October 2019 – Fix Bayonets!

A Master of Naval Warfare

A favored saying among historians is that our failure to learn the lessons of history condemns us to repeat it. There are several variations of this, of course, most are a misquotation of the original by George Santayana (1863-1952), who in Volume I of The Life of Reason, wrote, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” While the statement has a negative connotation, there are many positive things to learn from history and the people who made it.

Among the on-going discussions within the Navy and Marine Corps is how to best prepare for the next international conflagration. In his 2007 professional article published in the Marine Corps Gazette, Lieutenant Colonel Wayne Sinclair noted, “The greatest challenges and most far reaching opportunities of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander will lie in his ability to orchestrate and synchronize the efforts of numerous, diverse entities along a single path toward an overarching campaign adjective.” Sinclair was not the first to make such an observation. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance isolated the “single naval battle” in the Pacific during World War II. In 2012, Admiral John C. Harmony explained [1], “’The Single Naval Battle’ is a framework, or lens, for thinking about, planning for, and executing naval operations. Everything that occurs in the maritime battlespace affects everything else in that battlespace —so every aspect of Navy and Marine Corps doctrine and operations must consider the impact across the whole naval force.”

There is nothing simple about warfare. Quadruple that statement when it comes to naval warfare. Before World War II, Raymond A. Spruance began to train his mind to imagine the single battlespace. He was part of an organization that created and maintained the extraordinary culture in which learning, experimenting, and innovation was demanded and then rewarded through promotion and assignments. Admiral Spruance was an engineer; a man thoroughly knowledgeable of the technologies of the day: radar, processing combat information, air power —and how to effectively employ it. He thought long and hard about what his enemy was thinking and what they were likely to do. Spruance may have been the most intellectual of all senior naval officers of his day; his mental capacity back then may even dwarf that of modern-day admirals and generals. Something to think about because we haven’t seen the end of war.

Ray Spruance 001 Raymond Ames Spruance (1886-1969) became one of the greatest admirals in United States naval history. Although born in Maryland, he was raised in Indianapolis, Indiana. He graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1907 and later pursued advanced degrees in electrical engineering. Typical of the Navy, Spruance had to learn about sea service from the bottom rung of the officer rank structure. He initially served as a junior officer aboard the battleships USS Iowa and USS Minnesota. He later transferred to the destroyers USS Bainbridge and USS Osborne, and then back to the battleship flotilla. In 1916, Spruance helped to fit out USS Pennsylvania and served aboard that ship during its initial voyages. He later served as the Assistant Engineering Officer at the New York Naval Shipyard (1917-1918).

As an officer in command, Spruance was known for maintaining a quiet bridge. Chit-chat was prohibited. Whatever was spoken in the performance of duty must be said in clear and concise language. There was never any room on the bridge for confusion or lack of focus. Given the several recent at-sea mishaps involving our navy’s ships, this would seem to be a policy that contemporary commanders should be reimplement.

Spruance graduated from the Naval War College in 1927. He subsequently served as the executive officer of the USS Mississippi, several engineering assignments, staff intelligence, and as an instructor at the Naval War College. He later commanded the battleship USS Mississippi (1938-1939), receiving his promotion to rear admiral in 1939. His first flag assignment was as Commandant of the Tenth Naval District in Puerto Rico through August 1941. In the first few months of World War II, Admiral Spruance commanded Cruiser Division Five making his flagship the USS Northampton. His force was constructed around the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, which was then commanded by Vice Admiral William F. Halsey. Halsey’s task force conducted a series of hit and run raids against the Japanese in the Western Pacific —notably in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands in February 1942, Wake Island in March, and facilitating the Doolittle Raid in April. In reality, the raids achieved little more than raising the morale of the people of the United States, who were devastated by Japan’s surprise attack at Pearl Harbor —but they also set the tone for a more aggressive stance by naval commanders in the Pacific.

Yamamoto 001 In late May 1942, naval intelligence confirmed Japan’s intent to invade Midway Island. The attack was the brainchild of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto [2], who intended his combined fleet to expand the Japanese Navy’s outer perimeter in the Central Pacific. Yamamoto was convinced that an overwhelming attack at Midway would threaten the United States at Hawaii and cause the United States to sue for peace with Japan. For all of Yamamoto’s exposure to American culture, his thinking revealed that he did not know the American people. Commanding the United States Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz realized that his primary task was to destroy Japan’s air power in the Pacific. To do that, he would need to destroy the Japanese carrier fleet. This would become Vice Admiral Halsey’s mission.

Two days before Admiral Halsey was to set sail from Pearl Harbor, he was hospitalized with what we today refer to as Shingles. Halsey recommended that Spruance replace him as commander of the task force. Spruance had no prior experience employing carrier-based air combat. At first, Nimitz questioned Halsey’s choice, but Halsey was adamant, even insistent, but he also advised Spruance to rely on his chief of staff, Captain Miles Browning [3], a battle-tested expert in carrier warfare. Despite his personal trepidations, Admiral Spruance assumed command of Task Force 16, which included USS Enterprise and USS Hornet. In this capacity, Spruance served under the overall command of Vice Admiral Jack Fletcher, whose flagship was the USS Yorktown; Yorktown had been badly damaged during the Battle of the Coral Sea but was quickly repaired and returned to active service in time for the defense of Midway.

The navy’s intercept force consisted of the three carriers, seven heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, fifteen destroyers, 233 carrier-based attack aircraft, 127 land-based aircraft, and sixteen submarines. The battle group would face off against a two-battle group Japanese invasion force. The first group consisted of four carriers, two battleships, two heavy-cruisers, one light cruiser, twelve destroyers, 248-carrier based aircraft, and sixteen float planes. The surface support force (second group) involved four heavy cruisers, two destroyers, and twelve seaplanes. Japanese occupation forces served under Admiral Nobutake Kondo. Yamamoto exercised over-all command from the IJN ship Yamato.

Admiral Yamamoto devised a complex plan for seizing Midway. What made this scheme complex was the coordination of multiple battle groups over several hundred miles. He named his scheme Operation MI. Yamamoto’s plan, however, was based on erroneous assumptions —specifically that the Americans would field only two carriers. He knew that Lexington was sitting at the bottom of the Coral Sea, and assumed that the Americans had lost the Yorktown, as well. Admiral Yamamoto also underestimated American morale.

Yamamoto dispersed his attack force to mask their presence from the American navy. He then sought to lure the Americans into a trap, defeat the US Navy and land-based aircraft by overwhelming air power, and then bring up his second group to place the final nail in the coffin of what remained of the American navy. It was a doctrinal tactic popular among the major navies of the world at the time. It might have worked had the US Navy not broken the Japanese Naval Code (JN-25), which allowed Admiral Nimitz to read Yamamoto’s mail. Moreover, Yamamoto’s dispersal plan precluded one battle group from supporting the other. Additionally, Yamamoto’s light carriers and battleships were unable to keep up with his fleet carriers.

