Similar to the development of U. S. Marine Corps raider battalions, the genesis of airborne qualified Marines came from our European allies during World War II. In May 1940, the Commandant of the Marine Corps tasked his Plans and Policy branch to conduct a feasibility study for the utilization of Marine parachute troops. General Holcomb asked his staff to plan for one battalion of infantry at full strength, one platoon of 75-mm pack howitzers (two guns per platoon), issued three units of fire for all weapons, three days of rations and water, adding light anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons as appropriate, and no vehicles beyond hand-drawn carts.
While the plans and policy branch considered the Commandant’s proposal, various naval attaches began collecting reports on the use of parachute forces by Germany, Russia, and France.
The plans and policy branch considered the Commandant’s proposal and came up with three possible scenarios where parachute units might be employed as a Marine combat force:
- As a reconnaissance and raiding force with limited ability to return to its parent organization or base. In this application, planners assumed that the unit’s objective was sufficiently vital to the interests of the force commander that he was willing to sacrifice the entire organization to complete it, or
- As a spearhead or advance unit whose mission would be to seize and hold a strategic objective until the arrival of larger, reinforcing organizations, or
- As an independent force operating for extended periods as a guerrilla force within enemy held territory.
By October 1940, the Commandant decided that an element from one infantry battalion of each regiment would be trained as “air troops.” Each air troop battalion would host a company of parachutists, estimating a total airborne force of 750 parachute qualified Marines. The Commandant’s decision had nothing to do with transforming amphibious troops into air assault forces, but rather to increase the combat capability of the Marine infantry division —the same rationale he used in approving raider battalions.
Two Marine officers and 38 enlisted men reported to the Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, New Jersey for parachute training in late October 1940. By early November, they had completed tower training and were sent to Quantico, Virginia for added physical conditioning prior to making their first jump. A second group of Marines (3 officers and 44 enlisted men) began their initial training at the end of December. Both groups graduated from parachute training on 26 February 1941, each man qualified as parachute jumpers and riggers. Additional training occurred throughout the Spring and by mid-summer, a total of 225 jumpers had graduated from the Lakehurst course.
But NAS Lakehurst was inadequate for the training of so many Marines in such a compressed period of time, so Captain Marion L. Dawson, USMC was sent to San Diego in February 1941 to prepare additional facilities there. In March, the entire graduating class of the second training group was transferred to San Diego to form the 1st Platoon, Company A, 2nd Parachute Battalion. They were later joined by the third graduating class, who formed the 2nd Platoon, Company A.
Meanwhile, Company A of the 1st Parachute Battalion was formed at Quantico, Virginia on 10 July 1941 and to avoid confusion while in the process of growing a new battalion, Company A of the 2nd Parachute Battalion (San Diego) was renamed as Company B, 1st Parachute Battalion. The parachute battalion headquarters element was activated on 15 August 1941, with Captain Marcellus J. Howard, USMC as its first commanding officer. Howard relocated his emerging battalion to New River, North Carolina for further training on 28 September. The 1st Parachute Battalion was fully formed on 1 March 1942, while the 2nd Parachute Battalion was activated on 23 July 1941 under the command of Captain Charles E. Shepard, Jr. and declared at full strength on 3 September 1942.
There were no shortages of volunteers for parachute training, but the requirements for entering the program were quite strict. A successful applicant had to be unmarried, athletically inclined, above average in intelligence, between the ages of 18-32 years, and have no physical or mental impairments. Extra pay was authorized for Marines who completed parachute training, which amounted to an additional $100 for officers and $50.00 for enlisted men, and this may have been a factor in the number of Marines who applied for parachute training.
War was declared against Japan after their attack at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and this resulted in a sudden demand for combat Marines. The formation of specialized battalions put a tremendous strain on the Marine Corps because it was still in the process of putting together the manpower needed to expand regular conventional forces. A decision to establish two parachute training schools at New River, North Carolina and San Diego, California would ensure that the Marines could assemble and provide replacements to three parachute battalions. There were no barracks for these trainees, so they quartered in tents during their ten weeks of training. Each class consisted of 36 Marines and each school started a new class each week. Eventually, parachute training school was reduced to six weeks of training, totaling 361 hours of instruction.
