Month: December 2019

Preface 

Tinian is a 12 mile long by 6 mile wide island three miles off the southern coast of Saipan.  It isn’t as rugged as Saipan, but almost completely encircled by tall cliffs which vary anywhere from six to 100 feet.  Its proximity to Saipan, its 9,000 Japanese defenders, and its suitability for a large air base made the island a target for capture and pacification.  Tinian thus became the next mission assigned to V Amphibious Corps.  General Smith was replaced by the former 4^th Marine Division commander, Harry Schmidt [Note 1].

Preparations

For 43 days beginning on 11 June 1944, the U. S. Navy began a sustained campaign of bombing Tinian.  Army and Marine Corps artillery batteries, firing from the southern tip of Saipan, joined the assault on 20 June firing, in total, more than 24,000 rounds of 155 mm ammunition.  V Amphibious Corps scheduled an invasion for 24 July 1944.  The troops would go ashore on two narrow beaches on the northwestern side of the island.  The 2^nd Marine Division would make a feint toward the southwest coast in order to prevent the Japanese from reinforcing the actual landing site.

Even a feint can produce a lethal result.  At dawn on 24 July, a navy convoy with seven transports appeared on the horizon off the coast of Tinian town.  The 2^nd and 8^th Marines loaded into landing craft, rendezvoused at a point four miles offshore and began their feint.  At about 2,000 yards, the Japanese opened fire with large calibre mortars.  The landing craft turned about and headed back out to sea.  Japanese 6-inch shore batteries then opened up on the USS Colorado (BB-45) and the USS Norman Scott (DD-690).  Colorado was hit 22 times within 15 minutes, Norman Scott received six rounds.  In total, navy casualties exceeded 60 killed and 240 wounded.  The Marines suffered no casualties.

The Battle

The feint landing force was re-embarked and headed to join the 4^th Marine Division by 1100.  By this time, the 4^th division was already ashore.  The 2^nd division came in behind them, with 1/8 the first battalion ashore.  Because it was late in the day, 1/8 went into reserve for the 4^th Marine Division; the rest of the 2^nd Marine Division would come ashore the next day.  The Japanese assaulted the American perimeter three times during that night.

Colonel Wallace [Note 2] and the 8^th Marines headquarters came ashore just after dawn the next morning, the balance of his regiment following later in the day.  The Japanese attempted to counter these landing operations through sporadic and ineffective artillery fire.

Once the 8^th Marines was again intact, the battalions moved out of the perimeter to expand the beachhead.  The 8^th Marines primary objective was Ushi Point, the northern-most peninsula.  At first, the regiment experienced no opposition, but this changed as the Marines worked their way over the gnarled and rocky terrain.  Enemy snipers and machine gun fire sent the Marines into cover and the advance came to a standstill late in the morning when 1/8 came into contact with a company of Japanese riflemen.  The Marines flanked the enemy and they were soon neutralized.  After the regiment moved forward once again, 2/8 set the pace to the airfield at Ushi Point.  Upon arrival, the 8^th Marines tied in with 1/24 and the Marines went into  bivouac.   

The regiment moved against the airfield on the next morning only to find it abandoned with the wreckage of Japanese aircraft strewn along the landing strip—the result of the Navy’s bombardments.  1/8 and 2/8 proceeded to the east coast, confirming that the enemy had departed the area.  8^th Marines then went into Corps reserve and saw little enemy action for the next few days.  A typhoon slammed the island on 28 July and the Marines remained soaking wet for the next two days.

By the end of the month, Marines had cleared the northern end of the island; the Japanese had relocated south.  The 2^nd Marine Division moved south to join the 4^th in pursuit of the enemy.  The 8^th Marines was ordered to support the right flank of the 2^nd division’s front.  By the end of the day, the 8^th Marines were in place and the men went into bivouac.

By the next morning, the Japanese were compressed within a small area on the southern end of Tinian.  The navy launched a massive bombardment; within two hours, 625 tons of munitions had been lobbed into the Japanese position.  When the firing stopped, the Marines moved out and confront whatever remained of the entrapped Japanese.

In the 2^nd Marine Division’s front was a cliff where some number of Japanese had taken refuge.  Colonel Wallace directed 1/8 (LtCol Lawrence C. Hays [Note 3]) and 3/8 (LtCol Gavin C. Humphrey) to assault this position, 2/8 (LtCol Lane C. Kendall) following in trace mopping up isolated pockets of the enemy.  8^th Marines’ forward units reached the base of a massif at around noon with elements of the 4^th division on their right.  3/8 was ordered to scale the heights where there were several caves and crevices masked by dense foliage.  From these positions, the Japanese directed intense fire down upon the Marines.  The navy’s bombardment had not done its job and 3/8 was pulled back.

Meanwhile, 1/8 had started its own ascent, their forward movement continuing despite heavy Japanese fire.  Two platoons made it to the top of the massif at around 1630.  Colonel Wallace directed 3/8 to continue his assault.  At 1700, Kendall moved up to support Humphrey.  Meanwhile, three companies of Hays’ battalion had pushed their way to the top of the cliff.  As Kendall moved his 2^nd battalion into position to follow in trace, the Japanese launched a strong infantry assault on Echo Company, forcing 2/8 to assume a defensive perimeter for the night.

That night, the Japanese initiated several probing assaults to discover weaknesses in the Marine line.  Contact between Hays and Humphrey was lost.  Just after midnight, the Japanese infiltrated a large group of soldiers behind the Marine positions and launched an attack against Kendall’s 2/8.  The Marines drove the Japanese back and then launched a counter-attack killing most of the infiltrators.  Colonel Wallace requested reinforcements.  The division commander ordered 3/6 to move up at 0320 to support the 8^th Marines.  Artillery was assigned fire missions on the hill.  

At 0515, six-hundred Japanese soldiers and sailors assaulted the 8^th Marines.  Kendall’s battalion was hardest hit, and Echo Company took the brunt of the attack.  The enemy failed to penetrate the Marine’s lines, but again, Echo Company was nearly overrun in a fanatical banzai charge.  Echo Company’s survival was likely the result of two 37mm guns employed with canister shot into the enemy assault.  When the Japanese withdrew, they left behind 200 dead.  8^th Marines suffered 74 killed and wounded.

Hardest hit, Kendall’s battalion went into reserve.  At daybreak, Humphrey made his way to the top of the cliff and linked up with Hays’ battalion and 3/6.  Kendall’s 2/8 reached the top a short while later.  From this position, the Marines discovered a large body of Japanese and Korean civilians hiding in the caves. 

