On 20 May 1941, German forces launched an airborne invasion of the Island of Crete. It was the first airborne invasion in history. German casualties at the end of the first day were massive. Greek and allied forces in defense of Crete were confident they could hold off the German Luftlandeschlacht. Those defenders were wrong. On the second day, German airborne units seized the airfield at Maleme, and from that base, pushed the defenders entirely off the island. It wasn’t long after that when the Secretary of the Navy telephoned the Commandant of the Marine Corps and asked, “Dude, how cool was that?”
The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb, had already announced his decision in October 1940 to designate one battalion of each infantry regiment as “air troops.” Marine Corps planners envisioned that these “air troops” would fly to their destinations. Holcomb further imagined that one company would be trained parachutists, and the remaining two companies would e “air-landed” troops. The verbiage was confusing, but this was the language used in 1940: air-troops vs. air-landed-troops. One problem that went undiscovered until well-into pre-combat training was that the United States lacked enough aircraft to accomplish vertical assaults. Another pinch of sand in the “para-Marine” concept was landing Marines in dense jungle terrain. Oops.
After 1941, the subject of glider aircraft was always associated with the Marine Corps’ concept of airborne assault forces, which originated from “high level” interest after the successful German airborne invasion of Crete. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox was in awe of the concept. He directed General Holcomb to study the issue and determine whether it held any promise for amphibious operations. Because the German’s operation in Crete involved gliders carrying 750 troops, the Commandant was also asked to consider glider operations.
Apparently, what the Commandant meant by “air troops” in 1940 was parachutists, and what he meant by “air-landed” troops were Marines landing near the battle area in aircraft.
As for the suitability of such aircraft, it was the duty of the Navy Department’s Bureau of Aeronautics to study the feasibility of such operations and for procuring suitable vehicles to facilitate such tactics. Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) would only recruit men for such service once the Navy decided they were both feasible and practical for projecting naval power ashore. When the Chief of Naval Operations asked the Commandant how he intended to go about staffing a glider program, General Holcomb opined that he would find second lieutenants to volunteer for pilot training. He would select co-pilots from among the noncommissioned officer ranks. I can almost see the CNO’s eyebrows fluttering before he artfully changed the subject to another pressing issue.
Meanwhile, the Bureau of Aeronautics, which had already undertaken gliders’ study, found Secretary Knox’s suggestion underwhelming. In 1940, Naval Aviation had far more significant problems to deal with than glider feasibility. Besides, the Navy had already studied (and shelved) the possibility of using gliders as flight training vehicles. They determined that gliders did not contribute as much to flight training as engine-powered aircraft. In any event, the Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics advised the CNO that glider design studies were underway, noted that these projects incorporated both land and sea-based gliders. He had serious reservations about the practicality of gliders in any capacity.
Nevertheless, CMC issued his call for volunteers in July 1941, advising all officers (second lieutenant through captain) that he needed 50 officers and 100 NCOs during the fiscal year 1942 to undertake glider training. Initial training would occur at civilian schools, restricted to officers only until the Marine Corps could establish a glider school for enlisted men. HQMC anticipated the need for 75 gliders capable of transporting ten combat loaded troops and two pilots —judged sufficient to transport one airborne battalion. Such a project would challenge any early-war aeronautical industry but made even more perplexing because the largest glider manufactured in the United States in 1941 was a four-seat model not intended for people wearing combat gear. Europeans had developed larger gliders, however, so American builders knew that it was doable.
Seeking to provide its unwanted assistance to the Bureau of Aeronautics, HQMC identified “desirable” features of the aircraft in its design: For instance: (1) The ability to take off from land or water; (2) Capable of transporting equipment, including light vehicles, 37-mm anti-tank guns, and if possible, light tanks; (3) Configured for static line paratroop jumping; (4) Machine gun mounts for self-defense while airborne, and (5) a weight capacity of 12 men, each weighing 250 pounds in combat gear. It is difficult to keep from laughing.
The Navy’s BuAer evaluated two prototypes, both of which fulfilled the Marine Corps’ requirement. One of these was an amphibious, float-wing model available for production and open to bids. The second glider was a twin-hulled seaplane glider whose plans were still on the drawing board the day before yesterday.
Glider pilot training presented unique problems. When HQMC learned that the Army had enrolled officers in a soaring school in Elmira, New York, The Commandant directed First Lieutenant Eschol M. Mallory to evaluate this training. By the way, Mallory was a Marine Corps Aviator who had certain biases against the idea of glider aircraft. While in Elmira, Mallory learned that there was a second school in Lockport, Illinois. Taking it upon himself to investigate both facilities, Mallory wrote a report for the CMC recommending that (1) glider training be restricted to qualified naval aviators because of (a) control problems, (b) navigation issues, and (c) because night/instrument flying precluded safe flight operations with novice pilots on the stick. Additionally, in recognizing that 150 glider pilot trainees could not be pulled from existing resources, small as they were, Mallory recommended that should the CMC decide to proceed with the program, that (a) novice pilots be sent to the Lewis School outside Chicago and (b) that experienced pilots be sent to the Motorless Flight Institute at Harvey, Illinois.
