Month: May 2015

Battery A moved to Corregidor on 17 February 1942. Remaining on Bataan was the Marine Air Warning Detachment, the USAFFE Guard, and Battery C. Disease became a significant problem: malaria began to take its toll, along with the heat and insufficient food to keep the Marines going.

Washington relieved MacArthur of his duties in the Philippines on 22 February. Major General Wainwright assumed command of the newly designated US Forces in the Philippines (USFIP).

The Japanese knew what they were doing: cleverly timed aerial bombardments kept the Marines from getting badly needed rest. After 24 March, air raids increased in their frequency; throughout the night, Japanese artillery harassed the Marines every 25 to 30 minutes. In one typical 24-hour period, two periods of shelling began at 0950 and 1450; six bombing raids began at 0400 and spaced throughout the day. PFC Kenneth R. Paulin of Company M was killed during the day by shellfire from the Cavite shore. Bombing raids ended at 2205, but began again at 0100.

By the end of March 1942, rations had been reduced to 1,000 calories per day and Wainwright discovered that all food stores on Corregidor would run out by the end of June. He radioed to MacArthur in Australia, but there was nothing MacArthur could do. No ship could get through the Japanese line. At the beginning of May, the defenders of Corregidor consumed only 30 ounces of food per day: 8 ounces of meat, 7 ounces of flour, 4 ounces of vegetables, 3 ounces of beans and cereals, 2 ounces of rice, and 3 ounces of milk. PFC Ben Lohman recalled that they ate mule meat whenever the Japanese bombing killed one of the animals. In the 4^th Marines, some of the men had lost 40 pounds as a result of reduced rations and the stress of Japanese bombardments.

Very slowly, the Marines were being deprived of the energy needed to resist the Japanese assault.

Bataan fell to the Japanese on 9 April 1942; 75,000 American soldiers were taken prisoner.

As men subsequently became available from disintegrating units, they were integrated into the 4^th Marines and assigned to support the beach defense. Fifty-eight sailors from the USS Canopus were organized into a reserve company and received training by Marine platoon sergeants. Ten Marines and an additional 40 sailors were added to the company after the fall of Bataan. The largest group of reinforcements involved 72 officers and 1,173 enlisted men from more than 50 different organizations —all of these assigned to the 4^th Marines, which may have transformed the regiment into the most unusual organizations in the history of the Corps. They involved Navy, Army, Philippine Army, and Philippine Scouts. Ordinary seamen found themselves alongside Army engineers, tankers, and aviation mechanics. By the end of April, the 4^th Marines numbered 229 officers, 3,770 men —of whom only 1,500 were Marines.

Lieutenant Colonel Beecher now commanded 360 Marines, 500 Filipinos, 100 American sailors, and 100 American soldiers. He armed them with the 1903 Springfield rifle, hand grenades, Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR), four 37mm guns, and eight 30-caliber machine guns. A few mortars and .50 machine guns were also available from cannibalized ships. But all these weapons wouldn’t do these defenders any good if the troops became ineffective due to a lack of fresh water.

Continued next week

The 4^th Marines moved out of its barracks after the Japanese attack on 29 December; it was safer in the field. 1^st Battalion, 4^th Marines assumed responsibility for the eastern sector (Manila Hill to Hooker Point) on the tail-end of the island; 2^nd Battalion, 4^th Marines moved to the western sector, and the provisional battalion assigned to the middle section of the island. On 1 January 1942, the 1^st Separate Marine Battalion was officially renamed 3^rd Battalion, 4^th Marines. None of the Marine commanders were kidding themselves. There was no way that a battalion of 350 men could defend a sector of beach extending from between 3,500 to 4,000 yards. Still, the Marines began constructing barbed wire barriers, tank traps, and a system of trenches. When the Marines ran out of sandbags, they improvised with powder cans. Marines also filled bottles with gasoline, intending to drop them on top of landing Japanese forces from their positions in the cliffs of Malinta Hill. They also constructed wooden chutes from which the Marines intended to drop aircraft bombs on the Japanese.