Tinian was declared secure on 1 August 1944, but there did remain surviving pockets of Japanese enemy who had no intention of surrendering.  The 8^th Marines assumed sole responsibility for finding and dealing with Japanese holdouts.  This task kept Hays’ 1/8 busy for the rest of the year.  Between 1 August and 1 January 1945, an additional 500 Japanese were killed; the Marines lost 38 killed and suffered 125 wounded in action routing them out —which was approximately half the total casualties suffered by the 8^th Marines during the actual operation.

In total, the Americans suffered 1,900 casualties on Tinian.  The Japanese dead came to 5,500.

The United States began constructing a B-29 air base at Tinian almost immediately.  The atomic weapons dropped on the Japanese homeland were launched from Tinian.  But in January 1945, the war was far from over.

Next week: Okinawa

Sources:

1. Santelli, J. S.  A Brief History of the 8^th Marines.  Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, USMC, 1976
2. Rottman, G. L.  U. S. Marine Corps World War II Order of Battle, 1939-45.  Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002
3. Rottman, G. L. And Howard Gerrard.  Saipan and Tinian 1944.  Oxford: Osprey Publishing 2004.
4. Potter, E. B. And Chester Nimitz.  Sea Power: A Naval History.  Prentice Hall, 1960.

Endnotes:

1. General Schmidt (1886-1968) (known as Dutch to his friends) was commissioned a second lieutenant on 17 August 1909.  In a career spanning nearly 40 years, Schmidt served at sea, in South and Central America, and China.  As Commanding General, 4^th Marine Division and Commander, Fifth Amphibious Corps, he led Marines at Kwajalein, Saipan, Tinian, and Iwo Jima.  He was awarded the Navy Cross, Navy Distinguished Service Medal (3), Legion of Merit, and Bronze Star Medal (with combat V device).
2. Gerald R. Wallace (1897-1988) received his commission as a Marine after graduation from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1919.  In addition to normal sea service, Wallace served in Haiti, China, and England.  During World War II, he participated in combat operations at Kwajalein, Saipan, and Tinian.  Colonel Wallace was advanced to Brigadier General on the retired list on 30 June 1949.  His military decorations include the Legion of Merit (2) (with combat V device) and the Bronze Star Medal (with combat V device).
3. While serving as a major, Hays was wounded on Tarawa; he participated in the battles of Saipan and Tinian.

Preface

Saipan is an island within the Marianas Island group.  It is 12 miles long and just under 6 miles wide, altogether encompassing around 90 square miles.  Following the Spanish-American War (1898), the United States occupied the island of Saipan, a Spanish-held territory, for a short period of time.  Subsequently, Spain sold the island to Germany in 1899.  Germany administered the island as part of German New Guinea, but there was never any serious attempt to develop of settle the island.  Essentially, control of Saipan remained in the hands of its Spanish/Mestizo landowners.

During World War I, Japan was an ally and therefore an enemy of Germany.  Japan “captured” Saipan and, with appreciation for their participation in World War I, the League of Nations granted to Japan formal control over it.  In time, Saipan became one of Japan’s more important possessions and a place for Japanese settlement beginning in the 1920s.  Extensive sugar plantations were developed and the Japanese began to improve the island’s infrastructure—including port facilities.  In October 1943, the civilian population of Saipan was just under 30,000 Japanese.

During World War II, the Japanese regarded Saipan as one of its last lines of defense of the Japanese homelands and became strongly committed to defending it.  Unhappily for the Empire of Japan, the allied military campaigns of 1943-44 successfully defeated the Imperial Japanese Army in the Solomon Island, Gilbert Islands, Marshall Islands, and on the Papuan Peninsula of New Guinea.  All the Japanese had remaining at this point in the war was the Philippine Islands, the Caroline Islands, the Palau Islands, and the Mariana Islands.

General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area, did not favor Admiral Nimitz’ mid-Pacific island-hopping campaign.  In his opinion, island-hopping was a tragic waste of available manpower.  On the other hand, history reflects that were it not for these bloody campaigns, American air power would have been restricted at a time when it served the interests of the United States to pound the Japanese into submission.

Preparation

After leaving Tarawa, the 8^th Marine Regiment was transported to Hawaii, stopping first at Peal Harbor to off-load the wounded for treatment at military hospitals.  The regiment then proceeded to the big Island of Hawaii for billeting.  Their bivouac site was located 65 miles from the city of Hilo, in the mountainous area between Mauna Kea and Mauna Loa (two active volcanoes).  It was up to the men to construct their own camp, which they did and named Camp Tarawa.  The Island of Hawaii provided these Marines with a much cooler climate than they were used to, but it also helped men still suffering from malaria.  In January 1944, the Commanding General, 2^nd Marine Division ordered his staff to begin working on a training syllabus that would prepare his men for the next combat mission.  Before this could happen, however, the 8^th Marines needed personnel replacements and a refit in uniforms and equipment.

Admiral Nimitz targeted Saipan as the Division’s next operation sometime during the summer of 1944.    Major General Thomas E. Watson [Note 1] replaced Julian C. Smith in April 1944.  Saipan was important to Admiral Nimitz because he judged it as being the key to controlling the central Pacific area.  Capturing Saipan would disrupt Japanese communications with the home islands, and provide air and sea bases for the U. S. Navy.  From Saipan, the United States could strike at Japanese installations in the Philippines, Formosa, China, and even the Japanese home islands.

Once more, Lieutenant General H. M. Smith would command the V Amphibious Corps.  His landing force at Saipan would include the 2^nd Marine Division under General Watson, and the 4^th Marine Division under Major General Harry Schmidt.  Serving in reserve was the US 27^th Infantry Division under Major General Ralph C. Smith.

The terrain features of Saipan range from hilly with rolling plateaus in the eastern and Northern region to narrow coastal flats and at some locations, the rocky hills end abruptly in high cliffs that drop into the sea.  In the southern and western areas, the island is relatively flat.

Japanese defensive structures, while incomplete, were still formidable.  For one thing, the Japanese had learned how to fight a defense-in-depth [Note 2], which is costly to the attacking force.  Meanwhile, US intelligence under-estimated the Japanese strength and calculated it to be around 19,000 men.  In reality, it was closer to 32,000 and every one of these men were committed to give up their life for their Emperor.  

