In August 1950, Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN (pictured right), the commander of the United Nations’ naval forces, suggested that a small-scale raiding force should be formed to operate against the Communist lines of communication. The original intention was that this group be composed of volunteers from the British Far Eastern Fleet, but it was subsequently decided to enlarge on the original conception and to send out a small Royal Marines’ Commando unit. The force would be placed under U. S. Navy command and would be equipped and maintained from United States sources. On 16 August, the commanding officer-designate reported to the Admiralty, and the formation of the unit began. Two weeks later, the first party embarked aboard aircraft and left for Japan (See footnote 1).
The unit originally was about 200 strong (subsequently increased to 300), with personnel drawn from two sources. Fifty percent came from the various Royal Marine establishments in the United Kingdom and were assembled at the Commando School at Bickleigh. The remainder came from a draft which was at that time on its way to the 3d Commando Brigade of the Royal Marines in Malaya. This party was diverted at Singapore and flown to Japan (See footnote 1).
The commanding officer 41 Commando was given three weeks in which to train his men and be ready for operations. However, 48 hours later the first party left! This was a small subunit composed almost entirely of volunteers from the fleet. It operated as part of a United States Army raiding company and carried out raids on the west coast of Korea. Subsequently, it landed at Inchon and fought with the Army for three weeks before rejoining the main unit in early October. These raids were not a great success[1].
Following the successful amphibious assault of the US X Corps at Inchon, South Korea in September 1950, President Harry S. Truman directed General Douglas A. MacArthur, Commanding UN forces, to pursue the remnants of the largely-defeated communist Korean People’s Army into North Korea, whence they came. The Chinese warned MacArthur not to approach China’s border with North Korea, which was the Yalu River.
Discounting the Chinese warning as bluster, General MacArthur ordered the US Eighth Army across the 38th parallel to advance northward on the western side of the peninsula toward Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea.
Unknown to MacArthur, the Chinese had feared a UN invasion of North Korea since the Inch’on landing in September 1950. It was then that the Chinese began preparations to enter the war by sending supplies and support troops into North Korea. Ultimately, China would stage 21 combat divisions in Manchuria (later increased to 33 divisions) to move against UN forces.
Chinese leader Mao Zedong ordered his armies into North Korea on 19 October 1950, under the command of General Peng Dehuai. Peng promptly moved against the Eighth Army, whose lead elements had advanced beyond Pyongyang and were advancing along two separate routes toward the Yalu River.
The Chinese First Offensive (October 25—November 6) stunned the Eighth Army; one American infantry division and four South Korean infantry divisions were mauled in the battle of Onjŏng-Unsan.
Meanwhile, to the east, two divisions of X Corps landed along the North Korean coast on 26 October. The South Korean I Corps was moving northward up the coast road toward the Sino-Soviet border. Widely separated, these units made them a tempting target for overwhelming Chinese forces. US Marines and South Korean forces fought their first engagement against the Chinese at Sudong, inland from the port city of Hungnam. At Sudong, a Marine regiment defeated an attacking Chinese division, killing more than 600 communist soldiers … an engagement that provided clear evidence the Chinese were in North Korea, and in large numbers.
The X Corps[2]first objective, the village of Hagaru-ri, rested near the southern tip of the Chosin reservoir, a narrow mountain lake that provided hydroelectric power tothe mining industries of northern Korea. The area of the reservoir was a cold barren battleground where deep foxholes could be dug into the frozen earth only with the help of explosives and bulldozers.
With its supplies moving by truck, the 1stMarine Division established battalion-sized bases at Chinhŭng-ni and Kot’o-ri, villages along the Main Supply Route (MSR). The division began its final march to the reservoir on November 13, with the 5thMarine Regiment and 7thMarine Regiment in column and moving cautiously. Each regiment was reinforced by an artillery battalion, a tank company, combat engineers, and headquarters and service units. On 15 November, lead elements of the 7thMarines reached Hagaru-ri. From there the regiment prepared for its next advance, west of the reservoir to Yudam-ni, 14 miles away; the 5thMarines cautiously advanced up the reservoir’s right bank.
