Post-World War II and Korea
Artillery equipment and technology may be an art form, but its application is pure science. Training Marine Corps cannon-cockers for service in World War II included lessons learned from every engagement in which the Marine Corps participated from the beginning of the First World War. Colonel Georg Bruchmüller of the Imperial Germany Army, an artillerist, pioneered what became known as accurately predicted fire. Predicted fire is a technique for employing “fire for effect” artillery without alerting the enemy with ranging fire. Catching the enemy off guard is an essential aspect of combat. To facilitate this, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School developed the concept of fire direction control during the 1930s, which the Marine Corps incorporated within all artillery regiments as they came online in the early 1940s. However, the proximity of artillery targets to friendly forces was of particular concern to the Marines, operating as they did on relatively small islands. There is nothing simple about providing accurate and on-time artillery support to front-line forces; the performance of Marine artillery units during World War II was exceptional.
In early May 1945, following the defeat of Nazi Germany (but before the collapse of Imperial Japan), President Truman ordered a general demobilization of the armed forces. It would take time to demobilize twelve-million men and women. Military leaders always anticipated demobilization following the “second war to end all wars.” While men were still fighting and dying in the Pacific War, those who participated in the European theater and were not required for occupation duty prepared to return home to their loved ones. The plan for general demobilization was code-named Operation Magic Carpet. Demobilization fell under the authority of the War Shipping Administration and involved hundreds of ships.
Men and women of all the Armed Forces were, in time, released from their service obligation and sent on their way. Many of these people, aided by the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act (1944) (also called the GI Bill), went back to academic and trade schools. Between 1945 and 1946, America’s war veterans returned home to restart their lives — they married, started families, built homes, and settled down.
But to suggest that life was a bowl of cherries in 1946 would be a gross over-simplification of that time because the transition to peacetime America was difficult. War costs were tremendous. President Truman believed he should transfer funds earmarked for the armed forces to social programs. He and others in his cabinet were concerned that if the government did not pursue frugal policies, the United States might once more enter into an economic depression.
Having been asked to suspend wage increases during the war, the ink was still wet on the surrender documents when labor unions began organizing walk-outs in the steel and coal industries. Labor strikes destabilized U.S. industries when manufacturing plants underwent a massive re-tooling for peacetime production. Americans experienced housing shortages, limited availability of consumer goods, an inflated economy, and farmers refused to sell their yield at “cost.”
Still, even in recognizing the administration’s challenges, President Truman’s response was inept and short-sighted. Our average citizens, the men, and women who the government imposed rationing upon for four years, deeply resented the high cost of consumer goods. This condition only grew worse when Truman accelerated the removal of mandatory depression-era restrictions on goods and services. Increased demand for goods drove prices beyond what most Americans could afford to pay. When national rail services threatened to strike, Truman seized the railroads and forced the hand of labor unions —which went on strike anyway.
But for Some, the War Continued
In the immediate aftermath of Japan’s unconditional surrender, the 1stMarDiv embarked by ship for service in China. The 11th Marines, assigned to Tientsin at the old French arsenal, performed occupation duty, which involved the disarmament and repatriation of Japanese forces. Officially, our Marines took no part in the power struggle between Chinese Nationalists and Communists. What did happen is that the Marines had to defend themselves against unwarranted attacks by Chinese Communist guerrillas. By the fall of 1945, China was, once more, in an all-out civil war.
The task assigned to Marines was more humanitarian than military. By preventing communists from seizing land routes and rail systems, and by guarding coal shipments and coal fields, Marines attempted to prevent millions of Chinese peasants from freezing to death during the upcoming winter months. But suffering peasants was precisely what the Chinese Communists wanted to achieve, and Marines standing in the way became “targets of opportunity.”
Truman’s rapid demobilization placed these China Marines in greater danger. As the Truman administration ordered units deactivated, manpower levels dropped, and unit staffing fell below acceptable “combat readiness” postures. Some replacements were sent to China, but they were primarily youngsters just out of boot camp with no clear idea of what was going on in China. Losses in personnel forced local commanders to consolidate their remaining assets. Eventually, the concern was that these forward-deployed Marines might not be able to defend themselves.
In September 1946, for example, the 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines (3/11) vacated Tientsin and joined the 7th Marines at Pei Tai-Ho. Within 30 days, most Marine guards along railways and roadways withdrew, turning their duties over to the Nationalist Chinese Army. Some of us may recall how Truman’s China policy turned out.
