Every Marine, regardless of military occupational specialty, is a rifleman. There are specialists in the Marine Corps, of course —people trained to perform a specialized task, which, when combined with all other specialties, form the Marine Corps Team. The Marine team has but one purpose: winning battles. In contrast to the United States Army, which consists of several corps (three infantry divisions and supporting elements form a single corps, three such corps form a field army), the Marines are a single corps (three divisions, three air wings, and supporting elements).
Because the Marine Corps is a much smaller organization, which is the way we like it, Marines do not have the luxury of employing cooks or communicators that only cook and communicate. Every Marine is a rifleman, including combat pilots, administrators, supply pogues, truck drivers, field engineers, and computer technologists. Whether a general or a private, the Corps trains every Marine to pick up a rifle and kill an enemy. The notion that every Marine is a rifleman makes the Marine Corps unique among all U.S. Armed Services. The Corps’ distinctive training creates a common bond between Marines: officer and enlisted, men and women, whether ground, air, or logistics combat elements. Marine aviators, for example, are hell on wings; they are also a lethal force on the ground should it become necessary. Every Marine earns the title, Marine.
Marine Corps aviation began on 22 May 1912 when Marine First Lieutenant Alfred A. Cunningham reported to the Naval Aviation Camp at Annapolis, Maryland, for duty under instruction. He was the nucleus of what would become the Marine Corps’ air combat element. A few short years later, Congress declared war against Imperial Germany, and the United States entered the First World War. This event became the catalyst for the Navy and Marine Corps air arm, and a greatly accelerated growth in both Navy and Marine Corps manpower and combat technologies.
In those days, responsibility for procuring aircraft fell under the Navy Department’s Bureau of Aeronautics (Also, BuAer). Marine graduates of the U.S. Navy Flight School, Pensacola, Florida, became Naval Aviators. Since those early days, the Navy and Marine Corps have developed aviation equipment, strategies, and tactics common to their unique “naval” mission of protecting the fleet through air superiority and projecting naval power ashore. Marine pilots, however, provide close air support to ground forces —and this they do better than any other aerial arm of the Department of Defense.
At the beginning of the First World War, the entire Marine Corps consisted of a mere 511 officers and 13,214 enlisted men. At the end of the “war to end all wars,” 2,400 officers and 70,000 men served as Marines. Initially, HQMC assigned Captain Cunningham to command the Marine Aviation Company at Philadelphia. Since there was only one aviation company, this simple designation was enough. These early aviators’ mission was traditional, which is to say, attack and destroy enemy aircraft and provide intelligence on enemy forces’ location and movement. Suddenly, the Marine Corps incurred a separate mission requiring different equipment types and a different aeronautical skill set.
With the expansion of Marine aviation, Captain Cunningham’s Aviation Company became the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company (1stMAC) with a workforce ceiling of ten officers and 93 men. 1stMAC’s mission was flying anti-submarine patrols in seaplanes. HQMC approved a new aviation unit, designated as 1st Aviation Squadron (AS-1), to support the Marine Brigade in France. AS-1’s mission was to provide reconnaissance and artillery spotting missions. The strength of the 1st Aviation Squadron was 24 officers and 237 enlisted men.
Following the war in Europe, Navy and Marine Corps planners distributed aviation personnel and equipment to Naval stations to support operating forces throughout the east coast of the United States and those in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In the post-war environment, with less money available to sustain air combat forces, the Marine Corps began its desperate struggle to convince Congress that it should maintain, as a minimum, prewar levels of aviation personnel, bases, and equipment. Leading the charge in this endeavor was Major Cunningham, who strenuously argued for Marine Corps aviation’s permanent adoption.
Congress officially limited the Marine Corps’ strength to one-fifth that of the U. S. Navy, in total, approximately 27,000 Marines. Due in no small measure to Cunningham’s efforts, Congress approved an additional 1,100 Marines for aviation units. Congress also approved permanent Marine Corps Air Stations at Quantico, Virginia, Parris Island, South Carolina, and San Diego, California. On 30 October 1920, Major General Commandant John A. Lejeune approved an aviation table of organization for four squadrons, each consisting of two flights. Simultaneously, the 1st and 4th Aviation Squadrons supported combat operations in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, the 2nd and 3rd Aviation Squadrons trained at Quantico, Virginia. By 1924, the Marine Corps had two air groups, each consisting of two squadrons. The second air group took up station in San Diego, California.
As previously mentioned, the Marine Corps petitioned Congress for funds to maintain its air arm. Part of this effort involved demonstrating to Congress and the American public the utility and worthiness of Marine Corps aviation. To this end, the Marine aviators found it necessary to combine tactics and air strategy with headline-hunting public exhibitions. One of these involved a march of 4,000 Marines from Quantico, Virginia, to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. In this demonstration, the ground combat element maintained constant contact with aircraft along the route of march and provided air resupply of the men on the ground.