Commanding the 1stMarine Division, Major General Oliver. P. Smith was unhappy with this risky deployment[3]and was able to persuade Major General Almond to allow the Marines to concentrate at Hagaru-ri and replace the eastern force with a unit from the 7th Infantry Division.
Almond then ordered Major General David G. Barr, U. S. Army, commanding the 7thInfantry Division, to form a regimental combat team of two infantry battalions, an artillery battalion and other troops. This team was formed out of the 31stInfantry Regiment, officially designated RCT-31. It was commanded by Colonel Allan D. MacLean and is often referred to by historians as Task Force MacLean. The task force numbered 3,200 US Army and South Korean troops. RCT-31 replaced the Marines east of the reservoir on November 25.
General Smith used this operational pause to strengthen the defenses of Hagaru-ri and build a rough airfield for emergency resupply and medical evacuations. A battalion of Marines manned the most vulnerable part of the perimeter, but much of the position had to be manned by non-infantry units and personnel[4]. The Marine Corps’ investment in making “every Marine a rifleman” would soon pay dividends.
Meanwhile, as the Marines advanced, General Peng ordered the uncommitted Ninth Army Group to leave Manchuria and destroy the 1stMarine Division. Commanded by General Song Shilun, the Ninth Army consisted of twelve infantry divisions in three armies. In total, the Ninth Army consisted of 150,000 infantry troops. While armed with machineguns and mortars, the Chinese did not have much artillery. Still, the Chinese believed that their superiority in numbers, their stealth, night time attacks, ambushes, and surprise would enable them to defeat UN Forces near Chosin Reservoir.
The Ninth Army Group moved into positions on either side of the reservoir with five divisions; it moved three more divisions to cut the road south of Hagaru-ri and attack Kot’o-ri. General Smith, benefiting from aggressive intelligence operations, knew the Chinese had massed around his division; General Almond did not share Smith’s concerns.
In the last week of November 1950, the Ninth Army Group launched simultaneous division-level attacks on the 1stMarine Division at Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri, and Kot’o-ri … and on Task Force MacLean, east of the reservoir. The 5thMarines and 7thMarines, having met major Chinese forces in a daylight attack on 27 November, quickly prepared a perimeter defense for night action. The divisional enclaves at Hagaru-ri and Kot’o-ri were better prepared, but there was far more terrain to defend than there were Marines available to defend it. Halfway between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, one Marine rifle company defended Tŏktong Pass, where the Chinese 59th Division had positioned a major roadblock. RCT-31, meanwhile, was strung out along the east shoreline road in seven different locations.
In three days of intense night battles and daylight probes starting on the night of November 27–28, all of the major Marine positions held; RCT-31 did not[5]. By the time the surviving soldiers managed to struggle on foot and in small, disorganized groups around the frozen reservoir or directly across the ice to Hagaru-ri, they numbered only 670; half of them were fit for duty. Colonel MacLean was not one of the survivors.
The Marine regiments, on the other hand, though suffering losses of one-third to one-half in their rifle company strength, managed to halt or curb Chinese attacks, which were aimed at penetrating the perimeters and overrunning artillery positions, the airfield, and command posts. Around the clock artillery fire and air strikes by Navy and Marine Corps close air support aircraft during the day severely punished the Chinese.
There was one serious misstep, however: General Smith and the 1stMarine Regiment commander (Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller) decided to send a convoy of tanks and resupply trucks from Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri on 29 November without realizing that the entire area was then swarming with General Peng’s Ninth Army Group.
What happened was this: during the night of 27 November 1950, the entire UN line, extending some 35-miles west and south of the Chosin Reservoir, came under attack. By morning, the 1stMarine Division and RCT-31 were under siege in six separate enclaves. Two regiments of Marines (and artillery) (or what was left of them) held Yudam-ni. Fourteen miles south at Hagaru-ri, the 1stMarine Division command post, two artillery batteries, the equivalent of a battalion of infantry and headquarters troops were holding out against superior numbers of Chinese. At Koto-ri, 11-miles further south along the X Corps MSR, a Marine headquarters, rifle battalion, and artillery battery continued to resist.