A few Marines remained on the Bataan peninsula, however, and the dispute between General MacArthur and Admiral Rockwell continued over who owned these Marines and how they would be assigned. Two antiaircraft batteries in the Mariveles area formed part of a naval defense battalion assigned to the southern coast of Bataan. When MacArthur learned of these Marines, he ordered one battery to serve as a guard force for USAFFE headquarters, but the battalion commander, Commander Frank J. Bridget countermanded the order and directed the Battery A commander to return to duty at Mariveles. Undeterred, MacArthur wrote directly to Admiral Rockwell requesting suspension of Commander Bridget’s order. Rockwell refused, informing MacArthur that these Marines had not been released to Army control. MacArthur ended the dispute by ordering two officers and forty Marines from Corregidor to serve as guards for USAFFE.

The Japanese made an amphibious landing at Langoskawayan Point on 23 January 1942, some 2,000 yards west of Mariveles. Commander Bridget ordered the commanders of Battery A and Battery C to send patrols to the Point, confirm the landing, and set up a blocking force if necessary. Commander Bridget did not let the battery commanders know that he had issued orders to each; now there were two Marine patrols hunting for Japanese, neither one aware of the presence of the other. Then Commander Bridget organized a hastily gathered platoon of 36 sailors and placed them under the command of Platoon Sergeant Robert A. Clement, who was ordered to “support” his two Marine Corps lieutenants. By hastily formed platoon, I mean that these sailors did not know how to load their rifles with ammunition. Clement held school for individuals unfamiliar with their weapons, and then he pushed on. Clement and his platoon triggered a Japanese ambush a short while later —the firing alerted the two Marine patrols of the presence of other assets. The Marines continued to probe, finding strong Japanese resistance; they soon realized that they didn’t have enough Marines to handle these Japanese troops.

The Japanese were professional in their conduct, and exceedingly aggressive. They not only moved forward, they sent out patrols to locate the American Marines, and they set up ambushes, inflicting heavy losses. So few Marines could not afford heavy losses. Lieutenant Holdredge and eleven Marines from Battery C were wounded in one early confrontation with the Japanese; one Marine was killed. Whenever the Marines attacked the Japanese, the Japanese put up a vigorous defense and then counterattacked; Lieutenant Hogaboom, commanding Battery A reported to Commander Bridget, “We cannot hold our ground with so few troops.” Bridget was not empathetic; he ordered Hogaboom to dig in for the night and prepare for another attack at first light. Fortunately for these few Marines, the 1^st Battalion, 57^th Infantry (Philippine Scouts) relieved the Marines during the night permitting Bridget to withdraw his battalion to Mariveles. It took the Philippine Scouts three days to destroy the Japanese landing force, a reinforced battalion.

Continued next week

Three days following the Japanese attack at Cavite, General MacArthur summoned Lieutenant Colonel William T. Clement, the Fleet Marine Officer, Asiatic Fleet to meet with him and Major General Richard K. Sutherland in an attempt to secure the release of Marines in the Philippines from Navy to Army control. MacArthur wanted a battalion to relieve a battalion of the 31^st Infantry Regiment to guard his headquarters.   Admiral Hart was adamant in his refusal to use his Marines as a guard force. On 15 December, Hart offered a counter proposal: convert the 4^th Marines to two regiments, combine them with two regiments of Philippine Constabulary, and employ these forces as a brigade, commanded by Colonel Howard.

Admiral Hart convinced Lieutenant General Sutherland that the Marines still needed additional field training after so many years of light duty in Shanghai. Sutherland agreed and detailed the 4^th Marines as beach defense on Corregidor. Later, on 2 January 1942, General MacArthur remarked that since the Marines had no tactical training, they were little use to him as a tactical combat organization.

