Military and naval officers serve at the pleasure of the President of the United States. The President nominates officers for advancement (confirmation is required by the United States Senate), and depending on their seniority, it is the President who approves their assignments . Whenever an officer cannot, in good faith, serve the President, two things must occur: an officer with integrity must either resign his or her commission, or the President must relieve them from their duty assignment and send them away (either into retirement or reassign them to another duty). Generally, there are two reasons for presidential dismissal: insubordination, or professional disgrace (such as suffering considerable losses in war) .
James O. Richardson was born in Paris, Texas. He entered the United States Naval Academy in 1898 and graduated fifth in his class in 1902. His first assignment placed him in the Asiatic Squadron where he participated in the Philippine Campaign with later assignment to the Atlantic Squadron. Between 1907-09, while serving as a lieutenant, he was assigned command of the torpedo boats Tingey and Stockton, and later commanded the Third Division of the Atlantic Torpedo flotilla. Between 1909-11, he attended the Navy’s post-graduate Engineer School, then served as an engineer on the battleship USS Delaware. He was promoted to lieutenant commander and received an assignment to the Navy Department where he was charged with supervising the Navy’s store of fuel.
Promoted to commander, Richardson served as a navigator and executive officer of the battleship USS Nevada between 1917-19. Between 1919-22, Richardson was assigned to the Naval Academy as an instructor. In 1922, the Navy assigned Richardson command of the gunboat USS Asheville. Under his leadership, Asheville was dispatched to Asiatic waters where he also commanded a division of ships assigned to the South China Patrol. After his promotion to Captain, Richardson was reassigned to Washington from 1924-27, where he served as Assistant Chief, Bureau of Ordnance —afterward commanding a destroyer division of the Atlantic Squadron and then returning to Washington for service with the Bureau of Navigation.
In 1931, Captain Richardson took charge of the new heavy cruiser USS Augusta and commander her for two years. After attending the Naval War College (1933-34), he was promoted to Rear Admiral (Lower Half) and rejoined the Navy Department as its budget officer. His first command as a flag officer was the scouting force, cruiser division, Atlantic Squadron. He then served as an aide and chief of staff to Admiral J. M. Reeves, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and afterward as Commander, Destroyer Scouting Force. In 1937, he became Assistant Chief of Naval Operations under Admiral William D. Leahy. In this position, he coordinated the search for Amelia Earhart and dealt with the Japanese attack on the USS Panay. In 1938, Richardson assumed the duties as Chief, Bureau of Navigation and aided in the development of Plan Orange . In June 1939, Admiral Richardson took command of the Battle Force, US Fleet, with temporary promotion to the rank of admiral.
In January 1940, Richardson was assigned as Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet . According to journalist John Flynn , Admiral Richardson was one of the Navy’s foremost flag officers —a man who had made the study of Japanese warfare his life’s work and an outstanding authority on naval warfare in the Pacific and Japanese naval strategy.
One will note that in the 1930s, the European powers were moving rapidly toward another world war and Japan was rapidly increasing its power and prestige in Asia. The Sino-Japanese conflict in Asia continued unabated. In the United States, resulting from a lack of attention and funding, the army and navy were in a shamble. For the navy specifically, new ships, while ordered, were still under construction. In 1937-38, the United States was not ready for either of the world’s emerging conflicts; should something happen before new ships came online, the USN would have limited effectiveness in a two-ocean war. The organization of the United States fleet in 1939 reflects the Navy’s overall unreadiness for war. To correct this deficiency, the Navy began to re-commission ships from the mothball fleet, some of which were turned over to the British as part of the Lend-Lease Program.
In this environment, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet to move the Pacific Fleet from San Diego, California to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. His purpose in making this decision was to “restrain” Japanese naval activities in the Pacific Ocean Area. Roosevelt made this decision without asking Admiral Richardson (who not only had responsibility for the US Fleet, but also a broad base of knowledge about Japanese naval warfare) for his opinion. Admiral Richardson was not a happy sailor.
Admiral Richardson protested Roosevelt’s decision. He not only took his concern directly to the president; he went to other power brokers in Washington, as well. Richardson did believe that advance bases in Guam and Hawaii were necessary, but inadequate congressional funding over many years made these advance bases insufficient to a war time mission. Richardson firmly believed that future naval conflicts would involve enemy aircraft carriers; to detect these threats, the US Navy would require an expanded surface and aviation scouting force.