The American expeditionary force began an incremental departure from Hawaii in May 1944.  In total, 110 transport ships were required to carry this force to the Marianas.  Air and naval bombardments began on 11 June, but by now, particularly among the veterans of Tarawa, few Marines had much confidence in the effectiveness of either source; they would not be disappointed.

The 2^nd Marine Division was assigned to assault the beaches just north of Charan Kanoa in the southwestern sector of the island.  The 8^th Marines, now commanded by Colonel Clarence R. Wallace, would assign 2/8 and 3/8 to the initial landing.  As the Navy bombarded the coast shortly before dawn on 15 June, the assault units loaded into LVTs and the tractors aligned themselves for a dash to shore, scheduled for just after 0800.

The Battle is Joined

The command to “land the landing force” came on schedule and the Marines were on their way.  As the amphibian vehicles approached shore, they came under intense fire from Japanese cannons, anti-boat guns, artillery, and mortars.  Many of the tractors were hit and either sunk or were disabled.  Despite these conditions, 8,000 Marines were on the beach in the first twenty minutes.  In the confusion caused by Japanese defensive fires, LVT drivers came ashore in the wrong landing zones.  The entire division assault group landed 400 yards north of their assigned sector.  Moreover, communications with the 4^th Marine Division was disrupted.  By landing the Marines at the wrong beach, there was an accidental massing of troop formations, and these became easy targets for Japanese gunners.

Both 2/8 and 3/8 moved into the attack against a formidable Japanese defense.  At 0950, Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence C. Hays, commanding 1/8 received orders to go ashore.  Two battalions were not enough to expand the perimeter.  1/29 under Lieutenant Colonel Tannyhill was attached to the 8^th Marines for this purpose.  By noon, other Marine units had come ashore and moved inland 1,000 yards.  Marines seized the air strip near Charan Kanoa and a Japanese radio station.  Within the hour, Japanese were battling to stop the Marines.  Heavy fighting near Afetna Point persisted throughout the day.  Golf 2/8 overran Japanese positions and captured seven anti-gun boats.  Given the close proximity of Marine battalions, many Marines were armed with shotguns in order to avoid accidentally hitting fellow-Marines.  Moreover, the shotguns had a wide dispersal pattern and were found more efficient at killing Japanese at close range. 

Confusion during the landing caused the 8^th Marines to fall behind schedule in meeting their objectives.  Making things worse, all three battalion commanders in the regiment were hit during the landing phase.  3/8’s commander was badly wounded by a mortar round; the XO of 3/8 was also wounded.  1/8’s CO was hit with rifle fire on the beach; 2/8’s LtCol Crowe [Note 3] was also wounded, suffering a gunshot wound to his left lung but he initially refused evacuation.  While being examined at the aid station, however, a Japanese mortar round exploded nearby sending fragments into his chest, left arm and shoulder, and right leg.  The obstinate colonel was forcibly removed from the beach.  Command shifted to Major William C. Chamberlin, who also received wounds but continued to exercise control of his battalion.

That night, the Japanese mounted several counter-attacks, but they were weak efforts and more likely designed to keep the Marines awake.  At the end of the first day, the 2^nd Marine Division suffered 1,300 killed or wounded; 300 Marines were reported as missing in action.  The Marines had committed their reserve force and that, along with the number of casualties sustained on the first day, compelled General Smith to commit the Corps Reserve.  Major General Ralph C. Smith [Note 4], commanding the US 27^th Infantry Division, was ordered to land his division.  The division, however, was not fully ashore for another four days.  

On 17 June, the tempo of battle increased for the 8^th Marines when 1/8 and 3/8 began their advance inland and quickly achieved their objectives; 1/29, however ran into stiff resistance in the marsh surrounding Lake Susupe.  Elements of the 4^th Marine Division reached the East coast of Saipan on the 18^th, which severed the island into two parts.  The 2^nd Marine Division prepared to execute a wheeling maneuver to move north.  The 27^th US Infantry Division was assigned the task of mopping up remnants of enemy positions bypassed on Nafutan Point [Note 8].

General Smith ordered V Amphibious Corps to execute a major offensive for 22 June.  Both Marine divisions would participate in the attack with most of the 27^th brought up for additional muscle.  When the operation commenced, 2^nd Marine Division occupied the left flank with the 4^th Marine Division on the right flank.  The 8^th Marines made excellent progress until reaching the lower slopes of Mount Topotchau.  Here, the terrain became rugged and impeded further advance.

Operations commenced again the next day.  The 27^th US Infantry Division was now committed to the center of the Corps’ formation.  Terrain again slowed progress, but there was another problem.  8^th Marines, operating to the right of the Division’s TAOR, lost contact with the 106^th Infantry Regiment, which was assigned to the 8^th Marines’ immediate right.  The Army division’s main attack had been halted in an area that became known as “Death Valley” [Note 5]  It was an area with strong Japanese fortifications.  The 8^th Marines continued their attack, but again, rough terrain slowed their pace.

Colonel Wallace ordered another attack on 25 June: four battalions (including 1/29) pushed forward to achieve the summit.  Now under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Rathvon M. Tompkins [Note 6], 1/29 reached the summit and discovered an exceptional observation post.  Enemy counter-attacks failed to dislodge the Marines.  Below, the balance of the 8^th Marines struggled over the challenging ground.  Enemy riflemen, afforded good cover and concealment, harassed and ambushed the Marines.

On 28^th June, the regiment advanced on three small hills where they met stiff enemy resistance.  As these Marines were exhausted, Colonel Wallace halted the push at 1600.  The next morning, the Marines executed a series of probes to discover enemy defenses and for the next two days searched for a practical route suitable for heavy equipment (tanks).  A path for tanks was found and with their aid two of the hills fell to the Marines.  After smashing the remaining two hills with artillery and rockets, the 8^th Marines enabled the 2^nd Marine Division to proceed in good order to the destroyed city of Garapan, Saipan’s largest.

The 8^th Marines, now consisting of the 1^st and 3^rd battalions and 1/29 made a thrust at Tanapag Harbor.  The terrain was wooded but not prohibitive and the Marines made good use of their tank/infantry coordination.  On 2 July, a Japanese machine gun raked the entire front of 2/8 and 1/29.  Colonel Tompkins fell wounded.  He was replaced by LtCol Jack Juhan, the regimental executive officer.  The Japanese continued to pour fire into Marine positions.  Flame weapons and armor were rushed forward, but the Japanese position could not be defeated.  Ultimately, Wallace decided to bypass the position and continue the advance.  Fox 2/8 was detailed to remain behind to contain the Japanese.  Two days later, the 8^th Marines reached the sea.  General Smith ordered the 2^nd Marine Division into Corps reserve for the rest of the day.