On 20 December, Admiral Rockwell ordered Lieutenant Colonel Adams to move his 1^st Separate Marine Battalion to the Naval Section Base at Mariveles —a move that began the next day and was completed by Christmas day eve. Second Battalion, 4^th Marines began their move to Mariveles on Christmas Eve, completing their relocation and that of the regimental headquarters within two days. Admiral Rockwell then ordered a detachment of demolition Marines to destroy the Olongapo Navy Yard. Moreover, the obsolete cruiser USS Rochester was scuttled in Subic Bay, the PBY ramp destroyed, and all aviation fuel and submarine supplies were destroyed. Whatever facilities not blown up were set afire. On Christmas Eve, Japanese aircraft initially targeted American activities at Mariveles but ended up concentrating on a free-French freighter, the SS Si Kiang. The ship had been interned in Mariveles and a guard of eight Marines prevented the crew from moving the vessel. It its hold were much needed supplies of gasoline and flour, but before these materials could be off-loaded, Japanese aircraft bombed the ship and sent her to the bottom of Mariveles Bay. Two Marines were killed and three wounded in this action.

Christmas for everyone serving in the Philippines was nothing if not incongruent; the Marines were served a turkey dinner, but frequently had to run to the trenches to avoid Japanese bombers and strafing by fighter aircraft.

Four islands situated near its mouth protect Manila Bay. The largest of these is Corregidor, fortified prior to World War I with powerful coastal artillery and named Fort Mills. The tadpole shaped island is roughly three and a half miles long and one and a half miles wide at its head, and sits two miles off the southern tip of Bataan. The widest part of the island, called the topside, was the location of military headquarters and communications facilities, and a hospital. In the middle of the island was a small plateau, and this is where most of the officer’s quarters and enlisted barracks were located, along with the Malinta Tunnel, a vast storage shelter and personnel bunker. The tail of the island was called bottomside, the location of port facilities, and a small town named San Jose. Most of the coastal artillery was located in the area of topside, which included 23 batteries of 56 coastal artillery guns, 12 anti-aircraft batteries with 76 guns, and 10 searchlights.

The 4^th Marine Regiment began to move to Corregidor on 26 December; 400 Marines of the 1^st Separate Marine Battalion taken across the channel on lighters and then taken by narrow gauge railway to Middleside Barracks. The second battalion moved to the island on the following day, joined by the first battalion two days after that. The fortifications of Corregidor were so substantial that the Marines immediately felt as if they were finally safe. They were told that the island was impregnable —the Marines had nothing more to fear from any Japanese attack, but a Japanese aerial attack on 29 December quickly arrested all good feelings about Corregidor’s fortifications. Colonel Howard began an immediate inspection of the beach defense areas.

Continued next week

On 12 December 1941, IJA troops made another landing in southeastern Luzon. Mid-morning, 4^th Marines headquarters received notice of approaching enemy aircraft. An air raid was sounded, but after five minutes no aircraft appeared and field music sounded, “secure.” Suddenly, the roar of Japanese aircraft was heard. Apparently, seven fighters followed in a flight of PBY aircraft of Navy Patrol Wing 10 and, as these aircraft touched down, initiated their attack. All of the PBYs were soon in flames. The Japanese then turned toward Olongapo.

Marines at Olongapo opened fire on the Japanese aircraft with automatic rifles, rifles, and light machineguns, but had little effect. One Marine recounted, “The Japanese weren’t very impressed with our marksmanship; I’ve never seen more casual staffing runs than theirs.”

According to archivist J. Michael Miller, “Private First Class Thomas S. Allender was stationed on the water tower armed with a .30 caliber machine gun and soon engaged Japanese aircraft as they strafed the Navy Yard. ‘That god-dam plane was shooting at him, he’d run around to the other side of the tank and the guy would go by,’ recalled Master Technical Sergeant Ivan L. Buster, ‘and then the guy would come back and he’d run around to the other side of the tank again.’ Allender remained on the tower for the entire raid untouched, although the tank itself was riddled with machine gun fire, ‘with water spraying everywhere.’ A Marine gunnery sergeant lay in a ditch on his back firing his .45 pistol at the aircraft on their strafing runs. When asked why he was firing at all, he said, ‘This makes me feel better.’”