Both X Corps and 1stMarine Division operational planners could see that securing the one-lane MSR connection to all embattled forces would be the key in preventing a collapse (and the destruction) of UN forces. The pressure being applied to forward units was unremitting. Accordingly, all available combat units operating south of Chinhung-ni were ordered to Koto-ri.
By that same afternoon, Koto-ri had become a vast vehicle park of cargo vehicles moving up from the rear —but they were accompanied by a mixed bag of units. Among them, Company G, 1stMarine Regiment, Company B, RCT-31, and 41 Commando, Royal Marines. Involved in the mix were scores of trucks brimming with Army headquarters and service troops, their equipment and baggage —and no one was quite sure how many men there were within the Koto-ri perimeter. Colonel Puller ordered his headquarters to organize these transients into a convoy that would be able to break through to Hagaru-ri on the following morning.
The task force was placed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, Commanding Officer, 41 Independent Commando, Royal Marines (pictured right). Colonel Drysdale was informed of this appointment, but not many of his newly assigned subordinates knew about it. In fact, Captain Charles Peckham, commanding Company G, RCT-31 later stated that Colonel Puller had personally ordered him to lead the convoy all the way to Hagaru-ri[6].
Included in what became known as Task Force Drysdale were 250 Marines of 41 Independent Commando, USMC Headquarters and Service troops, a Marine Corps infantry company, a US Army infantry company, a company of tanks, and numerous medium-to-light cargo vehicles loaded with supplies. The task force was ambushed by regimental sized Chinese communists enroute to their objective. One-third of the force (tanks and infantry) fought through to Hagaru-ri; another third fought its way back to Kot’o-ri. The remainder (162 officers and men) died or became captives.
Nevertheless, on the morning of 29 November, units attached to Task Force Drysdale followed up UN artillery and airstrikes by attacking two Chinese-held areas on the MSR —which opened the way for the attached convoy of vehicles. Captain Bruce Clark, commanding Company D, 1stTank Battalion, later discovered the convoy stalled along the MSR. After refueling his tanks, Clark ordered First Lieutenant Paul Sanders’ five-tank platoon to support 41 Commando and Company G assaults on the ridgeline overlooking the MSR. Sanders conferred with Drysdale, who assigned him a common radio frequency.
With airstrikes and tanks in direct support, 41 Commando and Company G delivered up a spirited attack and several Chinese blocking points were destroyed … but this is the point where the action began to fall apart. Lieutenant Sanders lost radio contact with Drysdale and had to suspend his firing. Exiting his tank, Sanders saw that the convoy had fallen far behind his position, nor could he spot Peckham’s Company B, which had advanced out of visual range. Sanders, still in contact with Captain Clark, requested instructions. Clark advised him to proceed slowly along the MSR; another tank platoon would follow in his wake.
As soon as the Chinese blockade on the ridge overlooking the MSR just north of Koto-ri had been cleared, 41 Commando deployed between the roadway and the ridgeline to protect the long column of vehicles. It was a cold, miserable day, with snow flurries whipping into the faces of soldiers and Marines. Marine Corsairs were on station overhead, but the shifting mist and jumbled terrain forced these aircraft to pull up before they could get close enough to their targets. Progress along the MSR was agonizingly slow. (Shown left, elements of 41 Independent Commando, 1950).
In the vanguard, Captain Peckham maneuvered his company with great care. Behind Peckham, Captain Carl Sitter’s Company G maneuvered against numerous Chinese infantrymen who had been driven briefly to ground by Peckham’s infantry. As Peckham’s vanguard inched forward in the column lead, and given his present circumstances, Drysdale’s natural aggressiveness may have overtaken his judgment. In Drysdale’s opinion, Peckham was moving too slowly, too methodically along the MSR.
It was well past noon, and as Peckham was focused on re-loading the lead platoon’s trucks, a tank surged past him. The next vehicle in line was a jeep bearing Drysdale, who yelled above the din, ‘Let’s move forward!’ Peckham demurred; he had wounded men on his hands and refused to advance until they had been sent safely away. Drysdale responded with a smiling ‘Tally Ho!’ and took off, drawing along with him 41 Commando, all the tanks, and Captain Sitter’s Company of Marines in his wake.