On the night of 6-7 July, 5,000 Japanese launched a banzai charge which nearly overran the entire 105^th Infantry Regiment and spilled over into the lines of the 10^th Marines (artillery).  This bloody fight ended when Marine/Army units were rushed to reinforce the 105^th, but not before the Army experienced yet another 1,000 casualties.  The cost to the Japanese, however, was much higher: 4,000 enemy killed.

The 2^nd Marine Division went back on the line on 8 July to relieve the exhausted 27^th and began a final drive against the shattered Imperial Japanese Army.  The 8^th Marines pushed north and then wheeled inland through the hills, south of Marpi Point, back to Saipan’s northeastern beach.  The maneuver was completed on 9 July and the 8^th Marines joined with the 2^nd Marines, 24^th Marines, 25^th Marines at Marpi Point.  It was here that the Marines witnessed hundreds of Japanese soldiers and civilians leaping to their death from the rock ridges overlooking the sea.  Japanese propaganda had informed these people that they would be tortured and killed if they were captured by the Americans.  It was a horrific event that marked the end of organized enemy resistance on Saipan.  Mopping up operations would take several additional months, however.

The Japanese lost 23,800 killed in action; US experienced 16,500 casualties (killed and wounded).  The 8^th Marines lost 300 killed in action with 1,100 wounded.  Saipan gave the United States its first B-29 base, from which the Japanese home islands were easily reachable.  After the war, Japanese officials acknowledged that Saipan marked the beginning of the end for the Empire of Japan.

Next week: Tinian

Sources:

1. Santelli, J. S.  A Brief History of the 8^th Marines.  Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1976
2. Rottman, G. L.  U. S. Marine Corps World War II Order of Battle, 1939-45.  Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002
3. Rottman, G. L. and Howard Gerrard.  Saipan and Tinian 1944: Piercing the Japanese Empire.  Osprey, 2004
4. Johnson, R.  Follow Me: The Story of the 2^nd Marine Division in World War II.  Canada: Random House, 1948.
5. Potter, E. B. And Chester Nimitz.  Sea Power: A Naval History.  Prentice Hall, 1960.
6. Morison, S. E.  New Guinea and the Marianas, 1944.  A History of United States Naval Operations in World War II.  Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2001
7. Goldberg, H. J.  D-Day in the Pacific: The Battle of Saipan.  Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2007

Endnotes:

1. Major General Watson (1892-1966) (sometimes referred to as “Terrible Tom” ) served as a US Marine Officer from 1912-50.  He commanded 2/6, 3^rd Brigade, 2^nd Marine Division, and Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific.  He retired in grade as a Lieutenant General.
2. A tactical scheme of mutually supporting positions that are each capable of an all-round defense that have sufficient depth to prevent an enemy from achieving freedom of maneuver.  Strategically, a succession of defended areas permits the continuation of hostilities after forward areas have been lost.
3. See also: The Eighth Marines-Guadalcanal; The Eighth Marines-Tarawa.  LtCol Crowe was one tough old buzzard.
4. Major General Ralph C. Smith, United States Army, (1893-1998) served in World War I and World War II.  He commanded 1^st Battalion, 30^th US Infantry Regiment, 27^th US Infantry Division, and the 98^th US Infantry Division.  His personal decorations include the Silver Star Medal (2), Legion of Merit, and the Purple Heart.  General Smith was a fine officer who unfortunately ran afoul of LtGen “Howling Mad” Smith, his immediate superior at Saipan.  The clash caused problems between the Army and Marine Corps that lasted for many years.
5. “Death Valley” was a result of the conditions explained in Note 2, above.
6. Retired as a Major General.  His command experience included 1/29, 5^th Marines, 2^nd Marine Division, MCRD Parris Island, 3^rd Marine Division, and MCB Camp Lejeune, NC.  He passed away in 1999, aged 87 years.

Preface

In order to establish forward air bases that were capable of supporting land operations across the Pacific to the Philippines and Japan itself, it was necessary that the United States seize the Mariana Islands, which were heavily defended by the Japanese.  To achieve this, war planners in Hawaii determined that they would require land-based aircraft to help weaken Japanese defenses and protect the naval invasion forces.  The nearest islands suitable for land-based aircraft were in the Marshall Islands, which were also held by the Japanese.  Standing in the way was one island in particular.  They called it Betio, on the western side of an atoll named Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands.  In order to seize the Marianas, Marines would first have to snatch Tarawa away from the Japanese.

After Guadalcanal, the 2^nd Marine Division was withdrawn to New Zealand for rest and refit.  In July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington directed Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to prepare plans for an offensive operation in the Gilbert Islands.  Within a few weeks, Admiral Spruance flew to New Zealand to meet with the new commander of the 2^nd Marine Division, Major General Julian Smith.  The Battle of Tarawa would involve the V Amphibious Corps (Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith), which at the time included both the 2^nd Marine Division and the US 27^th Infantry Division.  The 2^nd Marine Division (18,000 men) would attack Betio; the US 27^th Infantry Division would seize Makin Island.

Holding Tarawa was the Japanese 3^rd Special Base Defense Force (formerly designated 6^th Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force) and the 7^th Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force [Note 2].  In total, the US Marines would face off against 2,636 Japanese troops, 14 tanks, 40 artillery pieces, 14 naval guns, and they would encounter an additional 2,200 construction laborers.  

Betio Island is located about 2,400 miles southwest of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.  It is the largest island in the atoll, positioned at the southernmost area of its lagoon.  Most of the Japanese defenders were located at Betio.  The Island is two miles long, and at its widest point, 800 yards.

In August 1942, Lieutenant Evans Carlson [Note 3] led his Marine Raiders in a diversionary assault at Makin Island.  The unforeseen consequences of this operation was that the raid made the Japanese aware of the vulnerability and strategic significance of the Gilbert Islands.  Accordingly, the Japanese began a vigorous effort to reinforce the Gilberts and assigned Rear Admiral Tomonari Saichiro (an experienced engineer) to direct the construction of defensive structures at Betio.  Admiral Tomonari’s plan was to stop any attackers at the water or pin them down on the beaches.  Accordingly, he constructed a series of pill boxes at locations that afforded the Japanese defenders with exceptional fields of fire over the water and across the sandy shoreline.  Tomonari’s construction efforts lasted for over a year.  Admiral Tomonari was eventually replaced by Rear Admiral Keiji Shibazaki, who boasted that it would take one-million men one-hundred years to conquer Tarawa.