Bombers returned to Olongapo on 13 December dropping their loads on the Navy Yard and inside an adjacent town. No installations were actually hit, but bombs did straddle the regimental hospital located near the river. The Japanese did manage to kill another 13 civilians and wound 40 more. After this bombing, the 2^nd Battalion, 4^th Marines moved to the hills on the Manila Road, five miles outside the Navy Yard. Elements of the battalion were rushed to beach near Calapacuan Point to repel a Japanese landing on several occasions, but all of these were false alarms. Lieutenant Colonel Anderson ordered his Marines to construct permanent defensive positions along Mauquinaya Beach; he calmed his Marines by telling them, “Don’t worry men, the Japs got nothing bigger than 8-inch shells.” The Marines also coordinated with the Philippine Division in setting up blocking positions on the Manila Road at Mount Panaigar. It wouldn’t be enough.

On 22 December, the 48^th Division, Imperial Japanese Army landed north of Olongapo at Lingayen; most of the 2^nd Battalion returned to protect the Naval Station and it wasn’t long before the IJA crushed the defenders. Two days later another major force came ashore, the 16^th Division, IJA landing just 60 miles from Manila. Douglas MacArthur, commanding US Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) withdrew to the peninsula of Bataan.

Note: The intended use of Marines in the joint defense plan for the Philippines called for the transfer of the 4^th Marine Regiment to Army operational control. Admiral Hart believed that experience level of Marine Corps officers and NCOs made the 4^th Marine Regiment the strongest infantry regiment in the Philippines. He reminded MacArthur of this in a letter dated 8 December 1941, but MacArthur only wanted a single battalion of Marines to guard his headquarters in Manila.

Continued next week

The word was passed down to the Marines through the chain of command. At the barracks in Olongapo, a gong was sounded and continued for several minutes. One Marine inquired, “What in the hell is that sound?” An anonymous reply came, “It’s the general alarm,” and so the Marines tumbled out of their bunks, quickly dressed, and fell in to standard formation. The Executive Officer of the battalion stood before his men and informed them of the news: “Men, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and we are at war with Japan.” One salt remarked, “Christ … you got us up for that?”

By 10 December, Colonel Howard’s 4^th Marines and the 1^st Separate Marine Battalion worked on their defensive positions. Crew served weapons were employed around Olongapo as an anti-air defense, beach defensive positions, and fire teams were organized, demolition crews designated, and bridges designated for destruction should the Japanese land there. The regimental band was formed as a rifle platoon within E Company, and a company officer ordered to liaison with the 31^st Philippine Army Division.

One Marine remembered, “The supply corporal brought us clips of five rounds each for our rifles; a few hours later he brought us even more ammunition, and then a few hours after that he was passing out bandoliers of ammo … we looked like a bunch of Mexican bandits.”

The Japanese did attack the Philippines, but rather than initially targeting the facilities at Cavite, the Imperial Japanese Army focused its attention on US airfields and the capital of Manila. The Japanese did eventually find Cavite, however … nor did it take them very long. Three Marine anti-aircraft positions were located outside of the Navy Yard: Battery A was set in on the tip of Sangley Point, Battery B about one mile south of that, at Binacayan, and Battery D reinforced these with additional .50 machineguns.

Two Japanese combat teams came ashore in northern Luzon (Philippine Islands map left by E. A. Villar), securing airfields for Japanese aircraft to support additional amphibious landings. There was no alarm at Cavite, however. Workers came to the base as they normally did and the only sign of war was a detachment of Filipinos digging air-raid trenches near the Commandancia. Then, at a little past noon on 10 December, the droning of numerous aircraft engines were hard and an air raid siren activated. Marines rushed to their stations and observed 54 aircraft in three “V” formations approach Cavite, and not long after that, the bombs began to fall.

The first two sticks of bombs fell into the water, but the rest of the bombs landed inside the Naval Station; small fires began to spread. Marines began firing, but soon learned that the aircraft were flying at 23,000 feet … far above the 15,000 foot ceiling of the Marine weapons. One Marine lieutenant noted, “We knew we were outmatched.” The first Marine to lose his life in defense of the Philippine Islands was PFC Thomas L. Wetherington, killed by bomb fragments.

Some Marines were assigned to man machineguns, in anticipation of Japanese aircraft staffing the Navy Yard —others took on fire-fighting duties. The next day, several dump trucks arrived at the Naval Station filled with the bodies of 250 civilians killed by Japanese bombs. As the trucks unceremoniously dumped these bodies into a trench, Marines shoveled dirt on top of them.

Continued next week