Yamamoto’s plan also involved a compromise with the Japanese Army. The IJA would support Yamamoto’s Midway operation if Yamamoto agreed to support the army’s invasion of the Aleutian Islands. The Army felt that their invasion was necessary in order to keep mainland Japan out of the range of US land-based aircraft in Alaska. Japan’s invasion of the Aleutian Islands was the first time a foreign nation had occupied American territory since the War of 1812. The Americans had no choice but to confront the Japanese in the Aleutians for the same reason: to prevent Japanese bombers from attacking the West Coast of the United States. The invasion of the Aleutians (designated Operation AL) reduced Yamamoto’s combat fleet by two carriers, five cruisers, twelve destroyers, six submarines, and four troop transport ships. Accordingly, Admiral Nagumo’s Carrier Division Five was two-thirds short of his original carrier fleet. Beyond this, the Japanese fleet suffered from what some historians have identified as a glass jaw. The Japanese could throw a pretty good punch, but it couldn’t take one.

At Midway on 4 June, the U. S. Navy had four squadrons of PBY aircraft (31 birds) for long-range reconnaissance, six TBF Avengers, nineteen Marine Corps [4] SBDs, seven F4F Wildcats, seventeen SB2U Vindicators, and twenty-one Brewster F2As (Buffalos). Army aircraft included seventeen B-17s, four B-26 Marauders equipped with torpedoes. Overall, 126 aircraft. Piloting a PBY, Ensign Jack Heid spotted the Japanese force at about 0900. He plotted their position as 580 miles west of Midway. What Heid observed was the occupation force, not the main battle force. Nine B-17s departed Midway just after noon to attack the force identified by Ensign Heid. Three hours later, the B-17s found their target and released their bombs. None of these munitions struck a Japanese ship. In fact, the only successful hit was from a PBY that delivered a torpedo into a Japanese oil tanker at 0100 on 5 June. Bombarding navy ships from the air was no easy task.

Japanese aircraft and shipboard anti-aircraft fires were intense, resulting in the defeat of several waves of US aircraft —at Midway and at sea en route to the Japanese task force. American dive bombers from Spruance’s air wing located the Japanese carriers at a most-inopportune time. Japanese fighter-bombers were in the process of refueling on the decks of carriers; planes detailed to provide air cover were overwhelmed with American torpedo bombers. It did not go well for the Japanese.

True … Admiral Spruance’s attack was a gamble —but not a foolish one. The United States Navy was at the time led by intellectual warriors. In June 1941, 83 of the Navy’s 84 admirals had completed the Naval War College. Through training and study, the US Navy-Marine Corps team had foreseen everything that in fact transpired during World War II. Admiral Spruance was one of these men. What set him apart from his peers was his display of intellectual independence and the courage to call a spade and spade. Admiral Spruance displayed his exceptional talent at Midway. If we could break it down, then we should observe that the outcome at Midway was a combination of luck, hubris, and exceptional leadership. The Americans were lucky to break the Japanese Naval Code (JN-25); Japanese national pride and ethnocentric arrogance got in the way of common sense, and Admiral Spruance was an extraordinary leader at a most critical moment in history.

After the task force’s initial success, Spruance was challenged by the question, “What next?” He knew that Japanese carriers had been gravely wounded. Should he exploit this success by pursuing the Japanese to take advantage of their diminished capability? Should he withdraw his task force back toward the east, beyond the reach of the Japanese fleet? The U. S. Navy had three aircraft carriers in the entire Pacific Ocean area; two of these were under Spruance’s command. Spruance knew as well as anyone that the U. S. Navy remained inferior to its Imperial Japanese counterpart both in numbers and in efficiency at sea [5]. Admiral Nimitz’ directive to Spruance was two-fold: Protect Midway and its land-based aviation capability; inflict maximum damage to the Japanese carrier force. He did that … but what next?

Spruance withdrew toward the east while maintaining a watchful eye over Midway Island. Despite scathing criticism from senior admirals [6], Spruance made the right decision. He knew that the Japanese were bloodied, not beaten. Defending Midway had been a risky endeavor; should Spruance have risked a night engagement with IJN forces that were still in the area? It would have placed limited assets at an unacceptable risk. Where Admiral Spruance stood out is his ability to see the “single naval battle.” Admiral Spruance ignored his critics. He was comfortable in his own skin; he had confidence in the capabilities of his subordinates.

Following the Battle of Midway, Rear Admiral Spruance was pulled back to Pearl Harbor to serve as Admiral Nimitz’ chief of staff and later, as Deputy Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Nimitz needed someone of Spruance’s intellectual capacity to advise him. Spruance remained in Hawaii until August 1943 when he was appointed to command of the Central Pacific Force —later designated US 5th Fleet [7].

In August 1943, Admiral Nimitz instituted a plan that was designed to make maximum use of his limited naval forces. Nimitz called it his “Big Blue Fleet.” Naval assets were alternated between Admiral Halsey (designated Third US Fleet) (Task Force 38) and Admiral Spruance (designated Fifth US Fleet) (Task Force 58). When not in command of their designated fleets, the admirals and their staffs were assigned to Pearl Harbor where they planned future operations.

The differences between Halsey and Spruance were as night and day. “Bull” Halsey [8] was aggressive and brash; Spruance was calculating and cautious. The rank and file were proud to serve under either of these men, but the senior officers preferred the leadership style of Spruance. Under Admiral Spruance, the senior staff knew what they were going to do, and when they were going to do it. Halsey, on the other hand, made his senior officers nervous. They never knew from one moment to the next what he would order them to do. For this reason, Admiral Spruance became known as the “admiral’s admiral.”

In February 1944, Admiral Spruance directed Operation Hailstone, the US assault against the Japanese naval base at Truk. Spruance’s Fifth Fleet destroyed twelve Japanese warships, 32 merchant ships, and 249 aircraft. The assault on Truk took place at the same time Admiral Kelly Turner’s amphibious force attacked Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands. When Japanese naval forces withdrew from Truk, Admiral Spruance commanded the task group that pursued them. It was the first time a four-star admiral took part in a sea action aboard one of the engaged ships. Spruance commanded his force with deadly precision. In addition to the destruction of Japanese ships at Truk, Spruance sunk the light cruiser Katori and the destroyer Maikaze. In June, while screening for the US invasion of Saipan, Admiral Spruance defeated the Japanese fleet in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, sinking three carriers, two oilers, and an estimated 600 Japanese aircraft. Spruance mauled the Japanese so badly that afterwards, Japanese carriers were used solely as decoys because there were no aircraft or aircrews to fly them. Again, in the aftermath of the battle, Spruance was criticized for not being aggressive enough … but once more, Spruance made the right call.