The process of glider development was, from this point on, somewhat convoluted. A series of conferences in 1941 to evaluate the progress of glider adaptation to Marine Corps combat service seemed favorable. By October, the HQMC position on glider utilization had been fully developed and enunciated by the CMC. Planners actually envisioned that gliders would be outfitted with outboard motors so that they could maneuver inside lagoons and other protected areas. Of course, a few questions remained, such as the location of operating facilities where they would not interfere in regular aviation operations.
The CMC, who had earlier resisted the creation of commando battalions, was now on record as fully supporting the notion of glider operations within parachute battalions. In retrospect, the situation illustrated senior leaders’ inability to foresee all possible tactical situations and the impact of their reluctance to conduct an adequate study, feasibility assessment, or experimentation and training.
In November 1941, four Marine Corps officers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Vernon M. Guymon, enrolled in the glider pilot’s course at Motorless Flight Institute. All of these officers were qualified naval aviators. Guymon had been awarded the Navy Cross for his role in the air evacuation of sick and wounded Marines during the Nicaragua intervention in 1929. Eight additional officers reported for training at the Lewis School. All officers graduated shortly after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. But to maintain their proficiency, they had to fly —and at this early stage, there was still no glider aircraft in the Marine Corps aviation inventory.
In early January 1942, the Director of Aviation at HQMC indicated some hesitance in proceeding with the program. First, he recommended a “temporary allowance” to form a glider detachment instead of a permanent glider organization. The CMC concurred, and on 15 January, approved the temporary assignment of 14 officers and 56 enlisted men to the newly created Glider Detachment. The manufacturer delivered one and two-man gliders to the Marine Corps during mid-March; the first 12-man gliders’ delivery was promised a short time later; it was a promise unfulfilled. On 16 March 1942, the CMC requested the CNO to approve the formation of Marine Glider Group (MGG) 71, which would consist of an H&S Squadron 71, and Marine Glider Squadron (VML) 711. The CNO approved the requested table of organization.
Activation of MGG 71 took place at the Marine Corps Air Station, Parris Island, South Carolina. Initially, the group was equipped with three N3N-3 trainers, one SNJ-2, one J2F-3, one JE-1, and seven (7) two-man gliders. Two of these gliders were kept in reserve. HQMC assigned Lieutenant Colonel Guymon as Group Commander.
By the summer of 1942, Guymon believed that training in two-man gliders was a waste of time. Since all glider pilots (so far) were qualified naval aviators, the only training these pilots needed was transitional flying —best achieved in the 12-man gliders. Colonel Guymon’s point was moot, however, because the Marine Corps still did not have 12-man gliders. A search for a suitable glider base was undertaken and eventually selected at Eagle Mountain Lake, Texas. HQMC considered additional sites, but none ever developed as glider bases or training facilities.
MGG-71 departed MCAS Parris Island on 21 November 1942 and arrived at Eagle Mountain Lake two days later. Training continued even though the 12-man gliders still had not been delivered. In February 1943, HQMC ordered the glider program’s suspension until the Marine Corps could satisfy the Pacific theater’s more pressing needs. At HQMC, the Plans and Operations Division and Aviation Division jointly concluded that parachute battalions and glider squadrons were impractical in the Pacific War’s island-hopping campaigns. CMC ordered the glider program terminated on 24 June 1943. The Navy Department reassigned all USMC Glider aircraft to the U. S. Army; the Eagle Mountain Lake facility transitioned to a night fighter training base.
- Updegraph, C. L. Jr., S. Marine Corps Special Units of World War II. History and Museums Division, HQMC, Washington, 1972.
- Sherrod, R. History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II. Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952.
- Grim, J. N. To Fly the Gentle Giants: The Training of US WWII Glider Pilots. Bloomington: Author House Press, 2009.
 Thomas Holcomb (1879-1965) served as the 17th Commandant of the Marine Corps (1936-1943). He was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant on 13 April 1900. Holcomb was awarded the Navy Cross medal, four awards of the Silver Star Medal, and the Purple Heart. Holcomb was a descendant of Commodore Joshua Barney of the Continental Navy.
 Proving that not every Marine officer was a genius unless one officer intended to defeat the program on the drawing board.
 Vernon Melvin Guymon (1898-1965) was a highly decorated Marine Corps mustang officer who retired as a Brigadier General in 1949. Throughout his 30 years of service, he was awarded the Navy Cross, Silver Star, Legion of Merit, and two Purple Hearts. While serving as a gunnery sergeant, Guymon was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in December 1918. After service in the so-called Banana Wars in the early 1920s, he applied and was accepted for flight school. He was designated a naval aviator on 15 November 1926. Following the deactivation of MGG-71, Guymon was assigned to MAG-12 in the Pacific Theater, where he served as the Group Commander and later as Chief of Staff, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing. Brigadier General Guymon retired from active duty on 1 March 1949.