mortar was introduced in 1960, called the “howtar.” The new M30 4.2-inch mortar was a rifled, muzzle-loading, high-angle weapon used for long-range indirect fire support. In addition to other “innovations,” cannon-cockers participated in (helicopter-borne) vertical assault training, which given the weight of artillery pieces, was not as simple as it sounds. The howtar, while still in service, is (to my knowledge) no longer part of the USMC weapons inventory.
Back to East Asia
In the early 1960s, the Cold War showed signs of easing. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) seemed to foreshadow a period of détente after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The hope for world peace fell apart with incidents in Asia, Africa, and Latin America — of which the war in Vietnam was an extraordinary event. From 1954 to 1975, nearly half a million Marines fought in the jungles of Vietnam (See also: Viet Nam: The Beginning).
In 1962, all Marine ground units began counterinsurgency training, which was mostly exercises designed to improve small unit combat patrols and area security operations. In June, the 11th Marines went through another re-organization. The 1st and 4th 155-mm Howitzer Batteries, Force Troops, FMF became the 4th Battalion, 11th Marines. Marine Corps Base, Twenty-nine Palms became the permanent home of the 4th Battalion because its weapons demanded more area for live-firing exercises.
In late July 1964, the US Seventh Fleet assigned the destroyer, USS Maddox, to perform a signals intelligence mission off the coast of North Vietnam. On Sunday, 2 August, the ship was allegedly approached by three North Vietnamese Navy (NVN) motor patrol boats. The official story of this incident is that after giving the NVN a warning to remain clear of the ship, the patrol boats launched an assault on Maddox. Nothing like that actually happened, but it was enough to give President Lyndon Baines Johnson a war in Indochina.
Following this incident, Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, Commander, US Pacific Fleet, activated the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (9thMEB). Brigadier General Raymond G. Davis, who was at the time serving as Assistant Division Commander, 3rd Marine Division, was named to command the Brigade.
9thMEB formed around the 9th Marine Regiment (9thMar), including the regimental headquarters (HQ) element and three battalion landing teams (BLTs) —in total, around 6,000 combat-ready Marines. When the Maddox incident faded away, the US Pacific Fleet ordered the 9thMEB to establish its command post at Subic Bay, Philippine Islands, with its BLTs strategically distributed to Subic Bay, Okinawa, and “afloat” at sea as part of the Special Landing Force (SLF), Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), US Seventh Fleet.
Between 28 December 1964 — 2 January 1965, North Vietnamese Army (NVA)/Viet Cong (VC) forces overwhelmingly defeated a South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) battalion and its US military advisors at Binh Gia. It was a clear demonstration to the Americans that the ARVN could not defend the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).
Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch assumed command of 9thMEB on 22 January 1965. At that point, President Johnson ordered the Marines into Da Nang — their specific mission was to secure the airfield against enemy Viet Cong (VC) intrusions. In late February, VC forces assaulted the US base at Pleiku, killing 9 Americans, wounding 128 others, and damaging or destroying 25 military aircraft. Karch led the 9thMAB ashore on 7 March 1965. In addition to BLTs 2/9 and 3/9, 9thMEB also absorbed Marine Aircraft Group 16 (MAG-16), which was already conducting “non-combat” ARVN support missions at Da Nang (See also: Vietnam, the Marines Head North).
Fox Battery, 2/12, attached to BLT 3/9, was the first Marine Corps artillery unit to serve in the Vietnam War. The arrival of additional artillery units prompted the formation of a Brigade Artillery Group, which included Alpha Battery, 1/12, Bravo Battery, 1/12, and Fox Battery, 2/12. These firing batteries employed 105-mm howitzers and 4.2-inch mortars. The arrival of Lima Battery, 4/12, added a 155-mm howitzer battery and an 8-inch howitzer platoon. As the number of Marine infantry units increased in Vietnam, so did the number of artillery units. The I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ) was further divided into Tactical Areas of Responsibilities (TAORs) and assigned to the 3rd Marine Division (from Okinawa) and 1st Marine Division (from Camp Pendleton, California).