Preparations

Once the 2^nd Marine Division received replacement arms and munitions, a series of training exercises were begun to get the Marines back in shape and to integrate replacements.  This training did not begin until September 1943, however.  What was needed was to transition the Marines from experienced jungle fighters into amphibious assault troops.  The code name for the upcoming operation was GALVANIC [Note 4]. 

During mid-September 1943, 2^nd Marine Division was assigned to the operational control of the V Amphibious Corps and tasked with supplying the assault force for GALVANIC.  Holland M. Smith and Julian C. Smith (not related) anticipated that wresting the island of Betio away from the Japanese would be a difficult task.  The division commander had to place his operation together with only two regiments, since the 6^th Marines had been removed from the 2^nd Marine Division and placed under V Amphibious Corps as its reserve force.  Both of these Marine Corps generals realized that Betio was a fortress; they both realized that they would be facing a vicious and determined enemy.

On 7 November 1943, the men of the 8^th Marines were riding at anchor off the New Hebrides Islands.  When the departed New Zealand, no one knew anything about where they were going; now, however, the Marines knew what they were getting ready to do, and why.  Landing exercises were completed by 13 November; the next day, the Marines were on their way to hell on earth.

The American invasion force arrived off Betio before dawn on 20 November.  At 0500, the Japanese welcomed them with their shore batteries; the US battleships Colorado and Maryland answered.  The battle had begun.  As the navy battled with Japanese artillery, the Marines began to board their landing craft.  The initial unit to land at Red Beach 3 would be 2^nd Battalion, 8^th Marines (2/8), then commanded by Major Henry Pierson Crowe [Note 5] (formerly the commander of Weapons Company, 8^th Marines).  Two additional assault battalions were 2/2 and 3/2.  The three battalions formed Combat Team 2 with Colonel David M. Shoup [Note 6] (Commanding 2^nd Marines) in overall command.  The landing force bobbed around in the sea for four hours while naval gunfire and aviators bombed and staffed Japanese positions.

The initial landing force were loaded into the new Landing Vehicle Track (LVT).  As these were in short supply, follow-on units were landed by Higgins boats (Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel, or LCVPs).  As the LCVPs drew three feet of water, getting Marines over the offshore reefs was a concern, but the Marines, in planning the operation, did not have adequate knowledge of tidal conditions off Betio Island.  The Marines designated for the LCVPs were advised that they may have to exit the craft and wade into shore.  This is, in fact, what happened.  As a consequence, many Marines never reached the shore line; the Japanese cut them to pieces with automatic weapons.

The first wave went ashore at approximately 0900.  The preselected landing  sites were on the lagoon side of the island for two reasons: (1) the heaviest concentration of enemy weapons was on the sea side, and (2) because of heavy swells rolling in from the ocean.  2/8 landed east of a long pier that jutted out into the lagoon near the tail of the island.  1/8 and 3/8 were placed in reserve.  2/2 and 3/2 went ashore west of the pier.   

2/8 landed at approximately 0917 and were immediately engaged by Japanese defenders.  Up until that point, casualties had been light, but once the Marines exited their LVTs, and struggled to get beyond the beach, losses increased dramatically.  E/2/8 [Note 7] lost five of its six officers within minutes of landing.  Devastating enemy fire prevented Major Crowe from seizing the air strip; his Marines were forced to dig in and hold their positions.  The Marines realized that the navy’s four-hour long preparatory fires had little to no effect on the Japanese defenses.

Shortly after coming ashore, two Japanese tanks rumbled toward the 2/8 position.  Major Crowe braved enemy fire to direct his men to move two 37mm guns into position to confront the tanks.  The Marines fired these weapons at point blank range, killing one tank as the other scurried back to wherever it had come from.

Holding the beach head on Betio rested in good measure with Major Crowe and 2/8 because his battalion landed in organized formations.  In contrast to this, 2/2 and 3/2 had both sustained a substantial number of killed and wounded in their movement to shore.  Among those killed was the Battalion Commander 2/2, Lieutenant Colonel Herbert R. Amey.  Shoup had to rely on 2/8 to defend the beach head, but also expand its perimeter.  Four hundred yards separated 2/8 from the 2^nd Marines.  In the struggle to get past the Japanese obstacles, one platoon from F/2/8 was completely wiped out.

Major General J. C. Smith realized that it was time to send in additional Marines.  When 3/8 came ashore, its survivors were attached to Crowe’s battalion.  2/8 still could not push past the pier.  Four tanks came to the aid of 2/8 but three of these were destroyed.  By nightfall, the Marines of 2/8 and 3/8 were dying, not for yards, but for inches of Betio sand.  Shoup and Crowe fully expected a Japanese counter-attack after sundown, but such an assault never took place.  Apparently, the Japanese were unaware of how precarious the Marine positions were.

Smith had intended to land the rest of the 8^th Marines on the afternoon of 20 November (consisting of the Regimental headquarters and 1/8), and while the Marines were ready to execute their assault, the regimental commander, Colonel Elmer E. Hall, never received the order to proceed ashore.  As a result, these Marines bobbed at sea for more than 12 hours.  Many of these Marines were sea sick and so nauseous as to make them ineffective for combat.  The delay in receiving the order to land was later attributed to the fog of war when the Division’s staff were unsure of where any of the 8^th Marine’s units were located.  Moreover, Colonel Hall and his first battalion were confused with elements of the 10^th Marines. Finally, Hall received his landing instructions: land west of the pier and attack westward toward the 2^nd Marines sector.

The first wave of 1/8 reached the reef at 0615 on 21 November and were immediately taken under fire by Japanese defense with automatic weapons and artillery.  Casualties again were high.  By 1400, the majority of the Marines had reached the shore line and were in the thick of the fighting.  Major Hays, commanding 1/8, was able to report that his men had succeeded in destroying several Japanese positions, and had isolated several groups of Japanese defenders.