Additionally, Marine pilots continually tested new equipment and flying techniques, including record-breaking long-distance flights and air show competitions. In the 1920s, air races became an American institution. Marines sometimes flew navy aircraft in these competitions. Sometimes, they flew their own squadron’s aircraft. They occasionally flew experimental planes, testing not only their endurance but also the reliability of aircraft prototypes. During this period, Notable pilots included First Lieutenant Ford O. Rogers, Major Charles A. Lutz, and Captain Arthur H. Page, Jr.
Arthur Hallet Page, Jr. was the first Naval Academy graduate to enter the Marine Corps Aviation program. He may have been typical of aviators in his day, or at least he seems to have been the sort of fellow popularized in Hollywood films of that period —the flamboyant devil-may-care fellow. From available sources at the USNA, we believe Captain Page had a colorful personality, a remarkable character, and was the embodiment of mature judgment. He was good looking; a natty dresser had a good singing voice, possessed a near-professional dancing ability, and was frequently in the company of beautiful women.
Page was also a daring, foolhardy risk-taker —but a man others might describe as lucky as hell. He graduated from the USNA, Class of 1918 (one of fourteen graduates) a year early due to the emerging European War. Second Lieutenant Arthur H. Page, Jr., became a Naval Aviator (No. 536) on 14 March 1918. His aviator number tells us how many Navy and Marine Corps pilots preceded him.
Today, we have few details about Page’s military career. For the most part, early assignments appear typical of young officers. He received his wings at the NAS Pensacola (1918). He then served several tours of duty attached to the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia —which may not have had anything to do with base security or operations (1919-20, 1923-24), service with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in Haiti —likely duties involving flight operations (1920-21), assignment as a flight instructor at NAS Pensacola (1924-25), as a student at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico (1925-26), service with the 3rd Marine Brigade in China (1926-28), an assignment at Marine Corps Base, San Diego, California (1928), and duty with the East Coast Expeditionary Force (1929). His final assignment was at Headquarters Marine Corps (1929-30), during which time he engaged in flying exhibitions (previously discussed).
We also know that the Marine Corps established its first balloon detachment on 28 June 1918 under Captain Page’s command, very likely at Quantico. The detachment’s mission artillery spotting in support of the 10th Marine Regiment (artillery), which in 1918 trained at Quantico for service with the American Expeditionary Forces. After the Armistice on 11 November 1918, there being no need for the 10th Marines in France, HQMC deactivated the regiment in April 1919.
An aside: Change within the Navy and War Departments, particularly involving aviation, was never easy. Senior officers within both departments were simply the product of their training and experience and somewhat intractable in their national defense views. Even following the First World War, Army and Navy leaders remained unconvinced that aviation should assume a more significant national defense role. They may have maintained this view had it not been for the relentless efforts of William Lendrum Mitchell (1879-1936), an Army aviator. Mitchell believed that “floating bases” was necessary to defend U.S. territories against naval threats, but the CNO, Admiral William S. Benson, dissolved navy aeronautics in 1919 (a decision later reversed by Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt). It was a bit of service rivalry that senior navy aviators argued that land-based pilots no more understood naval aviation demands than ground commanders understood airpower capabilities. They resisted any alliance with Mitchell. Despite these attitudes, Mitchell urged the development of naval air service, arguing that air-delivered bombs would become a serious threat to enemy ships. Not even Roosevelt agreed with Mitchell’s proposals in 1919.
Convinced that he was right on this issue, Mitchell became publicly critical of the Army and Navy’s senior leadership, judging them as “insufficiently far-sighted” regarding airpower. Despite their misgivings, the secretaries of War and the Navy agreed to a series of joint Army/Navy exercises that incorporated captured or decommissioned ships as targets. Mitchell believed that the nation’s spending on battleship fleets was a waste of money; he intended to demonstrate how easily aircraft could defeat the Navy’s dreadnaughts. Mitchell received public support for the joint exercise when the New York Tribune revealed that the Navy had cheated on its test results.
Despite his popularity with the press, Mitchell’s criticism of Army/Navy leadership made him a pariah in both departments. Nevertheless, the joint exercise proceeded with bombing attacks on a former German battleship by Army, Navy, and Marine Corps pilots armed with 230, 550, and 600-pound bombs. Air-delivered bombs’ success and the German ship’s sinking caused the Navy to suspend shipbuilding and focus more on the possibilities of naval air power, but there were also political ramifications. For starters, the Navy’s perceived weaknesses embarrassed President Harding —the blame of which fell at Mitchell’s feet.