USS Indianapolis 001 — Artist’s rendition of the USS Indianapolis

For most of the war, Admiral Spruance preferred to use the heavy cruiser USS Indianapolis as his flagship. It was named in honor of his hometown. After Indianapolis was struck by Kamikaze aircraft off the coast of Okinawa, Spruance moved his flag to the USS New Mexico. On 12 May 1945, two Kamikaze aircraft struck New Mexico; afterwards, the Admiral was could not be located. He was discovered manning a firehose amidships, helping deck hands to fight the fire. As the ship was not too badly damaged, Spruance maintained his flag aboard USS New Mexico. For his actions at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, Admiral Spruance was awarded the Navy Cross.

In November 1945, Admiral Spruance succeeded Admiral Nimitz as Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Spruance was later awarded the Army Distinguished Service Medal for his service during the capture of the Marshall and Marianas Islands. After the war, Spruance was not awarded five-star rank due to the limited number of Fleet Admirals authorized in the Navy. Instead, he was awarded five-star retirement pay for life. Admiral Spruance later said that he felt that Admiral Halsey was more deserving of the fifth star and was happy he received it.

From February 1946 to July 1948, Admiral Spruance served as President of the Naval War College. After retirement, Admiral Spruance served as US Ambassador to the Philippine Islands, serving from 1952 to 1955. Raymond Spruance passed away at Pebble Beach, California on 13 December 1969. He was laid to rest at Golden Gate National Cemetery alongside his wife, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Admiral Richmond K. Turner, and Admiral Charles A. Lockwood.

I lament that we no longer have fighting admirals of Ray Spruance’s caliber serving on active duty.

Sources:

Marine Corps Gazette, the Professional Journal of U. S. Marines, Marine Corps Association & Foundation.
Willmott, H. P. The Last Century of Sea Power: From Washington to Tokyo, 1922-1945. University of Indiana Press, 2010.
Buell, T. B. The Quiet Warrior: a biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance. Boston, Little-Brown, 1974.

Endnotes:

[1] Admiral Harvey, J. C. and Colonel Philip J. Ridderhof. “Keeping our Amphibious Edge.” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Annapolis, Maryland, 2012.

[2] See also: The Truly Reluctant Admiral (in several parts).

[3] Browning served as a navy surface warfare officer in World War I, later attended flight school at NAS Pensacola, and served aboard the USS Langley. He later evolved into one of the Navy’s most courageous combat pilots. He retired as a Rear Admiral in 1947.

[4] Marine F2A and SB2U aircraft were already obsolete, but it was all the Marine Corps had at the time.

[5] There was no better demonstration of this than the Naval Battle of Savo Island. The US Navy lacked the number of surface vessels and the training needed to defeat the Imperial Japanese Navy.

[6] Vice Admiral William S. Pye (1880-1959) issued a stinging rebuke of Spruance for his failure to pursue the Japanese Fleet. Pye was no intellectual and, despite his service in two world wars and his seniority, Admiral Pye had no combat experience. It was Admiral Pye who failed to relieve the Marines at Wake Island in December 1941.

[7] Admiral Nimitz devised a program of rotating senior officers (and staffs) in and out of the Central Pacific. Nimitz called it the “big blue fleet.” When Admiral Halsey commanded the US Third Fleet (Task Force 38), Spruance and his staff returned to Pearl Harbor to plan future operations. When Spruance activated the US Fifth Fleet (Task Force 58), Halsey and his staff would rotate back to Pearl Harbor.

[8] On 13 October 1942, William F. Halsey was abruptly ordered to “immediately” assume command of the South Pacific Area and South Pacific Forces. Admiral Ghormley had become reticent and a lackluster senior officer. Halsey’s appointment improved the morale of all naval, air, and ground forces in the South Pacific area … particularly among Marines on Guadalcanal, who suffered under Gormley’s command.

Manilla John

EGA Black Less than six months after Japan’s “sneak attack” on the United States, our armed forces were on the comeback trail. Americans were angry—very angry, and our front-line troops gave no quarter to the fanatical Japanese who confronted them. And, truth be known, it was just as well the Japanese were more willing to sacrifice themselves to their Emperor because US Marines weren’t inclined to take prisoners. Guadalcanal was a disease-ridden cesspool; it was here that U. S. Marines met the Imperial Japanese Army for the first time in land combat. The contest was one of fierce determination, bullet to bullet, bayonet to bayonet, and in some cases, hand to hand.

Imperial Japanese forces occupied the Solomon Islands in April 1942. It was their plan to capture Port Moresby in New Guinea and Tulagi in the southern Solomons. This would extend their southern defensive perimeter and establish bases to support future advances. Their seizure of Nauru, Ocean Island, New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa would sever supply lines between Australia and the United States; the result of this would reduce or eliminate Australia as a threat to Japanese possessions in the South Pacific.

The Japanese pushed forward two construction units, consisting of around 2,450 men. They were originally planned to work on Midway Island when it was captured, but that didn’t happen, so the Japanese moved these construction crews to Guadalcanal on 6 July, where they began building an airfield. When coast watchers reported this activity to the Americans, US military planners devised a scheme for the capture of Guadalcanal and use of the airfield against the Japanese.

Guadalcanal is not a small island; it extends 2,047 square miles. The U. S. Marine Corps footprint on this island was desperately small. Once the Marines had gained a foothold on Guadalcanal however, they were determined to keep it. The IJA was equally determined to push the American Marines into the sea. The battle lasted six months. The struggle to retain possession of the air strip, which the Marines renamed Henderson Field [1], was the focus of a bloody contest. The climax to the Battle of Lunga Ridge came on a Sunday night, 25 October 1942.

Lunga Ridge lay about 1,000 yards south of Henderson Field. Typical of Guadalcanal at this time of year, it was raining buckets that Sunday night; Marine positions were transformed into miserable mud pits. The Marines were exhausted; they had been battling the Japanese for two days, driving back wave after wave of fanatical assaults. The Marines knew well enough that the Japanese weren’t through with them just yet.

Basilone John 002 At about midnight, through dense darkness and rain, hundreds of screaming Japanese troops assaulted the Marine perimeter. They threw themselves into the flesh tearing barbed wire —these first waves creating human bridges across the wire to allow their comrades access to Marine lines. The Marines, although tired, knew that this was a desperate contest. They were wet, undernourished, ill, and pissed off. Among the Marines waiting to receive them was Sergeant John Basilone, who commanded two machine gun sections in Company D, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division.

Basilone, born on 4 November 1916 of Italian immigrants, was an experienced machine gun section leader. He joined the US Army in July 1934, serving a three-year enlistment with the US 16th Infantry Regiment in the Philippine Islands. He was a strapping young man who was a champion pugilist. He reenlisted in the Army in 1937 and was reassigned to the US 31st Infantry Regiment. He liked serving in the Philippines, where he was known as Manilla John, but the Army would not re-post him to the Philippines, and so he took his discharge from the Army and went back to his hometown, where he worked for a time as a truck driver.