Admiral Richardson was worried because he realized how vulnerable the US Fleet would be in such an exposed, vulnerable, and exposed location as Pearl Harbor. Moreover, he knew that logistical support of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor would be a nightmare, made worse by slim resources and an inadequate logistical organizational structure. Admiral Richardson believed that Roosevelt’s decision was impractical and strategically inept —that Roosevelt had no business offering US naval support to Great Britain when in fact the US Navy was barely able to stand on its own two feet. It was also true that the Navy had little in the way of adequate housing, materials, or defensive systems at Pearl Harbor. What Admiral Richardson wanted was to prepare the fleet for war at San Diego. Then, once it was ready for war, the Navy could return to Pearl Harbor.
Most of the Navy’s admirals agreed with Richardson —the Pacific Fleet should never berth inside Pearl Harbor where it would become a sitting duck for enemy (Japanese) attack. Admiral Richardson believed that Pearl harbor was the logical first choice of the Japanese high command for an attack on the United States because Pearl Harbor was America’s nearest “advanced base.” Since the 1930s, the US Navy had conducted several training exercises against the Army’s defenses at Pearl Harbor; in each episode, the Navy proved that Pearl Harbor did not lend itself to an adequate defense. Richardson communicated this information to President Roosevelt.
He also informed the President that, in his studied opinion, the United States Navy was not ready for war with Japan. When Richardson’s views were leaked to the Washington press, President Roosevelt fired him. On 1 February 1941, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel replaced Richardson as Commander, US Pacific Fleet, and Admiral Ernest J. King replaced Richardson as Commander of the US Atlantic Fleet. Fired by the President of the United States, Richardson reverted to Rear Admiral and served as a member of the Navy General Board until his retirement in October 1942.
Admiral Richardson predicted war with Japan and where the Japanese would strike. What the admiral knew ended up getting him fired from high command. It is my opinion that Admiral Richardson’s story tells us much about Franklin D. Roosevelt.
- Richardson, J. O. On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral J. O. Richardson, as told to Admiral George C. Dyer, Vice Admiral, USN (Retired). Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 1973
- Steely, S. Pearl Harbor Countdown: The Biography of Admiral James O. Richardson. Gretna: Pelican Press, 2008
 Permanent flag rank ends at major general/rear admiral (upper half). Advancements beyond major general/rear admiral (paygrade 08) are temporary assignments (lieutenant general/general, vice admiral/admiral). A major general who assigned as a corps commander will be temporarily advanced to lieutenant general for as long as he or she serves in that billet. Should this officer retire from active service after three years, he or she will revert to permanent grade of major general (although he or she may be entitled to a higher rate of pay on the retired list under the “high 36” pay scale for flag rank officers).
 The first officer charged with treason was Brigadier General Benedict Arnold of the Continental Army. During the War of 1812, Brigadier General William Hull, US Army, was court-martialed for cowardice in the face of the enemy. Hull was sentenced to death, but President Madison remitted the sentence owing to his former “good” service. President Lincoln fired several generals for their failure to win battles, Franklin Roosevelt fired several, Harry Truman famously fired Douglas MacArthur, Jimmy Carter fired Major General John K. Singlaub, George Bush fired three generals, and Barack Obama fired several.
 Plan Orange was a series of contingency operational plans involving joint Army-Navy operations against the Empire of Japan. Plan Orange failed to foresee the significance of technological changes to naval warfare, including submarine, the importance of air support, and the importance of the employment of aircraft carriers. Part of the navy’s plan was an island-hopping campaign, which was actually used during World War II. Note: the Japanese, who were obsessed with the “decisive battle,” ignored the need for a defense against submarines.
 The organization of the U. S. Navy has changed considerably since the 1900s. In 1923, the North Atlantic Squadron was reorganized into the US Scouting Forces, which (along with the US Pacific Fleet) was organized under the United States Fleet. In January 1939, the Atlantic Squadron, US Fleet was formed. On 1 November 1940, the Atlantic Squadron was renamed Patrol Force, which was organized into “type” commands: battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and training/logistical commands. Then, early in 1941, Patrol Force was renamed US Atlantic Fleet. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet exercised command authority over both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. At that time, the Chief of Naval Operations was responsible for navy organization, personnel, and support of the fleet—and administrative rather than having any operational responsibility.
 The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor, 1945.