In preparation for the 1948 elections, Truman made it clear that he identified himself as a “New Deal” Democrat; he wanted a national health insurance program, demanded that Congress hand him social services programs, sought repeal of the Taft-Harley Act, and lobbied for the creation of the United Nations — for which the United States would pay the largest share.
“It is customary in democratic countries to deplore expenditure on armaments as conflicting with the requirements of the social services. There is a tendency to forget that the most important social service that a government can do for its people is to keep them alive and free.”
—Sir John “Jack” Slessor, Air Marshal, Royal Air Force
Harry Truman ignored this and other good advice when he decided that the United States could no longer afford a combat-ready military force, given all his earmarks for social programs. Truman ordered a drastic reduction to all US military services through his Secretary of Defense.
By late 1949/early 1950, Truman and Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson gutted the military services despite multiple warning bells in Korea. Johnson gave the Chief of Naval Operations a warning that the days of the United States Navy were numbered. He told the CNO that the United States no longer needed a naval establishment — the United States had an air force. In early January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, during a speech at the National Press Club, outlined America’s global defensive sphere —omitting South Korea and Formosa. The Soviet Union, Communist China, and Communist North Korea were very interested in what Mr. Acheson did not say.
In June 1950, budget cuts reduced the entire Marine Corps FMF from a wartime strength of 300,000 Marines to less than 28,000 men. Most artillery regiments were reduced to an understaffed regimental headquarters and a single battalion with less than 300 men. After digesting Acheson’s January speech for six months, North Korea (backed by the Soviet Union), invaded South Korea three hours before dawn on 25 June 1950.
In March 1949, President Truman ordered Johnson to decrease further DoD expenditures. Truman, Johnson, and Truman-crony Stuart Symington (newly appointed Secretary of the Air Force) believed that the United States’ monopoly on nuclear weapons would act as an effective deterrent to communist aggression. There was no better demonstration of Truman’s delusion than when North Korea invaded South Korea.
North Korea’s invasion threw the entire southern peninsula into chaos. U.S. Army advisors, American civilian officials, South Korean politicians, and nearly everyone who could walk, run, or ride, made a beeline toward the southern city of Pusan. President Truman authorized General MacArthur, serving as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) (whose headquarters was in Tokyo), to employ elements of the Eighth U.S. Army to Korea to stop the NKPA advance. The problem was that the U. S. Army’s occupation force in Japan was not ready for another war. Truman’s defense cuts had reduced military manpower levels, impaired training, and interrupted the maintenance of combat equipment (including radios, motorized vehicles, tracked vehicles, artillery pieces, and aircraft) to such an extent that not one of the U.S. Armed Forces was ready for the Korean emergency.
The military’s unpreparedness for war was only one of several consequences of Truman’s malfeasance. U.S. forces in Europe and Asia, whose primary interest was indulging the mysteries of Asian and German culture, were dangerously exposed to Soviet aggression. Had the Soviet Union decided to launch a major assault on Europe, they would have slaughtered U.S. military forces. Military personnel had become lazy and apathetic to their mission. Mid-level and senior NCOs enriched themselves in black market activities, senior officers played golf and attended sycophantic soirees, and junior officers —the wise ones— stayed out of the way. But when it came time for the Eighth U.S. Army to “mount out” for combat service in Korea, no one was ready for combat — a fact that contributed to the worst military defeat in American military history — all of it made possible by President Harry S. Truman.
In July 1950, General MacArthur requested a Marine Corps regimental combat team to assist in the defense of the Pusan Perimeter. What MacArthur received, instead, was a Marine Corps combat brigade. HQMC assigned this task to the Commanding General, 1stMarDiv, at Camp Pendleton, California.
The challenge was that to form a combat brigade, HQMC had to reduce manning within every other organization inside the United States and order them to proceed (without delay) to Camp Pendleton. It wasn’t simply an issue of fleshing out the division’s single infantry regiment, the 5th Marines. A combat brigade includes several combat/combat support arms: communications, motor transport, field medical, shore party, combat engineer, ordnance, tanks, artillery, supply, combat services, reconnaissance, amphibian tractors, amphibian trucks, and military police. The brigade would also include an aviation air group formed around Provisional Marine Air Group (MAG)-33, three air squadrons, an observation squadron, and a maintenance/ordnance squadron.
Marine supporting establishments cut their staff to about a third, releasing Marines for combat service from coast-to-coast. HQMC called reservists to active duty — some of these youngsters had yet to attend recruit training. All these things were necessary because, in addition to forming a combat brigade, the JCS ordered the Commandant to reconstitute a full infantry division before the end of August 1950.