But Manilla John maintained his fervor for the Philippines and figured that the best way to find a posting there was to join the Marine Corps. He enlisted in 1940, and after recruit training at Parris Island, South Carolina, he was sent to Marine Corps Base, Quantico for advance infantry training. After an assignment at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the Marine Corps assigned him to the 7th Marine Regiment, which was part of the 1st Marine Division—an infantry division earmarked for service on Guadalcanal. In 1942, Basilone had nearly eight-years of active service in the infantry. He knew his job.

The Japanese assault on the night of 25 October was ruthless. Marine defenders received intense grenade and rifle fire; automatic weapons shredded human flesh, splattering friend and foe alike with blood and body parts. Buckets of blood mixed with the rain and mud. Basilone’s men, like many others on the line that night, suffered from malaria and dysentery. Despite these circumstances, Basilone kept his guns firing and his men focused. When the barrels became too hot, he changed them, cleared jammed weapons, directed automatic fire into the mass of attacking Japanese, and kept his men supplied with ammunition. He steadied his Marines on the line, and gave them encouragement by word and example.

Japanese bodies piled so high in front of the machine guns that he had to constantly reset the weapons so that they could fire over the dead soldiers into additional waves of fanatics. Eventually, not even water-cooled weapons could stop the Japanese and one section of guns was overrun. Two of the defenders were killed, three others seriously wounded. Basilone took up one of his weapons and ran to the breach. He surprised and killed eight Japanese soldiers. He then noted that two guns had become jammed by mud and water; the Japanese were setting up for yet another charge. Basilone stripped the mud away from the belts of ammunition, fed them into the guns, cleared the jammed chambers, and sprayed the Japanese as they began their renewed attack. The battle ran hot for two hours.

At around 0200, the Japanese assaults stopped, and the firing died down, but the Marines knew better than to relax, and as expected, the Japanese Sendai regiments renewed their attack at 0300. It was a Banzai attack with the full weight of the assault on Basilone’s sector. During the lull in firing, Basilone has repositioned his guns to establish a killing zone. Attacking Japanese fell by the hundreds. Advancing Japanese soon dropped into the mud and began crawling forward. Basilone depressed his weapons and destroyed these determined soldiers.

At dawn, Sergeant Basilone and his men were drained. Only three of these Marines were left alive. During the fight, Basilone has lost his boon dockers [2], the mud having sucked them off his feet. Their faces were filthy black from cordite and gun oil, their eyes red and swollen from lack of sleep. The battlefield was strewn with dead and wounded Marines and Japanese —but Henderson Field still belonged to the Marines. Many of the dead Japanese were credited to Sergeant Basilone, who killed them with anything he could get his hands on, including his .45 caliber pistol and a machete. On 26 October 1942, John Basilone was just 26-years old. In this battle, the legend of the fighting Manilla John was born.

Basilone Lena 001 — Sgt Lena Mae Basilone

Basilone was returned to the United States in 1943, where he received the Medal of Honor and placed on a war bond tour. The press made him into a celebrity, but that wasn’t who Basilone was. He was a Marine who felt that his duty, his rightful place, was with forward deployed combat Marines. He was offered an officer’s commission but turned it down. He was offered an assignment as a combat training instructor, but he turned that down too. What he wanted was to go back to the Pacific. The Marine Corps approved his request in December 1943 and Manilla John was assigned to Company C, 2nd Battalion, 23rd Marines, 5th Marine Division. At the time, the 5th Marine Division was undergoing pre-deployment training at Camp Pendleton, California. In 1944, Basilone married Sergeant Lena Mae Riggi, Women Marine Reserve, who was also assigned to Camp Pendleton. After their honeymoon, Basilone reenlisted in the U. S. Marine Corps [3].

On 19 February 1945, on the first day of the invasion of Iwo Jima, Gunnery Sergeant John Basilone was serving as a machine gun section leader on Red Beach II. The Marines came under concentrated enemy fire from Japanese fortifications staged at various locations on the island. With his unit pinned down, Basilone made his way around the side of the Japanese emplacements until he was in a position directly above their position. He then attacked the Japanese with grenades and demolitions, single-handedly destroying the entire point of resistance and its defending garrison.

Basilone then fought his way toward Airfield-1 and aided a tank that was trapped in an enemy mine field and encountering intense Japanese mortar and artillery fire. Despite the enemy fire that surrounded him, Basilone guided the tank through the hazardous terrain to safety. Soon after, however, Basilone was killed by Japanese fire while moving along the edge of the airfield. Some have attributed his death to mortars, while others claim that he was killed by well-aimed rifle fire. For his courageous actions at Iwo Jima, Basilone was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross and Purple Heart. He was also entitled to wear the Presidential Unit Citation (two awards), which equates to a Navy Cross for every individual assigned to a valorous unit.

Manilla John Basilone is buried at Arlington National Cemetery. Lena Basilone never remarried. She passed away in 1999.

Endnotes:

[1] Named in honor of Major Lofton Henderson, killed in action during the Battle for Midway while commanding VMSB-241. Henderson was the first Marine Corps aviator killed in this battle.

[2] Field boots used by soldiers and Marines in World War II.

[3] One wonders how much of Basilone’s story made its way into the popular John Wayne film, Sands of Iwo Jima (1949).

A Short History of the Royal Marines

US:UK Ensign What is a Marine? The short answer would be a specialized member of the armed forces who participates in efforts to project naval power ashore. What makes a Marine stand out from a regular soldier and sets him apart from any other fighting organization isn’t just a matter of how they’re trained, the equipment they use, or their tactical skills. It is the fighting spirit that lives within each Marine —and this is what drives a Marine to accept nothing less than victory in all lethal situations. It is the determination to win, the eagerness to fight, and the high standard of excellence they demand of themselves and each other that makes a Marine unique. Their battle record speaks for itself.

Marines are, by definition, an expeditionary force in readiness who are deployed at a moment’s notice to quickly and aggressively win their nation’s battles. Marines have a long history of developing expeditionary doctrine and amphibious innovation that sets the standard for all other branches of military service. In projecting naval power into a hostile environment, Marines rely on their superior training, their self-confidence, their discipline, and each other to win the day. Toward this end, Marines are trained to improvise, adapt, and overcome every obstacle in whatever situation they encounter. They are not only willing to engage any enemy force; they are also determined to defeat them until national victory has been achieved. Marines have but one mission: fight, and win.

Of all Marine organizations that exist in the world today, only two stand out: United States Marines, and their British counterparts—the Royal Marines.