Parachute training was divided into three two-week phases, the first being ground training. Phase I included parachute tactics, map reading, demolition training, techniques of fire, scouting, patrolling, water survival, and weapons familiarization. Phase II included parachute packing, rigging, flotation training, and the handling of cargo containers. Phase III involved actual jumping, beginning with controlled and free tower jumping, suspension lines, and six actual jumps. At the completion of Phase III, Marines were presented with the parachute qualification wings. Not everyone who began training successfully completed it —the washout rate was 40%.
Putting together the facilities for parachute training was only one of the problems facing the Marine Corps. There was also the problem of staffing these schools with qualified instructors, which eventually forced the Marine Corps to select its instructors from the operating forces —men who had successfully completed jump school. There was also a problem with acquiring sufficient numbers of parachutes for use in training Marines how to use them.
The Allied defeat of Japanese naval forces at Midway and the Coral Sea stopped Japan’s advance in the Pacific. Japanese losses were substantial, losing over 400 carrier and land-based aircraft and five aircraft carriers. Such losses forced Tokyo to assume a defensive posture. Japan’s new military reality was to establish a strong defensive perimeter of the Japanese home islands; its focus was to transform Truk in the Caroline Islands into an impregnable stronghold. To accomplish this, the Japanese would have to strengthen Rabaul on New Britain in the Solomon Islands. Part of this defensive structure was eastern New guinea, Guadalcanal, and Tulagi in the southern Solomons chain.
Fortified airbases in the foregoing named locations allowed the Japanese to meet Allied air and seaborne attacks by shuttling their own assets from one base to the next. By mid-June 1942, the Japanese airfield construction program had begun in earnest, including at Guadalcanal, Florida, and Savo Islands. The primary purpose was to cut communications between the United States and Australia and forestall any Allied offensive operations. While setting in a robust defensive structure, the Japanese retained its threat to vital supply bases in New Caledonia, New Hebrides, and Fiji.
The 1st Parachute Battalion departed from the United States on 7 June 1942, arriving at Wellington, New Zealand on 11 July 1942. Within a week, the battalion sailed to Koro, Fiji Islands where it began training and rehearsing for the assault on Guadalcanal—Code named Watchtower.
The Allied expeditionary force supporting Watchtower consisted of 75 ships and transports, including vessels of both the United States and Australia, which assembled off the Fiji Islands on 26 July 1942. There was only time for one rehearsal landing exercise before departing for Guadalcanal on 31 July. Overall command of the 16,000 (mostly) U. S. Marines fell under Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift. Of the total assault force, 3,000 were scheduled to land on Tulagi and nearby islands of Florida, Gavutu, and Tanambogo. Brigadier General William H. Rupertus, then serving as the Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division, would lead the Tulagi-Gavutu-Tanambogo force.
Bad weather permitted the Allied force to arrive off station unseen by the Japanese on the morning of 7 August, but the Japanese did pick up increased radio traffic from the Allied expeditionary force and planned to send out reconnaissance aircraft at daybreak. The landing force split into two groups for the assault on Guadalcanal and the Florida islands. At daybreak, aircraft from the USS Wasp began bombing Japanese targets, destroying 15 seaplanes at anchorage near the islands. Pre-assault naval bombardments were directed at Tulagi, Gavutu, Florida, and Tanambogo.
The island of Tulagi is two miles long and a half mile wide; it lies just south of Florida Island and 22 miles directly north across Sealark Channel from Guadalcanal. A ridge rising over 300 feet above sea level marks the northwest-southeast axis of the island. Around two-thirds of the way down from its northwest tip, the ridge is broken by a ravine and then rises again in a triangle of hills, designated Hill 208 in the southeast and Hill 281 in the northeast.
Tulagi had been the seat of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, with the governor’s residence and other offices on its northeast side. About 3,000 yards east of Tulagi are the small islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo, which are joined by a 500-yard long causeway.
At 0800 on 7 August, the 1st Raider Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson and 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines under Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Rosecrans made an unopposed landing on the western shore of Tulagi. Coral formations kept the landing craft from reaching the shore, which required that the Marines had to wade ashore from about 100 meters from the beach.