As for Mitchell, his prickly personality left him with few friends in the Army hierarchy, a condition that only grew worse after Mitchell appeared before a Congressional committee and criticized his superiors and senior Navy officers. In 1925, a tragic accident involving the airship Shenandoah prompted Mitchell to accuse senior Army/Navy leaders of gross incompetence and treasonable administration. As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, President Coolidge ordered Mitchell court-martialed. The court-martial proceeding was more on the order of a media circus. Mitchell’s defense attorney was a sitting congressman. Of the thirteen officers detailed as judges, which included Major Douglas A. MacArthur, none had an aviation background. In its deliberations, the court ruled that the truth or falsity of Mitchell’s accusations were immaterial to the charge against him: Violation of the 96th Article of War, “Bringing disgrace and reproach upon the military services,” which included six specifications. When the court found General Mitchell guilty of the charge and all specifications, he resigned his commission.
Despite Mitchell’s pissing-contest with Army/Navy leaders, the Marine Corps continued its experimentation with aviation platforms and aerial balloons. Between 1924-29, the Marine Corps established a balloon observation squadron (designated ZK-1M). Captain Page, meanwhile, continued evaluating experimental aircraft while challenging his aeronautical skills. He flew the Curtiss F6C-3 plane to victory in the Curtiss Marine Trophy Race on 31 May 1930, defeating a field of mostly Navy pilots. The F6C-3 was a member of the Hawk family of biplane fighters that, because of its performance evaluations by Navy/Marine Corps aviators, went through a series of design modifications to make it suitable for naval service. Captain Page lost his life while participating in the Thompson Air Race in 1930. There are old pilots, and there are bold pilots; there are no old bold pilots.
By the spring of 1940, planners at HQMC were acutely aware of the problems associated with defending advanced bases against enemy air attack. To address these issues, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) convened a board of senior officers to study air defense aspects. It became the duty of the Anti-Aircraft Defense Board to formulate policies suitable to both the Navy and War Departments. One agreement concerned the division of responsibility for barrage balloons and kite defenses protecting U.S. military installations. Under this agreement, the Army assumed air defense responsibility for permanent naval bases. Simultaneously, the Navy would develop shipboard defenses and “at such advanced bases as are not defended by the Army.”
On 27 December 1940, the Secretary of the Navy assigned responsibility for anti-air defenses (not defended by the Army) to the Fleet Marine Forces. From that point forward, Marine advanced base battalions assumed responsibility for the anti-aircraft defense mission at Guantanamo, Midway, Johnson Island, Palmyra, Samoa, Wake, Guam, and “any future location seized by American forces.” The CNO subsequently asked various bureaus and offices to comment or offer suggestions on the extent to which the Marine Corps should enter the barrage balloon field. There were two views:
- The Director, Navy War Plans Division opined that balloons were unreliable anti-air defense mechanisms and noted that the small size of several advanced base locations (islands) meant that balloon defenses would be ineffective except against dive bombers. Moreover, the placement of such balloons would have to be so as not to interfere with friendly air operations, which would require moveable barge platforms. At no time did the War Plans Division mention any reliance on carrier-based attack aircraft.
- The Director, Fleet Training Division expressed confidence in the efficiency of balloon defenses. He relied on the United Kingdom’s experience in London’s defense; it appeared to him that 50-100 balloons would provide adequate anti-air defenses. Based on this one assumption, the Director envisioned that the Marine Corps would require two to four squadrons of 24 balloons each and around 200 men per squadron. There was also the problem of availability because requisitions for Army balloon equipment strained industrial production capacities.
The CMC took immediate steps to procure balloons, not only for the initial issue but also for replacement balloons. HQMC also recalled to active service retired Major Bernard L. Smith and placed him in charge of the Corps’ barrage balloon development. During World War I, while serving as an assistant naval attaché in France, Major Smith’s study of lighter-than-air craft made him an “expert” in the field of balloon defense mechanisms.
In late April 1941, Major Smith (assisted by Captain Aquillo J. Dyess and Captain Robert S. Fairweather) established a training school at Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia. Smith led his officers and ten enlisted men to the Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, New Jersey, for a two-week course of instruction in the art of flying British-made Mark-5 and Mark-6 balloons. Returning to Quantico, Smith and his Marines prepared course curriculum and liaised with balloon manufacturers. When, more than a year later, Smith and his staff had yet to receive their first student, HQMC directed Smith to move his cadre to New River, North Carolina, where it became part of the Marine Corps Training Center, Camp Lejeune.