It wasn’t long, however, before the extensive column was slowed by a massive traffic jam where the soft-top vehicles became targets of opportunity for Chinese mortars on the heights. As a result of this, the convoy was soon fragmented by stalled vehicles and the smoking remains of burning trucks and jeeps. In the Chinese assault, large numbers of men were killed or wounded.
Peckham’s company, unable to move back into the column, became fragmented —stopped in trace by a burning ammunition truck that blocked the roadway. American and British marines under Major John McLaughlin, the Marine X Corps liaison officer, were helping to clear the roadway of wounded men and stalled vehicles. Unable to proceed, Peckham deployed his troops in roadside ditches to return the Chinese fire from the heights.
The eventual destruction of every radio in the column assured the loss of command and control, and this resulted in crumbling discipline. Unable to advance, numerous drivers simply turned their vehicles around in the vain hope of returning to Koto-ri. For a time, ambulances filled to capacity with wounded soldiers and Marines were getting through, but eventually, they were halted in their progress as the roadway was blocked with inoperable vehicles.
Colonel Drysdale’s combat elements, which included most of 41 Commando, Company D tanks, and Marine infantry from Company G, were briefly blocked at Pusong-ni, on a narrow defile about five miles north of Koto-ri. The choke point was eventually forced open, but the column’s progress was immediately halted again by a demolished bridge.
Lieutenant Sanders, whose tank platoon was Drysdale’s vanguard, was then ordered to move aside and allow the rear tank platoon to bypass the blown bridge. While the maneuver was accomplished (with difficulty), truck drivers became convinced that although tanks might get through, soft vehicles stood little chance. Drysdale sent his adjutant forward to evaluate the situation confronting forward elements; that officer was wounded. At the same time, massive gunfire from the surrounding heights incapacitated the Company G machine gun officer and wounded Colonel Drysdale. Command of the vanguard group passed to Captain Sitter, who ordered everyone to deploy and return fire.
British and American Marines jumped to the road to join the fight. Someone shouted “grenade,” which sent many troops ducking for cover. Private First Class William Baugh threw himself on top of the grenade, smothering it with his body, thereby saving the lives of the men around him[7].
As darkness descended over the MSR, Company D Tanks was feeling its way along the fire-swept roadway toward the Marine roadblocks guarding besieged Hagaru-ri. One of the tanks was knocked out by an anti-tank grenade and had to be shoved into a ditch to clear the roadway. Lieutenant Sanders passed the friendly roadblock almost before he realized he was safe. He had just passed the roadblock when his tank’s engine died —he had run out of fuel.
Company G passed through the roadblock at about 2015 —after more than ten hours on the move through “Indian country.” Company G was immediately placed along the Hagaru-ri defensive perimeter. Unhappily, the surge of Company G and Company D tank’s left the bulk of 41 Commando far behind. Without missing a beat, Chinese communists quickly surrounded the 200-plus Royal Marines and proceeded to reduce their numbers with lethal fire.
Rewinding for just a moment, the last cohesive unit to enter Koto-ri from the south was Company B, 1st Tank Battalion, which arrived at 1500. The bulk of the company, including soft vehicles, then advanced three miles up the MSR through moderate fire to find the tail of the convoy.
As Company B tanks drew close to the main convoy, far after the hour of darkness, they found the MSR blocked by destroyed vehicles. There was no way for the tanks to bypass the carnage; at that moment, heavy mortar fire began falling perilously close to the tank company’s fuel and ammunition trucks.
Further advance would only accomplish the destruction of these tanks; the company was forced to defend itself through the night against massed Chinese infantry assaults. Several tankers were killed or injured, and several soft vehicles were lost, but the company was destined to survive.
Of about 1,200 U.S. Army soldiers, Marines, and Royal Marines —plus a few South Koreans, who had started out from Koto-ri on the morning of November 29, only about 250 had arrived at Hagaru-ri by midnight. The rest were scattered along several miles of the road in at least six separate groups, isolated by Chinese strongpoints and impassible snarls of wrecked and burning vehicles of every description.