Japanese forces at Tulagi and Gavutu were assigned to the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force and an aviation detachment. The assault at Gavutu was not simultaneous with the landing at Tulagi, however. Insufficient numbers of landing craft delayed the 1st Parachute Battalion’s assault for four hours while the 1st Raider Battalion and 2/5 were completely ashore.
The 1st Parachute Battalion under Major Robert H. Williams finally made their assault in three waves beginning at noon on 7 August 1942. After landing, Company B made some progress inland before the Japanese garrison was able to implement their defense plan. Earlier naval gunfire had destroyed the seaplane ramp at Gavutu, forcing Marines in the second and third waves to land at a more exposed location. Japanese machine gun fire inflicted heavy casualties on the Marines of Company A and Company C; one Marine in ten was either killed or wounded, including the battalion commander, who was quickly replaced by the executive officer, Major Charles A. Miller.
Marines from Company A and Company C quickly employed their Browning 1919 Machine guns and mortars under the direction of Captain George Stallings to suppress enemy fire, allowing more Marines to push inland. As reflected on the map at left, Gavutu and Tanambogo are little more than mounds of coral averaging around 50 meters above sea level, except for two hills, one on each islet, numbered 148 and 121, reflecting their height in meters. Japanese on both islets were well entrenched in bunkers and caves constructed on and within both of these hills and organized with mutually supporting fields of fire. Marine planners had significantly underestimated the strength of the Japanese garrisons.
After a battle lasting well over two hours, the Marines were able to work their way to the top of Hill 148 and began destroying Japanese positions with demolition charges, hand grenades, and in some cases hand-to-hand fighting along the slopes of the hill. From the apex of Hill 148, Marines were able to suppress Japanese fire coming from Tanambogo. Major Miller radioed a request to General Rupertus for reinforcements before mounting an assault on Tanambogo.
Most of the defenders on Tanambogo were aviation personnel, some of which were armed with no more than hand sickles and gardening tools. General Rupertus detached one company from the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines (1/2) on Florida Island to assist in securing Tanambogo. Rupertus was advised by his staff that a single company would not be sufficient but Rupertus apparently knew better and ordered the company to assault the Islet. The Marines from 1/2 were hit by overwhelming machine gun fire as they approached the landing area, which resulted in many casualties among the Navy landing craft crews. Three landing craft were heavily damaged. Realizing that his position was untenable, the company commander ordered the remaining boats to depart with wounded Marines aboard; he and twelve of his men who had already landed sprinted across the causeway seeking cover on Gavutu. Japanese casualties on Tanambogo on 7 August was only ten killed in action.
Throughout the night, Japanese defenders staged isolated attacks against the Marines on Gavutu, their movements concealed by heavy thunderstorms. General Vandegrift alerted 3/2 to standby for a reinforcing assault. The battalion began its landing at Gavutu at 10:00 on the morning of 8 August; once ashore, 3/2 assisted 1st Parachute Battalion in the destruction of all remaining Japanese defenders, which was completed in two hours.
At this time, 3/2 prepared to attack Tanambogo across the causeway and 1st Parachute Battalion was assigned to provide covering fire. Dive bombers and naval artillery were also requested, but when aircraft dropped their ordnance on Marines on two occasions, killing several of them, further air support was called off. Accurate artillery was provided by USS San Juan, however, which lasted for 30 minutes.
The 3/2 assault began at 16:15, by landing craft and across the causeway, and with the assistance from two light tanks, the attack began making headway against the stout Japanese defense. One of these tanks became hung up on a tree stump and, isolated from its infantry support, was surrounded by a group of about 50 Japanese. They set fire to the tank, killing two of its crewmen and severely beat the other two crewmen before most of these men were killed by Marine Corps rifle fire. There were 42 bodies around the defeated tank, including the remains of senior officers and pilots.
Throughout the day, Marines methodically destroyed the Japanese-held caves with demolition charges. By 21:00, most of the Japanese defenders were dead, but a few holdouts continued to attack the Marines at night with several hand-to-hand engagements. By noon on 9 August, all Japanese resistance on Tanambogo ended. 476 Japanese were killed, 70 Americans joined them. Most of the 20 prisoners were construction workers.