Still without students, Smith’s “school” essentially became a balloon research/development center; the Navy’s Anti-Aircraft Defense Board provided Smith with several varieties of British prototypes. Smith was also involved in the study of rockets and fuses suspended from aloft balloons. By late 1941, the arrival of balloon equipment allowed Smith to commence teaching balloon defense’s art and science. Concurrently, HQMC directed the establishment of the 1st and 2nd Barrage Balloon squadrons to further order that defense battalions incorporate these squadrons into training and operations. Typically, HQMC wanted to review the defense battalion’s evaluations of the practicality of barrage squadrons. By early December, Smith advised HQMC that the 1st Barrage Balloon Squadron (designation ZMQ-1) was ready for deployment. In late December, Smith’s report was timely because the Army requested the Marines provide a squadron to defend the Panama Canal Zone. Administratively, ZMQ-1 fell under the Fifteenth Naval District; operationally, the squadron supported the Army’s artillery command. ZMQ-1’s “temporary” assignment lasted through mid-September 1942.
Meanwhile, ZMQ-2, under Captain Henry D. Strunk, joined the 2nd Marine Brigade in Samoa. War with Japan led the Marine Corps to activate six additional Barrage Balloon Squadrons, although planners estimated a need for as many as twenty squadrons by 1944. To meet this demand, HQMC increased Smith’s training unit’s size to five officers and 43 enlisted men. In April 1942, HQMC assigned ZMQ-3 to the Pacific command; by September, the squadron was operating on the island of Tulagi —but with significant restrictions. Concerned that deployed balloons would attract enemy aircraft to vital airfields and logistics storage areas, senior Navy and Marine Corps officers curtailed the use of balloons at Tulagi and Guadalcanal. Instead, squadron personnel performed ground defense (infantry) duties. ZMQ-3 departed Tulagi for Noumea, where it joined with ZMQ-1, ZMQ-5, and ZMQ-6. HQMC ordered the deactivation of ZMQ-4, serving in Samoa, on 20 February 1943. The unavailability of helium at forward bases hindered squadrons’ performance, as in Noumea’s case, forcing unit officers to alter their tactics: they only launched their balloons when an enemy attack was imminent.
Shortages of helium wasn’t the only problem plaguing ZMQ squadrons. The task of logistical resupply in the Pacific was incredibly difficult. Since senior commanders in the Pacific questioned barrage balloons’ utility, balloon squadrons had a lower priority for resupply than did the most-forward units. Army logisticians paid scant attention to the needs of the attached Marines. Back in Washington, the demands placed on BuAer to prioritize the resupply of aircraft squadrons similarly left the balloon squadrons only marginally effective. For example, each balloon squadron required 4,000 high-pressure hydrogen cylinders. The Marine’s demand for 14,500 cylinders per month fell considerably short, and there was nothing anyone could do about it. To help coordinate balloon activities and address logistical shortfalls, HQMC ordered Major Charles W. May to assume command of the Marine Barrage Balloon Group on 10 January 1943.
One wartime epiphany was the Marine Corps’ realization that anti-aircraft guns had a greater effect on the enemy than the barrage balloons did. In the spring of 1943, the Marine Corps’ Commandant asked the U.S. Army to assume full responsibility for aerial balloon activities. The Commandant’s decision made perfect sense because, at that time, all Marine balloon squadrons served under the operational control of the U.S. Army. In June, the Army agreed to absorb the balloon mission, making 60 officers and 1,200 enlisted Marines available to serve in other (more critical) combat units. Beginning in March 1943, Marines of ZMQ-5 began training with 90mm anti-aircraft guns; ZMQ-6 followed suit. By August, manning anti-aircraft guns became the primary focus of training and operations. ZMQ-2 disbanded on 21 August, with all its Marines joining the 2nd Defense Battalion.
All barrage balloon squadrons ceased to exist by December 1943, and all Marines assigned to them transferred to the Marine Corps’ defense battalions. Luckily, these Marines were not only skilled balloonists; they were also deadly as hell in their new assignment as anti-aircraft gun crewmen and as a rifleman, the essential role of every Marine.
- Updegraph, C. L. S. Marine Corps Special Units of World War II. Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1972.
- Barrage Balloons, Aerospace Power Journal, Summer 1989.
- 225th AAA Searchlight Battalion Veterans Association, online.
- Hillson, F. J. When the Balloon Goes Up: Barrage Balloons for Low-Level Defense. Maxwell AFB: U.S. Air Force Command and Staff College, 1988.
 The purpose of military tables of organization (and equipment) (also, T/O and T/O&E) is to standardize the personnel staffing of military units according to their mission and includes the numbers and types of weapons and accoutrements required by such organizations to complete their mission.
 Major Smith was the 6th Marine officer designated as a naval aviator.