In the summer of 1965, most of the 11thMar departed Camp Pendleton and moved to Camp Hansen, Okinawa. Within mere days of their arrival, 3/11 and Mike Battery, 4/11 proceeded to RVN. Assigned to Chu Lai to support the 7th Marines, elements of both regiments went immediately into Operation Starlight. During August, 1/11 moved to Okinawa. Alpha Battery went ashore in Vietnam with the Special Landing Force (SLF) in December. HQ 11th Marines arrived in Chu Lai in February 1966, joined by 2/11 from Camp Pendleton. The battalions of the 11thMar supported infantry regiments, as follows: 1/11 supported the 1stMar; 2/11 supported the 5thMar, and 3/11 supported the 7thMar. 4/11 served in general support of the 1st Marine Division.
The I CTZ was the northernmost section of South Vietnam. It consisted of five political provinces situated within approximately 18,500 square miles of dense jungle foliage. The area of I CTZ was by far larger than any two infantry divisions could defend or control, so the Marine Corps developed a tactical plan that assigned its six available infantry regiments to smaller-sized TAORs. These TAORs were still too large, but it was all the Marines could do under the rules of engagement dictated to them by the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV). The relative isolation of combat units created a dangerous situation. Marine artillerists were no exception
Although two artillery regiments operated in Vietnam, they were not equal in size or mission. By 1967, the 12th Marine Regiment was the largest artillery regiment in Marine Corps history — task organized to support a larger number of infantry units within a much larger TAOR. All artillery units were assigned to support infantry units throughout the I CTZ; tactical commanders placed these artillery units where they were most effective — fire support bases (FSBs) at strategic locations.
Although originally conceived as a temporary tactical arrangement, several FSBs became long-term (semi-permanent) operating bases. They were quite literally blasted into existence from heavily forested hilltops. For as much as possible, the FSB system provided mutually supporting fires, but this was not always possible. The size of FSBs varied according to the size of the units assigned. Typically, an FSB hosted a single firing battery (six 105mm or 155mm howitzers), a platoon of engineers, field medical and communications detachments, helicopter landing pads, a tactical operations center, and an infantry unit for area security. Larger FSBs might include two firing batteries and a BLT.
Beyond their traditional tasks, Marine artillerists were often required to provide for their own defense against enemy probes and outright assaults. FSBs were also the target of enemy mortar and artillery fires. When infantry units were unavailable, which was frequently the case in Vietnam, artillerists defended themselves by manning the perimeter, establishing outposts, and conducting combat/security patrols. VC units foolish enough to assault an FSB may very well have spent their last moments on earth contemplating that extremely poor decision. The only thing the NVA/VC ever accomplished by shooting at an American Marine was piss him off. Every Marine is a rifleman.
In 1968, the VC launched a major assault on all US installations in Vietnam. It was called the Tet Offensive because it took place during the Vietnamese new year (Tet). The tactical goal was to kill or injure as many US military and RVN personnel as possible — playing to the sentiments of the anti-war audience back in the United States and discrediting the US and ARVN forces in the eyes of the Vietnamese population. Marine artillery played a crucial role in defeating attackers from multiple regions within I CTZ, but the offensive also changed the part of Marine artillery after 1968. Before Tet-68, supporting fires were routine, on-call, and a somewhat minor factor during USMC ground operations. After Tet-68, artillery took on a more significant fire support role. 1968 was also a year of innovation as Marine artillery units incorporated the Army’s Field Artillery Digital Computer Center (FADAC) (which had been around since 1961) and the new Army/Navy Portable Radio Communications (25).
In addition to providing tactical fire direction and support to Marine Corps infantry units, USMC artillerists also provided fire support to US Army and ARVN units operating in the I CTZ. Following the communist’s failed Tet-68 offensive, the Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Major General Raymond G. Davis) initiated an offensive campaign to diminish or destroy NVA/VC units operating within I CTZ and demilitarized zones (DMZ). Marine artillery units joined with Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force attack aircraft, B-52 bombers, and naval gunfire from the U.S. Seventh Fleet to destroy enemy sanctuaries and artillery positions within the DMZ and Laos. These overwhelming bombardments allowed infantry units to exploit the enemy’s weaknesses, reduce the size of their forces, destroy enemy defensive fortifications, and disrupt their logistics efforts. What transpired within I CTZ was an impressive demonstration of inter-service cooperation that gave US forces the upper hand in RVN’s northern provinces.