On 9 August 1st Parachute Battalion was moved to Tulagi to reinforce the 1st Raider Battalion and took up positions as a security force near the government buildings. A month later, the 1st Parachute Battalion and 1st Raider Battalion, both under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson, executed a raid in the vicinity of Taivu near the village of Tasimboko, Guadalcanal. The Raiders landed at Taivu Point and advanced toward Tasimboko, while the Parachute Marines landed 2,000 yards east of the village and took up positions to protect the flank and rear of the Raider advance. Following an intense fire fight with Japanese defenders of Tasimboko, the combined force entered the village and destroyed food, medical equipment, and military stores. Before dark on 8 September 1942, the two battalions withdrew to its embarkation point.
Several days later, again in conjunction with the 1st Raider Battalion, 1st Parachute Battalion was ordered to occupy the ridge southeast of Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. Enemy activity increased on 11 September and reached a peak during the night of 13-14 September when the Marine perimeter repulsed strong and repeated attacks by Japanese forces. This battle would become known as the Battle of Bloody Ridge, also the Battle of Edson’s Ridge. This action severely mauled General Kawaguchi’s force, against whom the previous raid had been staged.
On 18 September the 1st Parachute Battalion was withdrawn from Guadalcanal and transported to New Caledonia for rest, refit, and retraining. Between September 1942 and the spring of 1943, the 1st Parachute Battalion was re-indoctrinated in jump techniques, parachute packing, patrolling, scouting, and platoon, company, and battalion sized operations.
The 2nd Parachute Battalion arrived at Wellington, New Zealand on 31 October 1942 and remained in camp until January 1943 when it was transported to Noumea to undergo further training with the 1st Parachute Battalion.
The 3rd Parachute Battalion under Major Robert T. Vance was organized on 16 September 1942 and assigned to the 3rd Marine Division in general support of Amphibious Corps Operations, Pacific Fleet. Dispatched to Noumea to join the other two parachute battalions, 3rd Parachute Battalion arrived on 27 March 1943. Five days later, the 1st Parachute Regiment was activated, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Parachute Battalions, Regimental Weapons Company, and the Headquarters & Service Company. Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Williams, having recovered from his wounds on Gavutu, assumed command of the Regiment.
A 4th Parachute Battalion was formed on 2 April 1943 under Lieutenant Colonel Marcellus J. Howard, but the battalion remained in training status until it was disbanded on 19 January 1944.
In early September 1943, Allied headquarters directed several reconnaissance patrols to Choiseul to gather intelligence on Japanese dispositions, force concentrations, and their normal patrol activity. The reconnaissance patrols involved clandestine elements of the New Zealand armed forces, US Marines, and US Navy personnel. These units operated for several days in the southwestern part of the island and in the northwest. Contact was made with coast watchers seeking suitable sites for airfields and beaches capable of landing operations. From these missions, it was determined that the terrain was unsuited for dropping troops by air and if troops were landed at all, it would require an amphibious operation. Owing to numerous coral reefs off shore there were very few beaches on the island suitable for an amphibious assault —but one of these was at Voza, the site of an abandoned village.
After being transported to Guadalcanal for pre-combat assignments, the 1st Parachute Regiment was moved to Vella Lavella. While encamped, the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Parachute Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Victor H. Krulak, was summoned to the I Marine Amphibious Corps headquarters on Guadalcanal. He was advised of an impending operation on the island of Bougainville, scheduled to begin on 1 November 1943. Krulak’s mission was to lead a raiding force onto the island of Choiseul and create as great a disturbance as possible in order to confuse the enemy and mask the true location of the main assault. Upon return to Vella Lavella to plan his operation, he was aided by Australian coast watchers who provided vital information on enemy forces and dispositions.
Krulak’s operation consisted of three rifle companies reinforced by a communications platoon, a regimental weapons detachment, and a detachment from an experimental rocket platoon. In total, the force would consist of 30 officers and 626 men. 2nd Parachute Battalion was loaded into four fast transports and departed Vella Lavella in the evening of 27 October 1943, landing unopposed near Voza. Krulak led his men about a mile inland and set up a base camp. On 28 and 29 October, patrols were sent out to reconnoiter Japanese positions at Sangigai to the southeast and along the Warrior River in the north.