The northernmost MSR enclave was manned by about 200 Royal Marines under Drysdale, who in spite of his painful wounds, directed a spirited defense, which denied the Chinese their intention to further fragment his bloodied unit. Royal Marine Casualties were heavy, particularly among the officers, but they nevertheless inched steadily along toward Hagaru-ri. The bulk of these Marines, including many wounded, passed through the outer U.S. Marine roadblock after midnight. After taking muster, the Royal Marines found that fully one-half of their original complement of 250 had been killed, wounded, or were missing.
Remaining on the MSR were some 500 Americans, British and South Koreans who were trapped within the five major enclaves extending several hundred yards through the defile south of Pusong-ni—or, about halfway between Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri. The northernmost group was under the command of the 1st Marine Division’s logistics officer, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Chidester. When he was shot through both legs, he passed command to Major John McLaughlin. McLaughlin found that he had about 135 men under his command, including Captain Peckham and what remained of Company B, RCT-31. McLaughlin also counted a U.S. Marine military police section under Warrant Officer Lloyd Dirst, a score of Royal Marines, assorted headquarters personnel, and an ever-growing contingent of wounded.
Two-hundred yards south of McLaughlin’s position were two understrength platoons of Company B, RCT-31 and several Marine stragglers, who had taken cover in a roadside ditch. Thirty yards further south were about 95 Marine staff officers, clerks and technicians under Captain Michael Capraro, a Marine public information officer.
A short distance south of Capraro’s force was another group of 45 Marines under the 1st Marine Division motor transport officer, Major Henry ‘Pop’ Seeley. A fifth group of men served under the 1stMarine Division Personnel officer, Colonel Harvey Walseth. Walseth had turned his group around after dark and slowly fought his way toward Koto-ri. When Walseth found that his vehicles were completely blocked by Company B Tanks, he and his troops dismounted and walked the rest of the way to Koto-ri.
Captain Peckham commanded the only viable infantry increment in the northernmost enclave, but he was not particularly enthused by the quality of the troops: many of these men were panic-stricken South Korean conscripts who used up the bulk of their ammunition firing at phantoms.
Warrant Officer Dirst, the MP section leader, sought to steady his men by striding up and down the road, pipe in hand, barking out curt commands. He managed to leave steady, organized soldiers and Marines in his wake. When he heard troops firing too much precious ammunition, he gently admonished the offenders, telling them that they had only to fight through to daybreak to draw the awesome support of Marine war planes and hopefully, ground reinforcements. In the end, however, Dirst was mortally wounded. Another steady hand was Major McLaughlin, who left no doubt about who was in command and how the defense was to be conducted. As ammunition supplies dwindled, McLaughlin personally collected rounds from the dead and wounded and distributed them to the men who seemed most composed. Sometime after midnight, the remnants of the two platoons from Company B, RCT-31 managed to work their way into McLaughlin’s perimeter. It was a welcome reinforcement.
Voices speaking from the dark in broken English called upon Captain Capraro to surrender his men in return for good treatment[8]. After trading insults, the Chinese informed Capraro that his small, beleaguered force were facing three regiments of Chinese infantry. Continued resistance was pointless, they told him. Capraro refused and prepared his men to meet renewed assaults.
Captain Peckham, in Major McLaughlin’s enclave, was reduced to handing out rifle ammunition in increments of two or three at a time. The South Koreans, meanwhile, drifted away into the hills. Peckham soon counted less than a dozen effective men in his command.
Having persuaded captive Sergeant Guillermo Tovar to act as an intermediary to carry a surrender offer to the Americans, Chinese fire abated as a delegation approached Major McLaughlin’s position. Once again, if the major surrendered his forces, American wounded would be well-treated. McLaughlin asked for time to discuss the proposal with his officers; the Chinese agreed. McLaughlin instructed Tovar to seek out Major Seeley and tell him to delay any surrender for as long as possible. It would soon be light; the beleaguered Americans could get help from close air support aircraft.
While Major McLaughlin was meeting with the Chinese delegation along the railway embankment, another Chinese officer approached Captain Peckham. Peckham was promised good treatment if he surrendered his forces. Captain Peckham gave the man a package of cigarettes and asked that he take them to his superior. If the Chinese agreed to give up, Peckham told him, he would see that the Chinese were fed and well-treated.