Meanwhile, 2/8 continued in its slug-fest with the enemy at the base of the pier.  Shoup ordered Crowe to make another effort to reduce the Japanese fortifications.  Fox company advanced against two fortifications (a pillbox to its immediate front, and a bunker to its right-front).  Japanese reinforcing fires halted the Marines.  Additional support from Golf Company proved fruitless.  3/8, on Fox company’s right, could not advance.  Colonel Shoup’s doubt about the success of the assault continued into the second day.  His message to Smith was, “Casualties many.  Percentage of dead not known.  Combat efficiency—we are winning.” 

1/6 under the command of Major William K. Jones, was ordered ashore with instructions to land on the east side of Betio along a beach that had been cleared by 3/2.  1/6 went ashore at 1855 with little Japanese opposition.  Jones did not advance that night, but waited until the next morning’s scheduled general attack.

At 0700 on 22 November, 1/8 struck westward against strong enemy fortifications, supported by three tanks, but not even point-blank firing could penetrate enemy pill boxes and barricades.  Additional support to 1/8 was provided by Weapons Company, 2^nd Marines: two 75mm pack howitzers quickly reduced to only one.  1/8 remained thwarted by Japanese defenses.  While Bravo company applied pressure to the Japanese positions, Alpha and Charlie companies moved to outflank the Japanese.  Succeeding, the Japanese attempted a counter-attack, but it was quickly defeated.  With nightfall, Major Hays had his battalion deployed in a semi-circle around the Japanese strongpoint—thereby establishing a blocking force to prevent Japanese escape.

At this point three Japanese strongholds stood in the way of the 2/8 and 3/8: a steel pillbox, a coconut log emplacement, and a large bombproof shelter.  As preparations were underway for a continuation of the attack, supporting mortars lobbed shells at the entrenched enemy.  One of these shells detonated a supply of ammunition, which blew the bunker apart.  Concurrently, a Marine tank took the pillbox under fire with 75mm rounds.  Fox and Kilo companies began their advance.  Bitter fighting evolved with Marines employing flame throwers and satchel charges on the Japanese bombproof structure.  The Japanese then launched a counter-attack and fell to overwhelming Marine fire.  Within a few moments, more than 100 Japanese soldiers had been killed.

2/8 forged ahead with its attack until it reached the enemy airfield and halted, not want to be come under the fire of 1/6.  Crowe ordered his Marines to dig in and await the possibility of an enemy counter-attack, which did occur in the evening.  Their assault was mainly focused on the 6^th Marines, but artillery and naval gunfire destroyed the Japanese.

On the morning of 23 November, the fourth day, the 8^th Marines (less 1/8) stood down and were moved to the nearby island of Bairiki which had previously been secured by the 6^th Marines.  On Betio, the Marine advance continued.  1/8 engaged Japanese forces on the northern shore.  Augmented with flame throwers, the battalion made good progress and linked up with 3/2 at 1000.  1/8 and 3/2 surrounded the pillboxes and the Japanese occupants were defeated.  

A half hour later, Major General Julian C. Smith declared the island was in American hands and there being no further Japanese resistance.  Nevertheless, a mopping up operation lasted through 24 November.  Betio Island was a shambles; American and Japanese dead littered the landscape; the stench was overwhelming and it was necessary to inter the American and Japanese dead as soon as possible.  Currently, an effort is underway to recover the American dead, identify them, and return their remains to their loved ones/descendants —76 years later.

Of the total Japanese military assigned to the garrison at Betio (2,636), and the civilian construction workers (2,200—of which included 1,200 Koreans and 1,000 Japanese), 4,690 were killed (either by lethal American military action, or their own hand).  Only 146 enemy soldiers/construction workers allowed themselves to be captured.  Of the Marines, 1,100 were killed in action and 3,000 others received wounds from enemy action.  Though American casualties were high, Admiral Nimitz was convinced that the action at Tarawa had the effect of knocking down Japan’s front door in the mid-Pacific.

Following this operation, the 2^nd Marine Division was withdrawn to Hawaii leaving 2/8 behind to help clear the battlefield of unexploded ordnance, provide security for the Seabees, and aid in the burial of the dead.  As a result of this battle, the Navy established the Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT), the forerunner of the U. S. Navy Seals.

Tarawa was unlike any previous campaign.  For the first time in history, a seaborne assault had been launched against a strongly defended enemy position.  Mistakes were made (there are always costly mistakes in war) but the feasibility of Marine Corps’ doctrine of amphibious warfare was confirmed and refinement and improvement was immediately undertaken.  

Next week: Saipan

Sources:

1. Santelli, J. S.  A Brief History of the 8^th Marines.  Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1976
2. Rottman, G. L.  U. S. Marine Corps World War II Order of Battle, 1939-45.  Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002
3. Johnson, R.  Follow Me: The Story of the 2^nd Marine Division in World War II.  Canada: Random House, 1948.
4. Potter, E. B. And Chester Nimitz.  Sea Power: A Naval History.  Prentice Hall, 1960.
5. Alexander, J. H.  Utmost Savagery: Three Days of Tarawa.  Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995.
6. Hammel, E. And John Lane.  Bloody Tarawa.  Zenith Press, 1998.

Endnotes:

1. Smith was a 35-year veteran and holder of the Navy Cross from service in Corinto, Nicaragua.  He served as Commanding Officer, 5^th Marines, as naval attache at the US Embassy, London, Director of the Fleet Marine Force Training Schools, and assumed command of the 2^nd Marine Division in May 1943.  General Smith passed away in 1975.
2. The Japanese did not have a “Marine Corps” organization, but organized Army units to serve as naval infantry.  In mission and prestige, however, they were more or less equivalent to marines.  
3. See also: Marine Raiders.
4. The American military began using coded designations for military operations during World War I.  They were used to conceal upcoming military operations, the details of which are always highly classified.  In some instances, the code name or words themselves are classified.  The expression that evolved during World War II was, “Loose lips sink ships.”  
5. Crowe was born in 1899 and enlisted in the Marine Corps shortly after World War I.  In all, he served on active duty for forty years, retiring as a colonel in 1960.  In those 40 years, Crowe served fourteen years as an enlisted man, 7 years as a Chief Warrant Officer, and 19 years as a commissioned officer.  For some reason, Crowe picked up the nickname “Jim,” which when combined with his last name has a distinctly southern ring to it.  Colonel Crowe passed away on 27 June 1991, aged 92-years.
6. Shoup was awarded the Medal of Honor for his courage under withering fire at Betio.  He was later selected by President Kennedy to serve as the Commandant of the Marine Corps.  He retired on 31 December 1963, shortly after Kennedy’s assassination.  General Shoup was a vocal opponent of US involvement in the Viet Nam War, objecting to its poor strategy and the undue influence of US corporations and military officials in the development of foreign policy.  Shoup passed away on 13 January 1983.
7. I served with E/2/8 at Camp Lejeune, NC (1963-64).  Sergeant Major Mason, our battalion sergeant major, had served with the regiment during this battle.    