The story of the Royal Marines began on 28 October 1664 when Great Britain formed the Duke of York and Albany’s Maritime Regiment of Foot. It soon became known as the Admiral’s Regiment. The Holland Regiment (later called The Buffs) was also raised to serve at sea on 11 July 1665. Both regiments were paid for by the Admiralty. John Churchill, later 1^st Duke of Marlborough, was a famous member of The Buffs. Additionally, a company of foot guards served as Marines to augment the Admiral’s Regiment during the sea battle at Sole Bay in 1672. The Holland Regiment was disbanded in 1689 after James II was deposed during the so-called Glorious Revolution.

Two maritime regiments of the British Army were raised in 1690 —the Earl of Pembroke’s and Torrington’s Regiments, later designated Lord Berkeley’s Regiment. These Marines participated in an opposed landing during the Williamite War in Ireland at Cork on 21 September 1690, John Churchill commanding. The Marine Establishment was reformed in 1698. Two existing regiments became a single regiment under Thomas Brudenell, and the foot regiments under William Seymour, Edward Dutton Colt, and Harry Mordaunt were converted to Marine regiments —all of which were disbanded in 1699.

In 1702, six regiments of Marines and six Sea Service Regiments of foot were formed to participate in the War of Spanish Succession. While on land, the Marines served under Brigadier General William Seymour; while at sea, they fell under the authority of the senior naval commander and the captain of the ship to which assigned. The Admiral’s Regiment first distinguished itself in 1704 when the Marines captured the mole [1] during the assault on Gibraltar. British and Dutch Marines later defended the fortress from counterattack. After the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, three Marine regiments were transferred to the army, where they were designated as the 30^th, 31^st, and 32^nd Regiments of Foot.

RM 001A Uniform — Painting of an early maritime officer.

The Admiral’s Regiment was redesignated as His Majesty’s Marine Forces on 5 April 1755; fifty companies were organized into three divisions, placed under the command of the Admiralty, and stationed at Portsmouth, Chatham, and Plymouth. Note: shown left, a painting of an early Maritime officer.

British Marines were not the first naval infantry to emerge in Europe. They were preceded by the Spanish Infanteria de Marina (1537), Venice’s Fanti da Mar (1550), the Portuguese Marine Corps (1610), and the French Troupes de Marine (1622). The British, in turn, established a regiment of (3,000) American Colonial Marines during the War of Jenkins’ Ear, around 1739.

In the early days, all field-grade officers of the Marines were serving officers in the Royal Navy. Because the Admiralty believed that the top field officer ranks were largely honorary posts (which was also true in the Army), the farthest a field officer could advance was to lieutenant colonel. It was not until 1771 that the first Marine officer was promoted to colonel, but this situation persisted well into the 1800s. In any case, British Marines performed numerous amphibious landings throughout most of the 18^th Century. Among the more famous was the landing at Belle Isle [2] in 1761. British Marines also served during the American War of Independence. A company of Marines under Major John Pitcairn broke rebel resistance at Bunker Hill and took possession of the American’s redoubt. When Royal Navy ships were becalmed, Marines often took to ship’s boats to repel attackers during blockade operations. On the day that Captain James Cook was killed in Hawaii (14 February 1779), he had with him four British Marines: Corporal James Thomas, Private Theophilus Hinks, Private Thomas Fatchett, and Private John Allen.

In May 1787, four companies of Marines under Major Robert Ross accompanied the First Fleet [3] to protect a new colony at Botany Bay (New South Wales). Due to a gross oversight, the First Fleet departed Portsmouth without its main supply of ammunition, cartridge paper, and flintlock tools. The oversight was noted early in the voyage and a dispatch sent back to England that the missing supplies be urgently forwarded to the fleet. Captain William Bligh was assigned this mission while in command of HMS Bounty. Ten thousand rounds of ammunition were obtained from Rio de Janeiro, but these stores were still inadequate and in time, the Marines would find themselves in difficult circumstances. A full measure of stores was never sent to the First Fleet.

In total, the Marine contingent of four companies included 212 Marines; of these, 160 privates. Marine strength was based on the advice of Mr. Joseph Banks, who counselled the British government that local Aborigines were few and retiring by disposition. Upon their arrival at New South Wales, Captain Arthur Phillip, Royal Navy, found that the natives were populous and aggressive. Within a year, Aboriginals had killed 6 of the First Fleet and wounded scores of others. Marines were ordered to expand the initial settlement area at Sydney Cove and organize farming operations at Parramatta. When Aboriginals contracted smallpox, some journalists claimed that the British Marines deliberately spread the disease. Most modern scholars regard this as uncorroborated bunk, however.

At the instigation of Admiral John Jervis, 1^st Earl of St. Vincent in 1802, His Majesty’s Marine Forces were titled Royal Marines by King George III.

Up until 1804, the Royal Artillery Regiment had provided artillery support to the British Marines. A lawsuit by a Royal Artillery Officer led a civil court to declare that Army officers were not subject to Navy regulations or the orders of Naval officers. Accordingly, Royal Marine Artillery was added to the Royal Marines in that very same year. They were referred to as “Blue Marines” because these forces retained the blue coats of the Royal Artillery Regiment. In contrast, the Royal Marines dressed in scarlet coats (as did the British Army). They were called “Red Marines” or, more derisively, Lobster backs by the unenlightened naval ranks.

During the Napoleonic Wars, Royal Marines took part in every notable naval battle on board Royal Navy ships, executed amphibious raids, provided security aboard ship, maintained discipline among the crew, engaged enemy crews with long rifles, and led boarding parties.

The number of Marines assigned to Royal Navy ships depended on the size of the ship, but Marine strength was usually maintained at a ratio of one Marine per ship’s gun, plus officers commanding. A “first rate ship of the line” would have a compliment of 104 Marines; a 28-gun frigate would have 29 Marines. Between 1807 and 1814, a total of 31,400 men served in the Royal Marines but given the size of the Royal Navy during this period, and the missions assigned to the Royal Navy, British Army detachments frequently served aboard Navy ships to augment the Royal Marines. Seaborne operations frequently included blockading French ports and conducting amphibious raids against French signal communications stations and other operations designed to harass the enemy.

In the Caribbean, freed French slave volunteers formed the 1^st Corps of Colonial Marines to help bolster the ranks of Royal Marines. This practice was repeated during the War of 1812, when escaped American slaves were formed into the 2^nd Corps of Colonial Marines. These men were commanded by Royal Marine officers and fought alongside their regular Marine counterparts at the Battle of Bladensburg (August 1814). During this battle, a detachment of Royal Marine Artillery under Lieutenant John Lawrence deployed Congreve rockets [4] with telling effect against American militia. A battalion of Royal Marines augmented the 21^st Regiment of Foot during the burning of Washington. They did not torch the U. S. Marine Corps Barracks at 8^th & I Streets, however.