Marines continue to learn essential lessons from their many past battles and conflicts. For example, the Small Wars Manual, 1941, is still used by Marines as a resource for certain types of operations. The expression Every Marine is a Rifleman is as true today as it was in 1775 — Marine artillerists are no exception. During Operation Enduring Freedom, Golf Battery, BLT 1/6 performed several essential combat functions, which in addition to fire support missions, included humanitarian assistance, convoy security, area security for Forward Operating Base (FOB) Ripley, UN Team security, prisoner security, and its transition into a provisional rifle company. Given the diverse range of military occupational specialties involved, making that transition was a challenge for Battery officers and NCOs.
Marines representing a wide range of occupational specialties within a firing battery, from cannon-cockers and lanyard snappers to FDC operations specialists, motor transport drivers and mechanics, cooks, and communicators molded themselves into cohesive fire teams, rifle squads, platoons, and ultimately, a responsive and highly lethal infantry company. The effort and result were the embodiment of task force organization. Golf Battery formed three fully functional infantry platoons (two rifle and one weapons platoon), each containing the requisite number of radio operators and a medical corpsman. The effort was fruitful because the individual Marine, adequately led and motivated, is innovative, adaptable, and resourceful in overcoming any challenge.
- Brown, R. J. A Brief History of the 14th Marines. Washington: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1990
- Buckner, D. N. A Brief History of the 10th Marines. Washington: US Marine Corps History Division, 1981
- Butler, M. D. Evolution of Marine Artillery: A History of Versatility and Relevance. Quantico: Command and Staff College, 2012.
- Emmet, R. A Brief History of the 11th Marines. Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1968
- Kummer, D. W. U. S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001-2009. Quantico: U.S. Marine Corps History Division, 2014.
- Russ, M. Breakout: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, Korea 1950. Penguin Books, 1999.
- Shulimson, J., and C. M. Johnson. US Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965. Washington: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1978.
- Smith, C. R. A Brief History of the 12th Marines. Washington: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1972.
- Strobridge, T. R. History of the 9th Marines. Quantico: Gray Research Center, 1961, 1967.
 On 7 July 1964, the US Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which authorized President Johnson to take any measures he believed were necessary to retaliate against North Vietnam’s aggression and promote peace and security in Southeast Asia.
 The 9thMEB was later deactivated and its units absorbed into the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF). In March 1966, the brigade was re-activated as the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (9thMAB) reflecting its primary special landing force mission under the US Seventh Fleet.
 General Davis (1915-2003) served on active duty in the US Marine Corps from 1938 to 1972 with combat service in World War II, Korea, and the Vietnam War. Davis was awarded the Medal of Honor while serving as CO 1/7 during the Battle of Chosin Reservoir. He was also awarded the Navy Cross, two Silver Stars, two Legions of Merit, the Bronze Star, and a Purple Heart Medal. General Davis’ last assignment was Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.
 RVN had been in political turmoil since November 1963 when President John Kennedy authorized the CIA to orchestrate the removal of Ngo Dinh Diem as President of South Vietnam. Diem and his brother were assassinated on 2 November; Kennedy himself was assassinated on 22 November 1963.
 The 8-inch howitzer is a 203-mm gun with a range of 20.2 miles; the 155-mm howitzer has a range of 15.3 miles.
 Fire Support Base Cunningham at one time hosted five artillery batteries (2 105-mm, 2 155-mm, 1 4.2-inch mortar).
 Also, AN/PRC-25 (Prick 25) was a lightweight, synthesized VHF solid-state radio offering 2 watts of power, 920 channels in two bands with a battery life of about 60 hours. The term “lightweight” was relative. The radio added 25-pounds to the radioman’s usual combat load. The PRC-25 was a significant improvement over the PRC-10. It has since been replaced by the PRC-77.
 The official US designation for the War on Terror (7 Oct 2001-28 Dec 2014).
3 thoughts on “Marine Corps Artillery — Part 4”
I hated that damned FADAC computer! It was useless to a 8″ artillery unit and almost useless for a 105mm unit. I could run off firing data, with a slide rule, quicker than anyone could type it in on a FADAC, plus you had to pack around a 220 volt 3 phase generator to run the damned thing.
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Bitch, bitch, bitch … all you guys ever do is bitch.
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