Preface

The U. S. Marine Corps is part of the naval service organized under the Secretary of the Navy.  Since the American Revolution, the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps have maintained a close relationship.  In the days of sail, U. S. Marine Detachments served aboard Navy ships as sharpshooters, gunners, shipboard security, and as a landing force.  Shipboard Marines served the ship’s captain and received their orders through their detachment commander, whose rank depended on the size of the ship.  The Navy and Marine Corps have a long history of conducting expeditionary operations at sea and on foreign shore in furtherance of United States foreign policy, noting that the Navy-Marine Corps do not make foreign policy; they implement it.

Over these many years, the Navy and Marine Corps developed a distinct naval culture that based on their shared operational experiences, while at the same time retaining their own distinct character.  It has not always been a bed of roses, as significant differences emerged between the Navy and Marines in the period leading up to the Spanish-American War.  Through the Civil War, Marine Officers were often commissioned through patronage rather than through examination and demonstrated leadership potential.  The Marine Corps addressed this problem, and solved it.

When the Navy transitioned from sail to steam, some senior naval officers argued that Marines were no longer needed aboard ship; they would be better employed if formed into expeditionary battalions for use within the fleet.  This particular controversy continued into the early twentieth century.  The fact was that at this time, the Marines did not have a unique mission that only they could perform—only traditional roles that could be as easily performed by sailors or soldiers.

The first employment of Marines as a landing force occurred during the Spanish American War when the Secretary of the Navy directed the formation of a landing battalion for service in the Caribbean.  The battalion was formed with six rifle companies; its commander was Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Huntington, and his mission was to secure an advanced base near Santiago, Cuba for use by the Navy as a coaling station.  Soon after going ashore, Huntington and his Marines were confronted by a sizable Spanish force in a nearby village.  Supported by naval gunfire, Huntington defeated the Spanish garrison at Cuzco—and the Marine Corps’ unique mission was at last revealed: amphibious warfare.

There is nothing simple about amphibious operations; it is a highly complex operation and if Mr. Murphy ever had a home, it was tucked away in amphibious warfare.  It was after the Spanish-American War that the Navy and Marine Corps began to develop amphibious warfare doctrine.  This work began in earnest in the Caribbean in 1902 and 1903, and in the Philippine Islands in 1907.  In that same year, Marine Corps planners began to consider a possible war with Japan, which involved the defense of the Philippines.  This planning and training helped the Marine Corps identify inadequate military weapons and equipment.  Important lessons were being learned, but few in Congress, which controls military expenditures, took any notice of these deficiencies or the need for modernization.   

In 1910, the Secretary of the Navy directed the Commandant of the Marine Corps to establish an Advance Base School to train Marine Corps officers in the defense of advanced naval bases.  This work was tested in the Atlantic Fleet exercises in 1913-14.  Subsequently, the Marine Corps formed an Advance Force Brigade whose mission was to assault from the sea, establish a defense on shore, and repel any attack by opposing forces.

World War I interrupted this work, but it was restarted in the 1920s.  In addition to reorganizing the Marine Corps to satisfy its Advance Force framework, other officers began projecting the likely need for amphibious warfare troops.  One of these was Earl Hancock (Pete) Ellis, who actually predicted what the Japanese would do in future decades, and almost precisely when they would begin to do it.

This was the work accomplished prior to World War II, which was uniquely suited to the U. S. Marine Corps.  The officers who re-activated the 8^th Marines were all trained in amphibious operations.

Reactivation

After general demobilization of the Armed Forces following World War I, the United States military was little more than a cadre force.  No one back then believed that the United States needed a standing army.  The outbreak of general war in Europe in the fall of 1939 prompted the United States to rethink this proposition.  President Roosevelt and the US Congress began funding a rebuilding and strengthening of the Army-Navy-Marine Corps.  Beginning in 1940, the Marine Corps began to increase the number of its units on active duty.  The first major organization established was the 8^th Marines [Note 1]. 

8^th Marines was re-activated on 1 April 1940 at San Diego, California.  The regiment then consisted of a headquarters company and two infantry battalions.  Each battalion consisted of a headquarters company and four lettered companies.  It strength was slightly over 1,000 officers and men.  The 8^th Marines was initially assigned to the 2^nd Marine Brigade and training began immediately.  A third battalion was added on 1 November 1940.

In February 1941, two Marine Divisions were activated: the 1^st Marine Division in the Caribbean from the then existing 1^st Marine Brigade, and the 2^nd Marine Division at San Diego from the then existing 2^nd Marine Brigade.  The 8^th Marines has been part of the 2^nd Marine Division ever since.  The 8^th Marines (and other regiments) engaged in intensified training at San Clemente Island, off the coast of California, until 7 December 1941 when the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor.  The 2^nd Marine Division (less the 6^th Marines garrisoned in Iceland) was initially instructed to defend the area from the border of Mexico to Oceanside, California against a possible Japanese attack.

Once the initial fear of a Japanese attack abated, the 8^th Marines returned to San Diego and prepared for deployment.  The 8^th Marines, augmented by 1/10 (an artillery battalion) was detached from the 2^nd Marine Division to form the nucleus of a new 2^nd Marine Brigade.  On 6 January 1942, the Brigade proceeded to American Samoa to preserve vital communications between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand [Note 2].  The Marines went ashore on 19 January.  1/8 was assigned the job of beach defenses.  When this task was completed, Marines began jungle warfare training.  By the summer, the 8^th Marines shifted from a defensive role to preparation for offensive operations against the Empire of Japan.

The 1^st Marine Division commenced operations on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942.  Included in the Guadalcanal campaign were Guadalcanal, Tulagi, Florida, Gavutu, and tanambogo in the southern Solomon Islands.  This was America’s first amphibious assault in World War II and the initial allied ground offensive in the Pacific Ocean Area.  For these Marines, Japanese infantry were only part of the problem.  They also faced oppressive heat, heavy rainfall, malaria, dengue, and fungus.  It would have been nice if the Marines had all of their food stores, but the Navy had landed the Marines and then departed with most of what the Marines needed to sustain themselves in the Solomons.  Lack of adequate nutrition made the Marines more susceptible to disease and the effects of heat and humidity.