The attack on Sangigai began at around 11:00 on 30 October when Company E opened fire on the Japanese garrison there. The Japanese quickly retreated toward the mountains directly into the path of Company F which had executed an envelopment of the village, flanking the enemy position. Company E immediately moved into the village, secured it, and destroyed all buildings and facilities, a barge, and around 180 tons of supplies. By 0800 the next morning, the raiders had returned to their base camp having lost 6 Marines killed in action, 12 wounded (including Krulak) while killing 75 Japanese soldiers.
A second raiding party under Major Warner T. Bigger was sent north to Nukiki and then overland to the Warrior River. This group mortared Japanese installations on nearby Guppy Island, which started several large fires. After encountering stiff enemy resistance, the party was withdrawn by landing craft. Krulak continued to send out patrols on 1 and 2 November. By 3 November, the Japanese recognized that the American force was small and began to close in on the beachhead and after laying minefields and booby traps, Krulak’s battalion was withdrawn during the night of 3-4 November.
On 22 November 1943, the 1st Parachute Battalion under Major Richard Fagan embarked 23 officers and 596 Marines on four infantry landing craft (also, LCIs), and headed for Bougainville. The battalion arrived off Empress Augusta Bay on 23 November and after going ashore, the battalion went into reserve under I Amphibious Corps, being administratively attached to the 2nd Raider Regiment. Four days later, 1st Parachute Battalion was task organized (reinforced by Company M of the 3rd Raider Battalion and an artillery forward observer team from the 12th Marines) for a raid on Japanese supply facilities near Koiari, south of Cape Torokina.
The movement of 1st Parachute Battalion from Cape Torokina to Koiari took about an hour by LCI. Fagan intended to come ashore some distance from the Japanese supply depot and approach the enemy from the rear, but it was soon discovered that the landing had taken place in the center of the supply depot tactical zone. The Marines quickly formed a defensive perimeter, as they were surrounded on three sides by Japanese forces and had their backs to the sea. A fierce battle raged for several hours. With casualties mounting and ammunition running low, Fagan requested to be withdrawn. Shortly before 18:00, three destroyers arrived offshore and began delivering artillery support to the flanks of the beleaguered battalion. Naval gunfire was augmented by 155-mm howitzers from Cape Torokina. Thus, protected on three sides by artillery fire, Fagan was able to load his Marines on rescue boats. 1st Parachute Battalion suffered 15 killed in action (KIA), 99 wounded, and 7 Marines unaccounted for.
On 3 December, the 1st Parachute Battalion was joined by its parent regiment (less the 2nd Battalion), which two days later was sent to occupy a forward position of the 3rd Marine Division front. During this time, the Marines were under constant attack and harassment by Japanese forces. On 10 December, the parachute Marines were withdrawn and replaced by the 9th Marines and 21st Marines and moved into Division reserve. On 22 December 1st Parachute Battalion, the regimental weapons company, and a platoon from H&S Company were attached to the 2nd Raider Regiment as a relief for the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines (1/3) near Eagle Creek. This unit was later relieved by the 132nd Infantry Regiment of the Americal Division on 11 January 1944.
By mid-January 1944, all parachute battalions were embarked aboard troop transport ships for return to the United States. The Marine Corps was in the process of creating six (6) infantry divisions and five (5) aircraft wings, circumstances that could not justify retaining specialized battalions such as Raider or Parachute battalions/regiments. Beyond this, none of the battle areas in the central and south Pacific region lent themselves to parachute drops, with the exception of one combat drop at Tagaytay Ridge in the Philippines, which was successfully conducted by the U. S. Army’s 11th Airborne Division in 1945. With this one exception, all US parachute units normally fought as regular infantry organizations.