Within a few weeks, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade formed around Brigadier General Edward A. Craig and his assistant (and the air component commander), Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman. Lieutenant Colonel (Colonel Select) Raymond L. Murray commanded the 5th Marines, including three understrength infantry battalions: 1/5, 2/5, and 3/5.
HQMC re-designated the three artillery battalions of the 10th Marines (at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina) as the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions, 11th Marine Regiment, and immediately transported them to Camp Pendleton. The Korean situation was so dire that the newly appointed Commanding General, 1stMarDiv, Major General Oliver P. Smith, began loading combat units and equipment aboard ships even before the division fully formed. Again, owing to Truman’s budgetary cuts, the re-formation of the 1stMarDiv consumed the total financial resources of the entire Marine Corps for that fiscal year.
One of the more famous engagements of the 11th Marine Regiment during the Korean War came on 7 December 1950 during the breakout from the Chosin Reservoir. Machine-gun fire from a Chinese infantry battalion halted the progress of Marines along the main supply route. Gulf and Hotel Batteries of 2/11 moved forward. In broad daylight and at extremely close range, the cannon-cockers leveled their 105-mm howitzers and fired salvo after salvo into the Chinese communist positions. With no time to stabilize the guns by digging them in, Marines braced themselves against the howitzers to keep them from moving. When the shooting ended, there were 500 dead Chinese, and the enemy battalion had no further capacity to wage war. One Marine officer who witnessed the fight later mused, “Has field artillery ever had a grander hour?”
In a series of bloody operations throughout the war, the men of the 11th Marines supported the 1st Marines, 5th Marines, 7th Marines, and the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division. On more than one occasion, accurate artillery fire devastated Chinese communist forces, made more critical given that poor weather conditions frequently inhibited airstrikes in the battle area.
Despite North Korea’s agreement to open peace talks in June 1951, the brutality of the Korean War continued until 27 July 1953. North Korea frequently used temporary truces and negotiating sessions to regroup its forces for renewed attacks. At these dangerous times, the 11th Marines provided lethal artillery coverage over areas already wrested from communist control, provided on-call fire support to platoon and squad-size combat patrols, and fired propaganda leaflets into enemy-held territories. The regiment returned to Camp Pendleton in March and April 1955.
(Continued Next Week)
- Brown, R. J. A Brief History of the 14th Marines. Washington: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1990
- Buckner, D. N. A Brief History of the 10th Marines. Washington: US Marine Corps History Division, 1981
- Butler, M. D. Evolution of Marine Artillery: A History of Versatility and Relevance. Quantico: Command and Staff College, 2012.
- Emmet, R. A Brief History of the 11th Marines. Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1968
- Kummer, D. W. U. S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001-2009. Quantico: U.S. Marine Corps History Division, 2014.
- Russ, M. Breakout: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, Korea 1950. Penguin Books, 1999.
- Shulimson, J., and C. M. Johnson. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965. Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1978.
- Smith, C. R. A Brief History of the 12th Marines. Washington: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1972.
- Strobridge, T. R. History of the 9th Marines. Quantico: Gray Research Center, 1961, 1967.
 The situation was much worse in Great Britain. Not only were their major cities destroyed by German bombing, but war rationing also lasted through 1954 — including the availability of coal for heating.
 This might be a good time to mention that all the U.S. arms and equipment FDR provided to Mao Ze-dong, to use against the Japanese, but wasn’t, was turned against U.S. Marines on occupation duty in China. Providing potential enemies with lethal weapons to use against American troops is ludicrous on its face, but this practice continues even now.
 Restricted the activities and power of labor unions, enacted in 1947 over the veto of President Truman.
 President Truman had no appreciation for the contributions of the US Marine Corps to the overall national defense; he did not think the nation needed a Corps of Marines, much less afford to retain the Corps, because the US already had a land army (of which he was a member during World War I). He never accepted the fact that the Marine Corps, as a combat force, provided unique strategic skills and in fact, Truman initiated several efforts to dissolve the Marines prior to the National Security Act of 1947, which ultimately protected the Marine Corps from political efforts to disband it.
 See also: Edward A. Craig — Marine.
One thought on “Marine Corps Artillery — Part 3”
I never liked Democrats and their administrations. Your report here in this series cements it. There is no better illustration than this current inept, corrupt CCP-blackmailed administration.
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