Major McLaughlin discovered Colonel Chidester, wounded, and lying in a ditch. McLaughlin told him about the Chinese proposal; Chidester reluctantly urged McLaughlin to accept the terms. A Chinese officer, meanwhile, returned to Peckham and told him that unless the Americans relinquish their weapons within fifteen minutes, a full regiment would launch their assault. Peckham asked for additional time to get the word out to his troops. He then set about destroying their weapons. McLaughlin approached the Chinese officer and informed him, “If we surrender, it won’t be because you beat us; we will only surrender to get our wounded cared for. If we cannot get our wounded evacuated, then we will fight on.”
Major Seeley, in the meantime, had assumed from the start that a relief expedition would be mounted from Hagaru-ri or Koto-ri at first light. For now, he thought the Chinese were being held back; the greatest threat seemed to come from the dank, subzero chill. Troop leaders constantly checked their subordinates and one another for signs of frostbite and reminded all hands to keep their limbs in constant motion. Ammunition supply was another constant worry; Seeley commanded mostly headquarters personnel who were issued limited amounts of ammunition.
When Seeley heard Tovar yelling his name in the dark, he ordered his troops to cease firing. Tovar approached and asked Seeley to accompany him into a field on the east side of the road. There he told the major what was going on and about McLaughlin’s desire to stall for as long as possible.
Farther on, the two Americans were met by two Chinese who spoke no English but nevertheless made it clear that Major Seeley was to have his troops put down their weapons and advance with their hands up. As the exchange was winding down, Major Eagen, who the Chinese had carried down from the heights, spoke out of the darkness and asked Seeley to come talk. Eagen, severely wounded in both legs, told Seeley everything he knew about McLaughlin’s situation and the Chinese offer; he had seen the Chinese setting up heavy mortars on the roadway, so he urged Seeley to surrender. This was Seeley’s first inkling as to the size of the Chinese force, but he still wanted to wait until dawn, which might bring relief.
Eagen was in the middle of pleading his case for the many wounded when a Chinese officer interrupted the exchange. It was clear from their hand signs that they wanted a decision. Seeley asked Eagen to stall them, then walked back to his enclave by the river. He told Sergeant Tovar to ask McLaughlin to stall while he and his troops dug in more securely. Major Seeley had made his decision: he was not going to give in. By then, however, the Chinese had begun disarming McLaughlin’s people —only a few of whom were capable of putting up further resistance.
Major Seeley was next approached by Warrant Officer Dee Yancey, who reported that he had reconnoitered the adjacent Changjin River and found that it was solid ice. There seemed to be no Chinese fire coming from the far shore, so Yancey suggested that the group break out. Major Seeley readily agreed. The entire group, including the wounded, started west across the river toward a ridge that might provide good cover. Capraro’s force joined Seeley’s west of the river where two seriously wounded Marines were discovered, who had been lost on patrol three days earlier. Seeley’s group struggled up to the ridge, clambered over the top and turned south toward Koto-ri at an agonizingly slow pace.
Major Seeley’s enclave was out of sight of the Chinese on the MSR before sunrise but did hear the voices of Chinese that seemed to be approaching from the rear. Warrant Officer Yancey, who had suffered painful shrapnel wounds in both legs and back, dropped behind as the first Chinese came over the ridge. A former Marine Corps rifle team shooter, Yancey quickly dropped two Chinese point men while the remainder of the American group scrambled down the slope. The Chinese patrol went to ground, and Yancey followed his countrymen, all of whom reached Koto-ri.
Of the approximately twelve-hundred men assigned to Task Force Drysdale, 162 remain listed as killed or missing in action. Another 159 men were wounded and repatriated. More than 300 American and British troops were marched off to prison camps. Of those, 18 Marines escaped the following spring. About two dozen Britons and several dozen American soldiers and Marines went to ground in the hills, cut off from friendly forces. Most of these survived. Seventy-five percent of all vehicles allocated to Task Force Drysdale were destroyed.
Sergeant Tovar managed to escape captivity while helping to prepare the wounded for return to Koto-ri. The wounded Colonel Drysdale was among the survivors who made it to Hagaru-ri, but 41 Commando had suffered 61 casualties, which would increase to 93 before X Corps completed the breakout to Hungnam on 10 December 1950.