There were four essential factors to explain why, after spending the time and money to train Marines as parachutists, they were never used in that capacity. As previously stated, island terrain simply did not lend itself to a successful airdrop insertion of combat troops, nor were there a sufficient land-based staging area for parachutists or aircraft. Next, the Marine Corps did not have sufficient aircraft to airlift more than a single battalion; it would have taken six squadrons of transport aircraft to accomplish the movement of two parachute regiments. Finally, the distances between suitable rear area staging areas and forward area combat zones exceeded the range of fully loaded transport aircraft.
The parachute battalions were always a “luxury” that the Marine Corps could ill-afford (the costs of training, specialized equipment, etc.) but they had certainly made noteworthy contributions to the Pacific war and their professionalism brought credit to the reputation of the Marine Corps. This would all become apparent a year later when many of these disbanded units were rolled into the newly created 5th Marine Division, which went ashore during the Battle of Iwo Jima.
Note: Parachute qualified Marines continue to serve in limited numbers, either as members of reconnaissance units or as members of the Raider Battalion community, brought back into active service in 2014.
- Hoffman, J. T. Silk Chutes and Hard Fighting: USMC Parachutes Units in World War II. Washington: USMC Historical Division, (1999).
- Johnstone, J. H. USMC Parachute Units. Washington: USMC Historical Division, (1961).
 The light tank, M-3 (unofficially, M3 Stuart) was named for J. E. B. Stuart of Civil War fame.
 The initial construction of this airfield was begun by the Japanese Imperial Army; after it was seized by Allied forces, the airfield was renamed in honor of Major Lofton Henderson, USMC, Commanding Officer of VMSB-241, who was killed during the Battle of Midway —the first Marine Corps aviator killed in the battle.
 Lieutenant General Krulak served at the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific from 1 March 1964 to 1968. Krulak’s son Charles served as the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1995-1999.
 Bougainville Island is the principal island of Papua New Guinea and the largest of the Solomon Islands archipelago. It is named after the French explorer Louis Antoine de Bougainville discovered some time in 1768.
 Voza is located along the coast of Choiseul Island northwest of the village of Sangigai. The island itself runs 75 miles in length and up to 25 miles in width at its widest point.
 One of the patrol boats providing security for Krulak’s force was commanded by a young lieutenant by the name of John F. Kennedy.
5 thoughts on “Airborne Marines”
The fact that the Marine parachutists never made a jump reminds me of a training exercise I participated in with A/1/8, with Captain Tracy, a Mustang, as the skipper. As the Company radio operator, I was told to get on the horn and find out when the helicopters would be arriving. When I informed Captain Tracy that Battalion had responded that our transport had been changed to trucks, he says “We’re supposed to be the G-D helo-insertion force, guess we’ll be flown in on good old CH- Forty Six By Sixes”. His Marines didn’t call him “Mad Dog Tracy” without reason. Semper Fi.
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An excellently detailed article on these men. Thank you.
As I read this well documented history of airborne Marines, the thought that crossed this civilian’s mind was, “I didn’t know Marines dropped in on the Japanese”. I was aware of the 11th A/B (US Army through GPCox) but as I read into your report, I realized these brave young boys did exactly what they trained for sans the silk.
Your summary at the end captured the essence as to why there were no drops during the hellish three years after Pearl. The lack of available aircraft needed to execute such operations is now clear… but I always truly wondered how parachutists could drop into dense jungle without high casualties. Well, jumping into any enemy territory would not have appealed to this civilian in any way.
Your report shows a 40% washout rate. A a bit of trivia, there were Nisei paratroopers in the 11th A/B whose job was to translate once on the battlefield. Of the 25 Nisei who volunteered, 23 earned their jump wings – a 8% washout rate. Of course, your response would be the Army takes anybody. 🙂
Thank you for this bit of unique lost history.
Do you know when the last successful parachute assault of battalion size or bigger was made – by any army- ? NEVER. Think about North Africa, Sicily, Normandy for the Americans. How about A Bridge Too Far for the Brits. The Luftwaffe controlled. The Fallshirmjaeger for the Germans. After the disaster at Crete they never jumped again. Small groups for raiding using stealth and get the hell out quick does work, but big units is an assured disaster.
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I’m not going to jump out of a perfectly good airplane. Especially with a full weapons load. ;^)
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