During the War of 1812, Royal Marines frequently operated in the Chesapeake Bay, including operations up the Penobscot River. This was a composite battalion, formed from several ship’s detachments, serving under Captain John Robyns [5]. A smaller organization of Royal Marines, numbering around 100 troops, served under captains John T. Wilson and John Alexander Phillips that augmented the British Army force of 700 men under Major Thomas Adair, who successfully led an attack against the west bank of the Mississippi River. This was Britain’s only success at New Orleans. These same Marines later helped to capture Fort Bowyer in Mobile Bay —the last action of the War of 1812.

In 1855, the Royal Marines were renamed the Royal Marines Light Infantry (RMLI). A slight modification to this designation was affected in 1862: Royal Marine Light Infantry. After 1850, the Royal Navy saw limited service at sea until 1914. During this time, Naval planners became more interested in the concept of Naval Brigades, which is to say Royal Marines, augmented by artillery, who would make amphibious landings ahead of naval infantry and conduct skirmishes —a traditional function of light infantry. For most of their history, the Royal Marines have functioned as fusiliers (riflemen). In this capacity, they served with distinction during the First and Second Opium Wars (1839-1860) in China. Every engagement in China was successful save one: when British Admiral Sir James Hope ordered the Marines to make a landing across a wide expanse of mud flats. I will forego any comment about Admiral Hope’s leadership ability.

RM 002 Boxer Rebellion — Royal Marines during the Boxer Rebellion

Royal Marines, along with their American counterparts, played a prominent role during the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900. See also: Send in the Marines!

Pursuing a career in the Royal Marines was considered “social suicide” through much of the 18^th and 19^th centuries. Royal Marines had a lower standing than their counterparts in the Royal Navy [6]. In 1907, the British government reduced professional differences between the Royal Navy and Royal Marines. In time, the Royal Marines were elevated to a position of respect within the British forces, although sharing a pint of ale with British Army veterans, one might come away with an entirely different point of view. What British soldiers have never understood, however, is that ARMY stands for “Aren’t Ready to be Marines Yet.”

During the first part of the 20th century, the role of the Royal Marines remained traditional, that is, providing shipboard infantry for security, boarding parties, and amphibious raids. The Marines’ other traditional role while aboard Royal Navy ships was manning gun turrets on battleships or cruisers.

During World War I, Royal Marines landed with the Royal Navy Division in Belgium in 1914 to defend Antwerp. They later participated in the amphibious landings at Gallipoli in 1915 and conducted the Zeebrugge Raid in 1918. After this “war to end all wars,” Royal Marines took part in the allied intervention in post-Revolutionary Russia. In 1919, the 6^thBattalion mutinied and was disbanded in disgrace.

RM 002 In 1922, during post-war demobilization, the Royal Marines were reduced from a strength of 55,000 to around 15,000. To further reduce the costs of maintaining this force in readiness, Royal Marine Artillery (RMA) and Light Infantry units were consolidated in June 1923. Even so, tremendous political pressure was applied to disbanding the Royal Marines altogether. As a compromise, opposing politicians agreed to a Royal Marine organization of 9,500 troops. To accomplish this, the RMA was deactivated; henceforth, the title Royal Marine would apply to the entire Corps. Artillery organizations would be part of the force structure, but on a much smaller scale. After consolidation, the Royal Marine full-dress uniform became dark blue and red; Royal Marine officers and SNCOs continue to wear scarlet uniforms as part of their mess dress kit. The rank structure was also modified. The private of infantry and gunner of artillery were replaced by the rank of Marine.

In World War II, Royal Marine shipboard detachments continued to make amphibious raids with limited objectives, such as accepting the surrender of French Axis forces. Initially, Royal Marine infantry units were organized as Mobile Naval Base Defense Organizations (which were similar to U. S. Marine Corps’ Advanced Base Defense Battalion). The MNBDO’s took part in the defense of Crete, Malaya, and Singapore.

RM 004 WW II In 1942, Royal Marine infantry battalions were reorganized as commando units. The Division command structure became a Special Service Brigade command. In total, four Special Service (Commando) Brigades were raised during World War II. Nine RMC battalions were created, numbered from 40 Commando to 48 Commando. Brigades were task organized, which means that Royal Marine commando organizational structure depended on their assigned mission. In the early years, British Army units served alongside the Marines within Commando Brigades. Support troops served as landing craft crew and saw extensive action on D-Day in June 1944. In January 1945, an additional two RM brigades were formed, both organized as conventional infantry. Of these, only one saw any action during World War II.

Several Royal Marine officers served as pilots during the World War II, one of these leading the air attack that sank the German warship Konigsberg. Eighteen RMOs commanded fleet air squadrons, and after the formation of the British Pacific Fleet, Royal Marine aviation assets were well-represented in final operations against Japan. Squadron commanders were usually captains and majors. Lieutenant Colonel R. C. Hay commanded an air group on board HMS Indefatigable. Meanwhile, Royal Marine detachments continued to serve aboard Royal Navy cruisers and battleships.

During World War II, the Victoria Cross [7] was awarded to only one Marine: Acting Corporal Thomas P. Hunter, aged 21 years, of 43 Commando, during combat operations at Lake Comacchio, Italy. On 2 April 1945, Hunter commanded a Bren gun (light machine gun) section.

RM 004 T P Hunter — Corporal Thomas Peck Hunter, RM

According to the citation for this award, 43 Commando was advancing to its final objective and was within 400 yards of an east-west canal. Corporal Hunter observed that the enemy was entrenched around a group of houses south of the canal and realized that his troops, who were following in trace of his advance, would soon be exposed to enemy fire in an area devoid of cover or concealment. Seizing his light machine gun, Hunter charged alone across two hundred yards of open ground. The Germans engaged Hunter with no fewer than nine automatic weapons. Attracting enemy fire away from his men, and demonstrating a complete disregard for his own safety, Corporal Hunter assaulted the German position while firing from the hip, changing magazines as he ran, killing several of the enemy and clearing houses of all enemy troops. Six German soldiers surrendered to him, while the remaining enemy fled across a footbridge to the north bank of the canal. Taking a position atop of pile of rubble, Corporal Hunter engaged the enemy’s new positions with deadly accurate fire while encouraging his men to take up secure positions within the cluster of houses. It was then that Corporal Hunter received the bulk of enemy’s fire and he was killed. Corporal Hunter is remembered at ten separate locations throughout the United Kingdom.

In 1946, British Army Commandos were disbanded, leaving the Royal Marines to continue the commando role (with supporting army elements).

Drysdale 002 — LtCol Douglas B. Drysdale, RM

At the outset of the Korean War, 41 Commando was reformed for service with the United States Navy. After the landing of the X Corps at Wonsan, 41 Commando joined the 1^st U. S. Marine Division. 41 Commando formed the nucleus of Task Force Drysdale under Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, Royal Marines, with one US Marine Corps rifle company and one US Army rifle company, and attachments of rolling stock and fought their way from Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri after the Chinese erected blockades along the north road. It then took part in the epic Battle of the Chosin Reservoir. 41 Commando subsequently implemented several raids against Communist Chinese forces. The Royal Marines were withdrawn from the Korean conflict in 1951. For its service in the Korean War, 41 Commando was awarded the United States Presidential Unit Citation and Colonel Drysdale received the Silver Star Medal for valor.