Colonel Chidester and Major Eagen were never seen again.
After being evacuated to South Korea, 41 Commando was withdrawn to Japan to be reconstituted in January 1951. Before departing Korea, Colonel Drysdale’s stated, “This was the first time that the Marines of the two nations had fought side by side since the defense of the Peking Legations in 1900. Let it be said that the admiration of all ranks of 41 Commando for their brothers in arms was and is unbounded. They fought like tigers and their morale and esprit de corps is second to none.”
How did the American Marines feel about their British comrades? According to author/historian Eric Hammel, one US Marine spoke for most when he said, “I walked into Hagaru-ri from Yudam-ni where I learned that the British had supplied us with a fighting force. Before that we laughed at the words `U.N. Forces’ because we had not seen the troops of any other nation except the Chinese. I was delighted to meet the British. When they came around you could stop looking for a fight, because they would be right in the middle of it.”
Post Script:
Douglas Burns Drysdale was born in Hampstead, England, United Kingdom on 2 October 1916. He spent the majority of his youth in Argentina where he developed a life-long passion for horsemanship and hunting.
Commissioned in the Royal Marines in 1935, he initially commanded the Marine Detachment aboard HMS Renownthrough the first three years of World War II and then joined 2ndBattalion, Royal Marines in Iceland. He was promoted to captain in June 1942 and assigned to the staff of the British Admiralty in Washington DC. It was during this tour that he had his first contact with the U. S. Marine Corps as a liaison officer until in 1943, he was assigned to serve as brigade major (chief of staff) of 3 Special Services Brigade and Commanding Officer, 44 Commando in Burma.
Following World War II, Drysdale served on the staff of the British Army Staff College, and on the staff of the officer’s school where he was promoted to acting lieutenant colonel. He was subsequently assigned to command 41 Independent Commando, Royal Marines.
His command of 41 Independent Commando in Korea was to become the highlight of his military career. For his actions at the Chosin Reservoir and his leadership of 41 Independent Commando, Colonel Drysdale was awarded two Silver Star medals (US) and the Distinguished Service Order (UK). Additionally, 41 Independent Commando was awarded the United States’ Presidential Unit Citation in recognition of its stellar performance during the Battle for Chosin Reservoir.
In late 1951, Drysdale relinquished command of 41 Independent Commando to Lieutenant Colonel Ferris N. Grant, RM. He subsequently served as the Royal Marine Representative at the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia until 1954. Between 1955 and 1962, Colonel Drysdale served as Commandant, Royal Marine Noncommissioned Officer’s School, staff officer in the office of the Commandant General, Royal Marines, and after his promotion to Colonel he commanded 3 Commando Brigade. Colonel Drysdale retired from active military service in 1962. He passed away on 22 June 1990 at the age of 73-years.
Notes:
[1]Source: Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, Royal Marines (1953)
[2]X Corps was commanded by Major General Ned Almond, U. S. Army. Almond served concurrently as General MacArthur’s chief of staff at his Tokyo headquarters and because of this, rather than being subordinate to the Eighth Army, operated independently from it. Almond took his marching orders directly from MacArthur, and no other. Almond had no amphibious operations experience, which given the mission assigned to X Corps, made him unqualified to command that organization. Beyond this, as a field general, Almond was operationally incompetent. See also…
[3]What made this a risky deployment, in General Smith’s opinion, was the plethora of intelligence gathered indicating a large presence of Chinese communist forces. This information, passed back to the headquarters of X Corps, was discounted and ignored. Not even after RCT-31 was decimated by overwhelming Chinese Communist forces on 27 November 1950 would Almond acknowledge the presence of this threat.
[4]In the Marine Corps, every Marine is a rifleman.
[5]One-third of the soldiers assigned to RCT-31 were killed or captured by the Chinese Army.
[6]This conversation was likely to have occurred before Puller realized that Colonel Drysdale was the senior combat officer present. Given the situation at the time, realizing that Puller’s plate was full-to-overflowing, he may not have thought to countermand his orders to Peckham.
[7]For this selfless act, PFC Baugh was awarded the Medal of Honor.
[8]This was a strategy the Chinese repeated several times along the MSR.
Fix Bayonets! 