By mid-October 1942, it was time to replace the 1^st Marine Division on Guadalcanal.  The US Americal Division began arriving at this time, and they would be reinforced by the 8^th Marines, who after 9 months in Samoa, were already acclimatized for jungle warfare.  The 8^th Marines landed at Lunga Point on 4 November 1942.  1/8 began clearing operations east of the Tenaru River almost immediately.  2/8 and 3/8 moved to Point Cruz on 10 November where they linked up with the 2^nd Marines and elements of the US 164^th Infantry Regiment.  This combined force aggressed the village of Kokumbona, encountering sporadic opposition from the ever-willful Japanese soldier.  This advance was halted on 11 November and the Americans recalled across the Matanikau River in preparation for Japanese counter-attack.  General Vandegrift wanted to reinforce Lunga Point.

Vandegrift’s intelligence was golden.  The Japanese Navy were moving thousands of fresh troops to Guadalcanal to confront the Americans.  On the night of 12-13 November, a Japanese covering force for a troop convoy en route to Guadalcanal collided with US Navy escorts for a convoy transporting the US 182^nd Infantry Regiment.  The Navy lost two light cruisers and four destroyers; the Japanese lost one battleship and two destroyers.  Navy and Marine aircraft discovered 11 enemy troop transports steaming toward Guadalcanal on 14 November.  American air so pounded these transports that out of 10,000 Japanese troops, only 4,000 came ashore.  That same night, the Japanese lost another battleship and two heavy cruisers.  These engagements all but decided the outcome of the Guadalcanal campaign.

Despite serious losses, the Japanese continued fighting on Guadalcanal into early 1943.  On 18 November 1942, the 8^th Marines provided flank security to Army units aggressing the Matanikau River.  A few days later, the 8^th Marines passed through the Army and assumed the offense.  On 23 November, the regiment encountered strong opposition.  Casualties were light, but General Vandegrift halted the assault to avoid needless casualties.  Instead, the 8^th Marines began a series of combat patrols, which included night ambushes and lightening forays into enemy-held areas.  In the first week, the 8^th Marines suffered 111 casualties.

On 12 December, the 8^th Marines linked up with the 2^nd Marines and began a series of hit and run attacks, designed to keep the Japanese off balance.

General Vandegrift passed overall command of Guadalcanal forces to Major General Alexander M. Patch, commanding the Americal Division.  The 1^st Marine Division began retrograde operations to Australia.  No offensive operations took place until 10 January 1943.  At that time, General Patch assigned three divisions to drive out the Japanese who remained on Guadalcanal: US Americal Division, US 25^th Infantry Division, and the 2^nd Marine Division.  The 2^nd Marine Division (now including the 6^th Marines) and the Americal Division had orders to seize Cape Esperance by driving along the northern coast.  The 25^th Division would approach Cape Esperance by an inland route.  The 25^th Division led off the assault followed by the 2^nd Marine Division on 13 January.  The 2^nd Marines was followed by the 8^th Marines.

While the Marines made good progress through the jungle setting, 3/8 encountered withering fire from an entrenched enemy position and all progress came to a halt.  Captain Henry P. Crowe [Note 3], a former enlisted man, commanded the regimental weapons company.  He rushed forward to find out what the problem was and found 3/8 Marines taking cover and somewhat disorganized.  While the Marines thought that Crowe has lost his temper, he was actually rallying them to continue their assault.  At one point, he yelled at the Marines, telling them, “God-damn it, you’ll never get the Purple Heart hiding in a foxhole.  Follow me!”  Crowe led them in a charge that overwhelmed the Japanese position.  Afterward, “Follow Me” became the 2^nd Marine Division’s motto.

Patch’s offensive succeeded in pushing the Japanese westward.  The 8^th Marines, with naval gunfire support, hammered the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and it was the Marine’s first real test of naval gunfire support of forces in the attack.  On 15 January, the Marines encountered stiff resistance and rushed flame throwers to the point of contact.  It was the first time the weapon was used in the Pacific war.

The 8^th Marines were pulled off the line between 16-18 January, serving as Division Reserve.  On 23 January, the US 27^th Infantry captured Kokumbona.  By this time, the Japanese realized the futility of trying to hold out against an ever-strengthening American military.  General Patch was so certain that the Japanese were defeated that the 8^th Marines began their withdrawal from the Solomons on 31 January.  Weapons Company and 1/8 embarked aboard the USS Crescent City (AP-40) and sailed for New Zealand.

The Japanese began withdrawing their forces from Guadalcanal on 1 February; some 11,000 IJA troops were evacuated during the night of 7-8 February and the island was declared “secure” on 9 February.  On that date, the rest of the regiment boarded USS Hunter Liggett (AP-27) and USS American Legion (AP-35) and sailed for Wellington, arriving on 16 February 1943. 

As with every American serving on Guadalcanal, the Marines were undernourished.  Arriving in New Zealand, the 8^th Marines were feed up to five meals a day and they consumed massive quantities of steak, eggs, and mutton.  Hunting parties went into the wilderness and helped themselves to the local deer, which at the time was significantly overpopulated.  Venison was added to the mess hall menu.  They also consumed large quantities of milk, which put a strain on local dairies.  The genuine friendliness of the New Zealanders probably explains why hundreds of Marines ended up marrying local ladies.  

Next week: Tarawa

Sources:

1. Santelli, J. S.  A Brief History of the 8^th Marines.  Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1976
2. Rottman, G. L.  U. S. Marine Corps World War II Order of Battle, 1939-45.  Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002

Endnotes:

1. The Marine Corps replaced the word “regiment” with “Marines” in the 1930s.  The designation 8^th Marines means the 8^th regiment of Marines.  Subordinate units within the regiment are designated by the number of the battalion slash the number of the regiment to which they belong.  1/8 is the designation for 1^st Battalion, 8^th Marines.  The designation of companies within battalions follows a similar arrangement.  Company A, 1^st Battalion, 8^th Marines would be abbreviated A/1/8 or sometimes Alpha 1/8. 
2. The 8^th Marines was the first Marine Corps regiment to deploy overseas to the Pacific theater in World War II.
3. Crowe was awarded both the Silver Star and Bronze Star medals for his courage under fire on Guadalcanal.  He had previously served in Haiti, Nicaragua, and China.