Between 1948 and 1960, elements of the Royal Marines participated at various times and places in the Malayan Emergency [8]. In 1955, 45 Commando was dispatched to Cyprus to undertake anti-terrorist operations against Greek Cypriot insurgents. In 1956, 3 Commando Brigade with 40, 42, and 45 Royal Commando took part in the Suez Crisis. This event marked the first time the Royal Marines employed helicopters in vertical assault operations. British and French forces ultimately defeated the Egyptians, but US diplomatic activities helped to defuse the crisis. 40 and 41 Commando were sent to Borneo at various times to help defuse tensions between Indonesian-Malayan belligerents. In January 1964, elements of the Tanzanian Army mutinied. The United Kingdom responded by dispatching 41 Commando from Devon and landing Royal Marine elements from HMS Bulwark. The Tanzanian revolt was put down rather quickly, but it took another six months to disarm rebel elements of the Tanzanian military.

Royal Marine units regularly deployed to Northern Ireland to help contain that conflict. Referred to as “the Troubles,” the Northern Ireland conflict lasted from 1969 through 1998. In total, 24 Royal Marines died as a result of protestant snipers and bombers.

Between 1974 and 1984, the Royal Marines undertook three United Nations peacekeeping tours of duty in Cyprus. The first was operation took place after the Turkish invasion in November 1974. 41 Commando took over responsibility for the Limassol District from the 2^nd Battalion Guard’s Brigade. 41 Commando was the first Royal Marine unit to wear the light blue beret of the United Nations Command.

RM 003 Falklands — The Battle for Stanley

When Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands in April 1982, the United Kingdom dispatched a task force to recapture them, which given the necessity for an amphibious assault, included the Royal Marine Commando. British troops landed at San Carlos Water on East Falkland and moved across the entire island to the capital city of Stanley. In Royal Marine parlance, the troops “yomped” across the Falklands, which means a long-distance force march in full kit. Stanley fell to the Brits on 14 June 1982. Major General Jeremy Moore, Royal Marines, commanded the land forces in the Falklands Conflict.

During the 1991 Gulf War, 24 Marines from Kilo Company, 41 Commando served as six-man raiding teams aboard Royal Navy destroyers and frigates. They were mainly used as ship boarding parties. Elements of 3 Commando Brigade were deployed to provide aid and protection to Iraqi Kurds in Northern Iraq as part of Operation Safe Haven.

RM 007 — Royal Marine Commando, Helmand Province

After the turn of the century, Royal Marines began converting from their light-infantry role towards an expanded force-protection role. The British refer to this reorganization as Commando-21: the establishment of two battalion-sized commando units (which included 40 Commando and 45 Commando. Each organization consists of six company sized units, and these organized into “troops,” (platoons). The change has given the Royal Marines more firepower, greater mobility, better access to intelligence, and more operational flexibility. The size of each commando is roughly 692 of all ranks. 41 Commando has taken on a specialized maritime mission since 2017 under the auspices of 3 Commando Brigade.

Now approaching the end of the second decade of the 21^st Century, Royal Marines and their American counterparts have never been closer. They share a tradition, a similar mission, and the title Marine goes a very long way in defining who they are. To cement this tie, British flight officers have begun training alongside Marine Corps aviators; US Marine officers serve in exchange billets in the United Kingdom, and lately, junior Royal Marine officers (three so far) have begun serving 18-month tours within US Marine Corps ground units. US Marine Corps lieutenants have not yet started serving in similar capacities in the United Kingdom, but it is likely that this will happen in the future.

Sources:

Ballantyne, I. Strike from the Sea. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004
Chappell, M. Wellington’s Peninsula Regiments. Oxford: The Oxford Press, 2004
Moore, J. The First Fleet Marines. Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1989
Mountbatten, L. Combined Operations: The Official Story of the Commando. New York: Macmillan Company, 1943
Poyntz, W. H. Per Mare, Per Terram: Reminiscences of Thirty-two Years’ Military, Naval, and Constabulary Service. London: Print & Publishing Company, 1892
Thompson, J. The Royal Marines, from Sea Soldiers to a Special Force. London: Pan Books, 2001

Endnotes:

[1] A mole is a massive stone structure constructed to serve as a pier, a breakwater, or causeway between bodies of water.

[2] The operation at Belle Isle was an amphibious expedition intended to capture the French island off the Brittany coast during the Seven Years’ War. The initial attack was repulsed, but a second landing forced a beach head. After a siege of six weeks, the French surrendered (as they almost always do) and this gave the British total control of the island. Belle Isle was returned to French authority after the Treaty of Paris in 1763.

[3] The First Fleet consisted of eleven ships that departed from Portsmouth, England on 13 May to establish a penal colony that became the first European settlement in Australia. The fleet involved two Royal Navy vessels, three store ships, and six convict transports carrying between 1,000 to 1,500 convicts, Marines, seamen, civil officers, and free people. From England, the fleet sailed to Rio de Janeiro, east to Cape Town and then to Botany Bay … arriving between 18 to 20 January 1788.

[4] The Congreve rocket was designed and developed by Sir William Congreve in 1804; it was an adaptation of the Mysorean rockets used against the British in India. By 1813, there were three classes of Congreve rockets: heavy, medium, and light. Heavy rockets consisted of between 100 and 300 pounds but were generally regarded as too cumbersome to use in the field. Medium rockets were between 24 and 42 pounds, and from two to four feet in length. Light rockets were between 6 and 18 pounds and from 16 to 25 inches in length. Medium and light rockets could be case shot, shell, or explosive.

[5] Major General John Robyns, Royal Marines, (1780-1857) served with distinction during the Napoleonic Wars, including Martinique, and the War of 1812. In America, Robyn faced off against the U. S. Marines at Bladensburg, Washington, Baltimore, and New Orleans.

[6] This was true in the United States, as well. My grandmother was devastated when I joined the U. S. Marine Corps in 1962. Every member of my family up until then had served in the Army. It wasn’t until 1965 when my uncle (my grandmother’s son, a career army NCO) was able to convince her that the Marines was the right choice for me. I was, at the time, a very proud and somewhat cocky corporal of Marines. By the time I received my commission in 1975, Grandmother had fully embraced my service and bragged to her few remaining friends that her grandson was a United States Marine.

[7] The Victoria Cross is the United Kingdom’s highest and most prestigious award for gallantry in the face of the enemy.

[8] Following World War II, British authorities attempted to form the Malayan Union. Their goal was to create a state wherein all citizens (Malay, Chinese, and Indian) would have equal stature, but many ethnic Malayans, along with regional rulers, rejected this scheme. Armed insurgency first occurred on 16 June 1948 when three of four targeted plantation managers were assassinated. The ensuring guerrilla war involved pro-communist, anti-British forces who engaged in terror tactics like those employed by the Viet Cong during the Viet Nam War. Nearly 12,000 people lost their lives in this 12-year conflict.

Jarhead Adventures

By Cliff Judkins [1]

Chu Lai AB 1966 At the time [in 1966], there was only the expeditionary field of 4,000 feet of shifting metal. All takeoffs were with Jet-Assisted Take Off (JATO) bottles (lots of things went wrong with these —especially at night) and all landings were arrested. One day we taxied in to VMA-223 from a mission and noticed an Air Force C-123 parked at the main ramp. It had made an emergency landing at Chu Lai.

That night at the club, the only passenger from the C-123 was there. He was an F-100 pilot in his flight suit on crutches and with two broken legs. Of course, we wanted to know how he broke his legs. He told us that he was an F-100F (two-seater) Misty Fast FAC (Airborne Forward Air Controller). The aircrew took turns flying front and back seat. He said that it was his day to go up North in the back seat. They found the target for the F-105s and marked it with 5″ white phosphorus (WP) rockets. Then, after the 105s were done, they were supposed to fly low and fast and take an after-action picture of the target. He was the guy with the hand-held camera.

Of course, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) knew the routine and began shooting the shit out of them. The front seat guy did a lot of jinking and somehow, the lens came off the camera and disappeared. The aircraft safely got “feet wet” and in-flight refueled for their return trip home down south to Tui Hoa. Our guy said that he kept looking for the lens but the front seater said to forget it. They would find it after landing. Upon landing and taxi back, the front seater called “Canopy Clear” and raised the canopy. The lens had landed near one of the actuators for the ejection seat. The back-seater said that he heard this tremendous explosion and realized what had happened when he got seat separation about 250 feet up at the top of the arc and, looking down saw a miniature F-100 below him missing a canopy. He said that it was like a “Wily Coyote” cartoon.

There was a point where you stop going up, a pause, and then a rapid going down thing. The F-100 didn’t have a zero/zero seat either (needed 100 knots and 100 feet). So, he said that he had always heard that in a long fall, one dies of a heart attack before one hits the ground. So he said he kept shouting: “Come on heart attack.”

The drogue chute had deployed and that kept his feet straight down. It was real steep near the taxiway, they had been doing a lot of excavating, and it had rained. He hit feet first. The un-deployed chute saved his back and kept it straight. He skidded down the embankment into a large pool of water. He had two simple fractures. Needless to say, he couldn’t buy another drink that night.

This next story is from a pilot who was in VMFA 314 at Chu Lai in ’69. Vietnam era F4 guys will appreciate this story. Here’s another ‘bad day’ from Chu Lai:

F-4B Phantom II VMFA 323 I was one of a half-dozen replacements who checked-in with MAG-13 on August 2. We were not all assigned to VMFA-314 though. There were two other combat squadrons in the Air Group: VMFA-115 (the Able Eagles), and VMFA-323 (the Death Rattlers). All three squadrons flew the McDonnell Douglas F4B Phantom II and shared common living areas. Although we may have been in different squadrons, eventually we all got to know each other very well.

The first thing we six rookies did was attend an Air Group briefing in an underground bunker protected by a thick layer of sandbags. This bunker served as our group intelligence center. (When I was there in `66, we used a house trailer. I guess things got hotter when the gooks realized that I left and started flying for Delta). Suddenly, an urgent radio call interrupted our briefing. We listened as one of VMFA-115s aircraft radioed-in to report a problem. The aircraft had been hit by enemy ground fire and could not lower its landing gear. The pilot was going to attempt a belly landing on the runway. At that news, we all raced outside near the runway to grab a good spot from which to watch the crash landing.

Crash crews raced to cover the runway with a layer of fire retardant foam while the damaged F4 circled overhead, burning down its load of fuel. Two arresting cables were strung across the middle of the runway. The cables were anchored on each end by a chain made with heavy, 40-pound links. The plan was for the F4 to lower his tail hook, to belly-land in the foam, to catch one of the arresting wires, and to come to a screeching halt.

It did not quite happen that way.

After burning off most of his fuel, the pilot gingerly lowered the airplane onto the foamed runway. A spark set off the fumes in the jet’s empty wing tanks and they erupted into flames. All one could see racing down the runway were two wingtips protruding from an orange and black ball of fire heading toward the arresting cables. The F4 hit the first arresting cable. We watched the cable snap and hurl its 40-pound chain links skyward. Then the plane hit the second arresting cable. It also parted and flung its chain links. The aircraft was now just a ball of fire heading toward the end of the runway.

Then we heard, Boom! Boom!

The pilot had lit his afterburners. He was attempting to takeoff without wheels! As the aircraft roared toward the end of the runway, it slowly struggled skyward. It got airborne and began to climb nearly vertically. Then, both the pilot and his back-seater, the radar intercept officer (RIO), ejected.

We stared in wonder as the aircraft crashed into the nearby ocean. The two crewmen slowly floated down in their parachutes. The wind carried them over the ocean and they too soon splashed down. A rescue helicopter was on the scene immediately. Both of the F-4 crewmen, treading water, raised their right hand. This was a signal to the chopper that they were unharmed. The helicopter slowly lowered itself and plucked the pilot out of the water and into the safety of the helicopter. The helicopter then turned its attention to the RIO. As the helicopter slowly lowered itself over the RIO, the helicopter pilot suddenly lost control of his chopper, and he crashed into the water on top of the RIO. As soon as the chopper hit the water, its pilot regained control, got airborne again, and yanked the RIO from the water. Although the RIO was rescued safely, his leg was broken when the helicopter crashed on top of him.

That night at the Officers Club, the RIO sat with his leg elevated and encased in a full-leg cast. As he imbibed a few, he related his story: “First, we got the shit shot out of us. But, hey, that’s okay —we weren’t hurt. Then, we survived a belly landing. But, that was okay too, we weren’t hurt. Then the pilot decided he’d take off without wheels, but that worked out well too. Then we survived an aircraft ejection [2] and water landing, but that was also okay, we weren’t hurt. Then the damn rescue helicopter crashed on me and broke my leg!”

Endnotes:

[1] In 1963, (then) First Lieutenant Cliff Judkins experienced an in-flight fire while refueling during a trans-Pacific flight. After he ejected from his aircraft, his parachute failed to open. He fell 15,000 feet into the Pacific … and survived. You can read about it here.

[2] The F-4 B was fitted with the Martin-Baker ejection seat. Powerful rockets launched the pilot and RIO seats out of the aircraft, propelling them clear of a disabled aircraft. Most everyone who ejected experienced significant back trauma, including broken back.